



# Security Council

Seventy-first year

*Provisional*

**7776**<sup>th</sup> meeting

Friday, 23 September 2016, 10 a.m.

New York

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*President:* Mr. McCully/Van Bohemen . . . . . (New Zealand)

*Members:*

Angola . . . . .	Mr. Gaspar Martins
China . . . . .	Mr. Liu Jieyi
Egypt . . . . .	Mr. Badr
France . . . . .	Mr. Delattre
Japan . . . . .	Mr. Bessho
Malaysia . . . . .	Mr. Ibrahim
Russian Federation. . . . .	Mr. Churkin
Senegal . . . . .	Mr. Ndiaye
Spain . . . . .	Mr. Ybañez
Ukraine . . . . .	Mr. Klimkin/Mr. Fesko
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . .	Mr. Sharma
United States of America. . . . .	Mr. Kerry
Uruguay. . . . .	Mr. Bermúdez
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) . . . . .	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

## Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

### **Adoption of the agenda**

*The agenda was adopted.*

### **Maintenance of international peace and security**

#### **Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament**

**The President:** I wish to warmly welcome the Foreign Ministers and other representatives present in the Security Council Chamber. Their presence today underscores the importance of the subject matter under discussion.

In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following to participate in this meeting: Mr. Kim Won-soo, Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Mr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/800, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Andorra, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

I give the floor to His Excellency Mr. John Kerry, Secretary of State of the United States of America.

**Mr. Kerry** (United States of America): I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting. Twenty years ago, President Bill Clinton entered the General Assembly with a pen in hand, the pen that he had used to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the same pen used by President John F. Kennedy decades earlier to bring the Limited Test-Ban Treaty into life. At the time, President Clinton declared the Treaty would be yet another essential step towards a century in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons could be further reduced and ultimately eliminated.

Today, our countries have an opportunity to vote once again to sign onto and to reaffirm the CTBT's promise of a safer, more secure and more peaceful planet. The draft resolution (S/2016/800) that we have an opportunity to adopt this morning is a strong and necessary statement of our principles and promises as a global community. It reaffirms the *de facto* norm — I emphasize, a norm — in the world today against nuclear testing. It acknowledges the legitimate interests of States that fully and faithfully renounce nuclear weapons to receive assurances against the use of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and that those assurances will be upheld. It reinforces the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its disarmament goals. It builds support for the international efforts to strengthen verification and monitoring systems. And it encourages nations to make the necessary preparations for the day when the Treaty enters into force.

I want to emphasize that the draft resolution does not impose a legal prohibition on testing, nor does it compel any Government to adopt new reporting requirements. But it does reinforce the core purposes and objectives of the CTBT itself, that is, to diminish our reliance on nuclear devices, to reduce competition among nuclear Powers and to promote responsible disarmament.

Next month in Reykjavik, the thirtieth anniversary of the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting will be celebrated and remembered, and I want everybody to think about where we were. I grew up in a world of hiding under my desk in school and being told to take cover and train for the possibility of a nuclear war — none of

which would have done any good, as we know. I can remember years in the Senate when I wanted to be on the arms control observer group, with luminaries such as Pat Moynihan and Ted Kennedy and John Warner and Sam Nunn, people who worked a lifetime to move towards responsible efforts here. Throughout the years, we watched as the United States and the former Soviet Union engaged in the arms race — tit for tat, each doing something that led the other to feel they had to respond — until we had 50,000 warheads facing each other, until that moment of Reykjavik, when the two Presidents came out and said, “This is insanity; we have to move in a different direction”.

Ever since then, that is exactly what the world has been doing. We have moved in a different direction. From 50,000 warheads we are now down to about 1,550, and we have proposed to move even further down. Brilliant people have spent a lifetime looking at this — former Secretary of Defense Jim Schlesinger, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry and Sam Nunn — people whom one would not expect to see talking about the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. Most recently, the United States and Iran spent two long years negotiating what everybody thought was the improbable. Two nations that had not talked to each other since 1979 began a conversation in the room right in back of the Chamber, the first time I came here for the General Assembly. We turned that into a nation actually giving up a nuclear programme and making it clear to the world it was willing to move away from the path of a nuclear weapon in order to make the world safer.

Two decades after that process began, therefore, there may be some who question the value of pursuing this Treaty or investing in its adoption, because the world has changed dramatically. Almost every member of the United Nations has now renounced the option of testing, and responsible Governments everywhere are committed to reducing the dangers that are posed by nuclear materials and nuclear weapons. Yet we have been reminded in recent weeks of the absolute necessity of supporting the CTBT. North Korea’s latest nuclear test is a challenge to the Security Council’s leadership. It is a challenge to the norm that I just articulated. It is a challenge and a direct threat to international stability and peace. It is a dangerous and reckless act of provocation that we have to summon a determined and effective answer to.

Today, this morning, is an affirmation of our willingness to make that clear, to give that answer, to take a step that says we will not lose our commitment, we will remain committed to moving in the direction of ending the threat of nuclear war. Today is also a reminder of the value of the CTBT. The actions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and our response demonstrate the effectiveness of the International Monitoring system, the International Data Centre and the broader verification and detection regime. This entire episode has offered a stark reminder of why the infrastructure of the Treaty is so vital and why adopting this draft resolution is so important.

Our affirmative vote here is a sign of our unwavering commitment to a safer world in which nuclear technology is used solely for peaceful purposes and the risk of nuclear conflict is no more.

Right now, the United States Government is engaged in a process with the Senate, where we have many new members who have not previously been part of this debate, in which we are beginning to literally explain to and educate those members about what the advances in technology do for us. In today’s modern world of virtual capacity, computerization and artificial intelligence, we do not need to blow up weapons to know what we can do. We have the ability to do this, and I would simply like to say to everyone in the Chamber that I can think of few greater gifts that we and our generation could give to the next than an affirmation that we will continue to move away from the possibilities of nuclear weaponry. Our action today can show people everywhere that a world without nuclear weapons might actually be possible, and that we are going to do everything responsible in our capacity to make that day a reality.

**The President:** I now call on His Excellency Mr. Pavlo Klimkin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

**Mr. Klimkin (Ukraine):** The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) process is of course a cornerstone of global security and, as one of its staunch supporters, we welcome the Security Council’s initiative in adopting today’s draft resolution (S/2016/800), aimed at encouraging continuing progress towards the Treaty’s entry into force. That is fundamental, and we all understand that there are a number of challenges involved, such as those just mentioned by Secretary Kerry regarding the fact

that North Korea continues to be able to conduct nuclear tests. But we also understand — and my own diplomatic career began precisely in this area of nuclear disarmament — how important it is that we strengthen the entire non-proliferation regime.

In drafting today's resolution, we decided to include the issue of security guarantees, which has been the subject of discussion within the CTBT process for a long time. I would like to recall in that regard that the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons included a clear clause on the necessity for fully respecting all existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Since today's draft resolution mentions security assurances given in 1995, it is vitally important to keep in mind that we also have other assurances, such as those in the Budapest Memorandum, signed in December 1994, which included very clear obligations for the three nuclear States concerned regarding respect for the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine. The paragraph following that part obliged all those States to affirm

“their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine”.

The primary breach of that security assurance by a particular country — namely, the Russian Federation — raises two basic issues. One, of course, is whether we can trust the security assurances that are mentioned in today's draft resolution; the issue of trust as it relates to the whole non-proliferation regime is also of fundamental importance. The second is whether those security guarantees are sufficient to enable us to achieve real progress towards nuclear disarmament. I would therefore like to urge the Security Council to look further down the road of the process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and all our related efforts, and to once again remind everyone of the absolute necessity and crucial importance of respect for all existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Any breach of such security assurances should be seen as a fundamental challenge for all of us.

**The President:** I now give the floor to Mr. Hesham Badr, Vice-Minister for Multilateral Relations and International Security of Egypt.

**Mr. Badr (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*):** Contrary to our usual rule, I will deliver my statement in English, owing to the technical nature of the topic under discussion and also so that we can be sure, in view of its vital importance, that our message is accurately conveyed.

(*spoke in English*)

Egypt's commitment to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is unwavering. For decades, nuclear disarmament has been a top priority of our foreign policy, and it continues to be a significant one for the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Our interest is founded in our long-standing belief that nuclear weapons present a grave threat to international peace and security and that collective global action is needed to eliminate them.

It is in that context that I wish to express our discontent and dissatisfaction with today's draft resolution (S/2016/800) on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is seriously flawed and does not deserve the Security Council's attention. Its contribution to the nuclear disarmament regime is minimal and ineffective. Rather than strengthening that regime, the draft resolution squanders an opportunity to emphasize how urgent it is that we advance nuclear disarmament. We regret that it was introduced without incorporating several essential amendments suggested by my delegation. I would like to address six specific concerns that we have about the draft resolution.

The first is the fact that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum for addressing the CTBT in the way the draft resolution attempts to do. Developments and progress related to the Treaty are regularly examined by the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The Council's intrusion into the dynamics and technicalities of the CTBT creates unnecessary duality and generates an atmosphere that is not conducive to inclusive deliberations. All States parties and signatories to the CTBT should be fully engaged in any discussion of relevance both to it and to its technical bodies and verification regime. Such discussion should not be limited to members of the Security Council.

Secondly, the draft resolution fails to highlight the centrality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Despite a modest reference to it in the preamble to the draft resolution, the NPT is completely overlooked in its operative



paragraphs, despite being the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is surprising that, while the draft resolution encourages promotion of the CTBT's universality, it makes no reference whatever to the importance of achieving universality for the NPT. What is the reason for the eagerness about the former and complete silence about the latter? We call on all NPT member States to promote the universality of the NPT, promptly and actively. As the key foundation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the NPT deserves greater prominence.

Thirdly, it is unusual, if not remarkable, that a draft resolution dealing with the CTBT fails to adequately address the urgency of concrete steps towards achieving nuclear disarmament. While nuclear testing should certainly be ceased in its entirety, as the Treaty clearly advocates, the international community has a much more pressing obligation and responsibility to advance nuclear disarmament. If the Council is genuinely concerned about the perils of nuclear weapons and their potential use or testing, it would only be logically coherent to treat the cause and not just the symptom. By exclusively addressing nuclear testing in this draft resolution, the Council bypasses the central point that the continued possession of nuclear weapons in itself, and the constant prolongation by those that possess them to engage in meaningful disarmament, is what challenges, if not threatens, global stability.

This draft resolution, inappropriately, makes no reference to the obligation stipulated in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that calls on nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament. It turns a blind eye to the outcome documents of the NPT Review Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010, including the 13 practical steps. In fact, the draft resolution does not adequately respond to the CTBT's own preambular section, which stressed the

“need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

Nuclear disarmament therefore should have been the priority in this draft resolution. It should have expressed its unequivocal rejection of the modernization of stockpiles of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States and the role they devote to nuclear weapons in

their strategic doctrines. Let me take this opportunity, therefore, to categorically reject the notion put forth by some States that nuclear stockpile maintenance is consistent with NPT objectives. It is not. The maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons runs contrary to the legal obligation and spirit of the NPT, which explicitly calls for effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons.

Consequently, the fact that nuclear disarmament is practically absent from this draft resolution severely undermines its credibility and erodes its effectiveness. It sends the wrong message to the international community, that the Security Council is selective, biased and engaged in a cherry-picking approach when it comes to the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The message this draft resolution sends is: Testing no, possession and modernization of stockpiles yes.

Fourthly, this draft resolution inequitably and unreasonably puts those that possess nuclear weapons with those that do not on an equal footing. It calls on States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosions and urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the CTBT, particularly the eight remaining annex 2 States, to do so without delay. The draft resolution ought to have placed special responsibility on nuclear-weapon States and States non-party to the NPT. To equate States that are party to the NPT with those that are not, while simultaneously calling on both categories of States to refrain from nuclear testing, is an unconvincing argument. Rationally, the onus rests chiefly on those States that actually possess the capability to conduct nuclear tests.

Fifthly, the draft resolution's intrusive nature in the work of the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat is counterproductive. The Secretariat is, and should remain, a State-driven body that should solely determine its direction and preserve its prerogative to take decisions independently, without external interference. The Security Council should not be in a position to meddle in the work of the Secretariat and intrude in the practice of reporting its conduct. It is up to the Preparatory Commission to decide what is conducive and favourable to its work, in accordance with the Organization's priorities and aspirations of its member States. The draft resolution sets an unwelcome

precedent and may be perceived as an encroachment by the Security Council on the independent standing of international organizations and treaty bodies, dictating certain procedures and measures to be undertaken, despite not being endorsed by the collective will of its member States.

Sixthly, progress pertaining to the verification regime of the CTBT falls within the prerogative of the Preparatory Commission. According to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 85 per cent of the verification regime has been successfully provisionally set up. Progress in all three pillars of the regime — namely, the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center and on-site inspection — is noted. The provisional nature of that regime should be maintained, in accordance with the Treaty provisions, and the official operational status launched upon the Treaty's entry into force.

The draft resolution also reflects a puzzling dilemma. While some States express enthusiasm here in the Council about the urgency of completing the verification regime, they contradictorily do not shoulder their responsibilities by ratifying the CTBT, and their legislative branches repeatedly refuse to ratify the Treaty, thereby precluding the possibility that the verification regime would come to fruition. We hope that there is some explanation for this dichotomous behaviour and contradictory message.

Egypt was among the first countries that negotiated and signed the CTBT. We fully support the purpose and objectives of the Treaty. We seek a world free of nuclear weapons, including nuclear testing. We swiftly and unequivocally condemn those that conduct nuclear tests. And we remain committed to the universality of the NPT and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Egypt has been, and will continue to be, a staunch advocate of a robust nuclear non-proliferation regime that is geared towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

**The President:** I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

*A vote was taken by show of hands.*

*In favour:*

Angola, China, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

*Against:*

None

*Abstaining:*

Egypt

**The President:** There were 14 votes in favour, none against and 1 abstention. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 2310 (2016).

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

I call on His Excellency Mr. Mankeur Ndiaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senegalese abroad of the Republic of Senegal.

**Mr. Ndiaye (Senegal) (*spoke in French*):** We are gathered here again to express our commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 20 years after it was opened for signature here in New York on 24 September 1996. The adoption of the Treaty was the result of grave concerns over an alarming nuclear arms race and an attempt to save the world from the terror that loomed over it. Over 2,000 nuclear tests were carried out between 1945 and 1996. Twenty years after the signing of that instrument, that number has drastically decreased to nine, which is still disconcerting, but promising, in our efforts to achieve the desired goal.

According to the Treaty, States parties pledged to refrain from all tests and nuclear explosions, whether for peaceful or military purposes and regardless of where they were conducted — in the atmosphere, underground, in outer space or under. Nonetheless, in spite of its scope and, in particular, its importance, the Treaty has not yet entered into force because of an insufficient number of ratifications by the annex 2 States. To date, 166 States are parties to the Treaty, including 36 of the 44 listed in the annex, whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to be entered into force. That shows the importance of resolution 2310 (2016), which the Council just adopted, with the support of the Senegalese delegation, to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of such an important instrument. I thank the American delegation for having submitted the present resolution and for leading the consultations that led to its adoption.

Because of its commitment to the ideal of a world free of nuclear weapons, Senegal has committed to

the goal of making this historic moment the start of a new era, marked by a renewal of the pledge to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. That is why the Senegalese delegation commends the importance given to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the crucial foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The United Nations can never state it enough: the main objective is not just non-proliferation but nuclear disarmament, pursuant to article VI of the NPT. Until that goal is achieved, it is crucial, if not necessary, to continue to strengthen, on the one hand, the commitment of the non-nuclear States to non-proliferation and, on the other hand, the determination of those who possess such weapons to adhere to negative security assurances. Senegal therefore implores all of the countries that have not yet expressed their consent to be bound by the Treaty, in particular annex 2 States, to take the appropriate measures in that regard to build a safer world.

Resolution 2310 (2016) takes notes of the joint ministerial statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty drafted by the permanent members of the Security Council, which highlights their commitment to nuclear disarmament and the entry into force of the Treaty and reaffirms the moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests and explosions, while awaiting the entry into force of this instrument.

I wish to reaffirm Senegal's commitment to disarmament and to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and by extension to the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established a nuclear-free-weapon zone in Africa. I would like to take this opportunity to invite the States Parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to honour their obligations, and the States that are not yet party to the Treaty, namely, the annex 2 States, to step up their ratification efforts for the good of the entire international community.

**The President:** I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Ignacio Ybáñez, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain.

**Mr. Ybáñez (Spain)** (*spoke in Spanish*): Spain co-sponsored resolution 2310 (2016) because we believe that it is an important step on the path to the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, it is already a fundamental element

of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. I welcome the presence at the Security Council table of Mr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and, of course, that of Under-Secretary-General Kim Won-soo. We are conveying an excellent message together as the Council, the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT to encourage its entry into force without further delay.

The Treaty has been signed by 183 States and ratified by 166 States. Spain ratified the Treaty in 1998. I would like to implore the States that have not already done so, in particular the States listed in annex 2, to ratify or sign the Treaty. This resolution is another step towards the full de-legitimization by the international community of nuclear tests, and it contributes to strengthening the prohibition on nuclear tests as a de facto international rule. However, the moratorium is not a replacement for the entry into force of the CTBT, which is our main aim.

In addition, I would like firmly to condemn the nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 6 January and 9 September, which were in violation of various Security Council resolutions. Such tests are a serious threat to international peace and security and to regional stability.

Lastly, the resolution that we have just adopted must serve to strengthen the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO. With this resolution, the Security Council acknowledges the maturity of the verification system set up by the Preparatory Commission and the work of the Provisional Technical Secretariat in that regard. I trust that the resolution will give the impetus needed to complete the International Monitoring System.

**The President:** I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Alok Sharma, Member of Parliament and Minister for Asia and the Pacific of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

**Mr. Sharma (United Kingdom):** The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of the important resolution 2310 (2016). This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Today's resolution is both well-timed and an important contribution to the goals of the Treaty. Today's call for



the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a tangible step towards a safer and more stable world.

The United Kingdom was one of the first signatories to the CTBT in 1996 and we ratified it in 1998. We regret that the Treaty has not yet entered into force, but further ratifications would demonstrate the global commitment towards ending nuclear-test explosions. We welcome the newest ratifications, by Burma and Swaziland. They joined the 166 States in total to have done so. Further ratifications would also send a clear message to the global community that nuclear explosive testing will not be tolerated.

The entry into force of the Treaty has clear advantages for all of us. Such benefits include a fully operational International Monitoring System and an International Data Centre, as well as the on-site inspection element of the Treaty. Combined, that would ensure that any State tempted to conduct a nuclear explosive test would know that it could not do so without facing detection. It is worth remembering that, when the Treaty was written, no one knew if the International Monitoring System would actually be possible. Today, we know that it is. All State signatories have equal access to the regular data it provides, and such monitoring can only improve as the system continues to grow. It is now 89 per cent complete. The success of the system depends on the dedication and collaboration of many countries that have established stations.

Given the importance of those objectives and their contribution to effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures, it is regrettable that some chose not to vote in favour today. We believe that it was a well-intentioned and balanced Security Council resolution and we thank the United States for introducing it for adoption.

We have come a long way towards ending nuclear explosive testing. Only one State, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, continues to undertake such activity. We condemn the recent nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which as well as going against the spirit and purpose of the Treaty is a direct violation of binding Security Council resolutions. As the Council agreed only a fortnight ago, there is now a need to work immediately on further significant measures in response to provocations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United Kingdom will be consulting with our

international partners to help deliver a robust response, making clear to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it must engage constructively with the international community.

In conclusion, the United Kingdom calls upon all those States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty, so as to bring it into force and so end explosive nuclear testing forever.

**Mr. Churkin** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation is committed to the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which, as is well-known, our country ratified as early as 2001. We hope that resolution 2310 (2016), adopted today, will help a maximum number of States, especially those listed in annex 2 to the CTBT, sign and ratify the Treaty.

We believe that the moratoriums on nuclear testing, as important as they are, cannot serve as a full-fledged replacement for legally binding international norms. The Treaty, rather than national moratoriums, should be the benchmark for States' responsible behaviour. Unfortunately, the pen that signed the Treaty, President Bill Clinton's — which Secretary of State Kerry mentioned this morning — was not that of President Barack Obama, and the United States has found itself unable to ratify the CTBT. We hope that the next President of the United States will be more zealous in his desire to see the Treaty ratified.

We would not want the adoption of this resolution to serve as an unwelcome precedent for the Security Council's interference in the remit of other international structures, or the creation of obligations under an international treaty for those States that have not joined that treaty. In this case, we feel we were able to avoid such a risk. Today, the Council adopted a balanced resolution that does not clash with the provisions of the CTBT. It is for that reason that we voted in favour of it.

The fact that the delegation of Ukraine always seems to step outside the parameters of our discussion at the Security Council has become an unfortunate tradition, and we do not intend to yield to such provocations.

**Mr. Liu Jieyi** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Tomorrow will mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature in New York of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years ago, in order to comprehensively ban nuclear-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, thereby effectively



advancing the process of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and enhancing international peace and security, the international community negotiated and concluded the CTBT. Over the past 20 years, the nuclear-test ban has become a common understanding of the international community.

Today's adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2310 (2016) is of great significance in commemorating the opening for signature of the Treaty, reaffirming the purpose of the nuclear-test ban and pushing for an early entry into force of the Treaty.

China has always stood for the comprehensive prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. We have committed not to be the first-users of nuclear weapons and we have committed unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

China was among the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We have been steadfast in maintaining the object and purpose of the Treaty and in abiding by our nuclear-test moratorium commitment. We will continue to work with all sides to push for the early entry into force of the Treaty and make unremitting efforts for the realization of the comprehensive prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Delattre** (France) (*spoke in French*): France welcomes the adoption today of resolution 2310 (2016), which we co-sponsored, and thanks the United States for having sponsored it as well.

The resolution urges all States that have not done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to ensure its entry into force as soon as possible. It reaffirms the importance of nuclear-testing moratoriums and urges all States to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear explosion.

The CTBT is an essential step in the gradual implementation of the nuclear-disarmament process, and its entry into force is France's foremost priority in this area. The CTBT and national moratoriums are fundamental instruments for nuclear non-proliferation and international security. Its importance is all the clearer in the context of the serious and repeated acts committed by North Korea, which carried out a fifth nuclear test earlier this month. France and the Security

Council condemned these provocations, which are very serious ones, with the utmost firmness.

It is crucial that all States live up to their responsibilities today by heeding our call for the universalization of the CTBT, as set forth in the resolution we have just adopted. This is especially true for those States whose signature and ratification are necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty.

France was among the first States to sign the CTBT, in September 1996, and to ratify it, in 1998. As a responsible nuclear Power, we have taken strong and exemplary steps, such as the dismantling of our nuclear-testing site in the Pacific Ocean and putting an end to our production of plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons.

We align ourselves all States members of the Security Council in sending this message of mobilization for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Such a prohibition has become an example of responsible behaviour at the international level. Only one State has conducted nuclear testing in the twenty-first century, and its behaviour is unanimously condemned at every opportunity.

On the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty, France wishes to reiterate its resolute commitment to the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible. With this resolution, the responsibility of every State is engaged today more than ever.

**Mr. Bessho** (Japan): The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important pillar of the nuclear-disarmament regime. Japan is playing a leading role as a co-facilitator of the early entry into force of the CTBT.

Japan welcomes the adoption of resolution 2310 (2016), which calls upon all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear tests. We believe that this will boost momentum towards nuclear disarmament as well as the early entry into force of the Treaty.

This resolution clearly demonstrates the collective desire of the international community to promote the nuclear-test ban. Japan appreciates the leadership of the United States on this resolution and is happy to be a sponsor.

North Korea has conducted its second nuclear test in a single year. These nuclear tests by North Korea are flagrant and unacceptable violations of

the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2270 (2016), and pose a serious challenge to the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Japan strongly condemns the tests by North Korea and continues to demand that North Korea stop these provocations and immediately comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

The Security Council has already agreed to begin work immediately on appropriate measures, under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, for a Security Council draft resolution. Japan looks forward to closely working with other Council members to that end.

In conclusion, Japan reiterates its commitment to working with the relevant countries on the early entry into force of the CTBT.

**Mr. Ramírez Carreño** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela voted in favour of resolution 2310 (2016), pertaining to the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), because we believe it to be a positive initiative for making progress towards the priority objective of nuclear disarmament and for countering the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and their possible use, which would have devastating consequences for humankind.

Although the Security Council has spoken on this matter today, we believe that it is up to the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT to address this important matter in line with their mandates.

The elimination of nuclear weapons requires the joint efforts of the States Members of the United Nations to ensure the effective implementation of multilateral commitments leading to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to which my country is a State party.

Although we welcome the resolution's contribution in the area of peace and security, we would have liked the text to include more categorical language with regard to the commitment that States possessing nuclear weapons should assume in order to eliminate those arsenals. We also believe that the mention in the resolution of the joint statement by the five permanent

members of the Council dilutes the commitment of the nuclear-weapon Powers when it comes to the goal of disarmament and adhering to the provisions of the NPT and the CTBT.

On the twentieth anniversary of the CTBT, we would like to stress its contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, we urge the eight remaining annex 2 States, whose ratifications are needed for its entry into force, to sign or ratify this legal instrument without further delay.

My delegation reiterates that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity. It is also a violation of international law and international humanitarian law, as was expressed by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion on the *Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons* (A/51/218, annex).

In that regard, we call on all States to refrain from carrying out nuclear tests, including sub-critical experiments and those carried out via simulation, with the aim of developing and improving nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We believe that such actions are detrimental to the objectives of disarmament, the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the provisions of the NPT and CTBT, as they weaken the impact of those instruments as disarmament measures.

The Latin American region has shown its decisive support for the CTBT, as can be seen in the special declaration, issued in connection with the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the CTBT, adopted by the Heads of State of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) at their Summit held in Quito in January. My country is also party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area. In addition to those achievements, I would mention the declaration of the second CELAC Summit held in Havana, in January 2014, which declared Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace.

We continue to encourage the international community to redouble efforts to give effect to the commitment agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was reaffirmed at subsequent conferences, with regard to

the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That would be a measure of particular importance for peace and security in that troubled region.

In that context, we also need concrete measures on disarmament and non proliferation on the part of States that possess nuclear weapons, in line with the obligations incumbent upon them under article VI of the NPT and measures adopted at successive NPT Review Conferences since 2000.

We reiterate the call for the negotiation and conclusion of universal legally binding instrument on unconditional security guarantees to all non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to achieving the complete elimination of this category of weapons of mass destruction, irrespective of its type or geographical location.

Finally, once again, we urge States that have not yet done to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the only viable legal instrument for prohibiting nuclear tests.

**Mr. Gaspar Martins** (Angola): The Republic of Angola very much welcomes and is satisfied with the adoption of resolution 2310 (2016) this morning.

Having signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty right after the conclusion of the Treaty negotiations, Angola ratified it only in 2015 due to the military conflict with apartheid South Africa, that, as is known, disposed of a nuclear arsenal. After the end of apartheid, South Africa took the wise decision to give up its nuclear arsenal. By doing so, it contributed decisively in materializing the African position enshrined in the Treaty of Pelindaba, which made Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The adoption of today's resolution takes place just a few days after the Security Council considered the question of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. By adopting resolution 2310 (2016), the Council is taking a comprehensive stand on the issue of nuclear tests. We would like to make three comments on the issue.

First, resolution 2310 (2016) makes real sense if it represents an effective contribution to the universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty through its ratification by all Members of the United Nations and the entire international community.

Secondly, the resolution makes full sense in the case the Treaty constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, thereby contributing to the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. More than instruments of war, nuclear weapons are instruments of annihilation, since their objective is basically the destruction of human lives and of the means of human existence, without a real military purpose.

Yesterday in the General Assembly debate (see A/71/PV.15) we heard very poignant testimony by the President of the Marshall Islands about the tragic human and environmental consequences for the South Pacific region caused by the nuclear tests that took place in the region some decades ago.

Thirdly, Angola voted in favour of this resolution as a sign of its clear stance against nuclear proliferation. We would welcome the further adoption by the Security Council of clear measures, without double standards, to condemn nuclear tests in the different regions where we still see the question of proliferation prevailing. We believe that, with double standards and without our clear stance, we would be weakening the resolution we have just adopted this morning.

**Mr. Ibrahim** (Malaysia): Today, the Security Council delivers on its commitment to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 24 September 1996. Malaysia wishes to convey its appreciation to delegations and contributors involved in negotiating the text for their constructive engagement and tremendous work in that regard. We remain hopeful that resolution 2310 (2016) is a positive move, from the standpoint of the Council, to encourage the early entry into force of the CTBT. In that context, Malaysia voted in favour of the resolution.

It must also be emphasized that our commitment and that of the international community towards general and complete disarmament can be realized only through the entry into force of the Treaty. We wish to put on record that, while we need to see incrementally positive progress to ensure that the CTBT enters into force, we iterate that these measures do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect to end nuclear-weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions.

My delegation notes with serious concern that the CTBT has yet to enter into force. As we celebrate two decades since the Treaty was opened for signature in



1996, we firmly believe that more could be done to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty, including maintaining all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon-test explosions.

As the CTBT contains no provisions that commit the nuclear-weapon States and States with nuclear-weapon capabilities to total nuclear disarmament, the call enshrined in the Treaty cannot be disregarded and needs to be further recognized. My delegation has some reservations that resolution 2310 (2016) does not sufficiently recognize that fact.

While we support the spirit and intent of the commemoration of the CTBT resolution, the resolution is not a substitute for, nor should it be construed as, a sufficient effort by all CTBT signatory States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, it is crucial that States with nuclear-weapon capabilities undertake their responsibilities to ratify the Treaty. In that respect, we urge the annex 2 States to do so at the earliest possibility.

Our responsibility is henceforth far from complete. We remain committed to working together in good faith and with strengthened resolve to facilitate the implementation of resolution 2310 (2016). While fully understanding that the text is a product of constructive negotiations, the fact remains that the challenge ahead lies in ensuring that there should be no precedent on referencing documents in Council resolutions that can be agreed to by only a handful of States. That is the basis for Malaysia's position of ensuring such a resolution secures the broadest support possible, and that the concerns of all members of the Council are taken on board in a balanced manner. Otherwise, this negates the authority and credibility of a resolution that is meant to provide guidance in our common pursuit of maintaining international peace and security. In terms of being constructive, allowing all Council members an equal opportunity and ample time to carefully review the provisions of the text would encourage our joint effort in facilitating implementation.

Malaysia also underscores that it is the responsibility of all members of the international community to abide by the obligations outlined in the regime under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On that basis, the pursuit of general and complete nuclear disarmament must remain, first and foremost, a shared and enduring commitment of all of us here.

**Mr. Bermúdez** (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): Uruguay voted in favour of resolution 2310 (2016) because of the intrinsic importance of the subject and because we believe in the need to work towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT, whose entry into force we encourage today, is a keystone of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As such, it will contribute to strengthening international peace and security in addition to helping bring about a safer world.

Promoting the universality and rapid entry into force of the CTBT, which has been open for signature for 20 years and which today still needs ratification by the eight States listed in annex 2, is a priority in order to address the danger posed by nuclear-weapon tests to the international community. In that regard, Uruguay once again urges States to ratify the text of the Treaty, in particular those annex 2 States whose ratification is required for the Treaty's entry into force. We would encourage them to take this initiative and ensure the appropriate ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible. The greatest responsibility for the entry into force of the Treaty falls on the shoulders of those States possessing nuclear weapons.

Uruguay, as a country committed to strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation system, advocates for a world that is free of nuclear weapons. The mere existence of nuclear weapons is itself a threat to peace and security in the world, and their total elimination is the only guarantee that they will not be used.

This meeting is also an opportunity for us to remember the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. This is something that has been examined at various international conferences, where it has been made clear that there are limitations in terms of the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons and that we are truly defenceless, no matter whether they are used offensively or accidentally. The humanitarian consequences of destruction with these weapons is something that should lead to an express and immediate ban, and for this reason we appeal for the fulfilment and implementation of all of the commitments undertaken in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

**The President:** I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Permanent Representative of New Zealand.



Anniversaries of important events are rarely straightforward celebrations. That is certainly the case for today's anniversary marking 20 years since the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Treaty's adoption, in this building two decades ago, occasioned considerable euphoria. Something that had seemed impossible — because it had been so strongly opposed by a number of significant countries until just a few years before — was now a done deal. Like other long-term supporters of nuclear disarmament, New Zealand believed something of real significance had been achieved.

Prior to the Treaty's adoption, New Zealand had vigorously pursued the objective of a nuclear-test-ban treaty for more than three decades. Twice, with support from others in the Pacific region, New Zealand had even gone to the International Court of Justice in an effort to stop the nuclear testing, which had inflamed our region, damaged the Pacific environment and caused deep tensions with some of our oldest friends and allies. Largely in response to testing in our region, the countries of the South Pacific had also adopted and brought into force the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.

For us, and for the Pacific region, the banning of all nuclear test explosions was the culmination of a long-sought-after goal. For New Zealand, therefore, there is real cause to remember and celebrate that historic moment in 1996 when the CTBT was adopted. However, as others know only too well, there is cause, too, for deep disappointment that 20 years later the Treaty is still not in force.

New Zealand supported the initiative by the United States to create new momentum for the Treaty's entry into force and voted in favour of today's resolution 2310 (2016). We join others in calling upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty — especially the remaining eight States whose ratification is needed for entry into force — to do so as soon as possible. Until they do, we will not, as a matter of international treaty law, have closed the door on nuclear testing.

A strong international norm against testing has been created by the Treaty. That norm is being complied with by all States except the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. North Korea's repeated nuclear tests are an affront to the international community's commitment, through the CTBT and the ongoing moratoriums against testing, to end the era of nuclear tests, as well as blatant

violations of the resolutions of the Security Council and of that country's commitments under the Charter of the United Nations.

While the CTBT is an important instrument in its own right, it is important to remember, as others have noted today, that it sits within a wider nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation context. That context would have been better reflected in today's resolution 2310 (2016) had the draft contained stronger language on the need for progress on nuclear disarmament, as New Zealand and others had proposed.

New Zealand also shares the reservations of other Council members about the reference in the resolution to the joint statement by five nuclear-weapon States that are also permanent members of the Council. While recognizing the value of the commitments in the joint statement, we are uncomfortable with the Council being used to validate the perspectives of any sub-group of Council members, whether they be permanent or elected, nuclear-weapon-holding or non-nuclear-free.

While we must continue to call for States to join the Treaty, after 20 years we also recognize that simply restating commitments to the entry into force of the CTBT is hardly progress towards nuclear disarmament. That is particularly true in the light of the modernization programmes that are under way in all States that possess nuclear weapons and which cut across the contribution that the CTBT can make to nuclear disarmament. For as long as some States retain nuclear weapons, and declare them to be essential for national security, others will seek them. That highlights the mutually reinforcing nature of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The neglect of one will set back the other.

New Zealand looks forward to working with the wider United Nations membership during the current session of the General Assembly both to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to reinvigorate efforts towards nuclear disarmament in line with the long-standing commitments set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

The representative of Ukraine has asked for the floor to make a further statement.

**Mr. Fesko** (Ukraine): I will be very brief. I would like to make a point of clarification for everyone's benefit.

As we are discussing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which constitutes an integral part of the global security infrastructure, we are convinced that, if any part or element of that structure is damaged or violated, as it was, it reflects negatively on the stability of the global security architecture. We therefore see a

very clear link between what my Minister has just said and today's topic of discussion. If some fail to see that linkage, it only demonstrates a selective approach to matters of global security.

*The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.*