Letter dated 13 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 2508 (2020), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan on 24 December 2020 and was considered by the Committee on 11 January 2021.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Thomas Bifwoli **Wanjala**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the Sudan

(Signed) Priscilla **Ciesay**
Expert

(Signed) Vincent **Darracq**
Expert

(Signed) Nikolai **Dobronravin**
Expert

(Signed) Rajeev **Yadav**
Expert
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Summary

The Government of Sudan and several major Darfuri armed movements signed the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, thereby taking a significant step forward in the Darfur peace process. Following the signing of the Agreement, the leaders and political wings of the movements began to return to the country and to work with the Government of the Sudan on the initial implementation measures.

Limited financial resources, as well as divisions between various actors of the political transition in the Sudan, will pose a challenge to the implementation of the Agreement. Other major challenges remain, in particular the rejection of the Agreement by the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), the only armed movement with a substantial area of control in Darfur, as well as by key constituencies, such as leading internally displaced persons bodies. The implementation of the security arrangements will be a sensitive matter also, posing a threat to the future of the agreement and stability in Darfur if not addressed adequately.

The situation in the region remained generally favourable to the peace process, albeit extremely fragile. The regional States either facilitated or otherwise supported the negotiations in Juba. Meanwhile, the conflict and stalemate in Libya, and the recent upsurge of violence in Ethiopia in particular, illustrated the fragility of most neighbouring States, which may constitute a threat to peace and stability in Darfur and the region.

In Darfur, SLA/AW increased its capability in Jebel Marra by recruiting new fighters and purchasing weapons, thanks to new gold-mining revenues. While clashes between SLA/AW and the security forces were relatively limited, ongoing internal fighting tore the movement apart and resulted in the displacement of at least 20,000 local civilians and numerous human rights violations. Supporters of a designated individual on the sanctions list, Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem (permanent reference number SDi. 002), became increasingly disgruntled about the detention of their leader, and some of them turned to military action in Jebel Marra and Libya. Recently, groups signatory to the Agreement have recruited extensively in Darfur in anticipation of the security arrangements; this has included cases of child recruitment.

Most of the Darfuri rebel groups strengthened their presence in Libya, where they participated heavily in major military operations of the Libyan National Army, including in Tripoli and Sirte. They grew significantly during the reporting period, engaging in large-scale recruitment and obtaining new equipment. They also developed higher-level, sustained relations with the Libyan National Army authorities, as well as direct relations with some of its foreign backers. Despite the Agreement, information gathered by the Panel indicates that they will maintain a significant number of troops in Libya for the foreseeable future.

The overall international humanitarian law situation has not improved during the reporting period. Intercommunal clashes and related attacks on civilians increased sharply, in both frequency and scale, in particular in South Darfur and West Darfur. The capacity of the Government of the Sudan to prevent or stop these incidents has proven limited, in particular in rural areas, where police forces are frequently outnumbered and overpowered by local, tribal armed groups. Attacks by armed elements from nomad communities on internally displaced persons and farmers trying to return to their land also continued. The situation of internally displaced persons
remained unchanged, in the absence of comprehensive Government policies and initiatives on the matter, including on land occupation and the disarmament of civilians. Although the Government formulated a national plan for protecting civilians after the exit of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (S/2020/429, annex), uncertainty remains as to the Government’s capacity and means to implement the plan.

Sexual and gender-based violence remained endemic in Darfur and was unaddressed, although growing awareness and acknowledgement of the issue by the new Government of the Sudan authorities can be considered progress. Acts of sexual and gender-based violence continue to be committed on a daily basis, in particular on women and girls conducting livelihood activities, by various perpetrators, including members of the security forces, armed members of nomad communities and some SLA/AW fighters.

During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan continued to transfer arms and other military material into Darfur in violation of the arms embargo. Since the embargo has been in place, the Government has submitted no arms embargo exemption requests or notifications to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan. For its part, the Libyan National Army and its backers provided the armed groups in Libya with significant numbers of military vehicles and weapons, in violation of the arms embargo. Porous borders and the easy availability of small arms in Darfur and the region meant that illicit flows of weapons in and out of Darfur continued, posing a threat to security and stability, in both Darfur and neighbouring countries, in particular in eastern Chad, the north-east of the Central African Republic and Libya.

The implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze remained a challenge, owing to lack of cooperation by the Government of the Sudan and regional Governments.

In Libya, mercenary activities in support of the Libyan National Army were the main source of financing for the Darfurian armed groups, some of which were also profiting from criminal activities such as participation in drug and migrant smuggling. In Darfur, the gold mine in the Torroye area of Jebel Marra became a new and major source of financing for SLA/AW. Now that they are returning to the Sudan, some groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement plan to engage in gold mining in Darfur to fund their activities, which may increase local competition over mining resources.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong> Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II.</strong> Peace process</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Overview: Juba Peace Agreement</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. National context and its impact on Darfur</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III.</strong> Regional dynamics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Overview</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. African Union</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. South Sudan</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Central African Republic</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Libya</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Chad</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Egypt</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Ethiopia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Qatar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV.</strong> Darfur after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement: challenges and risks</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Political and economic challenges</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Weaknesses and risks</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V.</strong> Darfurian armed groups in Darfur</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Musa Hilal and his Sudan Revolutionary Awakening Council</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Recruitment by groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI.</strong> Darfurian armed groups in Libya</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Military operations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Capability</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Cooperation with the Libyan National Army</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Cooperation with the Libyan National Army’s foreign backers</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Allegations concerning the Rapid Support Forces presence in Libya</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. After the Juba Peace Agreement: to remain or to leave</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VII.</strong> Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIII.</strong> International humanitarian law and human rights</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Overview</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Protection of civilians</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D. Violations and abuse against children ................................................................. 28
E. Repression of sit-ins ......................................................................................... 28
F. Human rights violations by Government security forces ................................. 29
G. Human rights violations by the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid ......... 30
H. Situation of internally displaced persons ......................................................... 31
I. Intercommunal violence ..................................................................................... 32
J. Justice and accountability. ................................................................................. 34

IX. Arms and border control .................................................................................. 35
   A. Arms embargo .................................................................................................. 35
   B. Arms collection ............................................................................................... 36
   C. Border control ................................................................................................ 37

X. Travel ban and asset freeze ............................................................................... 38
   A. Implementation by Member States .................................................................. 38
   B. Implementation by the Government of the Sudan ......................................... 38
   C. Ongoing travel ban investigations ................................................................. 39

XI. Financing of armed groups .............................................................................. 40
   A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in Darfur ............................................. 40
   B. Armed groups in South Sudan ....................................................................... 42
   C. Armed groups in Libya .................................................................................. 42
   D. Projects of groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement ............................ 43

XII. Recommendations .......................................................................................... 43

Annexes* ............................................................................................................ 45

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Introduction

1. On 11 February 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution 2508 (2020), by which the Panel of Experts on the Sudan was mandated, inter alia, to provide the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) with a final report on its activities by 13 January 2021. The present report outlines the findings and investigations of the Panel from the beginning of its mandate on 13 March 2020 to the time of drafting in December 2020 (for the details of the Panel’s mandate, see annex 1).

2. Owing to travel restrictions imposed by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the Panel experienced difficulties in travelling and conducting field investigations in the Sudan and the region. Notwithstanding, the Panel conducted two missions in the Sudan (including Darfur) in October and November. While the Panel was able to visit Egypt in November, other travel to the region had to be postponed owing to the pandemic and measures related thereto.

3. During the present mandate, the Panel continued to assess the implementation of the sanctions measures and violations thereof and to follow investigative leads. To this end, it engaged, either face-to-face or remotely, with the Government of the Sudan, Member States and a wide range of Darfuri interlocutors, including leaders and commanders of armed movements, internally displaced persons and human rights monitors. The Panel was greatly helped by the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Panel wishes to thank the Government of the Sudan for its valuable cooperation.

4. The Panel worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). Details on the methodology applied in the present report and the challenges met by the Panel can be found in annex 2.

II. Peace process

A. Overview: Juba Peace Agreement

5. Throughout the reporting period, the following positive factors shaped the peace process in Darfur:

   (a) Juba Peace Agreement (Agreement, Darfur track). On 3 October 2020, the Government of the Sudan and five of the most significant Darfuri armed movements, themselves members of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) coalition, signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Juba, which included various protocols such as power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements, aimed at addressing the root causes of the conflict. The signing of the Agreement was a major achievement, favoured by the goodwill of the Government of the Sudan negotiators, in particular the chief negotiator, Mohammed al-Ta’aishi, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemetti, first vice-president of the Transitional Sovereign Council and Head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), of the movements’ leadership and of the South Sudanese mediation team. The Agreement replaced the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which became obsolete;

1 Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC), Sudanese Alliance.
(b) **The return of the leadership of the signatory movements to Khartoum, including the head of each movement, on 15 November.** Following the signing of the Agreement, the movements returned to the Sudan to start working on the implementation of the Agreement, beginning with the harmonization of the Agreement and the constitutional document on 18 October;

(c) **Return of some armed elements of the movements to the Sudan.** In line with the Agreement, the movements began to return some of their troops to the Sudan, in coordination with the Government of the Sudan. At the time of writing, both the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and JEM had several dozen troops in Khartoum, tasked with the protection of their leaders;

(d) **Regular contact between the Government of the Sudan and Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW).** Although SLA/AW did not join the Agreement talks, Abdul Wahid Muhammad al-Nur kept in regular unofficial communication with the Government of the Sudan. After the conclusion of the Agreement, he travelled from France to Uganda on 13 November. From Kampala, Abdul Wahid announced that his movement would launch a new initiative aimed at the achievement of comprehensive peace in the Sudan (although he provided no details). He is expected to meet the South Sudanese authorities in Juba, then in the Sudan, to present his initiative;

(e) **Appointment of civilian governors.** The nomination of civilian governors, even though transitional, was a visible step towards peace and stability in Darfur. Some of the governors had previously been active in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and were not associated with the previous regime, and their appointment was generally welcomed.

B. **National context and its impact on Darfur**

6. There were some national factors which impacted negatively on the situation in Darfur and the Darfur peace process. In 2020, instability continued throughout the Sudan, with political competition over the control of the transition, further deterioration of the economic situation and a surge in local tensions (e.g., in eastern Sudan). The post-revolution political landscape included various bodies and coalitions, such as the Sovereign Council (with military and civilian components), the Council of Ministers, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), Resistance Committees Coordination, the Sudanese Professionals Association, SRF, political parties and civil society organizations. Almost all parties and coalitions, including SRF and FFC, experienced splits and allegiance changes.

7. Tensions between the military and civilian components have increased of late and were exacerbated by the return of the armed movements to the Sudan following the signing of the Agreement. On 1 December 2020, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Head of the transitional Sovereign Council, issued a decree which announced the formation of the Transitional Partners Council. It was planned that this new body would consist of 29 members, including the Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, Hemetti, his brother, General Abdel Rahim Dagolo, 13 representatives of FFC and nine representatives of SRF. Among others, there would be the five chairs of the Darfuri armed movements which signed the Agreement (Minni Minawi, Al-Hadi Idris, Gibril Ibrahim, al-Tahir Hajar, Khamis Abdallah Abakar). The announced objectives of the Transitional Partners Council included “directing the transitional period”, with General al-Burhan as its head for the whole period. Various parties and other political forces, such as the resistance committees, rejected the formation of the new council as a coup against the Sudanese revolution. The Prime Minister refused to join the Transitional Partners Council, and the Council of Ministers declared that
it should be a consultative rather than directive body. At the time of writing, the perspectives of the Transitional Partners Council remained unclear.

8. The COVID-19 global pandemic added further obstacles, although, according to the official statistics, Darfur has been less affected than other states. Since March 2020, there have been only six reported cases in Central Darfur, 23 in East Darfur, 44 in West Darfur, 56 in South Darfur and 154 in North Darfur. The situation was more difficult at the national level and in particular in Khartoum. The pandemic also affected the prospective donor countries, draining resources needed for the implementation of the Agreement.

III. Regional dynamics

A. Overview

9. The situation in the region remained generally favourable to peace and stability in Darfur, but extremely fragile. All regional states supported the peace process and the Juba Peace Agreement. South Sudan, as mediator and host of the Juba talks, played a major role in the negotiations between the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements, while Chad, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar also contributed positively to the talks.

10. All neighbouring States remained vulnerable to internal and external pressures. The recent conflict in Ethiopia, in a region bordering the Sudan, although it had no direct or immediate effect on the situation in Darfur, demonstrated that the region remains highly volatile. According to Egyptian authorities and experts met by the Panel in November in Cairo, there remained an appreciable risk of further instability and terrorist activities spreading to the Sudan from the Sahel.

B. African Union

11. The African Union continued to support the peace process in Darfur and saw it as part of its “Silencing the guns” initiative to stop armed conflicts in Africa by 2021. Speaking at an event on African Union-United Nations cooperation on 4 December 2020, the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, said: “We have made significant gains towards the achievement of this necessary goal, as evidenced by ground-breaking peace agreements in the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, the Sudan and, most recently, in Libya”.2

C. South Sudan

12. Relations between the Sudan and South Sudan developed positively. The two countries hosted a number of bilateral meetings, which were aimed at political and economic cooperation, in particular for the oil industry and border demarcation.3 Despite these efforts, many sectors of the border between the Sudan (including South and East Darfur) and South Sudan remained disputed. In connection with illegal mining and smuggling, this situation may put bilateral relations at risk in future, affecting some areas of Darfur. Significant numbers of South Sudanese refugees remained in these areas, while the activities of Darfurians in South Sudan were mainly

confined to business and trade, except for the small forces of SLA/AW and other Darfuri armed groups there (see sect. VII).

D. Central African Republic

13. The situation in the Sudan-Central African Republic border areas remained very fragile. The intercommunal conflicts in the Central African Republic led to a sizeable growth in the presence of refugees from the Central African Republic in the adjacent areas of South Darfur. Flows of fighters and weapons across the border continued to be reported. For example, in November 2020, several hundreds of heavily armed Misseriya forces from South Darfur attacked Boromata, more than 100 km inside the Central African Republic and clashed with the local Gula community. Since October, there have been reports on social networks that the Misseriya Arabs in the Sudan have announced the formation of a new armed movement, Jaysh al-Atawah (Atawah Army). There was no independently confirmed relationship between these events.

E. Libya

14. The situation in Libya developed towards a stalemate and a reduction in hostilities involving Darfuri elements (for more details on the Darfuri armed groups in Libya see sect. VI). The zone adjacent to the Sudan remained mostly under the effective control of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and affiliated forces. Darfuri civilians continued to head to Libya to enrol in the Darfuri movements or in the various Libyan factions. On 4 December 2020, the Rapid Support Forces announced that its forces had arrested 600 Sudanese who were on their way to Libya in order to join fighting there.4 On 23 October, the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army signed a ceasefire agreement whereby all foreign fighters, including the Darfuri movements, are required to leave the country within three months.5

F. Chad

15. Bilateral relations between the Sudan and Chad remained stable and, overall, positive. Chadian authorities repeatedly stressed to the Panel that peace and stability in the Sudan and Darfur are inseparable from peace and stability in Chad.6 The Chadian authorities regularly consulted with the Government of the Sudan and the movements on the peace process, while a high-level Chadian delegation attended the Juba talks and facilitated the discussions, in particular on security arrangements.

16. In consultation with Chad and the Government of the Sudan, the armed movements used the territory of Chad to transfer some of their armed elements from Libya to the Sudan under the Agreement. Despite the positive impact of the Chad-Sudan joint border force, there were several cross-border incidents in the Darfur-Chad border areas, including clashes between Chadian and Sudanese communities, which might pose a threat to future peacebuilding in Darfur.

4 See https://libyareview.com/8506/.
5 See https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ceasefire_agreement_between_libyan_parties_english.pdf.
6 Telephone interview with a Chadian official, May 2020.
G. Egypt

17. The relations between the Sudan and Egypt remained stable and centred on the issues related to the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. In November 2020, the armed forces of the two countries organized the first joint military exercises, which took place in the Sudan. The multi-million-strong Sudanese diaspora, including Darfurians, has been growing, owing to the economic and political instability in the Sudan. During the visit of the Panel to Cairo in November 2020, the officials and experts confirmed that Egypt supports the Darfur peace process and said that the activities of Darfurian movements in Libya do not create problems for the security of Egypt. However, in their view, the presence of foreign Islamists in Libya constitutes a threat not only to Egypt, but to the region in general, including the Sudan.

H. Ethiopia

18. Despite generally stable relations, the issues related to the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the recent events in the Tigray region of Ethiopia put at risk not only bilateral relations, but also stability in the region. The conflict in Tigray, where the federal and Amhara forces clashed with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, with the reported involvement of Eritrea, led to a significant influx of refugees from Ethiopia to the Sudan. Meanwhile, the Sudanese forces moved into disputed border areas, previously controlled by Ethiopia.

I. United Arab Emirates

19. Since the 2019 revolution in the Sudan, the United Arab Emirates has supported the Government of the Sudan, offering significant financial assistance. It has also contributed to facilitating the peace talks in Juba, the final stages of which were attended by a United Arab Emirates delegation. There were reports about the role of the United Arab Emirates in providing military and financial support to the Darfurian forces stationed in Libya (see sect. VI).

J. Qatar

20. The growing role of the United Arab Emirates in Sudanese politics led to Qatar losing its leading role in the Darfur peace process, which had culminated with the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in 2011. Qatar maintained good relations with some Darfurian movements, in particular JEM, and some components of FFC. The Qatari assistance projects in Darfur resumed after a break, which was due to the change of political regime in the Sudan.8

---

IV. Darfur after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement: challenges and risks

A. Political and economic challenges

1. Financial crisis

21. The Agreement will come into force in the context of the complex Sudanese transition. Political and economic uncertainties, in particular, competition between the main actors in the transition and a dire financial situation, are likely to hamper or seriously slow down the implementation process if not addressed swiftly.

22. The financing of the agreement is one of the most pressing issues. While, in the Agreement, the Government of the Sudan committed to funding of $7.5 billion over 10 years, it is facing a serious economic crisis and has very limited capacity to fulfil its Agreement engagements. As a member of the Government of the Sudan leadership put it to the Panel during a meeting in November 2020, “People are really suffering: the peace issues became far away”. The Agreement funding will depend mostly on the goodwill of the international community, but donors’ commitments to date have been very limited. In the absence of appropriate support, there is a substantial risk that the Agreement will meet the same fate as the previous agreements signed in Abuja and Doha, whose effects on the ground were minimal.

2. Political resistance to the Juba Peace Agreement

23. Political challenges to the implementation are likely to arise from divisions between the military and civilian components of the Government of the Sudan transitional authorities, as well as within SRF. Some components of the FFC ruling coalition and some political parties, such as the Communist Party and the National Umma party, publicly rejected the Juba agreement. They opposed it because it was brokered primarily by the military component. According to the Sudanese political actors with whom the Panel met, these political forces also considered that the armed movements had been given a large share in Government institutions at their expense. In addition, they feared that the movements would ally with the military against the civilian component, thereby strengthening the military’s position in the transition. Lastly, they had closer personal and ideological ties with non-signatory movements, in particular Abdul Wahid and the Al Hilu Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ North (SPLM/N).

24. Opposition came also from the non-signatory movements. In particular, Abdul Wahid tried to discredit and undermine the agreement by reaching out to leaders of the Fur community and internally displaced persons organizations to convince them to reject it. In Khartoum and internally displaced persons camps, SLA/AW was mobilizing its constituency against the signatory movements, including by intimidation and attacks. On 14 November, some SLA/AW supporters attacked a SLA/TC public gathering in Khartoum, seriously injuring some major SLA/TC cadres, such as military spokesman Ahmed Gido.9

25. Rivalries between the Darfurian signatory movements would also be a challenge. There were deep-seated tensions and leadership issues, as well as personal mistrust between those movements, which competed among themselves and pursued their own diverging interests. This was illustrated by the movements’ inability to swiftly reach an agreement on the appointment of their leaders in the various

---

institutions under the power-sharing protocol of the Agreement, which delayed the beginning of the implementation of the Agreement for several weeks.

B. Weaknesses and risks

1. Sticking points

26. In the absence of SLA/AW, the usual vehicle for the Fur’s political aspirations, a major weakness of the Agreement was the lack of acceptance of it among large sections of the Fur community, who saw it as “an agreement for Zaghawa”, or “an agreement for North Darfur only”, as several interlocutors put it to the Panel. The Fur were historically the dominant community in Darfur (literally, “Fur land”), and their endorsement of any peace deal is key for the establishment of peace in Darfur, in particular for the resolution of issues relating to internally displaced persons and land.

27. Internally displaced persons, in particular, seemed unconvinced by the Agreement. During the Panel’s visits to the Sudan, various internally displaced person leaders argued that that internally displaced persons were not concerned with the Agreement, and that internally displaced persons were not properly represented in the Juba talks. They complained to the Panel that various groups had tried to intimidate internally displaced persons to force them to endorse the Agreement (see sect. VIII, International humanitarian law). At the other end of the spectrum, some Arab communities, who often supported the previous regime, had no recognized representation in the Juba talks either, and were feeling threatened by the implications of the Agreement, on land issues in particular.

28. The Government of the Sudan is aware of the lack of support for the Agreement among the Fur and internally displaced persons and is trying to address the matter by pursuing different strategies simultaneously. First, it is making extra efforts to convince Abdul Wahid to join the peace process. However, Abdul Wahid’s unpredictability means that this strategy remains uncertain. He made it clear that he would not join the Juba peace process, and it remains to be seen how any new political initiative to engage him would fit with the Agreement. Second, the Government of the Sudan is trying to circumvent Abdul Wahid by dealing directly with SLA/AW political dissidents, leaders of the Fur community, such as traditional authorities and representatives of internally displaced persons, and SLA/AW military commanders. However, the fragmentation of SLA/AW, while not a guarantee for the success of the peace process, could also generate further internal conflict and instability in Jebel Marra and internally displaced persons camps.

29. Past Darfur peace agreements were marred by the absence of credible, efficient implementation institutions. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, a very comprehensive agreement which received considerable funding from Qatar, had limited effect on the ground owing to the weakness of the Darfur Regional Authority, the body created to manage the Doha Document programmes. The establishment of effective, accountable agencies, with the requisite staff, expertise and processes, will be key for full implementation of the Agreement.

---

10 Three of the five Darfurian signatory groups – GSLF, JEM and SLA/MM – have strong roots in the Zaghawa community, whose traditional territory is located in North Darfur. SLA/TC, a SLA/AW splinter group, has strong ties with the Fur of North Darfur, but lacks a strong presence in Jebel Marra, the Fur’s historical stronghold, and in the major internally displaced persons camps.
2. **Security arrangements**

30. For both the Government of the Sudan and the movements, the security arrangements were the key file in the Agreement. If not carefully implemented, protocol on security arrangements could derail the peace process and nullify the objectives of the Agreement.

31. Government of the Sudan interlocutors confirmed to the Panel that, for the Government, the main aim of the security arrangements was the return to the Sudan of the Darfuri forces based in Libya, as the continued presence and strengthening of these groups in a neighbouring country poses a latent threat to the security of the Sudan. However, the Panel’s early observations suggest that this objective is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future, and that the groups will leave many forces in Libya for the time being (see sect. VI).

32. At the negotiating table, the movements claimed significantly inflated numbers of fighters, in order to increase their influence. In recent months, they have engaged in accelerated recruitment to bridge the gap (see sect. V). This proved relatively successful, as many unemployed, destitute Darfurians were attracted by the prospect of obtaining a job in the security forces or benefits under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes to be created under the Agreement. However, such large-scale enrolment by the groups could have negative effects. If financing for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes does not arrive, the fighters’ expectations fighters will not be met. The recruitment is also contributing to the militarization of communities in Darfur.

33. If not managed carefully, the return of the movements to Darfur, with their thousands of well-armed fighters, could also generate localized instability. According to the Panel’s interviews with members of the movements, many fighters see their primary role as providing protection to their own ethnic communities. Under the security arrangements, the Zaghawa-dominated movements want to be deployed as a priority to Zaghawa areas, to provide security to the Zaghawa community, while SLA/TC, a predominantly Fur movement, wants to be deployed mostly in Fur areas with a similar goal of protecting the Fur, including internally displaced persons and returnees. Given the increased intercommunal tensions in Darfur recently, this alignment of armed groups with certain communities could pose a threat to the local security environment.

34. Lastly, the security arrangements will be implemented against a background of underlying rivalries between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. According to several cadres of the movements interviewed by the Panel during and after the Juba talks, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces are competing to attract troops from the Darfuri movements and, in particular, ensure that they do not join the other side. Some Sudanese Armed Forces leaders have been trying to leverage tensions between Zaghawa and Arabs in Darfur, to convince the movements to join the Sudanese Armed Forces, while Hemetti has been trying to lure them with a narrative of the unity of the marginalized Darfur against the Khartoum/Nile Valley elites. The movements have been making their own calculations and formulating their own strategies with regard to this competition between the two forces.
V. Darfurian armed groups in Darfur

A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

1. Enhanced capability

35. With increased resources from the exploitation of the Torroye gold mine in south-eastern Jebel Marra (see sect. XI), SLA/AW has continued to recruit new fighters, including by bringing back former members. Training took place mostly in Koya (southern Jebel Marra), under commander Abduljabar Yagoub, known as “Sajman”. The movement also bought new weapons and ammunition, mostly from local Arabs. The goal of the commanders was to build a strong, organized force before SLA/AW enters into peace talks with the Government of the Sudan.

2. Internal fighting

36. However, while the finances have surged, the group was undermined by severe internal fighting. Since around 20 May, clashes have taken place in the area between Golo and Rokero (central Jebel Marra), in particular Daya and Kia, between forces loyal to General Commander Abdelgadir Abdelrahman Ibrahim, known as “Gaddura”, led by commanders Salah Borso, Haroun Farank and Dafallah Mohamed Ahmed Nur, and rival commander Mubarak Aldouk (former SLA/AW head of operations). Since early September, clashes have also broken out between Gaddura’s forces and a commander allied with Aldouk, Zanoun Abdulshafi (commander of the movement’s Sultan Terab Brigade), in the area between Feina and Deribat (eastern Jebel Marra), in particular in Dwo, Dulow and Duri.

Figure I
Photograph of Mubarak Aldouk speaking to his force, Central Jebel Marra, November 2020

Source: Confidential.

37. Fighting continued at the time of writing and has resulted in several dozen casualties among the warring factions as well as among civilians, the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians (according to UNAMID sources) and various international humanitarian law violations, including attacks on civilians, summary

---

11 This section is based on information gathered and triangulated from interviews with various SLA/AW members and former members during the reporting period.
executions, kidnapping and sexual violence (see sect. VIII). In late April-early May, Fayssal Adam Ali Konio, a prominent commander in charge of administration at SLA/AW military headquarters, was tortured to death by Gaddura’s men, because of suspicions that he was siding with Aldouk. A transcript of his interrogation/beating session can be found in annex 3.

Figure II
Photograph of the body of Fayssal Adam Ali Konio

Source: Social networks.

38. The immediate cause of the fighting was a long-standing leadership issue between Gaddura on one side and Aldouk and Zanoun on the other, these two commanders formerly close to Abdul Wahid refusing to recognize Gaddura’s authority (see S/2019/34, paras. 46 and 51). The fighting started after a meeting of the military leadership in April failed to resolve the issue, and Gaddura subsequently issued an arrest warrant against Aldouk (see annex 4) and sent a team to his Daya area to arrest him. A secondary cause of the fighting was tensions between them on the sharing of the revenues of the Torroye gold mine (see sect. XI).

39. In October, Aldouk, Zanoun and a dozen other commanders released a statement to announce their departure from SLA/AW, criticizing Abdul Wahid and Gaddura on various leadership issues and crimes (see annex 5). According to sources with direct knowledge of the matter, at the time of writing, Aldouk and Zanoun were negotiating with the Rapid Support Forces on their integration into that Government force.

3. Fighting with the Government of the Sudan

40. In spite of sporadic incidents, clashes between SLA/AW and the security forces have generally diminished, as a result of the meeting between Abdul Wahid and Prime Minister Hamdok in Paris on 29 September 2019, as well as informal arrangements between Abdul Wahid and the Rapid Support Forces.

41. Most of the incidents have involved, on the Government side, some former SLA/AW commanders who signed security arrangements with the Government between 2016 and 2019 and subsequently joined the security forces, in particular Sudanese Armed Forces lieutenant-colonel al-Sadiq Foka and the Rapid Support Forces.
Forces commander in Rokero, Hassabo. During the reporting period, Foka's force committed abuse such as kidnap for ransom and harassment involving internally displaced persons and villagers suspected of supporting SLA/AW, in particular in the Sortony area of North Darfur (see sect. VIII, International humanitarian law). According to various local sources, Hassabo provided logistical support to Aldouk against Gaddura’s forces.

4. Dynamics, internally displaced persons

42. Internal divisions in SLA/AW have also impacted the security situation in the biggest internally displaced persons camps, such as Hamadiya, Hasahisa (Central Darfur) and Kalma (South Darfur), where SLA/AW still has a strong following and various internally displaced person groups with varying degrees of loyalty to Abdul Wahid compete for control. In Hamadiya, the killing of an internally displaced person by some SLA/AW members on 29 May triggered sporadic clashes between opposing SLA/AW factions, resulting in some internally displaced persons’ leaders being removed from the camp.

B. Musa Hilal and his Sudan Revolutionary Awakening Council

43. During the reporting period, the supporters of the designated individual, Musa Hilal (permanent reference number SDi. 002), mostly from his Mahamid clan of the Rizeigat tribe, have increasingly mobilized for his release. Sources in Hilal’s SRAC reported to the Panel that, following a conference in mid-March gathering thousands of Mahamid in Hilal’s Masteriha stronghold (North Darfur), about 150 Hilal’s fighters went to the Wadi Toro area of Jebel Marra (Central Darfur) in order to establish a new armed group and cooperate with SLA/AW. These SRAC members in Jebel Marra were led by commanders Mohamed Ahmed Adama and Said Musa.

44. On 1 June 2020, the SRAC fighters and a SLA/AW force jointly attacked Sudanese Armed Forces in Katrom (Jebel Marra, Central Darfur), killing about 20. According to local sources, on 14 June, Abdullah Haran, SLA/AW Deputy Chair based in South Sudan, telephoned SRAC commanders in Jebel Marra and ordered them to leave the area within 72 hours. Further to the SLA/AW ultimatum, most SRAC fighters left Jebel Marra. Several were arrested by the security forces on their way to Libya on 28 June, while some commanders managed to join SRAC forces there.

45. This agitation among the Mahamid clan has been a major source of concern for Hemetti, since Hilal and Mahamid could be instrumentalized against him by rival forces. On 23 April 2020, the Rapid Support Forces took Hilal from Sudanese Armed Forces premises, where he had been detained since his arrest in November 2017, to Rapid Support Forces facilities in Khartoum. Since then, he has been holding talks with Hemetti’s entourage over his judiciary case and conditions for his release. However, these talks have been inconclusive to date, owing to deeply entrenched mistrust between Hilal and Hemetti. At the time of writing, Hilal was appearing in a military court in two main cases, the killing of members of the Central Reserve Police in Jebel Amir and the clashes with Rapid Support Forces in Masteriha in November 2017.

46. In late October 2020, Ali Majok, a prominent member of SRAC, Mahamid politician and staunch Hilal supporter, was arrested by the Government of the Sudan on charges of preparing a coup. Majok, a former minister during the previous regime,

12 This section is based on information gathered and triangulated from interviews with several SRAC members and Hilal supporters during the reporting period.
who had left the country when the crisis between Hilal and the Government had broken out in mid-2017, had returned clandestinely to the Sudan a few days before his arrest. His plan was reportedly to mobilize Mahamid members of the Rapid Support Forces to take control of the force and overthrow the transitional authorities.

C. Recruitment by groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement

47. In the few months before and after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement, the signatory groups have engaged in an extensive recruitment drive, in order to recruit as many fighters as possible to the security arrangements and maximize their leverage. Many local sources have reported the activities of the movements’ recruiting agents throughout Darfur. As an illustration, annex 6 shows recruitment forms distributed in several areas of Darfur, attributed to JEM. Recruitment of children by various signatory groups has been reported, including by UNAMID.  

48. For fighters in movements which signed peace deals with the previous regime but were dissatisfied with the implementation of those agreements, the Juba signatory movements’ recruitment drive proved a valuable opportunity to be part of the new security arrangements, with the associated benefits. Two groups of several hundreds of fighters each, initially belonging to Abulgasim Imam Elhaj’s SLA/AW dissident movement, which signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur with the Government of the Sudan in January 2017, have joined JEM and SLA/TC in recent months in the Nertiti area.

VI. Darfurian armed groups in Libya

49. During the reporting period, most Darfurian groups in Libya were heavily involved in Libyan National Army military operations and significantly increased their capability and size, in terms of weapons, vehicles and fighters. They consolidated their relations with the Libyan National Army and developed direct relations with its foreign backers. In spite of the Juba peace agreement, large numbers of Darfurian rebel fighters are poised to stay in Libya for the foreseeable future.

A. Military operations

50. From late 2019 to June 2020, most of the Darfurian rebel groups supporting the Libyan National Army (GSLF, SLA/TC, SLA/AW, SRAC, Abdallah Banda) joined the Libyan National Army Tripoli operations, some of them fighting in the southern neighbourhoods of Tripoli, such as Ain Zara and Qasr Bin Ghasir. SLA/MM did not join the Tripoli operations, as it was reportedly not satisfied with the Libyan National Army offer of financing and equipment in return. On 6 January 2020, SLA/MM and other Darfurian groups participated in the Libyan National Army operation in which Sirte was captured. They left some forces in Sirte and later occupied Washkah.

51. When the Libyan National Army retreated eastwards in early June 2020, Darfurian groups followed the movement and left Tripoli, Tarhunah, Washkah and other areas in western Libya. At the time of writing, the bulk of Darfurian forces remained in two areas. Many of them were gathered in Harawa, about 70 km east of

---

14 According to various sources in the movements, as well as UNAMID.
15 This section is based on information gathered and triangulated from interviews with Darfurian rebels during the reporting period.
the Sirte frontline. Many others were in the Jufrah region, their hub for several years, in several places: Hun; Suknah; Waddan, in particular at the civilian airport; Zillah area, where SLA/MM has its headquarters and other groups such as SLA/TC and GSLF also have camps. They also had bases in the Haruj mountains, near Zillah, where SLA/MM had its training camp.

52. The movements also maintained a military presence in southern Libya. In June 2020, some Darfuri forces were deployed by the Libyan National Army to the Sabha area, in order to protect the location and neighbouring oilfields, such as Sharara, from a potential offensive by the Government of National Accord. They stayed in farms around Sabha belonging to Libyan Mahamid and to pro-Libyan National Army Libyans. The movements, which often operated jointly and stayed together, also had some small logistical bases in the Waw-al-Kabir, Tmassah and Umm al Aranib areas, where they stored fuel, ammunition, water and other supplies. As the main bases of the movements in Jufrah at a considerable distance, these logistical bases were necessary for the movements’ operations in the south.

53. During their operations in western Libya alongside the Libyan National Army, the Darfuri groups suffered some losses, in particular from drone strikes. A SLA/MM commander interviewed by the Panel said that, during the Libyan National Army operations in the first half of 2020, the movement had lost about 50 fighters, including a dozen field commanders. GSLF also lost several high-profile commanders, such as Salah Dausa Haroun Difa, known as “Sendoug”, killed in a drone attack in February. However, by comparison with the gains in troops and equipment made by the movements recently, these losses were minimal.

Figure III

Photograph of a Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi convoy hit by a drone strike on 12 April in the Abu Qurayn area

Source: Social networks.
B. Capability

54. During the reporting period, all the Darfuri groups considerably increased their capability. They recruited in large numbers, as illustrated by several videos of graduation ceremonies for new recruits seen by the Panel. Members of the movements reported to the Panel that, since the fall of the Government of Omer Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, it has been easy for them to recruit, as many young Darfurians were attracted by the prospect of earning a salary in the movements or being integrated at a later stage into the security arrangements negotiated in Juba. One SLA/MM commander claimed to the Panel that, since mid-2019, SLA/MM had recruited 3,000 new fighters. Darfuri groups, such as SLA/MM and JEM, had recruiters in various areas of Darfur and in refugee camps in eastern Chad such as Abunabak and Kariari. They gathered recruits in Tina, at the Chad-Darfur border, then transported them in civilian cars to Libya through Chad and the Kouri-Bougoudi mining area. For SLA/MM, commander Abd al Majid Ali Senine was one of the key officers in charge of the transport of recruits.

55. Before starting to redeploy some troops outside Libya following the signing of the Agreement, SLA/MM was the biggest Darfuri group in Libya. Rebel interlocutors reported to the Panel that, before this redeployment, the movement possessed about 400 vehicles in Libya, including several dozen armoured personnel carriers. The General Commander, Lieutenant General Juma Haggar, his deputy, Major General Jabir Ishag and new Military Chief of Staff, Major General Faysal Saleh, were leading the force. Other major commanders include Brigadier General Haroun Saleh Diffa, known as “Tawila”, (military intelligence), Major General Ismail Wad Habouba (moral guidance), Ahmed Arkouri (training), Lieutenant-Colonel Abdelaziz, known as Gniéré (artillery), Lieutenant-Colonel Amir Djoka (operations) and Colonel Azrek (logistics).
56. GSLF was the second biggest Darfuran armed group in Libya. After spending several months in detention in Chad, General Commander Abdallah Bashar Jeli, known as “Janna”, was back on the field in Libya, seconded by Deputy General Commander Aboud Adam Khater and Ahmed Abu Tonga. According to sources, the group owned from 150 to 200 cars.

57. SLA/AW had a force comprising approximately 100 armed vehicles in Libya, led by SLA/AW Chief of Staff Yusif Ahmed Yusif, known as “Karjakola”. Other leading commanders included General Salah Abdallah Juk, known as “Bob”, and Colonel Mohamed Saleh (officially the commander of the Libya force). Karjakola continued to recruit new fighters, in particular in South Darfur. SLA/TC, who were mostly from Fur, like SLA/AW, now had a force of about 70–80 vehicles led by General Commander Saleh, known as “Jebel Si”.

Figure VI
Photograph of Yusif “Karjakola” during a graduation ceremony (September 2020)
58. Musa Hilal’s SRAC has several hundred fighters in Libya. While members of the movement were initially fighting alongside the Libyan National Army under the umbrella of Libyan Mahamid, it later established a direct relationship with the Libyan National Army. Many members stayed in Sabha with Libyan Mahamid and obtained Libyan IDs through this tribal connection. The SRAC leading commander in Libya was Mahamat Bakhit “Doydoy”, while some SRAC leading political cadres also moved there, such as Mahamat Kadam, in charge of international relations. In recent months, some prominent commanders, frustrated with the leadership and the sharing of revenues, left the movement and associated with other groups such as Banda’s movement (see para. 60 and annex 7). The Sudanese authorities, in particular Hemetti, were particularly concerned about the presence of SRAC in Libya, which they feared represented a latent potential cause of destabilization in the Sudan. According to various sources, Hemetti would aim to solve this issue by striking informal deals with individual SRAC commanders to convince them to return, not through an official political deal with SRAC, which would give more visibility to Hilal’s cause.

59. Several smaller groups side with the Libyan National Army, although most do not have direct relations with the Libyan National Army authorities and work under the umbrella of bigger groups such as SLA/MM and GSLF. Abbas Ahmed Aseel “Jebel Moon”, a veteran rebel commander, split from SLA/MM in October 2019 and established his own group, reportedly constituted of about 200 fighters, mostly from his Misseriya Jebel community. The New Justice and Equality Movement (New JEM), a group which split from JEM in 2015, also has a small force in Libya, constituted largely of Masalit, led by General Magdi Hussein Sharaf. Another JEM splinter group, JEM Collective Wing, has several dozen fighters in Libya, led by commander Musa Saleh, a Mahamid former Border Guard.

60. Abdallah Banda, a prominent ex-JEM commander indicted by the International Criminal Court, gave up his goldmining activities in the Kouri-Bougoudi area in 2019, after being expelled from there by the Chadian authorities, and in March 2020 officially launched his own rebel group, the Assembly of the Justice and Equality Movement forces (see the founding statement in annex 7). Banda, who now had about 45 vehicles, recruited mostly among former JEM veterans (in particular from the Zaghawa Kobe clan), including his deputy Bichara Adam Ali and Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (Tek) (permanent reference number: SDi.004), a designated individual on the sanctions list, number three of the group. The group cooperated closely with SLA/MM and GSLF (also mostly from the Zaghawa community) and worked for the Libyan National Army under them.

61. JEM was the only major Darfurian rebel group not aligned with the Libyan National Army. During the reporting period, the group has not participated in any high-profile fighting. It has focused on smuggling (see sect. IX) in the far south of Libya, including areas around Kilinje and south to Qatrun, and on strengthening itself in view of the coming peace agreement. It has been preparing for the Juba security arrangements by incorporating groups of new recruits coming from the Sudan and Chad and reorganizing the force. According to a JEM officer interviewed by the Panel, about 50 JEM cadres joined the force in Libya from Darfur in mid-June to that end. Abdel Karim Cholloy, the JEM Head of Intelligence, was the leading commander on the field. Other prominent commanders included General Yahia Omda, Mohamed Dardug (from the Meidob tribe), General Abdulhalim and Ahmed Daud Tarda, in charge of administration.

C. Cooperation with the Libyan National Army

62. The main Darfuri movements (SLA/MM, GSLF, SLA/AW, SLA/TC, SRAC) now coordinated directly with the highest-ranking Libyan National Army leaders and held regular, frequent meetings with them in Benghazi. Leading Darfuri commanders such as Juma Haggar, Jabir Ishag and Faysal Saleh of SLA/MM, Aboud Adam Khater of GSLF, “Doydoy” of SRAC and “Karjakola” of SLA/AW met the Libyan National Army authorities in Benghazi in July, September, October and November. During the reporting period, their usual high-ranking Libyan National Army interlocutor was Saddam Heftar (Heftar’s son), while the groups also communicated with General Abdelkarim Hadiya, head of the General Secretariat of the Libyan National Army General Command, Heftar’s closest aide, and General Abd al-Razzak Nazuri, the Libyan National Army Chief of staff.

63. On the ground, the main Libyan National Army daily interlocutor of the Darfurians was the 128th battalion, led by commander Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma. In a speech during a SLA/AW celebration in Libya, a SLA/AW officer mentioned the force’s relations with the 128th battalion, a rare public admission of the movements’ cooperation with the Libyan National Army (see annex 8). The day-to-day supplies – ammunition, food and fuel – provided by the Libyan National Army to the groups, as well as their payments, are channelled through the 128th battalion and Hilal Musa Bouamoud al-Zawawi, the pro-Libyan National Army militia leader who hosts the movements in Zillah. Some movements also cooperated with other Libyan National Army units, as illustrated by a military identity card for a “volunteer”, delivered by the 152nd battalion to New JEM commander Magdi Hussein Sharaf (see figure VIII).
64. During the reporting period, the movements continued to receive large numbers of vehicles and weapons from the Libyan National Army, usually before every large-scale operation. The movements received several dozen Landcruisers (up to 200, according to some rebel sources) in June, to prepare the defence of Sirte and Jufrah, then several dozen more in early September. They received various types of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, including 23 mm, 106 mm and 130 mm, as well as rocket-propelled grenades and Goryunov-type machine guns.

D. Cooperation with the Libyan National Army’s foreign backers

65. While previously the Darfuri movements had contact with the Libyan National Army only, for about a year the United Arab Emirates, one of the most important Libyan National Army backers, had established direct relations with the main movements in Libya. This testified to the importance of the Darfuri groups for Libyan National Army military strategy.

66. Members of the movements reported to the Panel that regular meetings between the Darfuri leading commanders (Haggar, Ishag, “Doydoy”, etc.) and Emirati officers in Benghazi took place, some in September and November 2020. The main focus of those meetings was the logistical and financial needs of the movements and how the United Arab Emirates would contribute in this regard. The Darfuri elements interviewed by the Panel understood that the payments and equipment that they received from the Libyan National Army during the reporting period were given to them by the United Arab Emirates. In the last week of November 2020, several Emirati officers visited the camps of the movements in Jufrah region, to assess which forces would stay in or leave Libya after the signing of the Agreement.

67. The United Arab Emirates also tried to cultivate personal, privileged relations with high-ranking Darfuri Libya-based commanders, bypassing the Libyan National Army and the movements’ political leadership, by inviting them to Abu Dhabi. Various members of the movements mentioned to the Panel that Juma Haggar of SLA/MM visited the United Arab Emirates for about two months in November–
December 2019, while his deputy Jabir Ishag and Abdallah ("Janna") of GSLF went there for several weeks in October–November 2020. During those visits, the commanders reportedly met members of the United Arab Emirates security apparatus.

E. Allegations concerning the Rapid Support Forces presence in Libya

68. In late November, a document circulated on social networks, then in various media. Presented as an internal Rapid Support Forces letter, dated 6 November 2020, from the South Darfur Rapid Support Forces coordinator to the Rapid Support Forces deputy head Abdel Rahim Dagolo, it stated that 1,200 Rapid Support Forces had just been deployed in Libya to Jufrah, then Benghazi, with Emirati support (see annex 9). The Rapid Support Forces stated that the document was a forgery. The Panel was unable to ascertain the authenticity of the document. The Panel’s sources in Libya were not aware of the presence of Rapid Support Forces there during the reporting period.

F. After the Juba Peace Agreement: to remain or to leave

69. Under the security arrangements protocols of the Agreement, all the fighters in the Darfurian signatory movements (SLA/MM, SLA/TC, JEM, GSLF, Sudanese Alliance) have to come to agreed assembly areas in Darfur within 90 days of the signing of the agreement. However, the Juba Peace Agreement is very unlikely to bring to an end the presence of Darfurian armed movements in Libya.

70. Firstly, some movements, such as SLA/AW and SRAC, as well as smaller groups, are not part of the Agreement and will therefore stay in Libya for now. Secondly, the signatory movements’ entrenched presence in Libya and participation in the conflict there, the benefits that they obtain from it and their intricate relations with the Libyan National Army and its foreign backers make it difficult for them to leave Libya rapidly and completely.

71. Under the Agreement, some movements began to move some forces back to Darfur through Chad. In November, 40 SLA/MM cars arrived in North Darfur from southern Libya. Some of these troops will be integrated into a new force in charge of close protection for political leaders, while some were tasked with preparing the logistics for the return to Darfur of other contingents. At the time of writing, about 100 more SLA/MM cars coming from Libya were stationed in the Bao area of eastern Chad in a location provided by the Chadian authorities, and ready to cross to Darfur. Several dozen more were preparing to leave Libya at the movement’s headquarters in Zillah and enter Chad, led by Juma Haggar and Jabir Ishag. The Panel is aware of similar plans by GSLF.

72. However, the Panel’s interviews of members of the signatory movements indicate that these movements will leave some forces in Libya for the foreseeable future. Some commanders and troops enjoy their conditions there, which they consider to be better than those that they would have if they joined the security forces in the Sudan, and want to stay in Libya as long as the Libyan National Army and its backers pay them. Some also consider that keeping some forces in Libya would allow them to continue to participate in lucrative smuggling activities (migrants, narcotics, cars, etc.). In addition, in meetings held with the Libyan National Army since September, the Libyan National Army authorities, for whom the Darfurians are a major military asset, pressed the movements to stay in Libya, which the movements accepted. The movements are also keen to maintain rear bases and some forces in Libya in the event that the Agreement is not implemented and the peace process is derailed.
73. The signatory movements therefore intend to leave a significant number of troops in Libya – up to half of their force, according to some interviewees. While Juma Haggar and Jabir Ishag, of SLA/MM, are expected to return to the Sudan in the coming weeks, the movement’s Chief of Staff, Faysal Saleh, is supposed to stay in Libya with several dozen cars. At the time of writing, in mid-December, commanders of SLA/MM, GSLF, SLA/TC, SLA/AW and SRAC were promised new vehicles (about 150, according to rebel sources) by the Libyan National Army, their monthly payments, weapons, ammunition and uniforms. Such transactions indicate that the partnership between the various sides will survive the Agreement.

VII. Darfurian armed groups in South Sudan

74. Three Darfurian rebel groups maintained a military presence in the northern part of South Sudan during the reporting period, but none conducted any military operations. The Sudanese Revolutionary Council, a mostly Masalit JEM splinter group led by commander Abdelrahman Arbab, was based in the Raja area, with a few dozen armed vehicles and about 200 fighters. During the Juba peace process, several negotiating movements and bodies – JEM, the Sudanese Alliance, Abdulaziz Al Hilu’s SPLM/North, the Rapid Support Forces – tried to lure this force into their ranks. According to various sources, the group is now very close to Al Hilu.

75. JEM also had a military force of a few dozen vehicles in the Raja area. While the leader of the force, Omda Taher, was in Juba to represent JEM in the peace talks, the group strengthened itself by recruiting new members, bringing back veterans and repairing its vehicles in anticipation of the security arrangements.

76. SLA/AW kept a military force of approximately 120 fighters in remote areas of Pariang County, led by Major General Abdullah Haran, the movement’s deputy-chair. The group also continued to detain several dozen individuals (76, according to a former member who recently left the force), both members and civilians (see S/2020/36, paras. 98–106). As SLA/AW rejected the Juba peace process, Haran came under increased pressure from the South Sudanese authorities, who curtailed his business and farming activities and ordered him to stop attacks on SLA/AW dissidents. Haran arrived in Juba in early November to discuss with the South Sudanese mediation team SLA/AW plans for peace.

77. In recent few months, the Juba signatory movements have attempted to recruit new fighters in South Sudan among the Darfuri diaspora, in particular among veterans who had left the movements, with the aim of increasing their number of troops before becoming part of the security arrangements. The South Sudanese military allowed SLA/MM, SLA/TC and GSLF to establish some camps as assembly areas for fighters around Bentiu, Raja and Yida. Several dozen recruits joined these camps. For SLA/MM, the main recruiter was Aboud Ali Khater.

17 This section is based on information gathered and triangulated from interviews with Darfurian rebels during the reporting period.

18 Owing partly to Al Hilu’s Masalit origins, the SPLM/North has a strong following in the Masalit community in West Darfur.
VIII. International humanitarian law and human rights\textsuperscript{19}

A. Overview

78. The overall international humanitarian law situation remained dire, primarily owing to recurrent localized conflicts. Intercommunal violence, characterized by tensions between pastoralists and farmers, cattle rustling, attacks against internally displaced persons and returnees, significantly imperilled the civilian population. Women and girls remained highly vulnerable to attacks and sexual violence, including while trying to engage in livelihood activities. The absence of fully functioning law enforcement and rule of law institutions, in particular in remote areas, exacerbated protection gaps for civilians and made the environment conducive for perpetrators to operate with impunity. Most incidents stemmed from the root causes of the Darfur conflict, in particular the availability of weapons and conflict over land, which remained largely unaddressed. Fighting between SLA/AW rebel factions and between SLA/AW and Government of the Sudan forces in the Jebel Marra areas resulted in killings, injury and secondary displacement. Punitive measures were meted out against civilians by security forces, who also committed grave child rights violations, including rape and physical assaults, and caused disruption to children’s schooling.

B. Protection of civilians

79. During the reporting period, cases of rape, killings, intimidation, physical assaults and attacks on internally displaced persons, looting and arson were widespread. These incidents were mostly attributed to armed nomadic tribesmen, Government of the Sudan security forces – Sudanese Armed Forces, police and Rapid Support Forces – and militias. Some of the peaceful protests over poor services, insecurity and lack of justice turned violent and resulted in further human rights abuse.

80. The weakness of police, the only security force body with a presence in rural areas, meant that perpetrators frequently acted with a total sense of impunity and disdain for law and order. Attacks by groups of armed men on police trying to intervene in a case were a frequent occurrence. On 21 April, in Tamer Paul Jamel village (north-east of Zalingei, Central Darfur), Arab militias, in retaliation for the alleged murder of one of their tribesmen, overpowered and disarmed the local police and took over the station, where they arbitrarily detained several people, including local tribal elders and Government of the Sudan officials. According to local sources, the militias killed two individuals, injured 18 others, burned down 14 houses and the local market and looted 10 vehicles and 100 head of livestock. Such retaliatory attacks were grossly indiscriminate and excessive. The siege was lifted after villagers who sought refuge in the mosque were forced to pay compensation (\textit{diya}) for the dead shepherd. In October, a policeman and one gunman were killed when gunmen attacked the police station in East Jebel Marra locality in South Darfur. Two other policemen and a woman were injured. Armed groups, mostly from nomad communities, openly exploited the security gaps and have continued attacks against other local communities.

81. In May, the Government of the Sudan released a National Plan for Civilian Protection, aimed at the protection of civilians after the exit of UNAMID (see S/2020/429). At this stage, uncertainty remains regarding the capacity and means of

\textsuperscript{19} This section is based on interviews and telephone interviews with various Darfurian sources, including victims, community leaders, internally displaced persons and local human rights monitors.
the Government of the Sudan to implement the plan. In public statements, as well as in meetings with the Panel, representatives of internally displaced persons and the Darfurian movements\(^{20}\) expressed concern over the withdrawal of UNAMID, arguing that it would create a protection gap for civilians, and asked for the extension of its mandate. The security arrangements under the Agreement catered for the establishment of a 12,000-strong joint protection force (6,000 from the Government of the Sudan, 6,000 from the signatory movements) in Darfur within 90 days after the signing of the Agreement, tasked with protecting civilians after UNAMID leaves. However, it remains to be seen when this force will be fully operational, in particular given the early delays in the Agreement implementation, and how effective it will be.

C. Sexual and gender-based violence

82. Absence of gender justice exacerbated incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence against women and girls, as the majority of cases were not adequately investigated, if at all. The police often cited lack of capacity and resources, including fuel for their vehicles, as reasons for not following up on reported cases. For survivors, the notion of "safety in numbers" did not always work, in particular when assailants were armed and in large numbers. Groups of victims and survivors have been attacked during intercommunal violence, while going to school and/or engaging in livelihood activities outside of internally displaced persons camps, simple acts which further exposed their vulnerabilities. Alleged perpetrators included members of the security forces, armed men often from nomadic communities and occasionally members of SLA/AW.

83. On 28 November, a 14-year-old girl with a mental disability was allegedly raped at gunpoint by a Sudanese Armed Forces soldier near Thur market (Central Darfur). The incident was reported to the local military commander, who reportedly took no action, angering locals who felt that the perpetrator was not held accountable. The survivor received medical attention in Nertiti. In October, a woman was gang raped by two armed nomads while engaging in livelihood activities in Fuji (Central Darfur). Some victims were subjected to extreme physical violence, sometimes with tragic consequences. On 21 September, a Fur woman was gang raped and beaten to death by a group of men reported to be Arabs, during a night-time attack on the Ludang farming area for returnees in the outskirts of Nertiti (Central Darfur). The alleged perpetrators were travelling in a convoy of horses, motorcycles and camels. No arrests were made. On 13 September, a woman was physically assaulted and a 15-year-old girl raped by a Rapid Support Forces member at their home in the Bargo internally displaced persons camp in Tawila (North Darfur). Their home was targeted on account of the family’s alleged affiliation with the SLA/AW faction. No arrests were made by the Sudan Police Force in Tawila.

84. The Government of the Sudan acknowledged the challenge of addressing protection concerns for women and girls in Darfur. During the reporting period, the Director of the Unit for Combating Violence Against Women and Children under the Ministry of Labour and Social Development informed the Panel of progress in endorsing standard operating procedures for gender-based violence prevention and response and the signing of the framework of cooperation steered in under the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in March 2020. She outlined planned training programmes for the military and other security personnel and the amendment of various laws which would provide justice mechanisms for victims and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Noting

that awareness and enforcement are often a challenge, the Panel welcomes the enhanced preventive, response and protection measures being introduced for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

D. **Violations and abuse against children**

85. The Panel received several reports of incidents involving the abduction of children. On 30 April 2020, members of a militia abducted a 16-year-old shepherd girl near Nertiti. On 7 May, a 10-year-old boy was abducted in Wadi Tanqwa (Nertiti locality) following the killing of a 32-year-old man during a raid in which more than 45 head of sheep were also looted.

86. A number of children accompanying their parents were also injured when peaceful sit-ins in different parts of Darfur were attacked or dispersed with force (see below). Children were also significantly impacted in attacks and counter-attacks between Government of the Sudan forces and SLA/AW. Information received by the Panel indicated that a 6-year-old child was among the casualties who died when, on 1 and 2 June 2020, the Sudanese Armed Forces launched rockets attacks towards the SLA-controlled Mara village in Central Darfur. During the two days of counter-attacks, seven children aged from 4 to 12 years sustained shrapnel wounds, for which they were treated at the Nertiti hospital.

87. Similarly, a large number of children were among the civilians affected by the SLA/AW internal fighting in Jebel Marra, in particular among the newly displaced people. Their situation is compounded by the fact that some of the children were already from child-headed households and others became separated from their parents or caregivers as they fled to seek safety and shelter. In Sortony (North Darfur), pupils who fled the area owing to fear of arrests during military operations by Sudanese Armed Forces commander Al-Sadiq Foka that targeted suspected SLA/AW supporters, missed their school examinations.

E. **Repression of sit-ins**

88. Since the end of June 2020, there have been a number of peaceful sit-ins in Darfur, including in Nertiti (Jebel Marra, Central Darfur), Fata Borno, Kutum and Kabkabiya (North Darfur), Ed Daein and Abu Matariq (East Darfur), organized by local resistance committees with support from some SLA/AW elements and FFC. These sit-ins, with strong participation by women, followed repeated attacks on internally displaced persons and farmers in these areas. Protesters made various demands, including the dismissal of local authorities and the disarmament of local militias (see annex 10).

89. While the protests had been largely peaceful, the Sudan Police Force broke up a sit-in in Kutum, North Darfur on 12 July 2020, after firing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse the protesters, leaving a number of people injured, including women and children. Such actions were clearly in contravention of the protesters’ rights to peaceful assembly and association.

---

21 See [www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2020/7/13/](www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2020/7/13/)
90. On 13 July 2020 in Fata Borno, a sit-in was violently dispersed by armed militias on four-wheel-drive vehicles, motorcycles and horseback. The assailants indiscriminately fired live ammunition at the protesters, resulting in 12 deaths and 14 injuries, and looted and burned properties including the market. This attack, taking place a few hours after a high-level Government delegation had visited the sit-in to hear the claims of protesters, is indicative of the fragile security situation in Darfur, where armed militias continued to brazenly flout law and order, while the security forces are unable to adequately protect civilians.

F. Human rights violations by Government security forces

91. The Panel received several reports of lack of professionalism, human rights violations and abuse by security forces. The Resistance Committee in Abu Karinka (East Darfur) issued a press statement in August condemning the behaviour of the
Rapid Support Forces. It claimed that women and girls were harassed at the markets and in cafes and men beaten randomly, and that they forcibly shaved the head of some youths.22 Also in August, 10 members of the South Darfur Resistance Committees were arrested and detained for three weeks without charges by joint security forces, allegedly for their participation in protests in Kass locality. The protesters had condemned the release, without charge, of two members of a local militia, following their brief arrest on the grounds that several members of their group were attacking civilians on farms and villages around Kass and looting property. Sources stated that police in Kass found those arrested in possession of large numbers of heavy weapons, guns and sniper rifles.

92. In October, UNAMID reported widespread human rights violations and abuse against internally displaced persons and other civilians in Sortony and surrounding areas by Sudanese Armed Forces commander Al-Sadiq Foka. Cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, inhumane treatment amounting to torture, kidnap for ransom, expulsion of internally displaced persons, extortion and intimidation were highlighted. Most victims were suspected of affiliation with SLA/AW. In one incident, a woman who had reported the unlawful detention of her brother to authorities in Zalingei was herself arbitrarily detained on 14 October by Foka’s men. She was released after paying a ransom of 25,000 Sudanese Pounds. A 25-year-old Fur man was reportedly taken from his home at the Sortony internally displaced persons camp on 18 September to nearby Borgo village where, for two days, he was tied and hung from a tree with stones weighted on his back while being beaten. The victim’s family secured his release on 10 October after paying 45,000 Sudanese pounds. The victim was reportedly denied medical attention and the incident was not reported to authorities, Al-Sadiq Foka being the sole authority in Sortony, according to the report. Similarly, a 31-year-old man who was arrested by Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers for violating curfew orders at Deba Nyra, near Golo, was temporarily detained at a nearby Sudanese Armed Forces base. His hands and feet were tied, and he was left hanging from a tree for several hours and beaten repeatedly with rifle butts.

G. Human rights violations by the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

93. Internal SLA/AW fighting (see sect. V) was marred by various international humanitarian law and human rights abuse, including attacks on civilians, extortion, abduction and summary executions. In several cases, factions attacked and looted villages located in the area of operation of another faction, accusing villagers of complicity with their enemy. Since September, Gaddura’s forces have looted several villages in Zanoun’s territory, in eastern Jebel Marra.

94. The Panel is aware of at least one summary execution. In late August, after they repelled an attack by Gaddura’s troops on Dwo village, Zanoun’s forces shot dead four of Gaddura’s alleged soldiers that they had captured during the fighting, including a university student, Abu Sofyan Adam. Several cases of abduction by the various groups were also reported, usually targeting civilians having alleged links with a rival faction.

95. Sexual and gender-based violence incidents also took place. In several occurrences reported to the Panel, some members of the warring factions “punished” local communities accused of siding with the opposite faction by committing rapes on female civilians, including by targeting the wives of rival commanders.

---

96. The fighting and related attacks on civilians caused large-scale displacement. In July and August, fighting between Aldouk and Gaddura’s commander Saleh Borso in Leiba and Wuji villages led to the secondary displacement of thousands of internally displaced persons to the Savanga and Toga gathering sites near Golo (Central Darfur). UNAMID reports also indicated that fighting between Zanoun and Gaddura’s forces in September–November resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians of Eastern Jebel Marra to the villages of Jawa, Deribat and Suni.

H. Situation of internally displaced persons

97. During the reporting period, there was no tangible progress in improving conditions for the internally displaced persons. The transitional nature of the current Sudanese Government and the related political uncertainty have negatively impacted the capacity of the Government of the Sudan to put in place policies with regard to internally displaced persons, in particular regarding core issues such as land occupation and security in farming areas.

1. Attacks on internally displaced persons and returnees

98. Armed attacks by members of Arab communities on internally displaced persons and returnees have continued, especially in areas such as Nertiti (Central Darfur), Kutum (North Darfur) and southern fringes of Jebel Marra (South Darfur). Many Arab communities have become nervous since the fall of the previous regime, fearing that they would come under pressure to return the lands belonging to internally displaced persons that they have been occupying for years. As a consequence, they stepped up attacks on farmers in order to dissuade them from trying to return to their land.

99. The Government’s capacity to respond to this insecurity has proven limited. Outside the main towns where the Rapid Support Forces were present, the footprint and capability of the security forces was often insufficient. The police frequently had less firepower than some nomad communities and were unable to stop attacks on internally displaced persons and returnees.

2. Security situation in internally displaced persons camps

100. In internally displaced persons camps, residents also remained exposed to violence and harassment by armed elements staying in the camps. On 13 April 2020, an element working under Sudanese Armed Forces officer and former SLA/AW local commander, Al-Sadiq Foka, killed the leader of the Sortony internally displaced persons camp (North Darfur), allegedly because the leader refused to allow taxation of internally displaced persons by Foka’s men.

101. While some internally displaced persons considered the presence of SLA/AW in camps as a protection, many others saw it as a burden, as SLA/AW sometimes acted as a parallel administration, taxing internally displaced persons and detaining those opposing its rule. The activities of SLA/AW in the camps also sometimes created tensions between the internally displaced persons, on the one hand, and outside communities and the Government of the Sudan authorities on the other. For example, on 12 June, after some SLA/AW members shot dead two Arab civilians who had driven into the Kalma camp (South Darfur) at night by mistake, thousands of armed Arabs surrounded the camp, threatening to storm it in search of the perpetrators. Only the swift intervention of the Rapid Support Forces, local authorities and UNAMID, which mediated between the internally displaced person leaders and the representatives of the Arab civilians, prevented potential bloodshed.
3. **Harassment of internally displaced persons by signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement**

102. In meetings with the Panel in November in Central Darfur, various internally displaced person interlocutors complained about harassment by members to the Juba signatory groups. They claimed that members of the Rapid Support Forces, of SLA/TC, of JEM and unknown persons from outside the internally displaced persons camps, referred to as the “peace supporters”, had arrived in the camps in the last few months and started intimidating people to coerce them into accepting the Agreement. According to them, the “peace supporters” abducted or killed some internally displaced persons who did not agree with the Agreement. Some internally displaced persons claimed that the ultimate goal of this intimidation campaign was to dismantle the internally displaced persons camps. The interlocutors asked the United Nations “to stop the activities of the Agreement supporters, who are committing crimes inside the camps”.

1. **Intercommunal violence**

103. Intercommunal relations deteriorated sharply in several areas of Darfur during the reporting period. Some communities that were on the losing side under the Al-Bashir Government felt emboldened by political changes in Khartoum and became much more assertive in trying to recover the traditional lands that they had lost during the conflict. These deteriorating relations resulted in several large-scale clashes and attacks on civilians, with a frequency, scale and number of casualties unseen in recent years.

104. Such dynamics manifested themselves in West Darfur, the biggest hotspot for intercommunal violence during the reporting period. Tensions between Masalit, who see themselves as traditional owners of land, and local Arab communities continued to increase in the wake of the attack on Krinding internally displaced persons camp in late December 2019, which claimed at least 90 casualties (see annex 11). To date, results of Government of the Sudan investigations into the Krinding events were still pending, fuelling the fear that perpetrators, including alleged Rapid Support Forces officers, would not be brought to justice. In March 2020, a few dozen Masalit led by Abu Johara, mostly former members of rebel groups and of the police, declared a new rebellion in the Silik mountains; the new movement was swiftly crushed by local Arabs. From 19 to 21 July, groups of armed Arab and Masalit clashed in the Al-Jabal neighbourhood of El Geneina. This fighting claimed about 10 casualties and illustrated the growing militarization of communities in West Darfur. On 25 July, about 500 armed Arabs conducted attacks on Masteri (50 km from El Geneina, Masalit majority), as revenge after an Arab woman and her two children were murdered near the town. The attackers took over the police station. The clashes resulted in at least 77 casualties, including several police. Heavy deployment of the security forces helped to scale down clashes in the state, but tensions remain and incidents involving members of these communities continue to occur regularly.

105. Similar large-scale clashes took place in South Darfur. On 5 May, a conflict between Fulani (Fallata) and Rizeigat Arabs started in Mariya and rapidly spread, mostly near Tulus and Gireida, resulting in approximately 100 casualties, as well as significant loss of human life, cattle and property, mostly among the Fulani. Also, in South Darfur, the Fulani herders and local Masalit farmers restarted their traditional conflict in the Gereida locality in late July 2020. This time most of the 14 victims were Masalit internally displaced persons who were trying to settle on the lands which the Fulani viewed as their traditional territory. Later, from 20 to 22 October, armed Fulani herders attacked several villages in the Gereida locality, in retaliatory attacks...
against the Masalit community. UNAMID and media reports indicated that 12 people were killed and almost 30 others injured.\textsuperscript{23} Annex 12 provides statements by communities involved in South and West Darfur, which highlight the recurrent tensions.

106. Conflict over land remained the main issue fuelling intercommunal violence. This was illustrated by the numerous attacks throughout Darfur targeting internally displaced persons and voluntary returnees engaged in seasonal farming and other livelihood activities. In many cases, farmers were attacked because of their refusal to allow pastoralists to release their animals to graze on their crops. These incidents resulted in deaths and injuries, secondary displacement and loss of homes, livelihood and other properties.

107. An aggravating factor for intercommunal violence was the perceived bias of the authorities, including the security forces, in several of these incidents. In West Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces were seen by the communities as close to the local Arabs, while the police on the contrary were seen as predominantly pro-Maslait. Similarly, after the Rapid Support Forces attempted to mediate between the Fulani and the Rizeigat following the May clashes, some Fulani complained to the Panel that the mediation was biased towards the Rizeigat and de facto supporting the latter’s positions. In Central Darfur, after incidents between farmers and nomads in the Nertiti area which claimed several lives in mid-2020, Rapid Support Forces reinforcements were deployed to the area. However, these Rapid Support Forces troops, mostly Arabs from Darfur, received little acceptance from the local Fur, who criticized their alleged bias towards local Arabs. Consequently, they were replaced by Rapid Support Forces from communities outside Darfur, with a better result.\textsuperscript{24}

108. The new Government of the Sudan authorities acknowledged the problem of intercommunal violence and tried to address it. In West Darfur, the Governor declared the administrative unit of Masteri a “disaster area because of the rampant insecurity”. At least 5,000 Joint Forces including Rapid Support Forces, Sudanese Armed Forces and the police were subsequently deployed to West Darfur to protect civilians under imminent threat during the farming and harvest seasons. On some occasions, the Government of the Sudan authorities also launched mediation initiatives between the warring communities. Following the May clashes, leaders of the Fulani and Rizeigat communities signed a truce on 13 May, under the leadership of Abdul Rahim Dagolo, Rapid Support Forces deputy head.\textsuperscript{25} However, as long as the issue of land regime and ownership remains unresolved and weapons continue to be readily available, intercommunal tensions are very likely to persist and randomly break out in many areas of Darfur.

109. The groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement are also acutely aware of the threat posed to the stability in Darfur by recurrent intercommunal tensions, and some of their members intend to play a role in local mediation and reconciliation efforts. In October 2020, several cadres of the signatory groups and local activists created the Darfur Forum for Social Peace, an NGO working on local initiatives to promote social coexistence, led by Salah Hamid Ismail Mohamed.

110. In most cases, the intercommunal conflicts were confined to single localities in Darfur. However, some conflicts, such as those involving the Fulani, Masalit, Zaghawa and some Arab groups, are of a much wider cross-border nature, posing a threat to peace and stability not only in the Sudan, but also in the neighbouring States.

\textsuperscript{23} See www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/attack-on-south-darfur-village-leaves-12-dead.
\textsuperscript{24} Panel’s meeting with Central Darfur authorities, October 2020.
J. Justice and accountability

111. Some members of the security forces and armed factions have abused their powers; others have taken advantage of weak rule of law systems and committed human rights violations and abuses, with impunity. Accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including conflict-related sexual violence, is essential to address impunity for such crimes. During the reporting period, in some occasions, the authorities acted decisively against perpetrators. In October, the Rapid Support Forces arrested 39 people in connection with the attack on 23 July on a voluntary returns village in Abdoze (South Darfur), an incident which had left 15 dead and 25 injured.26 At the time, many fled, and some went missing from the village, which was then under Rapid Support Forces protection. These accountability measures were widely welcomed, but remained the exception.

112. In November, all members of Sudanese opposition and armed rebel groups, with the exception of those facing war crimes charges in the International Criminal Court, were granted amnesty. Minni Minawi and Gibril Ibrahim of JEM were recipients of the amnesty proclamations.27 It is unclear whether Abdul Wahid of SLA, who had not participated in the peace talks, will benefit from the amnesty. Members of the Transitional Council, including al-Burhan and Hemetti, were also exonerated through this proclamation. However, many Darfurian civilians who spoke to the Panel, including in internally displaced persons camps, were adamant that they needed redress and justice in order to have closure and rebuild their lives, and that perpetrators should be brought to justice for reconciliation to happen.28

113. Whereas the granting of amnesties, including for political expediency, is not uncommon, amnesties that prevent the prosecution of individuals who may be legally responsible for war crimes29 and other gross violations of human rights are inconsistent with States’ obligations under various sources of international law as well as with United Nations policy to investigate and prosecute persons suspected of having committed war crimes in non-international armed conflicts.30 The Agreement includes provisions for accountability, reconciliation mechanisms and transitional justice, including the establishment of a special criminal court for crimes committed in Darfur. The granting of amnesties to the key leaders goes against clarion calls by victims of human rights violations for justice and accountability. It also implies that the provisions for accountability in the Agreement will be aimed only at those that do not bear the greatest, overall responsibility for atrocities committed.

26 See www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/attack-on-south-darfur-village-leaves-12-dead.
28 For similar statements, see also https://www.voanews.com/africa/south-sudan-focus/sudan-offers-amnesty-armed-groups.
29 These crimes against humanity entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the enforced disappearance of persons, the forcible transfer of populations and other inhumane acts.
30 Human rights bodies have stated that amnesties are incompatible with the duty of States to investigate crimes under international law and violations of non-derogable human rights law, for example, the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 20 on article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (prohibition of torture).
IX. Arms and border control

A. Arms embargo

1. Government of the Sudan

114. Since the arms embargo imposition in 2004 and further amendments by, inter alia, resolution 1591 (2005), the Panel continued to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo on Darfur. Over the reporting period, the Panel received information on the movement of arms into Darfur in violation of the arms embargo by the Government of the Sudan, without prior notification or request for exemption from the arms embargo addressed to the Committee. For example, after the intercommunal clashes in West Darfur of July 25 2020, the Government of the Sudan deployed joint forces comprising the Sudanese Armed Forces, Rapid Support Forces and police, with “about 150 vehicles from Khartoum to bolster security in the area”.31 The Panel notes that it is fully within the rights and duties of the Government of the Sudan to provide security to its citizens, but for movement of arms into Darfur, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan requires advance notification of such movements. Similarly, the Darfurian armed groups in Libya continued to receive weapons and armed vehicles from the Libyan warring factions during the reporting period.

2. Signatory movements of the Juba Peace Agreement

115. During the reporting period, the Darfurian armed groups in Libya continued to receive weapons and armed vehicles from the Libyan National Army and other actors. Under the Agreement security arrangements protocol, the forces of signatory movements are supposed to gather in agreed assembly areas within 90 days of the signing of the Agreement, and have to hand over their heavy and long-range weapons and artillery to the Joint Military Ceasefire committee before entering the assembly areas. As mentioned in section VI, some forces began to return to Darfur from Libya, and more are coming. Technically, such movements of arms and military equipment into Darfur requires an exemption request to be made to the Sanctions Committee by the Government of the Sudan. Otherwise, this constitutes a violation of the United Nations arms embargo on Darfur.

116. In addition, some members of the movements made it clear to the Panel that they intend to keep some of their weapons and not hand them over, in violation of the Agreement. Some movements are planning to establish arms caches in Darfur, as well as in Darfur border areas with Chad and Libya, in the event that the Agreement is not implemented and conflict resumes. The unmonitored, uncontrolled movement of heavy weapons from neighbouring countries, Libya in particular, to Darfur poses a latent threat to the stability of the Darfur region and the Sudan.

3. Libyan National Army

117. The Panel notes that the provision of weapons and other military equipment to the Darfurian movements by the Libyan National Army and its backers constitutes a violation of the sanctions measures.

4. Weapons dissemination

118. The main drivers of the continued violations of the embargo and dissemination of weapons in Darfur were the following:

(a) Some local armed militias, and SLA/AW in particular, were not part of the Agreement;

(b) SLA/AW continued to operate in Jebel Marra and amassed more resources to procure weapons. Various SLA/AW factions were fighting each other, with massive negative implications for the civilian population;

(c) There has been a recent increase in armed intercommunal fighting, in particular in West and South Darfur, resulting, according to various sources, in increased demand for arms;

(d) During the reporting period, there were increased intercommunal clashes between cross-border tribes in border areas of Chad and Darfur. Clashes by Chadian Zaghawa gunmen and Arabs over cattle theft in West Darfur in early December 2020 claimed at least 2 casualties, while similar cross-border clashes in the same area claimed 16 lives in late July. These movements of armed men across the border also resulted in sporadic spikes in tensions between Chadian and Sudanese security forces;

(e) While Darfurian groups in Libya are preparing for peace and, in some cases, return to the Sudan, they bolstered their capability considerably and are now sizeable forces. If the Agreement, in particular the security arrangements, is not implemented properly, and the Sudanese transition is derailed, there is a chance that these weapons and equipment acquired in Libya end up being used in clashes in Darfur;

(f) Some members of the security forces continued to target civilians (see sect. VIII);

(g) The proliferation of weapons continues and has not been addressed adequately by previous weapons collection campaigns.

Additionally, although fighting between the security forces and the rebels remains largely circumscribed to some areas of Jebel Marra, there were continued reports of numerous security incidents and attacks throughout Darfur in which firearms were routinely used. In particular, in the last two years, there has been an indication of a rise in criminality and attacks against civilians, including internally displaced persons and returnees, according to various statistics, including those of UNAMID.\(^32\)

### B. Arms collection

#### 1. Disarmament of civilians

120. Disarmament of civilians has been advanced by the Government of the Sudan to be the ultimate solution to the security situation and continued armed attacks on civilians. In 2017, the Government launched a weapons collection initiative (see S/2017/1125). The arms collection measures were largely unsuccessful in fully addressing this complex problem, an issue that the Government of the Sudan itself acknowledged. General Hemetti on several occasions criticized the lack of results of former weapons collection campaigns, and pledged to launch a new, more comprehensive campaign.\(^33\)

121. During the reporting period, various Government of the Sudan authorities in Darfur announced some local weapons collection initiatives. In November, the Governor of Central Darfur announced plans for the forced collection of unauthorized

\(^32\) Panel’s meetings with UNAMID in February, October and November 2020.

weapons, to be led by "qualified technical teams equipped with modern detectors and trained police dogs." According to the Panel’s meetings with the Governor and the Sudanese Armed Forces in November in Zalingei, this followed a spate of security incidents which led them to acknowledge that insecurity persisted in a number of areas, despite the deployment of additional security forces. The Central Darfur authorities also stressed to the Panel that international support would be needed to complete the collection campaign successfully.

2. Challenges to weapons collection

122. Structural obstacles remained in the way of a comprehensive collection of weapons. For example, some of the Government of the Sudan forces in charge of the collection displayed bias towards certain tribes. This resulted in the selective collection of weapons, targeting some tribes and sparing others, which, instead of improving the security situation, had the opposite effect of entrenching the dominance of some tribes over others and thus exacerbating the existing tensions. In response to the clashes between Fulani and Rizeigat, mostly from the Awlad Mansur clan, in Tulus in May 2020, the Government authorities launched a weapons collection campaign in the area. However, Fulani leaders complained to the Panel that the campaign, conducted by the Rapid Support Forces, targeted the Fulani only, as the Rapid Support Forces had a strong bias towards the Awlad Mansur (Hemetti and many Rapid Support Forces commanders hail from this community), and that the result was to consolidate the superiority of Awlad Mansur in the area.

123. In addition, many groups of armed men roamed around in rural areas, where they continued to commit attacks on farmers and returnees. The vastness of the terrain to be covered, the very light footprint of the security forces in those areas, the strong firepower of these groups, their mobility, as well as, in some cases, their connections with the security forces, mean that a significant surge in the capability of the Government of the Sudan will be necessary to disarm them.

124. Porous borders and relations between communities across borders also make disarmament more complicated. During the aforementioned 2017–2018 weapons collection campaign, the Panel was aware that, in South Darfur, members of some communities straddling the Darfur-Central African Republic border temporarily handed over their weapons to their kinsmen on the Central African Republic side of the border to escape the campaign.

125. The signing of the Agreement offers an opportunity to comprehensively address the issue of disarmament of not only the armed groups but all the militias currently existing in Darfur. One of the conditions for achieving a meaningful disarmament would be the support of the international community.

C. Border control

126. Control of international borders of Darfur has always been a challenge for the respective authorities in the Sudan. Attempts have been made to strengthen the control of the borders, including having a joint border force with Chad and the deployment of Rapid Support Forces units in border areas, inter alia. These, however, have not prevented the smuggling and other opportunistic cross-border criminal activities. The continued occurrence of these activities has the potential to destabilize the situation in Darfur and the region.

127. During the reporting period, the Panel received several reports of smuggling of vehicles from Libya to Darfur. The Libyan National Army, in December 2020 reported the seizure of vehicles destined for the Sudan.35 During its visit to El Fasher in November, the Panel noted a proliferation of smuggled cars without number plates being plied on the streets. As previously reported, some Darfuri movements based in Libya participated in this smuggling. The Panel is aware that Karjakola’s SLA/AW force were bringing civilian cars from Libya to Darfur and had agents in various towns in Darfur, such as Zalingei, to receive and sell the cars.

128. The smugglers continued to take advantage of the chaotic situation in Libya, and the porous and unmanned border, to smuggle not only vehicles but other goods, including fuel and narcotics.36 Darfuri armed groups based in southern Libya, including JEM, SLA/MM and GSLF, were involved in these smuggling activities (see sect. XI). Migrant smuggling through Darfur to Libya, with some routes via Chad, as the Panel has previously reported (see for instance S/2017/1125), continued, with the Sudanese security forces, in particular the Rapid Support Forces, regularly claiming to have made arrests.

129. Historical border challenges continued to bedevil Darfur. The Panel received regular reports of recruits crossing the Darfur/Libya border to join the Darfuri armed groups in Libya. While some were intercepted by the security forces, the movements’ knowledge of border areas between Darfur and Libya and Chad meant that most recruits reach their destination. Despite the presence of the Chad-Sudan border force, smuggling of goods such as sugar between Darfur and Chadian territory continued. A similar situation continued between South Darfur and north east of Central African Republic.

130. The above cross-border situations contributed to instability not only in Darfur but the region. With the signing of the Agreement, the future stability and strengthening of the borders will be key. The relevant authorities’ responsibility to control the borders will need to be reinforced so as to ensure the stability of Darfur and the region.

X. Travel ban and asset freeze

A. Implementation by Member States

131. The Panel continued to monitor the implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban measures imposed by the Security Council through paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005) by Member States.

B. Implementation by the Government of the Sudan

132. The Government of the Sudan had yet to submit an implementation report on the steps taken to implement a travel ban and asset freeze. In November 2014, the Government had expressed its inability to implement the asset freeze measure. In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the Panel had requested the Government to provide an update regarding the implementation of the asset freeze measures. However, the Government had provided no response on the matter, although two of the designated individuals,

Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem and Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan (permanent reference numbers SDi 002 and SDi001, respectively), remain in the Sudan.

133. Through a letter dated 17 June 2020, the Panel requested an update on the issue from the Government of the Sudan. The Panel is awaiting the official response.

134. Since the inception of targeted sanction measures, the Government of the Sudan has consistently conveyed its inability to implement the asset freeze and travel ban measures in the absence of court orders (see S/2015/31, para. 214). The Government further stated that implementation of these measures may breach the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that the designated individuals were not provided with an opportunity to defend themselves, which the Government considered to be a potential violation of their human rights.

135. The Government of the Sudan, through a letter dated 31 August 2020 addressed to the Committee, submitted a request for the delisting of the four designated individuals. The request for delisting was put on hold by several members of the Committee, who requested additional time to consider the proposal.

136. The instances of travel ban violations by Musa Hilal were investigated by the Panel. The Panel concluded in its reports of 2016 (see S/2016/805, paras. 159–161) and 2017 (see S/2017/1125) that Musa Hilal travelled to Cairo and the United Arab Emirates, thereby contravening the travel ban provisions.

137. Musa Hilal was controlling and profiting from the Jebel Amir gold mines until his arrest in November 2017 (see S/2016/805, paras. 170 and 171). The Government of the Sudan has not informed the Panel about the measures or steps taken to investigate these profits or the movable and immovable assets of Musa Hilal. Information available to the Panel indicated that Musa Hilal owns a residence and several other properties in Khartoum. It was reliably learned that, in 2016, Musa Hilal sold one of his properties in Khartoum for 27 million Sudanese pounds. The property is located near the intersection of Obeid Khatim Street and Omak Street, and now houses a hotel. While some part of this money was used by Musa Hilal for his political activities, a substantial part was available to him at the time of his arrest in 2017. The information further indicated that, during the arrest of Musa Hilal, Government entities were aware of the presence and location of the money.

138. Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan is a retired military officer. The Government of the Sudan neither requested, nor received, an exemption from the asset freeze from the Committee to make pension or allowance payments to him.

C. Ongoing travel ban investigations

139. In 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019 and again in June 2020, the Panel requested the Government of Chad to examine certain instances of possible travel ban violations pertaining to Musa Hilal and Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu “Tek” (permanent reference number: SDi 004) relating to their visits to Chad during the period 2011–2014. No response was received.

140. Various reliable sources indicated that, throughout the reporting period, Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu “Tek” was based in Libya, where he was participating in the conflict on the side of the Libyan National Army in Abdallah Banda’s group (see annex 7).
XI. Financing of armed groups

141. During the reporting period, most Darfurian armed groups earned money by participating in mercenary and smuggling activities in Libya. SLA/AW, the only Darfurian rebel group active inside Darfur, was generating significant income from goldmining in Jebel Marra. Some Juba signatory groups, now that they are returning to the Sudan, are considering engaging in new income-generating activities in Darfur, including the gold mining business.

A. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid in Darfur

142. The artisanal gold mine in the area of Torroye, between Kidineer and Feina (South Darfur), has been emerging for almost two years as the largest source of financing for the group, enabling it to significantly enhance its income. The Panel visited Kidineer, Feina and Menawashei (where some of the Torroye gold is processed) in February 2020 and interviewed miners, SLA/AW members and local authorities.

143. In early 2019, gold was discovered in Torroye, an area controlled by SLA/AW. While the mining was done in Torroye, the artisanal mining mills for gold extraction started in the nearby Kidineer village, controlled by the Government of the Sudan. This gold rush led a number of people to move to Torroye and Kidineer in search of work and money. At its peak, before October 2019, local authorities reported that 30,000 people were working at both Kidineer and Torroye.

144. Initially, SLA/AW was demanding a 50 per cent share of the proceeds from the mine. Subsequently, after negotiations with local authorities and traditional leaders, SLA/AW settled for a share of 25–30 per cent. At Kidineer, approximately 5–6 kg of gold was being extracted on a daily basis, with a quarter of that going to SLA/AW. Local gold workers reported to the Panel that SLA/AW took a tax of 20,000 Sudanese pounds for each lorry of ore leaving Torroye. In addition, each person working at the mines had to pay 150 Sudanese pounds to SLA/AW.

145. SLA/AW has put in place a system to manage the mine. A committee, led by local SLA/AW leader Abakar Ibrahim Ahmed Shatta, mediated between the SLA/AW commanders and interacted with the local authorities in Kidineer. While Torroye is in the area controlled by SLA/AW commanders Yahia Adam and Sharon, all SLA/AW brigades operated a daily rota in Torroye to collect the income from the mining operations. Mining income for a while smoothed the difficult relations between some commanders and reduced the conflict between them. SLA/AW sources reported to the Panel that, thanks to Torroye gold, for the first time in its history the movement had significant money, and commanders could make money for themselves, with some now buying houses in Nyala and Zalingei.

146. Alarmed by the rapid increase in SLA/AW finances, the Government of the Sudan banned the gold processing activities at Kidineer in October 2019. Owing to this ban, many of the milling units shifted to the Torroye mine itself, resulting in more gold being extracted at the mines. In February 2020, during the Panel’s visit to the region, a source revealed that 10–15 kgs of gold were being extracted on a daily basis at Torroye. Not all the ore mined at Torroye was processed there. Some was transported on trucks to other milling sites in Government-controlled areas such as Menawashe. Approximately 10 to 15 trucks visit the mines every day.

147. Disagreement between some commanders on the sharing of mining revenues is one of the causes of the SLA/AW internal fighting which began in May 2020 (see sect. V). According to rebel sources, General Commander Gaddura wanted to bring the
income from gold mining under the General Command of SLA/AW, whereafter they would be distributed to the various SLA/AW departments and military brigades. However, other commanders wanted to continue with the existing practice, whereby each day, a different brigade collected the day’s income from gold mining. Commanders from the Kidineer-Feina area also considered that, as the mine was located in their area, they should be the primary beneficiaries, and that some commanders from other areas like Zanoun were receiving too generous a share. These divisions and clashes disrupted mining operations in Torroye, which were halted on several occasions.

148. Some new gold mines in the Government of the Sudan-controlled Kidineer (Kidingir) area have been identified. However, the Government has not permitted the operations of these mines until a new Government policy and arrangement for the mining operations are decreed.
B. Armed groups in South Sudan

149. During the reporting period, the SLA/AW group present in South Sudan, led by deputy chair Abdullah Haran, has continued its business activities, mainly agriculture and transportation, carried out in cooperation with some Dinka elites from Pariang County (see S/2020/36, paras. 161–166). SLA/AW also collected contributions from the Fur traders operating out of South Sudan. The proceeds from the business operations in South Sudan were shared by Abdul Wahid and Haran and used for maintaining their respective families and establishments (ibid.). Information received by the Panel suggests that, in the current agricultural season, the Pariang County local government opposed the grant of land to SLA/AW for agricultural purposes, probably as part of pressure by South Sudan on SLA/AW to join the Darfur peace process.

C. Armed groups in Libya

1. Mercenary activities

150. During the reporting period, the major Darfuri groups fighting in Libya for Haftar (SLA/MM, SLA/AW, GSLF, SLA/TC, SRAC) continued to receive financing from the Libyan National Army in return for their support. According to rebel sources, members of the movements continued to receive salaries from the Libyan National Army, ranging from 1,000 to 2,500 Libyan dinars per month. The cash was sometimes channelled to the movements by the Libyan National Army 128th Battalion and Hilal Musa Bouamoud al-Zawawi, and sometimes directly handed over to the movements’ top commanders during their visits to Benghazi (see sect. V). The movements inflated the numbers of their fighters to the Libyan National Army, in order to receive more money. Besides payments, the Darfuri groups were provided with vehicles, light and medium weaponry, ammunition and supplies by the Libyan National Army.

2. Smuggling

151. Various rebel sources reported to the Panel that the Darfuri movements in Libya participate in migrant smuggling, described to the Panel by a rebel leader as “normal”. Migrant smuggling conducted mostly by groups with a Zaghawa background (SLA/MM, GSLF, JEM), was carried out under Sudanese Zaghawa traffickers who have a presence in the Sudan and on the Libya coast. The most prominent of these traffickers are Abdelaziz Tayara (see S/2019/34, para. 183), brothers Jaber and Nil Mursal and Hamid Bakht Daud. The movements collected trucks carrying migrants in remote North Darfur desert areas close to Libya (Wadi Howar, Uwaynat, Atrun) and provided them with escorts to a further location in Libya (often Rabyanah), where they were handed over to other traffickers.

152. Rebel sources reported to the Panel that the movements also participated in drug smuggling. They provided escorts to drug convoys crossing southern Libya, between the border with Niger and the border with Egypt. From their camps in southern Libya, movements usually provide an escort of 20–25 vehicles. They are paid by the traffickers, at the beginning of the trip, usually approximately $10,000 per vehicle that they escort.

153. The participation of most groups in smuggling diminished in 2020, as they were kept busy by their participation in Libyan National Army operations. JEM, which is not siding with the Libyan National Army, was very active in smuggling during the reporting period, according to rebel sources.
D. Projects of groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement

154. After they began to return to the Sudan in November, the groups signatory to the Juba Peace Agreement have begun to explore new options for income generation and sustaining themselves in the country, in particular if some of their forces leave Libya. Access to new resources is a key reason why several movements are particularly interested in obtaining the position of Darfur Governor created by the Agreement, as they anticipate that this would allow them to control sources of income, such as border posts and customs and development projects.

155. According to sources in those movements, at least two groups wish to engage in gold mining operations and business in Darfur. SLA/MM, for one, had this in mind when it submitted to the Government of the Sudan its list of requested assembly areas for its force as part of the preparations for the Agreement security arrangements. Some locations such as Songo (South Darfur) were proposed, because they are gold mining areas, and the movement expects that the deployment of its forces there would allow it to get a stake in mining business. The Panel is aware of initial contact by some movements with small foreign mining companies and business people to discuss such projects, as reported by several sources in the movements. The movements’ mining projects, if they materialize, are likely to pit them against established actors in the gold business in Darfur, including Hemetti’s companies, and to increase competition over Darfur gold, at the risk of tensions on the ground.

156. According to sources in the movements, some movements were also planning to engage in mining activities in areas of the Central African Republic that border Darfur which are controlled by ex-Séléka factions. Several sources reported to the Panel that JEM, for one, was discussing these ventures with some ex-Séléka members.

XII. Recommendations

157. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to continue its peace efforts with non-signatory movements and with constituencies which do not feel represented in the peace process, such as internally displaced persons organizations and nomadic tribes;

(b) Urge the Darfurian major non-signatory groups to engage in peace talks with the Government of the Sudan as soon as possible. If any individuals or entities fail to comply, and therefore constitute an impediment to peace, the Committee should consider listing them on the sanctions list;

(c) Urge the movements signatory to the Agreement to stop recruiting fighters, in violation of the Agreement, including in internally displaced persons camps;

(d) Urge the movements signatory to the Agreement to withdraw all their forces from foreign countries, in line with the Agreement. If they fail to comply, and therefore continue to pose a threat to regional stability, the Committee should consider listing those individuals or entities on the sanctions list;

(e) Urge the Libyan warring factions and their backers to cease to cooperate with the Darfurian armed groups and providing them with financing and military equipment. They should also not oppose the movements’ withdrawal from Libya;

(f) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to implement its National Plan for Civilian Protection, in particular in conflict areas, in close coordination with tribal and religious elders and the local communities, including women’s groups;
(g) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to address protracted displacement and intercommunal tensions by initiating and supporting inclusive local negotiation and reconciliation mechanisms involving all tribes and genders, as well as by providing adequate social services equally to all communities, including in return areas;

(h) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to enhance the capacity of rule of law institutions, including in remote areas, and strengthen accountability measures to ensure that all persons, including those who bear the greatest responsibility for atrocities committed, would be held accountable, in line with previous recommendations of the Panel;

(i) As stated in the Agreement, encourage the Government of the Sudan to address the issue of land occupation by new settlers since the beginning of the conflict, by identifying and registering the areas where new settlement took place during the war, with the support of traditional leaders;

(j) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to launch a comprehensive weapons collection campaign in Darfur. Based on previous experiences, such a campaign should be conducted with the cooperation of local traditional authorities and, as far as possible, by non-Darfurian security personnel of the Government of the Sudan;

(k) Urge the Government of the Sudan and Member States to implement the asset freeze in respect of designated individuals and entities, as indicated in previous recommendations;

(l) Advise the Government of the Sudan that the Joint Military Ceasefire committee established by the Agreement could cooperate with the Committee and the Panel, in particular on information-sharing with regard to the weapons handed over by the signatory movements.

158. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Encourage the international community to provide adequate financial and logistical support to the implementation of the Agreement. The establishment of efficient and accountable implementing bodies should be supported, including with capacity-building;

(b) Request the Government of the Sudan to submit to the Committee requests for exemptions to the arms embargo concerning the weapons to be transferred to Darfur from neighbouring countries by the signatory movements as part of the implementation of the Agreement. Alternatively, consider amending the sanctions regime to allow for the weapons belonging to the Agreement signatory movements based in neighbouring countries to be exempted from the arms embargo;

(c) Under the Agreement, the signatory groups, within 90 days of the signing of the Agreement, will bring their weapons to agreed assembly areas in Darfur, where they will be registered and handed over. However, there is a risk that some members of the movements will hand over only some of their weapons and hide the rest in various areas of Darfur, posing a latent threat to the stability of Darfur. To avoid this, the Council could encourage the Government of the Sudan and the movements to conduct the inventory and registration of weapons prior to the movements’ entrance into Darfur in a neighbouring country, such as Chad, for the forces coming from Libya, and South Sudan for those coming from there. Such a process could receive technical support from the United Nations, as well as from the host countries.
Annex 1 — Mandate

In paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), the Security Council mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.

In paragraph 8 of the resolution 1556 (2004), the Council further mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent any provision to the non-governmental entities and individuals identified in paragraph 7, by their nationals or from their territories of technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in paragraph 7.

In paragraph 7 of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Council extended the arms embargo to include all parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the aforementioned areas in Darfur.

In its resolution 2035 (2012), the Council extended the reference to the three states of Darfur to all the territory of Darfur, including the new states of Eastern and Central Darfur created on 11 January 2012.

The enforcement of arms embargo was further strengthened, in Paragraph 10 of the resolution 1945, by imposing the condition of end user documentation for any sale or supply of arms and related materiel that is otherwise not prohibited by resolutions 1556 and 1591.

In paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Council imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions on designated individuals (the listing criteria were further extended to entities in resolution 2035 (2012)), to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution. In its resolution 1672 (2006), the Council designated four individuals.

The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). The mandate of the Panel, as set out in resolution 1591 (2005), is:

a) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo;

b) To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the targeted travel and financial sanctions; and

c) To make recommendations to the Committee on actions that the Security Council may want to consider.

In its resolution 2340 (2017) and preceding resolutions, the Security Council also requested that the Panel:

d) Report on the implementation and effectiveness of paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010) in quarterly updates;

e) Continue to coordinate its activities, as appropriate, with the operations of the UNAMID, with international efforts to promote a political process in Darfur, and with other Panels or Groups of Experts, established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;

f) Assess in its first and final reports;

g) Progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004), paragraph 7 of resolution 1591 (2005) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1945 (2010);
h) Progress towards removing impediments to the political process and threats to stability in Darfur and the region;

i) Violations of violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including those that involve attacks on the civilian population, sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses against children; and

j) Other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions;

k) Provide the Committee with information on those individuals and entities meeting the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005);

l) Continue to investigate the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, noting that individuals and entities planning, sponsoring or participating in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591 (2005); and

m) Investigate any means of the financing of armed groups in Darfur.
Annex 2 — Methodology and challenges

The Panel has retained terms such as “tribe” and “nomads” and personal and place names as provided by the various sources. Such usage does not necessarily reflect the views of the Panel.

Many interlocutors have applied the term “militias” to State security forces other than the Sudanese Armed Forces, such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Central Reserve Police. The Panel defines militias as armed groups that do not have any official status.

The COVID-19 pandemic and related health measures posed an additional challenge to the Panel, as it severely restrained the Panel’s capacity to travel to Sudan and the region, in particular during the first half of the mandate. The Panel overcame these difficulties by following investigative leads remotely, conducting video teleconference (VTC) meetings, phone interviews, and monitoring open sources. The Panel travelled to Sudan and the region immediately after the COVID-19 measures allowed for it again.

A member of the Panel was also subject to a disinformation campaign, when several media outlets, including some with a well-established, highly-politicized agenda, published articles relying on unsubstantiated allegations, amounting to a smear campaign against the expert. These articles were mostly based on what was presented as “leaks”, which was in fact the result of the hacking of the said expert's private email account, which is an illegal act in most countries. The Panel reaffirms that all its members without exception are fully professional, independent and impartial.
Annex 3 — Transcript of audio clips of the interrogation of Faysal Adam Ali Konio by SLA/AW

_Translated from Arabic and Fur_

* Interrogators, ** Faysal Konio

1st audio clip

*we want to ask you, what is your problem with the HQ??
** I don't have any problem with the HQ, I am a manager in the office.
*Manager? In which office??
** in the general HQ.
* You are a manager in the office, and you have a problem with the HQ, what is your relationship with Walduk ? He is against the HQ, and you work in the HQ ??
** let me explain one thing to you, when we were in the mining site, I work in the emergency.
* The emergency court ??
** yes.
* You are a member ??
** yes I am a member, so they have lots of disagreement, and we tell them not to bring up much problems, and there was that day when they fired an RPG missile, no one went to stop them, me and "Someet" and "Irtakiz", three persons, we went to them to solve their conflict, then we went to "Abuja" and we told him such a conflict should never happen again, or the people who cause problems here they should be sent away and only leave their representatives, this first. Secondly, this is a conspiracy, unclear. The person who came yesterday, I was going to the cell network\footnote{\textit{name unclear\textsuperscript*}}, I was going to call the commander that there are some problems, between " Marboo, Marabee, and names unclear, so some guys came and shouted, I was in the company of "Irtakiz", "Waleed", these guys it seems they don't know me, I asked them what is your problem ?? He tried to hit me with his hand, I hold his other hand, and hit him back, * who was he ??
** unclear name, I hit him back.
*when did this incident happen ??
** this was at the time when we were supposed to take the documents, so he came back to attack me again I kicked him and he felt down, name unclear he intervened between us, he ordered the soldiers "shoot him, shoot him", the soldiers refused to obey, after that the conflicts started, I have trained a new force and they will deal with to" Irtakiz him self said this, name unclear said, no what your doing is big, and I will call the commander, after that we stayed some few days and we were given the papers of the orders, "Abuja" was not willing to come, we stayed the first day, and the second, with the company of Walduk, Abuja refused to come with me. When we were waiting we spent our time in playing cards, we were not doing any thing else,
* Ok, look, how are they your friends ?? Are they the army of the revolution or your friends ??
** No, we were together since 2009, until 2015, our last battle together was in Golo.
* You are an office manager ... audio interrupted
** Explaining how they were together in the last tome in 2015
* OK, you are the manager of the HQ office, ..
** No, I am only a manager of a branch ..
* yes all of you are managers and heads of offices, so this person you are dealing with is your enemy, what is the matter ??
Secondly, why you got angry before ??
** I didn't get angry ..
* and why you are saying it is a not correct say ??
** yes, it is not correct
* What the general staff has said is not correct ??
** The general staff is saying that we are phone calling the commander about ... interrupted
* OK, I want to tell you something, the shots of the machine gun, where it was firing ?? Was it to the east, or the South!! It was firing to the West right, according to the HQ, Secondly if this was a lie, their outlook when they arrived which out look was that !!
** which outlook ????
* how they were looking when they arrived to the HQ !!!
** This is was "Abu Alzeek" he brought the person who fired the machine gun to the police,
* and what was that other problem which was happening at the time ??
** The police beate an innocent person, he was the person whom his machine gun was taken from him and fired,
* so the HQ is in your hands, the mangers and executives, you do as you like, and decide as you like, OK, Before all of this, you in the past before you join this movement, where did you belong to ????
** Hey man, I have been in these liberated lands,
* Before, haven't you belonged to the Rapid Support Forces ???
** hahaha, the RSF is newly formed, I have been in the movement since 2007.
* OK, I would like to ask you a question, answer me about what I am asking you, you as a person who work in the HQ, what is the relationship between the HQ and your enemy?? He has committed a military coup, and he has done it many times before, and until now he is fighting against the HQ, and you are a member here and a member there ????
** listen bro, you go and ask him whether I have done or said something for him or helped him by any mean, we never conspired against the HQ, you are just playing around here,
* He said so !!
(Another far person responds) : Yes he said so.
** you are just playing around here. This is soldier who is talking to me about Abdul Wahid, I asked him do you know Abdul Wahid for real, you useless boy, you are just playing around here
* Hey man, the people who are coming on the way if your head is as big as a camel they will put it down.
** let them do as they like
* You understand me, you don't talk bullshit speeches.
** I am not talking bullshit, the soldier makes me angry by asking ...
* You understand what I am saying, I am asking you a question for the second time, why you are taking information from the HQ and spread it out side, there are people who work against the HQ, if there is no conspiracy from the inside who he can be active ??,
** I didn't spread anything
* what so ever you became in this world, you should be free in your self, because there is nothing like free-self
** comrade, leave you from .....  
(the audio record is damaged at this point)

2nd audio clip

** You don't refuse what I am saying, you hear me out first and if I am wrong you can beat me then,
* are you understanding what I am saying, it is not about beating. We want to carry out an execution totally, with bullets, we don't like how this is going, And for this revolution; either it goes straight or every one goes in his way, we have lost as well, do you understand what I am saying !! We want things to be clear boy, so far I am speaking with you in a straight and legal way, do you understand me.
** Yes I will answer.
* are you a soldier or a citizen??
** yes I am a soldier.
* then as you are a soldier you execute what I am telling you, do you understand me ??
** OK you tell me what you want to know !! My comrade I will not hide anything.
* In this revolution, I swear Allah there are some crazy people, I want you to explain in details one by one,
** If you ask me what you want to know I will tell you, I am not refusing to say
(A sound of whipping, orders from another officer to stop the beating: as you are soldier don't beat him, it is not yet the beating time, we first want him to tell us)
** this is my kidney, comrades don't beat me in my kidney.
*General, explain to us the subject again,
** You ask me, so that I can answer
* My question is, What is your concept here when you act discrimination in the HQ ?? And why you are helping all the HQ work ?? When the papers reach you it don't come out in a straight way, it has extra or less - information, you your self you have gathered the generals and issued them orders for each one to move back to his location, except the ones who didn't do any problems, am I wrong !!
** Yes, you are right.
* Didn't you give them the orders ???
** Yes, I gave them the orders
* And why then you spread this information ?? If you are not working against the HQ then why you spread this information ?
** If you would believe me comrade, I swear to you, the general commander and he is presented, he called the head of general staff, and he gave him orders as follow, these generals, we don't have anything to feed these guys, so send these people back, until further notification. I went with him to the school .. He stopped me in the school, I saluted him "the head of general staff", he directed the people "soldiers" and then gave me the orders, then I speaker to them, comrades, according to the HQ orders, and "the head of general staff" is in the front, the orders are every group must go go to the back-line until further notification, here "irtakiz" said to me, brother, the higher officer want you to meet him, so I went to the higher officer, he said to me as follow, for now, let these people eat a different meal for change, and then they move tomorrow morning, and look, you write a paper to all the generals, that each one of them pick a group, and put them under The head of general staff, so as to be assigned as a security for the mining site,
* so then, the HQ do something, and then go back and disband it from behind,
** and if you don't believe me,
* And why then orders are issued for all these people to come back within 24 hours only, and after 24 hours why they didn't come back ????
** let me tell you what happened, you listen to me, I was there, and there are some people who get the orders from the boss, listen to me carefully, the same general commander called me, he said to me: right now, write down papers to the generals within 24 hours they should come back. And If they said they didn't get the orders then I am ready to take full responsibility even if to get shot down, and do you believe that I can send the generals away and the HQ wouldn't know about it ???? The head of general staff and the general commander wouldn't know anything about ??
Comrade, I am a soldier, if I was given orders, shouldn't I carry them out!!!
* yes, you should carry them out.
** The head of general staff stopped me "Attention!" And give me the orders, and I carried them out.
* OK, aha, we come to the subject of the money why there are some generals here, if you are not working against this HQ, why some generals are in a good situation and others in bad situation, and you are a responsible commander, what is this matter ?
** I did as follow, my comrade, when the money comes, and I have note books, and I have the number the total money, I swear to you, i didn't wrong any one,
* OK stay with me, there is this day when you digested the presents as 130 individual, or is it 103 !!
** It is not me, I didn't write this.
* who wrote this paper, it wasn't you, you gave them this paper and told them not to work with the old paper, they work with this new paper,
** No No No, these are the false information, do you believe, I came and found that Walduk was written for him 104, and the supplies managers are present, Mohey Al- deen and uncle Adam,
* general, there were 2 papers, we have our intelligence.
** this is lie, it is not mine comrade, there are people whom are here, do you believe that I criticized him, and I told him that their number does not exceed 30 individuals? And I send them back, and
you can go and ask, go ask Mohey Al-deen, and uncle Adam, if they said I gave them this paper without reducing the numbers, then I am laying, you can shoot me then, I swear to you, and people are present, and the time is Ramadan, right, in the morning you will find all of them, in a Adam and Mohey Al deen, you ask them, when they brought the paper with 104 names what did I say to them !! Do you believe me comrade, me, my self I reduced the number,
* I want to tell you something, these information of which you are saying is not what I want know, and me, I swear to you, you understand what I am saying, what I am asking you and how I am asking you is in a very suitable way, because a police man should be legal, and he take the say in a proper way because the wrong and right don't go along in one place, what so ever,
** I am not laying
* General, do you know that a soldier in the police division can arrest the president, do you know about this law !
** yes, you are right.
* then if you know about this law, you give us the full information of which we want, general Faysal what you did in this movement is not simple, I am telling you clearly, it is not simple, and before this movement was founded I have been a revolutionary person, you know this completely, secondly I worked in the intelligence my entire life, I am not known to the people,
** yes, you are right, even me I knew you lately
* do you understand what I am saying,
Secondly, general Faysal, in this world I am not afraid of anything but from the treason only, and I would not kill a person without him knowing why !! Do you know this. He must know the reason I am killing him for.
** Havn't you asked me !!!
* you are a soldier, we give you the information because you are a soldier and have immunity, and the period of which you worked in this movement whether in wrong or right, we are convinced that you have served the state, but, I want to know something, if you want to be clearly washed you should live in a relief, don't be distracted with any person, the information of which I am acquiring, I want to know them one by one, what is your only relationship with Walduk ? This is one, secondly, why did he go away ?? And you know that he was going, and you are a responsible person and you have a relationship with him, why you didn't stop him ??!
Wait up, secondly, if he was with you here, and you have some private secrets with him, and these secrets are not clear for us,
Thirdly, you are inside the HQ, wouldn't you know why the HQ is not going properly ??
You didn't answer these questions.
** Look comrade I want to tell you one thing ...
* general Faysal, stand up, stand up, I am telling you !
** I want to tell you something...
* As you are, stand up.
(Beatig sound, and cursing)
(crying sound)
* tell the truth, we will shoot you, I just want to know the truth
** I swear to you comrade, if you would believe me, I don't have any relationship with Walduk, I swear to you.
* tell me, what is your program, what do you want to do in this movement
** Comrade, do you believe in the one and only Allah, I swear to you, I don't have any relationship with Walduk.
* Are more man then us, or smarter than us, or know everything more than us ??!!
Me as well I have degrees in the Law, all of us are graduates, we are not illiterates, we want the truth, man !!
** You just ask what you want to know
* Tell the truth man (Beatig sound)
You are not saying the truth (Crying sound)
You don't know Allah, stand up.
Annex 4 — Arrest warrant by Gaddura against Mubarak Walduk, 26 April 2020

Translation from Arabic

In the name of Allah the merciful the compassionate
Sudan Liberation Army/Movement HQ
Office of the General Commander

Date :26/4/2020
No. O/G/C

Mr. Head of General Staff deputy general All Osma Khatir

Subject: arrest order

Regarding the upper subject according to the instructions of the General Staff head Yusif Ahmed Yusif to carry out the order of arresting the suspect Mubarak Walduk, and in case of resistance to be dealt with gun fire or deal with him as an enemy and arrest any commander conspiring with him.
Verified by the General Commander of Sudan Liberation Army / Movement General Abdelgadir Abdelrahman Ibrahim (Gaddura)
Annex 5 — Statement by Mubarak Walduk, Zanoun Abdulshafi and other SLA/AW commanders, October 2020

Translated from Arabic

Loyal masses of the Sudanese people, especially the honorable masses of the Sudan Liberation Army Movement, we have been fighting in the front ranks of the movement led by comrade Abdul Wahid Mohamed Ahmed al-Nur, because of injustice and the marginalized regions for eighteen decades in order to recover the rights of the Sudanese people, but the situation is without that, because the leadership of the movement has become a source of security confusion for the citizens inside the liberated lands, and it also started to create regional conflicts from time to time, and therefore we, as leaders in the SLA in Jebel Marra, mentioned below:

1- Mubarak Abdel Shakour (Walduk), commander of the movement's operations room.
2- Zanoun Abdulshafi Adam Arbab, commander of the Sultan Terab Brigade.
3- Suleiman Yaqoub Terab, commander of intelligence for Sultan Terab Brigade.
4- Al-Sadiq Rokero, Leader of Humanitarian Affairs in the Movement.
5- Awad Amfengkur, leader of the administration in the movement.
6- Muslim Abdulshafi Adam Arbab, commander of the operations room of Sultan Terab Brigade.
7- Adam Ahmad Hussein (Jelly), commander of the Abu al-Khairat Brigade.
8- Yassin Abdullah (Groko), commander of the Lora Brigade.
9- Musa Abd al-Shafa (Kiruna), commander of the third battalion of Karam al-Din Brigade.
10- Abd al-Wahhab Abdullah Bakr, commander of the administration of Sultan Terab Brigade.
11- Muhammad Daku, commander of the operations room, of Abu al-Khairat (b) Brigade.
12- Ibrahim Issa Mnjula, second commander of Sultan Terab Brigade.
13- Hammad Ismail Jaral al-Nabi, chief of police for Sultan Terab Brigade.
14- Salih (Nirim), commander of Abu al-Khairat Brigade (b).
15- Adam Habib, second commander of Karam al-Din Brigade.

And others from the leaders, the army, the civil and civil administrations, the Women and Youth Union, we announce our split from the Abdul Wahid movement for the following reasons:

1- Racial bias and the practice of regionalism within the movement in the military and political leadership.
2- The elimination of highly qualified leaders, including Maulana Osman Alzain, Hassan Khair, Faisal Konyo, Kemd Araw, and other leaders.
3- The arbitrary arrests, torture and excessive violence on the detainees.
4- Imposing exorbitant taxes to citizens (collection).
5- Arbitrary separation of comrades in foreign offices.
6- The deliberate and brutal assassination of citizens.
7- Deprivation of citizens from the harvest of their farms in the areas of Dulow and its environs, and their displacement in their villages.
8- The movement’s leader uses his relatives only to manage the movement.
9- His narrow analysis of the field differences and his standing with some leaders, such as Gaddura and overcoming others or leaving the project.
10- Freezing foreign support and diverting it to his own interest, along with developing curricula that call for sectarianism and hatred.

Therefore, we assure you, the masses of the movement, that we are not affiliated with any movement or political system that the Sudanese Revolutionary Front has so far included.

Our Sudanese people and the masses of the steadfast, outgoing movement, we call through you all international, regional and local organizations to address the affected citizens who have fled to the following areas:
Jawa, Deribat, Sony, Rokero, Thura and other areas. We also call on human rights organizations and the entire international community and people of conscience to conduct a transparent and urgent investigation about the villages that were burned in Bucket and its environs by the elements of the leader Gaddura and the violations of human rights, looting, rape, and the forced displacement of defenseless citizens.

Glory and eternity to our martyrs
And urgent healing for the wounded and injured
And freedom for the detainees.

Notification of defected leadership
Annex 6 — Recruitment form for fighters, attributed to JEM
Annex 7 — Founding statement of Abdallah Banda's movement, 1 March 2020

*Translated from Arabic*

Assembly of the Justice and Equality Movement forces

Transitional Military Council

Communiqué No. 1

Given the historic responsibility we bear at this critical juncture in the history of the Sudan in general, and Darfur in particular, and deeply inspired by the struggles of our proud people, who have risen in revolt and shown the way to other peoples;

In view of the way in which the armed movements in Darfur broke apart and splintered owing to the narrow and selfish ambitions of certain parts of the political leadership of those movements, and of the ensuing prolonged suffering that has afflicted people in the refugee and displaced persons camps; Firmy convinced that the only way to achieve a real, comprehensive and lasting peace throughout the land, thereby putting an end to the long years of suffering that has afflicted our people in Darfur and fully restoring the rights of which they had been deprived, is to transcend petty considerations and rise above narrow tribal and clan thinking, to reject division and fragmentation and to wholeheartedly embrace total unity, on the premise that in unity there is strength, and in division weakness;

And motivated by all those noble notions, we, the historical founding military leaders of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement army and those gathered today under the banner of this Assembly of the Movement’s forces, have proposed a number of serious and sincere initiatives and appeals, both via social media and directly, urging the leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement and other movements to launch and adopt an initiative for internal reconciliation in order to address all the administrative mistakes that led to division and fragmentation, by bringing together all the factions and military groups that were arbitrarily excluded from the Movement. That would be followed by the adoption of a plan for genuine unity with all the other movements under a united political and military leadership, which would send a single negotiating delegation representing the whole spectrum of revolutionary groups in Darfur to enter into serious talks with the transitional Government so as to achieve a real, comprehensive and lasting peace. Such a peace must meet the desires and aspirations of all the people of this large region, with their various ethnic and regional identities, without any differential treatment or partial settlements. The question of Darfur, we believe, is one that affects all its people as a whole; their rights are therefore utterly indivisible. Moreover, we the fighters, whether members of the many armed factions and groups that split from the Justice and Equality Movement or of other movements, who have borne the brunt of the pain to achieve what we have, are in full agreement in practical terms. All of the conflicts, discord and dissent that led to splits and which, in some cases, resulted in internecine warfare, were the doing of political leaders of those movements, some driven by narrow personal ambitions and grudges and others by family, tribal or clan interests, none of which bore the slightest relationship with the concerns and desires of the people of Darfur.

Our appeals to close ranks, repeated over a period of some six months, were met with nothing but a stubborn intransigence on the part of the political leadership as it rushed headlong to Juba to sign a quick political agreement at any price so as to join the transitional Government on a quid pro quo basis before the expiry of the Government’s mandate. It did so without the slightest regard for the interests or aspirations of the fighters on the ground or for the rest of Darfur society, the people who have the most at stake.

As a result, we, the Assembly of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement forces, do hereby declare the following:

1. A transitional military council has been formed, made up of senior officers who at one time or another have served as Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement, commanders who have led military operations and division and brigade commanders who by their efforts and heroism have made outstanding contributions to the military accomplishments of the Movement.
2. Lieutenant General Abdallah Banda Abakar Nurayn has been appointed as head of the transitional military council.

3. This Assembly is in no way to be seen as a new movement or a newly founded organization. Rather, it serves to put our house in order and reorganize the ranks for fighters who at various times have adopted stances with regard to how the Movement was run, in particular the army, which has been unjustly shunted aside by the political leadership of the Movement.

4. The motto of the Assembly is total integration and unity, and nothing but unity, of all the armed movements in Darfur. The Assembly shall embody and be at the heart of this great emerging unity, which, God willing, shall surely prosper.

5. The Assembly fully supports the transitional Government, and its Sovereign Council and Council of Ministers, in carrying out its worthy tasks in the transition period: achieving comprehensive peace throughout the Sudan, reviving the national economy and lifting it from its present state of decay, and bringing the country back into the fold of the family of nations by having its name erased from the blacklist of States that sponsor terrorism.

6. The Assembly acknowledges the major role played by the Forces for Freedom and Change and the Sudanese Professionals Association in leading the popular revolution. The Council also expresses its great appreciation to the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces for siding with the people, thereby sparing the country from sliding into the downward spiral of violence and civil war that had been planned by some leading figures of the now defunct regime.

7. The Assembly supports the decision to bring those accused of committing crimes in Darfur before the International Criminal Court to be punished in accordance with justice.

8. The Assembly appreciates the role played by the international community and neighbouring countries in the region, in particular Chad, which has shouldered the burden of sheltering, protecting and providing security for some half a million refugees from the Darfur region. The Council also appreciates the efforts of South Sudan in sponsoring the peace negotiations that are taking place today between the movements and the transitional Government in Juba.

9. The Assembly demands the release of members of the armed movements who are still in prison and that clear and credible explanations regarding the fate of those who are missing be given as soon as possible.

   Long live the Sudanese people’s struggle!
   Eternal glory to the righteous martyrs of the revolution!
   Assembly of the Justice and Equality Movement forces

The Transitional Military Council
Issued on 1 March 2020

cc:
1. Sovereign Council
2. Council of Ministers
3. Sudanese Revolutionary Front
4. Forces for Freedom and Change
5. Sudanese Professionals Association
6. Head of the Sudanese negotiating delegation in Juba
7. National Security Council
8. African Union
9. European Union
10. League of Arab States
11. Chad
12. South Sudan
13. Qatar
14. United Arab Emirates
15. Egypt
16. Ethiopia

Military commanders who are signatories of the communiqué
1. Lieutenant General Abdallah Banda Abakar Nurayn
2. Bishara Adam Ali Dawud
3. Jibril Abdulkarim Bari (Tek)
4. Ali Adam Timan Abdulrahman (Baga-Sola)
5. Al-Sadiq Hashim Hamid Deby
7. Muhammad Dud Hur Bakhit
8. Abdulaziz Muhammad Darqi Kursi (Sando)
9. Jiddu Ahmad Adam Jarbu
10. Uthman Mahmud Abdulrahman
11. Mansur Sabun Kharif (Carlos)
12. Ibrahim Hashim Bashir Ali (Qarsil)
13. Abduljalil al-Tum Abkar
14. Anwar Adam Mur
15. Abdulmajid Hashim Ano
16. Amr Haqar Jaqru
17. Muhammad Zakariya Dawa
18. Muhammad Sadiq Nur (Mita)
19. Majdi Muslim al-Shami
20. Yusuf Labs Hadi (Al-Kitab al-Akhdar)
21. Abdulrahman Ishaq Dawud Maquri
22. Tahir Bashir Tutti
23. Harun Ali Sharif Mako (Abu Taki)
24. Salim Sulayman Muhammad Daqish (Al-Sha’b)
25. Jamal Ahmad Mays (Rifa)
26. Ibrahim Aro Ithnayn
27. Malik Zakariya Abkar Hasan
28. Sadiq Adam Uthman
29. Isma’il Yahya Adam (Kinka)
30. Isa Bashir Nasr Banko
31. Tahir Hasan Jayad Qarn
32. Ibrahim Ali Ithnayn
33. Uthman Ali Shaybo
34. Ali Hamdan Ali
35. Isa Aru Ithnayn
36. Hasan Ibrahim Amir
37. Abdulmajid Sulayman Adam Atim
38. Al-Sadiq Zakariya Assu (Al-Fil)
39. Ahmad Nur Salih
40. Hasan Abdullah Haram
41. Abdulmajid Hasan Adam (Dababah)
42. Bisharah Adam Bari
43. Abdulkarim Bisharah Taqal
44. Bisharah Adam Hiran Mayo
45. Harun Jabir Ahmad
46. Bashir al-Nur Hashim (Dunya)
47. Abdulrahman Bakhit Ibrahim
48. Isma’il Hamid Muhammad
49. Muhammad Isma’il Qirda
50. Sulayman Abkar Muhammad Isma’il
51. Mubarak Idris Kurda
52. Nasr Yusuf Baja Hun
53. Bisharah Sabir
54. Al-Sadiq Abdulqadir Husayn
55. Sadam Husayn Ishaq
56. Al-Khamayni Ibrahim Rajab
57. Nur al-Din Isa Husayn (Mangalah)
58. Husayn Adam Ibrahim
59. Abdulkarim Yusuf Halu (Tran)
60. Muhammad Ali Muhammad Nur
61. Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim
62. Ahmed Abdallah Adam Haqar
63. Abkar Ibrahim Matar
64. Muhammad Nur Adam Ayd
65. Mustafa Abdullah Bandah
66. Nur Abdullah Bandah
67. Wad al-Amin Babikir Mahmud
68. Khalifah Khalfullah
69. Haliki Abdullah Bandah
70. Ahmad Jar Nambuba
71. Nasr al-Din Ishaq Khayr
72. Adam Arjah Fadl
73. Al-Sadiq Adam Barko
74. Abdullah Muhammad Khatir
75. Hamid Salim Haryo
76. Al-Nur Abdullah Muhammad
77. Bakhit Muhammadayn Amr
78. Jawayn Muhammad Ahmad
79. Al-Sadiq Hashim Hamid
80. Adam Husayn Mustafa
81. Adam Abdulrahim
82. Yahi Ahmad Abdullah
83. Isma’il Muhammad Abdulkarim
84. Ali Abdulrahman al-Tum
85. Abdulaziz Ibrahim Ahim Tum
86. Amar Hasan Wadi
87. Abdulkarim Muhammad Amr
88. Muhammad Bakhit Harun
89. Ibrahim Aro Itnayn
90. Radwan Adam Ibrahim

Issued on Sunday, 1 March 2020
Annex 8 — Transcript of the video of a SLA/AW meeting in Libya, highlighting the cooperation with the LNA's 128 Battalion

Translated from Arabic

When the people will to live,
Destiny must surely respond.
Oppression shall then vanish.
Fetters are certain to break.
Operations Commander of SLA, Axis North, Colonel Muhammad Salih!
Brothers officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers!
Brothers dear guests!
And greetings to you. And we are celebrating the graduation of the twelfth batch of the soldiers in the establishment of the SLA in the Libyan lands.
And allow me to greet through you the leader and founder of SLA al-ustadh Abdul Wahid Nur and his deputy Abdallah Harran.
And allow me to express through you sincere greetings to the Commander-in-Chief of the SLA forces Abdulgadir Gaddura.
Special greetings to the head of the operational command-in-chief Axis North Comrade Yusif Ahmad Yusif.
Sincere greetings to the Libyan participants, in particular to the 128th Battalion.
And we greet our comrades and colleagues in the fight in the transition, from the Transitional Council and its gatherings which are participating in this celebration.
Dear brothers!
We are happy today to celebrate the graduation of the twelfth batch of the soldiers of SLA under the command of doctor, founder and inspirer of revolution Abdul Wahid Nur and his loyal comrades.
Annex 9 — Alleged RSF internal document on presence in Libya
Annex 10 — Sit-ins in Darfur

The longest (18 days) and most visible sit-in took place in Nertiti, Central Darfur. This sit-in ended peacefully on 15 July 2020 after talks with a GoS delegation. In Fata Borno, also in North Darfur (Kutum locality), the sit-in led to a protest and attack at the state government delegation and the police station in Kutum on 12 July, followed by a militia attack at the sit-in (see Section VI). On 14 July, the North Darfur Wali issued the decree No. 84 (2020), ordering an immediate evacuation of the “aggressors” from the farming lands, prohibition of wearing the traditional turban (kadamul), confiscation of motorcycles and weapons, and arrest of the suspects.¹ By the time of reporting, sit-ins continued in other locations, such as Kalma (South Darfur). Photos below, from local sources and social networks, illustrate the protests and their demands.

Photo: Nertiti sit-in demands, version in pictures

![Photo: Nertiti sit-in demands, version in pictures](image)

Photo: Nertiti sit-in, one of the demands is to ban the traditional “kadamul” turbans, used for banditry and attacks at the farmers

![Photo: Nertiti sit-in, one of the demands is to ban the traditional “kadamul” turbans, used for banditry and attacks at the farmers](image)

Photo: Nertiti sit-in demands, English translation

Demands
Remove the local executive director
Disarm the local police chief
Arrest the local governor
Perpetrators of violence
Return livestock stolen in the last 2 months
Open routes that prevent confrontation
Protect farmers from attacks by militiamen

Photo: Al-Neem IDP camp sit-in, Ed Daein locality, East Darfur

Photo: Kabkabiya sit-in, North Darfur
Photo: Fata Borno, North Darfur; a demand to protect the farms

Photo: The beginning of the sit-in in Gereida, 25 July 2020
Annex 11 — El Geneina attack (29-31 December 2019)

On 29 December 2019 and following days, the most serious attack on civilians in recent years in Darfur took place in and around El Geneina, which had experienced escalating tensions between Masalit, traditional owners of the land in the area who had been massively displaced to IDP camps, and local Arab communities, who have been forcefully occupying this land. In February 2020, the Panel interviewed victims, injured, relatives of victims, tribal leaders, both in El Geneina in Khartoum, in order to get a clear picture of events and identify the perpetrators.

After a Masalit killed an Arab in a personal dispute, some RSF personnel and local armed Arabs launched a violent attack on the Krinding I, Krinding II and Sultan House IDP camps in El Geneina. In the attack, which lasted three days, at least 90 civilians were killed. On 31 December, armed Arabs then attacked about 40 villages mostly inhabited by Masalit in El Geneina surroundings, killing at least 12 more people. In the IDPs camps, as well as in the villages, assailants shot indiscriminately, systematically looted properties, and engaged in large-scale sexual violence, including gang rapes. According to several eyewitnesses, RSF local commander Musa Mbello was leading the attack on Krinding camps and was physically present on the scene.
Annex 12 — Intercommunal tensions: Selected statements and declarations by the communities

9 May 2020. The Sons of Fallata Gathering. Statement No. 1

The statement refers to the events which took place “between our people, the Fallata, and the Mahariya of the omda Abu Noba, Awlad mansour, Awlad Ga’id, Awlad Matar and Hamdaniya” in Tulus locality since 5 May 2020.

The conflict started in Mariya north west of Tulus, when the Fulani stopped some criminals with looted property, disarmed them and handed them over to their families. The subsequent dispute led to shooting, which resulted in the death of four Fallata and seven Rizeigat. Next morning a massive attack took place in many places. The attackers used four by four armed vehicles which are ownly owned by state agencies in Darfur and primarily by the RSF.

The statement refers to dozens killed “in an asymmetric and repeated fighting imposed on them in all directions and areas”. It also names the Omda Abu Noba, an uncle of Hemetti, as the leader of the attackers and accuses the Governor of South Darfur of false reports to Khartoum and unilateral curfew in the areas known as Dar al-Fallata.

24 July 2020. Rizeigat-Fulani clashes, a Fulani source of the Panel (from Nyala, translated from Arabic).

The reason of the attack is the desire to capture more land and to also make the Fulani area poorer, this is planned by the Arabs, they have a big plan to capture all the area from Dar Missiriya (Kordofan) to Um Dafok in South Darfur, they consider this area to belong to them, so they want to occupy the Fulani lands, and they consider the people there to be farmers and nomads who move around and are not inhabitants of the area, so they see them as a threat and they want to make them poor and hungry and deport them from the area.

We think the attack started on 5 May or 6 May, headed by the omda Moustafa Abu Noba from Rizeigat tribe. We heard that the RSF participated. Usually they participate by coming first to collect weapons and disarm people and then the attack comes later and people have nothing to defend themselves with.

The second attack came after the media started talking about removing Fallata from this area, so they wanted to remove the Fallata people and gather them in one place. After the attack the Sudanese government did not do anything which shows that this is a large scale operation and that the Arab factor here is clear, and we believe the Rizeigat are the ones responsible for all this.

First attack
It started in Um Dawa Al Ban (Um Dawban), Safiya, Um Safarik, Abu Jabarh, Al Ghoura, Al Twael, spread to all Fallata villages, most of the pastoral land of the Fallata.

They believe that Abu Noba is the one responsible for organizing this. About the RSF that participated, we believe that they receive direct orders from above. The RRF sector of South Darfur is headed by Abul Rahma Juma, the general that heads RSF in that part of Darfur, and he belongs to the Mahariya tribe. We believe that RSF were the ones that organized this attack.

The second attack
The areas where it happened Um Dafok, Um Jalol, Salamat.
The first strike was on Um Dafouk.

It is said that the attack was also done by Kushayb forces and their vehicles and people. Some of these forces were in the CAR and came to participate because they think it is a chance to steal from the Fallata and become rich and use the weakness of the state. They for example attacked Balakoti area near the borders of the CAR and they stole 40.000 of cattle. Their locations are known to the government, but the government is not doing anything about it. The Rizeigat tribe is behind all this, as we believe.

__________________

2 https://www.facebook.com/B3SHOM/posts/2316322378673562/.
20 July 2020. Masalit-Arab conflict, a Masalit source of the panel (from El Geneina, translated from Arabic).

06:28 AM: Yes, yesterday evening [19 July], Al-Geneina was more turbulent and there was heavy exchange of fire in the area near the Arab-inhabited area at Jebel El-Geneina and the camp of Abu Zar and south of Al-Geneina University, the headquarters of the former UNAMID and the Suq al-Jamarik area, where a heavy exchange of fire took place between the Arabs residents of Jebel El-Geneina and some of the Masalit youth. Then, the fire spread to the areas that I mentioned, as a result of the killing and liquidation incidents that took place with some Masalit youth in the previous period in the same area where the exchange of fire took place, as well as in response to what happened in Masteri from the Janjaweed abuse of Masalit and looting that took place there.

El-Geneina’s talk today is that the Masalit who do not possess arms now have grenades or explosives that they will use to settle their accounts with the Arab tribes that have been killing them and preventing them from cultivating their lands by force or forcing them to pay amounts for cultivation even though these are their lands. The army intervened and contained the situation after more than three hours of terror, especially for the residents of the Abu Zar camp in which the IDPs seemed to infiltrate into the city due to the intensity of the fire.

The army intervened and contained the situation, the situation is difficult and explosive again. What is new in the situation is that the Masalit youth own the grenades in large quantities and promote this as a new method that enables them to deter the Janjawid.

10:47 AM: Now in Al-Jeneina, all roads are closed with stones and vehicles are not allowed to pass, otherwise they will be broken with stones. Masses of Masalit are heading to the graves to bury their dead. The situation is very tense, and the markets are closed.

10:58 AM: There is another account of the causes of the outbreak of the problem, after the Arabs killed a Masalit person returning from the Mouley area and took his horse, and in the meantime, a passer-by, a Masalit from the army, contacted his family and called them to take revenge from the Arabs. Then a group of armed Masalit gathered and started hitting Arab children who were near Jabal Al-Sattan in Al-Geneina, and then the matter developed. Now the Central Reserve Forces are protecting the IDP camps. The situation is explosive, and everyone is expecting the Masalit response after returning from the cemetery.

11:39 AM: There is a complete absence of the Governor, at least he used to give a press conference explaining the events, and Radio El-Geneina city station is suspended while the citizens need news explaining the events and the precautions required in this circumstance. Now there is a sound of fire towards the cemetery, where the dead were buried. Only Sudan TV briefly indicated what happened, three deaths were announced by the government. In general, there is a complete absence of the central and state media.

0:08 PM: Radio Omdurman spoke with the governor, in which he confirmed the killing of three people and stated that the situation is now under control.

4:06 PM: The Governor proclaims an indefinite curfew in El Geneina and Beida (locality).

4:09 PM (reposted): Report on the events in El-Geneina, Hay El-Jebel, from Kamal al-Zain, activist: On 7/19/2020 there was a policeman called Bashir Sharif from the Civil Defense Police coming from his farm, and when he arrived near Geneina Nafar, he found there was a gathering there, and there were young men who were on their way to the gathering place and found Bashir Sharif on the way carrying a bag in his hand. Then he was ordered to hand over his bag to the young men who were going to the gathering place, and when he refused to hand them the bag, one of them took out a tabanja (8 mm revolver) and shot him in the legs. The policeman fell to the ground and was then brought to Al-Geneina Hospital with a small car. It is said that those who shot Bashir called their relatives, they told them that we are trapped, then they started firing all over the neighbourhood, then armed militias gathered, killing and stealing in the houses and terrorizing citizens. So far three have been killed and five wounded, maybe there are wounded or dead that I did not recognize. And now there are sounds of live bullets, as well as the attack on the Al-Ghaba camp, west of Al-Madaris neighbourhood.

The martyrs:
1 / Al-Nur Muhammad
2 / Muhammad Adam
3 / Abkar Juma

The wounded
24 July 2020. Higher Coordination of the Nomads. Statement No. 15

This statement accuses the Masalit militia of “killing of an entire family while they were sleeping, and the outbreak of the events of Al-Geneina, with the militia attacking young men who were on their leisure trip in the valley, and this attack was followed by another attack from the militias at the nomads in the Jebel neighborhood”.

The statement includes the following demands:
1 / Arresting the perpetrators and saboteurs who seek to destabilize the security and stability of this state (West Darfur).
2 / Imposing state prestige in all the different localities of the state and upholding the rule of law.
3 / The government of West Darfur State must impose its prestige and protect markets and roads to avoid any instability that may occur.
4 / We hold the state government fully responsible for what is going on in this state.
5 / We hold all security services responsible for the safety and security of our people, inside and outside, in their pastures and on their tracks.


This statement refers to “a new and repeated violation by the Janjawid against our defenseless people in various areas” and condemns “the complete absence of the honest media that explains to the public opinion about what exactly happens to citizens in the areas of the Sudanese margins”. According to the statement, on Thursday afternoon the Janjawid brutally assaulted the village of Abdos, which is located about 10 km from the city of Gereida in the state of South Darfur. The attackers were armed militias riding camels and horses, and they “killed large numbers of defenseless citizens and burned the village and looted livestock and other property which have not yet been fully counted”. The local authorities were fully aware of the attack, but “did not interfere, but rather withdrew the forces present in the village to protect the area for unknown reasons”.

The massacre “left dozens of martyrs, missing and wounded, currently receiving treatment in Gereida Hospital, which lacks the most basic elements of treatment”. The General Union of the Sons of Masalit condemned the attack and warned of “the eruption of an all-out war in Darfur as a result of the absence of the state in the performance of its national duty towards its people, and we fear that people will consider engaging in armed confrontations with the aim of defense”.

25 July 2020. The Fallata Youth Gathering. An important explanatory statement about the events of (Abudos) in Tulus locality (from a Fulani source)

This statement informs the citizens about “the unfortunate events that took place in the Abudos area, in which died some dear ones from our people in the Gereida area”. According to the statement, “a group of IDP camp residents in Gereida launched a few days ago attacks on the people of the Abudos area of Tulus locality, on the pretext that they are owners of farms in the area and provoked the citizens of that area. The problem was further complicated by the presence of an organization that
distributed tents and supplies to the IDPs, and this tempted many of the displaced to go to the region for the sake of the aforementioned organization”.

The statement refers to a letter of 5 May 1928 by colonial authorities regarding the borders of the Fur and Fallata lands, stressing that the area of incident is under the responsibility of the Fallata administration and not under that of the Gereida authorities. It argues that it were Yaqub Muhammad Yaqub, the Malik of Gereida, and the Omda Ibrahim Nimr, who “pushed the simple people of the camps in Gereida to go to the Abudos area without coordination with the official agencies and the Fallata administration in the area”.

The statement stresses the historical religion and neighbourhood relationship between the Fallata and the Masalit and indicates that “there are those who strive to destroy this relationship and replace it with hatred”.

**Photo: Map of the Sa’adun zone, South Darfur, marked as “under the Fallata Nazirate” (from a Fulani source)**

---

**Statement from Civil Society and Human Rights Activists on the attack on Masteri town, Beida, West Darfur on 25 July 2020 (English translation, from a Masalit source).**

Masteri town is located West South of Geneina town the capital of West Darfur and is about 49 KMs away from Geneina. It’s part of Beida locality. It hosts over 100,000 populations of which 70% is IDPs. Masteri admin unit hosts many tribes including Massalit (majority), Dago, Bargo, … etc

As it happens last week (18 July 2020) today the 25 July 2020 early morning around 6:30am armed Arab men estimated at over 1,000 on vehicles, motor bikes, horses, camels and on foot wearing military uniforms and civilian uniforms attacked Masteri area from the north and east sites. Despite the military compound is located in the northern part of Masteri and the police post/station located in the eastern part of Masteri both were ordered about not to open fire or fight back the attackers and that the attackers had to attack the police post in which 7 police men were killed. After this the perpetrators spread over the town and started killing, burning and looting belonging of the community across the town. This event lasted for almost 7 hours and sadly the state government sent joined forces/troops late evening after the attackers did whatever they wanted and withdrew themselves from the area. This attack resulted in many deaths and till this moment
they collected 57 remains and still finding more and many injuries of which so far 30 admitted to be critical injuries. They are still counting the houses that got burned and also estimating the loses. Currently people are living in a fear as they still expect that these attackers may come back and do whatever they can since movement is silent and not reacting. As civil society members and human right activists we urge the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to take strong step towards protecting civilians so that they don’t take refugee to another country or displace to other areas within the country. We also urge UN to quickly rescue those whom their houses burned, belonging taken especially it’s rainy season now the season of many diseases. We also urge the government of Sudan to hold those committed the crime accountable and ensure that such incident no longer take place.

**Below is the incident that took place in Masteri on 18 July 2020**

In the afternoon of 18 July 2020, armed Arab men wearing both civilian clothes and military uniforms on cars, horses, camels attacked Masteri town. The attack dispersed the sit-in that which at that point had lasted over 10 days. 18 people were injured including 3 women and 2 children (a girl of 5 and a boy 3 years old) over 100 houses got burned, animals and other belonging got looted (not yet counted). While the shooting and burning was ongoing, it rained and this rain rescued the town from massive burning.

**Civil Society and Human Rights Activists**

West Darfur State, Sudan

**Photo: 26 July 2020. Refugees leaving Masteri because of the attacks (Source: Twitter)**