



Security Council

Distr.: General
10 December 2019

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Eighth report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue is an important multilateral diplomatic achievement, which enjoys the broad support of Member States and was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran culminated in an agreement to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. An essential part of the Plan is the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, allowing for the normalization of trade and economic relations.

2. On 16 January 2016 (Implementation Day), upon completion of certain actions by the Islamic Republic of Iran (stipulated in the Plan)¹ as verified by the Agency, a decade of United Nations sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran were lifted. Between 16 January 2016 and 14 June 2019, the Agency reported 15 times (most recently in [S/2019/212](#) and [S/2019/496](#)) to the Security Council that the Islamic Republic of Iran had been fully implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.

3. I regret that the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 8 May 2018, that it reimposed all of the national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan and that it has since continued to implement its decision not to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and not to fully renew waivers for nuclear non-proliferation projects in the framework of the Plan. These actions continue to be contrary to the goals set out in the Plan and in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and may also impede the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to implement certain provisions of the Plan and of the resolution. I note the most recent concerns expressed in the letter dated 4 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to me ([S/2019/863](#)).

¹ As specified in paragraphs 15.1 to 15.11 of annex V to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.



4. I regret the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the monitoring of the Agency since 1 July 2019 – further to its announcement on 8 May 2019² – to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan (see para. 7). I continue to believe that full and effective implementation of the Plan by all participants is the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to secure tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. I note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stated that it wants to remain in the Plan and has emphasized that all of its measures since 1 July are reversible. It is important that the Islamic Republic of Iran reverse all of the measures and that it refrain from taking further steps to reduce its agreed commitments.

5. During both the meetings of the Joint Commission held in Vienna on 28 June and 6 December 2019 and the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and the Islamic Republic of Iran held in New York on 25 September 2019, all participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reaffirmed their continued commitment to preserving the Plan. I welcome their continuing efforts to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015) and their other initiatives in support of trade and economic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. These initiatives should be given full effect as a matter of urgency. I am also encouraged by the operationalization of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, the interest expressed by European Union and other Member States in joining France, Germany and the United Kingdom as shareholders, and efforts to open the special purpose vehicle to economic operators from third countries. It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all of its participants.

6. I also stress the important contribution of other Member States to preserve the Plan and continue to encourage them to work effectively with the participants in the Plan towards creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with resolution 2231 (2015).

7. The International Atomic Energy Agency plays an important role in supporting the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, especially by providing the international community with reports on its verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with resolution 2231 (2015). I commend its impartial, factual and professional work. In its reports issued since 1 July 2019,³ the Agency has confirmed the activities announced and undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce its commitments under the Plan. The Agency has also reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained ongoing. The Agency has further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement and to apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. The Agency indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

8. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) are essential for nuclear non-proliferation, and for regional and international security. I

² Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, statement of 8 May 2019, available at www.president.ir/en/109588.

³ See reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency entitled “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)” dated 1 and 8 July (S/2019/559 and S/2019/560), 30 August (S/2019/737), 8 and 26 September (S/2019/738 and S/2019/899), 7, 11 and 18 November 2019 (S/2019/900, S/2019/901 and S/2019/902).

encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and urgently address the concerns of Member States in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. I call upon all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that may have a negative impact on regional stability.

9. The present report, my eighth on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my seventh report ([S/2019/492](#)) on 13 June 2019. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

II. Key findings and recommendations

10. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism for the legitimate transfer to the Islamic Republic of Iran of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods and related services pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). All participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Joint Commission have a special role to play to ensure its success. To support its effective and efficient functioning, it is also important for the Security Council, through the Facilitator and with the assistance of the Secretariat, to increase awareness of and confidence in this important mechanism. I call upon Member States and the private sector to fully utilize and support this channel.

11. The United States announced on 18 November 2019 that participation in activities related to the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility may now be exposed to its national sanctions. The United States had previously announced on 3 May 2019 that participation in other activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) may be exposed to its national sanctions. I note again that the exemptions set out in paragraph 2 of annex B to the resolution are designed to provide for the transfer of such items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan.

12. The Secretariat continued its review of the arms and related material seized by the United Arab Emirates in Aden in December 2018 (see [S/2019/492](#), para. 31). Information provided by the State of manufacture indicates that the seized PGO-7V-type optical sights for RPG-7-type rocket-propelled grenade launchers were delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016. This suggests that these optical sights seized in Aden may have been retransferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

13. The Secretariat was able to examine the debris of the weapons systems used in the attacks on an oil facility in Afif (May 2019), on Abha International Airport (June and August 2019) and on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Khurays and Abqaiq (September 2019). At this time, it is unable to independently corroborate that the cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in those attacks were of Iranian origin and were transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat is still collecting and analysing additional information on these cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and I intend to report to the Security Council on further findings in due course, as appropriate.

14. Information from Iraqi media outlets suggests that Major General Soleimani has undertaken travel inconsistent with the travel ban provisions of the resolution. I call

upon all Member States to diligently implement the restrictive measures imposed on the individuals and entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

15. Since 13 June 2019, no new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) were submitted to the Security Council for approval through the procurement channel. Of the 44 proposals received from 16 January 2016 to 13 June 2019, 30 were approved by the Council, 5 were not approved and 9 were withdrawn by the proposing States. It is vital that the procurement channel continue to work effectively and efficiently, and in a manner that promotes increased international engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

16. In addition, the Security Council received four new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that do not require approval, but do require a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission. As previously reported, on 3 May 2019, the United States announced that involvement in some of the above-mentioned activities may now be exposed to its national sanctions, specifically assistance to expand the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant beyond the existing reactor unit and any involvement in transferring enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium.⁴ The United States also announced that other activities, such as the redesign of the Arak reactor, modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility and work at the existing unit of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, would be permitted to continue for a renewable duration of 90 days but that it reserved the right to modify or revoke its policy covering these non-proliferation activities at any time. Consequently, the United States announced on 18 November 2019 that it “will terminate the sanctions waiver related to the nuclear facility at Fordow, effective December 15th, 2019”.⁵ Subsequently, in a letter dated 5 December 2019 addressed to me ([A/74/575-S/2019/928](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran noted that, by taking this action, the United States “not only violates resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), but also coerces other countries to stop implementing their relevant international commitments”.

IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions

A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

17. In identical letters dated 29 August 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2019/705](#)), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission brought to my attention information regarding two ballistic missile launches, reportedly conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 25 July and 9 August 2019. The Chargé d'affaires a.i. noted that both missiles were designed to

⁴ United States Department of State, “Advancing the Maximum Pressure Campaign by Restricting Iran’s Nuclear Activities”, Fact sheet, 3 May 2019, available at www.state.gov/advancing-the-maximum-pressure-campaign-by-restricting-irans-nuclear-activities/.

⁵ “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to the Press” on 18 November 2019, available at <https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-remarks-to-the-press/>.

be category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime⁶ and therefore were designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The Chargé d'affaires a.i. observed that the Council, in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake launches with these types of ballistic missiles. In response, in a letter dated 19 September 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/752), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that there was no implicit or explicit reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the criteria contained therein. He reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that none of its ballistic missiles were “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and therefore that its related activities were not inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He also noted that when previous missile launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran were discussed in the Security Council, there was no consensus on how these launches related to resolution 2231 (2015).

18. In identical letters dated 19 November 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/895), the Permanent Representative of Israel informed me of three additional flight tests of ballistic missiles reportedly conducted between March and June 2019. He stated that two of these flight tests were inconsistent with the resolution because the tested missiles crossed the threshold of 300 km range and 500 kg payload and, therefore, violated annex B restrictions on the ballistic activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 26 November 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/907), stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “neither launched any missile nor conducted any other action inconsistent with annex B” and strongly rejected the information contained in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

19. In a letter dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/911), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom brought to my attention recent actions undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran. They stated that undated footage released on social media on 22 April 2019 revealed a previously unseen flight test of a new Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile variant equipped with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle. They also stated that, on 24 July 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran flight-tested a ballistic missile that flew over 1,000 km and that media reporting indicated that this flight test involved a Shahab-3 missile. They noted that, as a category I system under the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Shahab-3 “is designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”. They further stated that, if confirmed, the test would constitute an activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). They also noted that media reporting indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had unsuccessfully attempted to launch a Safir satellite launch vehicle at the end of August 2019. They recalled the technical analysis of the Safir satellite launch vehicle provided in their letter dated 25 March 2019 (S/2019/270) and concluded that, if confirmed, this attempted launch would also constitute an activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

20. In identical letters dated 4 December 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/926), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran referred to the aforementioned letter (S/2019/911) and reiterated the view that “there is no implicit or explicit reference in paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) either to the Missile Technology Control

⁶ Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see I.A.1 of the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).

Regime itself or to its definitions”. The Permanent Representative noted that, given the fact that “none of Iran’s missiles are ‘designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons’, paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) does not limit, in any way, the activities related to the conventional ballistic missiles of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. The Permanent Representative also stated that there was “no implicit or explicit reference or language” in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) pertaining to space launch vehicles. He further recalled that, as noted in the third and fourth six-month reports of the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515 and S/2017/1058), there was no consensus in the Security Council on how previous launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles related to resolution 2231 (2015). Finally, the Permanent Representative re-emphasized the view that “Iran has not conducted any activity inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015)”.

21. In identical letters dated 26 November addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (A/74/565–S/2019/909), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation reiterated the position of his country regarding the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). He underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not prohibited by multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms or resolution 2231 (2015) from developing missile and space programmes. He stated that the Russian Federation continued to consider that the Islamic Republic of Iran “is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. He reiterated that the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime were never intended to be used in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) to ascertain whether certain missiles were designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons and that “such types of missiles should include certain specific features and, up until now, no evidence of their existence on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles” had been presented to the Council.

B. Restrictions on ballistic missile related-transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran

22. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), provided that they have obtained prior approval from the Security Council, on a case-by-case basis, all States may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of certain ballistic missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology. At the time of reporting, one proposal had been submitted to the Council pursuant to that paragraph (see also report of the Facilitator S/2019/xxx).

23. In identical letters dated 3 and 7 September 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/704 and S/2019/716), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hizbullah have redoubled their efforts to convert and produce precision-guided missiles in Lebanon by attempting to build manufacturing and conversion facilities in a number of locations in Lebanon. He also stated that the components necessary for manufacturing and converting the precision-guided missiles were being transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran through different routes. The Permanent Representative of Israel further stated that, on 3 September 2019, the Israel Defense Forces exposed a facility located near Nabi Shit in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon designed to manufacture motors and warheads of precision-guided missiles and that the Islamic Republic of Iran provided “cutting-edge equipment and expertise to the manufacturing crews” of that facility. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in

identical letters dated 6 September 2019 (S/2019/714) and identical letters dated 23 October 2019 (S/2019/836) addressed to me and the President of the Security Council, rejected all claims made in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

24. In October 2019, the authorities of the United States informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, several shipments of a commodity to the Islamic Republic of Iran were undertaken contrary to paragraph 4 of annex B. According to the United States, two shipments of hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene were transferred to the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in July and August 2017 without prior approval of the Security Council. The Secretariat is examining the information provided by the United States and will update the Council, as appropriate, in due course.

25. In their letter dated 21 November 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/911), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom also brought to my attention that Houthi forces, on 2 August 2019, announced the launch of the Borkan-3, a new liquid-propelled medium-range ballistic missile. They noted that video of the launch showed that the Borkan-3 was “clearly an adaptation of earlier Borkan-2H missiles”. Pointing to similar features on both the Borkan-2H and Borkan-3 missiles and the Qiam-1 missile launched in September 2018 by the Islamic Republic of Iran against targets in the Syrian Arab Republic, they stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran “may be acting in breach of relevant provisions of annex B to Council resolution 2231 (2015) barring the transfer of missile technology from Iran”. In his letter dated 4 December 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/926), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the argument contained in the aforementioned letter (S/2019/911) that “annex B to Council resolution 2231 (2015) barr[ed] the transfer of missile technology from Iran” was a “distortion of the text of that resolution”. Instead, he recalled that “all States may participate in and permit” such activities with prior approval of the Security Council. He also stated that “the actual operationalization of the necessary mechanism for making required decisions to permit such activities” had been prevented “for clear political reasons”. He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran refuted the charges related to a possible Iranian transfer of missile technology to the Houthis.

V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

26. In my most recent report, I informed the Security Council that the Secretariat had examined (in the United Arab Emirates) samples of an arms shipment that had been seized in Aden in December 2018. The samples of the shipment included rocket-propelled grenade launchers with characteristics similar to Iranian-produced RPG-7-type launchers (see S/2019/492, para. 31). The samples also included 23 PGO-7V-type optical sights for RPG-7-type rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The Secretariat has since confirmed that serial numbers observed on the sights matched those of semi-knock-down kits for PGO-7V-type optical sights delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016. The State of manufacture informed the Secretariat that the importer was an entity located in Tehran and that the end user was the “Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Iran”. This suggests that these optical sights seized in Aden may have been retransferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016.

27. In a letter dated 13 June 2019 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2019/489), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia called attention to the attack carried out on 12 June 2019 on Abha International Airport in south-western

Saudi Arabia. He stated that the Houthis had claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that they had used a cruise missile, and that the attack proved the continued support provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis. In a letter dated 14 June 2019 addressed to me (S/2019/494), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejected the information contained in the aforementioned letter.

28. In identical letters dated 18 September 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/758), the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia brought to my attention the attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays on 14 September 2019. He informed me that “all preliminary signs and indicators reveal that this attack did not emanate from Yemeni lands”, as claimed by the Houthis, and that “the weapons used were Iranian-made”. In identical letters dated 2 October 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/785), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejected the claim by Saudi Arabia that the weapons used in the attack against the Abqaiq and Khurays oil facilities were Iranian-made.

29. In response to invitations from the authorities of Saudi Arabia, members of the Secretariat travelled to Riyadh in September and November 2019 to examine if arms or related materiel used in the above-mentioned attacks were transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). While in Riyadh, on 19 September 2019, the Secretariat was informed that at least 18 unmanned aerial vehicles were used in the attack on Abqaiq, four cruise missiles were used in the attack on Khurays and three more cruise missiles fell short of their target, for a total of at least 25 weapons systems. The Ministry of Defence also provided the Secretariat with its assessment (based on photographic comparison) that the “misfired land attack cruise missile” bore similarities with the Iranian cruise missile “Ya Ali”. The Secretariat was also shown a photograph from an Iranian exhibition in May 2014 of a possible mock-up of a delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicle, which Saudi Arabia considered to be similar to the ones used in the Abqaiq attack. On 22 November 2019, at the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat visited Washington D.C. and was informed that, owing to the maximum range of the cruise missiles (which they assessed to be 700 km) and of the unmanned aerial vehicles (which they assessed to be 900 km), it was highly unlikely that the weapons systems used in the attacks against the oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays had been transferred to and subsequently launched by the Houthis. The authorities of the United States also stressed that the number and nature of the weapons systems involved in the attacks on 14 September 2019 were inconsistent with statements made by the Houthis.⁷

30. Consistent with its mandate, when reviewing these attacks, the Secretariat focused on arms-related restrictive measures in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and not on other circumstances of the attacks. During these visits, the Secretariat was able to conduct a first-hand and in-depth examination of the debris recovered by Saudi authorities of the weapons systems used in the attack on Abha International Airport on 12 June 2019 and in the attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurays on 14 September 2019. The examination also included the debris of the weapons systems used in a second attack on Abha International Airport in August 2019 and in an attack on another oil facility in Afif in May 2019. The Secretariat observed that the number of impact points at the oil facilities in Khurays and Abqaiq was inconsistent with the statements made by the Houthis but more consistent with

⁷ See “Second Deterrent Balance Operation Hits Abqaiq, Khurais Oil Refineries East of Saudi Arabia”, Almasirah, 14 September 2019, available at https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8774&cat_id=1; and “Armed Forces Warn Foreign Companies Not to Be Present in Abqaiq, Khurais Refineries”, Almasirah, 19 September 2019, available at https://english.almasirah.net/details.php?es_id=8810&cat_id=1.

the figures provided by Saudi Arabia regarding the number of unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles involved.

31. In relation to the cruise missiles, with the aim of ascertaining the manufacturer and a possible transfer of these arms and related materiel, the Secretariat:

(a) Observed that a similar type of cruise missile was used in the attacks on both Abha International Airport and the Saudi Aramco oil facility in Khurays. The Secretariat notes that these cruise missiles have similar design characteristics and configuration⁸ to the mock-up of the Quds cruise missile that the Houthis displayed on 7 July 2019;⁹

(b) Identified the manufacturer of two subcomponents of the jet engines of the cruise missiles used in the attacks on 14 September 2019. The manufacturer informed the Secretariat that both subcomponents were part of two similar jet engines that it had manufactured and exported to another Member State in 2010 and 2011;

(c) Was informed by that manufacturer that it had not produced the jet engines examined by the Secretariat (excluding the above-mentioned components). Two of these engines had manufacturing date markings of January 2019 and April 2019, respectively.

32. The Secretariat is still conducting its review of the components and subcomponents retrieved from the debris of the cruise missiles with a view to establishing their supply chain. At this time, the Secretariat is unable to independently corroborate that the aforementioned components or the cruise missiles are of Iranian origin and were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).¹⁰ The Secretariat is still collecting and analysing additional information on these cruise missiles, and I intend to report to the Security Council on our further findings in due course, as appropriate.

33. Similarly, in relation to the unmanned aerial vehicles, the Secretariat:

(a) Observed that a similar type of delta-wing-type unmanned aerial vehicle was also used in the attacks on both the oil facility in Afif and the Saudi Aramco oil facility in Abqaiq;

(b) Noted that the Houthis have not been shown to be in possession of, nor been assessed to be in possession of, such a delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicle;

(c) Observed that these unmanned aerial vehicles were equipped with a “Model V9” vertical gyroscope. As noted in my most recent report, the Secretariat observed that an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle, reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016, was also equipped with a “Model V9” vertical gyroscope (S/2019/492, para. 29). The manufacturer of the “Model V9” is yet to be determined;

(d) Identified that a subcomponent (servo motors) used in the unmanned aerial vehicles had been produced between December 2014 and the end of 2018; that other subcomponents (flowmeters) were identified to have been transferred to two Member States in July 2017, but the Secretariat is unable to determine if or when they were subsequently retransferred to other Member States since that time; and that other

⁸ The number of sections, approximate length and diameter per section examined, layout of wings, control surfaces and jet engine.

⁹ See Almasirah video, published on 7 July 2019, available at https://almasirah.net/gallery/preview.php?file_id=28295 and photo, available at <https://www.newsit.gr/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SAUDI-ARAMCO-HOUTHIS.jpg>.

¹⁰ Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016 would also be relevant to the implementation of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

subcomponents (pressure regulators) were identified to have been produced in February 2018 and transferred to another Member State later that month.

34. The Secretariat is also still conducting its review of the components and subcomponents retrieved from the debris of the unmanned aerial vehicles with a view to establishing their supply chain. At this time, the Secretariat is unable to independently corroborate that these components or the unmanned aerial vehicles are of Iranian origin and were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).¹¹ The Secretariat is still collecting and analysing additional information on these unmanned aerial vehicles and I intend to report to the Security Council on further findings in due course, as appropriate.

35. In identical letters dated 27 August 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/688), the Permanent Representative of Israel informed me that, on 24 August 2019, Israel had thwarted “the threat of launching [of] armed drones” from the Quds Force and Shiite militia site in Aqrabah, south-west of Damascus. According to the Permanent Representative of Israel, prior to this, “Iranian Quds Force operators had arrived in Syria via Damascus International Airport equipped with drones and explosives”. In identical letters dated 6 September 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/714), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected “all claims raised” in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

36. My earlier reports referred to the remnants of two unmanned aerial vehicles that were recovered in Yemen and assessed by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates to be of Iranian origin (see S/2018/1089, para. 23, and S/2019/492, para. 29). In September 2019, the Secretariat was invited by the United Arab Emirates to examine the engines of the two unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat ascertained that both engines were exported from the State of manufacture to another Member State, and subsequently re-exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran in July 2015. The Secretariat, as yet, has no indication as to whether these engines were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner and at a time inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).

37. In identical letters dated 19 November 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/895), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had transferred the Sadad-103 electro-optic surveillance system to the Iraqi military and that this transfer most probably constituted a violation of arms transfer restrictions. Photographs published by an Iraqi media outlet show that a new thermal security camera system deployed in the Najaf province in November 2017¹² has some external design features similar to those of the Iranian Sadad-103 monitoring system.¹³ The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in identical letters dated 26 November 2019 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council (S/2019/907), “strongly rejected” the information contained in the aforementioned letters from the Permanent Representative of Israel.

VI. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze provisions

38. During the reporting period, information surfaced regarding additional travel by Major General Soleimani. According to Iraqi media outlets, he travelled a number of

¹¹ Likewise, any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016 would also be relevant to the implementation of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

¹² See, for example, pictures published by the Iraqi Alforat News Agency on 14 November 2017, available at <https://alforatnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=154080>.

¹³ Catalogue of the Export Centre of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Available at <http://www.mindexcenter.ir/frontpage>.

times to Baghdad in October 2019. The Secretariat has sought clarification from the Permanent Mission of Iraq, and I will report to the Council in due course.

39. The Secretariat is aware of information released by an academic organization indicating that, in 2017, it had signed a memorandum of understanding with an entity that is on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The memorandum of understanding establishes a framework for academic cooperation and joint activities, but leaves the details of financial arrangements to future, separate agreements. The Secretariat has written to the Member State concerned to seek clarification and will provide an update to the Security Council in due course, as appropriate. The Secretariat is also aware of several cooperation agreements in the construction sector involving entities on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat has requested clarification from the relevant Member States and will report to the Council in due course, as appropriate.

VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)

40. During the reporting period, the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division provided induction briefings for the incoming members of the Security Council to assist them in their work on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The Division continued to respond to queries from Member States and to provide relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).
