



Security Council

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Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

Corrigendum

1. Section III.D, table 4

Delete entire line for 28 June 2020

2. Section III.D, table 6, line for 12 May 2020

For and Tubruq (HLTQ) airbases *read* “airbase”

3. Section IX, Contents, entry for annex 40

For Infographic for Misagh-2 MANPADS *read* Withdrawn

4. Annex 9, figure 9.3

Title of figure *should read* Comparison between the real format of an RSF document (right) and the fabricated one (left)

5. Replace annexes 31, 40, 61 and 64 as indicated below.



Annex 31 Infographic for Mig-29A FGA

18 May - 18 June 2020

1. Khemeimim Airbase (OSLK), Syria
(35°24'33.30"N, 35°56'41.01"E)

2. Al Jufra Airbase (HL69), Libya
(29°12'0.83"N, 16° 0'11.58"E)

Satellite imagery of 18 May 2020 identifies six MiG-29 aircraft at RFF Khemeimim Airbase in Syria. The aircraft no longer show on the subsequent 19 May 2020 imagery. Imagery taken on 19 May 2020 shows a MiG-29 on runway being towed to hardened aircraft shelters at Al Jufra airbase, Libya. Subsequent imagery of 25 May 2020 also identifies a MiG-29 at Al Khadim airbase, Libya. In flight imagery shows some MiG-29 with RFF markings although it is not clear where and when imagery obtained.

In S/2019/229 the Panel assessed that some were ex Syrian Air Force MiG-29. An independent OSINT analyst has subsequently identified that Syrian Air Force MiG-29 do not have a dorsal hump (9.12 variant), whereas the aircraft supplied to Libya do (variant 9.13).


Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Brian_Castner/status/1263572061492035607, 19 May 2020.
2. https://www.facebook.com/USAoutofSyria/posts/617284718873488?_tn=-R, 20 May 2020.
3. <https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6220925/russia-deploys-military-fighter-aircraft-libya>, 26 May 2020
4. https://twitter.com/Am_Del/status/1265985704410128389, 28 May 2020.
5. <https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/32941/new-evidence-of-russian-aircraft-active-in-li>, 18 June 2020
6. www.ihs.janes.com, (Subscription). Accessed 24 May 2020.
7. Maxar Technologies Limited and Google Earth Pro - satellite imagery.
8. Confidential sources.
9. **Correction 25 March 2021.** <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1371893921492701186>, 16 March 2021.



The response from the Member State to the Panel's tracing request was that there was insufficient detail for their consideration.

Nevertheless the presence of these aircraft in Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).



Annex 40 Withdrawn

This annex is withdrawn in entirety as one open source has subsequently been discredited. Other MANPAD types previously known to be available in Libya in 2012 could also now match the imagery. As the Panel cannot now achieve the evidential levels necessary for a positive identification based solely on the available imagery of the system and the packaging the annex is withdrawn in entirety. Panel investigations continue.

Annex 61 Infographic for Dassault Mirage 2000-9

1. Sidi Barani Airbase (HE40), Egypt (31°27'59"N, 25°52'41"E)


2. Al Jufra Airbase (HL69), Libya (29°10'58.36"N, 16°01'25.01"E)

Satellite imagery of 6 May 2020 identified UAE Mirage 2000-9 fighter ground attack (FGA) at Sidi Barani Airbase in Egypt. Egypt informed the Panel that this was for maintenance. The Panel is unconvinced, as: 1) Egypt would not tell the Panel what level maintenance was purportedly provided; and 2) it is unlikely the specialised maintenance facilities required for such an aircraft are in Sidi Barani as no EAF Mirage are based there. Analysis of the imagery confirms the aircraft type as a Mirage 2000-9 rather than an Egyptian Mirage 5 based on: 1) shorter nose profile of the 2000-9; 2) larger proportional wing area of 2000-9; 3) shorter and wider tail profile of 2000-9; and 4) the distinctive camouflage pattern used by the UAE.


On 12 May 2020 a confidential source reported a Mirage 2000-9 present at Al Jufra (HL69) airbase. A second confidential source later confirmed to the Panel that at least one Mirage 2000-9 was present in Libya around that time, before being withdrawn.

Primary sources:

1. <https://twitter.com/obretix/status/1258087871136833537>, 6 May 2020.
2. http://www.easternorbat.com/html/dassault_mirage_5_eng.html. Accessed 24 March 2021.
3. <https://www.defencetalk.com/military/photos/egyptian-air-force-mirage-2000.27918/>. Accessed 10 May 2020.
4. <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/14/dassault-to-modernize-uaes-mirage-fleet-for-a-reported-350m/>, 14 November 2017.
5. <https://www.scramble.nl/orbats/egypt>. Accessed 10 May 2020.
6. http://www.easternorbat.com/html/dassault_mirage_5_eng.html. Accessed 24 May 2020.
7. Digital Globe, Maxar Technologies Limited and Google Earth Pro - satellite imagery.
8. Confidential sources.
9. **Amendment 25 March 2021.** <https://twitter.com/juanmab/status/1372574370456084482>, 18 March 2021.
10. **Amendment 25 March 2021.** <https://twitter.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1374357396580093954/photo/1>, 23 March 2021



Mirage 2000-9 Top View



Mirage 5 Top View



EAF Mirage 5



UAE Mirage 2000-9



EAF Mirage 2000



6 May 2020, One of six Mirage 2000-9 FGA at Sidi Barani (HE40), Egypt



12 May 2020, location of reported Mirage 2000-9 FGA at Al Jufra (HL69), Libya. (Aircraft not visible on imagery)

The initial assessment of a Mirage 2000-9 at Tobruk airbase (HLTQ) in June 2020 has now reverted to "under investigation" based on an alternative option provided by an independent OSINT analyst after initial publication of S/2019/229.

The UAE have denied the presence of Mirage 2000-9 in Libya. This deployment is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Annex 64 Infographic for T64 main battle tank (including upgrades)

Western Libya (5 June 2020)

Imagery from a range of sources shows some T-62 variant main battle tanks (MBT) captured from HAF by GNA-AF. These MBT may have been partially upgraded to a similar specification to that of the T-62MV model, which has not previously been seen in Libya. Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) has certainly been added to the original T-62 design. **A Member State has identified T-62MV in Libya.**

It is possible that these are some of the 13 x T-62 MBT reported as being maintained or overhauled by a Chvk Wagner repair team between 17 October 2019 and 12 March 2020. The imagery (still and video) available for some of the MBT suggests modification in Libya (see appendix D to annex 77) rather than a new import, as the quality of the work does not appear to be of factory standard.

Since publication of S/2021/229 an independent OSINT analyst identified temporary Russian rail transport markings on the side skirts, which could indicate a recent transfer as an alternative.

Primary sources

1. Twitter, @oryxspioenkop. 5 June 2020.
2. Twitter, @HasairiOuais. 5 June 2020.
3. www.ihs.janes.com. (Subscription). 25 February 2020.
4. **Amendment 25 March 2021.** <https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1371893466641354757>, 16 March 2021.
5. **Member State (6 July 2020).**

Developed by UN Panel of Experts



T-62MV MBT

Note the ERA fitted to turret. Unequally spaced and laid out ERA suggests not a factory modification. Only enhanced frontal protection added.



T-62 MBT

Stock image of standard T-62 MBT.



Russian rail transport markings

The markings were confirmed as Russian rail markings by a Russian linguist.

Regardless of whether recently transferred, or upgraded, either activity is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).



T-62MV MBT

Note the ERA fitted to glacis. Unequally spaced and laid out ERA suggests not a factory modification.