Special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the strategic review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union, in its communiqué of 12 June 2017 (PSC/PR/COMM.(DCXCI)), and the Security Council, in its resolution 2363 (2017), authorized a two-phase reconfiguration of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In accordance with the request to conduct a review contained in the statement by the President of the Security Council of 31 January 2018 (S/PRST/2018/4), a joint African Union-United Nations review team visited Khartoum and Darfur from 2 to 13 April 2018. The team was co-led by the African Union Commission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and comprised representatives of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat, including the Peacebuilding Support Office. The team also included staff from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Darfur, representing, respectively, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian country team. The review team held consultations with UNAMID, officials of the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations country team, visited all five states of Darfur and a number of team sites, and met with state and local authorities, the native administration and representatives of the communities of internally displaced persons.

2. The present report covers the period from 1 July 2017 to 15 May 2018, and provides an analysis of the conflict, depicting the current security situation and conflict drivers in Darfur, the political and humanitarian situation and the development needs critical to avoiding a relapse into conflict. It assesses the situation in line with the requirements of the statement of the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2018/4) and presents a whole-of-system approach for Darfur, which includes a new mission concept that contains adjusted priorities for UNAMID and a transition concept for withdrawal over a two-year time frame, during which the mission will work in collaboration with the United Nations country team in order to sustain peace in Darfur.
II. Conflict analysis

3. The security situation in Darfur has remained relatively stable, following military gains by the Government of the Sudan against the rebel movements since 2016 and a decrease in large-scale intercommunal clashes as of mid-2015, leading to the consolidation of State authority across Darfur, except for small pockets in the Jebel Marra area. Overall, the situation in Darfur has evolved significantly from the height of the conflict in the late 2000s, when the situation was marked by an armed conflict between Government forces and non-State actors. Today, conditions are better described as those of lawlessness and criminality, aggravated by a protracted humanitarian crisis, continued human rights violations and the lack of development. On the political front, the Darfur peace process remains incomplete, and implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur requires new impetus. There have been, however, encouraging developments regarding the constitutional review based on the outcome of the national dialogue.

Security analysis

Fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups

4. No major armed confrontations have taken place between the Government of the Sudan and Darfur rebel groups since 1 July 2017, except for small-scale clashes in eastern Jebel Marra from March to May 2018. The Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC) (a splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW)) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have been unable to maintain a sustained presence in Darfur or elsewhere in the Sudan, despite being involved in minor clashes described in the assessment of phase one of the reconfiguration of UNAMID (S/2018/12). In its letter dated 28 December 2017 (S/2017/1125), the Panel of Experts on the Sudan confirmed the involvement of those groups in mercenary and other illegal activities in neighbouring Libya and South Sudan. Recent reports indicate that SLA/MM is currently not capable of launching offensive operations against Government forces in Darfur, and that JEM is under significant pressure to leave South Sudan, as it is militarily weakened and fragmented.

5. The limited area and scale of the clashes observed in eastern Jebel Marra since early March 2018 testify to the fact that, while the small groups associated with SLA/AW continue to have some operational capabilities, they are largely contained. The letter from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan and other reports indicate the involvement of SLA/AW in extortion against internally displaced persons and acts of criminality contributing to intercommunal clashes. The recent fighting, according to a UNAMID fact-finding mission, may have been associated with the burning of a number of villages and the displacement of several thousand people in the area of Rockero in April 2018.

6. Although the Government and the armed groups have not agreed on a permanent ceasefire, they continue to extend temporary cessations of hostilities. On 19 March, the President of the Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, extended the Government’s unilateral ceasefire until 30 June 2018, while SLA/MM, SLA/TC and JEM have extended theirs until 6 August 2018.

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1 See the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID dated 25 April 2018 (S/2018/389) for a detailed account.
Security sector issues

7. Structural adjustments to the security sector are required to reflect post-conflict realities, and militia groups and the proliferation of weapons remain two immediate issues of concern (see also S/2017/437). Despite the capture of two notorious militia leaders, Abdallah Rizkallah and Musa Hilal, in November 2017 (see S/2018/12, para. 12), militia groups of particular communities continue to hamper the return of internally displaced persons over land and natural resources, with long-term implications for stability. In North Darfur, the northern Rizeigat militias associated with the Border Guards remain a challenge for the Beni Hussein in Sereif and Saraf Omra, due to their stake in gold mining. In South Darfur, Fallata militias often attack Masalit communities over land ownership around Graida, and militias from the Misseriya, northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa tribes frequently attack Fur displaced around Kass. In addition, during the recent clashes in eastern Jebel Marra, militias were responsible for the destruction of several villages and the displacement of the population in the area. In East Darfur, militias of the southern Rizeigat and Ma’aliya tribes are heavily involved in the conflict over land and resources in the areas north of Ed Daein. Many northern Rizeigat and Salamat militias associated with the Border Guards continue to harass Fur displaced in the areas of Mukjar, Bindisi and Um Dukhun of Central Darfur. Finally, in West Darfur, militias mainly from the northern Rizeigat and the Misseriya and Chadian Zaghawa tribes prevent local farmers and internally displaced persons from accessing their farmlands around El Geneina and in Kuraynik.

8. The weapons collection campaign and the deployment of Government security forces have largely improved security across Darfur. While the overall numbers remain unknown, local authorities and the native administration credit the campaign with a reduction of intercommunal violence and criminality. However, some communities of internally displaced persons believe that the campaign targets specific communities.

9. Security has been negatively affected by the limited presence and capacity of law enforcement and rule of law institutions outside the main population centres. Although there is a steady increase in the number of cases resolved by rural courts, which are at the forefront of addressing land disputes, their geographical reach remains limited. In addition, the limited presence and capacity of the Sudanese police forces in rural areas leave returnees, internally displaced persons, women and children particularly vulnerable, including to sexual violence.

10. It is necessary to stabilize the security sector within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the African Union policy framework on security sector reform. A wider reform of the security sector in line with the Doha Document (art. 67, para. 399 and art. 74, para. 463) could be conducted in line with the principles of the framework on security sector reform, which ensures national ownership and alignment with conflict prevention, peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction.

Intercommunal conflicts

11. Large-scale intercommunal clashes have subsided since mid-2015 and the majority of conflicts over land and natural resources are now also of a significantly lesser scale. Exceptions include clashes between the Ma’aliya and southern Rizeigat over land and cattle rustling in East Darfur, which in July 2017 killed 43 on both sides; between the Zaghawa and various nomadic tribes in West Darfur over natural resources in October 2017, leading to fatalities on both sides; and among the Fallata, the Masalit and the Salamat, and between the Habbaniya and the Salamat in South Darfur, over land and access to water.
12. Interventions by the Government and reconciliation efforts by the native administration, supported by UNAMID, have mitigated the escalation of intercommunal conflicts in Darfur. In the case of the clashes between the southern Rizeigat and the Ma’aliya in East Darfur, the Governor intervened by arresting native administration leaders accused of inciting the communities, and deployed the Rapid Support Forces in late July 2017 to disarm the tribal fighters. In the wake of the clashes between the Zaghawa from Chad and nomadic tribes in West Darfur in early 2018, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force intervened effectively to pacify the security situation and the local authorities mediated a solution.

**Political analysis**

**Darfur peace process**

13. Despite continued efforts to reach a negotiated settlement with the non-signatories, the negotiation process has not yielded any tangible results during the reporting period. In February 2018, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, which continues to lead the political process at a national level, briefed the Peace and Security Council on the challenges they faced with regard to the peace process within the context of the Roadmap Agreement for Ending the Conflicts in Sudan of March 2016. Subsequently, in its communiqué dated 20 February 2018 (PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCLIV)), the Peace and Security Council urged the non-signatory Darfur armed movements to commence, within three months, engagement for peace and reconciliation in Darfur on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The opposition Sudan Call, including the Darfur armed movements, then met in Paris from 13 to 17 March to adopt a joint position on the review of the Roadmap Agreement. On 17 April, the pre-negotiation talks between the Government of the Sudan and two of the non-signatory groups (SLA/MM and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril)) organized in Berlin by the Government of Germany failed to reach an agreement on a declaration of principles, as both movements continued to dispute the status of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the framework for negotiations.

**Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

14. Modest progress has been made since the submission of the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, but the status of the commissions related to the Doha Document and the implementation of projects from the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund remain largely the same as reported in the assessment of phase one of the reconfiguration of UNAMID (S/2018/12).

15. Consultations related to the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation process at the national and local levels were completed in 2017, and preliminary consultations were conducted with refugees in Chad from 11 to 26 April 2018. On 7 April, the Government of the Sudan signed an agreement with the Islamic Development Bank for a grant of $63.3 million to South Darfur to support the implementation of the United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur.

16. In an important development, on 15 and 16 April 2018, the Darfur Land Commission, in coordination with UNDP, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, organized a conference on land in the Sudan to discuss progress on land management programmes, issues of land tenure and the establishment of a national land commission to oversee the implementation of the Unregistered Land Act of 1970.
Land issues and impact on return of internally displaced persons

17. Land and natural resources remain at the heart of intercommunal conflicts and constitute the key to durable solutions for internally displaced persons. Taking into account the impacts of climate change and desertification in Darfur, accountable and effective land management is also a key factor for stability in Darfur in the long run. Those issues pre-date the conflict in Darfur, which exacerbated a system already under pressure from a dysfunctional legal framework, the environment and contentious political decisions. The war resulted in significant displacements whereby mainly Fur and Masalit tribes lost their fertile lands to several Arab nomadic tribes and, in search of pasture and livelihood, joined the counterinsurgency. Political will and long-term interventions are required regarding those issues.

18. The right of return and the restitution of property is stipulated in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (art. 52, para. 260). The Property Claims and Restitution Committee of the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, part of the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office as of January 2017, has made some progress, but has suspended its work owing to a lack of funds. In addition, the Doha Document provides for the establishment a land database and a land commission mandated to develop recommendations for state legislatures and serve as an arbitration forum on disputes related to land rights.

19. In North Darfur, the Governor directed local commissioners to collaborate with the native administration and the Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities to register individual lands, and settlers have also been notified to leave occupied plots of land to enable returns. However, recently some 176 households from the Sortony internally displaced persons site, who had voluntarily returned to their areas of origin, were subsequently forced out by the current occupants.

20. In Central Darfur, in March 2018, a joint committee of Fur leaders, the native administration and members of the peaceful coexistence committees arbitrated disputes over land between internally displaced persons and Khozam, Beni Halba and Salamat settlers, agreeing that the settlers would not cultivate new crops without the permission of the landowners.

21. In South Darfur, in May 2016, the Governor issued a decree restoring the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees to the lands and houses they had left behind in February 2003, and issued land ownership certificates for returnees in some areas. Despite that, in January 2018, the Fallata denied Masalit returnees access to land, and the internally displaced persons returned to the camp in Graida to avoid conflict.

22. In East Darfur, the state government amended the Land Acquisition Act of 1930 by adding a restitution policy to provide an opportunity to reclaim and formalize land ownership rights through the courts. In support of that policy, the state government has established two committees to verify proof of land ownership and registration and to conduct a sensitization campaign on the state government’s return strategy.

Humanitarian situation

23. The Sudan has faced two major overlapping humanitarian challenges since 2003: one triggered by the impact of the conflict, which has led to large-scale population displacement; and another due to climate conditions, which has contributed to food insecurity and malnutrition. Many communities continue to lack access to services and support. Humanitarian assistance to the Sudan has declined over the years, and Darfur remains the most affected region. The implementation of the humanitarian response plan for the Sudan developed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat (see www.unocha.org/sudan)
faces serious funding challenges, and at the time of writing was 23 per cent funded. In Darfur there are 159 humanitarian entities, including 14 United Nations agencies and other international organizations, 39 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 106 national NGOs.

24. According to the report of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs entitled “Sudan 2018 humanitarian needs overview” and its report entitled “Sudan 2018 humanitarian response plan, January–December 2018” (see www.unocha.org/sudan), there are 1.997 million internally displaced persons in the Sudan, some 1.6 million of whom are registered as living in camps in Darfur. While assessments of the number of unregistered internally displaced persons vary considerably, United Nations humanitarian agencies and partners estimate that an additional 500,000 internally displaced persons live in host communities and settlements in Darfur. The number of refugees from South Sudan in Darfur currently stands at about 174,000. Some 625,000 people have returned to their places of origin since 2003, including 301,000 civilians, approximately 197,000 internally displaced returnees and 104,000 refugee returnees between the beginning of 2015 and October 2017. Internally displaced persons most frequently cite safety and security, access to land and access to basic social services as the primary conditions for their voluntary return.

25. With regard to food security, the Famine Early Warning System Network has reported very poor pastoral and agricultural seasons in North Darfur, which could result in increased need for food assistance and agriculture and livestock-based livelihood support until mid-2018. In addition, the current economic crisis and recent fuel shortages have a negative impact on agriculture and are pushing more people into food insecurity. Restricted access to land, limited agricultural labour opportunities and low asset holdings resulting from insecurity in Jebel Marra continue to limit household production. The clashes in east Jebel Marra since March 2018 have had an impact on humanitarian operations, causing three NGOs to temporarily suspend or delay activities.

Development needs to avoid relapse

26. Since 2016, improvements in the security situation have led to a shift towards early recovery and peacebuilding. Recovery and development efforts are hampered by low confidence in governance and rule of law institutions, the destruction of infrastructure, limited livelihoods and employment opportunities, the erosion of social cohesion and community stability, unresolved land ownership, the unsustainable management of natural resources and poor access to basic social services. As a result, many conflict-affected people are still dependent on humanitarian assistance. Climate change is having severe consequences in the form of land degradation and desertification and competition over land and water, which is further aggravated by poor management and low institutional capacities to mitigate risks.

27. A low percentage of children in Darfur have safe access to basic education, and its primary health-care services are characterized by low coverage, the inadequate provision of essential services and limited accessibility. In addition, certain practices raise serious protection concerns, specifically with regard to the security of women and girls, who are subjected to gender-based and sexual violence.
III. Progress on implementing phases one and two

Two-pronged approach

28. The UNAMID two-pronged mission concept combines peacebuilding/stabilization measures and peacekeeping tasks to adapt to the needs of the population in Darfur. While UNAMID successfully set up the Jebel Marra task force at the end of phase one, conducting operations in accordance with the priorities within the peacekeeping prong, the mission encountered challenges in the implementation of its peacebuilding/stabilization strategy within the parameters of its mandate. Even though the integrated strategic framework was adopted in September 2017, insufficient emphasis was put on communication and cooperation with the United Nations country team with regard to joint planning, programming and implementation. The mission’s limited peacebuilding activities in the rule of law, police, child protection, human rights and community stabilization sectors continued, but without any coherent overarching guidance or strategy in support of the United Nations country team or the local governments.

Closure of team sites and impact of the mission’s withdrawal

29. The closure of 11 team sites during phase one of the mission’s overall reconfiguration has not had a negative impact on the security situation in the areas of withdrawal. Government authorities, including the police and judiciary, are gradually establishing their presence, and local communities generally cite humanitarian and development needs as their greatest concerns. However, the mission’s withdrawal has reduced its monitoring and reporting capacity in those areas.

30. In North Darfur, UNAMID withdrew from six team sites, namely Um Kaddadah, Mellit, Al-Malihah, Tine, Zamzam and Abu Shouk camp. In all locations the security situation was stable and the withdrawal of UNAMID has not had, for the time being, a negative impact. In Um Kaddadah, the local authorities raised concerns about the lack of land registry, as well as concerns about the lack of water, seeds and fertilizer. In Mellit, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the absence of Sudanese police forces inside the camps and outside Mellit town, while locals raised concerns about the lack of medicine and water. Plans for the return of internally displaced persons are being hampered by the lack of basic services and protection concerns, including the establishment of police presences in the areas of return. In Al-Malihah, the Rapid Support Forces are heavily present to ensure the control of the border with Libya and to prevent the infiltration of armed rebel groups. In Tine, the Joint Chad-Sudan Border Monitoring Force is providing effective security, which is creating conducive conditions for the expected return of up to 20,000 Sudanese refugees from Chad. In Zamzam, internally displaced persons raised concerns about the low presence of Sudanese police forces and the occupation of their lands by new settlers, while in Abu Shouk camp concerns were raised regarding the lack of access to food, water and health services.

31. In South Darfur, the closures of Tulus and Edd al-Fursan have also not had, for the time being, a negative impact on the security situation. In Tulus, a number of refugees from the Central African Republic arrived, while in Edd al-Fursan the weapons collection campaign contributed to the absence of clashes between farmers and herders. Some community leaders raised concerns about the Rapid Support Forces harassing the local communities. International NGOs reported unhindered access to the target communities. In Tulus and Edd al-Fursan, there were specific requests for tools to enhance agricultural production.
32. In West Darfur, the closure of the Habila and Foro Burunga team sites did not have an adverse impact on security. However, in both locations, the number of Sudanese police force personnel remained the same despite plans to deploy additional police officers. In East Darfur, the closure of the Muhajiriyah team site did not affect security, but community leaders requested more food, shelter, seeds, farming tools and medical care.

**Team sites handed over to formed police units**

33. As at 31 May 2018, the handover from the military to formed police units was completed at six team sites, and the final handover, at Kalma, is scheduled for June 2018, as planned. Since the handover of those sites, no threats of a military nature have been observed. The presence of Sudanese police forces and the judiciary remains limited in Korma, Sereif and Saraf Omra, where militia elements are increasingly turning to criminality. Communities have raised concerns that the formed police units are not engaged sufficiently in outreach and patrolling, particularly in Saraf Omra. It was noted during the review mission that the current formed police unit strength of 140 officers is insufficient to adequately cover camp security and perform mandated tasks, and that the support provided by the units to the activities of individual police officers is very limited.

**Operating environment**

*Attacks and threats of attacks*

34. During the reporting period, UNAMID was not the target of any armed groups or entities in Darfur. However, banditry and criminal activities remain a prominent feature of the security situation in Darfur owing to several factors, including the deterioration of economic conditions, the conflict over natural resources and the presence of weapons among citizens. From July 2017 to 15 May 2018, 184 criminal incidents affected United Nations personnel, facilities and operations, including 63 cases of theft/break-in/burglary/intrusion, 36 attempts of theft, 5 carjackings, 11 cases of robbery/road banditry, 7 shootings and 33 cases of stone-throwing.

*Access restrictions*

35. Over the past two years the number of access restrictions experienced by the mission has decreased significantly. There were nine cases of restrictions from 1 July to 31 December 2017, and four cases from 1 January to 31 March 2018. In April and May 2018, there were three cases of denials of access registered in the Jebel Marra area as clashes with rebel groups continued. Restrictions on direct flights between team sites continued as the Government insisted that flights be routed through state capitals.

*Visas and customs clearance issues*

36. Since 1 July 2017, the Government has granted 2,854 visas to UNAMID, including 441 for military personnel, 980 for police personnel, 91 for civilian staff and 1,342 for other categories. A total of 130 visa requests are still being processed, while 161 visa requests have been pending beyond the normal approval period of 15 days, some since April 2017. For the Human Rights Section, 17 visa applications remain pending, including for the Head of the Section, resulting in a vacancy rate of 32 per cent, while the overall vacancy rate for the mission’s international civilian staff decreased from 17 to 6 per cent, of which 3 per cent is due to pending visas.

37. The Government of the Sudan continues to release food ration containers from Port Sudan. While progress has been recorded in clearing other shipments, 23 shipments of contingent- and United Nations-owned equipment are still pending.
UNAMID continues to hold monthly technical-level meetings with Government officials in an effort to address pending issues. The Government informed UNAMID in February 2018 that it would receive a communication detailing new procedures that would replace the tax exemption certificate; however, the mission has yet to receive it.

IV. Whole-of-system approach to Darfur

38. For the second dry season in a row, fighting between the Government and the rebel groups has subsided and has remained sporadic in some areas of the Jebel Marra. However, while the security situation is much improved and the Government has been successful in consolidating authority across most of Darfur, the underlying conflict drivers, including land and resource distribution, remain largely unaddressed. Until a comprehensive solution to those difficult issues is reached, the possibility of a relapse into conflict cannot be entirely discounted. While peacekeeping activities should focus on the most precarious areas, where the protection of civilians, humanitarian support and the mediation of local conflict remain a necessity to further the peace process, a substantive investment in peacebuilding, recovery and development throughout Darfur is crucial to furthering the peace process in Darfur. The United Nations country team and UNAMID should define joint priorities and work hand in hand, including with other partners, and focus on activities and issues to prevent a relapse into conflict.

A. Peacekeeping concept

Redefined priorities

39. Within the whole-of-system approach, UNAMID would focus on mediation of the political process and at the local level, physical protection, the clearance of explosive remnants of war and emergency relief. Those tasks would be combined and coordinated with the humanitarian country team in order to focus efforts on stabilizing a redefined, smaller area of operations. The redefined priorities would include: (a) the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; (b) mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and (c) mediation at the local level to address intercommunal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation in the area of operations.

Redefined area of operations

40. Within the refined priorities of the peacekeeping operation, UNAMID would have its headquarters in Zalingei (Central Darfur), and its area of operations would include the following 13 team sites: Kutum, Saraf Omra, Kabkabiya, Tawilah, Sortony and Shangil Tobaya (North Darfur), Zalingei, Nertiti and Golo (Central Darfur) and Kalma, Kass, Menawashe and Khor Abeche (South Darfur). All other team sites and supercamps would be closed. The supercamp in El Fasher would be downsized and serve as the main logistics hub until the liquidation of the mission. Building on existing United Nations country team structures, the state liaison offices in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daiein would be managed by the United Nations country team and fall under its respective security arrangements. Each office would consist of United Nations country team staff, including 20 to 25 civilian staff and police from UNAMID. Details for each liaison office would be tailored to the respective context in the respective Darfur state and elaborated jointly by the United
Nations country team and UNAMID. The mission would be fiscally responsible for the establishment and sustainment of those offices for two years, as of July 2018.

**Military concept**

41. With the closure of 14 sites, the operational capability of the mission’s force in Jebel Marra would be improved by allocating more military assets, mainly enablers and reserves, for peacekeeping operations, improving the force’s outreach in the new area of operations. Of the 13 team sites in the new area of operations, the Kutum, Tawilah, Shangil Tobaya and Khor Abeche team sites would be handed over to UNAMID formed police units. Separate troops would be earmarked to provide protection to the supercamps until their respective closures or transitions.

42. By 31 December 2018, the force would comprise three components: (a) the force for mandate implementation (force headquarters, three battalions, one reserve battalion, a military police unit and enablers); (b) the temporary protection element for the El Fasher logistics hub (two companies); and (c) the temporary protection element for the three supercamps at Nyala (two companies), Ed Daein (one company) and El Geneina (two companies and a level 2 medical facility) for a total of five companies and one medical facility. The present level 3 medical facility at Nyala will be downgraded to level 2 and shifted to Zalingei as part of component (a). The overall strength of the force would be reduced by 31 December 2018 from 8,735 to 5,470 military personnel, including 4,220 personnel for component (a), 350 personnel for component (b) and 900 personnel for component (c). The seven companies (two for component (b) and five for component (c)) and the level 2 medical facility at El Geneina, nominated as the temporary protection element for the supercamps at El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein, and one engineering company would be repatriated no later than 30 June 2019. The overall strength of the force would be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019.

43. The mandate implementation component of the force would operate from force headquarters in Zalingei and out of six team sites: Kabkabiya and Sortony, Kass and Menawashei, and Nertiti and Golo. To ensure permanent presence in the area of operations, UNAMID would conduct operations in a coordinated and decentralized manner, operating from permanent, temporary and mobile bases, and conduct robust patrols, establish checkpoints and perform observation and escort activities which would be complemented by active liaison and coordination with parties to the conflict at all levels. To ensure a timely response to any changes in the situation, the reserve force, including military aviation assets, would be maintained and kept in a state of high readiness to facilitate deployment in extremis.

**Police concept**

44. The police component would focus on: (a) supporting the physical protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian assistance; (b) creating a protective environment by coordinating the development and training of the Sudanese police forces; and (c) conducting community-oriented policing initiatives in conjunction with the United Nations country team, including on gender-based and sexual violence and child protection, pursued through engagement with the state liaison offices and at the national level. The police concept foresees enabling the host State authorities to tackle rule of law challenges and build trust between the local communities and Government entities.

45. The current number of personnel in formed police units charged with security tasks of team sites in Saraf Omra should be adjusted from 140 to 180, in order to provide for the increased security measures at the team site and for an operational capacity to support activities conducted by individual police officers, and to allow for
an operational reserve to react to changes in the security situation. In view of the particular security requirements, two formed police units (140 personnel each) would be deployed to Kalma. Continued deployment of one formed police unit of 140 personnel would be required in Zalingei in order to tackle security issues of a non-military nature, such as demonstrations and engagements with internally displaced persons. Formed police units with 180 personnel each would take over the security tasks of the team sites in Kutum, Tawilla, Shangil Tobaya and Khor Abeche.

A maximum of 10 individual police officers would deploy to each of the newly established state liaison offices, and a maximum of 5 to the Khartoum liaison office. The strength of the police component would be reduced from 2,500 to 1,870 personnel, and would include 550 individual police officers and 1,320 formed police units.

Clearance of explosive remnants of war

47. The improved security situation is offering opportunities for increased clearance of explosive remnants of war as additional areas become accessible for the first time since the mission’s establishment. As a result, systematic survey and clearance operations are now possible with little risk of recontamination. Thus far, the present reporting period has seen an increase in the detection and disposal of unexploded ordinance of roughly 31 per cent, compared with the previous reporting period. Since such clearance is a key enabler of the mission’s military and protection work and is crucial to the facilitation of voluntary returns, it will remain a key component of the mission’s work. At the same time, a transition of the expected remaining workload to partners, including the National Mine Action Centre of the Sudan, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross, should be prepared.

B. Transition concept

48. The whole-of-system transition concept would focus on providing sustainable solutions to the critical drivers of conflict, within a two-year time frame, through four substantive areas identified as critical to preventing relapse and enabling the Government, the United Nations country team, civil society partners and international actors to prepare for the mission’s envisaged exit. The transition phase would provide an opportunity for UNAMID and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to identify key shared priorities in those four areas and to collaborate, through joint planning and delivery, towards their achievement. The conclusions of the strategic review point to the adoption of a pragmatic approach during the transition phase that focuses on concrete joint transition activities in areas where collaboration between UNAMID and the United Nations country team is already in place and the focusing of attention on ensuring that sufficient resources are made available to the United Nations country team to ramp up its peacebuilding and development work in Darfur. Joint efforts would be made to ensure that gains in humanitarian access are maintained during and following the drawdown, including continued United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights to areas in need.

49. Given that the African Union remains an integral partner during the transition period in Darfur, it is expected that the African Union Commission, through its relevant departments, would also engage the Government, the United Nations country team and UNAMID to provide the necessary assistance. The Commission would play a key role in furthering the political process towards a sustainable resolution to the Darfur conflict and in areas such as security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and other key governance areas, as has been highlighted in various Peace and Security Council communiqués on Darfur.
50. Shared priorities are being drawn from the critical needs identified in existing planning documents, including the integrated strategic framework, the Darfur Development Strategy, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework and the Multi-Year Humanitarian Strategy 2017–2019 for the Sudan. Priorities for Darfur are also being drawn from the United Nations country team/humanitarian country team approach to durable solutions, which has been piloted in the Sudan as part of the “New Way of Working”. During the transition phase, United Nations country team and UNAMID partners would focus on the priorities set out below.

**Rule of law: police, justice, corrections**

51. Joint UNAMID-United Nations country team support in the rule of law area would focus on supporting Government authorities in extending the rule of law (specifically access to justice) and State authority to remote areas to build public confidence in rule of law and law enforcement institutions, reduce intercommunal conflict, enhance accountability and create conditions conducive to durable solutions and the voluntary return of displaced populations. Interventions would strengthen the capacities of State authority and community-based conflict management and reconciliation mechanisms to mediate and address resource-based and local conflicts and strengthen legislation and policies on land and resource management.

52. The transition in the rule of law area would require a two-pronged approach that identified: (a) areas of intervention that could be completed by UNAMID within a two-year time frame and handed over to national authorities, such as capacity-building programmes for rural court judges (to be handed over to the federal judicial training centre), trial monitoring (to be handed over to national NGOs) and the capacity-building and professionalization of the prison service; and (b) areas of intervention that would require continued support from United Nations country team partners to prevent a relapse into conflict, such as the presence and functioning of rural courts, community policing, capacity-building and legal aid. Considering the nature of the support provided to the Special Court and Special Prosecutor for Crimes in Darfur, the mission is best placed to continue its support to that process and should prioritize it.

**Resilience and livelihoods/durable solutions for the displaced population and host communities**

53. Strategies and plans to implement integrated durable solutions would be developed in a participatory and consultative manner that involved local partners and communities. They would include interventions that respond to the needs of the highly vulnerable populations, including nomads and pastoralists, and conflict-affected communities, with the objective of protecting and recovering assets and stabilizing livelihoods. To ensure the success of and benefits from durable solutions, beneficiaries must enjoy safety, integrity and protection, therefore protective environments in the areas of displacement and return are crucial. Durable solutions would work towards achieving socioeconomic integration within communities through strengthening access to essential services (health, education, nutrition), utilities (water, energy, land) and shelter. In that context, land issues are central to the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and to achieving durable solutions, which makes cooperation on and the continuation of existing projects with the Darfur Land Commission and State authorities essential.

**Immediate service delivery for internally displaced persons**

54. Immediate needs in Darfur remain focused on delivering services to the most vulnerable persons. Assistance would be needs-based, and the issues of protection, livelihoods, reinforcing community assets and services and social cohesion would be
the focus of programming. Vulnerability assessments have identified 376,000 internally displaced persons who would be able to transition to livelihood activities or seasonal food distributions, while 716,000 would continue to receive year-round food assistance. Those vulnerable households that remain in need of relief assistance would continue to receive the required humanitarian support. The goal would be to improve access, in a more sustainable manner, to basic services such as health, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for All and education.

**Human rights**

55. Outside the mission’s redefined area of operations, UNAMID would contribute to monitoring and reporting on human rights and to capacity-building to strengthen Government institutions and civil society and community-based organizations with regard to good governance. UNAMID, with increased support from the United Nations country team, would prioritize strengthening State institutions, awareness-raising, education and support to community structures that empower rights-holders, including internally displaced persons and returnee populations. The United Nations country team would assume some of those functions, including mainstreaming work on protection, child protection, the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence and the return of internally displaced persons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) should open a fully mandated office in the Sudan in order to assist in the strengthening of human rights protections, despite the lack of progress to date regarding the engagement of OHCHR with the Government of the Sudan on a possible technical cooperation programme.

**Implementation**

56. To facilitate the transition of the above priority areas, it is crucial that United Nations partners reinforce collaborative efforts to enable joint planning and delivery towards clearly defined shared objectives. That should include collaboration at the strategic level, including structural links between the Deputy Joint Special Representative and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, and at the technical level through the establishment of joint teams at the state level and an enhanced UNAMID presence in Khartoum. With that in mind, the recommendation of the strategic review is to establish liaison offices in the capitals of four Darfur states (except Central Darfur, where the mission headquarters would be), where key substantive UNAMID components and United Nations country team staff should be co-located, to the extent possible, to form joint teams. The composition of those offices would be determined by the needs of the location. In terms of logistical considerations, existing UNAMID offices could be used in some areas, while in other places existing United Nations country team offices could be upgraded or new spaces identified. UNAMID should provide funding for those offices for the remainder of the mission’s lifespan and UNDP, as the common service manager, would manage them. Available headquarters resources to help plan and initiate joint approaches, including through the global focal point arrangement and the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity, should be considered as required. While such an arrangement would enable support for the capacities of the United Nations country team, including on human rights, the proposed reconfiguration would no longer allow UNAMID to continue the monitoring, verification and reporting of protection of civilians issues outside the greater Jebel Marra area, and the United Nations country team has limited scope to monitor, raise and address protection concerns.

**Funding for longer term development in Darfur**

57. As the mission withdraws, it is critical that longer-term funding arrangements be put in place to prevent a relapse into conflict. A successful transition from
peacekeeping to a peacebuilding- and development-oriented United Nations engagement requires an integrated resource mobilization strategy as well as high-level efforts to mobilize donor funding. The United Nations joint financing approach for sustaining peace in Darfur calls for the financing approach to be centred on the political engagement of the United Nations system, to reach out to traditional and non-traditional partners and to involve the Government of the Sudan in both facilitating the implementation of the integrated strategic framework and seeking the allocation of its own resources. In addition, as a transitional measure, the joint approach should focus on both raising voluntary contributions and acquiring funding from the assessed budget. Those transitional funding arrangements would ensure the establishment and operationalization of the state liaison offices and support for the implementation of the shared priorities in order to sustain gains in peace and security.

58. The Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund could be a crucial enabler for the transition. Ongoing efforts with the Peacebuilding Support Office should be reinforced to access funding for transition priorities and piloting other potential initiatives through the New Way of Working and for durable solutions that contribute to consolidating peace in Darfur. In response to the mission’s transition, the United Nations country team in the Sudan is in the process of finalizing a project on durable solutions and support for the rule of law in Darfur with the support of the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund. In addition, the Secretary-General also received a request from the President of the Sudan in late December 2017 expressing his interest in having the Sudan be declared eligible to receive funds from the Peacebuilding Fund.

59. Bringing those different strands together, new funding should be channelled through the existing United Nations Fund for Recovery, Reconstruction and Development in Darfur. As the contribution to the Fund from Qatar will be exhausted in 2018, it is important to diversify its funding base. For the new phase of support during the transition process, the Fund could potentially consist of funding from: (a) the Peacebuilding Fund (if the Sudan qualifies for full eligibility), to be allocated towards specific projects; (b) assessed contributions from Member States, if approved by the General Assembly; (c) seed funding from UNDP; and (d) a targeted effort to encourage existing partners to renew their funding commitments beyond 2018, coupled with attracting new donors to support the Fund. Channelling resources through the Fund would allow the United Nations country team to strengthen programming on peacebuilding and provide a framework for other donors to contribute voluntary contributions in a strategic manner.

C. Implementation arrangements, time frame and mission leadership

60. The main components of the implementation of the revised mission concept would be: (a) the mission drawdown and repositioning, which would consist of the repatriation of the military and police elements, the closure of team sites and supercamps, the right-sizing of the civilian staff and the enhanced joint working modalities with the United Nations country team; (b) the operationalization of the new mission headquarters, consisting of the functional establishment of all mission components in Zalingei; (c) the establishment of state liaison offices in El Fasher, El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein; and (d) liquidation. The reconfiguration of the Operation would start immediately following the adoption of a new mandate by the Security Council, and its liquidation phase would be completed, at the latest, by December 2020. As different elements in the four components would take place simultaneously, mission support should be organized into two focus areas: the delivery of the mandated tasks in the mission’s new area of responsibility, and the mission’s drawdown and closure.
61. In the context of the new mission concept, the Joint Special Representative for Darfur would be located in Khartoum with immediate effect, to follow up on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and on the peace process and to maintain a close interaction with the Government. The Joint Special Representative would continue to exercise overall authority over the mission’s strategic objectives and operations and frequently travel to the area of operations. The Deputy Joint Special Representative for Darfur would be posted in Zalingei to lead the day-to-day operations of the mission. The leadership of the military and police components, as well as the heads of sections/divisions of the civilian components, with the exception of mission support, should be right-sized to reflect the reduced footprint of the Operation, in line with levels of other operations of a similar size.

62. Provided that there will be no significant change in the security situation in Darfur and key indicators are fulfilled (see annex), the implementation time frame would adhere broadly to the following schedule: (a) by 31 August 2018, all planning processes and institutional arrangements with the Government should be completed, including a revised budget submission containing the new staffing structures; (b) by 31 December 2018, the UNAMID headquarters in Zalingei and the state liaison offices should be functional and the right-sizing of the civilian staff, following an alignment of the staffing requirements with the reconfigured mission staffing structures, should be completed; (c) the closure of the team sites outside the UNAMID area of responsibility and the repatriation of the assigned military and police units should be completed by 31 March 2019; (d) by June 2019 at the latest, the former sector headquarters in El Geneina, Nyala and Ed Daein should be closed down and handed over; and (e) the Operation would exit on 30 June 2020, and its liquidation would be completed by December 2020.

63. The cooperation of the Government with the reconfiguration is essential in order to facilitate the closure of team sites and the repatriation of equipment, as well as to enable freedom of movement within the new area of operations. The Government’s further and continued investment in Darfur and the proactive cooperation on the transition concept, not least with regard to human rights, will also be of paramount importance to ensure the security and delivery of services to its population.

64. To monitor progress against the priorities of the mission and the transition, a two-year action plan should be developed on the basis of the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. As noted in the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, provisions from the Doha Document could serve as the basis for indicators of achievement for the eventual exit of UNAMID (see annex). Proven progress with respect to the action plan during the two-year transition period and further improvements in the security situation, accompanied by sustained Government investment in Darfur, would be essential in order to allow UNAMID to exit Darfur.

V. Financial aspects

65. The General Assembly, in its resolution 72/259, appropriated the amount of $910.9 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, inclusive of the amount of $486.0 million previously authorized for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017 under the terms of its resolution 71/310. The proposed budget in the amount of $782.6 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (A/72/794) has been submitted to the Assembly for its consideration during the
second part of its resumed seventy-second session. It should be noted that proposed requirements are based on the prevailing mandate and scope of the Operation.

66. As at 16 May 2018, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $244.7 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,147.0 million.

67. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 31 January 2018, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 30 September 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VI. Observations

68. Improvements in the overall security situation in Darfur have created the conditions for UNAMID to prepare its exit after more than 10 years in the Sudan. The military successes of the Government against the rebel movements have visibly changed the landscape, despite the failed incursion of two rebel groups from Libya and South Sudan in May and June 2017 to establish a foothold in Darfur, and for the second dry season in a row no major operation has taken place. The weapons collection campaign, initiated in August 2017, has strengthened the control of the Government over the territory and created the conditions for the extension of State authority across Darfur. In the light of that, the presence of the African Union and the United Nations needs to adapt so as to serve the current needs of the population of Darfur. It is in that spirit that we propose a reconfiguration of our presence to deploy peacekeeping where it is still needed and to increase early recovery and development efforts to address root causes of conflict and consolidate and sustain peace. We therefore present to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council a whole-of-system approach for Darfur, which includes a new concept of operations for UNAMID and a transition concept that maps an exit for the peacekeeping mission, during which UNAMID would work in collaboration with the United Nations country team over a two-year time frame.

69. Crucial grievances at the origin of the conflict, however, remain unaddressed. The parties continue to extend their unilateral ceasefires, but a comprehensive cessation of hostilities has yet to be finalized. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur is slow, and roughly one third of the population of Darfur continues to bear the consequences of displacement. Although no major displacement has taken place during the past two years, durable and pragmatic solutions need to be found to enable the settlement of almost 2 million internally displaced persons. The recent practices of some state governments in Darfur in that context need to be considered, as does advocating for the principles of voluntary return and the right to access land. The successes of the local governments and the native administration in reducing intercommunal violence, with the mission’s support, should be sustained through adequate measures for addressing issues related to land and resources. The positive impact of the weapons collection campaign on the security situation and the control over the armed militia need to be reinforced with measures based on the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

70. The full implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in order to benefit the people of Darfur and avoid relapse into conflict is crucial. Our proposal and the exit of UNAMID are intrinsically linked to that implementation, and we urge the Government to do its utmost to provide security, rule of law and basic services to all its citizens in Darfur, and to address the root causes of the conflict within that framework. We also call on donor countries to provide the necessary financial support so that early recovery, peacebuilding and development activities can be undertaken in
a sustainable manner. We have invested too much in Darfur over the past decade and a half to risk it backsliding into conflict due to a lack of resources. Such support is even more critical in the light of the current economic crisis, which has had a serious impact, especially in rural areas, and is a threat to stability.

71. Finally, we would like to extend our gratitude to the men and women of UNAMID, the United Nations and the humanitarian community, who continue their relentless efforts to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. We would also like to thank and commend the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Kingsley Jeremiah Mamabolo, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, and the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, and the former President of Nigeria, Abdulsalami Abubakar, of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, for their steadfast commitment to sustainable peace and stability in the Sudan.
Annex

Indicators of achievement for the proposed two-year time frame for the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

In view of the letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/747) on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the provisions from the Doha Document set out below could serve as indicators of achievement for the proposed two-year time frame for the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

1. Security sector
   • Reform of some military institutions in Darfur and need for funding and experts [art. 74, paras. 463–464]
   • Disarmament of militia groups and the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan [art. 67, paras. 399–401]
   • Voluntary civilian arms control [art. 71, paras. 416–417]
   • Disarmament and demobilization of Movements’ combatants [art. 72, paras. 422 and 430–432]

2. Rule of law: police, justice, corrections
   • Facilitate access to justice [art. 56, para. 296]
   • Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission fully functioning [art. 58, paras. 311–321]
   • Special Court for Darfur [art. 59, paras. 322–328]

3. Durable solutions for the displaced population and host communities
   • Mechanisms and modalities in place to ensure freedom of movement of internally displaced persons [art. 46, paras. 235–237; art. 47, para. 238; art. 48, paras. 239–240]
   • Conditions in place to ensure the right to voluntary return [art. 49, paras. 241–246]
   • Mechanisms in place to ensure necessary conditions for return of internally displaced persons [art. 50, para. 249]
   • Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission fully functioning [art. 51, paras. 252–259]
   • Compensation/\textit{Jabr Al-Darar} mechanism fully functional [art. 57, paras. 301–304]
   • Establish mechanisms to ensure sustainable management and use of lands and other natural resources [art. 33, para. 186]
   • Modify the laws to include rights to land and its use (\textit{hawakeer}) [art. 33, para. 182]
   • Darfur states land use mapping database developed [art. 38, para. 197]
   • Darfur Land Commission exercising full competences [art. 38, paras. 196–207]
   • Darfur states to be represented by three non-permanent members in the National Petroleum Commission [art. 41, para. 214]
• Oil-producing states to benefit 2 per cent of oil revenue [*art. 41, para. 215*]

4. Immediate delivery of services for internally displaced persons

• Modalities in place to provide security and protection from all forms of physical attack [*art. 44, paras. 226–229; art. 45, paras. 230–231*]

• Joint coordination committees to deal with early warning and prevention of escalation: local government and native administrations are empowered to address consequences of the conflict [*art. 13, para. 86*]

5. Human rights

• Promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms [*art. 1, paras. 1–18; art. 61, para. 331*]