



Security Council

Seventy-third year

8418th meeting

Wednesday, 12 December 2018, 10 a.m.

New York

Provisional

President: Mr. Adom (Côte d'Ivoire)

Members:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	Mr. Llorentty Solíz
China	Mr. Ma Zhaoxu
Equatorial Guinea	Mr. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia	Mr. Amde
France	Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan	Mr. Umarov
Kuwait	Mr. Alotaibi
Netherlands	Mr. Van Oosterom
Peru	Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Poland	Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation	Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden	Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Pierce
United States of America	Mr. Pompeo

Agenda

Non-proliferation

Letter dated 30 November 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1070)

Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089)

Letter dated 11 December 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/1106)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation

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The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and Mr. Serge Christiane, Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to the following documents: S/2018/1070, which contains the text of a letter dated 30 November 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/2018/1089, which contains the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); and S/2018/1106, which contains the text of a letter dated 11 December 2018 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. DiCarlo, Mr. Christiane and Ambassador Van Oosterom.

I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo.

Ms. DiCarlo: Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which came into effect on 16 January 2016. The Secretary-General welcomed the Plan as a demonstration of successful multilateralism and a major achievement of nuclear non-proliferation, dialogue and diplomacy. Last month, as it has done since implementation day, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported to the Council that Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments.

The Secretary-General welcomes the reaffirmation by JCPOA participants of their commitments to its full and effective implementation. It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. The Secretary-General regrets the reimposition by the United States of its sanctions lifted pursuant to the Plan, after its withdrawal from the JCPOA. The Secretary-General believes that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. At the same time, he calls on Iran to carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. The Secretary-General notes that the Plan remains in effect and that the Security Council has called upon all Member States and regional and international organizations to support implementation of the Plan and to refrain from actions that undermine it.

I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089). As guided by the Security Council, and consistent with our previous reports, the report before the Council today is focused on annex B to the resolution.

First, on the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, the Secretariat has received additional information on two dual-use items destined for Iran, which were seized by the United Arab Emirates. The States that manufactured those items informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, they did not require prior approval by the Security Council through

the procurement channel process. In addition, the Secretariat continues to examine information related to the possible transfer of other items, undertaken contrary to the resolution, which were brought to its attention by the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

It is our assessment that the procurement channel remains a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism. It ensures that the transfers of certain goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the Plan. Forty-two proposals have been submitted to the procurement channel since January 2016, of which 28 have been approved. The Secretary-General encourages all States and the private sector to fully utilize and support the channel.

Secondly, on the ballistic-missile-related provisions, the report reflects information provided to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council by France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom on additional ballistic-missile flight tests reportedly conducted by Iran since January 2018, as well as on the launch of several ballistic missiles at targets in Syria on 1 October 2018. The Security Council met on 4 December to consider the reported test firing of a further medium-range ballistic missile by Iran on 1 December.

Since our previous report (S/2018/602), the Secretariat has examined the debris from three more ballistic missiles launched at Riyadh by the Houthis in March and April. That debris was consistent with that from the five missiles examined previously, which the Secretariat assessed shared key design features with the Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missile and had components parts manufactured in Iran. However, the Secretariat has not been able to determine whether such missiles, or parts thereof, or related technology, had been transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016, the date when annex B provisions came into effect.

Thirdly, in terms of the arms-related provisions, during the reporting period the Secretariat examined two container launch units for anti-tank guided missiles recovered in Yemen. The Secretariat found that they had characteristics of Iranian manufacture and that their markings showed production dates in 2016 and 2017. The Secretariat also examined a partly disassembled surface-to-air missile seized by the Saudi-led coalition and observed that its features appeared to be consistent with those of an Iranian Sayyad-2C missile. The

Secretariat is still analysing available information on additional unmanned aerial vehicles recovered in Yemen, including some that appear to have the same design features as the Iranian-made Ababeel-2.

The report also reflects the fact that the Secretariat examined a shipment of about 2,500 assault rifles seized by the United States in the Gulf of Aden in August. The Secretariat observed that those weapons did not have the characteristics of Iranian production. The Secretariat will further analyse that seizure and report back accordingly should new information become available. In addition, the report includes information received from Israel and Iran regarding the alleged transfer of an Iranian-produced Khordad air defence system to the T-4 airbase in Syria in April.

The report also highlights the continued participation of Iranian entities in another foreign arms exhibition, held in Baku in September. In relation to the travel-ban provisions, the report provides additional information on previous travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani to Iraq in May.

In conclusion, I would like to thank His Excellency Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands for his tenure as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve of Belgium, who will assume the functions of Facilitator on 1 January 2019. I assure him of the Secretariat's full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Christiane.

Mr. Christiane (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing.

(*spoke in English*)

I am honoured to again address the Security Council today on behalf of Ms. Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

First, I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres and His Excellency Mr. Karel van

Oosterom, Ambassador of the Netherlands, who is serving as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for the excellent cooperation throughout the year. Let me also express my gratitude to our colleagues in the Secretariat for their unwavering support and their excellent cooperation, in particular regarding the running of the procurement channel. I would also like to note my appreciation for their work in the preparation of the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

As we approach the third year after implementation day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, we should remind ourselves of the essence and scope of that agreement. The JCPOA is a nuclear agreement — one that is working and delivering on its goal, which is no other than ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This third anniversary should also remind us that diplomacy does work, and that international agreements can deliver results, even on the most sensitive issues. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed in 13 consecutive reports that Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments.

On that issue, our position remains unchanged. As long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear-related commitments in full, the European Union (EU) will remain committed to the continued full and effective implementation of the agreement. For us, the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA are clear and based on comprehensive scientific analysis and breakout time calculations. The JCPOA has significantly rolled back the Iranian nuclear programme and ensures that Iran does not acquire material or equipment to develop a nuclear weapon. That is why the JCPOA continues to enjoy the wide and full support of the broader international community.

However, the JCPOA faces considerable challenges following the withdrawal of the United States and the reimposition of sanctions against Iran. The EU and all 28 member States deeply regretted those decisions made by the United States. At their last Council meeting on 10 December, the 28 EU Foreign Ministers reiterated their full commitment to the continued implementation of the deal as long as Iran continues to implement its commitments in full. The EU also does not see any other credible, peaceful alternative. Dismantling the agreement would not only destroy years of diplomatic efforts, endorsed by this very organ in resolution 2231

(2015), but would also undermine other key multilateral negotiations in the nuclear field and beyond.

While the EU strongly welcomes Iran's continued implementation of its nuclear-related commitments, it is essential that the agreement continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the people of Iran. That has also been echoed by the other remaining participants in the JCPOA, and I would like to express sincere thanks for their unwavering commitment to the nuclear deal.

It is in that spirit that the JCPOA participants acknowledged, at the recent ministerial Joint Commission meetings, on 6 July in Vienna and 24 September in New York, that sanctions-lifting is an essential part of the deal, and they reiterated their commitment to the preservation and maintenance of effective financial channels with Iran and the continuation of Iran's export of oil and gas.

The EU is very concerned about the deteriorated economic situation of the people of Iran. The Iranian economy is facing strong challenges. We are also concerned about the challenges that the Iranian people face in terms of access to basic goods, including vital medicines. We are also fully cognizant of the fact that this situation may lead to a difficult domestic debate in Iran on the JCPOA and its future.

In that context, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini and the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministers of Germany, the United Kingdom and France (E3) stated their commitment in their joint statement of 2 November to advance the intensive work led by the E3, with the support of the EU, to set up a special purpose vehicle. The aim of that initiative is to facilitate trade payment and provide the necessary sovereign reassurances to the market participants engaged in legitimate business with Iran. That is in addition to a number of EU measures that were taken in August regarding the update of the Blocking Statute and the lending mandate of the European Investment Bank. I want to be very clear that the European initiative to set up a special purpose vehicle is about respecting the nuclear deal's commitments, including on sanctions-lifting, in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015) and European law. It is not directed against any State or meant to circumvent unilateral measures.

While the JCPOA deals with nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a number of serious issues outside of the deal continue to cast a shadow. The

EU notes with concern the findings of the Secretary-General's report regarding Iranian activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), and in particular restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities and transfers. Those actions feed regional tensions and threaten safety and stability in the region.

As members of the Council know, the EU has a long-standing track record of expressing its concern over the regional military build-up, including Iran's missile programme. The EU has repeatedly called upon Iran to refrain from activities that may deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015), and the statements associated with them. The situation in the region, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles, needs to be addressed as a priority, and the EU welcomes the Secretariat's further examinations. The EU still has restrictive measures in place to that effect, but those issues are distinct from the JCPOA. Dismantling a nuclear deal that is working would certainly not put us in a better position to discuss other issues or provide an immediate solution. The EU also strongly believes that addressing those difficult issues can be done in a more effective manner through dialogue.

The EU hosted the fourth round of EU/E4 discussions on regional issues with Iran on 10 December. The main focus was Yemen and Syria, with both sides publicly acknowledging the importance of the United Nations-facilitated talks in Sweden and agreeing to work on confidence-building measures in support of the United Nations Special Envoy. That indicates that our dialogue with Iran is yielding concrete results.

Annex III of the JCPOA addresses civil nuclear cooperation with Iran. That annex was carefully crafted and it plays a key role in the overall balance of the agreement. The JCPOA is not just about constraints on Iran's nuclear programme. It is also about cooperation — broader long-term re-engagement with Iran — through which we can understand Iran's civil nuclear needs better and gradually increase our confidence in Iran's nuclear programme. That makes the agreement more durable in time.

Cooperation is the right path for us, and for that reason, every step in the implementation of annex III is a positive one. The EU has launched several projects and actions in support of annex III since implementation day. To that effect, we recently organized the third

EU-Iran high-level seminar on international nuclear cooperation. The objective of the seminar was to build on previous discussions and the understanding that international nuclear cooperation and nuclear governance are mutually reinforcing.

Established under annex IV of the JCPOA, the procurement channel remains a unique non-proliferation and confidence-building instrument. It can help prevent the misuse of nuclear or dual-use items and ensures that exports of such items are consistent with the JCPOA. We expect that all Security Council members will continue to support the preservation of that channel, in line with resolution 2231 (2015). It is a positive signal that the channel has also received proposals after the reimposition of United States sanctions.

Transparency remains a guiding principle and cornerstone of the JCPOA. According to paragraph 6.10 of the JCPOA annex IV, the Joint Commission reports to the Security Council every six months on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issue. In that context, on 30 November, the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group submitted to the Facilitator, on behalf of the Joint Commission, its sixth biannual report. The report has been circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/2018/1070).

An impressive amount of outreach has been conducted during the past few years, and countries around the world are aware of the channel's procedures. We will continue our outreach efforts, together with colleagues from the Security Council secretariat and the Facilitator.

As I already said, we should not forget that the JCPOA is a nuclear agreement. It is working and delivering on its intended goal. That is why the EU is united with so many countries in support of this deal and calls once again on the international community to continue to support this internationally endorsed agreement.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Ambassador Van Oosterom.

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): Let me begin by thanking United States Secretary of State Pompeo for gracing us with his presence in the Chamber today. We welcome him to the Security Council.

I speak in my capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

In July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.7488). Three months later, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) came into effect. The agreement aims to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. Resolution 2231 (2015) terminated the previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue and urged the full implementation of the JCPOA. It also established specific restrictions in relation to Iran. This year, as Security Council Facilitator for the resolution, we have aimed to support its implementation. We have built on the excellent work of Italy, which we succeeded as Facilitator in the context of our split term on the Council for the period 2017-2018. We consider three elements to be key to the role of Facilitator and to that of the format: first, talks; secondly, transparency; and thirdly, trade.

My first point concerns talks. Our ambition has been to facilitate talks about the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As Facilitator, we have facilitated such talks through communication with all parties, through the discussion of the Security Council in the 2231 format and through smooth correspondence within the format. The Security Council met on 10 December under the 2231 format. We discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the sixth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) on resolution 2231 (2015) prior to its public release. Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo already pointed to some of his findings and recommendations in her statement.

The format held an open discussion on ballistic missile launches by Iran, as well as on broader developments related to resolution 2231 (2015). During the reporting period, several Member States sent communications to the Security Council alleging transfers and activities by Iran that fall under the restrictions under resolution 2231 (2015). Those communications are listed in detail in my report (see S/2018/1106), together with the replies received from the Permanent Mission of Iran. Iran also sent several letters in which it laid out its concerns with the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of all its national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the JCPOA.

I now turn to my second point — the facilitation of transparency concerning the work of the 2231 format.

Our reports have given a comprehensive overview of the work of the format this year, the continued monitoring activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the discussion on activities related to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). The reports have also included key aspects of the functioning of the procurement channel.

That brings me to my third point — the facilitation of trade by encouraging the use of the procurement channel. The channel reviews proposals by States seeking to participate in or permit certain transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods, technology or services to Iran. Since the beginning of 2016, 42 proposals have been submitted to the procurement channel by five Member States from three different regional groups. They include States that are not participants in the JCPOA. On average, proposals were processed in fewer than 50 calendar days. Since the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, five additional proposals have been submitted through the Security Council. The channel is operational and effective. We encourage all States and the private sector to fully utilize and support it.

In conclusion, the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, marked a fundamental shift concerning the Iranian nuclear issue. As Security Council Facilitator for the resolution, we have aimed to support and improve its implementation through the facilitation of talks, transparency and trade. In that effort, I would also like to thank the Secretariat for its hard work in support of both myself and the format this year. We would also like to commend the leadership of Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the European Union. As this is my last Security Council briefing in my capacity as Facilitator, I would like to wish my successor, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytsverve of Belgium, every success.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ambassador Van Oosterom for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

I call on His Excellency Mr. Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Mr. Pompeo (United States of America): I thank representatives for the kind words. I appreciate them.

Just two days ago, the Head of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Amir

Hajizadeh, boasted that Iran is capable of building missiles with a range beyond 2,000 kilometres. He said,

“We have the ability to build missiles with broader ranges. We don’t have limitations from a technical perspective.”

He also said that there are many enemy bases within 800 kilometres of Iran — in other words, within striking distance of Iranian missiles. He bragged that Iran carries out 40 to 50 tests per year.

As I will talk about further, it is clear that the Iranian regime ballistic missile activity has grown since the nuclear deal. Iran has exploited the goodwill of nations and defied multiple Security Council resolutions in its quest for a robust ballistic missile force. The United States will never stand for that; no nation that seeks peace and prosperity in the Middle East should either.

The Council has been telling Iran to stop testing and proliferating ballistic missiles in one form or another since 2006. From 2010 to 2015 Iran was subject to resolution 1929 (2010), the strictest resolution addressing the Iranian ballistic missiles to date. In that resolution, the Security Council decided that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology, and that States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities. That provision of resolution 1929 (2010) imposed a legal prohibition on Iran’s ballistic missile activity. There was the force of law behind those words. Nevertheless, Iran conducted multiple ballistic missile launches between 2010 and 2015, in flagrant violation of that resolution.

What did we do in response? Did we increase accountability in Iran for serial violations of international law? We did quite the opposite. In fact, the level of accountability in Iran has diminished, while the risk has increased. In connection with the Iranian regime’s engagement in nuclear talks and at the Obama Administration’s urging, the Security Council replaced resolution 1929 (2010) with resolution 2231 (2015). The latter calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding that change in language, the world’s concerns remain.

When we collectively call on Iran to cease its ballistic missile activity, we must agree to stop it

now. But Iran is as defiant of the world’s insistence as ever — because here we are, for the twelfth year in a row, meeting about Iran’s ballistic missiles and addressing an incredibly problematic data set. Iran’s pace of missile activity, including its missile launches and tests, has not diminished since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was adopted. In fact, Iran’s missile testing and proliferation is growing. Today Iran has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It has more than 10 ballistic missile systems in its inventory or in development. It has hundreds of missiles, and they pose a threat to our partners in the region.

More recently, in 2016, while the JCPOA was in effect, Iran unveiled two new short-range ballistic missiles that it claims are capable of striking targets between 500 and 700 kilometres. In January 2017, while the JCPOA was in effect, Iran launched a medium-range missile that was designed to carry a payload greater than 500 kilograms and that could be used to carry nuclear warheads. Its suspected range also approaches 2,000 kilometres, which is far enough to target Athens, Sofia, Bucharest and other major European cities. If the Commander of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is telling the truth and Iran does have capabilities beyond a 2,000-kilometre range, other European capitals are at risk as well.

In July 2017, when United States was still a party to the JCPOA, Iran tested a Simorgh space-launch vehicle. The United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom all assessed that the launch was inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) because space-launch vehicles use a technology similar to intercontinental ballistic missiles. Iran has exported ballistic missile systems as well — most recently to Yemen. We have hard evidence that Iran is providing missiles, training and support to the Houthis and that the Iranian-Houthi missile arsenal is fully engaged. That poses a threat to innocent civilians, including Americans living in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as well as people of all nationalities who travel on civilian aircraft in that region. Iran is also transferring ballistic missile systems to Shia militias in Iraq. Just look at the past two weeks. The Iranian regime test-fired a medium-range ballistic missile that is capable of carrying multiple warheads. Our goodwill gestures have been futile in correcting the Iranian regime’s reckless missile activity and its destructive behaviours. No nation can dispute that Iran openly defies resolution 2231 (2015).

The United States is not alone in raising these concerns. I would like to thank France, Germany and the United Kingdom for raising concerns about Iranian missile proliferation to the Secretariat. I would also like to thank our partners from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are working with United Nations inspectors to recover material debris of the Iranian-supplied missiles, rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles launched into their countries by Houthi forces in Yemen. Our Israeli allies have brought further evidence to the Security Council about Iran's continued launches of ballistic missiles that are inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Israel has also given evidence to the Secretariat of Iran's transfer of weapons systems to its proxies all over the Middle East — in defiance of what we have insisted that they should do.

We must now ask ourselves which steps we must take to confront that malign Iranian activity. If Iran continues stocking up on ballistic missiles, the security of our people will be at risk. If we fail to restore deterrence, we will run the risk of conflict escalating in the region. If we do nothing, we will convey to all other malign actors that they, too, can defy the Security Council with impunity. As all members of the Council know well, the Charter of the United Nations bestows upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. We all take that responsibility seriously. The United States seeks to work with all other members of the Council to reimpose on Iran the ballistic missile restrictions outlined in resolution 1929 (2010).

Beyond addressing Iran's ballistic missile activities, the Council should not lift the arms embargo on Iran in 2020. That country is in non-compliance with multiple Security Council resolutions, including those related to Al-Qaida, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen and Somalia. Even as we sit here today, Iran is harbouring Al-Qaida, supporting Taliban militants in Afghanistan, arming terrorists in Lebanon, facilitating illicit trade in Somali charcoal to benefit Al-Shabaab and training and equipping Shia militias in Iraq, even as we sit here today. It is also stoking conflict in Syria and Yemen. The Council must address those malign activities; it cannot reward Iran by lifting the arms embargo. We also call on the Council to establish inspection and interdiction measures in ports and on the high seas to thwart Iran's continuing efforts to circumvent the existing arms restrictions.

Some have questioned our decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. We reply that it is self-evident why we did so: they are based on the very conversation we are having here today. Prior to the deal, Western leaders made grand claims about how the JCPOA would usher in a new era of moderation from the Iranian regime. Indeed, America's own President said that

“ideally we would see a situation in which Iran, seeing sanctions reduced, would start focusing on its economy, on training its people, on re-entering the world community, to lessening its provocative activities in the region.”

But what we actually see is that, to date, the JCPOA has without a doubt shielded the Islamic Republic of Iran from being accountable for the risks it presents to the world. The Iranian regime is pursuing the same destructive, revolutionary goals that it has for the past 39 years, except now it has more money to achieve them thanks to the nuclear deal.

I am here today first and foremost in my capacity as the Secretary of State of the United States of America. Under President Trump, the security of our people and our allies comes first. But, in the finest traditions of American leadership, the United States will continue to unite sovereign nations in their responsibility to work for the peace and security of their own people and a stable international order. The United States is going to continue to be relentless in building a coalition of responsible nations that are serious about confronting the Iranian regime's reckless ballistic missile activity, as well as the way it treats its own people. That type of malign activity is something that the United States will continue to stand side by side with the people of Iran. They have been the worst victims of the regime for nearly 40 years, and they have the unwavering support of the United States.

Finally, in May the Trump Administration clearly defined the 12 areas on which we are demanding change from Iran. If Iran makes a fundamental strategic shift and honours those demands, we would be prepared to ease our pressure campaign and support the modernization and reintegration of the Iranian economy into the international economic system. But relief from our pressure will come about only when we see tangible, demonstrated and sustained shifts in Tehran's policies.

Mr. Delattre (France) (*spoke in French*): First of all, let me thank the Ivorian presidency of the Security

Council for convening today's meeting and welcome in particular the presence of Mr. Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America. I also thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Mr. Serge Christiane, Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. I would like to warmly thank our Dutch colleague Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, and his team for their work this year as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The past year has shown that our work is not finished with regard to the regime on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It has also shown how it is now more important than ever that we maintain our constant collective mobilization in strengthening it. Today's meeting on resolution 2231 (2015) is therefore very timely, since it concerns one of the most significant non-proliferation achievements of recent years. That resolution was supported by all the permanent members of the Security Council and unanimously adopted; it was brought to fruition both by the perseverance of the international community and by the leadership role of the Council. And it sealed the major agreement reached in Vienna after years of negotiations. In other words, it is a resolution that embodies the unity of the international community, the Security Council and all its members, especially its permanent members.

However, the paths of the States parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have diverged since 2015 and, as the Secretary-General does in his report (S/2018/1089), we have expressed our regret and concern about the implications of the United States withdrawal and the reimposition of American sanctions. Yet we all share the same objective — to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to ensure, through strict international monitoring, the peaceful ends of its programme. That is what made it possible put in place the JCPOA for 10 years, to which there is no credible alternative today. The collapse of that agreement would mark a serious step backwards, for which we would all pay the price.

While we have seen a serious crisis of confidence this year, the agreement remains in place and is working — Iran continues to comply with its nuclear obligations, as confirmed to us for the thirteenth consecutive time by the International Atomic Energy

Agency. We welcome that fact. The situation must be strengthened through respect for all our commitments, which applies to all United Nations Members, not only the parties to the Plan. No external developments should affect the implementation of those commitments. In that regard, France will actively continue to support the agreement as long as Iran strictly and fully respects its nuclear obligations and makes efforts to preserve the economic benefits of the JCPOA.

France commends the rigorous work of the Secretariat through its balanced report, prepared in full compliance with its mandate. Our collective commitments do not stop at the JCPOA, and Iran must comply with all the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). However, the report identifies several elements of Iranian actions that are not in conformity with those provisions, which gives us cause for concern. In conjunction with Germany and the United Kingdom, France has expressed its concern on several occasions concerning ballistic missiles. I would recall that the missiles in question are technically designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and it is that type of activity, which runs counter to resolution 2231 (2015), that we have collectively called on Iran not to carry out. The issue of ballistic transfers to State and non-State actors, in particular the Secretariat's conclusions on ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis, is also a great source of concern for France. Whether in Yemen or in the Syrian theatre, such actions violate resolution 1540 (2004), which is also an essential element of the international non-proliferation architecture.

Let us be clear: for the sake of regional stability and international security, Iran must immediately cease all destabilizing activities. We have already expressed our concern on that issue, including directly to the Iranian authorities. Each of us must clearly convey that message, and France, for its part, will continue its robust dialogue with Iran.

In conclusion, I would like to echo the Secretary-General's appeal to all States, whether or not they are parties to the Plan, to ensure the continuity of the JCPOA as a pillar of international and regional peace and security. Rest assured that France, which has worked tirelessly to make the agreement robust and endow it with rigorous verification mechanisms, remains fully committed to that goal. Only in that way can we together draw up a long-term strategy in the region, which cannot be reduced to a policy of pressure and sanctions. Such a strategy must also include a

firm and frank dialogue with the Iranians about our concerns. That is the only way that the international community can lay the foundation for a new agreement on a framework for Iranian nuclear power beyond 2025-2030, Iranian ballistic activity and regional stability. There is no other way to achieve lasting stability in the region and ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.

Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, for scheduling this debate. We are very grateful to United States Secretary of State Pompeo for taking the time to be here today. This debate comes at a very important moment. The world is an unpredictable place right now. The developments that we are going to discuss today risk making it more so. I would also like to join others in thanking the Under-Secretary-General and the Dutch representative and his team for all their work concerning resolution 2231 (2015).

Today's agenda is the implementation of that resolution, which was an endorsement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Yet, throughout the negotiations and at the adoption of the resolution, we were clear that the Council was not only addressing nuclear issue, but continuing to impose binding restrictions to curb Iran's ballistic missile and proliferation activity because it threatens the region and beyond.

I want to stress that ballistic missile proliferation is not solely about nuclear missiles, although there is a link with nuclear capability. Any conventional payload would cause extensive harm to civilians and infrastructure, and Member States in the region will naturally be deeply concerned about confronting such a threat from Iran. It heightens instability in the region and increases the risk of miscalculation. As Secretary Pompeo said, the international community has been trying to curb that activity since at least 2006.

If I may, I would like to set out the policy of my Government towards Iran. We are motivated by three objectives — first, and most critical, to uphold the global non-proliferation regime and prevent Iran from achieving nuclear capabilities that would threaten the Middle East region and Europe beyond; secondly, to constrain Iran's destabilizing actions in the region; and, thirdly, to encourage Iran to normalize its economic and diplomatic relations with the region and the West and assume its rightful role as a responsible Power constructively engaged.

The United Kingdom participated in negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran to secure the first of those objectives, and we believe the JCPOA has done so. It remains critical for our national security and, we believe, for the shared security of our partners and allies. I agree with what the French Ambassador said with regard to the way forward. We were also clear that the nuclear deal contained elements designed to encourage Iran on a path to normalcy in its trade and diplomatic relations with the outside world. The Secretary-General's report (S/2018/1089) records that Iran continues to comply with its nuclear-related obligations, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in its 12 November report. We expect that commitment to continue, and we look to Iran to continue to fully abide by its obligations under the deal.

Because our first objective continues to be met, the United Kingdom — together with France and Germany — has been working to ensure that Iran continues to receive the economic benefits from sanctions relief agreed as part of the nuclear deal. To that end, in September we announced the creation of a European special purpose vehicle to help facilitate that. That work continues and we hope to announce further progress soon.

There remains, however, much work to do towards the second objective — the ending of Iran's destabilizing regional behaviour. No one should have any doubt about the strength of our concern and our commitment to tackling that issue. Compliance with the JCPOA, important as it is for all of the reasons that the French Ambassador set out, is not a license to engage in destabilizing behaviour elsewhere, whether or not that has a nuclear link.

Iran cannot expect to improve its relations with the rest of the world or ensure its economic prosperity and security while pursuing its current path. Businesses will not invest there, and public finances should be spent at home, not diverted to adventurism abroad. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing today was very clear, and the findings in the Secretary-General's report should continue to trouble the Council. As the report notes, the United Kingdom, along with its E3 partners France and Germany, raised concerns about the recent Iranian ballistic-missile launches into Syria in a letter to the President on 20 November (S/2018/1062). Since then, as the Security Council discussed on 4 December, Iran has tested a medium-range ballistic missile with a capability that falls under category I of the Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR). Like those referred to in our letter, that latest launch is inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

We heard a number of arguments when we met to discuss this issue in consultations, and I am sure we will hear many of them again today, so I would like to address them briefly now. Some colleagues have made the point that the language in paragraph 7 of resolution 2231 (2015), and in paragraph 3 of the resolution's annex B, is not binding. The second part of that argument is that the Council should therefore not concern itself with Iran's behaviour because we argue that it is inconsistent with it.

We believe that this is both an extraordinary and a flawed argument for two reasons. Leaving aside the question of whether the language is legally binding or not, the Council has the power to make recommendations to Member States with a view of resolving any matter that threatens the maintenance of international peace and security. It is clear that those recommendations should be taken seriously by Member States rather than openly flouted. The call to Iran to comply with the request not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons has a clear purpose, and that purpose is to reduce international and regional tension. In defying the Council's clearly expressed view, Iran is not contributing to the stability of the region, to say the least, but is rather ignoring the Council's express wishes. Tendentious arguments that seek to diminish the Council's voice in that regard serve only to undermine its prerogative and authority and encourage other States to disregard its resolutions. We should all be deeply concerned about such irresponsible behaviour.

Another fallacious argument that I am sure we will hear today is that the MTCR is irrelevant and is only an arms-export regime. The MTCR is itself an important part of international efforts against proliferation. Its category I describes a platform of first-generation nuclear weapons commonly defined as capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilogrammes to a range of at least 300 kilometres. So it matters that Iran test-fired a ballistic missile with a capability that falls under MTCR's category I. Those missiles are not harmless tools of self-defence. They are a source of concern and they are included in resolution 2231 (2015) because if Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon, those missiles would be its delivery vehicle. They therefore threaten not only the region but Europe, and potentially

others beyond. Testing them is provocative and the Council should respond. We therefore demand that Iran cease the activity that defies resolution 2231 (2015) and that it and all Member States fully comply with the resolutions prohibiting the proliferation of missile technology to and from Iran — and by the way, there is no doubt that those are indeed legally binding.

On our second objective, we note with deep regret, and also concern, that Iran continues to play a negative role throughout the region in support of non-State actors that undermine the stability of its neighbours. In Syria, Iran has been the key supporter of Bashar Al-Assad's murderous seven-year campaign. Militias funded and controlled by Iran have been integral to Al-Assad's military campaign to retake opposition-held territory, committing gross abuses of human rights in the process. Iran has proactively shipped weapon systems into Syria, inflaming tensions with its neighbours as well as violating the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). For example, in just the past week, Israel has had to take action to prevent Iranian-backed Hizbullah militants from tunnelling under its borders. Those Hizbullah activities are a clear violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and are further evidence of Iran's destabilizing activity. The United Kingdom condemns the existence of those tunnels, which threaten the security of Israel and Lebanon. The violation of Israeli sovereignty is deeply worrying, and moreover it literally takes Iran's destabilizing activity to new depths.

In Yemen, we are watching the ongoing talks in Stockholm carefully and we welcome the attendance of the Houthi delegation. I accept the fact that it is important to note that Iran has expressed its strong support for the talks in Sweden, but the situation in Yemen remains of serious concern and the Secretary-General's report today includes information about ballistic missiles fired at Saudi Arabia by the Houthis as well as anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles recovered in Yemen. Those weapons had characteristics and components consistent with those known to be manufactured in Iran.

In the course of my work I have recently been to Tehran to discuss many of those issues with the Iranian leadership. I have made it clear every time that Iran's habit of testing weapons that threaten its neighbours, and defying the Council by exporting weapons and militias around the regions, makes it very difficult to see how Iran can play a constructive role in its region and means that its complaints when the Council puts such behaviour on its agenda have no legitimacy.

I have long said that Iran has legitimate security interests in the region. We recognize that, but the way Iran goes about pursuing those interests is leading to increasing destabilization and is simply not legitimate in the modern world. Iran has a different approach available to it, one that concentrates on reintegration into the global economic community and into diplomatic engagement. We support Iran in its quest to benefit from economic development and we want it to fulfil its undoubted potential as a vibrant economy and an important Power. But those are not unconditional goals. Iran can never achieve them without a vital change in its approach to the issues that I have mentioned. It must take steps to address the Council's concerns seriously and recognize that its expeditionary and expansionist security doctrine will only provoke more challenge and lead to greater instability within the region. That is why, together with its European partners, the United Kingdom continues to participate in the JCPOA. We will continue to work with everyone to convince Iran to take a radically different approach to the region and help secure a more prosperous future for itself.

Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), on Iran's nuclear programme. We also note the effective work carried out by Ambassador van Oosterom, the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of the resolution.

We fully share the Secretary-General's assessment in the report that the decision of the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose unilateral sanctions on Iran constitutes a serious challenge that does not contribute to the goals outlined in the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). We join the Secretary-General's general call to ensure the preservation of a unique agreement of fundamental importance to international and regional security. We agree with the report's conclusion that issues not included in the scope of the agreement should not serve as a reason for dismantling it.

The Russian Federation has repeatedly warned against attempts to torpedo the JCPOA and expressed the hope that reason will prevail nonetheless and that issues of global security and stability will no longer be held

hostage to domestic political processes. Unfortunately, our calls have not been heard. We are now faced with a paradoxical situation in which a Council member is not only openly refusing to implement resolution 2231 (2015), which it had itself endorsed, it is also trying to punish every other Member State for implementing the decisions of the Council and the Joint Commission of the JCPOA. Right now, the only way to preserve the agreement is through the conscientious implementation of their voluntary commitments by all its participating States. In that context, we should point out that the Secretary General's report presents clear evidence of Iran's unconditional compliance with its JCPOA obligations, which has been consistently confirmed not only by the International Atomic Energy Agency but also by the Secretariat, which, as the document testifies, has no verified data to the contrary.

We are once again obliged to remind the Council of the inadmissibility of any so-called investigations by the Secretariat of possible violations of resolution 2231 (2015) without a clear mandate from the Security Council. Let us leave aside the level of technical expertise of the representatives of the Secretariat, who on a basis of components and debris find it easy to opine on the tactical and technical characteristics of various types of missiles and hint at their Iranian origin. Legitimate questions arise as to the mandate of those specialists, the status of their visits and their authority to draw far-reaching conclusions. The attempts to use the authority of the United Nations to reinforce various countries' unfounded accusations that Iran is in violation of resolution 2231 (2015) are baffling. And yet the Secretariat's representatives themselves admit in the report that they were working exclusively with information provided to them by third countries. Any inspections or monitoring activities by the Secretariat that have not been agreed to, whatever the reasons for them, must end once and for all.

We continue to insist that the report should not contain information from open sources or references to unverified or deliberately unverifiable information provided by individual countries, especially when it is not brought to Council members' attention. We want to once again draw the Secretariat's attention to the fact that paragraph 7 of the note by the President dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44) provides for the preparation of semi-annual reports on the implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015) in its entirety, not its individual parts.

Today we have heard a great deal about ballistic missiles. We would like to remind the Council that paragraph 3 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015) only calls on Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Rocket launchers generally are not prohibited, and there is no evidence supporting the possibility that they might have nuclear components.

The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA has seriously damaged both the nuclear-non-proliferation regime and security interests in the Middle East as a whole. It is time to abandon unilateral action. History shows that it is doomed to failure. And contrariwise, when States genuinely unite their efforts to counter regional challenges they can achieve long-lasting results in terms of resolving crises and stabilizing situations. We consider the JCPOA just such an achievement. It has become a keystone of our joint work in the region to create conditions conducive to strengthening an overall atmosphere of trust. It has given rise to hopes of progress towards the realization of an important goal, the creation of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

Russia supports the preservation of the JCPOA. We urge for a rejection of efforts to artificially create situations in which some Member States label the Governments of others as rogues. Not only does that not help to solve the region's many problems, it creates many new ones. It is clear that if we are to reduce the potential for crisis we must bring international and regional efforts together, including in the framework of effective, inclusive formats where the United Nations and its Security Council play a central role.

With enviable predictability, many of our Council colleagues are trying to use the format of today's meeting to discuss Iran's so-called regional behaviour, which is presented as being virtually the exclusive source of all the Middle East's troubles. However, and despite the fact that Iran is prepared for that dialogue, they have produced no substantive proposals of any kind in that regard. At times one gets the impression that their only goal is to further intensify anti-Iranian hysteria and Iran's demonization, which in fact serve merely to aggravate the already difficult situation in the Middle East.

The Russian Federation supports developing a positive and unifying agenda on the Middle East for the Security Council and the entire international community

that takes into account the legitimate interests of all the States of the region, including Iran. The cornerstone of our shared efforts in the region should be the creation of conditions conducive to strengthening a general atmosphere of trust. That is extremely important to the relations between the Arab States, Israel and Iran. We would like to remind members that in its resolution 598 (1988), the Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to work with regional parties on measures for strengthening security and stability in the region. This is a difficult issue, but work on it must begin. And we are ready to provide every possible assistance through our contacts with our regional partners.

The ultimate goal should be the establishment of a regional security architecture that is truly inclusive and presupposes the involvement of every State in that part of the world. Our concept for strengthening security in the Persian Gulf under international guarantees remains relevant and could begin to be implemented through a conference with the participation of the States of the subregion. In the future, such a conference could be expanded to include other Middle Eastern countries. Russia is ready to work on all of these aspects and more, with interested partners, openly and impartially, and without threats or negative pressure.

In conclusion, I want to note once again that the Russian Federation remains committed to the unconditional and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, which continues to be implemented by all its other participants despite the withdrawal of the United States.

Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank Secretary of State Pompeo for his presence here today and his engagement on the subject. I also want to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Mr. Christiane for their briefings, and of course to express our great appreciation to our Dutch colleague and his team for their very diligent work in facilitating the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

This is the fifth briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) during Sweden's tenure on the Council and probably the last, so I would like to reiterate our principled position on this agenda item. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a prime example of finding successful multilateral solutions to collectively shared challenges. It has effectively ensured the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and made our world a safer place

in that regard. It should also be seen in the broader non-proliferation context. The undermining of the Plan of Action risks undermining our efforts elsewhere.

Together with its European Union partners, Sweden continues to strongly support the full implementation of the agreement. We welcome Iran's continued engagement and implementation of its nuclear-related obligations under the Plan of Action, as reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. I want to equally welcome Iran's participation in this meeting, since Iran is a party to the JCPOA and directly affected by resolution 2231 (2015). Iran's early ratification of the Additional Protocol would be a significant confidence-building measure. It is very important to respect both sides of the deal. The procurement channel must be kept functioning and the Joint Commission should continue to discuss any outstanding issues under the agreement. It is also important that the Iranian people continue to experience the economic benefits of the deal. The withdrawal of the United States and its reimposition of sanctions is therefore regrettable. We fully support the efforts within the European Union to protect and preserve the JCPOA in all its aspects.

Like many others, we continue to express our serious concerns about ballistic-missile activity that is inconsistent with annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), including the most recent test, on 1 December. That matter, however, should be addressed separately and not at the expense of the JCPOA. Iran must heed the Council's call and refrain from any actions that put its commitment to resolution 2231 (2015) in doubt. All parties must contribute to further de-escalation in the region. With respect to other alleged transfers and possible arms shipments, we thank the Secretariat for its thorough analysis and reporting so far in relation to the information at hand. We appreciate today's update by Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and look forward to further analysis, as appropriate, in due course.

As our term on the Council comes to an end, we note that divisions in the region remain deep, to the detriment of international peace and security both in the region and beyond. We believe that the Council should intensify efforts to bridge those divides. All actors in the region must now come together to de-escalate tensions and make common efforts to achieve political solutions to the ongoing conflicts and crises in the region. It is also crucial to continue the important political dialogue with Iran on its role in the region, as well as on the human rights situation in the country.

We will continue that dialogue through our established channels, including through the European Union.

In conclusion, at a time when multilateralism is often described as under pressure, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remains a model for successful multilateral negotiations and reaffirms the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes under the Charter of the United Nations for our common good as the norm. It is important to hold on to it.

Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to join others in welcoming the participation of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Mike Pompeo, in today's meeting. I also thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for her comprehensive briefing on the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089), as well as the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and the observer of the European Union on behalf of the Joint Commission, for their briefings to the Council.

Three years ago, Kuwait welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Security Council's subsequent adoption of resolution 2231 (2015). It is true that the agreement does not address all of the concerns of the countries of the region, such as deteriorating security conditions and interference in their domestic affairs. However, we welcomed the agreement because we fully support all United Nations resolutions, efforts and endeavours that seek to achieve security and stability in the Middle East. We maintain a principled and firm position on all non-proliferation issues in general, and on a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction in particular.

We have taken note of the sixth report of the Secretary-General, drafted in accordance with annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), which provides an overview of the nuclear-related provisions and ballistic-missile and arms-related provisions geared to strengthening the resolution's implementation. In that regard, we welcome the contents of the report on Iran's implementation of its commitments related to its nuclear programme, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We reiterate that Iran should stay on that positive course, in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran's early ratification of the Additional Protocol would

guarantee that it is continuing to maintain its status as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

The provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) are not limited to nuclear issues alone. They extend to controlling activities related to ballistic-missile technologies and the transfer of traditional weapons. In that regard, we are concerned about the continued firing of ballistic missiles into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the report states. The report also mentions the transfer of weapons and military equipment to other countries in the region. The Secretariat could not verify the dates on which such transfers took place but is continuing to investigate the issue of ballistic missiles. We still consider the matter very serious and a possible threat to international peace and security.

Kuwait condemns the recurring firing of ballistic missiles into our sister Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, threatening its national security and jeopardizing civilians' lives. We stress our firm position in that regard, which calls for maintaining security and stability in the region and the safety of its peoples. It is also important to refrain from interfering in the domestic affairs of countries and to respect their sovereignty in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the principles of good-neighbourliness, as well as to work to settle disputes by peaceful means, refrain from the threat or use of force and reject sectarianism.

In conclusion, the State of Kuwait reiterates that the Security Council should continue to shoulder its responsibilities and follow up on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in a comprehensive manner that guarantees compliance by Iran and other States with their commitments, not only in the area of nuclear non-proliferation but also with regard to other issues mentioned in the resolution. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador van Oosterom, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and to the members of his delegation for their efforts in the past year. We wish them and their friendly country every success.

Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would first like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador van Oosterom for their briefings. I welcome Secretary of State Pompeo to the Security Council today.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as a multilateral agreement endorsed by the Security Council, has the effect of international law, and as an important achievement of multilateralism is in the common interest of the international community. It has played a significant role in upholding the international nuclear-non-proliferation regime and maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East. It also serves as a model for addressing international and regional hotspot issues by political and diplomatic means. Despite the significant changes that have occurred in the international situation in the past six months, the current parties to the JCPOA, given their sense of responsibility, have continued to focus on implementing the agreement while maintaining normal economic and trade cooperation with Iran, and have received broad support from the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed Iran's compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA 13 consecutive times. The coordination between the Council and the procurement channel is functioning normally. Practice has shown that the JCPOA is an effective agreement and should be fully and effectively implemented.

The implementation of the JCPOA is now at a critical juncture. China appreciates Iran's efforts to implement resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. We hope that Iran can continue its implementation and that the other parties to the agreement will continue to honour their commitments as well. China deplores the fact that the United States has withdrawn from the JCPOA and made a decision to reimpose sanctions. It calls on all parties to work to find the right solution to the difficulties in maintaining normal economic and trade cooperation with Iran. We believe that all parties concerned must bear the overall long-term interests in mind, adhere to multilateralism, uphold multilateral agreements, fulfil their responsibilities and obligations and facilitate the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) emphasizes the need for all parties to adhere to multilateralism, cooperate in responding to challenges and work together to preserve the JCPOA. It supports the initiatives of the parties to the JCPOA to protect the freedom to pursue legitimate business with Iran, in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015), and calls on all parties to support the procurement channel. China expresses its appreciation for those elements.

At the same time, China also believes that the report of the Secretary-General should be balanced and objective, comprehensively reflect the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and fully address Iran's legitimate concerns. The Secretariat needs to act strictly in accordance with its mandate and functions so as to avoid including unverified elements in the report.

In the current circumstances, the parties should exercise caution in dealing with Iran's missile launches and accurately interpret resolution 2231 (2015). On several occasions, Iran has stated that it is committed to fully complying with its obligations under the JCPOA, that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and that its missiles are not designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Such a stance deserves attention. China commends Ambassador Van Oosterom, in his role as Facilitator, and his team for their efforts in facilitating the 2231 format. China has taken note of the recent report of the Joint Commission to the Security Council on the status of the Procurement Working Group's decisions and on any implementation issues (see S/2018/1070) and will continue to participate in its work.

China has always advocated for a political and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and remains committed to consolidating the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability. China will continue to uphold the principles of impartiality and objectivity with a firm sense of responsibility and work with the international community in its tireless efforts to uphold the JCPOA.

Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, we welcome the presence of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Mike Pompeo. We are grateful for the convening of this meeting and the important briefings by Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo and Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, to whom we express our special thanks for his work this year as Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We are also grateful for the briefing by the observer of the European Union.

As a country committed to multilateralism, international law and the non-proliferation regimes for weapons of mass destruction, Peru gives high priority to compliance with and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), through which the Security Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA), on the Iranian nuclear programme. We believe that that agreement and the subsequent follow-up and monitoring regime reflect the value of multilateralism and diplomacy in peacefully resolving international disputes and maintaining international peace and security, and that it must be preserved for that reason.

With regard to the sixth report (S/2018/1089) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), we welcome the progress made in the implementation of the JCPOA and commend the monitoring activities carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has been verified once again that Iran is complying with all the provisions of the agreement, including the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. We must nevertheless express our concern about allegations of an alleged violation of paragraph 2 of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), which refers to activities involving the supply, sale, transfer or export of dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology. We stress the need for strict compliance with all restrictive measures contained in annex B, which include transfers related to nuclear energy, ballistic missiles and weapons to or from Iran, as well as provisions on asset freezes and travel bans.

In relation to that and to the arms embargo imposed by the Council in connection with the conflict in Yemen, we must also express our concern about reports of the alleged transfer of Iranian-made ballistic missiles, their parts and related technology to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. We encourage the Iranian authorities to carefully consider and address those concerns with a view to fostering greater confidence in their readiness to comply with their international commitments and obligations, thereby generating new dynamics conducive to the promotion of sustainable peace in the Middle East.

In that regard, we share the Secretary-General's view of the need to address issues not directly related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. Specifically, in accordance with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), we urge the Iranian authorities not to engage in any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of launching nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic-missile technology. We believe that it is of the utmost importance that the Iranian authorities act prudently and with self-restraint, given that the

development of their ballistic missile programme is perceived as provocative and/or an armed escalation capable of increasing tensions in a particularly unstable region.

In conclusion, I underscore the importance of the Council remaining united in shouldering its responsibility to ensure the full enforcement and implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) with a view to ensuring the validity of the non-proliferation regime and maintaining international peace and security.

Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo; the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Serge Christiane; and Ambassador Karel van Oosterom for their informative briefings. I would also like to welcome the participation of Secretary of State Pompeo in our deliberations here. My delegation is pleased to note the following positive elements of the sixth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

First, the report very correctly and accurately notes the great importance and historical role of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as delineated in resolution 2231 (2015), which was adopted unanimously. My country is proud to have contributed to that historic negotiation process by organizing two rounds of constructive negotiations in Almaty in 2013.

Secondly, the report very clearly notes Iran's unwavering commitment to its nuclear obligations in the framework of the JCPOA, which has been confirmed 13 times by the relevant reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We welcome the Secretary-General's view and appeal to all parties, including the people of Iran, that everyone should benefit from this agreement. In that regard, we join in the welcome accorded to the aspirations of the parties to the agreement to ensure the freedom of their economic operators to cooperate with Iran, as stipulated in the JCPOA.

Thirdly, the report very appropriately notes the confident support of the majority of the international community for further preserving and implementing the JCPOA. That is a very clear signal that its success has justified the means, and current achievements should be consolidated and built upon. In that regard, we once again agree with the Secretary-General that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed

without prejudice to and with a view to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

Let me point out other aspects that are of concern to us. First, we unfortunately continue to observe that the Secretary-General's report contains notifications and claims from Member States that do not allow us to reach the unconditional conclusion that Iran has violated the requirements of resolution 2231 (2015). In our opinion, such points only dilute the content of the report and weaken its validity. All paragraphs about such notifications conclude with the provision that the relevant claim requires further analysis and verification by the Secretariat. The mechanism of interaction of the Secretariat with the Security Council regarding the checking of such notifications from Member States, as well as special trips for examining physical evidence, remains unclear. As the Secretariat does not have a direct mandate to carry out such actions, we should seriously consider how to deal with responses to Member States' notifications of alleged violations of resolution 2231 (2015) in the future. Secondly, we would like to see in the report a full reflection of both annexes of resolution 2231 (2015). That issue has also been raised by Council members for several years.

Turning to notifications of alleged violations, we advocate that issues not involving clear restrictions or prohibitions under resolution 2231 (2015), including controversial issues related to Iran's ballistic-missile activities, should be discussed, in case of serious need, separately and without prejudice to prospects for the further implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

Kazakhstan reiterates its support for the JCPOA, as stipulated in President Nazarbayev's policy address, which we presented to the Security Council last year (see S/PV.7857). We believe that it plays a very vital role in ensuring primarily nuclear security in the region, and thereby opens up prospects for cooperation with Iran in many other areas. That is not in violation of the current restrictive measures of the Security Council, which are respected and strictly executed by Kazakhstan. We are interested in developing active cooperation with all countries of the region, owing to our geographical location and transit potential. Thanks to our multilateral agreements, we are observing a revival of trade and economic cooperation, leading to regional development.

To conclude, I would like to congratulate the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands, on the completion of his duties, and commend his committed and tireless efforts to ensuring that resolution 2231 (2015) fulfils its objectives. As we come to the end of our term on the Council, we remain hopeful that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) will continue to make their contributions to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and ensuring stability and peace in the region.

Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to thank today's briefers: the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo; Mr. Serge Christiane; and Ambassador Karel van Oosterom for their respective briefings. I welcome the presence among us today of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Mike Pompeo.

Poland welcomes the sixth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which we find to be objective and balanced. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been an important achievement of multilateral diplomacy, the objectives of which have been concurrent with our shared goal of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation.

We note that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and that the Agency itself continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. We welcome the efforts of the IAEA to strictly monitor and verify Iran's commitments in order to guarantee that the Iranian nuclear programme remains peaceful and that Iran fulfils all of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We call on Iran to continue to apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and to formally ratify that Protocol in the near future.

At the same time, the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East is crucial to global security. For that reason, we should strive not only to guarantee the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, but also take steps to develop a comprehensive solution to the security problems in the region. It is necessary to take a broader perspective on the matter. Iran's

activity cannot be seen only from the point of view of its compliance with the nuclear deal. That nuclear agreement does not deal with all of the contentious issues related to Iran's regional policy and its capacities related to delivery systems.

Taking into account the current tensions in the Middle East, Iran's policy — including the development of ballistic missiles — is causing justified concerns. Ballistic missile tests and some of Iran's activities in the region, including reported missile transfers to non-State actors in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria, may deepen mistrust and are inconsistent with the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1540 (2004), 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). The launching of Zolfaghar short-range ballistic missiles and Qiam missiles against targets in the town of Hajin in Syria on 30 September and 1 October, as well as the testing of medium-range ballistic missiles conducted by Iran on 1 December and other testing of ballistic missiles, constitute unnecessary escalation.

Declarations by the Iranian authorities on the continuation of their missile testing in order to build up its defence capabilities may be perceived as provocative, threatening and contrary to the provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015). Such actions are counterproductive to the stabilization of the situation in the Middle East, as well as efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We call on Iran to refrain from actions that could undermine the further implementation of both the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

Poland supports the procurement channel and the Procurement Working Group, as well as the coordinating role of the European Union within the format, as we believe that that transparency measure ensures the conformity of relevant transfers with resolution 2231 (2015) and contributes to supporting the non-proliferation regime.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands for his excellent work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Both the Ambassador and his team have shown the professionalism and necessary transparency in promoting the efficient work of this difficult format of the Council.

Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation wishes to join other members of the Council in welcoming the United States

Secretary of State, Mr. Mike Pompeo, who is with us in the Chamber today. I also wish to express our gratitude for the briefings delivered by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo; the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Mr. Serge Christiane; and, of course, the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Karel van Oosterom. We also welcome the presence among us today of the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As this is likely to be the final time that my delegation will participate as a member of the Council in a meeting in this format on the topic of non-proliferation, I wish to reiterate that Bolivia is part of the world's first densely populated region to be completely free of nuclear weapons and, as provided for in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, of which Bolivia is a signatory, we have assumed the responsibility of contributing to putting an end to the arms race — especially the nuclear arms race — and to consolidating a peaceful world. In that regard, we reiterate our call for a world free of nuclear weapons, which is a view we have consistently promoted in our efforts on the Security Council to ensure that the Middle East joins the world's five nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Bolivia strongly reaffirms its commitment to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), given that it represents an unmistakable achievement of diplomacy and multilateralism and is an expression of the ability of States that respect international law to carry out research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that vein, I wish to emphasize a point raised in paragraph 2 of the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/1089), which has been introduced today and is the sixth report since the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), to the effect that,

“the Islamic Republic of Iran continues the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the face of considerable challenges brought about by the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its subsequent decisions to reimpose all its national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan”.

In that regard, we once again express our regret over the decision of the Government of the United States of America to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its imposition of unilateral sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. We believe that we should be able to generate an atmosphere of mutual trust among States so that aspirations to a total and verifiable denuclearization of the Middle East can be made a reality as early as possible. The clearest symbol of victory for multilateralism and political dialogue is indeed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and full compliance with it should serve as a guarantee for the strengthening of other denuclearization plans, such as that of the Korean peninsula.

For my delegation, the 12 years of intense diplomatic activity that achieved an overall, long-term and appropriate solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the Security Council endorsed unanimously in resolution 2231 (2015), cannot be postponed by the unilateral decision of a Member State or a group of States of a region that jeopardizes the very implementation of the Plan.

In light of this, Bolivia welcomes the resolve of the Plan participants that have renewed their commitment to its fully and effectively implementation. At the meeting of the Joint Commission, held in Vienna on 6 July, and at the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, held in New York on 24 September, they outlined initiatives aimed at protecting the freedom of economic agents wishing to maintain legitimate trade relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015).

In that understanding, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to preserve the Plan of Action as it was conceived, guaranteeing reciprocal commitments to its full implementation, in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere based on mutual respect. In this context, the Council membership is the main guarantor in terms of avoiding any action that threatens to undermine the Plan. We therefore express our full support and welcome for any future initiative of the Secretary-General to ensure the validity of the Plan.

Bolivia once again expresses its interest in seeing future reports providing more in-depth information regarding annex A, since both annexes — A and B — are

comprehensive and complementary for the effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Finally, as a pacifist country, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, reaffirms its commitment to preventive diplomacy, multilateralism, non-interference and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, in the understanding that these are universal principles recognized by the international community.

Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, my delegation would like to express its gratitude and satisfaction to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for his excellent work; and Mr. Serge Christiane, Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We thank them all for the comprehensive and detailed briefings they have just presented.

Furthermore, we welcome His Excellency Mr. Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States, and wish him a wonderful stay in New York. His presence among us this morning reflects the great importance of the topic we are discussing. I therefore congratulate Côte d'Ivoire for having foreseen it in its programme of work.

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea would like to thank the Secretary-General for his balanced and comprehensive sixth report (S/2018/1089) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, is the faithful result of the international community's commitment to providing a collective response to the non-proliferation regime, and remains a key element of the global architecture of multilateral diplomacy.

Our delegation joins others in commending the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme continues in accordance with the measures imposed by the Plan itself. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed in more than a dozen consecutive reports that Iran is fulfilling its commitments under the agreement. We

welcome that confirmation, despite the considerable challenges that led to the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and its subsequent decision to reimpose all unilateral sanctions that had been lifted or waived in accordance with the Plan. However, we expect Iran to continue to implement all of its nuclear commitments in full, as provided for by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Concerns persist about the full implementation of the provisions related to ballistic missiles and transfers of weapons to and from the Islamic Republic of Iran involving territories of the region, taking into account that some reports on this matter have not yet been duly verified. In this regard, we invite competent, duly mandated institutions to conduct a thorough, effective, independent and impartial investigation into these reports and to subsequently inform the Security Council.

At the same time, the recent alleged launch by the Iranian Government of medium-range ballistic missiles — if verified and confirmed — would undermine all advances that have been registered to date and weaken an agreement that has contributed to regional and international peace and security. However, diverging opinions among certain States with greater research capacity call into question the certainty of others regarding the verification of such events, as well as creating further tension in the region. In this connection, we appeal to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to respect and strictly abide by the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), which forbid it, inter alia, from carrying out activities relating to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea strongly condemns the proliferation and use of weapons of war in the Middle East, as well as the use of force in international relations. We accept the use of force only when it is in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, and in line with our foreign policy objectives and the ideals of peace and stability promoted and defended by our Government and its President, His Excellency Mr. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea reaffirms its commitment to preventive diplomacy, non-interference

and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States. We therefore encourage all parties involved to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, strictly adhering to the responsibilities and obligations they have undertaken and with the same shared vision for the future.

Let us bear in mind that progress is rooted not in the creation of differences, but in advancing together towards a better future that benefits all States. In that context, we once again reiterate the official position of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in favour of the total eradication of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, from the face of the Earth. That must be our aim if we want humankind to be free from this persistent threat once and for all.

Mr. Amde (Ethiopia): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom and Mr. Serge Christiane for their briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Let me also join other Council members in welcoming and thanking Secretary of State Pompeo for taking the time to be here with us today.

We have noted from the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to adhere to its nuclear-related commitments. We have also noted from the report that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has continued the verification and monitoring of the implementation of nuclear-related commitments, the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The fact that the Secretary-General has not received any report on the supply, transfer or export to Iran of nuclear and dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods and technology is indeed encouraging.

We share the view of the Secretary-General that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) stands out as a demonstration of successful multilateralism. It is indeed a symbol or, if we may, an embodiment of functioning multilateralism, with good results. However, we recognize the challenges and difficulties in the broader implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly in relation to the reported activities allegedly undertaken by Iran contrary to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution and the key findings included in the report of the Secretary-General.

We have noted the communications regarding the ballistic-missile test by the Islamic Republic of Iran as reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General and of the Facilitator (S/2018/1106). We have also noted from the report of the Secretary-General that the Secretariat has continued its analysis regarding ballistic-missile-related transfers or activities on the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as arms-related transfers. In our view, such activities, together with the ballistic missile launched by Iran, will affect the broader implementation of the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015). It will also increase tensions and have serious regional consequences.

We concur with the Secretary-General's statement in his report that "[i]t is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the Iranian people" (S/2018/1089, para. 3). For the JCPOA to continue to work for all participants and for it to achieve its broader objective — to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and continued dialogue and collaboration among the remaining participants — is of utmost importance. In our view, this will enable the remaining participants to address the challenges encountered in the implementation of the JCPOA, particularly with respect to arms- and ballistic-missile-related transfers as well as ballistic-missile tests. It will also certainly contribute to the preservation of the Plan, which the Secretary-General called for in his report.

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): I will now speak in my national capacity.

At the outset, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union, Mr. Christiane, for their briefings. We also welcome the reports of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089) and of the Joint Commission (see S/2018/1070).

I will focus on three points: first, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); secondly, our concerns about Iran's ballistic-missile programme and its role in the region; and, thirdly, the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

First, with respect to the JCPOA, in our view, the Plan is a product of years of negotiation, a major diplomatic accomplishment and a key non-proliferation achievement. It was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2231 (2015). Preserving the agreement is a clear priority for the Kingdom of the

Netherlands. The agreement is crucial for the security of the region, of Europe and of the entire world.

The JCPOA has been delivering on its objective, which is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, an obligation it also has under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Further, the JCPOA is based on solid verification. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spend more than 3,000 calendar days per year on the ground in Iran and monitor more than 25 locations in the country on a 24/7 basis, which is an important endeavour for my country and one to which we have contributed more than €1.5 million.

The inspections have led to already 13 consecutive IAEA reports confirming that Iran is living up to its commitments under the JCPOA. It is in that light that we reiterate our deep regret at the decision of the United States to withdraw from the agreement. We believe that the JCPOA effectively blocks the route to an Iranian nuclear weapon. It is better than any alternative, which is why we call on the JCPOA participants to remain committed to the agreement.

This brings me to my second point: our concerns about Iran's ballistic-missile programme and its role in the region. The Kingdom of the Netherlands shares the serious concerns expressed by many today about Iran's ballistic-missile programme, the recent ballistic-missile tests and Iran's destabilizing role in the region. We are concerned about Iran's meddling in the internal affairs of such countries as Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, and about its support for such armed groups as Hizbullah and the Houthi. We condemn any Iranian involvement in the transfer of missiles and arms to actors in the region, including missiles to the Houthi in Yemen. We call on Iran to refrain from any such activities, to fully implement resolution 2231 (2015) and to engage in serious dialogue on these concerns.

With respect to my third point, the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), as long as Iran continues to remain committed to the JCPOA, the international community should do so as well. We therefore call on the entire international community to continue to support and implement resolution 2231 (2015), including the JCPOA. The international community should ensure that Iran continues to benefit from the agreement, as foreseen, including trade through the procurement channel, as needed. The Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to play its part in ensuring the full

implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) — nationally, as a member of the European Union, and, this year, as Facilitator for the resolution in the Security Council.

In conclusion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands sees it as a clear priority that the JCPOA participants, including Iran, and the international community remain committed to resolution 2231 (2015), including the JCPOA, especially now that the agreement seems to be at a crossroads. At the same time, Iran should address the international concerns about its ballistic-missile programme and its destabilizing role in the region. The JCPOA showed that the international community could come together and resolve even the most complex of issues. It showed that it is possible to overcome differences through dialogue and diplomacy. It is a clear example of effective multilateralism, and ensuring the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is in the interests of the Iranian people, of the region and of us all.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Côte d'Ivoire.

I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for her briefing on the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/1089). I would also like to thank Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands and Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for introducing his latest six-month report (see S/2018/1106). I also thank Mr. Serge Christiane, Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Delegation of the European Union, for his excellent briefing on the activities of the Procurement Working Group. Finally, I would like to welcome the presence among us of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Michael Pompeo, and Ms. Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, who is not often with us, but whom I personally would like to see more often at our meetings.

More than three years after its adoption, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is today at a crossroads. The unity of the Council, which made possible the adoption of resolution 2231 (2015) endorsing the JCPOA, is now being undermined, to the point of impacting the interpretation of the provisions of the Plan, which had been welcomed by the international community.

With regard to the Iranian nuclear issue, my delegation would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation between the Iranian Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Indeed, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/1089), the IAEA continues to perform its role, without hindrance, in the verification of Iranian nuclear facilities.

In the Agency's latest report, dated 12 November, it notes that Iran is in compliance with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, has not enriched uranium to prohibited levels or created illegal stockpiles and continues to apply, on a provisional basis, the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force. Based on that observation, my delegation believes that the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement should continue since it meets the requirements of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

With regard to the issue of ballistic missiles, my country remains concerned about reports that Iran tested medium-range ballistic missiles, which could be nuclear-weapon delivery systems, on 1 December.

Côte d'Ivoire would like to take this opportunity to urge the Iranian authorities to strictly uphold their obligations, which would undoubtedly contribute to facilitating discussions on the implementation of the JCPOA and strengthening confidence and cooperation among the signatory parties. It also invites them to dispel all doubts with regard to alleged ballistic-missile transfers. In that regard, my country supports the establishment of consensual investigation mechanisms to establish the truth on that issue.

With regard to information on the illicit transfer of and discovery in the region of debris from other types of weapons allegedly manufactured in Iran, my delegation urges the United Nations to expeditiously conclude investigations into their origins and the timing of their transfer. Côte d'Ivoire would like to encourage the Iranian authorities to reassure the international community by scrupulously applying the provisions of the Security Council resolutions relating to, inter alia, the travel ban and measures to freeze assets.

Given that Côte d'Ivoire is strongly committed to multilateralism and the promotion of multilateral frameworks, where consensus is built to address current threats to international peace and security, I would like to reiterate our support for the JCPOA, which

remains a strong guarantee of the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Côte d'Ivoire therefore urges the parties to the Plan of Action to agree on the interpretation of its provisions and resolve any misunderstandings through the mechanisms provided for that purpose, in particular the Joint Commission established in its annex IV. My country also encourages them to maintain their level of commitment and work together towards the full implementation of the Plan, which, like any human undertaking, remains open to improvement.

My delegation urges all States parties, without exception, to return to the negotiating table and calls on them to fully uphold their respective commitments, while bearing in mind the need to strengthen international security by fully implementing the agreement, which has already led to significant progress. Côte d'Ivoire also invites the Islamic Republic of Iran to pay particular attention to the concerns raised by the members of the Council and maintain its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also calls on Iran to scrupulously respect the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Al Habib (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to begin by sincerely thanking those Council members who have reaffirmed their commitment to continue supporting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). At a time when multilateralism is under threat, preserving the JCPOA, which, according to the Secretary-General, is a demonstration of successful multilateralism and a major achievement in dialogue and diplomacy, is of utmost importance.

From that perspective, we laud the call made by the Secretary-General in his report (S/2018/1089) on the JCPOA participants, the Council, all Member States and regional and other international actors to ensure the continuity of that agreement, which is fundamental to regional and international peace and security.

At this meeting, which is being held to consider the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the Council should consider and address all obstacles created to its implementation, focusing in particular on its provisions on promoting and facilitating the development of

normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran.

As is well known, the sustainability of the JCPOA has been seriously challenged by the unilateral and unlawful conduct of the United States in withdrawing from the JCPOA and reimposing illegal sanctions against Iran. It is a clear violation of the resolution, which calls upon all States, without exception — all States, without exception — which includes the United States, not only to take actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, but also to refrain from actions that undermine the implementation of commitments under the JCPOA. Therefore, the Council should consider the United States' illegal acts as a flagrant violation of the resolution and hold it accountable for such violation.

It is evident that any inaction or leniency in taking appropriate action to prevent any violation of the resolution will only embolden the United States to continue its unlawful practices and irresponsible policies. The irony is that the United States, which itself is in absolute violation of resolution 2231 (2015), today accused Iran of violating that resolution. What we heard today was another series of lies, fabrications, disinformation and deceptive statements by the United States. This is not unprecedented. Suffice it to recall the infamous speeches made in the past in this very Chamber by United States officials.

This is not surprising. Deception is an inseparable part of the United States' foreign policy, as is bullying and its addiction to sanctions and warmongering. A clear example of such policies is the American approach to Iran's peaceful nuclear programme, about which it manufactured an unnecessary crisis and was successful in abusing the Council to impose illegal sanctions.

Nevertheless, as soon as the sanctions came to an end with the conclusion of the JCPOA, and the IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran's full compliance with its commitments, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, violated resolution 2231 (2015), reimposed its illegal sanctions and started punishing States that abide by the resolution. Such policies and practices clearly indicate that even in the past, they did not have any genuine concern about Iran's nuclear programme.

Now, for the first time in United Nations history, a permanent member of the Security Council is blatantly punishing United Nations Members not for violating, but rather for complying with a Security Council

resolution. That is the first time in the history of the Security Council. And yet, the United States finds the audacity to hijack the Council in order to intensify its hostilities against Iran. We have not forgotten the days when the United States rendered the Council ineffective in preventing Saddam's aggression, stopping the use of chemical weapons against Iranians, and addressing the attack on an Iranian civil aircraft over the Persian Gulf by American forces, killing all 290 people on board, including 66 children.

Rather than allowing the United States to repeat such abusive patterns, the Council should strongly condemn the United States for reimposing its illegal sanctions against Iranians in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. These sanctions only harm the ordinary and, more importantly, vulnerable people of Iran, such as women, children, the elderly and patients. They prevent even the import of basic foodstuffs, medicine and medical devices to Iran. Unlike the United States declaration, in practice there are no exceptions or exemptions for importing such needs. Now they argue that banks do not have confidence in Iran's banking system to facilitate those transactions. "That is Iran's problem," they say. "It is not our problem." Is this not ironic and disgraceful? How come they had confidence to Iran's banking system until weeks ago, and suddenly and for no reason lost their confidence? In fact, they avoid such transactions because they are intimidated and threatened by a bullying and irresponsible State.

On 7 November, the United States Secretary of State threatened all Iranians with mass starvation. He said that the Iranian "leadership has to make a decision that they want their people to eat". Does the weaponizing of food and medicine against civilians have any other designation than as a crime against humanity? Is the disruption of free trade and the application of United States national laws to other nations, thereby disrespecting their sovereignty, not a clear manifestation of economic terrorism? The international community should stand against American bullying policies and the United States authorities should be held to account for ordering, committing and enforcing such horrible crimes.

Through fabrication, disinformation and invoking irrelevant criteria, the United States tries to create ambiguity and confusion in order to misinterpret the resolution with regard to Iran's missile launches. Here, I draw the Council's attention to the interpretation of

relevant paragraphs of the resolution by the United States Special Envoy for Iran, who says that the resolution “simply” and “kindly” calls upon Iran not to undertake certain activity. He then concludes that the resolution’s language is “hardly a clear and enforceable prohibition”.

Iran’s ballistic missile programme is designed to be exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads required to deter foreign threats. While the Americans argue that Iran’s security concerns are entirely self-generated, and also hypocritically state that Iran faces no natural threat from Israel, as recently as three months ago Israel’s Prime Minister threatened Iran even with nuclear annihilation. That was definitely a wishful dream. Moreover, no one can ignore the consistent tremendous threats Iran continues to face from the United States itself, in particular through its outdated mantra of “all options are on the table” — which amounts to a military threat.

They are dreaming wishfully to bring us back to those days when Saddam’s planes bombed an Iranian city for 105 minutes — the longest aerial assault since the Second World War — killing and injuring over 1,000 civilians. They also wish to bring us back to those days when Saddam rained missiles on our cities — some of them carrying chemical components provided by the United States — and Iran was actively prevented from purchasing even the most rudimentary means of self-defence to at least deter the aggressor. No one should be surprised that they even prevented the export of barbed wire to Iran. Most such restrictions continue.

We have paid a very high price to save our territory from the aggressors and to ensure the security of our borders and citizens. Those days have long passed. Living in such a volatile region as the Middle East, our Government will not and cannot compromise on its security and its conventional defensive capability, as no other country does.

Describing Iran as a source of regional threat is nothing but a shifting of blame in order to sell more American “beautiful weapons” — as the United States President calls them. Conflicts, insecurity and instability in our region have two main sources: the occupation of Palestine by Israel and America’s interventions and massive military build-up in the region. Who can also forget the United States role — as openly confessed by its President during his campaign — in creating the ugliest face of terrorism, the monstrous Islamic

State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS)? If not for Iran’s support and help, the black flag of ISIS would still be flying around the Middle East. Our neighbours have repeatedly acknowledged Iran’s role in fighting and defeating Da’esh in their countries. In reaction to Iran’s prominent role in fighting terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, such groups have conducted a few terrorist attacks in Iran in 2017 and 2018, including in our Parliament.

Today, in addition to transferring ISIS elements to Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, the United States has extended its sponsorship of terrorism to a vicious terrorist cult, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, that has murdered more than 17,000 Iranians — including children, women, girls, officials and other ordinary people — and many Iraqis, and whose leaders currently cosy up to the highest political figures in Washington, D.C., to destabilize Iran through terrorist activities.

Here, I would like to stress that according to the Charter of the United Nations, the Council represents all Member States and that its decisions should therefore also echo their views. Almost all Members of the Organization have strongly supported the JCPOA and loudly voiced their rejection of the illegal unilateral sanctions that is a clear violation of resolution 2231 (2015). Consequently, the Council should hold the United States accountable for reimposing such sanctions and demand that it end their application. That would also be in line with the obligation imposed on the United States by the International Court of Justice order issued unanimously on 3 October, which is a clear testament to the illegality of the United States sanctions.

I would also like to clarify that our legal and technical observations on the report of the Secretary-General are contained in a letter that I sent to you yesterday, Mr. President, which also covers our views on issues that I did not address in my remarks today.

Last but not least, the United States representative made baseless allegations against Iran, most of which are either not relevant to the agenda of this meeting or do not even fall within the Council’s purview. I have therefore confined my statement to this meeting’s agenda, as I did not want to defy it as that representative did. At the same time, my country has responded to those allegations either through our Foreign Ministry or our representatives in the relevant international forums in Geneva, Vienna, The Hague or here in New York.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Heusgen (Germany): I thank you very much, Mr. President, for including Germany in today's meeting. I appreciate that all colleagues have stayed until the end of the debate. I also thank the Secretary of State of the United States for having stayed for more than two hours. In return, I promise to be brief. Indeed, I can be brief because I basically align myself with what was said earlier by my colleagues from the European Union — the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Poland and the Netherlands.

I would like to start by thanking Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/1089). We believe that it is a very good report — thorough, well-evidenced and balanced. We believe also that its current scope and methodology, with a focus on annex B, is appropriate. I would like to take this occasion to reject the criticisms of the report that have been voiced. I believe that, having been tasked with reporting on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretary-General must do so robustly and use the sources at his disposal.

I would also like to thank Ambassador Van Oosterom for his work as Facilitator. I must also say that I am very happy that my Belgian colleague Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve was selected to follow him in carrying out the Facilitator's difficult task.

With regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), let me repeat what my Dutch colleague said about the JCPOA being a major diplomatic accomplishment and what my Swedish colleague said about it being a successful multilateral agreement. I totally share those views. I also commend Federica Mogherini and the Secretary General of the European External Action Service, Helga Schmidt, for doing a fantastic job in stitching together the agreement and trying everything to keep it alive, which we consider essential.

Resolution 2231 (2015) endorsed the JCPOA, which strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We believe that the JCPOA is a very important contribution to the global non-proliferation architecture. It is an important asset for the security of the region and for the security of Europe, which is our key interest. Preserving the JCPOA is therefore very important to us. Our position remains unchanged. Along with our European partners, Germany will

remain committed to the JCPOA as long as Iran is in full compliance with it. So long as it is, along with our partners France and Britain and the remaining JCPOA partners, we will commit to taking the necessary steps to ensure that Iran continues to receive economic benefits from sanctions relief.

The full and effective implementation of annex B in all its aspects is equally important for regional and international stability. We heard the Secretary of State eloquently underline the breaches of annex B regarding arms transfers and ballistic-missile activity. Therefore, the findings of the Secretary-General give rise to serious concern. Iran's programme to develop ballistic missiles continues to be inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). I would like to give a couple of examples: the Iranian testing of a medium-range ballistic missile in December and the Iranian missile strikes on targets in Syria on 1 October. Furthermore, we strongly condemn the messages written on the missiles fired on 1 October, as reported in the Iranian and international media, which threatened the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia severely. Such aggressive rhetoric is unacceptable, and Germany condemns Iran's continued questioning of Israel's right of existence. We call on Iran not to conduct any further ballistic-missile launches and to refrain from such unacceptable rhetoric and any transfers to the Houthis, or anybody else, of ballistic missiles, components or technologies, as well transfers of any other weapons or related material from Iran, and to fully respect resolution 2231 (2015).

Lastly, let me come to the most important issue. Germany agrees with the Secretary-General that the issues not directly related to the nuclear deal should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement. We believe that the American position is akin to throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Secretary Pompeo quoted President Obama, who said that, ideally, Iran would behave in the region when it comes to missile technology. As Germans, we know all about idealism, which comes from German philosophy and Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. If that were observed by everybody, we would not need the Security Council. Nonetheless, we have to live with a non-ideal situation, which calls for the JCPOA to continue to be observed because it is in our security interests.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.