



# Security Council

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## Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

### Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was concluded by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran on 14 July 2015, was the result of tireless diplomatic efforts over several years. On 20 July 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council endorsed the Plan and called upon all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations to support its implementation. It is my steadfast belief that the Plan is the best available option to achieve non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. Now more than ever, I am convinced that diplomatic solutions provide the only path to enduring peace and security.

2. Since diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission resumed in November 2021, participants in the Plan and the United States have demonstrated a collective determination to resolve political and technical differences. However, those efforts have not yet resulted in the return of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to full and effective implementation of the Plan and the resolution. The importance of restoring the Plan should not be underestimated, nor should the positive impact of its restoration on the global non-proliferation architecture.

3. As noted in my previous report (S/2021/995), further delays and the lack of progress in diplomatic engagements to put the Plan back on track may undermine confidence in its ability to ensure that the Iranian nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful. I therefore urge the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to demonstrate the flexibility required to reach a compromise on the last remaining issues and to return to full implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) without further delay. In this regard, I welcome the step taken by the United States in February 2022 to reinstate waivers “to enable third-party participation in nuclear non-proliferation and safety projects in Iran”.<sup>1</sup> I again call upon the United States to also lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of State of the United States of America, press briefing, video, 14 April 2022. Available at [https://www.state.gov/page/3/?post\\_type=state\\_briefing&%3Bp=92333%2F](https://www.state.gov/page/3/?post_type=state_briefing&%3Bp=92333%2F).



4. I also call again upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan and to reverse the steps that it has taken since July 2019, which it pledged were reversible. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency has not been able to verify the total enriched uranium stockpile in the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 2021, the Agency estimated in its report dated 30 May 2022 (S/2022/472) that, as at 15 May 2022, its stockpile was 3,809.3 kg (which exceeds the 202.8 kg limit), including 238.4 kg enriched to 20 per cent uranium-235 and 43.1 kg enriched to 60 per cent uranium-235. The Agency also stated, in its report dated 8 June 2022, that the Islamic Republic of Iran had started to install additional advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In addition, it is important for the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address the other concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to resolution 2231 (2015). Issues not related to the Plan, however, should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

5. The international community remains supportive of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015). In this regard, the ongoing bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran remain key to supporting the Plan and resolution. These initiatives, which should be encouraged and built upon, may help to achieve regional stability, as well as to support the restoration of the Plan. Furthermore, it is important for Member States, and their economic operators, to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran using the available trade instruments in order to address ongoing challenges, including those resulting from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

6. The professional, factual and impartial monitoring and verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Islamic Republic of Iran remain a cornerstone of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). In his report dated 30 May 2022 (S/2022/472), the Director-General reported that “the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], including the Additional Protocol”. The Agency further noted, in its report dated 9 June 2022, the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to remove cameras from various locations and place them and the data collected from them in storage under Agency seals.

7. The present report, my thirteenth on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my twelfth report (S/2021/995) on 8 December 2021. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to the resolution.

## II. Key findings and recommendations

8. Since 8 December 2021, there have been no new proposals submitted for approval to the Security Council through the procurement channel. The procurement channel was established to be a transparency and confidence-building mechanism, aimed at providing assurances that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods and related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with resolution 2231 (2015) as well as the provisions and objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. I continue to recommend that all participants in the Plan, Member States and the private sector fully support and utilize this channel.

9. The Secretariat examined the debris of nine ballistic missiles and six cruise missiles launched towards the territories of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates since early 2020. It observed design characteristics and parts consistent with

those of missiles that it had examined previously and assessed the missiles and/or parts thereof to be of Iranian origin also. However, the Secretariat has not been able to determine when the ballistic missiles and/or parts thereof might have been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular whether the transfer(s) occurred after 16 January 2016, the date on which the restrictive measures set out in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) came into force.<sup>2</sup>

### III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

10. Since 8 December 2021, there have been no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) submitted to and approved by the Security Council through the procurement channel. In the same period, the Security Council received five new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

11. The activities foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) relate to the existing unit at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; assistance to expand that power plant beyond the existing reactor unit; the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium; the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility; and the modernization of the Arak reactor. In February 2022, the United States announced that it had reinstated waivers on these nuclear non-proliferation projects. This is a welcome step that will facilitate the implementation of these activities.

### IV. Implementation of provisions related to paragraphs 3 and 4

#### A. Restrictions on paragraph 3-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

12. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

13. The President of the Security Council and I have received several letters from the Permanent Representatives of the United States ([S/2022/3](#)), Israel ([S/2022/177](#) and [S/2022/421](#)), and France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2022/73](#) and [S/2022/415](#)) on activities undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran that those Member States deem to be inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In the letters, I was informed about ballistic missile launches conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran between November 2021 and January 2022 and the presentation of a new Iranian medium-range ballistic missile in February 2022. The Member States assessed all of the ballistic missiles to be classified as Missile

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<sup>2</sup> Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the date of the adoption of Security Council resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that resolution. The provisions of resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and those of other previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.

Technology Control Regime category I systems,<sup>3</sup> and as such, the missiles are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and therefore fall under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). In the letters, I was also informed about two space launch vehicle flight tests in December 2021 and March 2022, as well as two static tests in December 2021 and January 2022 of engines possibly intended for space launch vehicles, all conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Member States noted that the space launch vehicles incorporated technologies that were virtually identical to and interchangeable with those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and that flight tests of the space launch vehicles and related engine tests were activities that fell under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

14. In letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2022/15, S/2022/97, S/2022/225, S/2022/438 and S/2022/445), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically” rejected “all unsubstantiated allegations” made by the United States, Israel, and France, Germany and the United Kingdom. He noted the absence of implicit or explicit reference to the Missile Technology Control Regime or space launch vehicles in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and condemned what he called the “misleading interpretation” of this paragraph by those States. He also restated that the Iranian missile and space programmes, including the launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, fell “outside of the purview or competence of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annexes” and, “given the mandate outlined in the note by the President of the Security Council on the Council’s tasks pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2016/44)”, he requested me to “refrain from reporting on such irrelevant activities” in my subsequent reports on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

15. In letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and me (S/2022/34, S/2022/122 and S/2022/464), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations reiterated the position of his country regarding the interpretation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) in response to the letters from the United States and France, Germany and the United Kingdom. He reiterated that the category I criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime had “never been intended to be used in the context of resolution 2231 (2015)” and that the Russian Federation continued to consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “respecting in good faith the provisions of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that [were] designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”.

## **B. Restrictions on paragraph 4-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran**

16. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), all States, provided that they have obtained the prior approval of the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in document S/2015/546 and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear

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<sup>3</sup> Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see section 1.A.1 of the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime, available at <https://mtrc.info/mtrc-annex/>).

weapon delivery systems. Document [S/2015/546](#) includes ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicle systems (including target drones, reconnaissance drones and cruise missiles), all having a range equal to or greater than 300 km, and related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology.

17. Paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) also applies to the provision of various services or technical assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran and its acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in its subparagraph (a).

18. During the reporting period, the Secretariat travelled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in response to invitations from their respective authorities. The Secretariat examined the debris of nine ballistic missiles,<sup>4</sup> six cruise missiles<sup>5</sup> and several uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)<sup>6</sup> identified by those authorities as having been used in various attacks by the Houthis against their territories since 2020 and which were alleged to have been transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The visit to Saudi Arabia was a follow-up to the Secretariat's visit in October 2021 noted in my previous report ([S/2021/995](#), para. 20). The Secretariat conducted first-hand and in-depth examinations of the debris and collected other information and material available, including photographs and video recordings of the debris in situ, to confirm that the debris seen in those images corresponded to that presented to the Secretariat. Whenever possible, the Secretariat cross-referenced statements by the spokespersons for the Houthis and the Joint Forces Command and by Emirati authorities, as well as media reports, to confirm that the reported dates and other specific details of each attack, including locations and impact points, were consistent.

19. The Secretariat observed that the debris of the nine ballistic missiles had similar design characteristics and parts<sup>7</sup> to the missiles (designated by the Houthis as the Borkan-2H)<sup>8</sup> that it had previously examined and reported on to the Security Council ([S/2017/1030](#), paras. 28–29, [S/2018/602](#), paras. 26–32, and [S/2018/1089](#), para. 20). In addition, the debris had internal and external features consistent with those of the Scud-B missile and all of its variants, as well as key design features unique to the Iranian Qiam-type short-range ballistic missile, such as the split-oxidizer tank located

<sup>4</sup> The ballistic missiles were reportedly launched towards Yanbu' (on 21 February 2020), Riyadh (on 28 March, 23 June and 10 September 2020, and on 28 February and 7 December 2021) and Dammam (on 7 March and 4 September 2021) and towards Dubai (on 17 January 2022).

<sup>5</sup> Three cruise missiles were reportedly launched towards Jeddah (on 23 November 2020 and 4 March 2021) and Riyadh (on 17 September 2021); two cruise missiles were reportedly launched towards Abu Dhabi airport and one towards the Musaffah industrial district in Abu Dhabi (all on 17 January 2022).

<sup>6</sup> The UAVs were reportedly launched towards several locations in Saudi Arabia on 7, 16 and 28 February; 7 and 19 March; 3, 4 and 9 April; 10 May; 8 October; and 7 December 2021; and 10 and 20 March 2022. Others were reportedly launched towards Dafrah, United Arab Emirates, on 2 February 2022.

<sup>7</sup> The similarities were as follows: the engine had the same dimensions, design and parts (e.g. turbo pump, valves and gas generators) and used a similar format for part numbering; the engine section contained similar lightweight composite pressurized air bottles, with the same dimensions and a similar format for part numbering; the mounting plate of the inertial measurement unit had the same dimensions, design features and shape; the inertial measurement unit consisted of similar parts (e.g. batteries, gyroscopes and accelerators), and its housing and printed circuit boards were similar; and the on-board computer had the same dimensions and configuration, and similar housing, printed circuit boards and format for part numbering.

<sup>8</sup> The Houthis used this ballistic missile in several attacks against Saudi Arabia in 2017 and 2018. See, for example, Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Missile War in Yemen* (Washington, D.C., 2020). Available at [http://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/The-Missile-War-in-Yemen\\_June-2020.pdf](http://missilethreat.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/The-Missile-War-in-Yemen_June-2020.pdf).

above the fuel tank, the nine external valves and the lack of the original Scud-type stabilization fins. The Secretariat further observed that the oxidizer tanks of the nine ballistic missiles were longer and that the positioning pattern of the six external valves of the oxidizer tank was different to that of the missiles upon which it had previously reported. The Secretariat assessed that the nine ballistic missiles were a modified version of the Borkan-2H, with an increase in propellant capacity, resulting in a longer range. The Secretariat was able to identify the manufacturer of some retrieved subcomponents of the inertial measurement unit examined in the United Arab Emirates. According to the information provided to the Secretariat, those subcomponents had been exported between 2011 and 2012.

20. The Secretariat observed that all six cruise missiles were identical and had similar design characteristics and configurations<sup>9</sup> to the cruise missile presented publicly by the Houthis on 11 March 2021 and designated as Quds-II.<sup>10</sup> The Secretariat also observed similarities<sup>11</sup> between several parts found among the debris of the six cruise missiles (such as the jet engine, fuel feed system, steering mechanism and electronic subcomponents) and parts found among the debris of the cruise missiles used by the Houthis in attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019 and among the cruise missile sections seized by the United States in November 2019 that the Secretariat had previously examined and reported on to the Security Council (S/2019/934, para. 31, and S/2020/531, paras. 31–35). The Secretariat again identified the manufacturers of several subcomponents. One manufacturer informed the Secretariat that four pressure sensors had been exported between February 2016 and June 2020, and the Secretariat is still endeavouring to ascertain their supply chain. Another manufacturer informed the Secretariat that one pressure regulator had been manufactured and exported in 2020, but it was unable to ascertain the recipient.

21. Among the UAV debris, the Secretariat identified several “Model V10” vertical gyroscopes. A “Model V9” of the same vertical gyroscope had previously been observed among the debris of the delta-wing UAVs used in attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019 (S/2019/934, para. 33), and/or parts thereof, which the Secretariat assessed to be of Iranian origin (S/2020/531, paras. 36–37). The Secretariat also observed a “Model V9” vertical gyroscope in an open-source photo<sup>12</sup> taken at the Permanent Exhibition of Achievements and Capabilities of the Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps<sup>13</sup> in Tehran. The Secretariat observed that the type of UAVs used in those attacks had design characteristics and configurations (such as wingspan and layout, engine and some electronic components) that were similar to a family of UAV systems exhibited by the Houthis on 11 March 2021<sup>14</sup> and to UAVs previously examined by the Secretariat (S/2018/1089, para. 23, and S/2019/492,

<sup>9</sup> The similarities observed included the diameter per section examined, the layout of the wings, the control surfaces and the jet engine.

<sup>10</sup> Memri TV, “Houthi weapons exhibition showcases missiles, drones, sea mines, anti-tank weapons, sniper rifles, artillery marked ‘Made in Yemen’”, video, 11 March 2021. Available at [www.memri.org/tv/houthi-weapons-exhibition-showcases-missiles-drones-sea-mines-anti-tank-sniper-rifles-artillery-made-yemen](http://www.memri.org/tv/houthi-weapons-exhibition-showcases-missiles-drones-sea-mines-anti-tank-sniper-rifles-artillery-made-yemen).

<sup>11</sup> The similarities observed among the parts included their configuration, their dimensions, the manufacturers and the format for part numbering.

<sup>12</sup> See <https://twitter.com/projectmeshkat/status/1523254845309915136>.

<sup>13</sup> “IRGC launches permanent aerospace fair, showcases ballistic missiles”, *Tehran Times*, 27 September 2020, available at [www.tehrantimes.com/news/452945/IRGC-launches-permanent-aerospace-fair-showcases-ballistic-missiles](http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/452945/IRGC-launches-permanent-aerospace-fair-showcases-ballistic-missiles); Iranian Students News Agency, “Exhibition of IRGC’s Achievements, Capabilities in Aerospace Division opened in Tehran”, 27 September 2020, available at <https://en.isna.ir/photo/99070604607/Exhibition-of-IRGC-s-Achievements-Capabilities-in-Aerospace>.

<sup>14</sup> Memri TV, “Houthi weapons exhibition showcases missiles, drones, sea mines, anti-tank weapons, sniper rifles, artillery marked ‘Made in Yemen’”, video, 11 March 2021.

para. 29). The Secretariat continues to analyse available information, and I intend to report to the Security Council on our further findings in due course, as appropriate.

22. In identical letters dated 25 May 2022 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2022/421), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations alleged that, in “blatant violation” of resolution 2231 (2015), the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to “transfer UAV systems and capabilities to its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen”, specifically noting two attempted UAV transfers in March 2021 and February 2022 to Gaza. In a letter dated 31 May 2022 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me (S/2022/445), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations “categorically reject[ed]” those allegations.

## **V. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions**

23. During the reporting period, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging actions inconsistent with the asset freeze provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).

## **VI. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)**

24. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division participated in events for outreach to Member States on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).