
The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2454 (2019) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 2454 (2019), the midterm report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 12 July 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 29 July 2019.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Summary

The period covered by the present report coincided with the first months of the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, signed in Bangui on 6 February 2019 between the Government of the Central African Republic and 14 armed groups. Among the five other agreements signed since the beginning of the crisis in late 2012, none had been the object of so much effort, both by national and international actors, to facilitate the accord’s success.

To date, all parties have continued to express their commitment to implementing the Agreement. Some armed group leaders, however, have remained ambivalent concerning their support, such as sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène from the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). Others have committed serious violations of the Agreement, such as Abdoulaye Miskine, whose group, the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain, has engaged in hostile action against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. It is also underlined in the report how some leaders of armed groups, namely, Ali Darassa (Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, UPC), Mahamat Al-Khatim (Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique) and Souleymane Bi Sidi, alias “Abbas Sidiki” (Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation, 3R), have attempted to use some provisions of the Agreement, in particular the establishment of joint security units, as a way to legitimize their control over parts of the country.

The most serious incident since the signing of the Agreement was committed by 3R fighters in Ouham-Pendé Prefecture on 21 May 2019, where they carried out targeted attacks against civilians, killing at least 42. Serious violations of international humanitarian law have also been reported in other regions, in particular in Bria (Haute-Kotto Prefecture) and around Zangba (Basse-Kotto Prefecture), where ex-Séléka factions and anti-balaka groups were involved, among other violations, in cases of obstruction of humanitarian assistance, illegal detention and attacks against civilians. New cases of child recruitment have also been recorded.

Another factor raising doubts about the armed groups’ readiness to accept the restoration of State authority was their continued engagement in arms trafficking. Contained in the report are descriptions of the lines of supply and routes used by 3R to obtain weapons through networks based in Chad. New information is also provided on the continued acquisition of weapons by ex-Séléka factions FPRC and UPC from the territory of Chad and from elements of the Rapid Support Force operating in the Sudan.

Trafficking in gold and diamonds continued during the reporting period, both in zones declared “compliant” under the Kimberley Process, located in the west of the country, and zones controlled by armed groups in the east and the north. The report provides information on a seizure on 7 March 2019 at Bangui M’Poko International Airport of undeclared diamonds from Sam Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Prefecture) belonging to a former Séléka member. It also includes evidence on the activities of a network comprising Indian nationals and local traffickers involved in the smuggling of diamonds from Bria, in collaboration with local FPRC leaders.
Growing tensions were also noted in Bangui, with representatives of civil society and political opposition parties establishing a platform called *E Zingo Biani*, whose members have criticized the Government for having, among other things, appointed leaders of armed groups to key official positions. Between April and June 2019, the platform made several calls for demonstrations, which were prohibited by the authorities.

The national defence and security forces have continued to receive significant support from international partners. This facilitated the accelerated redeployment of the Forces armées centrafricaines, which nevertheless continued to face significant operational and logistical challenges during deployment, in particular in areas controlled by armed groups.

It is also underlined in the report that several private companies have imported significant volumes of commercial explosives and related material, including detonators, with the authorization of the authorities of the Central African Republic and that the storage of this explosive material does not meet international standards for safety and security.
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Background

1. On 31 January 2019, the Security Council adopted resolution 2454 (2019), by which the Panel of Experts was mandated, inter alia, to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic (Sanctions Committee), a midterm report no later than 30 July 2019.

2. In accordance with resolution 2454 (2019), the present report, inter alia, contains an assessment of the implementation of the measures imposed by the Security Council (arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze) and addresses a number of issues, with the aim of identifying individuals and entities involved in sanctionable activities, as enumerated in paragraphs 20 and 21 of resolution 2399 (2018) and extended in resolution 2454 (2019).

3. The present report covers the period between 14 December 2018, the date of publication of the 2018 Panel’s final report (S/2018/1119), and 26 June 2019, the drafting completion date.

Cooperation

4. Since 14 December 2018, the Panel has travelled to 11 of the 16 prefectures of the Central African Republic (see map in annex 1.1). The Panel also conducted official visits to Belgium (European Union), Cameroon, France, Gabon, the Netherlands (International Criminal Court) and the Russian Federation. The Government of Chad did not accommodate a visit proposed by the Panel.

5. Since 1 January 2019, the Panel has addressed 37 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities. The Panel regrets the low rate of responses received, especially among regional States (see annex 1.2).

6. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2454 (2019), the Panel has continued to exchange information with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, in particular the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Panels of Experts on the Sudan and on South Sudan.


Methodology

8. The Panel endeavoured to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.

9. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and endeavoured to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline.

10. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Panel Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.
II. Political process: positions of armed groups, political parties and civil society

11. On 6 February, the Government of the Central African Republic and the 14 recognized armed groups signed the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (see S/2019/145). The content had been agreed upon during negotiations held in Khartoum between 24 January and 5 February under the aegis of the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation.

A. Implementation of the agreement: follow-up meetings

12. On 25 February, as part of the implementation of the Agreement, Firmin Ngrebada, who had served as head of the delegation of the Government in Khartoum, was appointed Prime Minister, and, on 3 March, a new Government was established. The armed groups, opposition political parties and civil society representatives considered that that Government did not reflect the spirit of inclusiveness underlined in article 21 of the Agreement and requested that its composition be reconsidered (see annex 2.1).

13. From 18 to 20 March, the African Union convened a meeting in Addis Ababa to discuss those concerns with representatives of armed groups. As a result, on 22 March, the Prime Minister reshuffled the Government and appointed additional armed group representatives as ministers (see annex 2.2).

14. The executive follow-up committee (Comité exécutif de suivi) which, according to the Agreement, is the strategic body to discuss implementation, held its first three sessions, on 15 and 29 May and 13 June. The sessions, chaired by the Prime Minister, were attended by representatives of the African Union, MINUSCA, international partners, government officials and armed groups. They discussed, inter alia, the Agreement’s violations by all parties, including armed groups and State national defence and security forces, as well as possible follow-up action.

15. On 6 June, the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin-Archange Touadera, launched national consultations with a view to establishing the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation foreseen under article 9 of the Agreement.¹

B. Positions of armed groups

16. Many members of armed group have obtained senior positions or other functions in the Government (see annex 2.3). A number of small groups, such as Révolution et justice (RJ) or Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ), appeared inclined to facilitate the full implementation of the Agreement. By contrast, armed groups controlling significant areas of the national territory expected some form of legitimization of their “authority” in those areas in exchange for their participation in the Agreement’s implementation and the establishment of State authority.

Armed groups with various degrees of “double language”

_Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique: between the personal engagement of Nourredine Adam and the ambition of Abdoulaye Hissène_

17. The Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) reinforced its political weight, with three of its members appointed to ministerial positions in the new Government announced on 22 March. Discord, however, remained within the group, and its two main leaders, Abdoulaye Hissène and Nourredine Adam, both on the Sanctions Committee’s sanctions list, have pushed different agendas.

18. Nourredine Adam was strongly involved in all meetings that were held in Khartoum in preparation for the Agreement (S/2018/1119, paras. 25–28) and even encouraged leaders of other armed groups to participate.2 Armed group members and individuals who participated in those meetings told the Panel that, since May 2018, Adam has been “comfortably” based in Khartoum and that he had been protected by non-uniformed armed guards.3 In the Sudanese capital, he has benefited from long-standing connections, including with the leader of the official paramilitary unit Rapid Support Force and now deputy head of the transitional military council of the Sudan, Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, alias “Hemmeti”.4 Adam is reported to have met with Dagolo several times in 2019.5 Adam’s long absence from the Central African Republic, however, has generated discontent among FPRC ranks, who believe that he has promoted a personal agenda.6

19. With Nourredine Adam holding the political power, Abdoulaye Hissène has strengthened his leadership over the FPRC military branch, asserting himself as a key actor for the implementation of the Agreement. On several occasions, Hissène expressed his scepticism concerning the Agreement and remained ambiguous in his engagement.7 He told the Panel that he expected to obtain an official position from the Government confirming his role as a military leader with control over parts of the territory.8

20. Abdoulaye Hissène publicly opposed the deployment of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) in Kaga-Bandoro (see annex 2.4), where he pushed for the appointment of hardliners and individuals with a record of gross human rights violations as FPRC local leaders (i.e., Ahmat Bahar (see S/2018/1119, paras. 86–91) and Abdellkader Hassan, former members of the Mouvement national pour la libération de la Centrafrique (MNLC) and the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), respectively) (see annex 2.5). Both individuals had threatened to ambush the 106 FACA elements ahead of their deployment in Kaga-Bandoro (see para. 91 below).9 These appointments have created resistance among other FPRC leaders who are afraid of being drawn into clashes with FACA or MINUSCA.10

_Three special advisers_

21. One of the key provisions of the Agreement (articles 16 and 17) was the establishment of temporary joint security units (Unités spéciales mixtes de sécurité,
USMS) composed of members of both national defence and security forces and armed groups.

22. On 24 March, three leaders of armed groups, namely, Abbas Sidiki (3R), Mahamat Al-Khatim (MPC) and Ali Darassa (Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, UPC), were appointed by presidential decree (see annex 2.6) as special military advisers to the Prime Minister for USMS. Given that it was stated in the Agreement that USMS shall be under the supervision of the Chief of Staff of the defence forces, these appointments, and especially the armed group leaders’ interpretation of their role, as explained below, created some ambiguity regarding the USMS chain of command.

23. The Panel met the three special advisers, each of whom claimed that their nomination put them in military command of USMS in their respective areas, with the Prime Minister serving as their only supervisor. The armed groups’ continued control over their areas of influence has also raised doubts about their actual willingness to accept the return of State authority.

24. Ali Darassa has continued to behave like an armed group leader, maintaining control over territories and the cattle and transhumance business (S/2018/1119, paras. 105–136). On 18 February, he summoned civil society and religious leaders from Bambari, Alindao and surrounding areas to Bokolbo for a three-day meeting. Dressed in military attire, he expressed his willingness to ensure the security of all, provided that nobody interfered with “his interests”. He expressed his intention to cease exactions and robberies against the population, portraying himself as officially in charge of security in the Ouaka and Basse-Kotto Prefectures. Since then, Darassa has maintained his activities as warlord, including his involvement in hostilities in areas such as Zangba (see para. 58 below) and maintaining illegal taxation systems (see para. 47 below). During a joint mission of the Government, MINUSCA and the African Union in Bambari on 11 June, Darassa also displayed an important UPC military presence on the road from Bambari to Bokolbo as a show of strength.

25. Further information on 3R activities is provided in paras. 72 to 85 below.

**Armed groups unsatisfied with the Agreement’s implementation and follow-up nominations**

26. As described in annex 2.7, the disappointment of some members of the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) over their leadership has resulted in the creation of a new armed group with unclear intentions regarding the Agreement.

27. The Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC) of Abdoulaye Miskine, who refused to take up the ministerial position that he was offered, engaged in fighting with MINUSCA and FACA in April 2019, as cited in annex 2.8.

**C. Reaction of civil society and opposition political parties to the Agreement: growing tensions in Bangui**

28. On 10 April, the Groupe de travail de la société civile (GTSC), one of the leading civil society organizations in Bangui, issued a communiqué in which it called for the

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11 Meeting with Ali Darassa, Bokolbo, 21 April 2019; meeting with Abbas Sidiki, Koui, 16 May 2019; meeting with Mahamat Al-Khatim, Kaga-Bandoro, 10 June 2019.
12 Meeting with civil society representatives, Bambari, 22 April 2019; meeting with sub-prefect, Alindao, 20 April 2019.
13 Meeting with government official, Bangui, 14 June 2019.
army and the population to “rise up” on 15 April in protest against the appointment of members of armed groups in the Government (see annex 2.9). According to GTSC leaders, the appointment of members of armed groups, whom GTSC portrayed as “foreigners”, “illiterate” and “perpetrators of atrocities”, was against the population’s will.14

29. Notwithstanding the appeals of civil society, no demonstrations were held on 15 April. The day before, the spokesperson of GTSC, Paul Crescent Beninga, was arrested on the basis of inciting the population and the army to rebel against the Government. He was released on 21 April.15

30. The opposition political parties expressed disappointment over the Government regarding their lack of inclusion. On 31 May, leaders of several opposition political parties, along with civil society representatives, created a platform called E Zingo Biani, or the Front uni pour la défense de la nation (FUDN) (see annex 2.10). Gervais Lakosso, who played a key role in organizing demonstrations in Bangui in September 2015 and October 2016 (S/2016/1032, paras. 103–104), was appointed as the platform’s general coordinator.

31. Key political figures of FUDN included Anicet Georges Dologuele of the Union pour le renouveau centrafricain, Bertin Béa of Kwa Na Kwa, Jean-Serge Bokassa of Kodro ti mo kozoni si, Joseph Bendounga of the Mouvement démocratique pour la renaissance et l’évolution de Centrafrique and Alexandre Ferdinand Nguendet of the Rassemblement démocratique centrafricain.

32. FUDN criticized the Government, claiming that it had made too many concessions in favour of armed groups, at the expense of the majority of the population.16 FUDN also considered the attacks of 21 May by 3R (see paras. 76–80 below) as a demonstration of the failure of the strategy of the Government to appease armed groups by offering them official positions.17 FUDN called for demonstrations in Bangui on 15, 22 and 29 June 2019 (see annex 2.11).

33. In June, as a reaction to FUDN activities, a group named the Mouvement des requins de Centrafrique was established. The group published communiqués in which it called upon the population to prevent FUDN demonstrations, if necessary, through the use of violence (see annex 2.12). Leaders of the movement included Saint-Luc Bagaza as coordinator, as well as supporters of the presidential party (Mouvement des cœurs unis), such as Hériritier Doneng. The latter is a civil servant working in the Ministry of Youth and Sports and has regularly expressed views on social networks that could be considered as incitement to hatred and violence (see S/2018/729, annex 5.2). Furthermore, a member of the movement was officially put in charge of “the mobilization of non-lethal and lethal weapons” (see annex 2.13). Nevertheless, while engaging in intimidation through social media, the group has not engaged in actual fighting.18

34. The Ministry of the Interior also reacted by issuing a public statement in which it asserted that the FUDN demonstrations had been banned and labelling participants as “terrorists” (see annex 2.14). Notwithstanding all this, approximately 100 FUDN supporters gathered on 15 June; they were later dispersed by internal security forces (see para. 96).19 No demonstrations were held on 22 June.

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14 Meeting with Groupe de travail de la société civile (GTSC) leaders, Bangui, 21 April 2019.
15 Phone conversations with GTSC leaders, Bangui, 21 April 2019.
16 Meeting with FUDN leader, Bangui, 2 June 2019.
17 Meeting with FUDN leader, Bangui, 1 June 2019.
18 Meeting with Hériritier Doneng, Bangui, 11 June 2019.
19 Phone conversations with GTSC leaders, 17 June 2019, and confidential sources, 24 June 2019.
III. Regional issues

A. Relations with neighbouring countries and joint commissions

35. Pursuant to the Agreement (article 15) and the communiqué of 17 April 2019 of the International Support Group on the Central African Republic, adopted by the Government of the Central African Republic and international partners (see annex 3.1), the Government of the Central African Republic and its neighbours were encouraged to revitalize joint commissions as a way to address cross-border issues such as transhumance. According to the Central African Republic Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sylvie Baipo Temon, discussions have been held between the Central African Republic and four of its six neighbours (Cameroon, Chad, the Congo and the Sudan) to start (or restart) activities of relevant bilateral commissions in the near future.\(^{20}\)

Cameroon

36. On 6 and 7 May, the twelfth session of the Cameroon and Central African Republic joint commission of cooperation was held in Bangui under the leadership of the Minister of External Relations of Cameroon and the Central African Republic Minister for Foreign Affairs. The last joint commission between the two countries had been held in Yaoundé in September 2010.\(^{21}\) The Government of Cameroon committed itself to financially supporting the implementation of the Agreement. Both countries also agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation and reactivate joint commissions on transborder security and border management (see annex 3.2).\(^{22}\)

Chad

37. During the aforementioned meeting of 17 April of the International Support Group on the Central African Republic, the representative of Chad explained that the Central African Republic-Chad bilateral joint commission would restart its activities and that the border between the two countries, closed since May 2014, would be reopened once solutions were found to improve the security situation in the border areas.\(^{23}\)

38. Insecurity between the Central African Republic and Chad continued to be fuelled by cross-border dynamics such as arms trafficking (see paras. 52–53 below) and cattle-rustling activities.\(^{24}\) Efforts were ongoing to strengthen cooperation between the two countries on cross-border transhumance. With the support of the Economic Community of Central African States and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, two meetings were held, on 4 March (Goré, Chad) and 4 April (Paoua, Central African Republic), in the framework of the implementation of the bilateral agreement of October 2012 on cattle movements (see annex 3.3).\(^{25}\) The meetings were attended by representatives of the local authorities from both countries.

39. On 6 January, Chadian soldiers, accompanied by the prefect of Mia-Pendé in Chad, conducted an operation in Betoko (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture) to retrieve cattle

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\(^{20}\) Meeting with Sylvie Baipo Temon, Bangui, 19 April 2019.
\(^{21}\) Meeting with officials from the Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon, Yaoundé, 11 June 2019.
\(^{22}\) Idem.
\(^{23}\) Meeting with Chadian diplomat, Bangui, 22 April 2019.
\(^{24}\) Confidential report, 28 May 2019.
stolen one day earlier. The following day, the Central African Republic Ministry of Defence published a communiqué in which it indicated that the operation had been conducted in the framework of a bilateral cooperation agreement on defence between the two countries (see annex 3.4).

40. Similar retrieval operations by Chadian soldiers were reported in the border village of Bemal (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture) on 6 February and in Markounda (Ouham Prefecture) on 24 May. A Chadian official, however, denied the involvement of Chadian soldiers in those operations.

B. Follow-up to the alleged coup in Equatorial Guinea of December 2017

41. The Panel, in previous reports, had highlighted that Central African individuals were said to be involved in the alleged coup attempt of 24 December 2017 in Equatorial Guinea (S/2018/1119, paras. 50–51).

42. On 31 May, a court in Bata, Equatorial Guinea, sentenced to jail 130 individuals, including Ahmed Dada Yalo, alias “Daz”, a Central African businessman and former anti-balaka leader (S/2014/762, paras. 74–75), found guilty of participation in the coup attempt of 24 December 2017. A number of Central African Republic nationals, whose identities remain unknown, continued to be held in custody in the central prison of Ebolowa, Cameroon, awaiting their trial by the Military Court.

IV. Developments in areas of influence of ex-Séléka factions

A. Territorial control and illegal taxation systems by ex-Séléka factions

43. Illegal taxation and checkpoints have continued to be at the core of the ex-Séléka groups’ strategy. Those two practices continued to constitute an important source of revenue and an effective way to control territory. While it is stated in the Agreement that all illegal checkpoints should be removed, the leaders of ex-Séléka groups whom the Panel met considered that the removal of checkpoints should be done through their formalization, that is to say, the integration of the checkpoints into the official administration. Interestingly, since the signing of the Agreement, the main armed groups, in particular the ex-Séléka groups, have not only maintained their checkpoints, but also reinforced control over their territories and acquired weaponry (see paras. 48–53 below).

44. FPRC, for example, has continued to control all roads leading to the border town of Am Dafok (Vakaga Prefecture), a hub for trade and trafficking between the Central African Republic and the Sudan. On the Birao-Bria axis, FPRC controlled eight checkpoints, while three others were operated by RPRC and MLCJ fighters. As a result, a 10-wheeled truck owner reportedly had to pay more than FCFA 2 million

26 Confidential report, 8 January 2019.
27 Confidential reports, 7 February and 24 and 28 May 2019.
28 Meeting with Chadian diplomat, Bangui, 22 April 2019.
29 Meeting with official from the embassy of Equatorial-Guinea, Bangui, 2 June 2019.
30 Meeting with the State Minister in Charge of Gendarmerie in Cameroon, Yaoundé, 10 June 2019.
31 Meeting with ex-Séléka leaders, Central African Republic, February to June 2019.
32 Confidential report, 13 June 2019.
(about $3,470) to travel between Bria and the Sudanese border. The elements dispatched to those checkpoints also taxed other nearby activities.

45. In a meeting with the Panel, Abdoulaye Hissène made it clear that the USMS operationalization (see paras. 21–23 above) was a precondition for any removal of FPRC checkpoints. In a communiqué dated 19 June, Nourredine Adam announced his intention to remove all FPRC illegal barriers. He also called for the operationalization of USMS (see annex 4.1). In fact, ex-Séléka leaders view the USMS deployment as a way to legitimize the maintaining of fighters under their command on axes and towns located within their areas of influence, hence their insistence on holding command positions for those units (see paras. 21–23 above).

46. In his communiqué, Nourredine Adam also called for the deployment of USMS prior to the removal of checkpoints to prevent a “security void”. This argument resonates within some communities, especially in the border areas where armed groups are, at times, seen as providing security, in particular against incursions of armed individuals from neighbouring countries.

47. Annexes 4.2 and 4.3 contain descriptions of the UPC and MPC taxation systems.

B. Trafficking of arms by ex-Séléka factions

48. Even though they reiterated their intention to disarm by signing the Agreement, the two largest ex-Séléka factions, FPRC and UPC, have continued to acquire military equipment from Sudanese and Chadian territory. Both groups reported to the Panel the need to continue to strengthen their military capacity, fearing military operations against their positions similar to the “Bekpa II operation” of January 2019 (further details on this operation are provided in annex 4.4). They also expressed concerns over the calls of the Government to lift the arms embargo (see annex 4.5) and the acceleration of FACA deployment that, in their view, contrasted with the delays in USMS operationalization (see paras. 21–23 above).

Arms trafficking in Vakaga Prefecture

49. FPRC and UPC have continued to acquire weapons, ammunition and pickup vehicles from and/or through Sudanese territory, with the complicity of elements from the Rapid Support Force, which is led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, alias “Hemmeti” (see para. 18 above and S/2018/1119, para. 70).

50. As detailed in annex 4.6, between January and May 2019, new pickup trucks were purchased in Nyala, the Sudan. Vehicles belonging to FPRC and RPRC, some featuring mounted machine guns, were observed in Birao, Bria, Ndélé and Kaga-Bandoro. In January 2019, the Panel observed a strengthened military capacity in Birao, which coincided with tensions between FPRC and RPRC and with the positioning of a reported 60 vehicles and armed Rapid Support Force elements on the Sudanese side of the border (see annex 4.6).
51. In late March, 18 FPRC elements, including “Generals” Adoum Kanton, Fadoul Bashar and Kader, travelling in pickup trucks between Nyala, the Sudan and Birao, Central African Republic, were arrested by Sudanese military intelligence in possession of weapons, ammunition and military uniforms purchased in Nyala. Abdoulaye Hissemé reportedly purchased at least four of those loaded vehicles (see annex 4.6). On 8 April, Bashar Fadoul, who had been released immediately by the Sudanese military intelligence, and “General” Kingar reportedly returned to Nyala, where they purchased 20 boxes of 7.62x39 mm ammunition and 50 AK-type assault rifles from Rapid Support Force elements.

Union pour la paix en Centrafrique build-up of military capacity in Chad and the Sudan

52. UPC has concluded several weapons deals with FPRC “General” Bashar Fadoul, who is well connected with Sudanese individuals from whom he collected weapons on the instructions of Nourredine Adam. These weapons were then brought to Bokolbo through Am Dafok, Birao and Bria (see annex 4.7). In early February, immediately after the negotiations in Khartoum, a UPC trafficker also transported 500 rocket-propelled grenade rounds, AK-type assault rifles and ammunition, which he had ordered from individuals in Chad and picked up in Ndélé (see annex 4.7). The trafficker declared that the weaponry was needed to attack MINUSCA armoured personnel carriers in the event of a new military operation. In April 2019, that same trafficker reportedly purchased 260 grenades and grenade launchers in Chad (see annex 4.7). Similar types of grenades have been observed in the Central African Republic since 2010.

53. Annex 4.4 and 4.7 provide further information on the weapons used by UPC in response to the “Bekpa II operation” and on the weapons deals.

C. Violations of international humanitarian law by ex-Séléka factions and anti-balaka groups

Post-Agreement humanitarian situation

54. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have been committed almost daily by elements belonging to armed groups that were signatories to the Agreement. There is little evidence to demonstrate that there has been a significant change in the behaviour of combatants or that leaders have made efforts to identify and discipline those responsible.

55. Since the Agreement was signed, humanitarian actors have been able to take advantage of a respite from open fighting between armed groups in some locations that had been inaccessible since 2017, in particular in Nzacko (Mbomou Prefecture) and Mingala (Basse-Kotto Prefecture). Incident figures, however, do not show a significant change in the operating environment for humanitarians: for the first five months in 2019, 616 incidents affecting humanitarian workers, premises and assets,

39 Meetings with confidential sources, Bangui and Birao, 16, 17 and 29 April 2019.
40 Confidential report, 10 April 2019; Panel mission to Birao, 16–18 April 2019.
41 Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui and Birao, 16–18 April 2019.
42 Meeting with UPC trafficker, Bangui, 25 April 2019.
43 Phone conversation with researcher from Conflict Armament Research, 26 June 2019.
including three deaths among humanitarians, were reported, compared with 622 incidents for the same period in 2018, including six deaths.\(^{45}\)

56. In some areas, spontaneous voluntary returns of internally displaced persons have been reported, even though fresh displacement was still occurring. For example, after the signing of a local peace agreement between local leaders from Pombolo and Gambo (Mbomou Prefecture) on 20 March, approximately 5,600 internally displaced persons returned to the area.\(^{46}\) Approximately 90 per cent of those displaced during the FPRC attack on Bakouma of 31 December 2018 (see annex 4.8) had returned by the time of the Panel’s visit to the town (10–12 May 2019).\(^{47}\) The joint presence of FAC/A/MINUSCA, the arrests of several key anti-balaka elements and the reopening of the medical clinic were factors in the return.\(^{48}\)

57. The issue of returns is polarized. Some members of the humanitarian community considered that the Government of the Central African Republic, through its return project (Projet d’appui au retour et à la réintégration en République centrafricaine), was accelerating the return of internally displaced persons to feed its narrative of stabilization ahead of the upcoming elections.\(^{49}\) To illustrate, in Bangassou, the project carried out a series of visits to Bangassou to encourage Muslim internally displaced persons, notwithstanding their reluctance due to feelings of insecurity and lack of shelter, to return to Tokoyo district.\(^{50}\)

**Ongoing violations of international humanitarian law in Ouaka, Basse-Kotto and Haute-Kotto Prefectures**

58. The humanitarian situation in Zangba sub-prefecture (Basse-Kotto Prefecture) clearly illustrated the ongoing negative impact of armed group activities, notwithstanding the Agreement. Since early April, UPC has targeted a number of villages on the Kouango and Mobaye axes causing considerable displacement (see map in annex 4.9).\(^{51}\) On 20 April, groups kidnapped 12 civilians, including 5 children and 6 women, from Yamboro on the Zangba-Mobaye axis.\(^{52}\) In addition to those attacks, new checkpoints were set up by both UPC on the Zangba-Alindao and Zangba-Kouango axes, and by anti-balaka/self-defence groups on the Zangba-Mobaye axis, further restricting the free movement of the population.\(^{53}\)

59. In the same area in April 2019, peacekeepers were targeted by presumed anti-balaka/self-defence groups, wounding one blue helmet.\(^{54}\) Although no peacekeeper deaths from armed group attacks have occurred in the Central African Republic to date in 2019, at least nine other attacks against peacekeepers have been reported.\(^{55}\)


\(^{46}\) Meeting with confidential source, Bangassou, 10 May 2019.

\(^{47}\) The remaining population have in large part stayed in Bangassou, where most of them fled, to finish the school year there. The Panel visit to Bakouma coincided with the start of the World Bank income-generating “Projet Londo” and the World Food Programme (WFP) distribution of food, which also served as an incentive for returns; meeting with the mayor, Bakouma, 10 May 2019, and meeting with the president of the youth association, Bakouma, 11 May 2019.

\(^{48}\) Meeting with anti-balaka local leader, Bangassou, 14 May 2019; meeting with villagers, Bakouma, 10 and 11 May 2019.

\(^{49}\) Meetings with international NGOs, Bangui, 15 and 16 April 2019.

\(^{50}\) Meeting with internally displaced persons site residents and leaders, Bangassou, 13 May 2019.

\(^{51}\) Correspondence with confidential source, 4 June 2019.

\(^{52}\) Idem.

\(^{53}\) Confidential report, 24 May 2019.

\(^{54}\) Confidential report, 29 April 2019.

\(^{55}\) Confidential correspondence, 25 June 2019.
60. Even in those towns where MINUSCA has maintained a permanent presence and where local committees in charge of following up the implementation of the Agreement have been installed, UPC and anti-balaka combatants continued to commit exactions against civilians. For example, in Bambari non-uniformed UPC elements continued to illegally detain civilians. In one example of an arbitrary detention, on 12 April, a male individual was held by UPC fighters in a cell after being accused of theft and was released only after a payment had been made to UPC. In Bria, both the FPRC mixed brigade and the anti-balaka fighters carried out illegal arrests and detentions, notwithstanding the local agreement signed by six armed group leaders, including Thierry Plenga (anti-balaka) and Ali Ousta (FPRC) on 9 April. As time passes, the perception by those armed groups of delays in the USMS operationalization could even trigger additional violence.

61. Annex 4.10 provides further information on ongoing child recruitment by UPC.

D. Trafficking in natural resources

62. Although the export of rough diamonds from the eastern and northern regions of the Central African Republic remained suspended under the Kimberley Process, diamonds (and gold) continued to be exploited in these areas, in large part for the benefit of armed groups, which continued to generate revenue through illegal taxation and, at times, direct participation in trafficking.

63. Fighting for the control of resource-rich areas has continued to take place. Between December 2018 and March 2019, for example, fighters from MPC, UPC and FPRC reinforced their presence in the Bakala area (Ouaka Prefecture), taking over several gold-mining sites previously controlled by anti-balaka elements (see S/2018/729, annex 6.6).

Illicit trafficking in the Bria area: a network of Indian buyers

64. Bria is the centre of the eastern zone of diamond production in the Central African Republic. A significant portion of rough diamonds sourced in the area are purchased by foreign buyers, mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Mali and Mauritania. Since 2016, the following Indian nationals have also travelled to Bria to purchase diamonds: Chirag Gabani (presence confirmed in Bria in September 2016 and April 2017), Dipen Mavani (July and December 2017), Sunil Gadaliya (January 2018), Pravin Chandra Salvaliya (January to March 2018), Mukesh Ramoliya (December 2018 and January 2019) and Dineshbhai Panchabhai Chodvadiya (multiple trips since September 2016).

65. This network of Indian collectors collaborated with Central African nationals who, among other things, facilitated their access to the diamond- and gold-producing...
zones. For example, an unlicensed diamond dealer named Oumar Banga, involved in the trafficking of diamonds from eastern Central African Republic, as confirmed by his activities on social networks (see annex 4.12), accompanied Sunil Gadaliya and Pravin Chandra Salvaliya to Bria in January 2018. Banga also facilitated contact between the Indian buyers and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which included them in their staff list, thereby providing cover for their activities and facilitating their travel in the country. On several occasions, most recently in May 2019, Banga reportedly travelled to India by airplane to transport diamonds bought by some of these individuals.

66. As with all economic operators in Bria, individuals buying diamonds contribute to the funding of armed groups through the payment of illegal taxes to the FPRC parallel administration (S/2018/729, paras. 84–85). In addition, some of the above-mentioned Indian nationals have established strong business connections and engaged in the diamond trade with Bria-based FPRC leaders, in particular with regional commander Damboucha Hissein, whose involvement in trafficking is confirmed by his activities on social networks (see annex 4.13).

67. This is the case of Dineshbhai Panchabhai Chodvadry. While he registered in October 2018 with the official mining administration as a collector residing in Bossembélé (Ombella-Mpoko Prefecture), Chodvadry has actually opened a buying office in Bria called “DPC” (see annex 4.14) and is reportedly protected by FPRC fighters commanded by Hissein Damboucha and has stayed at the latter’s residence. He also reportedly helped families of Bria-based FPRC leaders travel to India for medical purposes. As with Chirag Gabani and Oumar Banga, Chodvadry features in photos, most likely taken in Bria, which were posted on Damboucha’s facebook page between 2016 and 2018 (see annex 4.15).

Seizure of undeclared rough diamonds at Bangui M’Poko International Airport

68. On 7 March, a national staff member from an international NGO was apprehended at Bangui M’Poko International Airport with an envelope containing undeclared rough diamonds hidden among documents (see annex 4.16). The seizure took place upon his arrival on a United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flight from Birao. According to the Ministry of Mines, the value of the 117 stones seized was 46,48 carats, worth between $3,000 and $7,000.

69. Many sources in Birao and Bangui confirmed that the stones belonged to Sélémane Oumar Garba. Garba had arranged with his associates in Birao to have the package transported by the NGO representative, who was unaware of the envelope’s contents, and brought to him in Bangui.

70. In the early years of the crisis, Sélémane Oumar Garba had played an active role within the Séléka coalition (see annex 4.17). He left the armed group in 2015; since then, however, his business activities have continued to be facilitated by his

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64 Idem.
65 Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 16 May 2019, and Douala, 13 June 2019.
66 Meetings with artisanal miner and diamond collectors, Bria, 18–20 January 2019.
67 United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights, operated by WFP, transport staff from the humanitarian community.
68 Meeting with the chief of the Unité spéciale anti-fraude, Bangui, 23 April 2019.
69 Meeting with diamonds experts, Bangui 12 May 2019, and Douala, 13 June 2019.
70 Meeting with community representatives, armed group members and economic operators, Birao, 16 and 17 April 2019.
71 Idem. Meeting with the NGO representative, Bangui, 15 April 2019. Given the challenges of transportation in the Central African Republic (insecurity on roads, limited opportunities and cost of air transportation, etc.), the transport of packages through a third party travelling by air is common practice.
connections with Birao-based FPRC leaders and have contributed to the funding of armed groups. The diamonds seized in Bangui were sourced in the Sam Ouandja area (Vakaga Prefecture), where Garba reportedly owns a mining site and where ex-Séléka factions RPRC and FPRC collect illegal taxes through a mining brigade.\textsuperscript{72}

71. The seizure confirms the need to strengthen controls at Bangui M’Poko International Airport (see S/2017/1023, paras. 158–169). The Panel welcomes efforts undertaken by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, which has provided national security forces based at the airport with tailored training and requested them to screen the luggage of its passengers travelling from diamond-producing areas.

V. Situation in 3R area of influence

A. 3R mass killings in Lemouna, Koundjili and Bohong

72. On 21 May in Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, 3R carried out targeted attacks in Lemouna and Koundjili, killing at least 32 civilians. On the same day, they killed a further nine individuals in Bohong. In Bohong, there had been a series of incidents in surrounding villages in the week ahead of the attack. In Lemouna and Koundjili, two incidents that had targeted Fulani on 17 April and 8 and 9 May appeared to have been the trigger for the attacks (see annex 5.1 for the full chronology of events).

73. The events of 21 May in Koundjili and Lemouna marked the first mass killings since the signing of the Agreement and were also significant because of the nature of the attacks (i.e., 3R fighters identified adult males in the two locations and summarily executed them). The full modus operandi of these targeted attacks is described in annex 5.1. The killings also threatened to spark a resurgence in the activities of local self-defence groups and, although several armed groups condemned the killings (see annex 5.2), fuelled the argument of those in Bangui who are opposed to the Agreement (see para. 32 above).\textsuperscript{73}

74. Under pressure from the Government and international partners, on 24 May, Abbas Sidiki handed over three 3R elements to the national authorities. All three confirmed that they had participated in the killings in Lemouna and Koundjili, which was also substantiated by eyewitnesses.\textsuperscript{74} Those three individuals, however, claimed that they could not be held responsible for the orders to carry out the attacks, thereby pointing at a higher level of responsibility.\textsuperscript{75}

75. On 22 May, Abbas Sidiki confirmed to the Panel that he had sent elements to the villages on the date of the attacks, but he did not admit to having given them orders to commit the killings.\textsuperscript{76} When confronted with the facts, he attempted to explain them by referring to the series of actions committed against Fulani over the course of the previous days.\textsuperscript{77} At the same time, as explained in annex 5.1, while the

\textsuperscript{72} Meeting with armed group leaders, Birao, 17 April 2019.
\textsuperscript{73} On 19 June, in Taley village (70 km south of Paoua), Ouham-Pende Prefecture, a self-defence group was formed to protect the village from a possible 3R attack; confidential report, 20 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{74} Abbas Sidiki handed over three individuals: Issa Salleh “Bozize” (from Kouï), Mahamat Tahir (also from Kouï) and Yauba Ousman (from Ngaoundaye). They all concurred that they had started out from Létélé but their stories also differed as to the roles of each. According to “Bozize”, it was the Létélé comzone who had distributed the roles. Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{75} Hearings of the three individuals, received on 27 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{76} Phone conversation with Abbas Sidiki, 22 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{77} Abbas Sidiki defended his group’s actions in those two locations, as he later did in Bohong, claiming that the national security forces do not adequately protect the Fulani and their herds.
3R attacks were being conducted, official procedures were already under way to bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks against the Fulani.

B. 3R: an accelerated expansion

76. As previously reported by the Panel, the main agenda of 3R is to control cattle-related activities (S/2018/1119, paras. 105–136). On 20 October 2018, an alliance of armed groups, the Rassemblement centrafricain pour la paix, was created under 3R leadership, bringing together most armed groups operating in western Central African Republic. The alliance was based on a tax-sharing agreement through which all groups were supposed to provide protection to herders and their cattle in return for tax payments (see annex 5.3).78

77. As a result of this alliance, transhumance was particularly lucrative for armed groups during the latest season (November 2018-May 2019). With cattle herders expecting better security, their number exceeded pre-crisis statistics.79 While many local conflicts between farmers and herders took place, unlike previous transhumance seasons, no major incidents were reported until those that occurred on 21 May. Prior to that, 3R had made efforts to establish peaceful relations with local populations, including by organizing social events and stopping taxation activities on non-Fulani civilians at their checkpoints.80

78. Since mid-2018, 3R has expanded the territory under its control considerably, having absorbed most of the Siriri elements operating in Mambéré-Kadéi Prefecture (see S/2018/1119, paras. 94–104).81 The armed group has also conducted several joint operations with FDPC and RJ fighters. It also took control of northwest Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, where its fighters established a supply route from Chad (see para. 82 below) and gained control over the area bordering Cameroon.82

79. This rapid expansion prompted 3R to recruit new elements, including from communities not traditionally found within its ranks. The Panel confirmed the presence of a large number of former MPC and MLNC fighters recruited by 3R on the Bouar-Mbéré axis.83 The 3R commzones of Létélé and Ngaoundaye, both non-Fulani and former members of MPC/MNLC,84 were appointed only one week before the mass killings of 21 May. This recruitment strategy explains in part the growing insecurity and distrust that led to the killings in Lemouna, Koundjili and Bohong. Of the three individuals handed over by 3R following the Lemouna/Koundjili killings, two were former MPC fighters who were based in Kaga-Bandoro until 2016–2017.85

80. Annex 5.4 provides further information on 3R activities.

C. 3R arms trafficking and weapons management

81. The revenue collected by 3R directly supported its resupply in weaponry, ammunition, vehicles and logistics.86 3R fighters are fully equipped, wearing military

Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019, and telephone conversation with Sidiki, 22 May 2019.
79 Meeting with confidential source, Bouar, 13 June 2019; meetings with the sultan of Kouï and with Abbas Sidiki, 16 June 2019.
81 Confidential report, 28 February 2019.
83 Idem.
84 Meeting with 3R commzones, Ngaoundaye and Létélé, 16 May 2019.
85 Meeting with armed group members, Kaga Bandoro, 8 June 2019.
uniforms and armed with assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine guns (see annex 5.5). Local authorities, merchants and civilians met by the Panel highlighted that, since November 2018, there had been an acceleration in 3R trafficking activities, mostly at night, of pickups and military equipment coming from the Moundou-Mbaikokoum-Mboum-Bitoye axis in Chad (see map in annex 5.6).

82. Moving on motorcycles and pickup vehicles, 3R fighters often crossed the Chadian border to buy weapons. At times, they also obtained materiel in Mberé and Ngaoundaye from individuals coming from Chad. In both locations, 3R cleared two small side roads to connect with the Mbaibokoum-Bitoye axis directly (see annex 5.7). All trafficking was organized by Abbas Sidiki himself in Koui.88

83. Since mid-November 2018, 3R has acquired at least nine pickups with sheeted loads (see annex 5.8). Machine guns are mounted atop these vehicles once in Koui. Abbas Sidiki has set up in Koui a specific weapons management system, with an arms register and armouries, to which the Panel was given access, for the control and use of weapons and ammunition by his elements (see annex 5.9).

D. **3R and gold trafficking**

84. As with UPC or Siriri (S/2018/1119, paras. 96–100 and 121–136), 3R has gradually developed interests outside the cattle business, in particular in mining activities. Its area of influence includes gold-mining sites on the Niem-Yelewa and on Bocaranga-Bozoum axes. 3R elements rarely take part in trafficking directly but generate revenue through illegal taxation and racketeering.

85. The Panel collected information on individuals coming from Chad who had gained access to gold-mining sites through a deal with the 3R leadership. This is the case in Moundi (Bocaranga-Bozoum axis), where site managers Adam Moussa and Issa Moussa have been allowed to operate and import detection materiel from Chad against the payment of taxes to 3R leaders. Gold produced in this area is then smuggled into Chad or Cameroon.

**VI. Arms embargo and national defence and security forces**

86. The present section features reports on developments related to the implementation of the arms embargo by national authorities and their international partners, and matters linked to the reform of the security sector.

A. **National defence and security forces: training, recruitment, equipment and deployment**

**Forces armées centrafricaines**

*Training*

87. FACA soldiers continued to receive support from European Union Military Training Mission (EUTM) and Russian instructors. As at 1 June, and as detailed in

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87 Idem.
90 Idem.
On 24 June, EUTM, in addition to the training provided to FACA elements in Bangui, also began to train new FACA recruits in Bouar. Russian instructors were present in Bambari, Bangassou, Berengo, Bocaranga, Bouar, Dekoa, Paoua and Sibut to ensure that the skills acquired during their training would be correctly applied by FACA elements who had been deployed (see annex 6.1). In addition, Russian instructors trained the tripartite force in the border town of Umm Rawq, the Sudan (S/2018/1119, para. 175). They were also involved in securing the transport of material from the Sudan into Central African Republic territory (see also S/2018/729, para. 13, and S/2018/1119, para. 176). On 12 February, a convoy escorted by Russian instructors travelled from the border town of Am Dafok through Birao and continued farther south. This convoy was also accompanied by armed FPRC elements. Following instructions from Abdoulaye Hissène, however, FPRC armed elements blocked the entry of other convoys similarly escorted by Russian instructors into Vakaga Prefecture through Am Dafok on 30 December 2018 and on 4 March 2019.

Recruitment

Annex 6.2 provides information on the country-wide recruitment process, the ongoing delays and the action of armed groups preventing recruitment in some prefectures.

Deployment, equipment and cases of misconduct

Since the signing of the Agreement, the Government of the Central African Republic has pursued a policy of rapid FACA deployment that is not always conducive to the garrison army concept, as outlined in the National Defence Plan (S/2017/1023, para. 19). The original concept had provided for the installation of FACA in permanent structures in the four defined defence zones (S/2019/147, para. 41).

With the critical support of MINUSCA and following negotiations with UPC leader Ali Darassa and MPC leader Mahamat Al-Khatim, FACA elements were deployed in Alindao and Kaga Bandoro in February and May 2019, respectively. As of mid-June, 1,500 FACA troops had been deployed in 16 locations outside the capital (see map in annex 6.3 and S/2018/1119, paras. 179–184).

The Government of the Central African Republic and MINUSCA consider that the deployment of new FACA units is necessary in preparation for the future establishment of USMS. This has caused tensions with some armed groups: for example, the FPRC leadership holds the view that the USMS operationalization should precede FACA deployment (see para. 45 above).

FACA deployments have also continued to face significant challenges. First, in most locations, FACA still had insufficient capacity for conducting operations without the support of MINUSCA and/or the Russian instructors. In Alindao, for example,

93 Meeting with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 30 May 2019.
94 Meeting with Abdoulaye Hissène and confidential sources, Birao, 22 and 23 January 2019; telephone conversation with confidential sources, 4 March 2019.
95 Confidential reports, 5 June 2019; as witnessed by the Panel in Alindao, Bambari, Bangassou, Bocaranga, Bouar, Kaga Bandoro and Paoua, 1 January to 15 June 2019.
96 Meeting with national authorities and international partners, Bangui, 6–17 June 2019.
97 Confidential report, 8 May 2019.
FACA soldiers could not conduct patrols alone owing to the persistent threat posed by UPC elements. In addition, in Kaga Bandoro, some 60 MINUSCA peacekeepers protected the FACA base against potential attacks by armed groups. Furthermore, FACA soldiers continued to face serious logistical challenges, including deficient fuel supplies, a lack of communication material, a lack of proper housing, food and water, substantive delays in rotations and daily subsistence allowance payments, and a lack of weapons storage facilities (see annex 6.4). Lastly, the poor logistic arrangements and living conditions, combined with a weak chain of command, resulted in numerous cases of misconduct, including physical assaults against civilians and fellow FACA soldiers, and illegal taxation (see annex 6.5).

**Internal security forces**

94. Annex 6.6 provides information on the recruitment, training, equipment, redeployment and conduct of internal security forces.

**Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry**

95. The Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry, an anti-crime unit, continued to be involved in serious human rights abuses in Bangui, as reported by the Panel in 2016 (S/2016/694, paras. 38–41). The Panel obtained evidence that, on 23 March, the Office branch at 92 logements (6th district of Bangui) had carried out cruel and degrading treatment of a Muslim detainee with the full knowledge and participation of the commissioner of that branch (see annex 6.7). On 11 June, magistrates and judges also released an official declaration in which they threatened to stop collaborating with the Office and denounced its aggressive behaviour towards them.

96. On 15 June, officers with the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry also arrested and physically abused two officially accredited Agence France Presse journalists and used live rounds to disperse the rally organized by FUDN (see para. 34 above).

**B. Importation of commercial explosives: position regarding the arms embargo and inappropriate storage standards**

97. In 2017, 2018 and 2019, the Central African Republic Ministries of Public Works, Mines, Defence and Foreign Affairs issued documents that permitted foreign and national companies active in the mining and road infrastructure industries to buy, import, transport, store and use significant quantities of commercial explosives and accessories, including detonators, in the country (see annex 6.8).

98. For example, the National Equipment Office, together with Sogea Satom and Thien Pao companies, were authorized to import at least 65 tonnes of commercial explosives and accessories (see annex 6.8). The authorizations stipulate that the importing companies shall arrange for, and are accountable for, the convoys, storage,
guarding and safe usage of the explosives. The explosive substances referred to in the various authorization documents have been acquired from and delivered by several companies in Cameroon, the Congo and France by air and by road (see annex 6.8).

99. In terms of explosive safety, the Panel finds that the storage sites for the explosive substances bought by Sogea Satom and the National Equipment Office did not comply with the recommendations contained within the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (see annex 6.8), putting the civilian population at significant risk of fatality or injury, MINUSCA staff and troops (Bouar) and FACA soldiers (Bouar and Bangui M’Poko International Airport), should there be an undesirable explosive event. 103

100. In terms of explosive security, the Panel finds that relevant recommendations of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines have also not been met, presenting a high risk of loss, theft and the diversion of commercial explosive materials to armed groups.

101. The Panel continues to investigate, in cooperation with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, the position of commercial explosives and accessories, which are essential for civil engineering projects and infrastructure development, vis-à-vis the sanctions measures.

VII. Update on issues related to the Kimberley Process

A. Diamond trade and trafficking in western Central African Republic

102. In 2019, as at 15 June, the Central African Republic had exported 10,789 carats of rough diamonds from the five sub-prefectures declared as “compliant” under the Kimberley Process (Berberati, Boda, Carnot, Gadzi and Nola). 104 Although superior to the amount recorded at the same time in 2018, that figure captured only a small portion of the current diamond production in those areas, which is estimated to be some 160,000 carats annually. 105

103. The Government has recently taken a series of coercive measures that will contribute to the efforts to combat trafficking (see annex 7.1), including the threat of licence withdrawal for buying houses not reaching a minimal threshold of legal exports. In the Panel’s view, efforts should also be made to support buying houses that continued to face unfair competition from collectors smuggling most of the diamonds sourced in the west in quasi-total impunity (S/2018/1119, para. 144). 106 A reform of the taxes applying to buying houses or of the export clearance process established under the Kimberley Process could, in this sense, be considered.

104. In November 2018, the Government of the Central African Republic had proposed the addition of nine new sub-prefectures to the five already declared as “Kimberley Process compliant”. In May, the Kimberley Process monitoring team decided that three of the nine sub-prefectures (Boganangone, Bagandou and Mbaïki) – met the three criteria defined in the 2015 Kimberley Process Administrative Decision on the Central African Republic (State presence, absence of the systematic

103 Confidential document, 31 May 2019, and Panel visit to storage area, Bangui, 12 and 13 June 2019.
104 Central African Republic official data.
105 www.researchgate.net/publication/333223352_Diamond_Mining_and_Conflict_in_the_Central_African_Republic (accessed on 1 June 2019).
106 Under the Mining Code, collectors shall sell diamonds to buying houses, which then export the goods.
presence of armed groups and freedom of movement). This should contribute to increasing the country’s official diamond exports.

B. Situation in the “green zones” of Carnot and Gadzi

105. In January 2019, the Carnot area experienced its most serious outbreak of violence in several years. An attack against Fulani herders in Zaorossango (40 km north-west of Carnot, sub-prefecture of Gadzi) on 2 January provoked two reprisal actions by 3R fighters several days later. The 3R attacks were followed by a further retaliatory act on 20 January, when members of the Muslim community of Carnot were the victims of targeted attacks by (former) anti-balaka fighters. An estimated 20 to 30 individuals were killed during that series of incidents. While such events demonstrated the determination of 3R to protect Fulanis even outside its area of influence, the armed group has not established a permanent presence in the zone.

106. The sub-prefectures of Carnot and Gadzi continued to meet the three criteria defined in the Kimberley Process operational framework. The targeted attacks of 20 January against Muslims, however, illustrated tensions remaining in Carnot. While many Muslims have returned to town, they still have limited access to some neighbourhoods. The criminal network involved in those attacks was composed of (former) anti-balaka elements regularly involved in cases of harassment and racketeering against members of the Muslim community, especially economic operators and diamond collectors. Its leaders, in particular François Kpombo, alias “B13”, have continued to act with impunity thanks to their connections with local internal security forces (see annex 7.2). They also benefited from the support of economic operators attempting to preserve their interests developed at the expense of Muslims exiled during the crisis.

VIII. Information on sanctioned individuals

A. Freezing of assets of Alfred Yékatom

107. An official from the Banque sahélo-saharienne pour l’investissement et le commerce informed the Panel that, following the transfer of Alfred Yékatom to the International Criminal Court in The Hague on 17 November 2018 and, at the request of the Public Prosecutor of Bangui, the bank had frozen his accounts (see S/2018/1119, para. 204, for information on his assets).108

108. The Public Prosecutor, however, has yet to provide banking institutions with a generic instruction to implement the asset freeze against all individuals and entities placed on the Sanctions Committee’s sanctions list, notwithstanding two recent letters on this matter from the Chair of the Committee and the Panel, respectively, on 17 December 2018 and 12 June 2019.

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108 Confidential reports, 3 and 21 January 2019.
110 Meetings with Banque sahélo-saharienne pour l’investissement et le commerce staff, Bangui, 23 January and 17 May 2019.
B. Arrest of Haroun Gaye in Chad

109. In October 2018, Haroun Gaye was arrested in Chad and thereafter reportedly detained in Sahr, Chad.\textsuperscript{111} He had gone to Chad upon instructions from the FPRC leadership, reportedly to recruit elements in refugee camps in the border area.\textsuperscript{112} He returned to the Central African Republic in March and then established himself in Ndélé to work with Abdoulaye Hissène, as observed by the Panel on 6 June. The Government of Chad has yet to provide a response to the Panel’s letter of 17 January requesting additional information concerning his detention.

C. Chadian identity card of Abdoulaye Hissène

110. On 22 February, the Panel obtained a copy of a Chadian national identity card issued in Ndjamena on 21 April 2009 for Abdoulaye Hissène (see annex 8.1). On 8 April, the Panel informed Chad of the identity card and requested the Chadian authorities to provide any additional information in that regard. (The expiry date of the card was 21 April 2019.) Chad has yet to provide a response. On 18 April, the Sanctions Committee updated the sanctions list entry for this individual, including information contained in the above-mentioned national identity card.

IX. Recommendations

111. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Remind States neighbouring the Central African Republic of the provisions of paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 2454 (2019), by which the Council urged Members States to ensure unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites, for the Panel, and call upon Member States to provide responses to letters from the Panel, including requests for information and proposals for official visits, in order for the Panel to execute its mandate (see paras. 5, 109 and 110 above);

(b) Welcome the initiative of the Governments of the Central African Republic and Cameroon to convene the twelfth joint commission in May 2019, and encourage other countries neighbouring the Central African Republic to activate or (re)activate joint commissions in support to the implementation of the Agreement (see paras. 35–37 above);

(c) Call upon the Government of the Central African Republic, as well as foreign and national companies using commercial explosives and accessories on the Central African Republic territory, to take all measures to ensure the proper and safe storage, management and custody of explosive materials and accessories (see paras. 99–100 above).

\textsuperscript{111} Meeting with FPRC members, Bangui, 20 January 2019.
\textsuperscript{112} Idem.
Annexes

Annexes to the midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2454 (2019)

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Annex 2.1: Communiqués of armed groups and opposition political parties requesting a Government reshuffle.

Documents obtained by the Panel from armed group members and opposition political parties, 3-8 March 2019.
COMMUNIQUÉ

L’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), à travers la voix de son Coordinateur Militaire, Chef d’État-major de l’UPC, le Général de Corps d’Armées Ali DARRASSA, a tous comme l’opinion nation et Internationale, pris connaissance du nouveau Gouvernement formé par le Président de la République, à la suite de l’Accord de Khartoum.

Le Chef de l’État-major de l’UPC, le Général de Corps d’Armées Ali DARRASSA tient à rappeler, devant l’opinion Nationale et Internationale, qu’il est resté jusqu’à maintenant dans l’esprit de la Paix et du retour à la cohésion Nationale qui a animé les pourparlers de Khartoum. Il l’a montré en acceptant des décisions du Président de la République qui étaient pourtant prises unilatéralement en violation de l’esprit de l’Accord telles que par exemple :

- L’adoption unilatérale de décret d’application de l’accord sans rechercher le consensus, ou encore la nomination d’un Chef du Gouvernement sans consultation préalable des autres parties à l’Accord.

L’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), à travers la voix de son coordinateur Militaire, Chef d’État-major de l’UPC, le Général de Corps d’Armées Ali DARRASSA constate que la formation du nouveau Gouvernement, dont la composition vient d’être rendue publique, se situe dans la même ligne.

Chacun peut en effet constater qu’il ne s’agit en aucun cas du Gouvernement inclusif qui a été voulu pour la paix et la réconciliation, qui devrait comprendre non seulement les représentants des Groupes Armées, mais aussi toutes les autres composantes essentielles de la Nation Centrafricaine.

Avec cette succession d’actes, force est de constater que le Président de la République, qui a pourtant proclamé tout son attachement au processus de Khartoum et qui est signataire de cet Accord, n’a pas la volonté d’appliquer l’Accord de bonne foi, et donc d’œuvrer véritablement au retour de la Paix dans le Pays, à la réconciliation entre les Centrafricains et à la tranquillité dans toutes nos provinces.

Dans ces conditions, l’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UCP), à travers la voix de son coordinateur Militaire, Chef d’État-major de l’UPC, le Général de Corps d’Armées Ali DARRASSA se voit obligé de considérer que l’Accord de Khartoum est désormais menacé si le Gouvernement ne montre pas très clairement un changement d’attitude.

Vive la RCA apaisée, vive la Paix.

Fait à Gbokolobo, 04 Mars 2019

Le Coordinateur Militaire, chef d’état-major de l’UPC

Tél : 75 67 70 46 – 72 48 25 12
Le format de cette lettre est un document officiel et authentique de l’UPC. Tout autre modèle est un faux.
FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE

BUREAU EXÉCUTIF NATIONAL
PRÉSIDENCE
N° 0002/FPRC/GEN/19

COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

Par le Décret n° 19.063, le Président de la République, Chef de l’Etat, sur proposition du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement, nomme et confirme les membres du gouvernement :

Le Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) informe l’opinion publique nationale et internationale que, en ne respectant pas ses engagements et les clauses des discussions qui ont suivies la signature de l’Accord de Khartoum, ainsi que la désignation de Monsieur Firmin Ngrébada au poste de Premier Ministre, Monsieur Faustin Archange Touadéra et son nouveau Premier Ministre manquent l’occasion d’ouvrir pour la paix en Centrafrique, mais encore font preuve de mauvaise foi d’amateurisme et d’incompétence. En jouant au “on reprend les mêmes et on recommence”, le Président de la République et le Premier Ministre vient d’ouvrir dans l’œil l’espoir du peuple centrafricain à l’Accord de Paix de Khartoum, car cet “ancien nouveau gouvernement” vient d’être mis en place ne que ce que Albert Einstein souligne : “la folie s’est de nouveau comporter de la même manière et s’attendre les résultats différents” (Albert Einstein).

En effet, c’est avec un grand regret que le Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) informe aux centrafricaines et centrafricains, ainsi qu’à la communauté internationale que, dans les conditions actuelles, le FPRC ne participera pas à ce gouvernement de mascarade.

Le Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) réitère ses remerciements à la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale, de l’Union Africaine, de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, les pays amis de la République Centrafricaine pour leur mobilisation et les efforts consentis en vue de rétablissement de la paix en République Centrafricaine. Le Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) remercie également les organisations internationales, au-devant desquelles se trouvent les Organisations Non Gouvernementales, nationales et internationales, pour l’aide et la solidarité envers le peuple centrafricain sans aucune distinction.

Fait à Birao, le 03 mars 2019

Président du FPRC

Général Nicomidine ADAM
MOUVEMENT PATRIOTIQUE POUR LA CENTRAFRIQUE

MPC

PAIX UNITE LIBERTE

DÉCLARATION RELATIVE À LA MISE EN PLACE DU NOUVEAU GOUVERNEMENT ET À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE L’ACCORD DE KHARTOUM

Le Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) a, tout comme l’opinion nationale et internationale, pris connaissance du nouveau Gouvernement formé par le Président de la République, son Excellence le professeur Faustin Archange Touadéra, à la suite de l’accord de Khartoum.

Le MPC tient à rappeler, devant l’opinion nationale et internationale, qu’il est resté jusqu’à maintenant dans l’esprit de la paix et du retour à la cohésion nationale qui a animé les pourparlers de Khartoum. Il l’a montré en acceptant des actes du président de la république qui était pourtant pris en violation de l’Accord, tels que par exemple l’adoption unilatérale de décrets d’application de l’Accord sans rechercher le consensus, ou encore la nomination d’un chef du gouvernement sans consultation préalable des autres parties de l’Accord.

Le MPC constate que la formation du nouveau Gouvernement, dont la composition vient d’être rendue publique, se situe dans la même ligne. Chacun peut en effet constater qu’il ne s’agit en aucun cas du Gouvernement inclusif qui a été voulu pour la paix et la réconciliation, qui devrait comprendre non seulement les représentants des groupes armés, mais aussi toutes les autres composantes essentielles de la nation centrafricaine.

Avec cette succession d’actes, force est de constater que le Président de la République, qui a pourtant dit tout son attachement au processus de Khartoum et qui est signataire de cet Accord, n’a pas la volonté d’appliquer l’Accord de bonne foi,
Mercredi le 06 mars 2019

Le mouvement dénonce la composition du gouvernement qui vient d’être mis sur place qui ne respecte pas le principe de l’inclusivité de quatorze mouvements signataires de l’accord, des minorités ethnique et religieuse du pays.

Ceci constitue une violation flagrante de cet accord ; nous demandons au gouvernement de revoir sa vision d’application de l’accord et de le faire de bonne foi pour l’intérêt suprême de la nation centrafricaine.

Nous demandons au gouvernement de corriger ces erreurs dans les quarante huit heures qui suivent au cas contraire, il serait responsable de ce qui adviendra.

Aux garants, nous demandons de redoubler de vigilance et d’accroître le suivi pour cet accord qui a suscité tant d’espoir pour le peuple centrafricain pour qu’il ne soit pas un énième accord.

Si nous ne parvenons pas à résoudre ces situations, elles risquent de générer des conséquences incalculables pour le peuple qui a tant souffert et qui n’aspire qu’à la paix.

LE PRÉSIDENT DU MOUVEMENT 3R

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 22 March 2019.
3. Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l’Entretien Routier :
   Monsieur GUISMALA HAMZA

4. Ministre du Développement de l’Energie et des Ressources Hydrauliques :
   Monsieur Herbert Gotran DJONO AHABA

5. Ministre de la Défense Nationale et de la Reconstruction de l’Armée :
   Madame Marie-Noëlle KOYARA

6. Ministre de la Justice, des Droits de l’Homme, Garde des Sceaux :
   Monsieur Flavien MBATA

7. Ministre chargé du Désarmement, Délocalisation, Réintégration et Rapatriement :
   Monsieur Maxime MOKOM

8. Ministre des Transports et de l’Aviation Civile :
   Monsieur Arnaud DJOUBAYE-ABAZENE

9. Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et des Centrafricains de l’Etranger :
   Madame Sylvie BAIPO TEMON

10. Ministre de l’Intérieur chargé de la Sécurité Publique :
   Général de Brigade Henri WANZET LINGUISSARA

11. Ministre du Commerce et de l’Industrie :
    Monsieur Mahamat TAÏB YACOUB

12. Ministre des Mines et de la Géologie :
    Monsieur Léopold MBOLI FATRANE

13. Ministre de l’Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation :
    Monsieur Augustin YANGANA-YAHOTE
14. Ministre de la Santé et de la Population :
   Monsieur Pierre SOMSE

15. Ministre de l’Elevage et de la Santé Animale :
   Monsieur Amadou BI ALIOU

16. Ministre de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rural :
   Monsieur Honoré FEIZCURE

17. Ministre des Postes et Télécommunications :
   Monsieur Justin GOURNA ZACKO

18. Ministre de la Communication et des Media, Porte-Parole du Gouvernement :
   Monsieur Ange Maxime KAZAGUI

19. Ministre des Eaux, Forêts, Chasse et Pêche :
   Monsieur Ami IDRIss

20. Ministre de l’Enseignement Primaire et Secondaire :
   Monsieur MOUKADAS NOURE

21. Ministre de l’Action Humanitaire et de la Réconciliation Nationale :
   Madame Virginie BAIKOUA

22. Ministre de l’Enseignement Supérieur :
   Monsieur Jean-Jacques SANZE

23. Ministre de la Recherche Scientifique et de l’Innovation Technologique :
   Madame Ginette AMARA

24. Ministre de l’Environnement et du Développement Durable :
   Monsieur Thierry KAMACH
25. Ministre du Travail, de l'Emploi, de la Protection Sociale et de la Formation Professionnelle :
   Monsieur Hugues TCHEMEUNI

26. Ministre de la Modernisation de l'Administration et de l'Innovation du Service Public :
   Monsieur Martin KOUMTAMADJI

27. Ministre de la Fonction Publique :
   Monsieur Jean Christophe INGUNZA

28. Ministre de la Promotion de la Femme, de la Famille et de la Protection de l'Enfant :
   Madame Aline Gisèle PANA

29. Ministre de l'Enseignement Technique et de l'Alphabétisation :
   Monsieur SOULEYMANE DAOUDA

30. Ministre chargé du Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement :
   Monsieur Maxime BALALOU

31. Ministre de la Jeunesse et des Sports :
   Monsieur Régis Noel DOUNDA

32. Ministre des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises, de l'Artisanat et du Secteur Informel :
   Monsieur MACOULOU D MOUSSA TERAB

33. Ministre chargé des Relations avec les Institutions de la République :
   Madame Eugénie NGBONDO

34. Ministre des Arts, de la Culture et du Tourisme :
   Monsieur Diouf ABDULLA KAMATE

35. Ministre de l'Urbanisme, de la Ville et de l'Habitat :
   Madame Gina LAWSON ROCSALEN
II. MINISTRES DELEGUES

36. Ministre Délégué auprès du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Centrafricains de l’Étranger, chargé de la Francophonie et du Protocole d’État :
Monsieur Chancel SEKODE NDEUGBAYI

37. Ministre Délégué auprès du Ministre de l’Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation, chargé du Développement Local :
Monsieur Issa Bi AMADOU

38. Ministre Délégué auprès du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement chargé des Relations avec les Groupes Armés :
Monsieur Gilber TOUMOU DEYA

39. Ministre Délégué auprès du Ministre du Désarmement, Démobilisation, Réintégration et Rapatriement :
Colonel Bienvenu SELESSON

Article 2 : Le présent Décret qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 22 mars 2019

Pr. Faustin Archange TOUADERA
Annex 2.3: List of armed group members appointed to the Government or to official positions.

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Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 12 May 2019.
Annex 2.5: FPRC communiqué signed on 30 April 2019 appointing local leaders in Kaga-Bandoro.

The communiqué was signed by Nourredine Adam but was the result of Abdoulaye Hissène’s initiative. Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 9 June 2019.

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**DECISION N**

**PORTANT NOMINATION D’UN OFFICIER SUPERIEUR**

**LE VICE-PRESIDENT**

Vu : Les Décisions de l’Assemblée Générale des 05, 06, et 07 Juillet 2014 tenue à Birao ; Portant création du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique ;
Vu : La Décision du 30 Mars 2018 Portant Nomination d’un Coordonnateur General ; Conformément au respect des dispositions de l’Accord de Paix

**DÉCIDE**

Art 1 Général : IBRAHIM CHARFADINE CMAT TITULAIRE
Général : KADER HASSAN CMAT ADJOINT

Ils ont été nommés dans les régions de la KEMO, de la NANA-GRIBIZI, de l’OUHAM et de l’OUHAM-PENDE avec résidence à KAGA-BANDORO

Art 2 : La présente décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée, publiée et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Ndele le 30 Avril 2019
Le 1er Vice-Président

GL Nourreddine ADAM

**Améliorations**
- Bureau Exécutif National
- Coordination Général
- MINUSCA
- Autorités Administratives
- Intéressé
- Archive
Annex 2.6: Appointment of armed group leaders as special advisers to the Prime Minister.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 24 March 2019.
C/ CONSEILLERS SPECIAUX
- CONSEILLER SPECIAL CHARGE DES RELATIONS AVEC LE MONDE ARABE :
  Monsieur AMADAMA CHAIBOU
- CONSEILLER MILITAIRE EN CHARGE DES UNITES SPECIALES MIXTES DE SECURITE POUR LA ZONE NORD-OUEST
  Monsieur BI SIDI SOULEYMANE
- CONSEILLER MILITAIRE EN CHARGE DES UNITES SPECIALES MIXTES DE SECURITE POUR LA ZONE CENTRE-NORD
  Monsieur ALKATIM MAHAMAT
- CONSEILLER MILITAIRE EN CHARGE DES UNITES SPECIALES MIXTES DE SECURITE POUR LA ZONE NORD-EST
  Monsieur ALI DARASSA

D/ CONSEILLERS
- CONSEILLER CHARGE DES UNITES SPECIALES MIXTES DE SECURITE
  Monsieur Ghislain BRIA
- CONSEILLER CHARGE DU DEVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE
  Monsieur AMLAS AROUN

E/ CHARGES DE MISSION
- CHARGE DE MISSION POUR LA PROMOTION DES PETITES ET MOYENNES ENTREPRISES
  Monsieur Simon-Pierre PASSI-INGAM
- CHARGE DE MISSION EN MATIERE DE L'ACTION HUMANITAIRE
  Monsieur Thierry Cyprien MPONDO
- CHARGE DE MISSION EN MATIERE DE L'HYDRAULIQUE ET DE L'ENERGIE RENOUVELABLE
  Monsieur IDRISS AMADOU MALOUM
Article 2 : Les Conseillers Spéciaux ont rang et prérogatives de Ministres Délégues.

Article 3 : Le présent Décret qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

fait à Bangui, le 24 mars 2019

LE PREMIER MINISTRE,
CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT DU CENTRAFRICAINE

Firmin Ngrebada

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
CHEF DE L’ETAT

Pr Faustin Archange Touadera
Annex 2.7: Further information on RPRC, a rejected leadership and a new splinter group.

RPRC is a Goula-dominated group mainly present in the Vakaga and Haute-Kotto prefectures. In the aftermath of the signing of the Peace Agreement, tensions emerged between its President Djono Ahaba and RPRC military leaders (“generals” Azor Kalite, Arda Hakouma, and Issa Issaka Aubin). The latter had traditionally supported Djono Ahaba, considering that he had the potential to become a major political figure and possibly Prime Minister.

At the Addis Ababa talks of 18 March 2019, Djono Ahaba played a pivotal role in convincing (including with bribes) several armed group representatives to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Ngrebada (see below document 1). While this move helped Djono Ahaba recover his former position as Minister of Energy and Hydrocarbon in the Government which was appointed on 22 March 2019, the outcome of the talks left the RPRC “generals” unsatisfied. During a gathering of RPRC leaders in Ouadda (Haute-Kotto prefecture) on 15 April 2019, which Djono Ahaba did not attend, these leaders complained about their absence at both the Khartoum and the Addis Ababa talks and accused the RPRC president of using the military branch as a political tool for his personal interests.

As a result, on 28 May 2019, former RPRC “general” Issa Issaka Aubin published a communiqué creating the Parti pour le Rassemblement de la Nation Centrafricaine (PRNC) and naming Nourd Gregaza, unknown on the Central African political scene, as the president of this new group (see below document 2). This declaration was aimed at undermining the RPRC’s military power and replacing the group with a new structure, thereby manoeuvring the “generals” into the political arena and enabling them to promote their own agenda.

Several questions which will affect the PRNC’s capacity to endure remain unanswered. First, the position of Zakaria Damane, the RPRC’s main leader, is not yet known, as he has not yet officially reacted to the emergence of the new group; Damane is particularly influential in the Ouadda area where he generates significant revenues through the exploitation of diamond mines. Another challenge is that the CAR Government is unlikely to accept the participation of a new armed group in the political process. If this is the case, and the PRNC is not accepted, then the group could be tempted to assert control over the RPRC or engage in a military operation to force the Government or the international community to engage with it.

114 Meeting with RPRC representative, Birao, 17 April 2019; meeting with RPRC representative, Bangui, 19 April 2019.

Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group representative on 18 March 2019.

Communiqué conjoint des 14 groupes Armés (Addis-Abeba)

A l'entame des discussions d'Addis-Abeba, les groupes armés annoncent, ensemble à déclarer ce qui suit:

De prime abord, féliciter et remercier les garants de l'accord de Khartoum, pour avoir contribué de façon constante et acharnée au succès de ces travaux, savoir d'une manière particulière, l'OMS, l'ONU, les USA, la FRANCE, et la RUSSIE pour leurs remarquables contributions à la résolution de la crise qui connaît notre pays la République Centrafricaine.

De plus, nous reconnaissons leurs spéculatifs en référence à l'article 34 dudit accord, qui prévoit l'impôt des Garants et facilitateurs en cas de trêve en vue d'une action globale de conciliation.

Notre présence dans cette réunion, s'explique par la volonté de tous et dans un esprit constructif.
Nous formons par conséquent, le voeu, le plus ardent que cette rencontre débouche sur un résultat positif pour la paix, la réconciliation et la sécurité des populations centrafricaines qui ont tant souffert.

En effet depuis la signature de Khartoum, les groupes armés ont adopté une posture positive.
Selon les récentes décisions prises par le chef de l'État, le professeur Faustin Archange Touadera, l'ont été sans consultation suffisante au près des groupes armés.

D'une part, le choix du premier ministre et la formation gouvernementale NGABADA en sont les exemples flagrants.

D'autre part, l'écoulement des 40 jours du calendrier de mise en œuvre prévu par l'annexe de l'accord est presque ou moins épousé.
A ce jour, aucune campagne de sensibilisation n'est organisée, les structures de mise en œuvre créer mais non constituées, et les groupes de travail. Ces réalités prévues par l'Accord sont aussi loin d'être réalisées.

Si l'on devait s'en tenir à ces différents constats, on aurait pu dire que l'accord de Khartoum est objectivement mort-né ou caduc et enterrer des conséquences. NON !
Les 14 groupes restent prêts pour la recherche de la paix, seule et unique voie d'une véritable sortie de crise en Centrafrique.

Les 14 groupes considèrent qu'accord est toujours valable, au detriment d'un gouvernement mort-né.

Les 14 groupes estiment que pour des avancées réel, il est souhaitable que la lecture de ce mini bilan inclut la bonne foi des interlocuteurs sur de réel centre d'intérêt.

En définitive, les 14 groupes estiment aussi que M. Firmin NGABADA n'est plus crédible, il ne fait donc plus office de notre interlocuteur pour la suite du processus et doit être remplacé aux fonctions de premier ministre. De ce fait, les 14 groupes exigent la formation d'un gouvernement d'union nationale.
En marge du panel de facilitation, les 14 groupes souhaiteraient désormais discuter directement avec le Président de la république, tel que l’a signifié M. GIEBADA dans l’une de ses interventions, il est le seul décideur.

Faite à Addis-Abeba le 18/03/2019
Ont signé :

UPC
Ali DARASS H.

MPC
Abdoul Bomba

FPRC

Grahm Bono ABA BAYA
3R Si Di’Ki’ A BASS

BALAKA MOHOM

MLCI
Gilbert Touré Eley

FDPC

MINTAMADJI - ABDOULAYE MUSKHE

BALAKA NGISSONA

SELLEKA RENOVÉ

A Li. Issa
## Liste des Officiers du PRNC suivants:

### Liste des Généraux

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### Liste des Colonels

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Signé par le Général

Issa Isanaka Aubin
Annex 2.8: Confrontation between the Government and the FDPC.

The FDPC is a small armed group (around 50 fighters) which, until 5 April 2018, essentially controlled a checkpoint in Zoukombo (Nana-Mambéré prefecture), where illegal taxes were collected (see S/2019/608S/2016/1032, paras. 218-222S/2019/608). As a result of the Khartoum and Addis Ababa talks, Martin Koumtamadji, alias Abdoulaye Miskine, the leader of the FDPC based in Brazzaville (Republic of the Congo), was appointed to the CAR Government as Minister for the Modernization of the Administration and Innovation of the Public Service, while three other FDPC affiliates were appointed to lower-level official positions. Miskine has to date refused to take office in the belief that he should instead be given a senior military position at army headquarters. 115 In several communiqués (see below document 1), Miskine has accused the Government of violating the Agreement by targeting the FDPC’s positions and illegally acquiring weapons. The Panel was unable to find any evidence to support this claim. Growing tensions between Miskine and the Government have resulted in FDPC elements, under direct instruction from Abdoulaye Miskine, perpetrating attacks against civilians, local authorities and MINUSCA peacekeepers. 116

On 5 April 2019, at Zoukombo, MINUSCA conducted a military operation in order to recover 11 Government-owned vehicles that had been taken by the FDPC on 3 March. FDPC combatants fired at MINUSCA soldiers who then returned fire, resulting in five FDPC fighters killed and forcing the group to leave its position in Zoukombo. 117 The FDPC remaining elements then dispersed, targeting villages and racketeering civilians for supplies around Zoukombo. As of 25 June 2019, the FDPC elements had regrouped and accepted to enter the DDRR programme. However, the FDPC leader Abdoulaye Miskine had yet to officially commit to implementing the Agreement.

On 20 June 2019, Miskine travelled to Birao (Vakaga prefecture) to hold a meeting with some FPRC leaders, including Bashar Fadoul. Pictures and a video from that meeting were circulated (see documents 2 below). In one picture, Abdoulaye Miskine appears in full military uniform, surrounded by well-armed individuals, pointing at a location on the map around the Zoukombo area. On the video, Abdoulaye Miskine presents himself as a commander reviewing his troops. Even though no official declaration was made by Miskine after the release of the video and pictures, this move was aimed at coercing the Government to meet his demands. The underlying message of the audio-visual propaganda material was that Miskine is ready to oppose the Government, by force.

115 Meeting with armed group representatives in contact with Abdoulaye Miskine, Bangui, 19-23 April 2019.
116 Confidential reports, 6 and 24 April 2019.
117 Confidential report, 6 April 2019.
if necessary, if his demands are not met. In fact, the troops seen in the pictures and video are FPRC elements not under Miskine’s command.\textsuperscript{118} As happened in January 2018 with the Congolese rebel John Tshibangu (S/2018/1119/para 53), some FPRC elements were made available to Miskine for him to put on a visual show of strength.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{118} Phone conversation with armed group representative based in Birao, 22 June 2019.
\end{footnotesize}
Deux conducteurs professionnels de nationalités camerounaise et centrafricaine sont protégés par l’État major général suite à un incident qui s’est produit sur route traversant la zone sous contrôle du FDPC. Les deux conducteurs transportaient d’importants équipements et matériels militaires pour le compte du gouvernement centrafricain en violation des résolutions des Nations Unies et des accords de paix de KARThOUM sans oublier les Assises d’Addis-Abeba.

Le régime du Président TOUADERA a une fois de plus ordonné en représailles l’arrestation de Jean Rock SOBI. Opérateur économique habitant à BANGUI, il est placé en détention arbitraire et d’une femme qui, sera libérée. Tout ceci dans un contexte de cacophonie orchestrée au sommet de l’État sur le caractère supranational ou non des accords de KARThOUM dont le seul but est de distraire l’opinion nationale et internationale sur les enjeux et défis de la paix. Toute cette campagne de communication emprunte de subjectivité regrettable et Indigne de la Présidence de la République minimisant les signatures des Hauts représentants des institutions de l’Union Africaine et des Nations Unies à l’initiative des accords de KARThOUM, démontre une fois de plus à suffisance les limites intellectuelles dont excelle le régime au détriment des vraies actions de développement et de paix.

Dans son communiqué du 20 Avril 2019, l’État major général suite aux ignobles attaques du 05 avril 2019 avait pris ses responsabilités légitimes dans la protection des populations civiles et aussi des hommes et femmes qui luttent depuis pour la démocratie et la défense de la souveraineté nationale. Il a fait aussi pour sécuriser la zone sous son contrôle dès ce dernier incident et, aussi prévenir la logique guerrière du gouvernement.

L’État major réaffirme son soutien au Général KOUNTCHADJI Martin alias Abdoulaye Miskine Président du FDPC et signataire des accords de KARThOUM. Cependant il ne peut rester inerte et attirer son attention quand au comportement anti-républicain du gouvernement.

En conséquence l’État major condamne avec la dernière rigueur la haute trahison du gouvernement centrafricain dans sa méthode à s’approvisionner en armes par des réseaux mafieux.

- Demande instamment la libération immédiate de
- 1/ NGABA arrêté arbitrairement cinq jours après les attaques du 05 avril 2019 alors qu’il était en son suite à un accident de motocyclette
- 2/ M. Jean Rock SOBI personnalité préposée par le FDPC dans sa liste aux fins nominations à des fonctions dans le cadre des discussions de KARThOUM
- 3/ Hassan Dondeye arrêté et détenus au Cameroun sur ordre du gouvernement centrafricain

Par ailleurs l’État major dément formellement les allégations mensongères du gouvernement centrafricain faisant état des demandes de caution pour la libération des deux conducteurs convoyeurs de matériels militaires.

En outre l’État major demande au Président de la République d’user de sa responsabilité en tant que signataire des accords de KARThOUM pour mettre fin à la logique guerrière du gouvernement centrafricain au quel cas il entend durcir sa position et les conséquences sont de sa seule responsabilité.
Document 2: Pictures and screenshots from the video released after the meeting between Abdoulaye Miskine and FPRC leaders.

*Picture of Abdoulaye Miskine meeting with Bashar Fadoul, one of Nourredine Adam’s close associates and member of the FPRC leadership. Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 22 June 2019.*
Picture of Abdoulaye Miskine pointing at Zoukombo. Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 22 June 2019.

Screenshot of the video featuring Abdoulaye Miskine and Bashar Fadoul reviewing troops. Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 22 June 2019.
Annex 2.9: GTSC call for demonstration against the Government.

*Document obtained by the Panel from a GTSC member on 10 April 2019.*

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**Appel à la manifestation populaire du Groupe de Travail de la Société Civile sur la Crise Centrafricaine**

Chers compatriotes,


Outre ces tueurs, alors que le peuple centrafricain est confronté aux énormes problèmes d’eau sur toute l’étendue du territoire, le Président de la République ainsi que le Président de l’Assemblée nationale abandonnent la Nation pour des balades à l’étranger à coût des centaines de milliers de franc CFA. Face aux violations graves de la Constitution de la République, à la haute trahison dont le Chef de l’État serait coupable et à ce qu’il convient de qualifier de négligence et de non-assistance au peuple en danger, le GTSC demande :

À l’armée nationale et républicaine, aux partis politiques, aux enseignants du primaire, du secondaire et du supérieur, aux syndicats, aux diverses associations, aux élus de la Nation, aux avocats, aux médecins, aux transporteurs (taksi-moto, bus, taxi…), aux élèves et étudiants, à la jeunesse, aux femmes, aux commerçants, aux journalistes, aux fonctionnaires, à toute la société centrafricaine DE SE LEVER TOUS COMME EN SEUL PEUPLE, UNE SEULE NATION ET SORTIR DANS LA RUE LE LUNDI 15 AVRIL 2019 POUR :

- Dire non à la haute trahison par le Chef de l’État ;
- Dire non à la prise en otage de la République par des rebelles mercenaires ;
- Dire non au non-respect de la Constitution ;
- Exiger que le peuple ait accès à l’eau potable.

Chers compatriotes,

Le changement tant attendu ne viendra que de nous-mêmes, courageusement, prenons la destinée de notre Nation en main. Qu’ait l’aventure pour un destin historique et héroïque.

La Patrie, rien que la Patrie !

Fait à Bangui, le 10 Avril 2019

Le Porte-parole du GTSC

Paul-Crescent BENINGA
Annex 2.10: Creation of E Zingo Biana or FUDN.

Document obtained by the Panel from a member of E Zingo Biani on 31 May 2019.
Annex 2.11: FUDN’s communiqué calling for demonstrations.

Document obtained by the Panel from a member of E Zingo Biani on 5 June 2019.

**É ZÎNGO BÎANÎ**

**Front Uni pour la Défense de la Nation**

**Communiqué de presse 002**

« É ZÎNGO BÎANÎ » Le Front Uni pour la Défense de la Nation, tient à informer toute l’opinion mais plus particulièrement nos compatriotes, des nouvelles adhésions que le Front vient d’enregistrer.

Il s’agit de :
- Parti de l’Unité et de la Reconstruction (PUR/Parti Politique)
- Centrafrique Debout et Solidaire (CDS-CA/Société Civile)
- Forum Démocratique pour la Modernité (PODEM/Parti Politique)
- Espace Linga Toro (Société Civile)
- Union Nationale pour la Défense de la Démocratie (UNDD/Parti Politique)

Nous saisissions cette occasion pour inviter toutes les entités et les personnalités, ayant conscience du péril qu’encourt notre démocratie face aux dérives totalitaires que nous ne cessons d’enregistrer, mais encore et surtout, confrontées à la persistance des massacres perpétrés contre les populations sans protection et sans défense, à nous rejoindre pour poursuivre cette lutte démocratique, indispensable à la libération de notre patrie.

Par ailleurs, pour insister sur les revendications citoyennes du 28 mai 2019, « É ZÎNGO BÎANÎ » Le Front Uni pour la Défense de la Nation, invite toute la population de Bangui à une série de meetings d’éveil de conscience et de sursaut patriotique, « É ZÎNGO BÎANÎ » qui auront lieu respectivement :
- Le Samedi 15 juin 2019 à 15h sur le terrain Ucatex dans le 8ème arrondissement
- Le Samedi 22 juin 2019 à 15h sur le terrain Saint Jacques Kpetene dans le 6ème arrondissement
- Et le Samedi 29 juin 2019 à 19h sur le terrain de football de Begoua

Peuple Centrafricain, é zingo biani pour défendre notre Nation en danger.

Fait à Bangui, le 5 juin 2019

Pour « É ZÎNGO BÎANÎ »,
le Front Uni pour la Défense de la Nation

[Signature]

Le Porte-Parole
Jean-Serge Bokassa

Coordonnateur Général 75500295 Porte-Parole 72260461 Conseiller mobilisation 75363636
Annex 2.12: Communiqué from the *Mouvements des requins de Centrafrique* of 6 June 2019 calling for the movement’s members to oppose the holding of FUDN meetings. *Document by the Panel obtained from a member of FUDN on 6 June 2019.*

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**COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE N°003**

(Large diffusion)

La coordination Générale des Requins de Centrafrique demande à tous les coordinateurs locaux et leurs bases respectives à être prêts pour une opération dénommée "la BLIETZKRIEG" que les consignes leurs seront données dans les heures qui suivent par la coordination des opérations.

Par ailleurs, elle remercie infiniment nos amis russes pour leurs dotation en matériels de surveillance et de dissuasion à savoir : les drones, les gourcins électriques et les baguettes de décharges électriques pour rendre les assaillants du pouvoir impuissants et stériles.

Par conséquent, une carte blanche est déjà donnée pour des actions dommageables prévues les 15, 22 et 29 juin 2019 aux différents lieux de leurs rassemblements ciblés.

Fait à Bangui le 06 juin 2019.
Le Coordonnateur Général des Requins de Centrafrique
Saint Luc BAGAZA
Annex 2.13: Communiqué appointing an individual in charge of the mobilization of lethal and non-lethal equipment for the Mouvements des requins de Centrafrique.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 12 June 2019.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 13 June 2019.
parole de l’Association « E ZINGO BIANI » pour leur notifier de vive voix l’interdiction de cette manifestation dont les conséquences risqueraient d’être incommensurables.

Ceux-ci se sont retirés en promettant de s’en référer à leur base.

Ainsi, le Ministère de l’Intérieur, chargé de la Sécurité Publique prend à témoin l’opinion tant nationale qu’internationale sur les conséquences qui adviendraient et qui engageraient l’entièree responsabilité morale et pénale de leurs auteurs connus de nos services.

Le présent communiqué tient lieu d’ultime avertissement.

A BON ATTENDEUR SALUT.

Fait à Bangui, le 13 juillet 2019

Le Général de Brigade,

Henri WANZET-LINGUSSARA

Document obtained by the Panel from a diplomatic source on 18 April 2019.

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Unité – Dignité – Travail

DEUXIÈME RÉUNION DU GROUPE INTERNATIONAL DE SOUTIEN À LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE (GIS-RCA)
BANGUI, LE 17 AVRIL 2019

CONCLUSIONS

2. L’objectif principal de la réunion, coprésidée par Messieurs Firmin Ngrebada, Smail CherGui, et Jean-Pierre Lacroix, était de faire le point sur les progrès et défis dans la mise en œuvre de l’Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation en République Centrafricaine (APPR-RCA), signé par le Gouvernement de la République centrafricaine et quatorze (14) groupes armés à Bangui, le 6 février 2019. La cérémonie d’ouverture a été marquée par des allocutions prononcées respectivement par les représentants de l’UE, de la CEEAC, des Nations Unies, de l’Union Africaine ainsi que par le discours du Chef de l’État, S.E.M. le Professeur Faustin Archange Touadera.

3. Le Chef de l’État dans son discours, a réaffirmé sa ferme volonté de respecter de bonne foi, la mise en œuvre des engagements contenus dans l’APPR-RCA et a appelé les anciens groupes armés signataires de l’Accord, à faire de même.

Délégations

4. Dès l’ouverture des travaux, le Premier Ministre Firmin Ngrebada a présenté aux participants les onze (11) priorités du Gouvernement centrafricain sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord de paix, élaborées sous la très haute impulsion du Chef de l’État et qui se présentent comme suit :

   i. La cessation immédiate des hostilités sur l'ensemble du territoire national ;
   ii. La campagne de sensibilisation et de vulgarisation de l’APPR-RCA ;
   iii. L’opérationnalisation de tous les organes du MOS. y compris le Secrétariat Technique ;
   iv. Le démarrage des travaux de la Commission Mixte Inclusive chargée d’examiner tous les aspects liés aux événements tragiques du conflit, de les qualifier et de proposer toute action susceptible d’être prise en matière de justice et rendre son rapport à la Commission, Vérité, Justice, Réparation et Réconciliation (CVJRR) ;
   v. La lutte contre l’impunité, l’opérationnalisation de la CVJRR et la poursuite du travail des mécanismes judiciaires et de justice transitionnelle existants (juridictions ordinaires et Cour pénale spéciale) ;
vi. L’opérationnalisation des Unités Spéciales Mixtes de Sécurité (USMS) pour lesquelles le vetting, la démobilisation, le désarmement des anciens groupes armés et toutes les mesures d’accompagnement traditionnelles sont nécessaires ;

vii. La poursuite de la Réforme du secteur de la sécurité (RSS) et du Programme DDRR ;

viii. L’adoption des lois notamment sur la décentralisation, le statut des anciens chefs d’État, les partis politiques ainsi que la préparation des élections générales de 2020/2021 ;

ix. Le lancement du programme d’urgence de réhabilitation des communautés à la base dans chaque Préfecture ;

x. L’organisation des quatre (4) fora pour le développement régional (Bangassou, Birao, Bouar et Mbaiki) ; et enfin

xi. Le lancement du Plan national et régional de gestion de la transhumance.

5. Le Premier Ministre a également insisté sur les défis et besoins pour la mise en œuvre adéquate de l’APPR-RCA.

6. Suite à la communication du Premier Ministre, le Groupe a salué le Gouvernement pour ses efforts de consolidation de la paix et de restauration de l’autorité de l’État, avec l’appui de ses partenaires bilatéraux et multilatéraux. Le Groupe a également salué les progrès enregistrés dans la mise en œuvre de l’APPR-RCA, notamment la mise en place d’un Gouvernement inclusif, la création des Mécanismes de suivi et de mise en œuvre et d’autres organes prévus par l’Accord telle que la Commission inclusive. Le Groupe a cependant déploré la poursuite des exactions commises contre les populations civiles et les défis humanitaires qui persistent.

Décisions du Groupe International de Soutien

7. Après délibérations, le Groupe International de Soutien a décidé de ce qui suit :

i. Souligne l’importance vitale de la cessation effective des hostilités et l’arrêt des exactions contre les populations et du respect des engagements contenus dans l’APPR-RCA ;

ii. Invite les anciens groupes armés à transmettre, la liste de leurs membres pour les différentes structures de mise en œuvre et de suivi (MOS) ainsi que la Commission inclusive, les USMS et le DDRR ;

iii. Encourage le Gouvernement à élaborer une feuille de route, avec un calendrier précis, en concertation avec les partenaires pour la mise en œuvre effective des activités prioritaires mentionnées ci-dessus, dans un esprit d’ouverture ;

iv. Exhorte le Gouvernement à redoubler d’effort pour une grande inclusivité des différents segments de la société centrafricaine dans la gouvernance publique, notamment à travers une participation plus active des femmes et une meilleure représentativité de la diversité des composantes de la société centrafricaine dans les forces nationales de défense et de sécurité.
v. Encourage le Gouvernement centrafricain, avec l’appui de ses partenaires, à poursuivre ses efforts pour faciliter le travail vital des humanitaires envers la population nécessiteuse et créer les conditions favorables au retour volontaire, digne et en sécurité des personnes déplacées internes et des réfugiés ;

vi. Encourage l’ensemble des Centrafricaines et des Centrafricains, y compris les parties signataires, les acteurs politiques, les leaders religieux, la société civile, les associations de femmes et de jeunes, à s’approprier l’Accord et d’en assurer une promotion active en vue d’un retour à une paix durable ;

vii. Encourage les pays voisins et institutions de la région à soutenir les efforts de mise en œuvre de l’APPR-RCA, notamment à travers la revitalisation des relations diplomatiques et plus particulièrement la reprise des Commissions mixtes.

viii. Salue l’action des partenaires bilatéraux et multilatéraux de la République centrafricaine en faveur de la stabilisation et de la consolidation de la paix dans ce pays, conformément à leur mandat respectif. Le Groupe les encourage à poursuivre cet appui multiforme et de l’aligner aux priorités de mise en œuvre de l’Accord de paix, tout en poursuivant la mise en œuvre des programmes et fonds existants, en faveur du Plan national de relèvement et de consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (RCPsC), notamment en matière de protection sociale, de développement local et d’infrastructures socio-économiques de base. Il s’agit d’une dimension cruciale pour apporter aux populations les plus affectées, y compris les jeunes et les femmes, les dividendes tangibles de la paix.

8. Les participants ont pris note de la volonté du Président de la République et de son Gouvernement d’organiser dans les meilleures conditions de transparence, d’intégrité et d’équité les prochaines élections. Ils ont, à cet effet, demandé aux partenaires de la République Centrafricaine de fournir l’appui financier, opérationnel, logistique, sécuritaire ainsi que l’assistance technique nécessaires.


11. Les participants ont convenu de fixer dans de meilleurs délais, et après consultations, la date et le lieu de la prochaine réunion du Groupe International de Soutien.

Fait à Bangui, le 17 avril 2019
Annex 3.2: Communiqué of the 12th session of the Cameroon and Central African Republic Joint Commission of Cooperation (Bangui, 6-7 May 2019).

From the 6th through the 7th of May 2019, was held at the Ledger Plaza Hotel in Bangui, the 12th Session of Cameroon-Central African Republic Joint Commission.

The two delegations were led respectively by their Excellencies, Sylvie BAIPO TEMON, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Central African Abroad of the Central African Republic and MBELLA MBELLA, Minister of External Relations of the Republic of Cameroon.

The list of the two Delegations is attached.

During his stay in Central African Republic, H.E. MBELLA MBELLA was received in audience by H.E. Faustin Archange TOUADERA, President of the Central African Republic, to whom he conveyed the fraternal greetings of his Counterpart and Friend, H.E. Paul BIYA, President of the Republic of Cameroon, and his sincere congratulations on the negotiation and signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic as well as his wishes for full success in the implementation of this important instrument.

He was also received in audience by H.E. Firmin NGREBADA, Prime Minister, Head of Government of the Central African Republic with whom he discussed the taking office of the new Central African Government and the implementation of the Bangui Agreement of the 6th of February 2019.

H.E. MBELLA MBELLA also met with H.E. Sylvie BAIPO TEMON, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Central African Abroad of the Central African Republic, with whom it carried out a broad review of bilateral cooperation and the ways and means by which it can be relaunched.

The solemn opening ceremony was punctuated by the speeches of Their Excellencies MBELLA MBELLA and Sylvie BAIPO TEMON, who welcomed the excellent relations of friendship and historical brotherhood that unite the two countries, and their Heads of State.

in accordance with the adopted agenda, the Experts of the two Delegations discussed political, legal and security issues, issues of
economic, commercial, scientific, cultural and technical cooperation for example.

The following draft Cooperation Agreements were thus examined and initialed:

1. the draft Framework Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation;
2. the draft Cooperation Agreement in the areas of small and medium-sized enterprises and the small industries;
3. the draft Protocol Agreement for Technical Cooperation in the Field of Sports and Physical Education;
4. the draft Cooperation Agreement in the field of Youth Development;
5. the draft Implementation Protocol for the triennium 2020 - 2024 of the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation and Technical Assistance in the Field of Arts and Culture;
6. the draft Agreement on Energy and Water Cooperation;
7. the draft Agreement on Cooperation in Higher Education;
8. the draft Protocol Agreement on the exchange of broadcasting and television programmes and technical experience between Central Africa Broadcasting and Television and Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation (CRTV);
9. the draft Protocol Agreement for the establishment of a permanent system for the control of movements of fish, livestock and animal products between the Republic of Cameroon and the Central African Republic.

The two Parties have agreed to give a new impetus to cooperation between the two countries, notably through deepening cooperation in various areas of interest such as institutional and human capacity building, academic exchanges, trade, industry and mining.

They also agreed on the establishment of a Monitoring Committee for the implementation of the recommendations of the Joint Commission of Cooperation, to ensure the effective implementation of cooperation actions initiated between the two countries.

Finally, the two Delegations welcomed the spirit of brotherhood,
conviviality and mutual understanding that prevailed throughout the work.

The Cameroonian Delegation expressed its deep gratitude to the Head of State, the Government and the Central African people for the fraternal and warm welcome and for the hospitality it received.

The two Parties have agreed to hold the meetings of the Monitoring Committee and of the 13th session of the Joint Commission of Cooperation in Cameroon, on dates to be agreed by diplomatic means.

Done in Bangui, 7th May 2019.

For the Government of the Republic of Cameroon,

H.E. Mébella Mébella
Minister of External Relations

For the Government of the Central African Republic,

H.E. Sylvie Baipo Temon
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Central Africans Abroad
Annex 3.3: Bilateral agreement between the Central African Republic and Chad on cattle movement (signed in Ndjamena, 30 October 2012).

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE D'UNE PART;

ET

LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD D'AUTRE PART;
(Ci-dessus dénommées "les Parties Contractantes")

Considérant l'Acte N°31/R4-UDEAC- 413 du 10 décembre 1984, adoptant l'accord relatif à l'harmonisation des législations et réglementations Zoo-sanitaire en U.D.E.A.C ;

Considérant l'Accord du 18 Décembre 1987, portant création de la commission de la communauté économique du bétail, de la viande et des ressources halieutiques en U.D.E.A.C ;


Résolu à appliquer scrupuleusement les textes y relatifs en vigueur dans les États membres de la C.E.M.A.C et dans leur pays respectif ;

Soucieux de mieux contrôler, les mouvements des éleveurs, du bétail et des produits d'élevage et halieutiques de part et d'autre de leur frontière ;

Sont convenus de ce qui suit :

Article 1er : Le présent Accord définit le cadre juridique du contrôle des mouvements de bétail de commercialisation et de transhumance, ainsi que le contrôle de la qualité des produits animaux et halieutiques en circulation entre les deux pays conformément aux textes de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) ; de la législation et de la réglementation en vigueur dans les deux Pays.

Article 2: Les produits animaux et halieutiques destinés à la commercialisation circulant entre les deux pays doivent être accompagnés d'un certificat sanitaire et vétérinaire délivré conformément à la législation et à la réglementation en vigueur dans chacun des deux pays.

Article 3 : Le bétail circulant entre les deux pays dans le cadre de la transhumance et de commercialisation doit être accompagné d'un Passeport International du bétail pour les
animaux de commercialisation et d’un Certificat International de Transhumance délivrés par les Autorités vétérinaires compétentes de chaque pays.

**Article 4 :** Le Certificat International de Transhumance (CIT), est un document de la CEDEVIHA/CEMAC valable pendant toute la période de la transhumance. Cependant, le Certificat Zoo-Sanitaire ou le Laissez-Passer Sanitaire qui accompagnent le CIT ou le Passeport à une validité de trois (03) mois pour le bétail de commercialisation.

**Article 5 :** Lors de la transhumance des animaux, le Certificat International de transhumance et le certificat Zoo-Sanitaire doivent comporter chacun les mentions suivantes :

- **POUR LE BETAIL TRANSHUMANT**
  - N° d’identification ;
  - Identité du Berger ;
  - Identité du Propriétaire ;
  - Composition du troupeau ;
  - Destination et la zone de transhumance sollicitée ;
  - Durée de séjour ;
  - Photo 4 x 4 du berger ;
  - Signature de l’Autorité Vétérinaire ayant délivré le CIT et le Laissez-Passer Sanitaire ;
  - Visas des services de la sécurité Tchadienne et Contrafricaine à la sortie et à l’entrée des frontières.

Le Certificat International de Transhumance est valable également pour un aller et retour, tandis que le passeport est retiré à l’arrivée des animaux de boucherie par le service vétérinaire du pays bénéficiaire.

- **POUR LES COMMERCANTS**
  Le passeport pour le bétail et le laissez-passer sanitaire sont établis conformément aux dispositions des textes en vigueur dans chaque pays à la lumière de la réglementation Sanitaire de la CEDEVIHA/CEMAC.
**Article 6 :** Les deux pays signataires conviennent de faire délivrer par leurs services compétents respectifs des cartes professionnelles aux convoyeurs du bétail de commercialisation. Cette carte doit comporter les mentions suivantes :

- N° d'indication ;
- Date et lieu de délivrance ;
- Identité complète du convoyeur ;
- Situation de famille ;
- Identité du Propriétaire ;
- Annexe : Certificat Zoo-Sanitaire ;
- Photo du convoyeur ;
- Signature de l’autorité ayant délivré la carte ;
- Destination ;
- Durée de séjour ;
- Visa des services de Sécurité à l'entrée et à la sortie du territoire.

**Article 7 :** Les deux parties prennent des dispositions en vue de définir les couloirs de transhumance et d'installer les postes de contrôle aux frontières dans les localités suivantes :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COTE TCHADIEN</th>
<th>COTE CENTRAFRICAIN</th>
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<tr>
<td>DAHA (HARAZ MANGUEIN)</td>
<td>NGARBA (BAMINGUI- BANGORAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARO (GRAND SIDO)</td>
<td>SIDO (OUHAM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOISSALA (BAHR SARAH)</td>
<td>BATANGAFO (OUHAM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GORE (NYA PENDE)</td>
<td>MARKOUNDA (OUHAM)</td>
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<td>MBAIBOKOUM (MONT de LAM)</td>
<td>EEMAL (OUHAM PENDE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMTIMAN (SALAMAT)</td>
<td>NGAOUNDAYE (OUHAM PENDE)</td>
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<td>NGONDEY (Lac IRO)</td>
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D’autres voies de sortie peuvent en cas de besoin, être ajoutées à cette liste par voie d’avenant au présent accord.

**Article 8 :** Les deux parties doivent veiller à l’instauration d’une bonne coopération entre les services techniques au niveau des frontières en organisant des rencontres annuelles et à tout moment et en cas de besoin.
Article 9 : Les dispositions de cet accord peuvent être modifiées d'un commun accord à la demande de l'une des deux parties.

Article 10 : Les litiges nés de l'exécution de cet Accord sont réglés par une Commission d'Experts et des Autorités Administratives locales de chaque pays. En cas de désaccord, le contentieux sera soumis à la Grande Commission Mixte Tchado-centrafricaine pour examen et règlement à l'amiable.

Article 11 : Le présent Accord entre en vigueur dès sa signature, pour une durée d'un an renouvelable par tacite reconduction, sauf dénonciation expresse par l'une des deux parties, les actions en cours peuvent se poursuivre jusqu'à leur terme.

Fait à N'Djamena, le 30 octobre 2012

Pour le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine,
Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et des Centrafricaines de l'Étranger

LE GL DE CORPS D'ARMÉE
Antoine Gambi

Pour le Gouvernement de la République du Tchad,
Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et de l'Intégration Africaine

MOUSSA FAKI MAHAMAT
Annex 3.4: Communiqué of the Minster of Defence of the Central African Republic on the presence of Chadian forces in northern CAR signed on 7 January 2019.


Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 20 June 2019.
Annex 4.2: Information on UPC illegal checkpoints and taxation system.

UPC’s most important revenues emanate from cattle-related activities (S/2018/1119, paras. 111-126). This includes the control of transhumance corridors, where the USMS, once operationalized, are mandated to operate.

In spite of his commitment to the implementation of the Agreement, UPC leader Ali Darassa has consolidated the UPC’s taxation systems. On 16 April 2019, he summoned all the “ardos”¹¹⁹ (S/2018/1119, para.127) of Ouaka prefecture in Bokolbo. During this meeting, he presented a new and more discreet system of tax collection on the cattle trade.¹²⁰ He requested each ardo to send directly to him FCFA 200,000 (almost $400) every month in order to limit the direct involvement of his armed fighters in tax collection.

Taxation of coffee production and trade remains yet another important source of income for the UPC. The Panel obtained documented information, detailed below, showing that the UPC had collected, as of 23 April 2019, an estimated FCFA 51,450,000 ($88,000) in taxes since the beginning of the coffee season in October 2018, with still two months remaining until the end of the season in June 2019.¹²¹

The coffee is produced mainly in the Ouaka, Basse-Kotto and Mbomou prefectures. Depending on the size of the truck, the UPC collects between FCFA 30,000 to 50,000 ($50-85) at each of its checkpoint on the Kouango-Bambari and Alindao-Bambari axes.

In Bambari, where 12 of the 23 coffee purchasers are based, each coffee purchaser pays taxes to both the UPC and the Direction General de l’Office de réglementation de la commercialisation et du contrôle du conditionnement des produits agricoles (ORCCPA), an official Government institution.¹²² For each truck loaded in Bambari for export to the Sudan, the ORCCPA collects FCFA 60 ($0,10) per kilo (i.e. FCFA 961,200 ($1,600) per 16-tonne truck),¹²³ and the UPC collects FCFA 600,000 ($1,025) per 16-tonne truck.¹²⁴ UPC taxes are collected in Bambari by individuals sent from the group’s so-called ‘tax office’ located in Bokolobo. UPC also levies a toll of FCFA 12,500 ($21) in return for the required “laissez-passez” documents for each truck leaving Bambari towards Nyala, the Sudan.

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¹¹⁹ An ‘ardo’ is a traditional position within the Fulani community and recognized under Central African law. The ardos’ role is to manage the cattle business and transhumance-related matters within its jurisdiction.
¹²⁰ Meeting with Fulani traditional leader, Bangui, 20 April 2019.
¹²¹ Meetings with confidential sources and ORCCPA staff, Bambari, 22-24 April 2019.
¹²² Direction General de l’office de réglementation de la commercialisation et du contrôle du conditionnement des produits agricoles.
¹²³ Meeting with ORCCPA, Bambari, 22 April 2019.
¹²⁴ Meeting with coffee purchasers/exporters, Bambari, 21, 22 and 23 April 2019.
Between Bambari and Am Dafok, traders pay taxes at Bria, Ouadda and Birao checkpoints, amongst others. The revenues generated by these tolls are shared between UPC and FPRC (see also S/2018/729, annex 6.4).
Annex 4.3: Information on MPC illegal checkpoints and taxation system.

The MPC is composed of a patchwork of factions partially organized along ethnic lines (Salamat, Misseriya Hemad, etc.). These factions operate a number of roadblocks in the Ouham, Ouham-Pendé and Nana-Grebizi prefectures, where they levy taxes.

The logic behind MPC’s recruitment strategy is quantitative rather than qualitative. The objective is to have a significant number of elements to increase the armed group’s weight in the political process. Little consideration is given to the competencies or background of the fighters. Recruitment often works as follows: a small group of individuals approach an MPC leader (Al-Khatim or a local leader) to offer their service; in return, they are allocated an area or a checkpoint where they can levy taxes and racketeer the population.

In Ouham-Pendé prefecture, for instance, the Panel met with several members of MPC factions operating along the Chadian border. All of them told the Panel they had been recruited in or near refugee camps in Chad after the signing of the Agreement. Individuals representing MPC had been sent to Chad to advertise the imminence of the DDRR program and related benefits for any individual with a weapon. Most of the individuals met by the Panel had limited contacts with the MPC headquarters in Kaga Bandoro, Nana-Grebizi prefecture.

In the same area, other MPC elements told the Panel that local MPC factions mostly comprised individuals from Chad. These fighters from Chad often come to the Central African Republic for a short period of time to benefit from racketeering or the exploitation of natural resources. These MP elements also explained that this results in a high turn-over of elements in the MPC and in the armed group’s local leadership in the Ouham-Pendé prefecture.

The MPC leader Al-Khatim’s authority over the numerous MPC factions is limited and sustained only due to his capacity to share the considerable revenues generated by the taxation system established at the Kaga Bandoro cattle market (S/2018/1119, para 118).

This complicated internal structure within MPC will constitute a challenge for the implementation of the Agreement, as the removal of MPC-operated roadblocks will require not only the approval of Al-Khatim, but of each of the MPC factions.

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125 Meetings with armed group representative, Kaga-Bandoro, 7-10 June 2019.
126 Meetings with MPC members, Ouham-Pende prefecture, 13-19 June 2019.
127 Meetings with MPC members, Ouham-Pende prefecture, 13-19 June 2019.
Moreover, Al-Khatim’s authority could be weakened by the decrease in the revenues generated by the Kaga Bandoro market (see picture below). With the reduction of violence targeting Muslims in the Kemo prefecture and around Bangui, the cattle herders now tend to avoid heavy MPC taxes in Kaga Bandoro and sell their cattle directly at the markets in Damara (S/2018/1119, para. 125) or Bangui. The decrease in tax revenues from the Kaga Bandoro market has already resulted in increased insecurity around the town where MPC fighters have engaged in disorganized taxation and racketeering activities.

*Picture of the Kaga-Bandoro cattle market taken by the Panel on 8 June 2019.*

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129 Meeting with economic operators, Kaga-Bandoro’s cattle markets, 8 June 2019.
Annex 4.4: Background on fighting between UPC and MINUSCA forces in the context of “Bekpa II” operation.

Fighting between UPC elements and MINUSCA started on 10 January 2019 after the UPC had attacked the local police and gendarmerie in Bambari, killing two police officers. Several hours later, a MINUSCA patrol was also targeted by UPC with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). In reaction, MINUSCA launched “Operation Bambari Without Armed Groups and Weapons” (or Bepka II) aimed at dismantling UPC bases in town. UPC maintained a discreet presence in town, though limited by the heavy presence of MINUSCA troops.

Amid the fighting, UPC attempted to portray MINUSCA’s actions as anti-Muslim in order to rally the local population behind its cause (see communiqués below). The group adopted a guerilla strategy with its elements wearing civilian clothes and hiding in random houses in order to create collateral damage. UPC leaders, as well as community leaders under their influence, manipulated some incidents – for instance the reported death of three civilians in an exchange of fire on 23 January 2019, as well as the destruction of houses – to fuel anti-MINUSCA sentiments within the population.

The FPRC provided operational and logistical support to UPC during these clashes with MINUSCA in January. Some FPRC combatants present in Bambari on the basis of the Ippy agreement of October 2017 (S/2017/1023, paras.136-137) participated in the fighting. Logistical support by men on motobikes was also sent from Bria under the supervision of Ahmat Mounir, FPRC comzone for the Haute-Kotto prefecture.

UPC actions illustrated, once again, the concerns and trepidations of the armed group vis-à-vis FACA deployment in areas under its control. The planned organisation of the ‘Journée mondiale de l’Agriculture’ (JMA) in Bambari, alongside new FACA deployments, triggered UPC’s decision to launch an attack against MINUSCA on 10 January, resulting in the cancelling of the JMA a day before President Touadera was expected in Bambari. UPC’s attack was motivated by a perception that the security measures around the JMA were intended to disarm UPC elements and therefore challenged the group’s control over Bambari to the benefit of both the newly-deployed and established FACA. This perception was reinforced by the non-involvement of some of those civil society organizations under UPC’s influence in the JMA’s organization committee.

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130 Confidential report, 11 January 2019.
131 Meeting with Bambari community leader, Bangui, 28 January 2019.
134 Meeting with armed group member, Bangui, 20 January 2019.
135 Meeting with Bambari community leader, Bangui, 28 January 2018
LETTRE A L’INTENTION DE L’UNION AFRICAINE

L’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), à travers la voix de son Coordinateur Militaire, Chef d’Etat-major de l’UPC, le Général d’Armées Ali DARRASSA.

Suite aux événements et la situation qui se dégrade sur le terrain et plus précisément dans la région que nous contrôlons.

Suite aux multiples attaques des contingents Portugais et Népalais de la MINUSCA à la demande du gouvernement sur la population civile et le mouvement de l’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), cela ne me permet pas pour des diverses raisons de me rendre personnellement à Khartoum (Soudan) pour le dialogue mais tout au moins l’UPC reste attaché aux principes que ce dialogue est le seul voie qui mènera à une solution politique et pacifique pour la résolution définitive de la crise.

Pour cela je délègue le Coordonnateur Politique de l’Unité pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UCP) Monsieur HASSAN BOUBA comme mon Représentant Spécial et Chef de Délégation en compagnie de Monsieur SOULEMANE Daoût et Monsieur MOUSSA Allou de représenter valablement notre mouvement.

LES REPRESENTANTS :
1. Chef de Délégation : HASSAN BOUBA (Bria) ;
2. Adjoint 1 : SOULEMANE Daoud (Bangui) ;
3. Adjoint 2 : Moussa Allou (Bria).

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’expression de nos très hautes considérations et sentiments distingués.

Vive la Paix, vive la Centrafrique apaisée.

Fait à Ippy, le 18 Janvier 2019

Le Coordinateur Militaire, chef d’état-major de l’UPC

Général du Corps d’armée ALI DARRASSA

Tél : 75 67 77

Le format de cette lettre est un document officiel et authentique de l’UPC. Tout autre modèle est un faux.
During the January 2019 fighting in Bambari, UPC combatants made use of AK-type assault rifles, machine guns mounted on pickups, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and hand grenades. The numerous UPC attacks against FACA, police, gendarmes and MINUSCA compelled MINUSCA to use intensive suppressive fire and consume large volumes of ammunition in the process. On 17 January, a MINUSCA MI-17 helicopter providing air support to the operation was damaged by bullet piercing the hydraulic tank following shooting by UPC combatants. When firing RPGs, UPC combatants also damaged MINUSCA Armored Personnel Carriers. During the operation, MINUSCA seized or captured a mounted pickup, machine guns, small arms and light weapons, communication tools, military uniforms and documents (see below). Nevertheless, UPC combatants managed to flee with most of their weaponry.

As mentioned above, FPRC armed elements provided support to UPC in Bambari. At the same time, UPC elements have also travelled to FPRC-controlled areas to obtain additional weapons, ammunition and fuel. For example, on 20 January 2019, four UPC elements reportedly arrived in Ndélé on motorcycles to retrieve ammunition and fuel cans; they returned the same day to Bambari.
Pictures of pickups, machine guns, small arms and light weapons, uniforms, communication tools and documents seized by MINUSCA during “Bekpa II Operation”. Obtained from confidential source on 19 January 2019.
Pictures of UPC vehicle that burnt out during Bekpa II operation, taken by the Panel in Bambari on 22 April 2019.
Annex 4.5: Information on the calls to lift the arms embargo by national authorities and regional organizations.

In its 2018 final report, the Panel mentioned that expressions of support by national authorities for a total lifting of the arms embargo had gained prominence in the second half of 2018 (see S/2018/1119, para. 185). Those calls have continued since, with the national authorities organizing a campaign to garner support. The Government’s main argument remains that the arms embargo unfairly affects the national defense and security forces while armed groups continue to acquire weapons.

For the first time, these calls in the CAR were not only expressed by individuals but rather by State institutions. On 12 December 2018, heads of national institutions, the Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the High Council for Communication, the National Electoral Authority, the High Authority on Good Governance, and the National Mediator signed a declaration calling for the Security Council to lift the arms embargo. Arguing that the situation had changed since the embargo was first introduced during the transition, the leaders referred to progress in reforming the security sector, thanks to the support of the international community and MINUSCA, and called upon the country’s allies to help support this request. This initiative followed the earlier call by the Speaker of the National Assembly dated 23 November 2018 (see documents below).

The CAR Government’s attempts to push for a total lifting of the arms embargo reached their peak on 28 January 2019 when several civil society groups organised demonstrations in Bangui and other towns (Bouar, Bossangoa, Mbaiki), calling for the Security Council to lift the arms embargo. In Bangui, the then Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji, addressed the crowd and thanked them for sharing the Government’s views on this matter.\textsuperscript{141} MINUSCA had to restrict staff movement as crowds attempted to damage United Nations property in Bouar and in some areas of Bangui.\textsuperscript{142}

On 31 January 2019, in resolution 2454 (2019), the Security Council unanimously renewed the arms embargo until 31 January 2020 and expressed its intention to establish clear and well identified key benchmarks regarding the reform of the security sector, the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation process, and the management of weapons and ammunition, that could serve in guiding the Security Council to review the arms embargo measures on the Government of the CAR. On 9 April, five key benchmarks were articulated in a statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2019/3, 9 April 2019).

\textsuperscript{141} Panel’s mission in Bangui, 5-30 January 2019.

Since the adoption of resolution 2454 (2019), the CAR Government, while working on the benchmarks with the substantive support of international partners, has continued to call for a total lifting of the arms embargo. For instance, in an interview released on 14 June 2019, the President underlined the need for a total lifting to enable the national armed and security forces to recover control over all national territory.\footnote{Interview with President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, 14 June 2019, available at \url{https://www.msn.com/fr-fr/actualite/monde/faustin-archange-touadera-l'accord-de-paix-en-centrafrique-a-toutes-les-chances-daboutir/vi-AACSRkx} [consulted on 25 June 2019].}

On 31 May 2019, regional States gathered in the context of the 48\textsuperscript{th} Ministerial Meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the members expressed support for the complete lifting of the arms embargo.\footnote{Communiqué of the 48\textsuperscript{th} Ministerial Meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, Kinshasa, 31 May 2019. The Committee comprises Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.}
Annex 4.6: Additional information on arms trafficking by ex-Séléka factions in the Vakaga prefecture.

In January 2019 in Birao (CAR), the Panel observed many uniformed and armed elements as well as several new pickups, purchased in Nyala (the Sudan), with machine guns mounted atop. Similar pickups and weaponry were also observed in Bria, Ndélé, Am Dafok and Kaga Bandoro in March, April, May and June 2019. In Birao, Kaga Bandoro, Ndélé and Am Dafok, FPRC elements were observed in pickups carrying AK-type assault rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers (see pictures below).

On 11 January, FPRC leader Abdoulaye Hissène coming from border-town Am Dafok entered Birao with five pickups which he had picked up in Nyala. One month earlier, RPRC “general” Arda also bought three pickups in Nyala. On 12-13 January, during Nourredine Adam’s stay in Birao, an estimated total of 30 vehicles circulated in the town. One FPRC pickup was reportedly mounted with a type-63 variant multiple rocket system, also observed in Ndélé in May 2018 (see picture below). The Panel obtained a picture of the FRPC pickup, but could not itself observe the pickup which was reportedly parked in Hissène’s compound in Birao (see picture below).

This demonstration of a strengthened military capacity by the FPRC and RPRC coincided with tensions between the two groups and the positioning of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) along the CAR-Sudan border. In January 2019, 60 RSF vehicles and an undetermined number of armed elements, allegedly under the command of “Hemmeti”, were reportedly posted on the Sudanese side of the border town Am Dafok. Their goal was reportedly to prevent the possible incursion of Sudanese armed groups coming from South Sudan and going to Chad through CAR territory.

In late March 2019, 18 FPRC elements – including “generals” Adoum Kanton, Bashar Fadoul and Kader – travelling in pick-up trucks between Nyala and Birao, were arrested by Sudanese Military Intelligence (SMI) in possession of weapons, ammunition and military uniforms purchased...
in Nyala.\textsuperscript{153} Four of the vehicles in which the military material was loaded had been purchased in Nyala by sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène and collected by these FPRC elements.\textsuperscript{154} While some of the FPRC elements, including the three “generals”, were allowed to return to Birao, all the other vehicles and military equipment were seized and the remaining FPRC elements arrested by SMI. The FPRC elements were released in late April.\textsuperscript{155}

On 28 May, there was a report of an armed movement of 20 FPRC and RPRC elements armed with AK-type assault rifles in five Toyota pickups and nine motorbikes between Birao and Ndélé. While some sources have noted that the movement was related to arms trafficking, Abdoulaye Hissène stated it was only a movement of his guards.\textsuperscript{156} The Panel continues to investigate this case.

\textit{Pictures of armed and uniformed FPRC elements in Birao, obtained by the Panel from FPRC members on 3 February 2019.}


\textsuperscript{154} Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 17 April 2019.

\textsuperscript{155} Telephone conversation with a confidential source in Birao, 23 April 2019.

Photograph of armed elements walking in Birao, taken by the Panel on 23 January 2019.

Screenshots of a video showing at least 10 FPRC vehicles and about 100 armed elements circulating in Birao, obtained from a confidential source on 7 February 2019.
Picture of a FPRC pickup with a multiple rocket system and armed elements in Am Dafok, obtained from confidential source on 4 March 2019.

Picture of a FPRC pickup mounted with a 63-variant multiple rocket system, obtained by the Panel from a FPRC source on 23 January 2019.
Picture of one of Abdoulaye Hissène’s vehicles reportedly being repaired in Nyala, Sudan, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 31 January 2019.

Pictures of two vehicles seized from FPRC by the Sudanese Military Intelligence late March 2019 and released in April 2019, obtained from a confidential source on 23 April 2019.
Annex 4.7: Additional information on UPC build-up of military capacity in Chad and the Sudan.

The UPC continues to be well-equipped (see also information above on ‘Bekpa II’ operation) and has continued to acquire military equipment from the territories of the Sudan and Chad to complement its stocks. In Bokolobo (Ouaka prefecture), where the UPC’s headquarters is based, the Panel observed about 50 uniformed elements, including around 20 child soldiers armed with handguns and AK-type assault rifles, operating checkpoints and securing Ali Darassa’s compound.\(^{157}\) In Alindao (Basse-Kotto prefecture) and on the road to Bambari, the Panel observed two commercial trucks being repaired by armed UPC elements and a pickup with a machine-gun mounted atop.\(^{158}\) Several sources – merchants, IDPs and UPC elements – reported that the UPC purchases some ammunition from merchants coming from DRC who sell equipment in Zangba and Mobaye, two small towns situated along the Oubangui river bordering the DRC (see map in annex 4.9).\(^{159}\)

The Panel also obtained a picture of rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) motors ordered, alongside rocket-propelled grenade rounds, from individuals coming from Chad and picked up by a UPC element in Ndélé early February, immediately after the talks in Khartoum (see picture below). According to this UPC trafficker, he transported 500 RPG rounds worth a total of FCFA 7,500,000 ($12,500) needed to attack MINUSCA Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) in the event of a new military operation.\(^{160}\) Eyewitnesses from the 15 November 2018 attack against the IDP site and Catholic church in Alindao reported that UPC elements fired several rocket-propelled grenades and provided the Panel with a similar rocket-propelled grenade remnant found on the site (see picture below).\(^{161}\)

The RPG deal was concluded through FPRC “general” Bashar Fadoul, who reportedly receives five per cent of the total paid.\(^{162}\) FPRC sources informed the Panel that the UPC still needs to pay the FPRC trafficker, and that the UPC also purchased 15 boxes of 12.7mm and 7.62x39mm ammunition worth FCFA 3,500,000 ($6,000) through the same individual.\(^{163}\) To date in 2019, the UPC has reportedly concluded several weapons deals with Fadoul, who is also well-connected with Sudanese individuals from whom he collects weapons on Nourredine

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\(^{157}\) Panel’s mission to Bokolobo, 21 April 2019.

\(^{158}\) Panel’s mission to Alindao, Bokolbo and Bambari, 19-23 April 2019.

\(^{159}\) Meeting with confidential source, Bria, 18 April 2019. Panel’s mission to Alindao, Bokolbo and Bambari, 19-23 April 2019.

\(^{160}\) Meeting with confidential source, Bria, 25 April 2019.

\(^{161}\) Meeting with IDPs, merchants and local authorities at Alindao IDP site, Alindao, 20 April 2019.

\(^{162}\) Ibid. Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 22 April 2019.

\(^{163}\) Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 22 April 2019.
Adam’s instructions. These weapons are then brought to Bokolobo via Am Dafok, Birao and Bria. 164

In April 2019, the abovementioned UPC trafficker also reportedly purchased 260 grenades and grenade launchers in Chad (see picture below). In April 2014, Conflict Armament Research examined matching VOG 25 40 mm grenades which had been in the pre-Séléka stocks of the FACA, obtained by Séléka forces and then seized from Séléka by the African Union forces (MISCA) in 2014. 165

Pictures of UPC uniformed and armed elements and a UPC pick-up observed by the Panel in Alindao, taken by the Panel in Alindao on 20 April 2019.

164 Ibid. Meeting with confidential sources, Bria, 18 April 2019.

165 Interview with researcher of Conflict Armament Research, 26 June 2019. See also http://www.conflictarm.com/car_publications/NONSTATE_ARMED_GROUPS_IN_CENTRAL_AFRICAN_REPUBLIC.pdf (p. 22) [consulted on 26 June 2019].
Picture of RPG 7 rocket motors reportedly bought by the UPC from Chadian individuals, obtained from a UPC trafficker in Bria on 25 April 2019.
Picture of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) remnant found by a witness after the attack by UPC on the IDP site in Alindao on 15 November 2019, taken by the Panel in Alindao on 20 April 2019.

Pictures of grenades and grenade launchers obtained by the Panel from a UPC trafficker who reportedly bought the material in April 2019.
Annex 4.8: Further information on the situation in Bakouma.

Bakouma (150 kilometers southeast of Bria; Mbomou prefecture) is a strategic location in the region given the presence of significant resources.\(^{166}\) On 31 December 2018, the FPRC Comzone “general” Faris Youssouf Ben Barka led an attack from Nzacko under the command of Bria-based leaders “generals” Hissein Damboucha and Mahmat Saleh on Bakouma. Although the FPRC claimed that it intended to establish a base in Bakouma, the anti-balaka/self defence group political and military leaders, Ferdinand and Herve Madambari (S/2017/1023 para 79-80) appeared to be the main target of the attack: the house of the Madambari brothers’ was one of the first targets of the attack and both brothers died (see picture and list of deaths below).

A number of other anti-balaka/self-defence group elements were also killed on 31 December 2018 and in the days which followed, as anti-balaka/self defence groups continued to attack the FPRC positions in and around Bakouma.

As a result of the aforementioned FPRC attack on Bakouma and the subsequent occupation of the town between 31 December 2018 and 15 January 2019, at least 32 people were reportedly killed, many civilians,\(^{167}\) and at least four women and girls remain missing.\(^{168}\) Almost the entire population of Bakouma, around 12,000 people, was displaced to villages along the axis to Bangassou and in Bangassou itself.\(^{169}\)

According to information from the local Red Cross (see list below) and evidence from local residents, however, no single mass grave exists although some bodies, including those of the FPRC, were buried together.

The town of Bangassou (Mbomou prefecture) was also destabilized by the arrival of fighters belonging to Bakouma-based self-defence groups. On 8 January, around 100 people gathered in sign of protest against the events of Bakouma and threw stones against the MINUSCA base located in the Tokoyo neighborhood. Later the same day, armed elements allegedly belonging to the self-defence groups opened fire at the same MINUSCA base,\(^ {170}\) and peacekeepers returned fire, wounding six assailants. After the attack, some elements of the self-defence groups broke into the local hospital, threatening humanitarian personnel and a Fulani woman.\(^{171}\)

The FPRC – supported by other non-uniformed elements – eventually withdrew from Bakouma on 15 January 2019. On their withdrawal, the

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166 Maps from the Ministry of Mines and Geology cite tin, cobalt, copper and chrome among the resources reportedly present in the Bakouma area.
168 Meeting with victims’ relatives, Bakouma, 10 May 2019.
171 Meeting with international NGO staff, Bangui, 22 January 2019.
group also set fire to around 40 houses in Fadama, a village five kilometers to the north of Bakouma (see list of houses below). FACA and MINUSCA eventually established two temporary bases in Bakouma on 19 January which then saw a return of the civilian population and humanitarians.

List of victims compiled by the local Red Cross. Received by the Panel 10 May 2019 in Bakouma.
List of houses damaged in Fadama. Received by the Panel 10 May 2019 in Bakouma.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of House</th>
<th>Number of Rooms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herve Madambari</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand Madambari</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The house of Herve and Ferdinand Madambari after the attack, Bakouma.  
*Photograph obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 18 May 2019.*
Annex 4.9: Map of Basse-Kotto prefecture.

Civilians in Basse-Kotto have been particularly affected by clashes between anti-balaka/self defence groups and UPC since the Agreement.\textsuperscript{172} The first attack by UPC on 4 April 2019 took place as the armed group attempted to remove anti-balaka/ self defence group roadblocks. This not only triggered population displacement but also a series of tit-for-tat attacks including the burning of houses in four villages on the Zangba-Kouango axis (Zoula, Ngandi, Ngaza, Koussou and Balshi) and nine on the Zangba-Mobaye axis (Yamboro, Nguati, Kesse, Ndoma, Batalimon, Banda-Nguati, Banda-Nguati, Ndjivo and Banda Weli). Around 100 deaths were also reported as a result of these clashes, with more than 6,000 also displaced, although exact numbers have not been confirmed.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{172} According to UNHCR, 65,397 civilians are displaced in Basse-Kotto prefecture, UNHCR, 17 June 2019.

\textsuperscript{173} Meeting with national NGO, Bangui, 2 June 2019 and confidential reports, 6 April and 30 May 2019.
Annex 4.10: Recruitment of child soldiers by UPC.

In pursuance of the commitment by all signatory groups to the Agreement to end child recruitment\(^{174}\), the FPRC, MPC, and Séléka Renovée released 101 children in March 2019.\(^ {175}\)

In contrast, the UPC has continued to forcibly recruit children from Fulani families. For example, in March 2019 in Fulani camps in and around Sam-Ouandja (Haute-Kotto prefecture), the UPC under Ali Santiago attempted to recruit boys from Fulani families demanding they either hand over a boy or pay a fee.\(^ {176}\) During a Panel visit to Bokolobo in April 2019, UPC leader Ali Darassa denied any recruitment of child soldiers and instead claimed to have returned Fulani youth against their will to their families.\(^ {177}\) However, the Panel observed about 20 child soldiers in uniform around Darassa’s headquarters. A former UPC child soldier from Bambari confirmed that the UPC take children by force and that they are killed if they refuse to work.\(^ {178}\)

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\(^{174}\) In Article 5(h) of the Peace Agreement, the signatory groups commit to putting ‘… an immediate end to all forms of recruitment into armed groups, including the recruitment of children and foreigners.’


\(^{176}\) Information received by the Panel from an international NGO, 21 June 2019. In the case of Sam-Ouandja, allegedly after the complaints received by the Fulani families to the FPRC, the UPC were not able to leave with any boys, only money and cows. The UPC under Garba in Mboki (Haut Mbomou prefecture) also requested Fulani families to give a child to the rebellion for their security; the 3R also reportedly has a similar practice in the Ouham-Pende prefecture.

\(^{177}\) Meeting with Ali Darassa, Bokolobo, 21 April 2019.

\(^{178}\) Meeting with former child soldier, Bangui, 19 January 2019.
Annex 4.11: Facebook profile of Dipen Mavani.

Available at https://www.facebook.com/dipen.mavani.92
[consulted on 17 June 2019]
Annex 4.12: Oumar Banga’s activities on Facebook.

Screenshots from https://www.facebook.com/oumar.banga.5
[Consulted on 17 June 2019]

Information confirming his activities as a dealer of diamonds from eastern CAR.
malgré avec le lancement d'embargo sur notre diamant en RCA nous les collecteurs de diamant et OR nous achetons tj le diamant de notre pays
Screenshots from Oumar Banga’s Facebook profile confirming his connections with Indian diamond buyers.
Annex 4.13: Hissein Damboucha’s activities on Facebook.

Available at https://www.facebook.com/damboucha.hissen
[consulted on 17 June 2019]

Pictures showing him in collectors’ offices and featuring diamonds and gold seemingly for sale.
Ces jumeaux sont parti au bord de l'eau ils ont trouvé 41 cailloux à terre.

Voici or 24.

Dambouche Hissen
21 décembre 2016 •

Si tu as des clients.

Hilwara El Rafaï 1 gram à combien mon frère.

Dambouche Hissen 20000C est 1kilo.

*Picture taken by the Panel on 21 January 2019.*
Annex 4.15: Pictures of Indian buyers and Oumar Banga posted on Hissein Damboucha’s Facebook profile.

Available at https://www.facebook.com/damboucha.hissen [Consulted on 17 June 2019]

Pictures featuring Chirag Gabani (uploaded on 10 August 2018 and 27 April 2018).

Picture featuring Oumar Banga (uploaded on 19 December 2016)
Annex 4.16: Seizure of undeclared rough diamonds at Bangui M’Poko International Airport (7 March 2019).

Picture available at
https://www.facebook.com/CentrafriqueInfo/photos/pcb.2581414075300016/2581413775300046/?type=3 &theater [Consulted on 17 June 2019]

Sélémane Oumar Garba
Annex 4.17: Sélémane Oumar Garba’s appointments as a Séléka member.

Sélémane Oumar Banga’s appointment as head of the Administrative and Financial Department of the Comité Extraordinaire pour la Défense des Acquis Démocratiques (CEDAD). The CEDAD was headed by listed individual Nourredine Adam and was created during the presidency of Michel Djotodia.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 30 April 2019.
(Vu le Décret n°13.396 du 30 septembre 2013, portant
Organisation et Fonctionnement du Comité Extraordinaire
pour la Défense des Acquis Démocratiques.

**SUR PROPOSITION DU DIRECTEUR GENERAL**

**DECRETE**

Art. 1° Sont nommés aux différents postes de responsabilité ci-après, les Fonctionnaires et Agents de l’État dont les noms suivent :

**I- CABINET**

Chef de Cabinet
- Monsieur Clément DOMBIAS

Conseiller Spécial, Chargé des Affaires Juridiques
- Monsieur Joseph Junior ZONGAVODEY, Commissaire de Police

Chef de Service de Secrétariat
- Mademoiselle Lore ADJASS

**II- DIRECTION DES ANALYSES**

Directeur
- Monsieur Noel DJIBRINE, Commissaire de Police

Chef de Service Politique
- Monsieur Christian MOCKET

Chef de Service Intérieur et Extérieur
- Monsieur AbdoulNabi DJARSOUL

Chef de Service de Lutte Anti-terrorisme
- Monsieur Bernard WASSIALO
III- DIRECTION DE LA RECHERCHE
Directeur
- Monsieur Etienne YANGA GREGONEMBEI
Chef de Service Enquête et Investigation
- Monsieur Raoul HASSAN HAROUN
Chef de Service Surveillance des Objectifs
- Monsieur Zakaria DJOUMA
Chef de Service de Protection et Intervention
- Monsieur BAH MAHAMAT

IV- DIRECTION ADMINISTRATIVE ET FINANCIERE
Directeur
- Monsieur Séliman OUMAR GARBA
Chef de Service Administratif et Personnel
- Madame Nathalie LEGUETAMA
Chef de Service Financier
- Monsieur ABDARAMANE HAMIT
Chef de Service Matériel et Logistique
- Madame Eliane MIZALI-KAYA

Art. 2 : Le présent décret, qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera enregistré et publié au Journal Officiel.

Fait à Bangui, le 02 OCT 2013

Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDOKO
Sélémane Oumar Garba’s appointment as FPRC’s General Treasurer (July 2014).

COMMUNIQUÉ FINAL.

DE LA PREMIÈRE ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES CADRES POLITIQUES DU FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE (FPRC) TENUE À BIRAO

Du 06 au 10 juillet 2014, s’est tenue à Birao la première Assemblée Générale du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) sous la Présidence du Général Mahamat Nouradine ADAM, Premier vice Président de l’ex-coalition séléka.
Ont pris part à ces assises les personnalités politiques ci-après :
Le Général Mohammed Moussa DHAFFANE; le Ministre d’Etat DJONO AHABA Herbert Gontran; le Général DAMANE Zakaria; le Général ISSA ISSAKA Aubin; le Général ABDELKARIM Moussa ; le Général BABA Issène, Chef de mission de l’Etat Major des Forces Républicaines ; le Général ACHAFI DAOUDE; le Général YAYA Bourma ; le Général MAHAMATKER; le Général Nama Hamat DAGACHE; Messieurs les Ministres; les Conseillers Nationaux de Transition ; les Sultans de la Vakaga et du Bamingui Bangoran; les leaders communautaires; les Cadres musulmans ; les Conseillers Municipaux.

L’objectif est d’évaluer la crise actuelle et redéfinir une nouvelle orientation politique du mouvement.

Les points suivants ont fait l’objet d’examen :
1- Le compte rendu des activités de la coordination politique provisoire ;
2- L’adoption des textes de base ;
3- La mise en place du bureau politique ;
4- Le forum de Brazzaville.

A l’issue de cette Assemblée Générale, il a été arrêté ce qui suit :
1. Du compte rendu des activités de la coordination provisoire
Les participants ont pris acte de ce compte rendu et ont félicité la coordination politique provisoire de leurs efforts.

2. De l’adoption des textes de base
L’assemblée générale a entériné la dissolution de la coalition Séléka et a donné le nom du nouveau mouvement qui s’appelle Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC). En examinant les textes, les participants ont apporté des amendements tant qu’à la forme qu’au fond. C’est ainsi que la validation des textes a été reportée à une assemblée générale extraordinaire qui sera convoquée par le bureau politique.

3. De la mise en place du Bureau politique
Les participants ont passé en revue les maux qui sont à l’origine de la divergence entre les Cadres politiques de FPRC et se sont accordés pour désigner les différentes personnalités aux postes suivants :

- Président : Michel DJOTODIA AM NONDROKO
- 1er vice-président chargé des questions de défense et de sécurité : Gi. Mahamat Nouradine ADAM
- 2ème vice-président chargé de logistique et de l’administration : Gi. Mohamed Moussa DHAFFANE
- 3ème vice-président chargé des questions économiques et financières : Mahamat TAÏB YACOUB
- Conseiller chargé Désarmement, Démobilisation Réinsertion (DDR) : Abdoulaye Issène RAMADANE
- Conseiller chargé de Défense globale : Gi. Damane ZAKARIA
- Conseiller chargé de la culture civique et de la formation : Ousmane Mahamat OUSMANE
- Secrétaire Général : Moustapha SABOUNE
- Secrétaire Général Adjoint : Hamat MAL-MAL ESSENE
- Trésorier Général : Sélimane Oumar GARBA
- Trésorier Général Adjoint : Djouma NDJAHÀ
- 1er Commissaire aux comptes : Gilbert TOUMOU DEYA
- 2ème Commissaire aux comptes : Assane BOUBA ALI
- Délégué chargé des relations extérieures : Eric NERIS MASSI
- Délégué chargé des affaires juridiques : Mamadou Moussa DANGAROU
- Délégué chargé des affaires politiques : Mahamat ABRASS
- Délégué chargé de la matriculation des ressources financières : Haroun Amolas AMLAS
- Délégué chargé des projets de développement : Rizigala RAMADANE
- Délégué chargé de la promotion feminine : Esiade TABANE MAHAMAT
- Délégué chargé des affaires sociales et culturelles : Abakar MOUSTAPHA
- Délégué chargé de la jeunesse : Ibrahim Sallat HAMIT
- Délégué chargé des médias et des nouvelles technologies : Mahamat Ahmat SRID
- Délégué Adjoint chargé des médias et nouvelles technologies : Ousmane ABAKAR
- Délégué Europe : Salif MANDJO
- Délégué Amérique : Abidene ABDOU
- Délégué Asie : Ibrahim OUSMANE
- Délégué Afrique et monde Arabe : Salahou NDIAYE
- Porte-parole : Awal HABILA

À l'issue de la mise en place de ce nouveau bureau, les participants ont donné des orientations claires aux nouveaux membres afin de prendre leur responsabilité face aux défis qui les attendent.

4. De la participation de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) au prochain forum de Brazzaville

Les candidats politiques de FPRC s’adhèrent et se félicitent de l’initiative des Chefs d’État au 23ème Sommet de l’Union Africaine tenu à Malabo pour la tenue d’un forum à Brazzaville relative à la crise Centrafricaine.

Cependant, le Rapport des Nations Unies soutenu par l’Union Africaine précise en substance : "des milices chrétiennes anti-balaka sont des voyous et des bandits de grand chemin et méritent d’être traitées par les organisations internationales comme tel..."
Cette question nécessite une large consultation car les véritables victimes sont les populations civiles musulmane et chrétienne assimilées.

Toutefois, le bureau politique est mandaté pour apprécier l'opportunité de participer à ce forum.

Les participants ont constaté avec angoisse la part partialité des Nations-Unies à travers le BINUCA et les forces françaises de l'opération SANGARIS qui n'ont pas réagi devant les actes de destruction des habitations, des mosquées et Corans, l'anthropophagie et la perforation des corps des musulmans.

Les participants ont également noté l'incapacité des forces étrangères à protéger les musulmans après la démission du Président Michel DJOTODIA. Cela rejoint la déclaration solennelle de la Présidente de Transition faite au cours de sa visite officielle pendant le mois de février 2014 à N'Djamena qui affirmait « qu'elle n'avait pas les moyens de protéger les musulmans », les persécutions du gouvernement contre les fonctionnaires musulmans et le non-respect des Accords de N'Djamena.

Après avoir épuisé les points inscrits à l'ordre du jour, l'assemblée générale a adressé ses vifs remerciements à la MISACA, au Président de la Délégation spécialisée auprès de la commune de Rédina, à sa Majesté, le Sultan de la Vakaga et aux populations de Birao pour son accueil fraternel et son aimable hospitalité.

Enfin, à l'unanimité les participants ont adopté le présent communiqué final et les recommandations des travaux de la première Assemblée Générale des cadres politiques de Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) jointes en annexe.

Fait à Birao le 10 juillet 2014

Le Rapporteur Général

Amit IDRISSE

Le Président du comité d'organisation

Prof ABDEL-DJOUBAR
Annex 5.1: Further information (including photos and map) on 3R attacks.

Full chronology

Incidents involving Fulani prior to the Lemounda/ Koundjili killings

The events leading up to the killings on 21 May 2019 in Lemouna and Koundjili began on 17 April with an attack against a Fulani by four individuals in Ndjom Ndjom village (5 kilometers from Lemouna in Ouham Pendé prefecture; see map below). On leaving the Paoua hospital, this individual demanded a payment of FCFA 250,000 (about $410) before 13 May 2019 from the villagers of Lemouna, threatening to seek revenge with the 3R if they failed to pay by this date. The chef du groupe of Lemouna reported this to the judicial officials in Paoua; he attempted but failed to find a negotiated solution with the Fulani during a meeting in Pougol (see map below). Four individuals had earlier been arrested over the original 17 April attack against the Fulani, but escaped from the prison in Paoua on 8 May 2019.

In the second incident, an RJ element accompanied by two others, killed a Fulani trader in Koundjili on the evening of the 8-9 May. The relatives of this Fulani went to the 3R to lodge a complaint even though the Koundjili villagers had handed over two of the three suspects (the third had fled to Cameroon) to the gendarmes on 9 and 10 May and they had also burned their houses (see photos below).

Attacks of 21 May in Lemouna and Koundjili

On 21 May 2019, the day of the attack, villagers in Loura (see map below) reported seeing 14 motorbikes coming from Létélé (where 3R has a base) heading towards Lemouna-Koundjili, but only four returned. Just before noon, 14 motorbikes with around three uniformed elements on each – apart from one non-uniformed element - stopped in Lemouna village. In Lemouna, the villagers recognized some of them as 3R elements who come to the village for the market, or to harass the Fulani in their camp near to the town. This includes the three individuals handed over by 3R leadership to national leaders.

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179 Meeting with Prosecutor, Paoua and confidential source, 29 and 27 May 2019.
180 Confidential report of a meeting involving Jean Deny Albert Horo, Chef du groupe of Lemouna, Paoua, 31 May 2019 and meeting with villagers, Lemouna, 28 May 2019 and meeting with the Prosecutor, Paoua, 30 May 2019.
181 Confidential report of a meeting involving Jean Deny Albert Horo, Chef du groupe of Lemouna, Paoua, 31 May 2019.
182 Meeting with Prosecutor, Paoua, 30 May 2019.
183 Meeting with Prosecutor, Paoua, 30 May 2019.
185 Meeting with villagers, Lemouna, 28 May 2019.
186 Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019.
187 Meeting with eyewitnesses, Lemouna, 28 May 2019.
188 Meetings with eyewitnesses, Lemouna, 28 May 2019.
authorities on 24 May. The 3R elements asked for the local youth leader and the village chief,\textsuperscript{189} claiming to want to speak to them in matters linked to cattle, but at the same time, several 3R elements rounded up all the males from the quartiers, tying 22 of them up in groups of two or three close to the village chief’s house.\textsuperscript{190} Any women who approached were sent away. They had not brought rope with them to tie up the individuals but asked for rope from the villagers and also used the clothes of some of the villagers.

Four of the motorbikes continued to Koundjili: two stopped at the entrance to the village while the other two went to the top. At the entrance to Koundjili, the 3R elements gathered together 13 males instructing them to lie down with their heads to the ground. Unlike in Lemouna, the villagers at the top of Koundjili had fled, leaving just a deaf child and a traveller who had just arrived in the village. The 3R killed these two civilians and looted a shop.\textsuperscript{191} Meanwhile, at the bottom of the village one of the group of 13 fled, at which time the execution of the other 12 began. Each person was shot with a bullet, leaving no wounded (see photos below). A MINUSCA convoy arrived at this moment at the top of Koundjili at which time the 3R elements fled on their motorbikes for Lemouna.\textsuperscript{192}

When these same 3R elements then arrived in Lemouna, some eyewitnesses reported hearing the returning 3R elements shout at those who had remained there. Only on the arrival of these elements from Koundjili, did those remaining then proceeded to execute those who were tied up. In Lemouna several individuals still managed to flee and others were wounded.\textsuperscript{193} All 3R elements left at this time but some took different routes to return back to Létélé.\textsuperscript{194}

\textit{Incidents in the Bohong area}

At the same time as the Koundjili and Lemouna killing, the 3R also carried out a series of attacks in the area to the south of Bohong. The origin of these attacks appeared to be once again several incidents involving Fulani herders.

On 13 May, a Fulani was killed in Mbere/Songo Yongo (20 kilometers south-east of Bohong).\textsuperscript{195} On 14 May, in response to the incident the day before, a local Fulani group attacked the village resulting in the death of a village chief and his two children, along with a second

\textsuperscript{189} These were the only two individuals who were specifically requested. Meetings with eyewitnesses, Lemouna, 28 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{190} Meeting with eyewitnesses, Lemouna, 28 May 2019 and Bangui, 3 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{191} Meeting with eyewitnesses from Koundjili, Koundjili, 29 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{192} Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{193} Meetings with villagers, Lemouna, 28 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{194} Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{195} Meeting with gendarmes, Bohong, 18 May 2019. In a meeting with the Panel in Koui on 17 May 2019, Sidiki claimed that the anti-balaka from Bozoum were behind this killing. Meeting with Sidiki, Koui, 17 May 2019.
Fulani.\textsuperscript{196} On 15 May reports were received that around 40 3R elements moved from Bokaya southwards to Loh village, south-west of Bocaranga, in response to the killing of two Fulani.

There then followed a series of 3R attacks on villages around Bohong:

- on 16 May 2019, around 28 3R elements attacked Ndarandaye (10 kilometers north-east of Bohong) and beat up the village chief;
- on 17 May, 3R elements reportedly attacked Maikolo (25 kilometers south-east of Bohong) looting a health centre and exchanging fire with a self-defence group;
- on 19 May 2019, the 3R reportedly attacked more villages along the river Ouham.\textsuperscript{197}

On 21 May, around 50 3R elements launched an attack against Bohong,\textsuperscript{198} killing at least nine civilians directly and wounding four others, with at least six others are believed to have died while fleeing the attack.\textsuperscript{199} On 22 May, a MINUSCA delegation convinced the 3R to withdraw from Bohong. On 24 May, the 3R also left Bokaya after requests from MINUSCA only to return on 18 June against the agreement and despite the presence of the FACA in the town.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{196} Meeting with gendarmes, Bohong, 18 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{197} Confidential report, June 2019.
\textsuperscript{198} Meeting with confidential source, Paoua, 27 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{199} Confidential report, 12 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{200} Confidential report, 19 June 2019.
Map showing Koundjili and Lemouna

Map showing Bocaranga-Bokaya-Bohong and
Photographs obtained by the Panel from a confidential source between 29 May and 25 June 2019:

Photo of individual victim shot in Koundjili I after the population fled

Photo of male victims shot after being ordered to lie face down on the ground in Koundjili II

Photo of male victims tied up and shot in Lemouna
Graves for the victims of Koundjili and Lemouna
Annex 5.2: Communiqués of armed groups condemning the killings of Lemouna and Koundjili.

Below the communiqué published by FPRC on 23 May 2019. Similar communiqués were published by other groups, including ex-Séléka factions MPC and UPC.

*Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group member on 24 May 2019.*

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**COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE**

Le Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) est consterné par les tueries d’une extrême lâcheté perpétrée contre les populations civiles innocentes de Koundjili, Djoumjoum Bohong et Lemouna, dans la préfecture de l’Ouham-Pendé, le 21 mai 2019, causant des dizaines des victimes dont le député suppléant de Paoua 1.

Le Bureau Politique du FPRC présente ses condoléances les plus attristées aux familles des victimes et condamne avec la dernière énergie ces actes ignobles, barbares, inacceptables.

En ce moment où tout est mis en œuvre pour la pacification de la RCA et le retour à l’ordre institutionnel, le Bureau Politique du FPRC dénonce ces massacres et se désolidarise de leurs auteurs.

Fidèle à son engagement total et adhésion sans faille à l’APPR-RCA, le Bureau Politique du FPRC s’associe à l’action du gouvernement et de la MINUSCA pour empêcher toutes les actions d’obstruction à la mise en œuvre de l’APPR-RCA et se met à la disposition du gouvernement pour discuter, en bilatérale, des arrangements sécuritaires transitoires (article 16 de l’APPR-RCA) en vue de la mise en œuvre des points mentionnés à l’article 5 de l’APPR-RCA dans l’ensemble des zones sous contrôle FPRC.

Fait à Brao, le 23 mai 2019

Le Vice-Président
Annex 5.3: Declaration of Degaulles creating the RCP signed on 20 October 2018.

Document obtained by the Panel from an armed group leader on 1 November 2018

La déclaration de coordination des groupes armés (RCP)

Vu le conflit entre les groupes armés;

Vu les barrières abusives qui empêchent la libre circulation des personnes et biens;

Vu la provocation et agression des FACAS sur les groupes armés engagés dans les processus de paix (le cas de RI);

Vu les vols de bétails, tueries des paysans, pillage et incendie systématique des villages par des groupes armés non identifiés;

Vu l’empeignement des paysans et le personnel Humanitaire; (le cas de MENTOR à Paoua);

Nous, les cinq groupes Armés de la zone Ouest: 3R, FDPC, ATB, RJS et RJB réunis à dégaulle du 18 au 20 Octobre 2018 dans une plate forme dénommée le Rassemblement Centrafricain pour la paix (RCP) sous la coordination du GAL Sidiki Abbass, décidons ce qui suit:

1 Promouvoir la libre circulation des personnes et biens.

2 Consolidé la Paix et promouvoir la cohésion sociale qui est un facteur d'unité pour tous les fils et filles du pays.

3 Parvenir à un pacte de non agression entre les différents groupes armés

4 Renforcer la promotion de processus de dialogue de l'union Africaine

5 Se préparer à la sensibilisation pour le lancement du grand DRR de nos différents groupes armés

6 Remercier les Nations Unies, l'Union Africaine, l'Union Européenne, CEEAC, la CEMAC, toute la communauté internationale pour leur volonté ferme d'accompagner le Centrafrique sur le chemin de la Paix
Annex 5.4: Additional information on the armed group 3R.

The armed group 3R controls the significant part of the area bordering Cameroon, a key zone from which to monitor activities related to transhumance. In the border town of Mbéré (Ouham-Pendé prefecture), the customs post is held by officials appointed by the national authorities in Bangui. Their situation is particularly precarious given the limited support they receive from the State. Some of them even hold refugee status in Cameroon from where they commute daily; the 3R comzone also obliges them to pay 100,000 FCFA per week to the 3R Ngaoundaye checkpoint.

In parallel with its recruitment efforts, the leadership of 3R has also organized training for its fighters. According to the population in Kouï, 3R elements are conducting daily physical exercises; to be recruited, the fighters also need to go through a selection process to determine whether they are physically fit. According to many sources, a former Cameroonian soldier referred to as “Abdulaziz” and seen by the Panel, supervises the 3R training (see picture below). This individual is reportedly a former member of the Brigade d’Intervention Rapide (BIR) who had fled Cameroun to avoid imprisonment there.

The absorption of new elements, in particular from Siriri, such as Abdelkader Ramadan, now present in Kouï alongside Sidiki, creates a challenge for Sidiki’s authority. Ramadan is a former Siriri leader from the Oudah ethnic group, a community within the Fulani and at the heart of the Baba Ladé rebellion (S/2018/1119, para. 131-133). As the Ouadah community still has a major influence within the Fulani-dominated armed groups in CAR, and given Sidiki’s health issues, the Panel assesses that Ramadan might claim leadership of 3R in the near future.

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201 Meeting with custom officials, Mbéré, 16 May 2019.
Picture of “Abdulaziz” as identified by confidential sources.

*Picture taken by the Panel in Ngaoundaye on 15 May 2019.*
Annex 5.5: Uniformed and non-uniformed 3R fighters with AK-type assault rifles and a Galil ACE 32.

Pictures of 3R fighters carrying AK-type assault rifle taken by the Panel in Létélé and Ngaoundaye on 16 May 2019.

Picture of 3R fighter carrying a Galil ACE 32 7.62x39mm, received from confidential source on 22 June 2019.
Picture of 3R fighters with different uniforms taken by the Panel at the Ngaoundaye 3R base installed in State buildings (gendarmerie) on 16 May 2019.
Annex 5.6: Map showing several 3R trafficking routes.
Annex 5.7: Photograph of a side road cleared by 3R in border town Mbéré and connecting with the Mbaibokoum-Bitoi axis.

Picture of the cleared side road in Mbéré taken by the Panel on 16 May 2019.
Annex 5.8: Additional information on the acquisition of pickups, weapons and ammunition by 3R.

Since mid-November 2018, 3R has acquired at least nine pickup vehicles with sheeted loads. In mid-November 2018, the group reportedly paid approximately FCFA 6 million ($ 9,900) to acquire six land cruiser pickups from individuals in Chad. Machine guns were mounted atop these vehicles in the town of Koui (Ouham Pendé prefecture). These machine guns would have been purchased around the same period, together with ammunition and other automatic weapons, for the reported total amount of FCFA 37 million (US$ 61,100). The material was reportedly transported to the village of Mini, located in Chad near the border with CAR and Cameroon, and trafficked into CAR via small side roads leading straight to Ngaoundaye. Local authorities, merchants and civilians met by the Panel reported that between January and April 2019, 3R purchased at least three other pickups vehicles from individuals in Chad, and that at least weekly, 3R elements move to the Chadian border and beyond, on motorcycles, to pick up weapons, ammunition and uniforms.

*Picture of Toyota pickups vehicles with 3R elements taken by the Panel in Koui on 17 May 2019.*

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205 Idem.
206 Idem.
Annex 5.9: The 3R weapons storage and arms register system.

To control his fighters and for the 3R to appear as a well-organized and responsible armed group, Abbas Sidiki has installed a weapons storage and management system. In Kouï, there are reportedly four bases where 3R stores its weapons (for some of their weaponry, see pictures below). The main storage site, to which the Panel was given access, is located at Sidiki’s base. Sidiki also showed the Panel the arms register of 3R on his computer. This register lists all weapons and the armed elements to whom the weapons and rounds of ammunition are given, as well as their specific location. According to Sidiki, when armed elements return to Kouï, they must first pass to one of the four weapons storage sites to hand over their weapons and ammunition. The weapons are then verified and the ammunition is accounted for.207

Pictures taken by the Panel at the base of Sidiki in Kouï on 17 May 2019.

207 Panel’s mission to Kouï, 17 May 2019.
Annex 6.1: Additional information on the training of FACA.

On training of FACA by the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic

The European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM) completed the training of 333 soldiers of the amphibious battalion on 30 November 2018 and 332 soldiers of a fourth battalion of the Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) on 12 April 2019. As of 18 June, the total number of FACA soldiers trained by EUTM was 4,104 (2,598 for operational training and 1,506 for educational training). 208

On 24 June 2019, EUTM started the four-month basic training of the 1,023 new FACA soldiers in Bangui (camp Kassai) and Bouar (camp Lerclerc), initially scheduled to begin in January 2019 (see S/2018/1119, para. 177).

On 29 May, the Sanctions Committee received a notification from the Republic of Cyprus regarding the transfer of 100,800 pieces of 7.62x38mm ammunition for the support of and use by the training mission, which arrived in Bangui on 7 June 2019. EUTM now also uses some FACA weapons for their training. 209

On the training by, and related deployment of, instructors from the Russian Federation

The 175 Russian instructors were recently reinforced with an additional 60 instructors (S/2018/1119, para. 176). The total number of FACA soldiers trained by Russian instructors was 2,236. 210

Russian instructors are currently present in Bambari, Bangassou, Bocaranga, Bouar, Dekoa, Paoua, and Sibut to ensure that the skills acquired during the training are correctly applied by the FACA once deployed. 211 Russian instructors also continue to be involved in securing the transport of material from the Sudan into the territory of the Central African Republic. On 12 February, the escort travelling from Am Dafok through the town of Birao was escorted by FPRC elements. 212

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209 Meeting with confidential sources, 1 July 2019.
210 Meeting with the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, 10 June 2019.
Annex 6.2: Information on the country-wide recruitment process.

The country-wide recruitment procedure (organized with MINUSCA technical and logistical assistance) and training of new recruits has been affected by several delays and a number of obstacles. Armed groups opposed the recruitment of potential FACA recruits in Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture) and Bria (Haute-Kotto prefecture); therefore, none of the candidates from these two prefectures could attend the examination process for FACA recruitment, which aimed at the inclusion of recruits from all the prefectures.\textsuperscript{213} Also, there were several attempts, including by Bangui-based individuals, to remove and add names from the selected list,\textsuperscript{214} which thus required rigorous nominal control.


\textsuperscript{214} Meeting with confidential sources, 13 June 2019.
Annex 6.3: Map on FACA deployment.
Annex 6.4: The challenges of FACA deployment.

FACA still have insufficient capacity for conducting operations without the substantive and constant support of MINUSCA and/or Russian instructors. For example, on 20 April 2019 the Panel met FACA deployed in Alindao. These FACA live alongside UPC elements in town, and stated to the Panel that they could only leave their base if protected by MINUSCA, as they were under constant threat from the UPC. The UPC had declared that the FACA are not allowed to move in town.

*Picture of FACA taken by the Panel, Alindao, 20 April 2019.*

FACA also face serious logistical challenges. In Bambari, Bocaranga and Bouar, the Panel witnessed a lack of proper housing for deployed FACA (see picture below). In most areas where FACA are deployed, there is also still a lack of proper/safe storage capacity for weapons and ammunition, as observed by the Panel in Bangassou (see picture below). In Bambari, Bouar and Bocaranga, the FACA also complained about a lack of fuel. On the other hand, the Panel observed FACA based in Bocaranga selling the fuel they had just picked up in Bouar at the market in Bocaranga. Another illustration is that, as of 7 June, there was a delay in FACA rotations in Bocaranga, Paoua, Kaga-Bandoro, Dekoa, Bambari, Bangassou and Alindao, i.e. almost 50% of those areas where FACA are

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215 Meeting with UPC zone commander, Alindao, 20 April 2019.
deployed (for the consequences on these delayed rotations, see below). \(^{220}\)

*Picture of one of the destroyed FACA tents in their base in Bambari, taken by the Panel in Bambari on 22 April 2019*

*Picture of weapons and ammunition stored at the FACA base in Bangassou, taken by the Panel on 11 May 2019.*

\(^{220}\) Confidential document, 7 June 2019.
Annex 6.5: Cases of FACA misconduct.

Even if the number of abuses by FACA are significantly lower than those committed by armed groups, poor logistic arrangements and living conditions combined with a weak chain of command have resulted in numerous cases of misconduct by FACA being reported in all areas of deployment. Several reports refer to the “chronic lack of resources or professionalism” that have plagued the FACA.²²¹ To illustrate, on 3 March 2019 in Bocaranga, a FACA soldier killed another FACA and wounded another.²²² FACA in Bocaranga have been accused by the population of setting up checkpoints to illegally tax civilians, and having arbitrarily arrested civilians.²²³ On 4 March, in Obo, an armed FACA soldier stopped and threatened a MINUSCA patrol.²²⁴ The same day, FACA soldiers fired shots in the air in their base, protesting the delays in their rotation: the FACA contingent had been deployed in Obo since May 2017.²²⁵ On 12 March 2019, during new protests by FACA on their delayed rotation, the commander of the gendarmerie brigade was killed inside the FACA base.²²⁶ FACA soldiers in Obo also imposed illegal taxes on civilians.²²⁷ In Bangassou and Béma, FACA soldiers also imposed illegal taxes on goods that civilians import from the Democratic Republic of Congo.²²⁸ In early April, one FACA soldier in Bangassou also sold his weapon to an individual linked with a self-defence group. The FACA soldier was later arrested.²²⁹ In Alindao, on 20 February, a FACA soldier shot in the air after he did not receive food.²³⁰ In Paoua, on 3 April 2019, six FACA soldiers kidnapped and physically abused two civilians.²³¹ Four days later, three FACA elements physically abused a MINUSCA staff member in Paoua.²³² In Dekoa, FACA soldiers tortured six elderly women accused of witchcraft, one of whom later died.²³³ National authorities have investigated several cases of misconduct and sanctioned FACA; yet, not all abuses are managed by the military hierarchy.

²²¹ Confidential reports, February-May 2019.
²²² Confidential report, 3 March 2019.
²²³ Confidential report, February 2019.
²²⁵ Ibid.
²³² Ibid.
Annex 6.6: Information on the recruitment, training, equipment, redeployment and conduct of Internal Security Forces

As of 1 June, a total number of 259 police officers and 240 gendarmes had benefitted from training by Russian instructors (see also S/2018/1119, para. 178). The recruitment process of an additional 1,000 police and gendarmes is still ongoing; the nationwide information campaign on this new recruitment started on 15 June 2019 (see also S/2018/1119, para. 178).

In spite of the 2018 recruitment and training (S/2018/1119, para.178), the redeployment of the national security forces has yet to gain momentum. The lack of proper equipment and logistics, and the fear of armed group attacks such as those witnessed in January 2019 in Bambari (see annex 4.3), have prevented an effective and rapid deployment.

Only 28% of the 3,682 police and gendarme officers are currently deployed outside Bangui, most of them in the west, as the table below shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
<th>ISF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangui</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>2404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not operational</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>3682</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thanks to the material provided by the Russian Federation and France, following exemption requests, some progress has been made regarding the provision of weapons and ammunition; however, there continues to be a need for crowd control equipment, as shown during the 15 June demonstration where the crowd was dispersed with live ammunition shot in the air.

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234 Meeting with the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, 10 June 2019.
235 Meeting with confidential source, 11 June 2019.
236 Confidential report, 10 June 2019.
237 Meeting with confidential sources, 12 June 2019 and confidential document, 10 June 2019. See also S/2018/1119, para.182
Even if the number of abuses is significantly lower than those committed by armed groups, there continue to be reports of misconduct committed by police and gendarmes, including physical abuse, collection of illegal taxes and the inappropriate use of weapons. For example, in late February 2019 a gendarme reportedly killed a civilian and wounded two others in Boda (Ombella-M’poko prefecture). The gendarme was arrested.\(^\text{239}\) On 3 May, the commander of the gendarmerie in Gadzi (Mambere-Kadei prefecture) was accused of infringing the right to liberty of movement of a Muslim man.\(^\text{240}\) On 30 May, civilians reported that gendarmes were illegally taxing them at five checkpoints installed on the Grimari-Bakala and Grimari-Kouango axes.\(^\text{241}\)

\(^\text{239}\) Confidential document, March 2019.
\(^\text{240}\) Confidential report, May 2019.
\(^\text{241}\) Confidential report, 31 May 2019.
Annex 6.7: Additional information on the OCRB.

The OCRB has a history of human rights abuses including illegal detention, torture and extrajudicial killings (S/2016/694, paras. 38-41). Since 2016, MINUSCA has no longer co-located with the OCRB either at the headquarters in the 1st District or in any of the six antennae (92 logements, Damala, Ngouciment, PK 13, Bangouma, and Katine Plateau). The former OCRB director, Robert Yekoua-Kette, was removed from his post on 8 June 2016 after being accused of human rights abuses.

According to video evidence and witness testimony, on 23 March 2019 at OCRB 92 logements, three OCRB elements in uniform, together with a fourth in civilian clothing (later identified as the director of the 92 Logements OCRB antenna), repeatedly hit a bound detainee with a wooden stick and also whipped him, accusing him of being part of a Muslim self-defence group from the PK5 neighbourhood of Bangui. A day earlier, on 22 March, the victim had been seized by a group of youth armed with knives and machetes in the 6th district and then, on the recommendation of another member of their community, had been taken to the OCRB 92 logements post. On arrival, the OCRB officers took from him FCFA 37,000 (64 USD) and his driving license.

At 6am on 23 March 2019, Luther Kouta, commander of the ‘corps urbain’, reportedly took the victim from the cell, and tied his arms around a concrete post (see photo below). While an officer filmed the incident, asking the victim questions and accusing him of being part of a militia from the PK5 neighbourhood, he asked the two other officers present – Guy Pamebeti and a judicial police officer known only by his nickname ‘ampoule grillée’ - to hit the detainee. During this incident, the victim was forced to wear a chain around his neck while being repeatedly hit on his body and feet for around 30 minutes (see photo below).

When Jean-Paul Yourou, Director of the Antenna arrived (in civilian clothes), he watched the scene, and then instructed the officers to continue. In one of the videos, the Director also hit the victim. Finally, the Commissioner orders the victim to be taken to the OCRB headquarters in the first district. On 24 March the victim was again reportedly hit, this time on his hands, at the OCRB headquarters, and was accused of having killed a youth from his district. He was then transferred to the judicial police services department (DSPJ) on

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242 Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 4 June 2019.
243 The Panel obtained one of the four videos on 17 May and additional videos in Bangui on 4 June 2019.
244 ‘Ampoule grilée’ has since been transferred to the “PK13” antenna. Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 4 May 2019.
27 March, and then eventually to the Ngragba prison on 15 April 2019. The inspectorate of police has been notified and has said it would open an inquiry.\textsuperscript{245}

The OCRB is largely made up of auxiliaries – 190 of the 225 officers (or 80 per cent) – who, despite not having regular police training nor receiving an official salary, carry weapons and wear the same OCRB uniforms as the regular officers.\textsuperscript{246} Fines handed down to those arrested by the unit are a key source of income, predisposing them to such behaviour.\textsuperscript{247} On 26 March 2019, the Minister of Interior, responsible for Public Security, General Wanzet, gathered representatives of the auxiliaries of the police force together at the National Police Academy to inform them of his decision to integrate them directly into the police force.\textsuperscript{248} This declaration reportedly created problems between the Minister of Interior and the Director-General of the Police, Bienvenue Zoukoue (and former Director of the OCRB), because an informal commission had already been established to create a legal framework to train and test all auxiliaries within the force to ensure they meet the standards required of all regular police officers and to then allow them to be integrated within the force.\textsuperscript{249}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{245} Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 4 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{246} An attempt is currently underway to register all auxiliaries with the police force. Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 3 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{247} Meeting with confidential source and national NGO, Bangui, 4 June and 2 June 2019.
\textsuperscript{248} There are just over 600 auxiliaries working in the police force according to official sources. Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 3 June 2019. http://centrafriqueactu.com/2018/03/29/centrafrique-integration-dans-la-fonction-publique-les-auxiliaires-de-la-police-nationale-menacent-de-entrer-en-greve/
\textsuperscript{249} Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 3 June 2019.
\end{footnotesize}
Screenshots from the videos taken at OCRB 92 Logements.
Annex 6.8: Commercial explosives: importation and safety in storage

The CAR Government routinely authorizes the import of seemingly large quantities of commercial explosives. This must be balanced though against the needs of the civil engineering and mining sectors, and specialists in this sector may not consider that such large quantities are unusual by industry standards. Some examples of authorized types and quantities are included in the table below:

Summary of some approved commercial explosives imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb 2018</td>
<td>ONM</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>5,000kg</td>
<td>• Booster explosive for Ammonium Nitrate / Fuel Oil (ANFO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ammonium Nitrate</td>
<td>20,000kg</td>
<td>• Non-explosive until mixed with fuel oil to make ANFO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detonating cord</td>
<td>10,000m</td>
<td>• Requires a booster to initiate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electric detonators</td>
<td>5,000 off</td>
<td>• Commercial type. (Not manufactured or packaged to military specifications).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sep 2018</td>
<td>Sogea Satom</td>
<td>Explogel 65 or Plus 70</td>
<td>32,000kg</td>
<td>• Gel commercial explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ammonium Nitrate</td>
<td>56,700kg</td>
<td>• Non-explosive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Detonating cord</td>
<td>15,000m</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electric detonators</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nonel shocktube detonators</td>
<td>2,410</td>
<td>• Unsuitable for military or terrorist use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar 2019</td>
<td>Sogea Satom</td>
<td>Explogel 65 or Plus 70</td>
<td>8,000kg</td>
<td>• Gel commercial explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr 2019</td>
<td>Thien Pao</td>
<td>Explosive TBC</td>
<td>10,000kg</td>
<td>• Booster explosive for ANFO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ammonium Nitrate</td>
<td>71,000kg</td>
<td>• Non-explosive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electric detonators</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Commercial type.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The substances referred to in the different CAR Government authorizations have been acquired from, and delivered by, several enterprises in France, Cameroon and the Republic of Congo.\(^{250}\)

The Ministry of Defense authorized Sogea Satom to store the explosives and related material at the *Camp Leclerc* military base in Bouar and assigned six FACA officers to guard the explosives.\(^{251}\) Several FACA officers also guard the explosives at the ONM base in Bangui.\(^{252}\)

\(^{250}\) Panel’s inspection at ONM base, 12-13 June 2019. Documents on the inspection of storage of the explosives and related material of Sogea Satom, Bouar, 4 and 17 June 2019. Documents obtained by the Panel from different companies in June 2019.

\(^{251}\) Contract between Sogea Satom and the FACA commander in Bouar, 9 October 2018.

\(^{252}\) Panel’s inspection at ONM base, 12-13 June 2019.
Panel has not yet inspected the storage site of the explosives imported by Thien Pao.253

The Panel has informed the national authorities and importing companies that the imports of explosives could constitute a violation of the arms embargo, but the Panel is investigating the issue in more detail and will also consult with the 2127 Committee.

The Panel also notes that improper storage and safeguarding of such materials could lead to diversion of explosive materials and ultimately to their use by armed groups. In early July 2019, the Minister of Public Works, in close consultation with Sogea Satom, informed the Panel that the Ministry of Public Works would regulate the matter and send all (post-facto) exemption requests to the Sanctions Committee, if required.254

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253 Meeting with Thien Pao representative, Bangui, 15 June 2019.
254 Meeting with Minister of Public works, 3 July 2019.
Copy of correspondence from the CAR Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon, referring to the authorization given by the CAR Minister of Defense to ONM to buy explosives and related material dated 25 March 2017. Document obtained by the Panel from an official from the Ministry of Public Works on 11 June 2019.
Excerpt of a decision by the Minister of Mines authorizing Sogea Satom to buy explosives and related material dated 26 September 2018. Document obtained by the Panel from a Sogea Satom staff member on 12 June 2019.

There is a similar decision authorizing Sogea Satom to import certain amounts of explosives and related material dated 28 March 2019.
Copy of authorization by the Ministry of Defence for Sogea Satom to transport detonators from Mongoumba (DRC border) to Bouar with a FACA escort dated 14 February 2019. Document obtained by the Panel from an official from the Ministry of Public Works on 11 June 2019.

There is a similar decision on the transport of detonators from Bangui to Bouar with gendarmerie escort dated 6 March 2019.
Picture of the storage of nitrate close to the M’Poko international airport in Bangui, taken by the Panel on 12 June 2019.

Establishment of quarterly threshold for exports of rough diamonds by diamond houses. According to this note by the Minister of Mines, if a buying house does not export diamonds of a value of $600,000 on a quarterly basis, it will have its license revoked.

Document provided to the Panel by a staff from the Ministry of Mines on 17 May 2019.
Note by the Minister of Mines recalling some of the rules framing the activities of collectors. In particular, the Note recalls that the selling of diamonds among collectors is forbidden. In previous reports, the Panel had underlined that most collectors were trading diamonds among themselves in violation of the mining code, especially in the absence of buying houses’ offices in the provinces (S/2016/1032, para. 172 and S/2018/1119, para. 144).
Art 149. Pour être agent collecteur il faut remplir les conditions suivantes :
- avoir une bonne moralité ;
- n'avoir jamais été condamné soit pour infraction à la législation Minière soit pour infraction pénale à une peine pour crime ou délit ;
- ne pas être actionnaire ni employé d'une Société Minière, d'un Bureau d'Achat, d'une tailleuse, d'une bijouterie ou d'une fondrière ni membre d'une coopérative minière ;
- avoir payé sa patente de collecteur de l'année en cours.

NB : LES COLLECTEURS SONT TENUS DE REALISER TRIMESTREELLEMENT UNE PERFORMANCE MINIMALE DE 50 000 DOLLARS D'ACHAT AFIN DE PRETENDRE AU RENOUVELLEMENT DE LEUR VEAU LE L'ANNEE SUIVANTE.

Art 156. Les gérants et agents acheteurs des Bureaux d'Achat et centres secondaires d'achat doivent être préalablement agréés par Arrêté du Ministre chargé des Mines avant d'exercer toute activité.

Les gérants et agents acheteurs des Bureaux d'Achat et centres secondaires d'achat sont autorisés à acheter les pierres et métaux précieux et semi-précieux bruts aux collecteurs agréés, aux coopératives d'artisans miniers et aux exploitants artisans patentés.

Chaque lot acheté doit faire l'objet d'une inscription sur un bordereau d'achat préalablement cacheté, numéroté et enregistré dans les registres de l'Administration des Mines.

Art 187. Sont passibles d'un emprisonnement de deux (2) à cinq (5) ans et d'une amende pouvant aller de cinq cent mille (500 000) à cinquante millions (50 000 000) francs CFA ou à deux (2) fois la valeur de la marchandise saisie ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement, les personnes qui, n'ayant les qualités ni de collecteur, ni d'agent acheteur d'un Bureau d'Achat, d'une bijouterie, d'une tailleuse, d'une fondrière ou du COMIGEM se livrent à l'achat, à la vente et à la transformation illicite de l'or, des diamants bruts et d'autres substances minérales.

Les collecteurs ayant acheté ou vendu un lot entre les collecteurs seront soumis à la même peine.

Le Chef de Mission, l'Inspecteur Général en matière des Mines, les Structures déconcentrées du Ministère en charge des Mines et les Unités Opérationnelles de l'USAF sont tenus, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de veiller à la stricte application de la présente note.
II. Dispositions du Décret d’application du Code Minier

Art 247 : Les candidats à la profession d’agent collecteur présentent leur demande à la Direction Générale des Mines ou à la Direction Régionale des Mines de la localité pour acheminement à la Direction Générale qui statuera après enquête.
La réception du carnet de collecteur est subordonnée au paiement préalable de la dotation dont le taux est fixé par la Loi de Finances. La validité du carnet de collecteur est de un (1) an, à compter du 1er janvier de l’année renouvelable.
Lors de la livraison du nouveau carnet, le collecteur doit remettre à la Direction Générale des Mines ou à la Direction Régionale des Mines de la localité où il réside, les carnet exprimés ainsi que tous les bordereaux d’achat en sa possession. Il lui est en outre chargé de ces documents.
Le carnet du collecteur est strictement personnel et seul son titulaire est autorisé à acheter de l’or et des diamants bruts en provenance des exploitants artisanaux ou coopératives minières.

Art 248 : Toute collecte d’or et de diamants bruts effectuée par un collecteur auprès d’un exploitant artisanal ou coopératif donne lieu à l’établissement en quatre (4) exemplaires d’un bordereau d’achat conforme au modèle agréé par la Direction Générale des Mines, laquelle est conservée par le collecteur.

Les collecteurs sont tenus de vendre la totalité de leurs produits soit aux agents notables agréés des Bureaux d’achat ou Centres d’achat, soit au COMSAMU ainsi qu’aux Tontons, Bijouteries ou Fonderies agréées. Toutes autres possibilités de vente, en particulier la vente d’un collecteur à un autre collecteur ou à une société minière sont interdites. Tout lot collecté doit obligatoirement être vendu dans un délai maximum de 30 jours à compter de la date de son acquisition.

Les collecteurs devant faire viser leur carnet professionnel au départ de province par le Directeur Régional des Mines, le cas échéant par la Brigade Spéciale Anti-Fraudes la plus proche, et à l’arrivée à Bangui par la Direction Générale des Mines.

Pour l’obtention du visa, la présentation des bordereaux d’achat ou de vente est exigée.

Art 249 : Il est fait obligation à tous les collecteurs de diamants et d’or de fournir mensuellement à la Direction Générale des Mines, les bordereaux d’achat.

Ces bordereaux doivent contenir systématiquement les indications suivantes :
l'identité du vendeur
l'identité de l'acheteur
la qualité
le chantier d'exploitation
la quantité
la répartition par caratage pour le diamant - le prix d'achat
la date et le lieu.

Le double des bordereaux de vente comportant la date de cession, le nom et l'adresse de l'acheteur, le numéro de la patente pour les collecteurs ou celui du bureau d'achat et le prix de vente,

Art 250 : Les documents ci-dessus mentionnés doivent être remis au plus tard le 15 du mois suivant à la Direction Régionale des Mines ou à la Brigade de Contrôle Énergétique, Minier et Hydraulique qui sont tenues de les acheminer à la Direction Générale des Mines dans la semaine suivant leur réception.

Art 251 : Tout retard injustifié ou inobservation des dispositions des articles 248, 249 et 250 ci-dessus sera sanctionné, après un avertissement, du retrait de la patente de collecteur de diamant et d'or.

Art 257 : L'exercice de la profession d'agent acheteur des bureaux d'achat d'importation et d'exportation ou d'exploitant artisan d'or et de diamants, brûl est interdit aux agents collecteurs.

Art 275 : Il est fait interdiction aux coopératives d'acheter des produits miniers auprès d'autres coopératives ou auprès des collecteurs.

Fait à Bangui, le

Leopold MBOLI FATRAN
Ministre des Mines et de la Géologie
Annex 7.2: Evasion and wanted notice against François Kpombo, alias “B13”.

Due to his involvement in criminal activities, François Kpombo, alias “B13”, was arrested and imprisoned in Berbérati (Mambéré-Kadéi prefecture) in January 2016. He escaped in September 2017. Since then, he has continued to be involved in criminal activities in Carnot, in particular criminal acts against the Muslim community, including herders and diamond collectors.

*Document provided to the Panel by a confidential source on 6 June 2019.*
Annex 8.1: Copy of Chadian identity card of Abdoulaye Hissène.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 22 March 2019.