President: Mr. Nebenzia/Mr. Safronkov (Russian Federation)

Members:
- Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Mr. Llorentty Soliz
- China Mr. Ma Zhaoxu
- Côte d'Ivoire Mr. Djédjé
- Equatorial Guinea Mr. Esono Mbengono
- Ethiopia Mr. Alemu
- France Mr. Delattre
- Kazakhstan Mr. Tumysh
- Kuwait Mr. Alotaibi
- Netherlands Mr. Van Oosterom
- Peru Mr. Tenya
- Poland Ms. Wronecka
- Sweden Mr. Orrenius Skau
- United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Ms. Pierce
- United States of America Mr. Cohen

Agenda

Non-proliferation


Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602)


This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Non-proliferation


Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602)


The President (spoke in Russian): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Germany to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; and His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.


At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

I now give the floor to Ms. DiCarlo.

Ms. DiCarlo: Nearly three years ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015) to endorse the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Secretary-General and the international community welcomed the Plan as a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation.

Since implementation day, 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 11 times to the Security Council that Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Notwithstanding the continued adherence of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments, the agreement is unfortunately at a crossroads.

On 8 May, the United States of America announced its withdrawal from the agreement. The Secretary-General deeply regrets this setback to the JCPOA and believes that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. At the same time, the Secretary-General calls on Iran to consider carefully the concerns expressed by Member States about Iranian activities that are allegedly contrary to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution.

I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602). As guided by the Security Council, and consistent with our last four reports, the one before members today focuses on annex B to the resolution.

First, on the implementation of the nuclear-related provisions, I am pleased to report that the procurement channel continues to function effectively. Thirteen additional nuclear-related proposals have been submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing the total number of proposals to 37 since implementation day. However, in this reporting period, the Secretariat received information from two Member States on the supply, sale, transfer or export to Iran of dual-use items that may have been undertaken contrary
to the resolution. The Secretariat has contacted the relevant Member States, which have informed us that they have initiated internal reviews. Iran, in its response to the Secretariat stressed that it is the “responsibility of the exporting State to seek approval through the procurement channel”, and encouraged more outreach activities to address the lack of awareness among some Member States. The Secretary-General will report back on this issue to the Council in due course.

Secondly, in terms of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report reflects information provided by Israel and Iran to the Secretary-General and the Security Council on two ballistic missile launches by Iran in January, as well as our findings on the ballistic missiles launched by the Houthis into Saudi territory. Since our last report (S/2017/1030), Saudi authorities have brought to the attention of the Secretariat nine additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, which in their assessment were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles. The Secretariat was invited to examine the debris of three of those additional missiles. We provided preliminary observations, in our last report, from our examination of the debris of the missiles launched into Saudi Arabia on 22 July and 4 November 2017.

Based on the information and material analysed, the Secretariat assesses that the debris of the five missiles launched at Yanbu’ and Riyadh since July 2017 share key design features with the Iranian Qiam-1 ballistic missile. It is also our assessment that some component parts of the debris were manufactured in Iran. We could confirm that subcomponents of the guidance system in these missiles were produced between 2002 and 2010. We note that the production-date range of these subcomponents is incompatible with Scud missiles known to be in Yemeni stockpiles prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in early 2015. However, we are at present unable to determine whether such missiles, or parts thereof, or related technology, may have been transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016.

The report also reflects information received from Israel regarding the possible presence of an Iranian drone in Syria, which was reportedly downed after entering Israeli airspace on 10 February. The Secretariat did not have the opportunity to examine its debris, but images provided by Israeli authorities show that its wing configuration appears to be consistent with that of an Iranian drone unveiled in October 2016. The report further notes that, according to Iranian media outlets, several Iranian drones have been deployed in Syria. The Secretariat has no information as to the owner and operator of those drones.

Thirdly, as detailed in the report, the Secretariat examined arms and related material that was seized in Bahrain after 16 January 2016, and obtained additional information on the unmanned surface vessel, laden with explosives, that was recovered by the United Arab Emirates. In both cases, the Secretariat is confident that some of the arms and related material it examined were manufactured in Iran. However, we are unable to confirm whether those items were transferred from Iran after 16 January 2016.

The report also notes the 21 May statement of the political leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip that Iran has provided the Al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups in Gaza with money, military equipment and expertise. That statement suggests that transfers of arms and related material from Iran may have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of annex B.

Fourthly, the report highlights the participation of Iran’s Defence Industries Organization for the third year in a row in an arms and defence exhibition in Iraq. It provides information on the foreign activities of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters in Syria. Since both entities are on the 2231 list their funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi and the Syrian territories should have been frozen.

The report also provides information on additional travel by Major General Qasem Soleimani. The Secretary-General has reiterated his call upon all Member States in the region to take the steps necessary to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).

In closing, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of Ambassador Van Oosterom of the Netherlands in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of the resolution. I also thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our excellent cooperation. I would like to assure them and the Security Council of our fullest support for the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The President (spoke in Russian): I thank Ms. DiCarlo for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Vale de Almeida.
Mr. Vale de Almeida: I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor and the opportunity to brief the Security Council. I am honoured to once again address the Council on behalf of Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in her capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

First, I would like to thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Ambassador of the Netherlands, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their excellent cooperation. Let me also express my gratitude to our colleagues of the Secretariat and the Security Council Affairs Division for their unwavering support, in particular regarding the running of the procurement channel. I would also like to note my appreciation for their work in the preparation of the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Last, but not least, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her briefing today.

We are in a difficult situation, which had not been foreseen back in July 2015 when resolution 2231 (2015) was unanimously adopted by the Security Council (see S/PV.7488). While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed as recently as 24 May — for the eleventh time in a row — that Iran is respecting its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, United States President Trump announced on 8 May that the United States will withdraw from the agreement. The European Union (EU) and all other remaining JCPOA participants have expressed deep regret at that decision, including at the last meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 May.

The preservation of the JCPOA is a key security interest not only for the European Union, but also for the international community as a whole. The unanimous endorsement of the JCPOA by the Security Council confirmed the importance of the JCPOA in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The recent messages of support expressed by an overwhelming number of partners around the world — in Africa, Asia, Latin America and in the Pacific — are yet another signal that the JCPOA needs to be preserved and fully implemented.

The full implementation of the JCPOA will prevent a nuclear arms race in the region. Such an arms race is in no one’s interests. There is no positive alternative to the JCPOA, which is the fruit of more than 12 years of negotiations and constitutes a 104-page document that is endorsed at the highest level by the international community. Undoubtedly, it remains the standard of a multilateral nuclear non-proliferation agreement to which other initiatives still have to live up.

The EU has taken the position that, as long as Iran implements its nuclear-related obligations, we will remain firmly committed to the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA. That has also been echoed by the other remaining participants at the highest level, and in that regard I would like to express sincere thanks to the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China for their unwavering commitment to the nuclear deal. Their support in facing the global challenge of nuclear proliferation through the hard work of multilateral diplomacy cannot be overstated.

The remaining parties to the JCPOA have held a number of discussions on how to preserve the deal. We recognize that sanctions-lifting is an essential part of the agreement, and the Iranian people have a very understandable expectation that the benefits of the deal will continue to be felt. The European Union, together with its partners, will continue to employ its best efforts to preserve legitimate financial and trade flows, preserving the interests of businesses acting in good faith and with the endorsement of the Security Council. The measures that we are putting in place at home are designed to allow those businesses and investors to continue to do their work, as governed by international and European law.

We are of course aware that within Iran a difficult debate is being held on the JCPOA and on the benefits that it brings to the country and its citizens. I am convinced that those benefits continue to be tangible, even though I cannot hide the fact that there will be a number of companies that do not see themselves in a position to continue their current engagements in Iran. The European Union continues to explore with Iran the possibilities of preserving legitimate trade and investment and continuing our overall bilateral cooperation, which has taken place since 2016.

On the nuclear side, under the JCPOA Iran is undergoing the most rigorous monitoring and verification regime in the world. The IAEA issued on 24 May, as I mentioned earlier, its eleventh report since implementation day, which acknowledges once again Iran’s full compliance with its commitments.
undertaken under the JCPOA. That is further reflected by the large number of inspections on the ground. It goes without saying that, at this juncture, it is critical to strictly follow the terms of the deal. That is essential to upholding the agreement and continuing to build trust.

While the JCPOA deals with nuclear non-proliferation aspects, a number of serious issues outside of the deal continue to cast a shadow over our overall relationship with Iran. I regret that I have to stress again that the situation in the region has clearly worsened over the past few months.

Regarding the situation in Yemen, the European Union is seriously concerned about the recent intensification of military operations, in particular in Al-Hudaydah, and we have urged all parties to the conflict to ensure the protection of civilians and fully respect international humanitarian law. The European Union has also engaged in a regional dialogue with the stakeholders to urge the parties to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and resume political negotiations. We note with concern the findings of the Secretary-General’s report and the Panel of Experts on Yemen report (see S/2018/68) regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology. Those actions feed regional tensions and threaten the safety and stability of Yemen’s neighbours, freedom of navigation and global sea trade.

As the Council is aware, the European Union has a long-standing track record of expressing its concern at the regional military build-up, including Iran’s missile programme. We have repeatedly called upon Iran to refrain from activities that may deepen mistrust, such as ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015) and the statements associated with it.

The situation in the region, including the proliferation of ballistic missiles, needs to be addressed as a priority. But those issues are distinct from the JCPOA. Dismantling a nuclear deal that is working would certainly not put us in a better position to discuss other issues. Walking away from a robust non-proliferation agreement will not provide a solution to regional tensions or ballistic missile proliferation.

In addition to Iran’s nuclear obligations, which are laid out in annex 1 of the JCPOA, and to elements related to sanctions-lifting, contained in annex 2, allow me to reiterate the need to further engage on the basis of annex 3 of the JCPOA, which foresees civil-nuclear cooperation. The European Union sees this annex as key to the overall balance of the agreement and essential to the overall objective of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

We continue to engage with Iran in a number of concrete projects focused on nuclear safety and research, and we look forward to a civil nuclear liability seminar, to take place in Vienna in mid-July, and to the third high-level seminar on nuclear cooperation and governance, scheduled for November, building further on the concept that civil-nuclear cooperation and adherence to international norms on nuclear governance have to go hand in hand. While implementing projects on the ground and conducting research, Iran is also taking steps towards its accession to the international nuclear regulatory framework. Those steps need to be encouraged and supported further. All of the foregoing are significant measures that enhance the credibility of the international community with respect to the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

Let me continue in this spirit by focusing on the reporting related to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015), in particular on the work of the Procurement Working Group, which is responsible for reviewing proposals by States seeking to engage in activities with Iran that are for nuclear and non-nuclear civilian end uses.

The procurement channel is a key pillar of the JCPOA. The procurement channel and the Procurement Working Group will continue their activity in the same spirit as our continued implementation of the other parts of the JCPOA. Since implementation day, the Procurement Working Group has been in full operation, with the EU reaching out and coordinating its meetings with the aim of promoting the Channel as the only mechanism for legitimate transfers of Nuclear Suppliers Group-listed items to Iran. After the United States withdrawal, the Group met twice in the new format of E3/EU+2 and Iran, and mandated the Working Group Coordinator to continue the work of the Channel as the only alternative to attempts for irregular transfers. It is a fact that confidence in the Channel can be built only if new proposals are officially received and reviewed. I therefore find it positive that the Channel currently has five proposals under review.

Transparency remains a guiding principle and cornerstone of the JCPOA. According to paragraph 6.10 of annex 4, the Joint Commission reports to the Security Council every six months on the status of
the Procurement Working Group’s decisions and on any implementation issues. In that context, on 8 June the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group submitted to the Facilitator, on behalf of the Joint Commission, its fifth biannual report. The report aims to provide the Facilitator and Security Council members with an overview of the work undertaken by the Procurement Working Group from 1 December 2017 to 12 June 2018. The report has been circulated in document S/2018/601.

During this period, the Procurement Working Group continued to discuss relevant topics, including end use, common outreach messaging and procedural aspects relevant to the smooth processing of the proposals. It also intensified efforts to be as transparent as possible, without compromising confidentiality, by reaching out to United Nations Member States and promoting a better understanding of its aims, objectives and its review process, which are embedded in the JCPOA’s multilayered system of checks and balances.

Impressive outreach activities have been conducted over the past few years, and countries around the world are aware of the procedures of the channel. Therefore, it is regrettable, as reported by the Secretary-General, that some exports of listed items have been undertaken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). We see the need to further familiarize countries and potential exporters with the procurement channel. To that end, our outreach efforts will continue, together with colleagues from the Security Council secretariat and the Facilitator. Member States’ governmental export-control stakeholders should continue supporting the engagement of their companies in any new transfers, through only the official channels.

Noting the challenges relating to the procurement channel in the wider JCPOA framework, we have no time for complacency. Immediate action is required to find a sustainable solution on overall trade with Iran, since that would also have an important impact on the procurement channel.

I wish to conclude my briefing with two further comments. Should the momentum on the JCPOA’s preservation and implementation be lost, that would be very detrimental to Iran, all other remaining JCPOA parties and the wider international community, and it would damage the trust in the effectiveness of multilateral diplomacy and the non-proliferation architecture. That is why the European Union once again calls on the international community to support this internationally endorsed common engagement. All remaining signatory parties need to implement the JCPOA in full and resolution 2231 (2015) in all its dimensions. We need to continue to build on this achievement of multilateral diplomacy, which is the best hope for security and stability in the region. As ever, the Coordinator of the Joint Commission stands ready to work with United Nations bodies and Member States in order to support the objectives of the JCPOA.

**The President (spoke in Russian):** I thank Mr. Vale de Almeida for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ambassador Van Oosterom.

**Mr. Van Oosterom** (Netherlands): I now speak in my capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

In July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015) (see S/PV.7488). Three months later, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) came into effect. The agreement aims to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. Resolution 2231 (2015) replaced previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue and urged the full implementation of the JCPOA. It also established specific restrictions in relation to Iran. As Security Council Facilitator for the resolution, I have aimed to support and improve its implementation. I have built on the excellent work of Italy, which we succeeded as Facilitator in the context of our split term on the Council.

I consider three issues that we facilitate to be key to my role and that of the format: first, talks; secondly, transparency; and thirdly, trade.

My first point concerns talks. Our ambition is to facilitate talks about the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). As Facilitator, I have facilitated communication among all parties, discussion of the Security Council in the 2231 format and smooth correspondence within the format. On 20 June, the Security Council met in the 2231 format and, during the format review, discussed the findings and recommendations contained in the fifth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) on resolution 2231 (2015) prior to its public release. We had an open discussion on recent developments. In her statement, Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo has just elaborated on the findings and recommendations in the report.
During the reporting period, two Member States sent communications to the Council alleging transfers and activities by Iran that fall under the restrictions of resolution 2231 (2015). Those communications are listed in detail in my report (see S/2018/624), together with all replies received from the Permanent Mission of Iran, as well as a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, Javad Zarif. The letter was sent in reaction to the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the reimposition of all United States sanctions that had been lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA.

I will now turn to my second point — the facilitation of transparency concerning the work of the 2231 format. My report gives a comprehensive overview of the work of the format during the past half-year, including the monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). It includes the relevant communications, as well as key aspects of the functioning of the procurement channel. It is also my intention to give an open briefing to the wider United Nations membership on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) in the next reporting period. The goal of such a briefing would be to raise awareness among Member States of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly of the procurement channel, as just described by the Head of Delegation of the European Union.

That brings me to my third point — the facilitation of trade by encouraging the use of the procurement channel. The Channel reviews proposals by States seeking to participate in or permit certain transfers of nuclear and dual-use goods, technology or services to Iran. On 27 April, the 2231 format received a briefing from the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on the procurement channel. Since the beginning of 2016, 37 proposals for the procurement channel have been submitted by five Member States from three different regional groups. Those include States that are not participants in the JCPOA. On average, proposals were processed in fewer than 51 calendar days. Following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, the Council has continued to receive proposals through the Channel, and the review of those proposals continues.

In conclusion, the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, marked a fundamental shift concerning the Iranian nuclear issue. As Security Council Facilitator for the resolution, I have aimed to support and improve its implementation through the facilitation of talks, transparency and trade. In that effort, I would also like to thank the Secretariat for its hard work in support of both myself and the format. We commend the leadership of Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo and Ambassador Vale de Almeida and their cooperation.

The President (spoke in Russian): I thank Ambassador Van Oosterom for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

Mr. Cohen (United States of America): I thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Van Oosterom and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their briefings today.

As has been noted, on 8 May, President Trump announced that the United States would end its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and instead pursue a comprehensive policy to both deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s malignant activities.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) shows that Iran continues to destabilize the region through its support for terrorist groups and proxy forces. The findings and information presented in the Secretary-General’s report paint a deeply troubling picture of the scope of this behaviour. We are particularly concerned by the detailed reporting that confirms numerous Iranian arms embargo violations across the Middle East and that certain nuclear dual-use items have been shipped to Iran outside of the agreed channels and without the required Security Council approval.

It is clear from the report that Iran bears responsibility for providing the Houthis with five ballistic missiles that they launched at civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. The United Nations also finds that seized weapons it inspected in Bahrain were manufactured in Iran, and confirms that an unmanned explosive boat recovered by the United Arab Emirates had systems with coordinates showing that it had been in Iranian territorial waters and that at least some of its components were manufactured in Iran. The report describes Iranian drones recovered in Yemen and Syria, and cites a televised interview with Hamas political leader Yahya Sinwar, in which he states that the Islamic Republic of Iran provided armed groups in Gaza with “money, [military] equipment, and
expertise” (S/2018/602, para. 13) before and after the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict.

Those unacceptable violations provide us with concrete evidence of how Iran is destabilizing the region and, in particular prolonging the violence in Yemen. Adding up all of these data points leads to one unmistakable conclusion — that Iran continues to send weapons across the Middle East, in blatant violation of the Council’s resolutions. If there was ever any doubt regarding Iran’s clear threat to international peace and stability, the findings of the report should lay it to rest.

The only question remains, when confronted with all of the information presented by the Secretary-General in this and other reports: How will the States members of the Council respond? At a minimum, Iran has violated the provisions of resolutions 2231 (2015), 2216 (2015), 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004). In those resolutions, we, the members of the Council, prohibited Iran from exporting weapons, and we prohibited the supply of weapons to the Houthis and to Hizbullah. Iran has defied and violated those resolutions, in many cases openly. When confronted with a country that continually violates the Council’s resolutions, it is imperative that we pursue meaningful consequences. That is why we urge members of the Council to join us in the imposition of sanctions that target Iran’s malign behaviour in the region. The United States stands ready to work with the members of the Council to take real action against the threat that Iran poses.

The United States will continue to work with Member States and the Secretariat to shine a spotlight on Iran’s behaviour. Reports like the one we are considering today are critical, and we encourage everyone to read it. With the reimposition of our sanctions, the United States is taking a stand. We have declared that Iran’s actions will not go unchallenged, and we have shown that we will follow through. The United States is taking decisive action to ensure that Iran faces consequences as long as it remains bent on sowing instability. We urge the members of the Council to join us.

Standing up to Iran’s destabilizing behaviour is a mission that all of us should have and share. When we look out at the region, we see Iran supporting the Houthis, Iran supporting Hizbullah, Iran supporting Hamas and Iran supporting the Al-Assad regime. Iran repeatedly comes up when we gather to discuss mass atrocities, humanitarian catastrophes or the launching of ballistic missiles. As long as Iran is the common denominator in so many conflicts across the region, we must respond. Any Member State concerned about promoting peace in the Middle East should do the same.

Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): Let me begin by thanking the Russian presidency of the Council for convening this important meeting. I also thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, our colleague of the Netherlands and the observer of the European Union for their very informative briefings.

I would also like to commend the factual and balanced nature of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2018/602), which has been submitted to us and whose scope fully corresponds to his mandate.

The Security Council’s responsibilities are measured by the variety and complexity of international peace and security issues it has to deal with, including non-proliferation. We spoke briefly about this issue two days ago during the debate on North Africa and the Middle East (see S/PV.8293), where the challenges are immense. In this context, the Iranian nuclear issue is a textbook case; it confirms the role of impetus and monitoring that the Security Council can and must play. This was demonstrated by the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), on 20 July 2015, which sealed the agreement reached in Vienna, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), of which the Council is the guarantor.

The JCPOA is the result of the perseverance of the international community and a common will to provide a robust response to our shared security interests. The JCPOA also embodies the pragmatic and demanding multilateralism to which my country is deeply committed. The collapse of this major achievement would mark a serious step backwards for the region, for the non-proliferation regime, and for all of our security, which would potentially have serious consequences. This is why I want now to renew with force the commitment reaffirmed by President Macron alongside his British and German partners, and supported by the other Europeans, on 8 May. France, which has worked tirelessly throughout the negotiations to ensure the robust nature of this agreement, remains determined to ensure its implementation and preserve it.

In this regard, we have noted with regret and concern the decision of the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA. However, the agreement remains in place, and this decision should not affect the implementation by
the parties to this agreement of their commitments. France will continue to work with the parties involved in this collective framework. Let us be clear — as long as Iran fulfils its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA, France will meet its own. We are therefore determined to ensure as far as possible the maintenance of the economic relations with Iran permitted by the agreement. The agreement was designed specifically to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme is not diverted for military purposes. That founding goal continues to be met, as the Secretary-General recalls in his report. In accordance with its mandate, the International Atomic Energy Agency reconfirmed in its report of 24 May that Iran is in compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA.

I now come to my third point, which concerns resolution 2231 (2015) and the report before us. Our collective commitments do not end with the JCPOA framework. For its part, Iran must respect all its commitments under the resolution, including those under annex B. However, the Secretary-General’s report identifies various elements of Iran’s continued non-compliance with several of its provisions, which are sources of significant concern. I would refer to Iran’s ballistic activities and the transfer of ballistic capabilities and technologies, in particular to the Houthis, as documented in the report of the Secretary-General. The Security Council has on several occasions condemned the firing of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia. This aspect is in addition to the information reported on seizures of weapons of probable Iranian origin and elements relating to violations of asset freezes and travel bans. However, I recall that all States, first and foremost Iran, must comply with those provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). In particular, any activity involving the transfer of assistance, missiles, technologies and ballistic capabilities to State or non-State actors is contrary to Security Council resolutions and must cease immediately.

In conclusion, I recall the importance of the JCPOA, which is both an essential instrument of the international non-proliferation regime and one of the cornerstones of stability in the region as a whole. Anything that weakens it therefore poses a direct risk to our collective security. The assurances given to us by the JCPOA in the nuclear field should enable us to address other issues of concern for regional security. This is the thrust of President Macron’s proposal to engage in discussions towards a broader four-pillar agreement that preserves the JCPOA, provides a long-term framework for Iran’s nuclear programme, constrains the most destabilizing developments in Iran’s ballistic activities, and ensures that Iran ceases to play a destabilizing role in the region. I would assure Council members of France’s full and clear commitment, alongside our partners, on these points, as well as on the implementation of all our commitments.

Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo; the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), Ambassador Karel van Oosterom; and the Head of the European Union Delegation, Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, for their informative briefings. I would also like to welcome to the Security Council today Ambassador Christoph Heusgen, Permanent Representative of Germany, and cordially wish him and his country every success as an incoming member of the Security Council.

Kazakhstan supports the Secretary-General in pointing out that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the culmination of 12 years of intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of the Iranian nuclear problem. The extremely long and difficult multilateral negotiation process was a credit to the international community. My country has made a significant contribution to the process by organizing two rounds of negotiations between the E3+3 and Iran in Almaty in 2013.

Kazakhstan firmly and consistently supports the JCPOA on account of the following features. First, it is recognized by many as an unprecedented — and the only — way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. We consider it to be an important factor in securing the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening regional and global peace and security.

Secondly, this historic nuclear deal is valuable as it fulfils its mission to, at a minimum, convince Iran stop enriching the uranium needed for nuclear weapons. It has given International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors access to facilities in Iran and put the nuclear programme under international control. IAEA reports confirm that Iran is in compliance with all requirements under the JCPOA.

Thirdly, the JCPOA is a truly practical and successful example of solving the most difficult issues
through negotiations, as it was developed and adopted through dialogue and in an atmosphere of trust.

We share the position of the Secretary-General and the overwhelming majority of States in regretting the decision by the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA and impose unilateral sanctions against Tehran. We believe that the concerns of the United States about Iran’s ballistic activities and other issues should not prejudice or impede putting this multilateral agreement into effect. Furthermore, we would still like to see the fifth report (S/2018/602) presented in its most complete and comprehensive form, namely, by including both annexes of resolution 2231 (2015). Due attention has not been given to the content and provisions of annex A, which is the JCPOA. In order to give greater importance and proper political significance to the JCPOA, we suggest that resolution 2231 (2015), with both its annexes, be fully covered in future.

In addition, we note that notifications by some States Members of the United Nations in the report do not contain complete and irrefutable evidence that proves that Iran has violated the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). They require further consideration, thorough investigation and closer and clearer coordination between the Council and the Secretariat so as to be able to effectively respond to such allegations.

At the same time, we recall that the Security Council, in paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), calls on all Member States as well as regional and international organizations to support the implementation of the JCPOA and refrain from actions that undermine the realization of the commitments under that agreement.

To conclude, I would like to congratulate the Facilitator, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands, on his first briefing and to commend his committed and tireless efforts to ensure that resolution 2231 (2015) fulfils its objectives. We support his endeavours to consistently maintain transparency, a constructive and inclusive approach and optimal operationalization of the 2231 format.

Kazakhstan will continue to advocate for preserving and further implementing the agreement, to which we do not see any alternative. We are convinced that political and diplomatic solutions are the only way to resolve all the issues pertaining to the Iranian nuclear programme.

Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I wish to thank our three briefers today. This is an important issue, so I thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this debate.

For the United Kingdom’s part, we welcome the thorough and well-evidenced report on the ongoing implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602). We are aware of the criticism that has been made of the report in some quarters, but we consider the scope and the methodology of the report to be both appropriate and robust. We offer our thanks to the Secretariat for its continued work to ensure the proper implementation of this resolution of such importance for regional and international peace and security.

My intervention, like the issue itself, comes in two halves: what happens with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and what happens in respect of the region and regional stability.

With respect to the JCPOA, we join the Secretary-General and my French colleague in regretting the United States decision to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and to reimpose United States sanctions on Iran. For the United Kingdom’s part, we remain committed to the nuclear deal. It is an essential part of the global non-proliferation architecture, and, furthermore, the deal is working. As we have just heard, the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran continues to comply with its nuclear obligations under the deal, as indeed it has since implementation day. This is consistent with the previous 10 IAEA reports, and we believe that it demonstrates the Iranian commitment to the nuclear deal.

We expect this commitment to continue. We expect Iran to continue to abide by its obligations under the deal. In return, the United Kingdom, together with the remaining participants in the deal, will take the steps necessary to ensure that Iran continues to receive economic benefits from sanctions relief. We welcome the update on the activities of the procurement channel. The United Kingdom fully supports and remains committed to the procurement channel process.

While the JCPOA remains vital for our national security, and indeed for the stability of the Middle East, it is only one part of the efforts towards long-term stability and peace in the region. The United Kingdom shares the Secretary-General’s view that issues not directly related to the nuclear deal should be addressed...
without prejudice to preserving the agreement. We believe that these issues can most effectively be addressed while the nuclear deal remains in place.

I will now turn to the second half of today’s debate: the regional picture. I listened very carefully to the briefing given by the Under-Secretary-General in particular, but also by the two other speakers. It is true that the Secretary-General’s latest report contains concerning reports of attempted shipments to Iran of certain dual-use items without the necessary prior approval from the Security Council. We call on the United Nations to investigate these alleged transfers further and to report its findings to the Council.

We also note the Secretary-General’s assessment that ballistic-missile technology used by the Houthi in Yemen was transferred from Iran, as previously set out in the Yemen Panel of Experts report (see S/2018/68). This chimes with our own assessment. The United Kingdom considers these transfers to be in contravention of resolutions 2231 (2015) and 2216 (2015). The proliferation of missile technology is destabilizing for the region and needs to cease, in the interest of Iran, in the interest of regional stability, and in the interest of international peace and security.

In addition, we remain concerned by Iran’s testing of missiles that are designed to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.

It was not my intention today to talk about the wider Iranian role in the region, but I would just like to echo what my United States colleagues said about some of the activities undertaken by Iran in places such as Lebanon and Syria.

I should like to be very clear about the United Kingdom’s position. Iran is an ancient, respected and mature civilization. It has legitimate security interests in the region and deserves a proper place in the global multilateral system. However, the way it pursues and prosecutes these interests is too often destabilizing and too often threatening to its neighbours and threatening to others, including those of us in Europe. Supplying missiles for attacks on regional neighbours has no legitimacy. Transferring threatening technology has no legitimacy, nor does importing dual-use equipment without the Security Council’s prior approval. And while we recognize Iran’s national security interests, there is no legitimacy or justification for Iran testing missiles that are designed to be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, diverting Iran’s public finances into such adventures retards its own ability to modernize its economy and deliver services to its people.

After 9/11, which struck this city, I worked very closely with the Iranian Government. We were on the same side in combating terrorism. It is a matter of lasting regret that Iran has chosen a different course of action in the intervening years. What I would like to do is to join others in taking the opportunity today to urge Iran to refrain from the destabilizing behaviour that the report outlines and that we have talked about today, and in particular to make a material contribution to the political process in Yemen that the United Nations is so bravely undertaking.

To conclude, the United Kingdom’s position on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is clear. It is a critical agreement that makes the world a safer place. It is vital for our security, and we remain committed to it. To that end, the United Kingdom, and, we believe, our European partners, will continue to work with the remaining parties to the deal to maintain it.

Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I should like to start by thanking Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I wish also to acknowledge the presence here with us of our colleague the Permanent Representative of Germany, whose country has a critical role in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

We note from the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to adhere to its nuclear-related commitments and the Secretary-General has not received any report on the supply, transfer or export to Iran of nuclear or dual-use items, materials, equipment, goods or technology. We also note that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear-related commitments by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the JCPOA-participating States will also remain very critical for the full implementation of the nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA.

We welcome the smooth cooperation between the Security Council and the Joint Commission as indicated in the report of the Facilitator (see S/2018/601). We also welcome the continued work of the procurement channel
in approving the proposal submitted to it. The planned open briefing to the wider United Nations membership on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) by the Facilitator is commendable as it will contribute to fostering awareness particularly with the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and the procurement channel.

We share the view of the Secretary-General that the JCPOA is

“a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation that has contributed to regional and international peace and security.” (S/2018/602, para. 3)

However, we recognize the challenges and difficulties in the broader implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), particularly the reported activities allegedly undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran contrary to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and the key findings included in the reports of the Secretary-General and the Facilitator. While awaiting further information on those reported activities allegedly undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, we share the view expressed by the Secretary-General that the Islamic Republic of Iran needs to carefully consider these concerns, as they have the potential to impact the context within which the JCPOA is being implemented.

It is also worth noting the difficulty associated with the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. We share the view of the Secretary-General, highlighted in his report, that it is a setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In that regard, we appreciate the commitment of the remaining participating countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to fully implement the JCPOA. It is critical for the remaining JCPOA participants to continue to address challenges associated with the withdrawal and contribute to the full implementation of the JCPOA and the satisfactory conclusion of the issue.

I would like to end my remarks by encouraging the remaining participating countries to continue to work together to address some of the challenges aimed at ensuring the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): First of all, I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Van Oosterom and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their briefings and to express my appreciation for their work.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme represents an important achievement of multilateralism and a success story in addressing international and regional hotspot issues through political and diplomatic means. It has played an important role in upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. As such, it is generally welcome by the international community.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported 11 times in a row that Iran has been implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. The coordination between the Security Council and the Procurement Channel is working as expected. The experience in the past three years has fully shown that the JCPOA is an effective agreement.

China commends the efforts of all the parties concerned to implement the JCPOA and expresses regret with regard to the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. China calls on all parties to assume a responsible attitude, bear in mind the long-term and broader situation, commit to patiently engaging in dialogue and cooperation in order to preserve the seriousness and authority of the JCPOA, and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiation.

The report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) is an important component of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA. The report welcomes the commitment of the parties concerned to maintain the full implementation of the JCPOA and reflects Iran's effort to implement the agreement in an objective manner, which China acknowledges.

China has also noted that, in his report, the Secretary-General expressed his deep regret with regard to the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. In the meantime, China believes that the report of the Secretary-General should reflect the implementation efforts in an objective, balanced and comprehensive manner, and take the legitimate concerns of Iran into a consideration. The Secretariat should act in strict accordance with its mandates and functions.

China appreciates the work done by Ambassador Van Oosterom and his team in his capacity as Facilitator of the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). China has taken note of the report submitted by the Joint
Commission to the Security Council on the work of the Procurement Working Group, and will continue to take an active part in the work of the Joint Commission and the Procurement Working Group.

China consistently stands for the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means and is committed to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability. China will objectively, impartially and responsibly maintain its dialogue with all parties concerned to continue to preserve and implement the JCPOA.

Mr. Djédjé (Côte d'Ivoire) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. João Vale de Almeida for their edifying briefings. I also congratulate our colleague Ambassador Karel van Oosterom for the work he has done in his capacity as the Facilitator entrusted by the Security Council to promote the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Almost three years after its adoption by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which in the view of my delegation is one of the best achievements in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, has reached an impasse.

In adopting resolution 2231 (2015), the Security Council sought, inter alia, to guarantee the exclusively civilian character of Iran’s nuclear programme, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). My delegation believes that this agreement constitutes a solid foundation for the implementation of the NPT and that bringing it into question is likely to undermine the collective efforts of the international community to find a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Moreover, it calls on all stakeholders to resolve all disagreements relating to the implementation of the provisions of the JCPOA through negotiations within the Joint Commission provided for in annex 4 of the agreement.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the function and findings of which play a pivotal role in the Iranian dossier, has admirably discharged its obligations since 2015, as demonstrated by the 11 reports that it has issued since then. In its most recent reports, the IAEA has once again pointed out the successful implementation of the 2015 agreement owing to the frequent inspections in Iran, which have confirmed limited uranium enrichment exclusively for civilian use and the provisional implementation of its Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA, which has not discovered any violation concerning restrictions placed on Iran’s ballistic missile-related activities, pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B of Resolution 2231 (2015), has also indicated the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

Furthermore, the successful implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was just reaffirmed by the 12 June fifth semi-annual report (S/2018/602) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015). My country welcomes its recommendations concerning the strengthening of capacities of States Members to better avail themselves of the procurement channel and the full compliance of States of the region with their obligations pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). In that light, Côte d’Ivoire believes that Iran’s implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is satisfactory, although, as with all agreements, there is still room for improvement.

My delegation believes that it is essential that all concerns involving the implementation of the Plan of Action be addressed through mechanisms established for that purpose, in particular within the framework of the Joint Commission provided for in annex 4 of the agreement. My country therefore urges all parties to the Iranian nuclear agreement to return to the negotiating table, and calls on them to respect their respective commitments fully, while at the same time keeping in mind the importance of strengthening international security through the comprehensive implementation of the agreement, which has led to significant progress concerning the Iranian issue. Moreover, Côte d’Ivoire calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to pay particular attention to the concerns raised by other States, especially the countries of the Middle East region, and to increase its cooperation with the IAEA. It also calls on Iran to comply with the travel ban and asset freeze provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions in good faith.

In conclusion, my delegation believes that, with regard to the Iranian dossier, the effectiveness of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as well as the IAEA verification regime, has made the agreement into a diplomatic success, which the international community must work arduously to preserve. In that regard, it welcomes all initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful and lasting solution that is satisfactory for all those who have a stake in the Iranian nuclear issue.

Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to thank all of today’s briefers—Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo; Ambassador João Vale de Almeida; and Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, in his capacity as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)—for their respective reports.

We believe that it is in our common interest to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, reduce tension in the region and, most important, prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In our view, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is an important step towards achieving the objective of a nuclear non-proliferation, as it provides the international community with verification mechanisms to monitor the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, it has become an important element of the global non-proliferation architecture.

Poland welcomes the fifth semi-annual report (S/2018/602) of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We note that the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and the fact that the Agency itself continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

We call on Iran to continue to implement the Additional Protocols to its Safeguards Agreement. It is important for Iran to continue to abide by the terms of the JCPOA. The recent declaration by Iran about increasing its capacity to produce uranium hexafluoride does not constitute a violation of the agreement, but neither does it contribute to building confidence. At the same time, Poland shares concerns about Iranian activities undertaken that run contrary to the provisions of annex B contained in resolution 2231 (2015), as accurately reported by the Secretary-General. The JCPOA does not explicitly prohibit the development of delivery systems, or address the question of Iranian influence in the region, which some countries perceive as negative. In that connection, Iran should refrain from actions that are not in spirit of the JCPOA and could undermine the implementation of commitments under the Plan. The series of short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests conducted by Iran and reported missile transfers, as well as some of Iran’s other activities in the region, are a source of concern for us. They risk deepening mistrust and are inconsistent with the spirit of resolution 2231 (2015).

We recognize the procurement channel and the Procurement Working Group as essential parts of the JCPOA and a significant transparency measure under the Plan. Poland supports the procurement channel and believes that its proper functioning ensures conformity of the relevant transfers in connection with the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015) and contributes to supporting the non-proliferation regime.

Last but not least, I would like to thank Ambassador Karel van Oosterom for his balanced and scrupulous report. I would like to recognize his diligent efforts in facilitating the important, yet challenging, format of the Security Council by—as he described—promoting talks, transparency and trade in order to fully implement resolution 2231 (2015).

Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): I am now speaking in my national capacity.

First, let me welcome our German colleague to the Security Council. I will make three points concerning, first, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); secondly, Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its role in the region; and, thirdly, the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Let me turn to my first point—the JCPOA. The JCPOA is a major diplomatic accomplishment and a key non-proliferation achievement. It has been unanimously endorsed by the Security Council via resolution 2231 (2015). For the Kingdom of the Netherlands, preserving that robust and effective agreement is a clear priority. It is crucial for the security of the region, Europe and the entire world, and the JCPOA has been delivering on its objective, which is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons—an obligation it also has under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The JCPOA is based on solid verification. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) spend more than 3,000 calendar days per year on the ground in Iran and monitor more than 25 locations in Iran on a 24/7 basis. That is an important IAEA endeavour to which my country has contributed more than €1.5 million. The
inspection regime has resulted in eleven consecutive IAEA reports, which confirm that Iran is living up to its commitments under the JCPOA.

It is in that light that we deeply regret the decision of the United States to withdraw from the agreement. We believe that this international agreement effectively blocks the route to an Iranian nuclear weapon. It is better than any alternative. That is why we call on the JCPOA participants to remain committed to the agreement.

That brings me to my second point, the position of Iran. Whereas Iran fulfils its nuclear commitments, the Kingdom of the Netherlands shares the concerns voiced by others today about its ballistic missile programme and its destabilizing role in the region. Iran mingles in the internal affairs of other countries and supports armed groups. We strongly condemn any Iranian involvement in the missiles fired on Saudi Arabia by the Houthis from Yemen. We also note with concern the continuation of arms transfers, as well as violations of the asset freeze and travel ban, in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). We call on Iran to refrain from any such activities, to fully implement resolution 2231 (2015) and to engage in serious dialogue on these concerns outside the framework of the JCPOA.

As long as Iran remains committed to the JCPOA, the international community should do so as well. Therefore, as my third point, I wish to call on the entire international community to continue to support and implement resolution 2231 (2015), including the JCPOA. The international community should ensure that Iran continues to benefit from the agreement as was foreseen, including trade — if appropriate, via the procurement channel. The Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to play its part to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) — nationally, as a member of the European Union, and as a facilitator for resolution 2231 (2015) here in New York this year.

In conclusion, the Kingdom of the Netherlands sees it as a clear priority that the JCPOA participants, including Iran and the wider international community, remain committed to resolution 2231 (2015), including the JCPOA — especially now that the agreement faces serious challenges. At the same time, Iran should address international concerns regarding its ballistic missile programme and its destabilizing role in the region.

The JCPOA showed that the international community can come together and solve even the most complex of issues. It showed that it is possible to overcome differences through dialogue and diplomacy. It is a clear example of effective multilateralism. Ensuring the continued implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is in the interest of the Iranian people, of the region and of us all.

Mr. Esono Mbengono (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, my delegation would like to express its gratitude to Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Karel van Oosterom of the Netherlands, as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015); and Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, on behalf of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as Coordinator of the Joint Commission, for their comprehensive briefings.

Almost three years ago (see S/PV.7488), the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), thereby marking a fundamental change in its consideration of Iranian nuclear issues and building a bridge to foster trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian programme. The Government of Equatorial Guinea shares the positive view of the Secretary-General on this agreement in his report (S/2018/602). We also applaud the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring the agreement, as it has made apparent that the successes and the work of the last 20 years have been worth it.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has shown its total commitment, pursuant to the JCPOA, to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). My Government welcomes that achievement, as characterized by the IAEA. Like the Secretary-General in his report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), we encourage the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran to conduct an in-depth review of the concerns of the Commission and other States with regard to the use of ballistic missiles. Even though that issue is not covered in the Plan, it affects the overall perception of the Plan, which is key to the effective and efficient implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

On 8 May, President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan and the reimposition of all sanctions that his country had lifted on Iran. Although that decision is a regrettable setback to significant progress in the implementation of the
Plan, the Government of Equatorial Guinea urges all parties to continue carrying out their responsibilities and obligations, thereby preserving an agreement that has contributed to regional and international peace and security.

Iranian authorities must abstain from any activity that could undermine the full implementation of the resolution 2231 (2015). We encourage all parties to the Plan to continue honouring it. Any discrepancy with regard to the implementation of the Plan must be resolved through negotiations.

Finally, we wish to stress once again our understanding that the agreement ensures the peaceful uses of the Iranian nuclear programme and helps consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the region.

Mr. Llorentty Soliz (Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation wishes to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Mr. João Vale de Almeida, for their briefings. We also thank the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Karel van Oosterom, for the detailed information he provided in relation to his work as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Finally, we welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Germany in this session.

I begin by stressing that Bolivia is part of the first densely populated region of the world that is completely free of nuclear weapons and, as provided for in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, we have assumed the responsibility of contributing, to the best of our ability, to ending the arms race — especially nuclear — and to consolidating international peace and security. In that regard, we attend this meeting convinced that we have an obligation to the international community to join forces so that the Middle East can join the five nuclear-weapon-free zones of the world.

Bolivia firmly reaffirms its commitment to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), in the understanding that it represents an unmistakable diplomatic achievement with respect to nuclear non-proliferation and a manifestation of the capacity of States when we are committed to multilateralism and international law. In that context, we reiterate the right of the peoples of the world, without exception, to research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the principles laid down by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

My delegation believes that the 12 years of intense diplomatic activity that led to an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue and that resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the Security Council endorsed through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2231 (2015), cannot be postponed by the unilateral decision of one State that jeopardizes the implementation of the Plan. In that order of priorities, like many other representatives, we regret the announcement on 8 May by the United States Government of its withdrawal from the agreement and its reimposition of the unilateral sanctions that had been lifted or had been subject to exemptions, in accordance with the JCPOA. Bolivia categorically condemns unilateral sanctions, which are a flagrant violation of multilateralism and a serious threat to the international order, constituting as they do illegal measures that impose one State’s jurisdiction and internal legislation on another’s, violating the principles of equality, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of States. We are concerned about the possibility that that decision could affect the Plan of Action, with consequences that would have implications for the whole world, not just the Middle East. In that regard, we believe that we should be able to create a climate of mutual trust among States given the denuclearization proposals that are currently being negotiated, as is the case with the Korean peninsula.

Despite all of this, we want to emphasize the decision of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue to abide by its commitments under the JCPOA. We also commend the support of the other signatories to the JCPOA to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, as expressed on 25 May in Vienna, and to the continuing, full and effective implementation of the Plan of Action. In that regard, it is the responsibility of the Security Council to uphold the agreement exactly as it was envisaged, guaranteeing reciprocal commitments for its full good-faith implementation in a constructive atmosphere based on mutual respect. In that context, the Council members are the main guarantors preventing any action that could undermine the Plan of Action. We support any initiative of the Secretary-General that ensures the validity of the JCPOA.
As on other occasions, we are interested in seeing more in-depth information in future reports regarding annex A, since annexes A and B are both integral and complementary to the effective implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Finally, as a peaceful country, Bolivia reaffirms its commitment to preventive diplomacy, multilateralism, non-interference and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, in the understanding that those are universal principles recognized by the international community.

**Mr. Tenya** (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): We would like to express our gratitude for the convening of this meeting and for the briefings by Mrs. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and Ambassador João Pedro Vale de Almeida. We also welcome the presence of the Permanent Representative of Germany at today’s meeting.

As a country committed to multilateralism, international law and the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, Peru gives high priority to safeguarding the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including as it concerns delivery systems, as well as to promoting disarmament and arms control. We therefore affirm the importance of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for the Iranian nuclear programme, achieved thanks to the unity that the members of the Council were able to maintain with regard to that issue for years and adopted unanimously under resolution 2231 (2015), which is still in force.

In the circumstances, we would like to commend the commitment of the parties to preserving the agreement and the need to safeguard it. We express our appreciation and support for the verification and monitoring work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also want to underline the importance of ensuring that Iran continues to fulfil its obligations in that sensitive area. We take due note of the Iranian compliance, as mentioned by the Secretary-General in his fifth biannual reports (S/2018/601, S/2018/602 and S/2018/624) on the implementation of the JCPOA. We also emphasize the importance of duly investigating the allegations mentioned in the most recent report (S/2017/1030) on the alleged violations of paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

We also underscore the importance of continuing to verify that in accordance with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), Iran does not undertake any ballistic-missile-related activity aimed at launching nuclear weapons, including launches that use such ballistic-missile technology. We believe that the Iranian ballistic-missile programme has the potential to increase regional tensions. We therefore believe that it is important that the Iranian authorities act with extreme prudence. We are particularly concerned about the reports of the alleged delivery of missiles or ballistic technology to the Houthis in Yemen. In that regard, we support the Secretary-General’s proposal to conduct additional outreach and training activities for Member States on the procedures and requests that must be submitted through the Procurement Working Group.

We also believe it appropriate to recall the obligations of all States, pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), with regard to the bans on travel and the transfer of arms and related materiel, and the freezing of assets of the persons and entities listed in the resolution’s attachments.

In conclusion, I affirm Peru’s commitment to the non-proliferation regime, the need to maintain the unity of the Council around its responsibility to ensure the full effectiveness of that regime and its importance for maintaining international peace and security.

**Mr. Alotaibi** (Kuwait) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to thank Mrs. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for her briefing on the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602). I would also like to thank my colleague the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, in his capacity as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), and the observer of the European Union for their briefings. And we welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Germany in this meeting.

We meet today on the agenda item of nuclear non-proliferation to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), against the backdrop of the reports under consideration (S/2018/601, S/2018/602 and S/2018/624), and in the wake of the recent developments with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the decision of the United States to withdraw from it. My delegation has reviewed the three reports before us, including the content of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2018/602) on
Iran’s implementation of its commitments regarding its nuclear programme. We welcome its assertions about that implementation in accordance with the nuclear agreement, as mentioned in the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that have been submitted to the Security Council since January 2016 (see S/2018/624). In that regard, we affirm that Iran should continue to meet all its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Iran should also quickly ratify the Additional Protocol in order to maintain its position as a non-nuclear State.

The State of Kuwait supports all ongoing efforts to ensure security and stability in the region, which has long endured turbulence and war. However, we want to emphasize our firm position on all non-proliferation issues in general, and specifically on declaring the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Nearly three years ago, the State of Kuwait welcomed the adoption of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme under the JCPOA (see S/PV.7488), although we believe that it does not address all the concerns of the region. However, in the spirit of cooperation and support for diplomatic efforts, at the time we expressed the hope that the agreement would help to promote security and stability in the Middle East. Notwithstanding the deteriorating security situation in the region, the ongoing interference in the region’s internal affairs and the destabilization of security and stability at the regional level, we believe that it is important to support and encourage all the parties to the agreement to uphold it and implement its provisions. The State of Kuwait respects and abides by Council resolutions. Nonetheless, the grounds for the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA must be highlighted in order to address all the regional and international concerns related to that agreement.

We are concerned about the findings of the Secretariat involved in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) pertaining to the ballistic missiles fired at Saudi Arabia from Yemen, as well as the issues related to the transfer of arms and military equipment to other States in the region. Although the Secretariat was unable to determine dates for the arms transfers that are mentioned in the report, it remains a very serious issue that threatens security and stability in the region. In that regard, we reiterate our condemnation in the strongest terms of firing ballistic missiles at the sister Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as they are a threat to its national security and the civilian facilities of our sister countries in the Gulf.

We underscore the position of the League of Arab States in its last summit, which calls for maintaining security and stability in the countries of the region, ensuring the safety of their peoples, committing to non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respecting their sovereignty and maintaining good neighbourliness, in accordance with international instruments and norms. Meanwhile all acts of provocation that undermine trust and threaten security and stability in the region must cease.

In conclusion, the State of Kuwait reaffirms that the Security Council should continue to shoulder its responsibilities.

Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I too would like to thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Ambassador Van Oosterom and Ambassador Vale de Almeida for their useful briefings and reports to the Security Council today.

We welcome the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602), which endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. The nuclear agreement with Iran was negotiated over a period of 12 years and was a success for diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It has also been endorsed by the Security Council. As we have consistently stated, its continued implementation is crucial. The agreement has ensured the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, which in itself contributes to stability in the region and beyond. In that regard, we note that Iran continues to fulfil its nuclear-related obligations, according to the most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is for that reason that as we have stated previously, we deeply regret the decision by the United States to withdraw from the agreement. Its withdrawal poses a serious risk to the international peace and security architecture and could have negative repercussions for global non-proliferation efforts. The European Union (EU) is unified in its full support for the deal and its implementation. Sweden and the EU will work to preserve the JCPOA. It is vital to ensure that the deal continues to be respected and that Iran continues to fulfil its commitment.
We remain seriously concerned about reported violations by Iran of the arms embargo and the travel ban put in place under resolution 2231 (2015). Any new information pertinent to such cases should be verified by the Secretariat. We have also expressed our concern about the previously reported ballistic-missile launches, which we believe to be inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). We echo the Secretary-General’s call on all Member States of the region to take the necessary steps to fully implement their obligations in relation to resolution 2231 (2015), including those on the travel ban, as well as on asset freezes on individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to the resolution. We would appreciate further information in future reports with regard to the reported seizure and transfer of dual-use items to Iran without the prior approval of the Security Council.

There is strong EU support for broad relations and dialogue with Iran, including on regional issues, the worrisome human rights situation and the principles of the rule of law. All actors in the region, including Iran, must come together to de-escalate tensions and contribute to finding political solutions to the ongoing conflicts and crises in the region. However, those matters should be treated as separate from the JCPOA and resolution 2231 (2015).

The President (spoke in Russian): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation.

We would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for presenting the biannual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2018/602). We also note the effective work being done by Mr. Karel van Oosterom, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). We would also like to thank Mr. Vale de Almeida for his briefing.

We fully agree with the Secretary-General in his report when he states that he deeply regrets the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and points out that issues not within the scope of the agreement should not be used as a pretext for dismantling it. In that regard, we would like to recall that the Russian Federation has frequently taken the floor in the Council to condemn the irresponsible attempts by the United States to torpedo the JCPOA and has expressed the hope that reason would nonetheless prevail and issues of global security and stability would no longer be held hostage to Washington’s internal political processes. Now, following the withdrawal of the United States from the agreement, we are obliged to conclude that our calls went unheeded and that the unique potential of the JCPOA, which has not been allowed to function at full strength, is under threat. Furthermore, the step taken by the American side will do serious harm both to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to the interests of security in the Middle East.

Considering the significance that the unilateral actions by the United States have for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and the JCPOA, we were astonished that the report mentions it only in passing. It is simply unfathomable that it was possible to draft a document entitled “Implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)” with no mention whatever of the fact that Washington’s reimposition of unilateral sanctions is a direct violation not only of its obligations under the JCPOA, but also of resolution 2231 (2015).

It is also striking that in referencing the resolution’s call to all Member States to support the implementation of the JCPOA and refrain from actions that could undermine it, the report completely ignores the public statements by the leadership of the United States and a number of other countries that fly in the face of that position. We are surprised at the complete absence in the report of any mention that Tehran has started a dispute-settlement process under the JCPOA related to the irresponsible actions of the United States, which the Security Council and the Secretary-General were duly informed in a letter of 11 May from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran. In general, the report is overtly unbalanced and more like a collection of unproven accusations about Iran than an attempt to paint an objective picture of the situation concerning the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), an approach that is all the more incomprehensible considering that none of the examples of Tehran’s alleged violations of the resolution have been confirmed, owing to insufficient information and the lack of a firm body of proof.

We are once again compelled to point out that it is unacceptable for the Secretariat to carry out any so-called investigations of potential violations of resolution 2231 (2015) without a clear mandate from the Security Council, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the note by the President dated 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). We again emphasize that Secretariat staff do not have the
qualifications or expertise for analysing and evaluating missile systems or conventional weapons. In our view, therefore, the technical information in the report on the study of the missile components in Saudi Arabia that were fired from Yemen proves nothing and is simply groundless, while there was no independent expert analysis of the Secretariat’s conclusions. On top of that, the very fact and the timeline of Iran’s alleged transfers of the ballistic-missile systems or their components to the Houthis have not been established, as the report emphasizes. The report therefore indicates an absence of any of the elements that constitute a violation. The same applies to the Secretariat’s illegitimate inspections in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

In the absence of any facts pointing to a violation of the requirements of resolution 2231 (2015), the need for the inclusion in the report of a reference to the facts of the participation of Iran’s Defence Industries Organization in a foreign arms exhibition in Iraq, or of a memorandum of understanding between the Iranian construction company Khatam al-Anbiya and the Syrian authorities, raises serious questions. We must continue to insist that the report should not contain information from open sources or references to unverified or unverifiable information provided by individual countries, especially when it is not even being brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. We believe such practices are completely unacceptable and consider them malicious attempts to create a groundlessly negative climate around Iran by circumventing the Council.

In connection with all of this, we would like to remind the Secretariat yet again that paragraph 7 of the note by the President of 16 January 2016 provides for semi-annual reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) as a whole, not its individual parts. We hope that future reports will be prepared strictly in line with the existing mandate and that all activities that run counter to the Council’s decisions, in particular the entry into force of the unilateral measures announced by the United States on 8 May, will receive due attention.

At this point, the only way of preserving the agreement is the conscientious implementation by all the remaining States participating in it of the obligations they voluntarily undertook. In that context, I would like to note that there is clear evidence in the Secretary-General’s report of Iran’s inarguable compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA, which has consistently been confirmed not just by the International Atomic Energy Agency but also by the Secretariat, which, as can be seen from the report, has no verified proof to the contrary.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the Russian Federation remains committed to the unconditional and comprehensive implementation of the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Despite the withdrawal of the United States, the implementation of the JCPOA by all of its remaining participants is currently continuing in full.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Germany.

Mr. Heusgen (Germany): I thank the Security Council for inviting Germany to this discussion today. We are participating here as part of the 4+2 group that negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and also as part of the Joint Commission that is overseeing the implementation of the JCPOA.

I would like to echo others’ thanks for the briefings by Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union, and our colleague the representative of the Netherlands. We are particularly grateful to Karel van Oosterom for the work that he has put into this.

We welcome the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/602) and do not believe that it is malicious. We think it is constructive, and that its concentration on annex B is legitimate. I also support the proposal that perhaps next time around it should focus more on annex A, but I think it is legitimate that while looking at the overall picture, the report should concentrate on annex B, because we believe that there are serious things to report in that regard.

But before I come to annex B, I would also like to address generally the question of the JCPOA, endorsed by resolution 2231 (2015). On that topic I can be brief. Indeed, I can only echo the words of everybody around the table, with one exception, and that is that they all support the JCPOA and regret that the United States has left it. We believe that the JCPOA builds on and strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It prevents a potential nuclear arms race in the region. It is essential for our national and European security that there not be nuclear proliferation or a nuclear arms race in the region. We believe that the
European security situation has become worse. We also believe that leaving the JCPOA undermines effective multilateralism and the rules-based international order, of which the nuclear-non-proliferation regime is a very important pillar. It is therefore clear to us that Germany, together with its European partners, will remain committed to the JCPOA as long as Iran is in compliance, and we urge Iran to abide by all the nuclear-related restrictions that it is committed to under the JCPOA. The latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency has just confirmed that it has been doing so.

I will now to turn to annex B. In our view, its full and effective implementation is very important for the maintenance of regional and international security. We encourage everyone to ensure respect for annex B and compliance with it. The findings of the Secretary-General on arms transfers and ballistic-missile activities, which are documented in the report, give rise to serious concerns. In that regard, we are particularly concerned about the missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, Iran’s non-compliance with the arms embargo against Yemen and the transfer to Yemen of ballistic-missile technology. The report also points to Iranian arms deliveries in the Middle East. We call on Iran to put a stop to all of this, as such actions violate binding provisions of annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).

Germany is also deeply concerned about the development of Iran’s ballistic-missile programme, and we call on Iran to end the programme and all testing. Iran’s arms-transfer and missile-programme activities in the region are destabilizing and have negative effects for European security. Instead of investing in violations of resolution 2231 (2015), we again appeal to Iran to invest in building trust in the region and in abiding by the resolution.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.