



## Security Council

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### **Letter dated 30 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to send you the report of the fourteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council, which was held on 3 and 4 November 2016 at the Greentree Foundation in Manhasset, New York (see annex). The final report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House Rule under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

On the basis of the very positive feedback that we have received from the participants each year, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland hopes that the report will contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the work of the Council.

I should be grateful, accordingly, if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Kai **Sauer**  
Ambassador

Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations



## **Annex to the letter dated 30 May 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

### **“Hitting the ground running”: fourteenth annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council**

**3 and 4 November 2016**

**Greentree Foundation  
Manhasset, New York**

The Government of Finland, in conjunction with the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University and the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, convened the fourteenth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council on 3 and 4 November 2016.

Over the years, the annual workshops have served two primary purposes. Their founding and sustaining purpose has been to give the newly elected members a deeper understanding of the dynamics, practices, procedures and working methods of the Security Council so that they are in a position to “hit the ground running” when their terms on the Council commence the following January. A second, complementary, purpose has emerged over time: to provide current, as well as incoming, members with an unparalleled opportunity to reflect on the work of the Council in an informal and interactive setting. To further those goals, the conversations have been conducted under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution. In the present report, therefore, the only speakers identified are those at the opening dinner.

On 3 November, the opening dinner featured welcoming remarks by the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations, Kai Sauer, a keynote address by the President of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, remarks by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, and closing remarks by the President of the Security Council and Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations, Fodé Seck.

The full-day programme, on 4 November, included round-table exchanges among all participants on the following three themes:

- (a) State of the Security Council 2016: taking stock and looking ahead (session I);
- (b) Working methods and subsidiary bodies (session II);
- (c) Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2016 (session III).

#### **Opening dinner**

In his keynote address, Mr. Rudd described the work and findings of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism, which he chaired. The Commission sought to examine the performance of the United Nations system and assess how well it was equipped to meet the challenges of global governance in the twenty-first century. The Commission addressed a wide range of thematic areas of the Organization’s work and consulted widely with key stakeholders, ultimately producing both a Chair’s report, *UN 2030: Rebuilding Order in a Fragmenting World*, and the Commission’s report, *Pulling Together: The Multilateral System and*

*Its Future.* The work of the Commission was both diagnostic and prescriptive, identifying macro-challenges as well as organizing principles.

Mr. Rudd highlighted a series of macro-challenges to the international system, as follows:

(a) First, there is a strong global consensus on the need for a stronger, not weaker, United Nations. This consensus is the product of the dynamics of current geopolitical and geo-economic forces, the challenges of globalization, the proliferation of non-State actors, some committed to the destruction of the inter-State system, and the proliferation of new, potentially destructive, technologies;

(b) Second, there is an equally strong consensus that the United Nations, although not yet broken, is in serious trouble and needs to be bolstered on multiple levels. There is growing evidence of States “walking around” the United Nations system to address a series of critical problems. The functional effectiveness of key United Nations agencies has been increasingly questioned;

(c) Third, from a longer-range historical perspective, there is little reason to expect that the United Nations, or any other institution, will last forever. With much of human history characterized by disorder, the United Nations represents a thin blue line between civilization and barbarism and between global order and disorder;

(d) Fourth, active efforts to reinvigorate and reinvent the institution will be required on a continuing basis to equip the United Nations to respond to a growing list of global challenges and dilemmas;

(e) Fifth, the Member States, large and small, including, critically, the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, need to decide whether they want a fully functioning and effective multilateral system. If so, then they must own it, argue for it and demonstrate their readiness to re-energize and reinvent it;

(f) Sixth, the course of great power politics is raising questions about the future of neo-liberal institutionalism and geopolitical challenges that are far beyond the control of the Secretary-General.

Mr. Rudd then outlined 10 principles that had been identified over the course of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism process, as follows:

(a) **Principle 1.** A comprehensive doctrine of prevention across the entire United Nations system needs to be articulated and implemented. This should extend across the peace and security, sustainable development, human rights and humanitarian spheres. This shift would have major implications for the ways in which the United Nations Secretariat goes about policy planning and political affairs;

(b) **Principle 2.** The United Nations needs a new, comprehensive doctrine of delivery before it drowns in a sea of reports produced by a myriad of high-level panels and independent commissions. Report-writing must not become a substitute for effective, measurable and accountable action and delivery on the ground;

(c) **Principle 3.** To that end, field operations need to be permanently prioritized over the centre. Building on the One United Nations Initiative, a fully integrated, multi-disciplinary “Team United Nations” approach is needed for delivery around the world;

(d) **Principle 4.** As an immediate priority, the problem of institutional silos needs to be dealt with both at Headquarters and in the field. The Independent Commission on Multilateralism process has proposed an extensive recasting of the top echelons of the Secretariat for that purpose;

(e) **Principle 5.** Meeting the far-reaching goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will require a focused effort at the highest levels, both in Member States and in the United Nations. Again, the Commission identified a series of steps that the world body could take to further those common objectives;

(f) **Principle 6.** Rather than trying to do everything, the United Nations should develop a more formal global compact between the public and private development sectors to facilitate joint assessments and the prioritization of collective efforts;

(g) **Principle 7.** A new “Agenda for peace, security and development” is needed to integrate the Organization’s valuable work across all sectors;

(h) **Principle 8.** Women should be integrated throughout the United Nations system and should hold half of all United Nations management positions, at Headquarters and in the field, by 2030;

(i) **Principle 9.** Structural youth unemployment needs to be tackled as a high priority, including through the establishment by the General Assembly of a subsidiary organ called “United Nations Youth”;

(j) **Principle 10.** Given the acute budgetary constraints, the reform of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly should be a matter of high priority.

Following the address by Mr. Rudd, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon offered some informal remarks. He stressed the importance of the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretary-General and the value of the various mechanisms, such as the monthly lunches, the annual retreat and the opportunities for briefings, for mutual engagement.

In the view of the Secretary-General, progress on maintaining international peace and security had been made over the past decade. The peacekeeping operation in Timor-Leste had been completed successfully and those in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia had been drawn down. Owing to timely interventions, there had been peaceful transitions in Burkina Faso and Guinea. The peacekeeping and police summits had resulted in important pledges from Member States. Partnerships with regional organizations had been strengthened. In a number of ways, women had assumed greater roles in peace and security matters. Steps were under way to implement the findings and recommendations of the reviews of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#). By addressing the security implications of climate change and the differential impact of armed conflict on women and children, the Council had expanded traditional understandings of peace and security in positive and useful ways.

Nevertheless, continued the Secretary-General, serious challenges remained. Peace operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, the Sudan and Western Sahara faced a “crisis of consent.” The Council needed to show strong and consistent support for the missions and personnel that it deployed. Preventing sexual abuse and exploitation and protecting civilians remained key challenges. Peace operations deserved the tools, resources and mandates required for success. He noted that his decision to replace the force commander of the mission in South Sudan had been both controversial and necessary.

Moving from conflict management to conflict prevention, noted the Secretary-General, would require a more substantial and targeted investment in preventive diplomacy. That would be enormously cost-effective. The unanimous support for Security Council resolution [2282 \(2016\)](#) on peacebuilding and the prevention of a recurrence of conflict was encouraging, but too often, differences within the Council

on the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen had spilled over into other matters, sometimes with paralyzing effects. The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development, especially Goal 16, addressed important aspects of prevention, as did the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. They demonstrated, as well, that humanity was still capable of coming together despite divergent perspectives. That spirit needed to inspire the work of the Council, which could do much to help the incoming Secretary-General achieve his prevention goals.

Imploring the members of the Security Council not to let differences in one area spill into others, the Secretary-General cautioned against letting the drive for unanimity block timely and much-needed action. Consensus should not be equated with unanimity, especially in life and death situations. While resolutions on non-procedural matters could be blocked by a veto, presidential statements and press statements required absolute unanimity. It was unreasonable, that resolutions could be passed with nine affirmative votes, while press statements could be blocked by a dissent from any member. To avoid being silent on crucial issues, the members of the Council should consider reforms in that matter.

During the ensuing discussion period, both the Secretary-General and Mr. Rudd responded to questions and comments. There were exchanges on ways to increase the number of women in United Nations posts both at Headquarters and in the field, how to enhance accountability within the United Nations system, how to improve the quality and training of contingents supplied for peacekeeping operations, how to enhance the relevance and restore the political capital of the United Nations and how to discourage the scheduling of so many side events during the high-level week at the opening of the General Assembly, to permit greater focus on high-priority matters.

The next morning, at the opening of the round-table sessions of the workshop, introductory remarks were made by the Director of the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the Secretariat, Hasmik Egian, and by Edward C. Luck of the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University.

## **Session I**

### **State of the Security Council 2016: taking stock and looking ahead**

#### **Moderator**

Ambassador Matthew Rycroft  
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

#### **Commentators**

Ambassador Amr Aboulatta  
Permanent Representative of Egypt

Ambassador François Delattre  
Permanent Representative of France

Ambassador Haitao Wu  
Deputy Permanent Representative of China

The agenda for session I contained the following questions:

- How well is the Council fulfilling its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security? How would you assess its

performance in 2016 in this regard compared with 2015 and earlier years? Where is it performing relatively well or relatively poorly? Why?

- Which benchmarks should be employed to gauge the extent to which the Council has or has not been successful over the past year? Are you encouraged or discouraged about its prospects for 2017? In which situations and thematic issues is it poised to make the most positive difference in the coming year?
- At this point, the Council is being asked to address a wider range of peace and security challenges than at any other time over the past seven decades. Which of the following challenges have proved most daunting or problematic over the past year: conflict prevention, peacemaking and conflict resolution, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, sanctions oversight, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, atrocity prevention and/or civilian protection? In which of these areas could the Council improve its performance in 2017 and beyond? What specific steps could be undertaken to enhance its capacity and effectiveness in some of these areas?
- At recent “Hitting the ground running” workshops, it has been noted that the members of the Council have remained focused and productive on many issues even though sharp differences have been evident on others. Nevertheless, is there reason to be concerned that growing tension in some parts of the world, such as the Middle East, could begin to affect the Council’s effectiveness and reputation, while complicating other situations and issues? How could non-permanent members assist the search for common ground within the Council in such difficult times? Are newly elected members likely to face particular challenges in this regard in 2017?
- For several years, quantitative measures suggest that the Council has been increasing the share of its time and attention devoted to the Middle East, while the relative share devoted to Africa has declined modestly. Yet, the portion of its decisions and outcomes related to Africa has remained relatively high. Do these trends reflect the depth and breadth of the peace and security challenges in the two regions, the degree of difficulty reaching consensus on the issues presented, or other factors? Within the two regions, where do the opportunities for positive contributions by the Council in 2017 appear to be greatest? Where have its efforts fallen short in 2016?
- At past workshops, participants have often underscored the importance of conflict prevention, while lamenting that the Council too often has been ill-equipped or ill-prepared to engage in effective operational or structural prevention. Is this an endemic weakness owing to institutional factors or one that can and is being addressed? How could the Council improve its preventive efforts in 2017 and beyond? Has the Council’s engagement in the situation in Burundi offered any lessons for conflict prevention efforts elsewhere?
- Likewise, the value of collaborative work with regional and subregional arrangements is regularly stressed at the workshops, although perceptions of actual practice have been mixed.
  - For instance, at the 2015 workshop, it was asserted that the Council’s interactions with the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had been too formal and too scripted. Is that still the case, given the multiple times that the Council engaged with the Peace and Security Council, visited Africa and addressed collaboration with the African Union in 2016? How much progress has been achieved on the ambitious cooperative agenda laid out in the presidential statement of 24 May 2016 (S/PRST/2016/8)?

- In 2016, members of the Security Council and members of the League of Arab States held their first consultative meeting, in Cairo. There was also a briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and formal and informal meetings on strengthening cooperation with the European Union. What follow-up steps, if any, might be anticipated in 2017? Are there ways that the Council might support the on-the-ground efforts of OSCE related to the situation around Ukraine?
  - Beyond these individual initiatives, should the members of the Security Council consider undertaking a more strategic and generic review of its interactions with regional and subregional arrangements? When and where have such collaborations added value? How and why? And where have they fallen short?
  - According to the Highlights of Security Council Practice 2015, “In 2015, the Council continued its practice of including provisions on cross-cutting issues, namely, the protection of civilians, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict, in its decisions relating to country-specific or regional situations. In 2015, 79 per cent of resolutions and presidential statements relating to country-specific or regional situations contained one or more provisions on protection of civilians, 59 per cent on women and peace and security and 48 per cent on children and armed conflict.” From a normative standpoint, these numbers suggest a growing willingness to include the language of human protection in Council decisions. Less clear, especially when record numbers of people have been forcibly displaced, is whether these cross-cutting concerns have been carried out on the ground. How might the Council begin to narrow this gap between expectations and performance over the coming years? Specifically, what more could be done to realize the promise of resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#)?
- What more could be done to address the acute humanitarian emergencies in Iraq, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen? What lessons could be derived from the Council’s experience in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia? What was learned, in this regard, from the Council’s three missions to Africa in 2016? What steps could the Council take to improve its anticipation of and response to signs of imminent mass atrocities?
  - One of the areas in which the members of the Council have demonstrated broad and sustained cooperation has been counter-terrorism. As the campaigns to deny the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and other armed groups the control of territory continue to progress, it is possible that the threats they pose could become more diffuse and unpredictable. Under such circumstances, what form is the Council’s role in countering terrorism and violent extremism likely to take? Where will its comparative advantages lie? What specific new measures should it consider in 2017 and beyond?
  - As cybersecurity emerges as a universal security concern, is there either a normative or operational role to be played by the Council in addressing its implications for governments, the private sector and civil society alike?
  - With tensions related to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea rising, are there additional measures that could be undertaken by the Council in the coming year? Could the implementation of existing sanctions be tightened? Should new approaches to diplomacy and conflict resolution be considered?

- The series of declarations, reviews and reports produced in 2015 concerning peace operations, peacekeeping modernization, sanctions, peacebuilding and the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) contained a wide range of recommendations and commitments about how to enhance these aspects of the Council's work. Are there implementation steps that should be regarded as priorities for the coming year?

### **Assessment of the performance of the Security Council in 2016**

Participants expressed a range of views about how well the Security Council had been performing. It was noted that the Council members had worked very hard in 2016, addressing a wide scope of issues and regional situations. They had passed more resolutions than in recent years, including many with strong substantive content. The resolution on the mandate for the operation in Mali, for instance, included many elements and demonstrated a comprehensive approach to the issues in that country. Sanctions had been lifted on Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, reflecting progress in both situations. The Council had shown unity in support of the peace process in Colombia, as well as in the selection of the Secretary-General. It had enhanced its collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements in South Sudan, the Sudan and elsewhere. In short, concluded the speaker, the Council had lived up to its obligations in 2016.

Although there were no grounds for complacency, commented an interlocutor, the members of the Security Council had demonstrated flexibility in tackling emerging threats, such as aviation security, terrorist financing and the return of foreign terrorist fighters to their countries of origin. The Council had shown unity in identifying ways to counter those common threats, and now its members needed to work together to implement and enforce the steps that had been agreed.

According to another participant, there was a tendency among some observers to be too gloomy about the performance of the Security Council. Efforts by the Council and by its permanent members had bolstered stability in Central Asia and Eurasia, for example. Some of the current difficulties within the Council could be attributed to a post-Cold War, post-colonial syndrome. It would take some time to adapt to changing conditions in the world, but the mentality of Council members had begun to adapt.

Citing a question from the background paper prepared by Mr. Luck, a speaker asked why the standing of the Security Council appeared to be so low in public eyes. Doing more and doing better were two different things. The statistics suggested that the Council had more on its plate than ever before, not that it was handling the myriad challenges more adeptly. There was a need to assess what was working and what was getting in the way of greater progress, as well as how to prioritize the use of time and how to handle the most difficult situations. According to a second participant, there was a dual problem: one, the Council tried to do too much without delivering what was most needed in a timely fashion and two, too many of the core peace and security issues were decided outside of the Council. The members needed to reaffirm that the Council was the primary organ for maintaining international peace and security and act accordingly or to move on to other things.

A speaker contended that public perceptions of the Security Council were quite negative owing to its ineffectiveness in dealing with the State of Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic and other conflicts in the Middle East. Its performance had been compromised by the national interests of some members, as respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter, for international humanitarian law and for international law in general had been ebbing to a worrisome degree. It was difficult to hold the Council accountable, in part because it paid too little attention to the

views of the parties to conflict and to respecting international rules of behaviour. According to another participant, the discussion had highlighted some significant successes, although most of the exchange largely focused on areas where the Council could perform better in the coming year.

The Security Council faced a crisis of relevance, in the view of a speaker, because it had been engaged in producing paper, documents and noise instead of making a difference on the critical issues before it. It was pretending, not doing. It was treating outcomes as ends in themselves. As a result, the relevance of the Council had come into question when important crises, such as the war in the Syrian Arab Republic and the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, were being handled elsewhere. Few members had seen that agreement before they were asked to vote on it. An interlocutor contended that the Council had been talking too much and implementing too little. Another participant, however, pointed out that many agreements developed outside the Council were then brought to it for implementation and/or legitimation. That allowed for some interactive engagement and assured the continuing relevance of the Council.

The credibility of the Security Council was at stake, it was said, given the perceptions that both the public and other Member States had of its performance. Its relevance was on the line when it failed to prevent mass atrocities in the Syrian Arab Republic and elsewhere, such as in South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. That sense of frustration was palpable within the Council itself. People were not naïve, countered a second speaker, and their expectations of the Council were not overly high. They did expect, however, for members to pursue the larger interests of the international community and not only their own national interests. A third interlocutor suggested that non-members of the Council, especially developing countries, had been disappointed that their initiatives and proposals had not been addressed by the Council. They felt as though their voice had been in a wilderness.

The question of unity within the Security Council received much attention, some of it in response to the comments of the Secretary-General at the opening dinner. There was a chance, it was asserted, to build on the unity that had been achieved on the selection process for the Secretary-General, as well as on the peace process in Colombia, on Lebanon and on counter-terrorism. In that regard, the search for a common position on the non-proliferation challenges with chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and with nuclear weapons in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a continuing challenge, but the Council could build on the unity it had achieved in dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another participant suggested that, when the Council was united, its decisions carried more weight politically. The Council appeared weaker when it was divided.

A speaker compared the Security Council to a family that did not agree on everything. While seeking consensus, it needed to accept that there could be legitimate differences of opinion that needed to be aired and sorted out. Unity should not always be the ultimate goal. In that regard, a participant recalled what the Secretary-General had said at the dinner, namely, that the Council's rules requiring consensus had had a negative effect on its capacity for decisive and effective action. An interlocutor agreed that differences within the Council could be legitimate and that the Secretary-General had been right about the downside of requiring consensus on every press statement.

It was noted that, from a political perspective, unity within the Security Council could make a difference when speaking to another country or party to a conflict, but that was not required under the Charter and should not be over-emphasized. A participant commented that the Secretary-General had made a valid point about the requirement for a complete consensus on presidential statements and

press statements, but that all members needed to recognize that a Council decision was binding no matter their views during the process of negotiations or the way they voted. To act otherwise would only lessen the legitimacy of the Council and undermine its reputation.

Concurring with the point by the Secretary-General on the sometimes negative consequences of the exercise of a collective veto on presidential statements and press statements, a speaker suggested that that indicated the value of allocating more time during informal meetings for drafting and less for going around the table for prepared statements. Also agreeing with the observation by the Secretary-General, a participant remarked that it underscored the need for a broader reform of the decision-making process within the Council, especially given the frequency of resolutions being adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and the tendency to produce more resolutions than could possibly be implemented.

According to another participant, unity within the Security Council had been negatively affected on several occasions by the actions of the penholder. The penholders had the power to foster unity or division among Council members, depending on whether they took on board drafting suggestions by other members. The latter had occurred in the case of resolution 2272 (2016) on sexual exploitation and abuse related to peace operations and resolution 2310 (2016) on nuclear non-proliferation. Two interlocutors pointed out that sometimes penholders faced difficult questions of timing and how best to move the drafting process forward.

Several interlocutors commented on the need to maintain a firewall between the most divisive issues and others where there were fewer differences. It was asserted that differences over the Syrian Arab Republic, which profoundly divided the Security Council, had begun to affect deliberations on other matters. Resolutions on Burundi (2303 (2016)) and South Sudan (2304 (2016)) were adopted by smaller majorities, statements on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on Mali had been more difficult to negotiate, and it had been hard to maintain the consensus on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Syrian Arab Republic was the defining issue of our times, the Council was facing other tough issues as well, such as Libya, South Sudan, Yemen and the Middle East peace process. It was therefore essential not to let problems over the Syrian Arab Republic pollute the good work that had been done in other areas. A participant agreed with that point, noting that bolstering the firewall was essential to the productive functioning of the Council.

Of course, attempts should be made to keep differences over the Syrian Arab Republic from spilling over into other areas, it was stressed, but that had proved very difficult to do. In some cases, such as on Burundi and South Sudan, the Council was close to a consensus until the penholder imposed a draft and forced a vote. More negotiations might have bridged the remaining differences. One speaker commented that the firewall had, in fact, been working relatively well. Some issues, however, were linked substantively and were bound to affect each other. Another suggested that the best way to maintain the firewall was to abide by the rules.

The Security Council, it was said, was most effective when it was actively engaged on the ground in an effort to prevent conflicts from breaking out or escalating. Mediation efforts in Guinea-Bissau, for instance, had been quite effective. A participant agreed on the importance of preventive diplomacy and urged that the Council should employ the tools of prevention and mediation more comprehensively. The Council, commented another speaker, had not been sufficiently engaged with the countries involved in the situations it addressed, such as the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Similarly, it was evident that some of the things that had occurred in South Sudan might have been prevented if there had been more active Council engagement on the ground. One

speaker commented that few Permanent Representatives had listened to the briefings by the representatives of regional organizations in the open debate on cooperation with them, while another participant responded that it might have been because members of the Council did not believe that those groups always added value to prevention efforts. The problem, in part, was on their side.

It was contended that the successes of peace operations and the good work of peacekeepers needed to be communicated more effectively both to the public and to the wider United Nations membership. There were many good stories to tell in Africa, such as the successful efforts in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia and the ongoing good work in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. The Council's multiple visits to Africa in 2016 had helped members to learn about such wider United Nations efforts and operations and how to bolster them as needed. A speaker commented, however, that briefings on Mali and South Sudan had also highlighted the challenges they faced. It was particularly evident that the mission in South Sudan lacked the capacity to adequately protect civilians and to fulfil its mandate. Those experiences raised the question of whether the United Nations was functioning well enough. Another interlocutor pointed out that the Council had not held a proper debate on the report by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, nor had it acted on its recommendations.

Although the selection process for the Secretary-General was widely seen as a successful step forward, areas for further progress in improving that process were also noted. The result was good, commented an interlocutor, but there were problems with the way the results of the straw polls were announced and it was not clear that straw polls were necessarily the ideal way to select such a critical leader, given that other organizations had adopted more transparent processes. Lessons needed to be drawn in order to avoid similar problems in the future. Concurring, another participant asserted that the Security Council should be ashamed by the lack of transparency. In 5 or 10 years, there could well be another General Assembly resolution demanding full transparency.

The Security Council, in the view of a speaker, had begun to address issues that were not central to the maintenance of international peace and security and could be regarded as encroachments on the mandates of other intergovernmental organs. That had distracted attention from core issues and had, at times, raised concerns about how Article 2 (7) of the Charter was being interpreted. The work of the Council had not always been as adaptable to changing times as it should have been, given the emphasis on precedent even as circumstances had changed. Another participant pointed out that there remained differences within the Council about how broadly threats to international peace and security should be cast and about how sovereignty and the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the Charter should be understood.

### **Challenges ahead**

A number of participants identified the transition to a new Secretary-General as an opportunity for dialogue and the testing of new ideas and approaches. One referred to the suggestions in that regard offered by Mr. Rudd at the opening dinner. A second urged an early informal meeting with the incoming Secretary-General for a global review of threats to international peace and security and for an exchange on the way forward. A third suggested an informal dialogue, like the one at the workshop, with the new Secretary-General, perhaps over breakfast. A fourth speaker seconded the idea, while a fifth proposed that the Secretary-General participate once a month in one of the Council's informal meetings. That would be far preferable to the overly rigid monthly lunches with the Secretary-General. According to another participant, there was a need both for an early session before the Secretary-General took office and for regular informal meetings with him, perhaps twice monthly. At

the outset, it would be important to know more about his vision, as well as what he expected from the Council. Such exchanges would also provide an opportunity to ask the Secretary-General about his plans to restructure the Secretariat.

Given that the Security Council functioned as part of the larger United Nations system, a speaker called for a new impetus from the Secretary-General to break down silos and engender better interdepartmental collaboration. Too often, in the peace and security realm, the right hand did not know what the left hand was doing. The new Secretary-General, concurred another interlocutor, would have the opportunity to increase trust and decrease barriers. Agreeing on the need to break down silos within the Secretariat, a participant urged the initiation of a dialogue between the new Secretary-General and the Council on how to sustain peace in a way that went beyond distinctions between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. That was an area that called out for fresh thinking and analysis. A speaker stressed that effective prevention required a high degree of trust between the Council and the Secretary-General. The new Secretary-General could bring new energy to that quest, while an early dialogue between him and the Council could both identify new approaches and help to establish that essential trust. Another interlocutor called on the Council to make a more comprehensive use of prevention, dialogue and mediation, which would entail a fuller degree of collaboration with other principal organs, including with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat.

In the view of a participant, there was a huge gap between peacekeeping mandates and the capacity to deliver on them. That was a question that should be raised early on with the new Secretary-General and the suggestion, made earlier at the workshop, that the Council address the report by the High-level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations more carefully was welcome. An interlocutor urged that greater attention be paid to the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, including to closer collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission. According to another speaker, the Council needed to find ways of improving the quality of troops provided to peacekeeping, supporting the political work of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and coordinating with development agencies in situations addressed by the Council.

One of the most dramatic developments of recent years, it was emphasized, was the complete disregard for international humanitarian law. Schools and hospitals could no longer be considered safe havens. The Security Council had not been able to ensure accountability in such cases, bringing its credibility into question. Although the behaviour of non-State armed groups was a big part of the problem, they were not the only perpetrators. Reversing that trend should be a high priority for the Council. The trend represented a fundamental challenge to the rule of law, noted another participant, and the Council needed to do better when it came to implementing mandates on the protection of civilians.

Although there were limits to how much attention the Security Council could devote to cross-cutting issues, it was noted, it was essential that the Council consider such matters seriously, given that they would become the threats of tomorrow. The thinking of Council members needed to adapt to emerging threats to the maintenance of international peace and security. A speaker pointed out that the way the world responded to climate change and sustainable development challenges could have an effect on peace and security. It appeared, commented another participant, that some Council members believed that it should address a broader range of issues and others a narrower range.

Several other matters were mentioned as substantive priorities for 2017. The Security Council needed to maintain its unity in dealing with the threat of terrorism, including when issues of ideology were raised. An interlocutor called for greater

transparency in decision-making related to sanctions, given legal and political challenges. In the view of a participant, the crisis in Yemen deserved higher priority attention from the Council. If not addressed more effectively, the situation could foreshadow a major geopolitical shift that could affect the Horn of Africa. In terms of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an interlocutor asked whether more thought should be given to reviving a political process to replace the suspended six party talks. Sanctions alone might not be an adequate engagement. In response, it was pointed out that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had refused to talk about the denuclearization of the peninsula and seemed to only want to talk to the United States of America bilaterally. The focus, unfortunately, had been on the short term, when thought needed to be given to the longer-term future of the peoples there.

Improving collaboration with regional arrangements, it was said, would be a major challenge in 2017, as would be working out an effective division of labour with other United Nations bodies. More reflection was needed, according to a participant, on how the United Nations and its Security Council fit into the larger sphere of international political decision-making. For the Council, that was a question both of relating to other formats and processes and of interacting with regional organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union, on an ongoing basis. The Council, commented another speaker, would be open to hearing new ideas on those matters.

As in previous workshops, there was substantial discussion of relations among the members of the Security Council. It was posited that the 5 permanent members should reach out more to the 10 elected members, while the 10 elected members should reach out more to their regional constituencies. The latter would enhance the effectiveness of their work in the Council. A speaker responded that, in practice, the differences on most issues did not fall along those lines, as there were usually a range of views among both the 5 permanent members and the 10 elected members. The goal, commented another participant, was to achieve consensus among all members. An interlocutor agreed that on most issues, there were no rigid divisions between permanent and non-permanent members, but there was a steel ceiling, not a glass one, between them when it came to the veto and other privileges that came with permanent status within the Council.

When the permanent members refused to innovate, it was noted, that had led to unity among the elected members, which would act as a group to try to fix shortcomings in the way the Security Council functioned. According to another speaker, there had been insufficient opportunities for give-and-take exchanges among all 15 members of the Council. The permanent members should make more of an effort to engage with the elected members on a more regular basis. What should the elected members do, asked an interlocutor, when the five permanent members were deeply divided? How could they make a difference?

Across the board, it was suggested, the biggest challenge confronting the Security Council in the coming year would be implementation. Among the places where the Council needed to do better, commented another participant, were improving the role of penholders, achieving greater unity, improving implementation and enforcement, enhancing peacekeeping, getting more out of visits to the field, assuring accountability and working with the new Secretary-General.

### **Sharpening tools**

It was suggested that the Security Council should have a serious discussion of how to use its tools more effectively and productively. The lack of exit strategies for

peacekeeping operations or sunset clauses for sanctions regimes made them less responsive to changing conditions and needs. Too often, the Council renewed mandates without taking sufficient account of conditions on the ground. Unrealistic, Christmas tree-like mandates were treated as templates and applied to new situations without recognition of differing circumstances. There was a growing sense of fatigue concerning peacekeeping, contended a participant, with mandate renewals receiving inadequate attention. For instance, the United Nations had deployed peacekeepers for decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but the Council had not assessed whether anything had been accomplished. More peacebuilding efforts were needed there and elsewhere, and the views of the local population had to be taken more fully into account. The members needed to engage with the new Secretary-General on an exercise of fresh thinking about such matters.

Agreeing that peacekeeping renewals had become routine, an interlocutor asserted that developments in South Sudan underscored the need to assign a higher priority to consultations related to peacekeeping. Ambassadors rarely attended either meetings with troop-contributing countries or sessions of the working group on peacekeeping operations. Basic issues, such as training and capacity, remained unmet challenges. It was not enough to just leave those matters to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Peacekeeping had been the best invention by the United Nations, replied another speaker, but it was in trouble and needed renewal.

Targeted sanctions, it was observed, could be a valuable tool for prevention, if applied in a timely and effective manner and aimed at the right individuals. A participant added that enhanced collaboration with regional arrangements could also improve the Security Council's record on conflict prevention. Yet, the Council had found it difficult to agree on a press statement about the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. Another interlocutor commented that prevention was itself a cross-cutting issue that could best draw on insights from a variety of perspectives and disciplines, some beyond the scope of traditional notions of security. In terms of bolstering efforts in respect of preventive diplomacy, a speaker called for the Council to engage more closely with regional organizations and the Peacebuilding Commission.

Security Council visits to areas of concern could be an effective tool of preventive diplomacy, declared a participant. An example was the upcoming trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Council visits to Mali, Somalia and South Sudan had been very helpful in providing an opportunity to see directly what was happening on the ground, added an interlocutor. The challenge, however, was to follow up more systematically once the members had returned to New York. Noting that the Council was about to undertake its fifth such trip in 2016, a participant concurred with the assertion about their value for raising awareness and for preventive diplomacy. However, there were questions about their costs and how to maximize their benefit. Follow-up had been a problem, as illustrated by the revealing trip to South Sudan that helped to foster a common understanding of the problems there but that was not the subject of any follow-up meetings of the whole Council.

A speaker agreed with those who had expressed concern about the decline in respect for international humanitarian law. There was a need to combat impunity in such situations and it would be helpful to have a paper from the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secretariat about how that might be done. The deadlock in the Security Council in the face of the repeated commission of mass atrocities in the Syrian Arab Republic had frustrated both the public and Member States, commented another participant. The lack of agreement on effective action had brought the international community's "never again" commitment into question and given impetus to the effort to achieve restraint in the use of the veto in such situations.

According to an interlocutor, there could be no accountability unless the Council made progress on ending impunity.

The penholder system, it was claimed, had concentrated the core work of the Security Council in very few hands. The penholders largely determined what the Council would do or say. A speaker suggested that the penholder system could be modified, for instance by including an African member as co-penholder on situations in Africa. Such steps could usefully be explored in 2017. According to another interlocutor, a rebellion by the elected members had produced some modest reforms in how chairs of subsidiary bodies were selected, but there had been little progress on the more critical question of how penholders were chosen and operated. Too often, penholders were overly secretive and most members did not see draft resolutions in a timely manner.

It was asserted that Permanent Representatives were inadequately engaged in the work of the Security Council, relying too much on their political coordinators, including for the drafting and negotiating of resolutions. The latter were not in a position to go much beyond their national positions on such intensely political matters, while Permanent Representatives might have more leeway. In subsidiary bodies, Ambassadors rarely participated unless they were in the chair. A speaker responded that, when it came to having Permanent Representatives more involved in drafting, it was not clear whether the outcomes would be better or worse. It was rare, commented an interlocutor, for Permanent Representatives to meet in New York for substantive exchanges as they were doing at the workshop. It would be hard for them to devote the time required for detailed negotiations on draft language, which often depended on precedent and past texts. In the view of a participant, it would be useful for Permanent Representatives to provide more strategic and long-term perspectives to drafting negotiations. Detailed matters could be left to the experts.

## **Session II**

### **Working methods and subsidiary bodies**

#### **Moderator**

Ambassador Koro Bessho  
Permanent Representative of Japan

#### **Commentators**

Petr Iliichev  
Acting Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Ambassador Michele Sison  
Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States

Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko  
Permanent Representative of Ukraine

The agenda for session II included the following questions:

- The selection process for the new Secretary-General had gone remarkably well, with a consensus choice emerging from the Security Council more readily than many observers had anticipated. Was the process facilitated or complicated by the innovations instituted in 2016 both in the nature of collaboration with the General Assembly and in the more rigorous and public scrutiny of the candidates? Would the choice have been different if the more closed procedures of the past had been followed? In the end, considerations of gender and geography appeared not to have been controlling. Why? What

lessons should be derived from the conduct of the process in 2016? Should further reforms in the process be considered in the future?

- The Charter gives the Secretary-General important responsibilities in terms of assisting and facilitating the work of the Security Council, and these have been expanded by practice over time. With a new Secretary-General taking office at the same time that the class of 2018 enters the Council, should any adjustments be considered in the way the Council and Secretary-General interact and support each other? For instance, there have been concerns expressed at recent workshops about the conduct of the Secretary-General's monthly luncheon for members of the Council. Are adjustments needed to make these opportunities less formal, more interactive and more productive?
- In 2016, the election of new members of the Security Council was undertaken earlier than in the past, in part to provide them a longer period to prepare for their new responsibilities. Do the newly elected members feel that this extended transition period has, in fact, given them more opportunities to observe how the Council works and to learn what their membership will entail? Are further efforts needed in this regard?
- In recent years, two of the more prominent concerns expressed at the workshops have been about how the chairs of the subsidiary organs have been selected and how support has been provided to them in terms of their preparations to undertake these new responsibilities. In 2016, two notes by the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/170](#) of 22 February 2016 and [S/2016/619](#) of 15 July 2016) sought to address these matters. Have the measures and processes laid out in these notes been fully and consistently implemented? Have they resulted in a more interactive, consultative and transparent process, particularly in terms of the selection of chairs of subsidiary organs? Are further improvements needed?
- Another topic that has received extensive attention at recent workshops has been how the informal practice of some members exercising the role of penholder on certain issues has developed and been practiced. There has been both praise for the critical work undertaken by the penholders and calls for broadening the participation of additional members in this process. The possibility of co-penholders on some issues, particularly those in which additional regional expertise would be helpful, has been raised. In 2016, non-permanent members have taken the lead on some issues. What advice should newly elected members receive on this question? Should this matter receive further attention in debates about working methods reform within the Council or are current practices working as well as could be expected? In general, has there been sufficient collaboration between penholders and the chairs of related subsidiary organs?
- A letter dated 1 July 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Japan, introducing the open debate on working methods, suggested that it would be an opportunity for the Council, with the participation of interested delegations from the wider membership, to look at the implementation of the note by the President contained in document [S/2010/507](#) and other relevant notes to identify successful practices as well as possible shortcomings, and consider making necessary adjustments. In that regard, what points stand out from the open debate and what follow-up steps might be considered?
- It has been widely recognized at past workshops that the Council has been among the most adaptable organs in the United Nations system in terms of adopting improvements in its working methods. At this point, which implementation steps or additional areas should receive priority attention? For

instance, despite repeated expressions of concern at past workshops, consultations are said to remain insufficiently informal and interactive. Why has it been so difficult to make improvements in this area and are further steps possible in this direction?

- In recent years, new or modified meeting formats appear to be providing the Council with greater flexibility for considering a wider range of issues and getting broader input to the Council's deliberations. Are informal interactive dialogues and Arria formula meetings being used appropriately and effectively? Have consultations with troop-contributing and police-contributing countries been employed as effectively as possible?
- On the other hand, there have been numerous comments at recent workshops about the limited utility of and the amount of time consumed by open debates, particularly on thematic issues, when there is inadequate follow-up. Could there be ways of organizing and conducting them that would be more efficient and effective?
- According to the Highlights of Security Council Practice 2015, there were 12 high-level meetings in 2015, or an average of one per month. Is that a pace the Council should seek to sustain? Which kinds of topics benefit from such high-level attention by the Council and which could be better addressed by other formats?
- At the last workshop, there was discussion of the possible utility of making wider use of the agenda item "Any other business." Since then, this has, in fact, become a more common practice. What have been the effects of this evolving practice and where has it made a positive difference? Are there any potential downsides?
- Note [S/2016/170](#) of 22 February 2016 proposed a number of measures for enhancing the transparency of the Council's subsidiary organs. To what extent have these steps been implemented? Where is further progress needed? The note also encouraged steps to improve interactivity and coordination among subsidiary bodies and between them and the Council as a whole. Are further steps needed in this area?
- At some recent workshops, concerns have been expressed about the difficulty the Council sometimes experiences in trying to exercise effective oversight over the implementation of peacekeeping operations, sanctions regimes and enforcement operations it has authorized. Has enhanced reporting from Force Commanders and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, more frequent Council missions to the field and improved procedures for sanctions committees eased this concern? Are other steps to enhance periodic reviews of ongoing operations and sanctions regimes needed?

### **Assessment of and prospects for change**

The experience with instituting changes in Security Council working methods, it was said, had been that much was possible just through the members taking the initiative, since none of that required Charter amendment. Examples cited of "just doing it" included the monthly breakfasts among Permanent Representatives, interactive wrap-up meetings, speaking in the chamber before moving to consultations and the expanded use of "Other matters" (also known as "Any other business") on the agenda. According to several speakers, the annual "Hitting the ground running" workshops had been instrumental in identifying areas for change and in reviewing how much they had been able to accomplish on their own initiative. In the view of a speaker, outside of the Council, everyone criticized its

working methods, but once one joined the Council and saw it from the inside, things looked different and one came to recognize how much had been accomplished in that regard. The impression became much more positive.

Although the background paper by Mr. Luck had asserted that permanent members tended to be less enthusiastic about changing working methods than non-permanent ones, a participant responded that that was not always the case. There had been a number of improvements in working methods in recent years, some suggested by permanent and others by non-permanent members. The chairs of sanctions committees had been making visits that clarified perceptions and expectations. Regional stakeholders had been invited to meet with the members of sanctions committees, which had aided implementation. Transparency had been aided by the growing number of public meetings and press statements following committee meetings, yet it was important to retain a balance in that regard. Committee meetings needed to be conducted in private.

A participant asserted that it was true that permanent members tended to be more optimistic about the progress that had been made on working methods reform, while non-permanent members were less positive about what had been accomplished. In the view of another speaker, there were too many rituals in the practices of the Security Council, which were hard for new members to understand or to change. According to an interlocutor, there had been resistance to an idea for a new agenda item proposed by their delegation and it required convening an Arria meeting to educate Council members and to overcome the resistance. In response, a speaker agreed that the Council needed to be more open-minded about fresh ideas, whether they concerned the agenda or working methods. The trend was moving in that direction, in any case.

Two participants commented that the early election of new members had been a productive step forward, given that it allowed them more time to prepare properly before joining the Security Council. It had been useful, mentioned another interlocutor, to have them sitting in meetings to get a better sense of how the Council and its subsidiary bodies worked. According to an interlocutor, it was time to codify some of the innovations in working methods as part of the ongoing effort to rationalize the practices of the Council. A speaker suggested that an update to the note by the President of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507) might be in order and that the Council might take into account the views expressed in the open debate on working methods. It was pointed out that the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions continued to address such matters on an ongoing basis.

A speaker identified the modifications to the selection process for the new Secretary-General as another significant innovation. Although it was important to respect the Charter provisions in that regard, the institution of informal dialogues had produced some significant conversations with the candidates. The question of how to communicate the results of straw polls did require more thought, however, as had been noted in session I. Concurring that the informal dialogue with candidates had been useful, an interlocutor suggested that the practice should be included in the Council's provisional rules of procedure. The effort to keep the results of the straw polls secret, however, spoke to the almost instinctive preference by members of the Council for secrecy. That had damaged the Council's standing and undermined its credibility. Although not everyone would agree, it was time to formalize the new process through a decision by the Council. To one participant, the selection of the new Secretary-General and the Colombian peace process had been highlights of 2016, but much of the rest had been marred by political confrontations. In the view of an interlocutor, the working methods of the Council should be developed in a manner that would facilitate conflict prevention as a core purpose of the Council's work.

## Meetings and consultations

Meetings were too frequent and too long, it was said, a practice that would be unsustainable in the private sector. The Security Council needed to be more efficient and to make better use of time. A speaker called for shorter meetings with better briefers. Agreeing that meetings should be less time-consuming and that the quality of briefers had been uneven, a participant called for action-oriented meetings that were convened only when necessary. The Council should meet only when it had to. In the view of an interlocutor, time limits on interventions would help and speakers should not repeat points already made by the briefers. Comments should be substantive and focused on possible outcomes. A participant noted that it did not take long for a new member to recognize that the Council was inefficient in the way it conducted meetings. The goal, asserted another speaker, was to make the Council both more efficient and more transparent.

It was pointed out that time issues would be even more acute if the Security Council was enlarged, so inefficiencies should be addressed at this point. Perhaps working groups or drafting groups could help to facilitate progress on specific issues. A participant concurred on the need for greater efficiency and streamlining, for instance by combining sanctions and country-specific discussions, keeping meetings short, reviewing reporting cycles and only holding meetings if something was happening. Shorter was better, noted another speaker, yet members had a tendency to overestimate the power of the spoken word.

It was asserted that there were too many open debates with excessively long statements. When non-permanent members served as President, they had understandably seen it as a legacy issue, but it had led to the overly frequent convening of open debates. A participant asked about the value of open debates, given that negotiations within the Security Council were usually undertaken beforehand without taking into account the views that would subsequently be expressed in the open debates. Questioning the utility of open debates, a speaker pointed out that Permanent Representatives from the Council rarely attended, so the messaging purpose was not well served. There were, moreover, far too many of them, sometimes two in a single month. Despite those concerns, an interlocutor suggested that open debates did serve as a means of making connections between the Council and the General Assembly.

A participant cited several ways that consultations could be improved. Briefers should be encouraged to be succinct and to focus on the key questions, something which the President should ask them in advance to do. In selecting briefers, protocol should not always be followed if there were lower-ranking officials with more direct and relevant experience on the ground. Also, the use of the two-finger rule had the effect of making consultations more interactive and productive. In general, noted a speaker, there tended to be too many briefers and they tended to speak at too great a length. Another interlocutor contended, however, that there were not enough briefers with independent perspectives, for example from academia or civil society.

A speaker remarked that consultations had largely become a recital of written statements, which often repeated what the briefers had already said. The two-finger rule was not employed often, but it offered the promise of making consultations more interactive and more substantive. Transparency would be enhanced if the members stayed in the chamber after being briefed rather than retiring to the smaller consultation room. A participant underscored that Security Council consultations should not be treated as a courtroom in which a statement was made and then the witness departed. It was shocking that speakers did not stay to listen to others, given that consultations were meant to be interactive. According to another interlocutor,

that unfortunate practice had developed because statements in consultations were so often repetitive.

It was suggested that it would be helpful if briefers from the Secretariat could update the material they were presenting and if they could provide visual materials to support their oral presentations, where appropriate. A participant, noting that statements in consultations tended to be repetitious, proposed use of the “Toledo formula” by which Deputy Permanent Representatives would meet at the beginning of each month to sort out which delegations would want to speak on which subjects and then to consider a division of labour in which there could be joint statements so that each delegation did not have to speak to every item. An interlocutor responded that it would have been helpful to have employed the Toledo formula more often, but that it had to be recognized that delegations were often compelled to make statements on certain issues even if others had already said similar things.

One way of encouraging more interactivity in consultations, it was suggested, would be to have the President set out an annotated agenda, perhaps with the identification of the three most pressing issues to be addressed. In the view of a speaker, improving consultations would require a more disciplined approach by members, not just changes in working methods. It was essential to remain action-oriented, instead of focusing on interesting analysis and descriptive presentations. A participant noted that the overall goal should be to make consultations more informal and more interactive. The bottom line, underscored a speaker, was that the members needed to make more of an effort to listen to each other. The more one listened, the more one learned and the more interesting the deliberations became. The more one put into consultations, the more one would get out of them. Yes, concurred an interlocutor, the members did not listen to each other enough. That was why the workshop was so valuable: it was one time when members actually listened to each other. Another participant agreed on the need to listen more.

Horizon scanning meetings, it was said, had proved helpful when convened when they were most needed. If they were automatically put on the agenda every month, however, they would become routine and stale, ultimately losing their purpose. A participant commented that it was useful to have more frequent horizon scanning meetings, but that they could be enhanced by the use of more visual supports. The momentum behind the convening of horizon scanning sessions should be maintained, according to an interlocutor. According to a speaker, horizon scanning meetings could be quite useful in getting a sense of what was looming on the horizon.

A speaker noted that the background paper by Mr. Luck had mentioned that it had been agreed at the previous year’s workshop to use “Any other business” more frequently than in the past and that seemed to be happening. There had been, for instance, a discussion on current developments in Iraq that had led to quick agreement on a press statement without instructions from capitals. Concurring that the discussion on Iraq had been useful and that the use of “Any other business” could be productive, a participant also pointed out that the “Any other business” procedure had been overused in other cases to keep talking about the same item without putting it on the agenda. An interlocutor commented that “Any other business” discussions, whether or not one was pleased to see the issue addressed, were always valid and interesting exchanges. The expanded use of “Any other business” in 2016, in the view of a speaker, had been a useful development in terms of facilitating the work of the Security Council and had been a direct result of the 2015 workshop.

### **Process, procedure and practice**

On the question of penholders, it was argued that they should be more flexible and inclusive from the outset of the process. The current pattern, in which a very limited group of members got to see early drafts that were then shared with a somewhat larger group before the whole Council membership, should be avoided. A less formal system would be preferable. An interlocutor agreed that it would be very helpful to have drafts circulated more widely at an earlier point in the process. When time permitted, it would be helpful to hold informal consultations on draft decisions. A speaker suggested that it would be a step forward to make more use of a system of co-penholders, especially on situations in Africa and other places where regional expertise could be helpful. That rule could also apply to the Middle East, noted another participant. The idea of co-penholders was very interesting and worth further follow-up.

There was nothing to prevent members from seizing the pen on any given subject, it was said. Penholders generally tried to be inclusive, because the diversity of views could yield fresh insights and a better result. There had been several recent situations in which non-permanent members had been successful penholders. A participant asked whether it was always true that penholders would welcome either co-penholders or other members offering language at any point. If so, that would be a very important step in the right direction. According to an interlocutor, the penholder system could be more equitable and democratic. Establishing co-penholders had worked in some situations and should be encouraged. A speaker spoke of a positive experience with a co-penholder in 2016 on a high-profile draft resolution, even though the effort did not ultimately succeed. Commenting that the penholder question was very sensitive, an interlocutor contended that having a single penholder made the work of the Council more efficient, if less legitimate in the eyes of some. Always requiring a co-penholder would make the Council less efficient, if more representative. The key, overall, would be for each penholder to exercise that role as inclusively as possible.

Noting that the question of the selection of chairs of subsidiary bodies had been mentioned in the background materials for the workshop as a continuing concern and that two notes by the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/170](#) and [S/2016/619](#)) had addressed the issue, a participant suggested that there had been some progress in carrying out those guidelines, but that more work was needed. The Council had not met its target of allocating chairmanships by early October, but the consultative process had been more interactive than in the past. It would be helpful to have an explanation from the President about the reasons for the choices. A speaker noted that confirmation of their chairmanship of a working group did not come until the end of December. Given that elections to the Council had been moved to June, an interlocutor questioned why it took until the end of October to be notified of chairmanships. However, it was recognized that that represented a substantial improvement from earlier years and that the facilitators had made a real effort to improve the process in 2016. Although there was room for improvement, a participant commented that the earlier appointment had provided a chance to get to know the work of the subsidiary bodies better. Owing to the good work of the facilitators, the process of selection had been interactive. Expressing appreciation for the efforts of the facilitators, another interlocutor said that the process had been satisfactory.

More attention, it was suggested, should be given to how the meetings of subsidiary bodies were organized. It had proved necessary to organize a wide range of meeting formats, including formal meetings, informal meetings and informal informals. The latter offered an opportunity to invite experts from civil society and

academia who had information and perspectives of interest to the members. A participant suggested that an innovation of having a joint meeting of a thematic working group and a sanctions committee had been productive, although some members had raised principled objections. Both bodies had faced similar concerns about potential sanctions designations.

Those who chaired sanctions committees, it was said, needed to be concerned with their humanitarian impact and reports and analyses from the Secretariat and agencies on such matters would be valued. More consultations with the relevant penholders would also be helpful. According to a participant, the consensus rule had undermined the potential of sanctions committees, as well as other subsidiary bodies, to make progress. Political issues had often been obstacles to their work. Participation in their work, other than by the chairs, had been largely limited to experts, making it insufficiently integrated with the wider work of the Security Council. Although confidentiality was sometimes needed, sanctions committees could take steps towards greater transparency, for instance through open briefings, consultations with countries involved and the publication of some documents. More broadly, a speaker contended that there had been occasions, for instance in relation to Western Sahara, when documents were shared with the permanent members but not the other members. That was a counterproductive practice.

Referring to the statement by the Secretary-General at the opening dinner about the requirement that every press statement and presidential statement reflect a full consensus, a speaker concurred with that concern. Press statements tended to be too long and were released too frequently. According to an interlocutor, presidential statements and press statements tended to get little attention, in part because of the cumbersome process of gaining full unanimity that tended to make the language convoluted and the timing too tardy. To improve the Council's messaging, the point by the Secretary-General was well taken. In the view of another speaker, the problem was not with the goal of consensus for presidential statements and press statements, but with the fact that more time needed to be allocated to producing one. With time, the chances of their being action-oriented would grow. An interlocutor agreed with the goal of consensus in most cases, although it had been a problem in addressing Western Sahara.

Although visits by the Security Council to areas of concern could have important benefits, it was noted that it had not always been easy to get them off the ground given lack of consensus among Council members or reluctance on the part of the host countries. Was the decision to go on such a trip a procedural or non-procedural one? Was a vote necessary? In the view of a speaker, such visits were particularly helpful before key decisions were taken about the situation, given that the members would be better informed afterwards. When the members travelled together and then came to a decision together, it would have the effect of strengthening their sense of common purpose and their mutual understanding of the situation. Another participant underscored the value of such trips and regretted that some had not been undertaken because of the lack of unanimity. Those questions should be treated as procedural matters that did not require unanimity.

All members, it was pointed out, had to be concerned about relationships among capitals, Permanent Representatives, Deputy Permanent Representatives, political coordinators and experts. What was the optimum division of labour in the case of each member? In the view of a participant, the triple-track approach employed at the European Union in Brussels could be useful at the United Nations as well. Under that approach, delegations decided in advance which issues should be pursued at which level: Permanent Representative; Deputy Permanent Representative; or political coordinator/expert. A participant endorsed the approach as it had been practised at the European Union. As another interlocutor pointed out,

the division of labour would vary from mission to mission depending on their substantive priorities, but it was in principle a good idea. Meetings to change direction on an issue or to adopt a new strategy should be attended by Permanent Representatives, and their exclusive breakfast meetings had proved quite productive and should be continued. An interlocutor called this triple-track approach intriguing. A speaker suggested that more drafting should be done by Permanent Representatives and during consultations. In the view of another participant, Permanent Representatives should be more engaged at the strategic level, especially when it came to outcomes, although that should not necessarily extend to drafting. Political coordinators and experts, it seemed, had more fun.

A participant asked that references to Security Council decisions and Secretariat documents include mention of the subject and not just the United Nations document number. According to a speaker, certain rituals, such as giving gifts when a new President of the Council took over or declaring that the monthly lunch was in honour of the Secretary-General, were outmoded and counterproductive when those occasions should be seen just as part of normal Council working methods. An interlocutor noted that there seemed to be agreement on those points. The luncheons should just be called monthly working lunches. There remained some unresolved matters relating to rules and procedures, such as decision-making rules on presidential statements and undertaking trips. However, there was broad agreement on many other points, and members should just take those steps without seeking further approval.

### **Partners and outreach**

It was asserted that greater effort should be made to reach out to the General Assembly and to political groups, such as the Group of 77 and regional groups. That could help to improve relationships, as well as avoid perceptions of encroachment. A speaker questioned the utility of monthly assessments of the work of the Security Council, wondering if anyone read them. Were they worth the time and effort that went into preparing them? There had been significant improvements in the annual report to the General Assembly, however, which was required by the Charter. The Council was not a club, an interlocutor emphasized, and there should be greater openness to working with the Assembly and other interested parties, as each organ had its own set of competencies. There was a need to strike a balance among the interests of the Council, those of the Assembly and those of the constituencies that elected the members, a speaker noted. Arria formula meetings could be employed to address those larger issues. A participant pointed out that it could be helpful to have representatives of regional organizations or the Permanent Representatives who were serving as chairs of country configurations in the Peacebuilding Commission participate in relevant consultations from time to time.

A participant suggested that one reason to engage with regional organizations was to avoid overlap. At times, it seemed like Security Council members were completely ignorant of the activities of other organizations. The Council could go further to engage regional arrangements, a speaker asserted, including in providing support for their efforts to prevent and resolve conflict. According to a participant, with greater mutual effort, productive coordination with the European Union could be achieved. In the view of an interlocutor, more creative and informal ways could be found to get messages to regional actors, for instance through a conversation by the President with a key Permanent Representative, delivery of a demarche, or an interactive dialogue. It did not have to involve summoning a country to the Council. A speaker related how a working group had reached out to affected countries, allowing them to participate in some meetings and comment on some drafts.

To call on parties to do this or that, it was said, without having them in the room or having any follow-up mechanism was just posturing. The Security Council needed to do a better job of coordination in such cases, clarifying who would conduct which follow-up steps, such as delivering demarches on behalf of the Council. According to an interlocutor, the Council needed to talk to and listen to countries involved in situations of concern. The President of the Council should call on some of those Permanent Representatives to convey the Council's concerns and, in some cases, allow them to participate in consultations. Yes, agreed a participant, the Council needed to speak more and engage more with countries on its agenda. Another speaker noted the value of encouraging countries facing sanctions to interact with members of the Council.

The Secretariat, it was asserted, should be able to approach the President at any point that they saw an issue of importance brewing. More engagement with the Secretary-General was to be welcomed. More white papers from the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would be useful, especially on places where not everybody had an embassy. Time should be found, asserted an interlocutor, for a proper discussion of the report by the High-level Independent Panel on Peacekeeping Operations on the future of peace operations. A participant suggested that it might be productive to have an interactive and informal exchange with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon before he left office, in order to draw on his expertise and experience, including in dealing with the Council.

In the view of a speaker, the Security Council was like the United Nations legislative body and the Secretariat was its executive branch. Therefore, the Secretariat should be action-oriented and focused on helping to carry out the decisions of the Council. It was, in that regard, always useful when the Secretariat raised matters with the Council in the spirit of Article 99 of the Charter. Concurring, an interlocutor stated that the Secretary-General should always be welcome to interact with the Council. That should happen on a more regular basis. The Secretariat should feel free to tell the members what they needed to hear, even if it was not what they wanted to hear. When the Council was addressing peace operations, the briefings should not always be dominated by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, given that there were other aspects of those situations, such as peacebuilding or political considerations, that involved the organization as a whole. A speaker commented that the Council's direct engagement with Special Representatives of the Secretary-General was sometimes disappointing, so it was sometimes necessary to arrange less formal interactions at national missions, given that all members of the Council did not necessarily have an equal interest in all situations.

### **Session III**

#### **Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2016**

##### **Moderator**

Ambassador Elbio Rosselli  
Permanent Representative of Uruguay

##### **Commentators**

Siti Hajjar Adnin  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Malaysia

Ambassador Ismael Abraao Gaspar Martins  
Permanent Representative of Angola

Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi  
Permanent Representative of Spain

Wilmer Alfonzo Méndez Graterol  
Political coordinator of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Ambassador Phillip Taula  
Deputy Permanent Representative of New Zealand

### **Challenges and opportunities**

For one Member State, the primary reasons to join the Security Council were to demonstrate its readiness to contribute to the collective responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to showcase the contributions that an emerging economy could make to a wide range of United Nations objectives, and to pursue a specific set of policy priorities and principles. Among the peace and security goals they sought were finding non-military solutions to a series of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, addressing terrorist threats, seeking new approaches to climate change and the threats faced by small island developing countries and advancing non-proliferation and disarmament.

A speaker stressed that non-permanent members had limited powers within the Security Council, which was organized to preserve the status quo. Chairing a sanctions committee was frustrating but important work. Informal meeting formats offered opportunities to keep attention on issues, such as those related to the Middle East or Western Sahara, which some major powers would like to keep off the agenda. For all its frustrations, serving on the Council was an exciting and, on balance, pleasurable experience.

A speaker commented that the engagement of the Security Council with issues tended to be periodic and superficial rather than systematic. Often, there was no larger strategy to provide guidance and a sense of direction. Generally, the substantive input and analysis provided by the Secretariat was inadequate. Fresh thinking was often lacking. According to a participant, more attention needed to be paid to negotiating mandates for peace operations. The so-called Christmas tree effect needed to be avoided. That was an area in which fresh strategic thinking was called for. It was worrisome when the five permanent members were divided, but such situations sometimes had also provided unexpected opportunities for non-permanent members to try to make a difference. When the five were united, however, there was usually little room for the elected members to affect outcomes.

Noting that life in the Security Council could be quite frustrating for its elected members, a participant asked what they could do to be more effective. Was there a place for a Movement of Non-Aligned Countries caucus within the Council? How could relations between the elected and permanent members be improved? It was pointed out that most issues, other than a few related to working methods, did not break down along permanent/non-permanent lines. There was diversity among both the 10 members and the 5 members on most matters. In the view of a speaker, the fundamental goal of all members should be to seek and push for unity within the Council. To that end, the elected members could play an essential role in helping the permanent members to overcome their differences.

A speaker pointed out that Security Council Report had been established both to enhance transparency and accountability in the work of the Council and to help all 15 members to be as effective and productive as possible. Incoming, as well as current, members of the Council regularly made extensive use of its services. The Security Council Affairs Division, it was emphasized, provided a wide range of information and technical advice to all 15 members on a regular and ongoing basis. Several references were made to upcoming events to assist incoming members in preparing to join the Council.

A speaker noted that a major accomplishment during their time on the Security Council was the increased attention given to building bridges and to bolstering the mediation capacity of the United Nations. A second area of forward movement was on the reform of Council working methods, as reflected in efforts to review and update the note by the President [S/2010/507](#), in the renovated process to select the new Secretary-General, and in continuing efforts to enhance transparency and inclusivity. According to a participant, the addition of monthly breakfasts to facilitate informal conversation among the 15 Permanent Representatives had been a useful innovation. Also, there had been encouragement on the part of some permanent members for some non-permanent members to take the pen on a sensitive issue. That opportunity was much appreciated, although it entailed significant responsibilities and substantial work. According to an interlocutor, there had been a series of initiatives on working methods over the past two years. They represented progress even as they highlighted how much further work was needed. Many of the steps requiring further consideration had been identified at the current workshop, as well as a few that could be implemented right away.

### **Lessons learned**

The participants provided many pieces of advice to the newly elected members based on the lessons that they had learned from their time in the Security Council, including the following:

- Focus from the outset on preparedness and internal cohesion. Elected members should use the extended time now provided them to get organized and to test out various configurations, scenarios and protocols.
- Before joining the Council, engage bilaterally as much as possible with serving members of the Council. There was much to learn from them.
- Keep close connections with capitals and ministers. Get their buy-in, manage expectations and clarify priorities. Build your team; you are going to need them. Give them some time off. Make the best possible use of your Deputy Permanent Representatives. If your team does well, you will do well.
- In terms of the penholder system, the question was not who held the pen but how they held it. The emphasis always seemed to be on retaining agreed language, so look for opportunities to support fresh language that might offer new possibilities for dealing with deadlocked situations.
- Take the pen when you have the chance to move an issue forward. It is a big responsibility and a lot of work, but a chance to make a difference.
- When the permanent members are divided, there may be opportunities to claim some middle ground. Look for them.
- Smaller countries can, and should, retain their independent voices.
- The Council had its heart in the right place when it came to prevention, but it had been too tentative, so elected members should help push it in the right direction.
- Do not forget one's accountability to the whole United Nations membership, for instance by insisting that the briefings on the note of the President [S/2010/507](#) be held as formal wrap-up sessions with meeting records rather than as informal briefings.
- The Council was a big family, so expect, when the time approaches to depart the Council, to miss those close relationships that had been built around two years of intensive shared activity.

- Non-permanent members need to struggle to find ways of making their voices heard. Seize the opportunity offered by the presidency, especially for holding high-visibility debates on selected topics. Also, make the best use of informal formats, such as Arria formula meetings, informal interactive dialogues, and “Any other business” sessions.
- Continue to innovate; changing Council working methods came slowly but was possible, step by step.
- Serving on the Council was very hard work, but a very valuable professional experience. Stay at it.
- Do not blame the Council for all of the world’s ills. Instead, focus on making a difference.
- Look for ways to get Permanent Representatives more involved in the day-to-day work of the Council. Ad hoc, off-site gatherings can help to move agendas forward and build constituencies inside and outside the Council.
- Encourage the convening of situational awareness sessions. Push the Secretariat to provide more integrated information and to break down institutional silos. Look for non-scripted opportunities whenever possible.
- Engage with troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and regional players, but only on targeted situations, given time constraints.
- Be patient when advocating new ideas. They take time to mature. Stay with them.
- Recognize that it takes 15 effective members to make the Council effective. Work together to get the most out of everyone. Each member brings and contributes something different.
- Coalitions within the Council tend to shift from issue to issue, usually not along P-5 versus E10 lines. Look for support from across the Council.
- Look to current and outgoing members for guidance and advice, especially on how to get things done. Their experience is invaluable. Learn from the class of 2016.

A participant offered a personal list of 10 lessons for incoming members, as follows:

- One, never request instructions about how to cast informal meetings. You do not want to be tied to someone else’s script.
- Two, establish your priorities for your two-year term. Prepare three months in advance for your presidency, but do not stake everything on it or your team will get bored the rest of the year. Strike a happy balance in that regard.
- Three, forget your ego. Often it is your expert who needs to maintain the critical contacts on the ground.
- Four, stop running and think. At times, reflection and thinking out of the box are the most valuable commodities.
- Five, work to maintain your regional constituencies. Try to keep care of your friends.
- Six, keep your political coordinators healthy and have a replacement on hand if necessary. They work very hard, as do your experts, and they are essential.
- Seven, try to avoid becoming hostage to your sanctions committee and to your experts, who will give you detailed technical reports to present to the Council

that you cannot possibly understand. Instead, submit a written report and give the Council your own views orally.

- Eight, innovate, for instance by having breakfasts for delegations with a humanitarian orientation whether or not they are on the Council.
- Nine, develop a close working relationship with the Security Council Affairs Division, given that they are very good and you will need their help in preparing your presidency.
- Ten, do not panic. Get a shrink.

Following the conclusion of session III, closing remarks were made by Ambassador Fodé Seck, President of the Security Council, Ambassador Kai Sauer, Permanent Representative of Finland, and Edward C. Luck of Columbia University.

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