Letter dated 5 May 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2275 (2016), in which the Council requested that I conduct a review of the United Nations presence in Somalia after the 2016 electoral process, to ensure that the United Nations is properly configured to support the next phase of State-building in Somalia and to present options and recommendations to the Council.

In line with the request of the Council, a strategic assessment process was initiated at the end of 2016, followed by the deployment of a strategic assessment mission to Somalia and the region from 5 to 15 March 2017, after the completion of the electoral process. The mission was led by the Department of Political Affairs and comprised representatives of all relevant departments and offices, including the Department of Field Support and the United Nations Office to the African Union, as well as agencies, funds and programmes. It met with Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, authorities from the federal member states of Somalia as well as “Somaliland”, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the African Union Commission. The mission also met with representatives from Somali civil society organizations, including women and youth representatives, Somali intellectuals and journalists, and representatives from international and local non-governmental organizations working in Somalia, building on the work undertaken with these organizations prior to the mission. In addition to Mogadishu, the mission travelled to the towns of Kismaayo in Jubbaland, Belet Weyne in HirShabelle, Garoowe in Puntland and Hargeysa in “Somaliland”. It also visited Nairobi and Addis Ababa.

Somalia currently faces a humanitarian situation that is deteriorating due to severe drought. This could result in famine in the coming months if the next rains fail and humanitarian assistance is not scaled up in time. At the time of the assessment, some 6.2 million people — half of the country’s population — required humanitarian assistance. Of these, nearly 3 million needed urgent life-saving assistance; a vast increase from 1.1 million in August 2016. Almost 950,000 children under the age of five are expected to be acutely malnourished this year, including 185,000 children who are at risk of dying in the absence of immediate medical treatment.

I visited Somalia on 7 March 2017 to draw attention to the humanitarian crisis and to appeal for $825 million to assist 5.5 million people until June 2017. In addition to dramatic humanitarian consequences for the Somali people, the crisis could also have serious implications for the political process and the security situation in the country, with a risk of reversing the progress achieved in recent
years. Responding to the crisis in order to avert a possible famine is and must be the first priority of the Somali Government, the United Nations and the international community.

Main findings

Four years after the political process of 2012 that led to the selection of the members of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, the country has experienced a smooth transition to a new bicameral Parliament, an outcome of the 2016 electoral process. On 8 February 2017, the Parliament elected a new President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, for a four-year term, an outcome that has been widely welcomed across the country. This marks a new and significant phase in peacebuilding and State-building in Somalia. A new federal cabinet under Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre was approved by Parliament on 29 March 2017. These developments would not have been possible without AMISOM, which has played an indispensable role in creating the necessary security conditions to allow for the Government to function and for political processes to take place. The continued presence of AMISOM remains essential for the security of the country and for further political progress.

As Somalia begins a new political cycle, key processes envisioned to be completed by 2016, notably the review of the Constitution, the holding of universal (one person, one vote) elections, the establishment of a functional Federal State and the reform of the security services remain unfinished. Economic recovery has yet to begin in earnest, and the Government’s ability to raise revenue, deliver basic services and pay salaries is severely limited. Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat, notwithstanding a series of setbacks and internal divisions they suffered and their loss of a number of key towns and territory to AMISOM and Somali security forces between 2012 and 2016. Recourse by Al-Shabaab to political assassinations and asymmetric complex terror attacks against both hard and soft targets have increased since 2013 and are a major source of insecurity in Mogadishu and across Somalia.

Since the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in Mogadishu in 2013, the United Nations has played an important role in assisting the peacebuilding and State-building processes in Somalia. Notably, the United Nations played an essential role in support of the state formation process and the electoral process (from strategic advice to logistical support, including the attainment of women representing 24 per cent representation of Parliament), in partnership with AMISOM and other international actors.

The demand for the United Nations presence and engagement in Somalia remains very strong. The United Nations should continue to engage, as a trusted partner of Somalia, in building a functional federal State, preventing and resolving conflict and consolidating peace. The United Nations should continue to exercise its core functions of facilitating well-informed discussions, agreements and plans among Somalis, mobilizing coherent international support and working with Somalis to build effective partnerships, drawing upon technical expertise based on the United Nations comparative advantage and that of its other partners.

Federalism and challenges to State-building

A federal state map now exists in Somalia, with the formation of administrations in Jubbaland, South-West, Galmudug and HirShabelle. These, together with Puntland, form the existing and emerging federal member states of Somalia. The status of the federal capital remains unresolved. The “Somaliland”
issue has yet to be settled, and dialogue between the Federal Government in Mogadishu and “Somaliland” authorities should be revived.

Federal member states are functioning at various levels of capacity, from Puntland, which has had relatively effective institutions for several years, to HirShabelle, which was only established at the end of 2016. However, all federal member states need sustained support for building the capacity of their institutions and have asked for greater United Nations and international support. This includes strengthening legislative assemblies, building effective State bureaucracies and extending State authority to the district and local levels, including through building and leveraging relations between the State and the private sector. It also includes the resolution of ongoing conflicts, investment in and capacity-building of the security (including police) and justice sectors in particular and creating socioeconomic opportunities for their populations.

Notwithstanding some positive developments, progress in Somalia over the past four years, including on the rule of law and good governance, development, the extension of State authority and the reduction of armed conflict, has been limited. The absence of State authority over large parts of the territory continues to impede peacebuilding, which allows for continued violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, exacerbated by the complexity of military operations and the existence of non-State armed groups. Of particular concern is child recruitment and use by Al-Shabaab and the security forces, and arbitrary arrests and detention of children and young people for alleged association with Al-Shabaab.

The protracted conflict also continues to produce widespread sexual violence. Internally displaced women and girls and members of minority clans remain the most vulnerable. The limited legal framework, weak rule of law and human rights protection systems and lack of legitimate institutions contribute to a high level of impunity for violations. The participation and role of women and young people in leadership and decision-making, including the clan-based political structure, is extremely limited, perpetuating gender inequalities and contributing to the disenfranchisement of young Somalis.

State weakness has generally been treated as a problem that is due to a lack of resources and capacity, but the reality is that the enduring challenges facing Somalia are inherently political. Issues related to structural federalism remain unresolved, in part because of a limited understanding of federalism among the leadership and people of Somalia. Whether Somalia should adopt a presidential or parliamentary system must be decided, in conjunction with the establishment of an electoral legal framework and system of representation. Within the federal framework, the Federal Government and federal member states have yet to agree on the distribution of powers, jurisdiction and resources. This is of particular urgency with regard to the creation of a viable, federated security sector. Discussions have begun on this issue, and federal and federal member state leaders agreed on a way forward towards establishing a national security architecture on 16 April 2017. International support to the security sector over the past years, while substantive, made limited gains, due to insufficient coordination among international actors, the absence of a political agreement on the size, composition and financing of the security sector and a disproportionate focus on the military to the detriment of efforts to build local police and judicial services to protect communities. The regular payment of salaries for security personnel is an essential step towards stronger, accountable and Somali-owned security institutions and the overall improvement of the security situation in Somalia. The arrangements for the coordination and delivery of support by international partners in the security sector should be based on a political agreement among Somalis on security.
Another significant impediment to progress is corruption and the existence of powerful political and business syndicates whose interests are served by the status quo and the perpetuation of weak rule of law, feeble State capacity and a war economy. This, together with the lack of a revenue base to sustain its functions, contributes to the Government’s lack of capacity with respect to service delivery and accountability to the population. The country remains disproportionately dependent on donors and remittances from its large diaspora (estimated at $1.2 to $2 billion annually, which is equivalent to 23 to 38 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product), as well as its ability to raise revenue through taxation, customs and other means is virtually non-existent. Somalia has been identified as eligible for debt relief under the International Monetary Fund’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, but reforms in public financial management are needed to gain access to financing and eventual debt relief from international financial institutions. President Farmajo has highlighted anti-corruption and transparency, together with revenue generation and engagement with the private sector to widen the tax base, as priorities for his administration, to increase public accountability to Somalis and reduce the dependency of Somalia on international support.

As Somalia emerges from decades of civil war and continues to take gradual steps towards rebuilding itself as a federal State, all existing and emerging federal member states face serious fault lines related to disputes over borders and territory, and long-standing or new clan tensions, which often have an impact on the control of nascent administrations. In the absence of local reconciliation, and a lack of trust among the political entities that are to make up a federal Somalia, these divisions have resulted in some of the country’s deadliest armed conflicts, such as territorial clashes in and around Gaalkacyo between Galmudug and Puntland that displaced 70,000 people in 2016, and the long-running conflict in the Sool and Sanaag regions involving “Somaliland”, Puntland and the self-declared Khatumo state. These divisions and conflicts are often exploited by Al-Shabaab and have the potential to endanger the viability of the federal State project as a whole. Efforts to deepen federalism in Somalia run the risk of igniting or exacerbating intra- and inter-regional conflicts, especially as border and territorial jurisdiction questions become more prominent and the federal member states expand their authority into contested areas. Land disputes are also a driver of armed conflict in parts of Somalia, exacerbated by the absence of land registry systems and legal and adjudicatory frameworks and institutions. The inclusion of all parts of Somali society in the political process and the peaceful resolution of long-standing or new internal conflicts, including as part of the discussions on federalism, will be central to the stability of the country. The resolution of conflicts should be led by Somalis, with the United Nations providing a sufficient level of support as and when needed, in collaboration with key partners.

The above-mentioned problems are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. They also provide the conditions for Al-Shabaab to continue to flourish by filling in the gaps created or unaddressed by the Somali State. The federalization process can generate valuable peace dividends if it is inclusive. If it is not, the process may perpetuate or even increase the risk of predatory behaviour and abuse of Somali populations, particularly those from minority clans, which have constantly been the most affected by armed conflict and humanitarian crises.

Somalis consulted during the course of the assessment called for a greater role for the United Nations in addressing many of the obstacles to peacebuilding and State-building in Somalia, including a role in the fight against corruption and a stronger role in conflict resolution and mediation at various levels, including between clans, between federal member states and between the federal and state-level governments. They emphasized the importance of Somalis being able to take
responsibility for their security and the need for greater access to justice, education and vocational and employment opportunities, particularly for young men and women, who make up a large majority of the population. They see the United Nations as an enabler, supporting them to reach and implement their own solutions to these concerns. The recently concluded electoral process, while at its core a political process with important electoral elements, has given hope to Somalis as to their ability to choose their own leaders. They see it as a stepping stone towards the organization of universal elections in 2020, which is an important goal and a testament to the progress of Somalia towards becoming a functioning democratic State. This can only be achieved once a conducive electoral environment is established, underpinned by the necessary administrative and legal frameworks, security arrangements and genuine political will. Meeting this objective will require the full commitment of all stakeholders and must start without delay.

The revision and finalization of the Constitution will be a key milestone in the State-building process. The United Nations should support Somali structures and mechanisms that will manage the constitutional review process, promoting inclusivity for all sectors of society, including minorities, women and youth. Building upon improvements in women’s representation in Parliament after the 2016 electoral process, the United Nations should continue to promote the representation and participation of women in federal and state-level governance and shift to a more qualitative empowerment and capacity focus.

Security strategy

The United Nations has played a leading role in advocating for a comprehensive approach to security in Somalia, one that focuses on building long-term human security for Somalis. This entails a conditions-based drawdown of AMISOM and gradual assumption of lead security responsibilities by the Somalis; bolstering the role of AMISOM in a short-term surge, including for offensive operations; building viable, acceptable, affordable and accountable federal Somali security institutions in the medium and longer term, with a strategic shift from a predominantly military approach towards more focus on police, justice and the rule of law; promoting community recovery and extending State authority across all parts of the country; and preventing and countering violent extremism, including through civic education, socioeconomic opportunities and the disarmament and disengagement of armed fighters. The United Nations should facilitate the design of an integration process for militia into the army, police and possibly other security services, placing particular emphasis on human rights vetting and screening to prevent children from being integrated. Its strategic advice is required on how to tackle the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and to develop options for disarming and demobilizing militia that cannot be integrated into the security forces. In many locations, disarmament discussions will have to start with local community leaders as part of wider reconciliation efforts.

Somalia has begun to take steps to address the conditions conducive to terrorism and violent extremism and reduce the root causes of recruitment and radicalization, but lacks strategic outlook and capacity. Somalia is seeking to effectively prevent recruitment by two listed terrorist organizations, Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh). UNSOM can advise Somalia at the strategic and technical levels on the implementation of a strategy to prevent violent extremism.

The security strategy for Somalia must be Somali-owned and clearly establish the roles of all actors involved, including federal and State authorities, AMISOM, the United Nations, the European Union and bilateral partners.
An assessment of the security strategy will be conducted in the upcoming joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM, encompassing the conditions for a transition from AMISOM and a gradual transfer of security responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security institutions, the role of the United Nations in support of the Somali security sector (including police), the support to the 3,000 troops in Puntland to be integrated into the Somali national army and, more generally, the role of the United Nations in the security sector in areas outside the deployment of AMISOM.

**Strengthening resilience and promoting socioeconomic change**

The Somali context is one of recurrent crises — with the current risk of famine being a stark example of this — the effects of which are exacerbated by decades of armed conflict and chronic governance deficits. United Nations efforts in response must complement humanitarian relief and life-saving measures by creating conditions to build and strengthen the resilience of the population.

Development dividends must be realized for the political gains to be sustained and increased. Transformational socioeconomic change in Somalia will require progress on a number of interlinked areas, including (a) an understanding between the private sector and Government on taxation and revenue generation in exchange for the provision of public services, including security; (b) obtaining eligibility for Somalia for financing and debt relief from international financial institutions through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative process; (c) an agreement on service delivery models between the Federal Government and the existing and emerging federal member states, and between the Government, civil society and the private sector; and (d) significant investments in markets, agricultural value chains, coastal areas and productive infrastructure, including ports.

**Recommendations for the United Nations strategy for the next four years**

Over the next four years, the United Nations should focus on the priority areas outlined above, in support of Somali-led and -owned political, federalization and other State-building processes to build a functional, legitimate and accountable federal State. The new Government should define its own clear priorities, including under the national development plan that will guide United Nations support. The United Nations engagement should be based on the principles of mutual accountability between Somalia and the international community, and on a commitment by the Somali Government to its people on the protection of human rights and the promotion of the rule of law, security and development. While it is important to plan for the next political cycle, the United Nations should also adopt a longer-term perspective to strengthen resilience in Somalia, linked to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

**Core functions, integrated teams and partnerships**

In 2012, the Federal Government had asked the United Nations to organize itself in a way that provides “one door to knock on”. The United Nations has maintained its unity of purpose vis-à-vis the international community and the Somalis and emphasized its collective adherence to the principle of national ownership. As Somalia enters a new political cycle, the United Nations remains a trusted and relied-upon partner for the Government and citizens of Somalia and the international community across a range of priorities and challenges. This role
should continue and be reaffirmed in the mandate of UNSOM, to build on existing trust in the United Nations from the federal and State authorities.

The United Nations should continue to utilize its comparative advantage in providing good offices and strategic advice and playing a convening role, which has enabled Somalis to come together and build political consensus on key decisions and outcomes. These should be implemented and realized through the right partnerships with the Somali public and private sectors and international actors, including international financial institutions and agencies, funds and programmes, as best suited.

The United Nations established a structurally integrated presence in Somalia in 2014 and developed a number of integrated teams in areas of common work, such as the Integrated Electoral Support Group, a joint team on constitutional support, the Integrated Gender Office and joint programmes under the Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict and Other Crisis Situations. On human rights and protection, UNSOM is participating in the pilot phase of the consolidation of protection functions. An integrated task force on the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy has also been established. The system has been able to come together in a fast, effective and coordinated manner in times of crisis or urgent priorities such as security incidents, the support to the electoral process and the response to the drought. Additional integrated mechanisms should now be considered, in particular to support efforts on deepening federalism, as part of or separate from the integrated team on the Constitution. The enabling role of the United Nations in conflict resolution also requires an integrated approach and specialized capacity. Strategic communications should be configured in a more integrated manner, while respecting the independence of individual United Nations entities to issue their own communications.

Partnerships with external actors are an indispensable element of the work of the United Nations in Somalia. The partnership between the United Nations and the African Union is central to the delivery of the mandates of both organizations in support of Somalia. While the establishment of senior- and working-level coordination forums such as the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum have improved strategic coordination between the United Nations in Somalia and AMISOM, initiatives such as the establishment of joint teams or the strengthening of co-location should be explored and the role of the United Nations in providing strategic advice and supporting operational planning should be reviewed, as part of the joint review of AMISOM. The partnership with the World Bank, which is already strong, has the potential to be enhanced, including in new areas to unlock investment and release constraints on economic growth and in advocacy for debt relief for Somalia. The United Nations should also deepen its work with the European Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The United Nations should increase engagement with civil society organizations at the national and regional levels, as partners, to deepen the understanding of local contexts and promote local conflict management and resolution, in particular. The private sector in Somalia will be the primary actor in the development of a federal State that can generate its own resources. It will be important to facilitate their involvement and build their trust in State-building wherever possible, including in support of infrastructure development, on the basis of a robust understanding of the political economy, incentives and financial flows.
Operational flexibility, joint operational planning and regional engagement

Over the past four years, the United Nations has made efforts to break the impression of the “bunkerization” of the international community in Somalia. While the security situation has prevented the establishment of a large footprint outside of Mogadishu International Airport, the United Nations has managed to stay and deliver services in the country under challenging security circumstances: there have been 16 direct and 3 indirect attacks since 2012, resulting in 16 casualties among staff members. The United Nations in Somalia has expanded its staffing in Mogadishu and its presence in the regions, based on effective collaboration between its various security structures, AMISOM, Member States and host authorities. United Nations presence and engagement in the federal member states has gradually increased and should be expanded in a tailored manner for each federal member state. In this respect, UNSOM has offices in the capitals of all federal member states, except in Galmudug, pending reconciliation between Ahlu Sunna wal-Jama’a and the Galmudug administration.

The broad functions of the United Nations presence in federal member states are to discharge the mandates of UNSOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations country team at the regional level, on the basis of clear priorities, and to facilitate dialogue between Mogadishu and federal member state entities. UNSOM should maintain a more appropriate balance in engagement between the Federal Government in Mogadishu and the existing and emerging federal member states. UNSOM and the United Nations country team should engage with federal member states in a structured manner to deepen the federalism project, assisting in defining the roles and responsibilities of federal and State entities and building the capacity of institutions at both levels to effectively deliver on governance and security objectives.

This should be implemented primarily through effective joint planning, flexibility and a maximizing of resources across the United Nations system in Somalia in a challenging operational and resource environment. Functions and deployment in each federal member state should be reviewed on a regular basis, including the ability to deploy temporarily and options to work outside regional offices. This must be reflected in the UNSOM budget and structures and corresponding adjustments to UNSOS support, and supported from Mogadishu and Nairobi by effective and enhanced enabling systems, complemented by targeted increases in staffing, accommodation and other logistics. The current prioritization and enabling of the drought response across the system can be seen as a good practice for system-wide coordination.

This will also require a strengthening of strategic integration and decision-making by all parts of the United Nations in Somalia. UNSOS is an enabler of the broader United Nations presence in the country and should be included in operational planning, with due consideration granted to the independence, impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian action. A system of collective operational planning should take into account programme criticality and which system-wide efforts and resources, including within the United Nations country team, are needed to support the effective and efficient implementation of the UNSOM peacebuilding and State-building mandate, while taking into account the various United Nations priorities that are separate from the UNSOM mandate, specifically in the context of humanitarian operations.

There is potential for a further integration of enabling functions in support of UNSOM sections and interested agencies, funds and programmes in a single platform, with resources from UNSOM, the available expertise and capacities of UNSOS and resources from participating agencies, funds and programmes allocated
on the basis of strategic priorities. This could include support for planning, coordination, information-sharing, analytics, resource mobilization, a dedicated risk management capacity and civilian capacity identification and deployment.

Since the various federal member states are at different levels of capacity and situational contexts, a differentiated approach at the sub-federal level, tailored to each federal member state, should be adopted. In parallel, options should be explored on a case-by-case basis for an engagement that would represent a step change, if the security and operational situation improves. For example, the planned construction of a dedicated compound at Kismaayo airport in Jubbaland may offer opportunities for a greater United Nations presence, and an UNSOM office in Galmudug should be set up as soon as feasible. It will be important for the United Nations in Somalia to be able to quickly expand, if possible, in support of regional progress. This should be done taking into account the necessary staff security requirements.

**Implications for staff security**

Current arrangements for staff security also vary across the regions, involving AMISOM security where UNSOM is present in AMISOM areas of operations, private security companies, a United Nations Guard Unit for the internal perimeter in Mogadishu and a mix of private companies and State forces in Puntland and “Somaliland”, where AMISOM is not present.

The security provided by AMISOM is critical in enabling the United Nations presence and operations in Somalia. An AMISOM withdrawal without significantly increased security levels would force the United Nations in Somalia to establish new mechanisms. While the end state is the assumption of primary responsibility for security provision by Somali security institutions, this is an unlikely prospect in the next four years. The United Nations therefore needs to explore a range of options to provide the necessary mitigating measures in the event that AMISOM begins drawing down in that period, which would have an impact on mobile and static security.

In this regard, the United Nations should prioritize the development of Somali police at the federal and State levels, and at the same time develop alternative options for the provision of security to the United Nations. The options could include an expansion of United Nations Guard Units into the regions and the possibility of armed security services by an international private security company. Security arrangements should be tailored to each regional situation, with scope for adjustments that would enable a step change in the United Nations presence in case of improvements of the security environment.

These options will be clearer following the joint review of AMISOM, which will define an exit strategy for AMISOM based on a conditions-based transition and implications for the provision of security to United Nations operations. The United Nations should subsequently conduct a thorough assessment of its security arrangements and decide on appropriate measures.

**Specific human rights due diligence policy considerations**

Somalia provides a pioneering setting in the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy and for the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations more broadly. Continued and strengthened implementation of that policy will be a key aspect of the work of the United Nations in Somalia and should contribute to mitigating the risk of civilian harm and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the context of military operations, and the building of accountable security institutions.
Significant efforts have been made to establish an architecture for the human rights due diligence policy in Somalia, which comprises a standard operating procedure for implementing the policy, a United Nations task force and a joint working group with AMISOM. However, resources for a dedicated capacity within UNSOM for the implementation of the policy remain limited. While these mechanisms are pioneering that implementation in a challenging environment, there is scope for a strengthening of communication channels with AMISOM and improvements to accountability mechanisms within the United Nations system, including to ensure greater awareness and understanding of the obligations of all United Nations entities in Somalia under the human rights due diligence policy.

In the context of the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy, but also as part of its wider mandate, UNSOM is performing monitoring functions for the United Nations system, albeit with limited capacities. Independent investigations of incidents are particularly challenging, but should be conducted whenever possible. The ability of UNSOS to account for how support is used, and by whom, is also limited and could be improved by systematizing mechanisms for tracking support delivery and use. While significant work has been done in developing risk assessments and mitigating measures in consultation with UNSOS, this capability needs to be further increased to ensure an adequate analysis of risks and the operationalization of mitigating measures by all entities involved.

In addition, the implementation of institutional measures and mechanisms identified as part of the human rights due diligence policy framework to prevent and address violations by AMISOM, including in the field of selection and screening, training, accountability, monitoring, policy, planning and protection, must be strengthened.

**Implications for the mandate and reconfiguration of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia**

On the basis of this assessment, the overall concept of UNSOM as a political mission should remain, with its core tasks of providing good offices, strategic advice on peacebuilding and State-building, the coordination of international support, capacity-building for Somali federal and State institutions, and monitoring and reporting on violations. However, the UNSOM mandate should be adapted to integrate support at the level of federal member states in all areas of the mandate. At the moment, Security Council resolutions 2232 (2015) and 2275 (2016) encourage UNSOM to expand its presence in all federal member state capitals, but the functions of the presences should be clarified as part of the core mandate of UNSOM. Stronger emphasis should be placed on the good offices and conflict resolution role of the Mission in all areas, at the national, regional and local levels, and on the basis of the overall role of the United Nations as a facilitator of political agreements and in coordinating international support, especially as regards the federalization process.

Strategic advice in support of a comprehensive approach to security will be a priority task. This includes advice on the implementation of the Government’s plan for preventing violent extremism. UNSOM should also emphasize support to improve the accountability of Somali institutions, especially on transparency and anti-corruption issues.

The women, peace and security agenda should be better integrated, beyond women’s protection, to reflect the progress achieved and focus on women’s participation and engagement in peacebuilding and State-building efforts at all levels. Similarly, the mandate should reflect the youth, peace and security agenda,
and UNSOM should integrate a youth empowerment approach in its programmes and policies.

The capacity-building role of UNSOM should be expanded to the police sector, in line with the overall rebalancing of the approach to security, and to support the entire rule of law chain.

UNSOM responsibilities on the human rights due diligence policy should be clarified in the mandate to ensure adequate prioritization and integrated implementation across the United Nations presence and for legislative bodies to better allocate resources across relevant United Nations entities in Somalia. The respective mandates of UNSOM and UNSOS should reflect their shared responsibility and common strategic goal on the human rights due diligence policy, including three elements: (a) the human rights due diligence policy dimension of all United Nations support to the security sector in Somalia; (b) the facilitation role of UNSOM for the system-wide implementation of that policy under the authority of my Special Representative for Somalia; and (c) the joint responsibility and accountability by UNSOS and UNSOM for implementation of the policy, including effective mitigation measures, the monitoring of delivery of support by UNSOS and the monitoring of violations by UNSOM.

While UNSOS does not require a specific change of mandate as a result of this assessment, its role as a strategic enabler of the United Nations portfolio in the country owing to its presence alongside AMISOM should be acknowledged. The UNSOS mandate should reflect cross-referencing on responsibility and accountability for the implementation of common mandated strategic goals and, as stated above, the human rights due diligence policy. UNSOS should be included in all discussions on planning that have operational implications.

Resource implications

While the strategic assessment did not examine in detail the possible resource implications of its recommendations, it considered a number of elements that are likely to result in demands for increased resources due to an adjustment to the mandate of UNSOM to better support the next phase of State-building and peacebuilding in Somalia. These include:

(a) The capacity to support conflict resolution and local reconciliation efforts, in the form of staff resources, but also the ability to deploy specialized expertise and to ensure that United Nations staff in Somalia have the appropriate skills in conflict management and resolution;

(b) The capacity to enable the United Nations system on the ground, in the UNSOM Coherence and Effectiveness Group, the Integrated Office and UNSOS, including for system-wide risk management support, and increases in the operational budget to support flexible deployments;

(c) A dedicated capacity for the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy, to discharge the mandates of UNSOM and UNSOS in line with the priority of strengthening accountability;

(d) Resources for a possible increased United Nations role in capacity-building of Somali police (to be further examined in the joint review of AMISOM);

(e) Increased air transport capabilities across the country, given the absence of other means of transportation and commercial options and given the critical role that “bringing people together” plays in the good offices of the United Nations.
Reconfiguration

The United Nations configuration in Somalia and the presence of UNSOM in Mogadishu and federal member states should also be subject to continuous review to ensure that the United Nations presence and operations remain flexible and adaptable to the evolving situation on the ground. A number of configuration adjustments could be made in three main areas to better implement the priorities identified in the assessment: integrated decision-making, UNSOM structures and reporting lines, and improving enabling functions. These should be finalized at the technical level on the basis of a revised UNSOM mandate. Finally, the United Nations in Somalia must enhance internal accountability for adherence to commitments and corporate obligations, including greater gender parity and appropriate budgeting.

Conclusion

During my visit to Somalia on 7 March 2017, I was struck by the contrast between the palpable hope and opportunities for success of the country and the looming tragedy due to the extended drought. The drought response should be a top priority, and all energies should be mobilized in support of the President, the Prime Minister and the Somali Government, who have been proactive and committed partners of the international community. Funding for the Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia must increase urgently, and the international community must work together to facilitate the response at all levels. The window of opportunity to avert a famine is now.

This is particularly critical because Somalia is at a moment of hope, with the establishment of a new Government that enjoys support from the population and should start addressing long-standing and urgent challenges for the formation of the State. Chief among these is security, beginning with the adoption of a security architecture accepted by all at the national, federal and local levels, which will enable coordinated international support to the Somali security institutions. The conference to be held on 11 May 2017 in London will be a critical milestone for the engagement of Somalia with its partners in the international community. I am convinced that with clear resolve, political will and sufficient mobilization of resources, Somalia can make decisive progress this year and set the course towards peace and stability.

(Signed) António Guterres