



# Security Council

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## Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

### I. Introduction

1. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), stands out as a demonstration of successful multilateralism. It is a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and in dialogue and diplomacy. The Plan and the resolution remain in effect. The participants in the Plan, the Council, all Member States and regional and other international actors must ensure the continuity of this agreement that is fundamental to regional and international peace and security. I remain of the view that issues not directly related to the Plan should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments.

2. I welcome the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran continues the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments, as verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the face of considerable challenges brought about by the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its subsequent decisions to reimpose all its national sanctions that had been lifted or waived pursuant to the Plan. I regret these actions and firmly believe that they do not advance the goals set out in the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015), in which all Member States, regional organizations and international organizations were called upon to support the implementation of the Plan and to refrain from actions that undermine it. I note the concerns expressed in the letter dated 5 November 2018 addressed to me by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/73/490-S/2018/988).

3. In this regard, I welcome the reaffirmation by participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, during the meeting of the Joint Commission held in Vienna on 6 July 2018 and during the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+2 and the Islamic Republic of Iran held in New York on 24 September 2018, of their commitments to the full and effective implementation of the Plan. I welcome and am encouraged by their initiatives to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in full accordance with resolution 2231 (2015). It is essential that the Plan continue to work for all its participants, including by delivering tangible economic benefits to the Iranian people. It is critical that these initiatives be given full effect as soon as possible.

4. The continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015) also enjoys the full support of the broader international community. Statements in support of the Plan were made by numerous Member



States, including during the general debate of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly. These statements demonstrate the broad and deep support for multilateral and cooperative approaches to addressing threats to international peace and security. I call upon all Member States to work effectively with the participants in the Plan towards its preservation, including in creating the conditions necessary for their economic operators to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with the resolution.

5. I acknowledge the important contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency in providing the international community with reports on its verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in the light of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Since January 2016, the Agency has reported 13 times to the Security Council. In its most recent reports ([S/2018/835](#) and [S/2018/1048](#)), the Agency again reported that it continued to verify and monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Agency also reported that it continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and that its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran remained ongoing. The Agency further reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, pending its entry into force, and to apply the transparency measures contained in the Plan. In its most recent reports, the Agency also indicated that it had conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran that it needed to visit.

6. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is only one part of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Staunch support for the Plan among the participants and Member States continues to be accompanied with concerns about Iranian activities in relation to the restrictive measures contained in annex B to the resolution. Therefore, I again encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address these concerns.

7. The present report provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my fifth report ([S/2018/602](#)), on 12 June 2018. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which include restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile-related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as asset freeze and travel ban provisions.

## II. Key findings and recommendations

8. The procurement channel continues to be a vital transparency and confidence-building mechanism ensuring that transfers of certain goods, technology and/or related services to the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the provisions and objectives of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Since 12 June 2018, five additional proposals have been submitted to the Security Council. The channel is operational and effective, and I encourage all States and the private sector to fully utilize and support this channel.

9. The Secretariat received further information on two shipments of dual-use items, previously brought to the attention of the Security Council. The authorities of two manufacturing States confirmed that, in their assessment, the items did not meet the criteria set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#) and therefore did not require prior approval of the Council through the procurement channel.

10. During the reporting period, the Secretariat examined the debris of three additional ballistic missiles launched at the territory of Saudi Arabia on 25 March and 11 April 2018. The Secretariat observed design characteristics and component parts consistent with those of the missiles that it had examined previously. The debris of the three missiles had internal and external features consistent with those of the Scud-B missile and all its variants, as well as specific key design features consistent with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile. However, the Secretariat has not been able to determine whether such missiles, parts thereof or related technology were transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran after 16 January 2016, the day on which the restrictions set out in annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) came into force.<sup>1</sup>

11. The Secretariat also examined two container launch units for anti-tank guided missiles recovered by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. The Secretariat found that they had characteristics of Iranian manufacture and that their markings indicated production dates in 2016 and 2017. The Secretariat also examined a partly disassembled surface-to-air missile seized by the Saudi-led coalition and observed that its features appeared to be consistent with those of an Iranian missile. The Secretariat is still analysing the information available on this disassembled missile, and I intend to report back to the Security Council accordingly.

### III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

12. Since 12 June 2018, 5 new proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to the Security Council, bringing to 42 the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) for approval through the procurement channel. At the time of reporting, 28 proposals had been approved by the Council, 4 had not been approved, 9 had been withdrawn by the proposing States and 1 was currently under review. The Council also received five new notifications pursuant to the same provision for certain nuclear-related activities that only required a notification to the Council or to both the Council and the Joint Commission.

13. Since my previous report, the Secretariat received further information related to three of the four shipments of dual-use items seized by the United Arab Emirates in May 2016 and April 2017 while in transit to the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [S/2018/602](#), para. 18). Contrary to the original assessment by the authorities of the United Arab Emirates, the authorities of two of the States of manufacture have confirmed that, in their assessment, the 40 cylindrical segments of tungsten and the 10 capacitors did not meet the criteria set out in [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#) and that their re-export to the Islamic Republic of Iran did not require prior approval of the Security Council.<sup>2</sup> The authorities of another State of manufacture informed the Secretariat that, in their assessment, the inductively coupled mass spectrometer met the criteria set out in the above-mentioned information circular, but that their internal review was ongoing. I intend to report thereon to the Council as more information becomes available on this shipment and on the shipment of one titanium rod.

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<sup>1</sup> Any such transfer from the Islamic Republic of Iran between the adoption of Security Council resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and 16 January 2016 would have been subject to paragraph 7 of that resolution. The provisions of resolution [1737 \(2006\)](#) and those of other previous Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue were terminated on 16 January 2016.

<sup>2</sup> According to one State of manufacture, the 40 cylindrical segments did not contain more than 90 per cent tungsten by weight (see 2.C.14 of [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#)). According to the other States of manufacture, the 10 capacitors do not meet the voltage rating and energy storage criteria of 6.A.4.(a) or the voltage rating criteria of 6.A.4 (b) of [INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2](#).

14. In addition, on 30 October 2018, the United States provided the Secretariat with additional information on the transfer of two commodities that, in their assessment, would have required prior approval from the Security Council (see [S/2018/602](#), para. 19). According to this information, at least 50 tonnes of aluminium alloys were shipped to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2016 and 2017, and the carbon fibre was shipped in 2017. The Secretariat has sought clarification on that additional information from relevant Member States and will report to the Council in due course.

## **IV. Implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions**

### **A. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran**

15. During the reporting period, I received information regarding ballistic missiles reportedly launched by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 30 September and 1 October 2018 at targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. In identical letters dated 19 October 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/939](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel noted that, according to Iranian media outlets, at least five ballistic missiles with a range of 700 km were launched. He considered that those missiles “crossed the Annex B threshold” of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and called upon the Council to condemn the activity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a joint letter dated 20 November 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/1062](#)), the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland stressed that those ballistic missiles were category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime<sup>3</sup> and therefore inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They concluded that the launches of those missiles constituted an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and “launches using such ballistic missile technology”, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has been called upon not to undertake pursuant to paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution. In the letter, they also stated that those launches were destabilizing and increased regional tensions.

16. I also received information regarding flight tests of ballistic missiles by the Islamic Republic of Iran. In identical letters dated 23 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/1047](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel brought to my attention information regarding seven flight tests reportedly conducted in 2018, in addition to those of a Shahab-3 variant and a Scud variant in January 2018 (see [S/2018/602](#), para. 22). According to the information provided, one Khorramshahr, two Shahab-3 variants, one Qiam and three Zolfaghar ballistic missiles were flight-tested between February and August 2018. The Permanent Representative stated that their test-firing was in violation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) because those ballistic missiles were all category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime and therefore inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

17. In a letter dated 29 October 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/967](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran recalled that “the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, acting in legitimate self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, took limited and measured military action on 1 October 2018 in Syria, targeting

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<sup>3</sup> Category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime are defined as “complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg ‘payload’ to a ‘range’ of at least 300 km” (see 1.A.1 of the Equipment, Software and Technology Annex of the Missile Technology Control Regime).

terrorist elements that are also linked to the terrorist act in Ahvaz”. However, in reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel dated 23 November, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter dated 29 November addressed to me and the President of the Council (S/2018/1073), stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran had “not launched any type of such missiles on any of the dates specified in the letter”. The Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in his letter dated 29 October, also reiterated the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran that none of its missiles were “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”, but rather, as the Chargé d’affaires a.i. had indicated in a letter dated 28 November addressed to the President of the Council (S/2018/1061), “‘designed’ to be exclusively capable of delivering conventional warheads”, and thus fell outside the purview of resolution 2231 (2015). The Chargé d’affaires a.i., in his letter dated 28 November, also stressed that there was no implicit or explicit reference to the Missile Technology Control Regime in paragraph 3 of annex B to the resolution and concluded that none of its criteria were applicable to the paragraph.

18. In a letter dated 30 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation underscored that the Islamic Republic of Iran was not prohibited by resolution 2231 (2015) to develop missile and space programmes and that it had been respecting in good faith the call to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. He noted that there was no evidence that the Islamic Republic of Iran was developing or producing a nuclear weapon or means of its delivery. He underlined that the category I parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime were never intended to be used in the context of the resolution to ascertain whether certain missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. He further stated that missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons included certain features and that no “evidence of the existence of such features on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles” was presented to the Council.

19. On 4 December 2018, the Security Council discussed the reported test firing of a medium-range ballistic missile by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 1 December 2018.

## **B. Restrictions on ballistic missile-related transfers or activities with the Islamic Republic of Iran**

20. In relation to the possible transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia brought to the attention of the Secretariat two additional launches of ballistic missiles by the Houthis, aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia, on 24 June 2018 (S/2018/636), which, in their assessment, were Iranian Qiam-1 missiles.<sup>4</sup> The Islamic Republic of Iran had previously stated that it “neither has a policy nor seeks to transfer arms or military equipment in Yemen or manufacture them therein” (S/2018/145). In September 2018, Saudi authorities invited the Secretariat to examine the debris that they stated was of three missiles reportedly launched at Riyadh on 25 March and 11 April 2018. The Secretariat conducted first-hand examinations of the physical debris presented by Saudi authorities and collected all other information and material available, including photographs and video of the debris in situ, to confirm that the debris seen in those images corresponded to the debris presented to the Secretariat.

<sup>4</sup> The 12 previous launches reportedly occurred on 22 July (1), 4 November (1) and 19 December 2017 (1), and on 5 January (1), 30 January (1), 25 March (3), 11 April (1), 9 May (2) and 5 June 2018 (1).

The Secretariat observed that the debris of the three missiles had design characteristics and component parts consistent with all those that it had previously examined and reported thereon to the Security Council (see S/2018/602, paras. 28 to 30). The Secretariat is still working on establishing the production date range of guidance subcomponents with the assistance of the foreign manufacturers and will report back to the Council in due course.

21. In August 2018, media outlets reported that a shipment to the Islamic Republic of Iran of at least two items with potential missile-related applications had been halted at London Heathrow airport.<sup>5</sup> In response to a request for clarification, the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom informed the Secretariat that several goods (seal kits, packing rings, packing sets and O-rings) had been seized by customs after having been presented for export to the Islamic Republic of Iran without a valid licence. However, the Permanent Mission added that the exporter later applied for, and was granted, an export licence.

## V. Implementation of arms-related provisions

22. In a press conference on 26 March 2018, the Saudi-led coalition publicly displayed a partly disassembled missile that it indicated had been found in a consignment destined to the Houthis and seized earlier in March 2018. Saudi authorities alleged that it was an Iranian-made Sayyad 2C surface-to-air missile. While in Riyadh in September 2018, the Secretariat examined the partly disassembled missile, which was missing its forward guidance nose section and fins. The Secretariat observed that its length and other external features (e.g., mounting for the rear fins, mounting notches and brackets for the long mid-section fins) appeared consistent with those of the Iranian Sayyad-2C visible in video and photographs published by Iranian media outlets. The Secretariat further observed that the paint, serial numbering and other markings also appeared to be consistent with those of the Sayyad-2C. The Secretariat also observed that markings on the missile airframe and quality control labels on internal components were in Farsi. The Secretariat continues to analyse the information available on this missile, and I will report back to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

23. In June and August 2018, the authorities of the United Arab Emirates brought to the attention of the Secretariat information about additional unmanned aerial vehicles, reportedly recovered in Yemen, including some fitted with an explosive charge. In their assessment, those unmanned aerial vehicles were Iranian-made and had been transferred in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 6 (b) of resolution 2231 (2015). In September 2018, the Secretariat was invited to examine the remnants of those unmanned aerial vehicles in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The Secretariat observed a number of unmanned aerial vehicles with characteristics consistent with those of the unmanned aerial vehicles examined during the previous reporting periods, which had the same design features as the Iranian-made Ababil-2 unmanned aerial vehicles (see S/2018/602, para. 40). Furthermore, the Secretariat examined the remnants of two different unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected on all these unmanned aerial vehicles and on their foreign-made components and will report to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

24. While in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in September 2018, the Secretariat was presented with two container launch units — one in each of the aforementioned countries — for anti-tank guided missiles, whose production dates

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<sup>5</sup> Martin Bentham, "Heathrow Airport border staff 'seize missile parts that were being sent to Iran'", *Evening Standard*, 2 August 2018. Available at [www.standard.co.uk/news/london/heathrow-border-staff-seize-missile-parts-that-were-being-sent-to-iran-a3902096.html](http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/heathrow-border-staff-seize-missile-parts-that-were-being-sent-to-iran-a3902096.html).



were marked on the units as 2016 and 2017, respectively. According to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, both had been recovered in Yemen by forces of the Saudi-led coalition. The Secretariat observed specific characteristics consistent with those of the container launch units for the Iranian-produced Dehlabieh anti-tank guided missile visible in video and photographs published by Iranian media outlets (left-aligned marking without spaces between lines; location of marking in upper third of unit; indication of missile type code, missile type, lot, date, serial number and temperature range; font type indicative of Iranian markings; and pronounced end cap chamfer).

25. In October 2018, United States authorities invited the Secretariat to examine an arms shipment, which they believed was relevant to the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), consisting of approximately 2,500 AKMS-type assault rifles, seized on 28 August 2018 en route towards Yemen in international waters in the Gulf of Aden. The Secretariat established that the seized assault rifles did not have the characteristics of Iranian production. The Secretariat will continue to analyse new information should it become available, and I will report to the Security Council, as appropriate.

26. In identical letters dated 22 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/1046](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel stated that, in April 2018, one Iranian-produced Khordad air defence system was delivered to the “T4 airbase” in the Syrian Arab Republic. According to Israel, the system was delivered using an Iranian transport plane and unloaded in the presence of senior officials of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Permanent Representative concluded that the air defence system had been transferred by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In the letter dated 29 November 2018 addressed to me and the President of the Council ([S/2018/1073](#)), the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the allegations in the aforementioned letter from the Permanent Representative of Israel were “entirely false”.

27. In my previous report, I brought to the attention of the Security Council the participation of Iranian entities in foreign exhibitions, including the Eurasia Airshow 2018, held in Antalya, Turkey, in April 2018. In July 2018, the Permanent Mission of Turkey informed the Secretariat that Iranian participants only exhibited mock-up unmanned aerial vehicles and that no commercial transaction had taken place with regard to those items. Meanwhile, information released by the organizer of the third Azerbaijan International Defence Exhibition, held in Baku in September 2018, indicated that an Iranian entity also participated in the exhibition.<sup>6</sup> According to media coverage of that exhibition, the items displayed by that entity appear to have been tactical and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles. The Secretariat has raised this issue with the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan. The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran previously stated that it believed that no prior approval was required from the Council for that activity, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran retained ownership of the items exhibited. I intend to report thereon to the Council in due course as additional information becomes available.

## **VI. Implementation of the travel ban provision**

28. Regarding the previously reported travel of Major General Soleimani to Baghdad in mid-May 2018, the Permanent Mission of Iraq informed the Secretariat in July 2018 that he had been denied permission to enter Iraqi territory through

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<sup>6</sup> List of participants at the exhibition available at <https://adex.az/en-content/11.html>.

Baghdad International Airport and that he left the country without entering Iraqi territory.

## **VII. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)**

29. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Division also liaised with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on all matters related to the procurement channel. In October 2018, the Division participated in the European Union second Dialogue on Export Control Governance, organized by the European Commission, and the 2018 Nuclear Export Control Practices Forum, organized by the United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation. During the reporting period, the Division continued to respond to queries from and provided relevant support to Member States regarding the provisions of the resolution, in particular on the procedures for the submission of nuclear-related proposals and its review process. The Secretariat continues to assist Member States in such efforts, as needed.

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