



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 15 November 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Security Council, in paragraph 7 of its resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#), called upon me to conduct, by 15 October 2017, an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), related resources, priorities, and areas in which it has comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and United Nations country team are configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks.

Following the adoption of the resolution, I established an independent external assessment team consisting of Anthony Banbury and Phillip Rawkins. The team conducted its work from 11 September to 8 November 2017, including a field visit to Iraq and Kuwait between 25 September and 11 October 2017. Pursuant to my exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council on 1 October, the deadline for completion of the assessment was extended from 15 October to 15 November 2017, for which I would like to reiterate my gratitude.

The team submitted its report on 9 November 2017. I am grateful to the team for the report and its recommendations, including for noting the “deep appreciation for the work of the United Nations among Iraqis. Perhaps the greatest asset that UNAMI has is the trust Iraqis place in it as a neutral, impartial actor, without any self-interest in Iraqi affairs. However, there is also a strong desire to see UNAMI do more, accomplish more and achieve more tangible results”.

The report and its recommendations focus on the following key areas:

- Strategic priorities and strategy-setting
- Organizational structure
- Resources and staffing
- Collaboration and coordination between UNAMI and the United Nations country team
- UNAMI and United Nations country team common services and cost-sharing
- Performance measurement and reporting

I am attaching herewith for the attention of the Security Council, the executive summary, the observations and the full set of recommendations of the report as submitted by the team of experts (see annex). Also enclosed are several charts and tables that support the findings of the team (see enclosures\*).

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\* The enclosures are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.



It is my view that the recommendations of the team are comprehensive and cover the areas mandated by the Council under resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#). Some of the recommendations can be implemented relatively quickly and under my authority, while others will require further action or certain decisions by other bodies before they can be fully implemented, in line with the existing organizational policy and methods of work.

I have therefore requested that a group, led by the Department of Political Affairs and consisting of representatives of the Departments of Field Support and Safety and Security, as well as of the United Nations Development Programme, be established immediately at Headquarters to further review the report and its recommendations, with deadlines and clear responsibilities for action. I have further requested that the group, working closely with UNAMI and the United Nations country team, submit to me the outcome of the review with a view to developing an implementation plan by 12 January 2018.

I am guided by the overall priorities of the mandate implementation in support of the Government and people of Iraq, as well as the need to make efficient use of resources, while ensuring that the Mission is properly resourced and that the safety and security of the United Nations staff working in Iraq is addressed to the highest standard. Where appropriate, I will work with the governing bodies and keep the Council informed on steps and actions taken.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* António **Guterres**

## Annex

### Executive summary

In resolution [2367 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General to conduct an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and of related resources, priorities and areas in which it has comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and United Nations country team are configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks. The report is the product of that assessment.

While the assessment focused on the role and operations of the United Nations in Iraq, by necessity the starting point for such an assessment must be an analysis and understanding of the situation in the country, the needs of the people and the views of the Government of Iraq and other stakeholders. It is only from such an understanding that the objectives and priorities for United Nations engagement within the existing mandate can be identified, roles defined and supporting structures and resource requirements proposed.

Iraq is facing a challenge unlike any in its history due to a confluence of political, security, economic and social crises. Some of these crises predate the territorial conquests and subsequent military defeats of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), such as the tensions between Iraq and Erbil. Other crises have contributed to the rise of ISIL and remain unresolved and threaten the future of Iraq, such as the lack of adequate representation of the Sunni population in the Government. Others were coincidental with the rise of ISIL, but have had a devastating effect on society, such as the dramatic fall in oil prices and its impact on the economy of Iraq. Still others are a product of the rise and fall of ISIL, such as the social cleavages and the psychological effects caused by the control, at one time, by ISIL over millions of Iraqis.

While military victories over ISIL are indeed a cause for Iraqis to celebrate, the challenges that the Government and the people of Iraq now face are unprecedented, enormous, interdependent and recalcitrant. A consistent theme that the assessment team heard in Iraq from Government officials and a range of stakeholders was that the United Nations is needed in Iraq, now more than ever.

There is deep appreciation for the work of the United Nations among Iraqis. Perhaps the greatest asset that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has is the trust Iraqis place in it as a neutral and impartial actor, without any self-interest in Iraqi affairs. However, there is also a strong wish for UNAMI to do more, to accomplish more and to achieve more tangible results.

In conducting the assessment, the team sought to answer two basic questions: what should UNAMI be focused on and how can it better achieve effective results.

The assessment team concluded that, broadly speaking, UNAMI was working on the right priority issues, based on its mandate, although the report contains some recommendations on updating the Mission's priorities and making them more focused.

The most important conclusions of the assessment team are those regarding how UNAMI seeks to implement its mandate. The report recommends significant changes to Mission strategy-setting, structure, staffing, resources and performance

measurement so that the Mission will be in a stronger position to produce more tangible progress in its priority areas of work.

In order for UNAMI, and indeed any other United Nations peace operation, to achieve tangible results and impact, it needs to have clearly defined objectives, and a strategy to achieve those objectives, with assigned roles and responsibilities, milestones, timelines and a performance measurement framework to measure progress and enable strategy or operational adjustment where warranted. Absent a strategy designed to achieve specific results and a deliberate effort to measure and report on progress against targets, there is a high likelihood that the Mission will engage in extensive activities within its mandated areas without achieving the results over time that the Security Council expects and that the people and the Government need.

Surprisingly, United Nations peace operations, including UNAMI, tend not to put in place the kind of robust strategy-setting and performance measurement framework necessary for the Mission to achieve results over time. The present report makes important recommendations on how UNAMI should significantly enhance its strategy-setting and performance measurement capabilities.

The second major area of recommendations are on Mission structure. The report concludes that UNAMI, again like many other peace operations, has a structure that promotes operational ineffectiveness and tension and underutilizes an important capability in the form of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance.

Within the structure of UNAMI, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General takes personal responsibility for the political work of the Mission, which is at the heart of the mandate, and of the responsibilities entrusted to him or her by the Secretary-General. While quite understandable, and common throughout United Nations peace operations, as a practical matter this leaves the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance with a limited role and limited responsibilities. At the same time, there is no one in the Mission below the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General charged with and empowered to manage the day-to-day operations of the Mission, leaving a large, complex and expensive operation without the level of daily managerial oversight it requires for effective functioning. The report recommends that the Deputy Special Representative position be reprofiled to include more of the managerial and operational responsibilities of the Mission.

The report makes additional recommendations on the structure of the Mission, including the creation from within existing resources of integrated teams designed and mandated to achieve specific objectives related to the Mission's priority areas of work, the transfer of the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs from the Mission to the Humanitarian Coordinator's Office and the phasing out of the Kuwait Joint Support Office.

The third major area of recommendations concerns Mission resources and staffing. The report recommends increasing the Mission's capacity to deliver mandate-related results by adding political, human rights and analytical capabilities, especially outside Baghdad. Only 20 per cent, approximately, of the UNAMI budget is allocated for staff directly involved in mandate implementation. A relatively small increase in that areas could have a disproportionate impact on mandate implementation, while being more than offset by savings from other proposed

changes. In addition, the report recommends a security assessment to examine, inter alia, replacing the United Nations Guard Unit in Baghdad.

The last major area of recommendations concerns the collaboration between UNAMI and the United Nations country team. While the Mission and the country team have put in place a number of mechanisms designed to align and coordinate their activities, regrettably the vast majority of those mechanisms are not functioning properly and in many cases exist on paper only. This leads to disjointed activity and frustration among Iraqi counterparts and United Nations staff alike. The most important first step would be the establishment of a senior policy forum chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which would bring together the leadership of the Mission and the country team for the purpose of promoting the kind of holistic and integrated work and impact of the United Nations system called for by the Secretary-General as part of his reform agenda. The report recommends improving the coordination structure, as well as other measures to promote concerted action. However, in the end it is up to the responsible United Nations officials to act in a manner that prioritizes the needs of Iraq and the interests of the broader United Nations.

Iraq is in a tenuous and precarious situation. Its Government has worked to put the country on a path to a stable, prosperous and democratic future, at peace with its neighbours, and it has achieved some success in advancing down that path, notwithstanding the obstacles in its way. But there should be no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead and the risk of not only setbacks, but of total failure, causing untold suffering for the people of Iraq. The United Nations has played an important role in Iraq and is capable of playing a vital and indispensable role in assisting Iraq on the path towards a brighter future. Whether it plays this role is no more inevitable than whether Iraq will succeed. The recommendations contained in the report are designed to enhance the United Nations ability to deliver results and ultimately to assist the United Nations in its efforts to support the work of the Iraqi Government and improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

### **Observations**

Iraq is at a perilous time in its history, beset by a wide range of complex and dangerous challenges. The Government of Iraq, with assistance from its partners, has made some important progress in becoming a democratic, stable, prosperous and sovereign country at peace with its neighbours. However, Iraq remains a deeply fractured nation, where important segments of Iraqi society do not feel they have a voice in their Government, where some minority groups who have lived in Iraq for centuries question whether their community will still exist in Iraq in 25 years. There is no guarantee of progress towards stability in Iraq. The needs of Iraq are great and the stakes for the Iraqi people could not be higher. A peaceful, prosperous Iraq is also crucial to the stability of the region. The world's interest in the future of Iraq is clear.

The work over the years of the United Nations in Iraq, especially since 2003, is greatly appreciated by the Iraqi people and its Government. It was heartening to hear one Iraqi after another express appreciation for Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General's Special Representative killed in the Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad on 19 August 2003. Coupled with this appreciation though, there is an expectation and need of the Iraqi people and Government for the United Nations to do more, especially now at this fragile time. Iraqis are well aware of the challenges

they face, the dangers, the risks and the implication of social cleavages and renewed conflict.

The Iraqi people trust the United Nations and believe it has the interests of the Iraqi people at heart. Because of this trust, and the legitimacy it bestows on the United Nations, the Organization is capable of playing an indispensable and unique role in Iraq that no other actor can come close to fulfilling. This gives the United Nations a great opportunity to advance the principles and purposes for which it was created. Inherent in that opportunity, however, is a responsibility to do a good job, to deliver results for the Iraqi people.

Many of the challenges faced by UNAMI in Iraq have at their roots policies, practices, rules and procedures originating in New York. The consequences of the inability of the Organization's human resources system to serve the needs of its field missions and its mandated responsibilities are acutely visible in UNAMI. While UNAMI can and should make some changes to how it operates, the implementation of the Secretary-General's reform agenda will be crucial to the Organization's ultimate ability to deliver results in Iraq.

The recommendations in the report are designed primarily to enhance the ability of UNAMI to deliver concrete results. It is essential for any United Nations peace operation to have explicit goals, a strategy to achieve them and the ability to measure their progress. Strategy-setting and performance management should be a routine aspect of a mission's work and should be developed as part of the culture of United Nations peace operations. To be successful, a mission also needs a structure designed for mandate delivery in complex operating environments, and not merely reflecting bureaucratic priorities.

Some of the recommendations will require a modest investment, others will produce significant savings. Given the dramatic changes in Iraq over the course of the past few years, a reallocation of resources of this nature is warranted and, in some cases, overdue.

The Security Council, and Member States in general, have made clear their expectation that United Nations peace operations be more nimble, responsive to changing circumstances, results-oriented and tailored to the circumstances of a particular country. The recommendations in this report are designed with those shared objectives in mind, with the intention of helping UNAMI move in that direction. To accomplish those objectives, change is required. The advocates for change will need to prevail over those who wish to preserve the status quo and will need to overcome the myriad of arguments and criticisms mustered in its defence.

The assessment team would like to pay tribute to the staff of the United Nations in Iraq who, despite the obstacles, perform their vital work every day with dedication and commitment. We would especially like to recognize the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Jan Kubiš, who, in our view exemplifies the model attributes of a leader, manager and member of the international civil service.

We wish to offer a very special thanks to the Boston Consulting Group, and in particular Ross Love, Simonida Subotic, Raghav Verma and Christopher Williams, who on a pro bono basis provided extensive and invaluable assistance in the preparation of the report, and in particular the underlying data analysis and supplementary material used to support the report's findings.

Finally, we wish to express our respect for and admiration of the people of Iraq who have faced so many difficulties and endured so much suffering, but whose

dignity, pride and optimism remain as inspirational as ever. They deserve a brighter future, and it is our hope and belief that the United Nations will walk towards that future side-by-side with them.

### **List of recommendations**

#### **Strategic priorities and strategy-setting**

1. Adopt the following strategic priorities:
  - (a) Prevention of conflict;
  - (b) National reconciliation, including the resolution of Baghdad-Erbil relations;
  - (c) Promotion and protection of human rights, including women's empowerment and gender equality;
  - (d) Promotion and protection of minorities' place in society;
  - (e) Promotion of good governance, including free and fair elections and implementation of the constitution;
  - (f) Support for Iraqi sovereignty and regional reintegration, including resolution of the Kuwait file.
2. Create a distinct strategy-setting process resulting in strategy documents for the overall mandate of UNAMI, as well as for each Mission-strategic priority, with clear goals and a plan to achieve them, including benchmarks, timelines and assigned roles and responsibilities.
3. Establish quarterly or semi-annual periods for strategy review and revise strategy and/or implementation plans, as appropriate.
4. Embed a performance measurement framework and monitoring plan into the strategy-setting process and resulting strategy documents.
5. Produce an annual report to the Security Council on Mission performance relating to the strategy and the progress made against benchmarks and indicators for each specified priority, including reasons for lack of progress, in advance of the annual mandate review.
6. Ensure that the strategy serves as the basis for budget requests so that resources are tightly linked to the strategic goals and the results specified in the performance measurement framework.
7. Establish a UNAMI strategic planning unit from within existing resources, reporting to the reprofiled Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs (see below) and supported by a policy and priorities committee.
8. Establish a policies and priorities committee within UNAMI, chaired by the reprofiled Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which would include the heads of all sections in UNAMI, to prepare strategy and planning documents for approval by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

#### **Organizational structure**

9. Reprofile the position of Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs to a role focused on overseeing and managing the day-to-day work of the Mission,

freeing up the Special Representative to focus on political matters and mandate implementation.

10. Reprofile the Chief of Staff role to align with the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs role and reallocate staff within the offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Chief of Staff accordingly.

11. Integrate the Women's Protection Unit and the Child Protection Unit into the Human Rights Office.

12. Establish integrated, cross-functional, multi-disciplinary teams using UNAMI staff and, where appropriate, staff from the country team and outside experts aligned to specific objectives derived from mission priorities, with the aim of delivering on those objectives within a given time frame.

13. Progressively transfer functions and staff of the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs from the Mission to the Humanitarian Coordinator's Office; amend the proposed 2018 UNAMI budget so that funding for the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs is progressively reduced and ends entirely by 30 June 2018.

14. Close the transport workshop and the warehouse in Kuwait.

The Department of Field Support should:

15. Work with the Department of Management, UNAMI and other Missions receiving services from the Kuwait Joint Support Office, as well as relevant oversight bodies, to phase out the back-office functions of the Kuwait Joint Support Office, in the context of the global service delivery model and the management reforms of the Secretary-General.

### **Resources and staffing**

16. Strengthen and expand the leadership, representational and political capabilities of UNAMI beyond Baghdad by:

- (a) Raising the level of the Head of Office in Erbil;
- (b) Creating a Head of Office in Mosul, supported by two Political Affairs Officers (National Professional Officer);
- (c) Creating a Head of Office in Sulaymaniyah, supported by one Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer);
- (d) Creating a Head of Office (National Professional Officer) in Najaf.

17. Strengthen and expand the human rights capabilities of UNAMI by:

- (a) Creating four Human Rights Officer positions (two international and two National Professional Officer) in Baghdad to focus on legal reform, rule of law, prisons and detention;
- (b) Creating two Human Rights Officer positions (one international and one National Professional Officer) in Erbil to focus on legal reform, rule of law, prisons and detention;
- (c) Creating two Human Rights Officer positions (one international and one National Professional Officer) in Mosul.

18. Strengthen the capacity of UNAMI to obtain the necessary expertise in support of targeted, mandate-specific activities, at the time the expertise is required, by adding an additional \$300,000 to the 2018 UNAMI general consultancy budget, under the discretion of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

19. Strengthen and expand the analytical capabilities of UNAMI by:

(a) Adding \$150,000 to the 2018 Joint Analysis Unit consultancy budget to fund a range of international and national consultants to work on, inter alia, constitutional and legal analysis on disputed boundaries, minority issues, armed groups, terrorism financing and counter-terrorism, macroeconomic issues and the energy sector;

(b) Creating one Analyst (National Professional Officer) position in Basra reporting to the Joint Analysis Unit to cover the south of Iraq.

20. Increase reliance on national staff at all levels and begin to incorporate United Nations Volunteers into the Mission's human resources strategy, and in particular:

(a) Increase the percentage of national staff in Mission support, including by hiring of National Professional Officers, from approximately 70 per cent to approximately 80 per cent;

(b) Develop a forward-looking human resources strategy that methodically goes through every international post in the Mission to identify which posts could be transitioned to national staff or United Nations Volunteers, when that could happen, and what preparatory work would be required to enable such a transition.

21. Ensure appropriate representation of Kurdish-speaking national staff, including National Professional Officers, in Erbil, as well as in Baghdad and Kirkuk.

The Department of Field Support should:

22. Request that the International Civil Service Commission review the rest and recuperation cycle for all duty stations in Iraq, with a view to changing the cycle in Baghdad from four to six weeks.

23. Instruct the Mission to implement the outstanding recommendations from the 2014 civilian staffing review, and obtain approval from Headquarters not to implement any recommendations the Mission believes should not be implemented.

24. Send a team to UNAMI to work with the Mission to assess what additional Mission support functions and staff could be moved from Baghdad to Kuwait or Erbil.

The Department of Safety and Security should:

25. Send a security assessment team to Iraq to redesign the security architecture based on current threat levels; particular attention should be paid to the possibility of replacing the United Nations Guard Unit in Baghdad with a combination of Iraqi security forces for facility perimeter protection and United Nations personnel for facility entry-point control; consideration should also be given to terminating the administrative presence of the United Nations Guard Unit in Erbil.

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and United Nations country team collaboration and coordination**

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the United Nations country team should:

26. Establish a senior policy forum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and made up of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, heads of country team agencies and heads of UNAMI sections, with defined terms of reference, to provide strategic direction to the work of the United Nations in Iraq and to ensure strategic coordination and coherence between the work of the Mission and the country team. The senior policy forum should meet on a set schedule and disseminate records of its decisions.

27. Establish a Joint Coordination Office using staff from the coordination unit of the UNAMI Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs and the Resident Coordinator's Office to support effective coordination of United Nations activities in Iraq and to serve as a secretariat for the senior policy forum; the Joint Coordination Office should report on a six-month rotating basis to the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

28. Develop workplans, with clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, specific objectives and timelines, for each of the agreed areas of shared work between UNAMI and the country team.

29. Establish a coordination mechanism for each of the agreed areas of shared work, with terms of reference, and keep a record of decisions from meetings of the coordination mechanisms.

30. Report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in writing, on a quarterly basis on the progress achieved in implementing the workplans.

31. Produce a weekly report of key United Nations activities and developments in Iraq for the Mission and the United Nations country team leadership and respective headquarters.

32. Submit to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General any project document that is going to be jointly signed by a United Nations entity and the Government of Iraq one week in advance of planned signature for his information and comment as appropriate.

33. Have annual "360-degree" evaluations of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and all UNAMI section heads and country team agency heads, including a component on how well they collaborate with their peers, with results made available to supervisors.

**United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and United Nations country team common services and cost-sharing**

UNAMI should:

34. Provide clear, explicit justification for the costs it charges for the full range of services it provides to members of the country team.

35. Report annually to the country team by 28 February on expenditures against targets for the previous fiscal year on services for which country team members pay an annual fee.

36. Engage transparently with the country team in forward-looking planning processes so that members of the country team know what services UNAMI will be in a position to provide and at what cost, and are able to budget accordingly.
37. Retain oversight, accountability and responsibility for the UNAMI headquarters compound in Baghdad and associated assets and facilities.

The Department of Field Support should:

38. Work with the Controller, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Group to develop a set of exceptional principles and explicit, formal guidance on cost reimbursement in situations where agencies are wholly or almost wholly dependent on missions for their operations (i.e. Baghdad, Mogadishu, Tripoli).

### **Performance measurement and reporting**


UNAMI should:

39. Adopt a new performance measurement framework that tracks progress in mandate implementation using the objectives and benchmarks from the strategic plans.
40. Adopt an operational performance measurement framework to assess effectiveness and efficiency, based on the Department of Field Support model used for peacekeeping missions.
41. Conduct annual stakeholder reviews and public polling in Iraq to assist in measuring performance.
42. Incorporate performance measurement reporting in the annual report to the Security Council.

Enclosure 1\*

Resource and Staffing Analysis Tables

Breakdown of UNAMI 2017 budget; mandate activity staff costs 20% of total




1. Mandate Activity Staff Costs for units represented do not include support staff aligned to these particular units, who are instead classified as Non-Mandate Activity staff costs; 2. UNGU budget is considered Non-Staff costs as grants are not an UNAMI activity. If included under Security Staff Costs Non-Staff Costs would represent ~25% of budget (~\$29M), and Non-Mandate Activity Staff Costs would represent ~55% of budget (~\$65M). Note: Staff Costs include salaries, common-staff costs, and danger pay allowances. Source: UNAMI Mandate and Budget

\* The enclosure is being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

Enclosure 2\*

Breakdown of UNAMI 2017 budget; support and security staff costs 50% of total



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|---|---|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supply Chain/Audit</li> <li>• HR/Finance/IT</li> <li>• Medical</li> <li>• Engineering/Equipment Operations</li> <li>• Procurement</li> <li>• Vehicle/fair operations</li> <li>• Mail assistants</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security units</li> <li>• Investigation</li> <li>• Close protection</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Office of Political Affairs</li> <li>• Human Rights Office</li> <li>• Gender and Child Protection</li> <li>• Chief of Staff</li> <li>• Public Information</li> <li>• Electoral Assistance</li> <li>• Joint Analysis</li> <li>• Dep. Special Rep Offices</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational Costs (Facilities, Infrastructure, Air Transport, Communications, IT, Medical, Supplies and Services, Official Travel, Consultants)</li> <li>• Military and Police Personnel (reimbursed cost, not part of registered staffing headcount)</li> </ul> |
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1. Mandate-Activity Staff Costs for units represented do not include support staff assigned to these particular units, who are instead classified under Support Staff Costs; 2. UNAMI budget is considered Non-Staff costs as per UNAMI payroll. If reclassified under Security Staff Costs; Non-Staff Costs would represent ~25% of budget (~\$29M), and Security Staff Costs would represent ~25% (~\$29M).  
 Note: Staff Costs include salaries, common-staff costs, and danger pay allowance.  
 Source: UNAMI Mandate and Budget

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Enclosure 3\*

potential efficiency savings through 5 initiatives

Savings Opportunity	Impact Levers	Key Assumptions
1 Migrate shared service functions from KJSO to a shared service center	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Savings on lower costs per employee in a shared service center relative to Kuwait</li> <li>Efficiency uplift (lower headcount)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>~35% efficiency uplift for current KJSO operations<sup>1</sup></li> </ul>
2 Gradually phase out UNGU operations in Baghdad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Troop costs and travel costs</li> <li>Troop benefits (rec. leave, etc.)</li> <li>Rations (food, water, etc.)</li> <li>Fixed costs associated with accommodation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Baghdad operations does not influence Kirkuk operations</li> </ul>
3 Gradually increase proportion of national support staff from 70% to 80% of total support staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Savings on international employee cost differential</li> <li>Savings on R&amp;R productivity loss</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No efficiency loss in replacing internationals (same headcount)</li> </ul>
4 Modify R&R benefits in Baghdad from 4-week to 6-week accrual policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lump sum reimbursement for travel</li> <li>Productivity associated with time taken off</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Historical utilization rate of R&amp;R to remain consistent</li> </ul>
5 Transfer ICODHA from UNAM to HC/OCHA <sup>2</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Staff cost savings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Does not imply staffing changes across organization</li> </ul>

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