Letter dated 28 December 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2340 (2017), the final report on its work.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan on 27 November 2017 and was considered by the Committee on 28 December 2017.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Thomas Bifwoli Wanjala
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)

(Signed) Vincent Darraçq
Expert

(Signed) Daniela Kravetz Miranda
Expert

(Signed) Warren Melia
Expert

(Signed) Abhai Kumar Srivastav
Expert
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)

Summary

The present report covers the period from 13 March to 17 November 2017. The Panel has continued to monitor developments in Darfur and in the broader region in accordance with its mandate.

During the reporting period, the Darfur peace process has not made any progress. Several of the main rebel groups currently remain active in Libya and South Sudan, where they have developed relations with local stakeholders.

The main development in the conflict dynamics was the joint incursions into Darfur in late May of two Darfurian rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC), from their rear bases in Libya and South Sudan. On 20 May, SLA/MM and SLA/TC entered Darfur in two coordinated columns, in violation of the arms embargo. Clashes between Government security forces and the rebel groups ensued, continuing through early June. Security forces seized a significant amount of military materiel, some of which the Panel was able to inspect. Additionally, the Panel investigated reports of violations of international humanitarian law by Government security forces during these clashes.

During its May mission to Darfur, the Panel observed several military aircraft previously reported by the Panel, as well as aircraft not previously seen in Darfur. The Government has submitted no exemption requests to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan for the deployment to Darfur of these aircraft, thereby violating the arms embargo.

In July, the Government launched an arms collection campaign in Darfur. In late October, the Government deployed several thousand personnel of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to Darfur to assist in this effort; that armed deployment without an exemption from the Committee is in contravention of the arms embargo.

A major security development in recent months has been the escalation of tensions between Musa Hilal, the most notorious Darfurian Arab militia leader, and the Government, arising from the Government’s arms collection campaign and its efforts to integrate the Border Guards, under Hilal, into RSF. The Panel is closely monitoring this situation as it unfolds.

While the conflict has been limited to the areas described above and to the Jebel Marra region, armed violence, banditry and intercommunal violence in Darfur continue to pose a serious threat to civilians, in particular to internally displaced persons. Although significantly less new displacement has been recorded in 2017 than in previous years, the situation of internally displaced persons remains a major challenge to restoring peace and stability in Darfur. Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations has improved significantly in 2017.

Sexual and gender-based violence remains prevalent, exacerbated by impunity and the ready availability of weapons. The Panel has continued to monitor violations and serious abuses against children, and received several reports of recruitment and use of children by Darfurian rebel groups.
The Panel received various reports of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests by Government of the Sudan authorities against university students from Darfur. Violations of the rights of freedom of expression, association and assembly of Darfurian students were recorded.

In the course of its mandate, the Panel investigated migrant smuggling through and out of Darfur as a cross-cutting issue, and provides details in the present report on the Darfurian armed actors involved, abuses against migrants and smuggling routes in Darfur, among other aspects.

Darfurian rebel groups are financing their activities through their mercenary and criminal activities in Libya and South Sudan, as well as criminal activities in Darfur. In addition, certain companies and business establishments are reportedly providing income streams to these groups. Further, Darfurian rebel groups are involved in illegal cross-border activities.

The Panel continues to investigate non-compliance with the travel ban and asset freeze measures in relation to the designated individuals, and has established one travel ban violation. In addition, it has taken steps to update identifiers in relation to three designated individuals.
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Programme of work</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Cooperation and operating environment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Government of the Sudan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Member States</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and other United Nations and international entities</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Conflict dynamics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Rebel incursions into Darfur from Libya and South Sudan (May–June 2017)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Presence of Chadian rebel groups in Darfur</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Militias</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. The Musa Hilal factor</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Regional dynamics</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Regional relations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Darfuri rebel groups in South Sudan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Presence of Darfuri groups in Libya</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Political process and progress towards removing impediments to the peace process</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Peace process</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Implementation of the Doha Document during the reporting period</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Progress towards reducing violations of the arms embargo</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Arms embargo violations</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Armed violence monitoring in Darfur</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Clashes between Government and rebel forces in May 2017</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Humanitarian access</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Situation of internally displaced persons</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Sudanese refugees in Chad</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Situation of Darfuri university students</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Violations and serious abuses against children</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H. Attacks against United Nations and humanitarian personnel</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Migrant smuggling from and through Darfur</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Routes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Involvement of Darfurian armed actors ......................................................... 37
C. Costs and duration ......................................................................................... 38
D. Abuses against migrants .................................................................................. 39
E. West Africans transiting through Darfur .......................................................... 40

X. Transport and customs ................................................................................... 40
A. Tracing of vehicles used by Darfurian rebel groups .......................................... 40
B. Smuggling and other illicit cross-border activities .............................................. 41

XI. Financing of Darfurian armed groups ............................................................. 42
A. Rebel groups in Libya.......................................................................................... 42
B. Rebel groups in South Sudan .............................................................................. 43
C. Companies and business establishments providing income streams .............. 44
D. Rebel groups in Darfur ....................................................................................... 45

XII. Assets freeze and travel ban .......................................................................... 46
A. Implementation by Member States .................................................................... 47
B. Implementation by the Government of the Sudan .............................................. 47
C. Ongoing investigations ....................................................................................... 48
D. Updating the identifiers of designated individuals ............................................ 49
E. Updating of the sanctions list and INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council special notices with photographs of designated individuals .................................................. 50
F. Challenges in the identification of designated individuals in transit ................. 50

XIII. Recommendations ......................................................................................... 51

Annexes* .............................................................................................................. 52

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Introduction

1. The Panel of Experts on the Sudan was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1591 (2005). The Panel’s mandate has since been extended, most recently by resolution 2340 (2017). Full details of the Panel’s mandate and methodology are found in annex I.

2. On 2 March 2017, the Secretary-General appointed the following experts to serve on the Panel: Thomas Bifwoli Wanjala (Kenya, coordinator and transport and customs expert); Vincent Darraq (France, regional expert); Daniela Kravetz Miranda (Chile, international humanitarian law expert); Warren Melia (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms expert); and Abhai Kumar Srivastav (India, finance expert) (see S/2017/188).

3. In its resolution 2340 (2017), the Security Council requested the Panel to provide a final report with its findings and recommendations no later than 12 January 2018. The present report has been prepared in response to that request.

II. Programme of work

4. In the second half of March 2017, the Panel travelled to the United States of America to meet with various interlocutors and to pursue issues relevant to its mandate. After an introductory meeting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, held in New York in early April, the Panel developed a programme of work to carry out its mandate. Panel members also participated in bilateral meetings with representatives of various Member States.

5. During the reporting period, the Panel carried out a total of 40 regional and international missions to monitor developments in Darfur and in the broader region. The Panel travelled to Belgium, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Kenya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Qatar, South Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Switzerland to follow leads relevant to its mandate.

6. The Panel also conducted four missions to the Sudan. The Panel’s first mission to the Sudan took place from 14 to 26 May. During the first four days of that mission, the Panel joined the Chair of the Committee and several Committee members in their official visit to the Sudan. From 30 July to 4 August, the Panel visited the Sudan at the request of the Government of the Sudan to examine weapons and materiel captured from the rebel incursions in May. The Panel again visited the Sudan from 3 to 30 September and from 18 to 30 October.

7. During its missions to the Sudan, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders in Khartoum and in Darfur, including representatives of various government agencies and ministries, United Nations and other international agencies, members of the diplomatic corps, civil society groups, academics, members of political parties, Doha Document for Peace in Darfur signatory groups, former rebels, migrants, researchers and local community leaders. In Darfur, the Panel conducted field missions to North, South, Central and West Darfur States.

III. Cooperation and operating environment

8. During the reporting period, the Panel received positive cooperation from the Government of the Sudan, as well as from Member States and United Nations agencies.
A. Government of the Sudan

9. The Panel continued to engage and work with Sudanese authorities and received positive cooperation during its various missions and field visits. However, the finance expert was unable to join the missions to the Sudan because he was not issued a visa by Sudanese authorities during the mandate. The remaining four Panel members, with the exception of the coordinator, continued to receive single-entry visas for their missions to the Sudan. That resulted in delays in the planning of missions and limited the time the Panel could spend on the ground in the Sudan during its mandate. When the Panel raised the issue of obtaining multiple-entry visas with the national focal point, it was informed that a committee had been set up to examine the issue of visas for international staff and that the issue should be resolved in the near future.

10. The Panel also notes that the internal procedures for obtaining Darfur travel permits frequently result in delays to the deployment of Panel members to Darfur. With the exception of the Chair’s visit in May and the weapons inspection in July–August, Government authorities have been unwilling to process the travel permits in advance of the experts’ arrival in the Sudan. The experts have therefore had to spend extended periods in Khartoum waiting for their travel permits to be issued.

B. Member States

11. The Panel appreciates the cooperation received from Member States. In several of its missions, the Panel met with members of the diplomatic community to discuss the implementation of various resolutions. The Panel also sent various requests for information to different Member States (see annex II) and hopes that Member States will continue to cooperate with it by providing timely responses to its requests.

12. Additionally, the Panel has been following up with several Member States on the measures adopted to implement sanctions measures. Since 2009, in eight successive resolutions,1 including by paragraph 15 of resolution 2340 (2017), the Council has encouraged and urged all Member States, including those in the region, to report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement sanctions measures. Compliance with this provision has been limited. To date, only 36 States have submitted their implementation reports. Most countries in the region have not yet submitted their implementation reports.

C. African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and other United Nations and international entities

13. The Panel appreciates the cooperation and logistical support provided to it by the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) during its missions to the Sudan, as well as that provided by other United Nations missions. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) provided administrative and logistical support and facilitated the experts’ work in South Sudan. In Tunisia, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) supported the work of the Panel. During these missions, the Panel held meetings with various UNMISS and UNSMIL officials to discuss issues relevant to its mandate. Finally, the Panel appreciates the support of various United Nations and other international agencies, who agreed to

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engages in exchanges and detailed analyses with the experts on different areas of its mandate.

IV. Conflict dynamics

A. Rebel incursions into Darfur from Libya and South Sudan (May–June 2017)

14. During the reporting period, the main development in the conflict dynamics was the joint incursions into Darfur in late May by two Darfuri rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council (SLA/TC), from their rear bases in Libya and South Sudan. The ensuing clashes between the two groups and government security forces were the first large-scale clashes since the failed attempt of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to return to Darfur in April 2015. Annex III provides details on the incursions and related clashes.

15. While SLA/MM is one of the three main historical Darfuri rebel groups (with JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW)), SLA/TC is a more recent and lesser-known group. It is a splinter group from SLA/AW, formed in 2015 by prominent SLA/AW figures who were unhappy with Abdul Wahid’s leadership and strategy. The group, mostly composed of ethnic Fur, aims to reunite various SLA/AW groupings under its leadership and push out Abdul Wahid in order to re-energize SLA/AW, formerly a more powerful, visible movement. By May 2017, SLA/TC was mostly located in South Sudan, where its then-Chair Nimir Abdel-Rahman, its then-General Commander Mohamed Adam Abdelsalam “Tarrada” and Saleh Abdulrahman, the deputy of “Tarrada”, were based with about 30 vehicles. The group also has a presence in Libya. Since its formation, SLA/TC has been working closely with SLA/MM.

16. The main political objective of the incursions was to counter the narrative of the Government of the Sudan that the conflict is over and that there is peace in Darfur. The incursions took place during a particularly sensitive period, in which the UNAMID downsizing and the review of the United States sanctions were being discussed. SLA/MM also wanted to demonstrate to the Government of the Sudan and the international community — in particular the countries and bodies involved in the mediations on the Darfur conflict — that it was not a spent force and should be taken more seriously at the negotiating table. The negative environment in South Sudan for the Darfuri rebel groups was an additional factor, according to some rebel sources. In particular, SLA/TC reportedly felt compelled to return to Darfur owing to pressure by the Government of South Sudan on the groups to leave (see para. 40 below).

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2 A former SLA/AW spokesman with Sudanese Armed Forces background and university education.
3 Formerly SLA/AW Deputy General Commander, “Tarrada” was one of the most renowned Darfuri rebel commanders.
4 Nimir Abdel-Rahman was captured during the incursions and was replaced as Chair by al-Hadi Idriss Yahia, while “Tarrada” was killed during the fighting and was replaced as General Commander by Saleh Jebel Si.
5 In February 2015, Nimir Abdel-Rahman signed a coordination agreement with SLA/MM, and several sources report that the two groups have since been cooperating in the field in South Sudan and Libya.
6 Interviews with members of rebel groups.
B. Presence of Chadian rebel groups in Darfur

17. In early June, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were in pursuit of SLA/MM elements in North Darfur, they encountered Chadian rebels in the Ain Siro/Kutum area. The Panel gathered from several Chadian rebel sources that these were members of the Union of the Forces of Resistance (UFR), led by Chief of Staff Gerdi Abdallah. Before the rapprochement between Chad and the Sudan in 2010, UFR was supported and hosted in Darfur by the Government of the Sudan, and had a base in the Ain Siro area. During its time in Darfur, the group developed good relations with SLA/MM, as well as with Musa Hilal. The group is now based in Libya.

18. The Panel received conflicting explanations on the June presence of UFR elements in North Darfur. Some Chadian rebel sources say that these elements were in North Darfur to establish a small rear base there and were not part of the SLA/MM column. Other sources indicate that the UFR elements joined the SLA/MM incursions. After being chased by RSF, the UFR elements were hosted for a few days by Musa Hilal, who provided them with shelter and supplies, and then returned to Libya.

C. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

19. No significant development took place during the reporting period in the conflict between the security forces and SLA/AW in Darfur. Small-scale, isolated incidents were reported in Jebel Marra, such as ambushes by rebel elements on security forces in early April on the Keila–Al Malam road. The last large-scale government offensive in January–April 2016, which pushed SLA/AW fighters out from some of their strongholds and towards higher, mountainous locations, seems to have significantly weakened the group. This offensive damaged its capability, limiting the group’s freedom of movement and cutting some of its supply routes. The group now seems to be in survival mode, with no intention or capacity to engage in large-scale operations, as explained in greater detail in annex IV.

D. Militias

20. Several armed militia groups — mostly of Arab ethnicity and commonly referred to as “Janjaweed” — continue to operate in Darfur, posing a threat to the rule of law and the security of civilians in several areas of the five Darfur states. This is in contravention of article 67/399 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, which stipulated that the Government had to disarm all armed militia groups.

21. In particular, militia groups have a strong presence in North Darfur, where they control large swaths of territory, including in the districts of Kutum, Tawila, Korma, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobayi. These groups are organized along tribal lines and hard to control. Annex V provides details on the most prominent militias of North Darfur.

22. According to several sources, the government security forces have well-established relations with several local militias leaders and have mobilized some militias as proxies during military operations against the rebels. The participation of these militia groups in operations is usually coordinated by officials of the

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7 A Chadian, mostly Zaghawa rebel group chaired by Timan Erdimi.
8 This was facilitated by the fact that both groups are mostly from the Zaghawa tribe.
9 Gerdi Abdallah subsequently died in a car accident in Libya.
10 For example, according to some sources, some tribal Arab militias were involved in the most recent fighting between the security forces and the rebel groups in May and June.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Military Intelligence or the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), depending on the operational needs. Moreover, according to different sources, the militias sometimes act with and are integrated into official paramilitary units such as RSF and the Border Guards, themselves constituted mostly of former Arab militiamen. When required by security forces or NISS, the militias participate in RSF operations and commit most of the abuses against civilians, such as the looting of villages and livestock, rapes and torching of homes. According to sources, there is an understanding that the militias will loot the villages as soon as the operation they are participating in ends.

23. The militias have reportedly become a concern for some quarters of the Government in Khartoum. Since July 2017, government authorities have been conducting an arms collection campaign, chaired by Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, partly aimed at disarming these groups.

E. The Musa Hilal factor

24. During the reporting period, a major security development on the ground in Darfur has been the escalation of tensions between Musa Hilal, the most notorious Darfurian Arab militia leader, and the Government. In particular, the arms collection campaign and the Government’s intention to integrate the Border Guards into RSF has been contentious.

25. While both are paramilitary units made up mostly of Darfurian Arab militiamen, the Border Guards and RSF have different backgrounds and entertain a rivalry. The Border Guards were created in 2003, when the Government tried to provide a formal status to proxy Darfurian Arab tribal militias. Its members are principally Darfurian Arabs from the Mahamid branch of the Rezeigat tribe (Musa Hilal’s branch). While their administrative status is not entirely clear, they reportedly respond, at least on paper, to Military Intelligence.

26. RSF was created in 2013, when the Government was facing a spike in rebel activity in Darfur and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (the Two Areas). The Government was seeking to regain control of increasingly restive Arab militias in Darfur and establish a new paramilitary unit distinct from the unreliable Musa Hilal. The RSF troops reportedly number between 30,000 and 40,000. The vast majority of them are from Darfurian Arab tribes; the first batch was made up mostly of kinsmen of “Hemmeti” from the Mahariya branch of the Rezeigat (see para. 27 below). However, recruitment has recently been extended to Darfurian African tribes (including rebel defectors) and to areas outside Darfur, such as Southern Kordofan. Initially placed under NISS, RSF has been part of SAF since January 2017, while maintaining a distinct status.

27. Musa Hilal, the de facto commander of the Border Guards, has refused the integration of the Border Guards into RSF. Hilal feels that the Government, by incorporating his Border Guards into RSF and placing them under the leadership of his rival, Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo “Hemmeti”, is trying to clip his wings because he has become autonomous and critical of Khartoum. The disagreement on the status of the Border Guards is also fuelled by personal rivalries between Musa Hilal, on one side, and Vice-President Hassabo and “Hemmeti” (both Mahariya and close associates), on the other, over access to the central Government and leadership of the Darfurian Arab community. These rivalries are also related to issues of tribal status and egos. As a tribal leader from an influential family, Hilal considers that he

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11 A former militia leader and Border Guard officer.
should be recognized by the Government as a more important figure than “Hemmeti” and Hassabo, who are not endowed with any traditional leadership position.

28. Mediations by some Darfurian Arab politicians and religious leaders have failed to resolve the deadlock between Musa Hilal and the Government, and security tensions between the two sides have steadily increased. In late September, at the Libyan border, RSF personnel intercepted and killed 17 of Hilal’s men, whom the Government alleged were “human traffickers”. In early November, localized clashes between the force of Abdellah Razikalla “Savanna”, a Musa Hilal associate, and RSF resulted in the capture of “Savanna” near Kabkabiya, in North Darfur.

29. The Government also accuses Hilal of cooperating with General Khalifa Haftar in Libya. While the Panel has so far not established this cooperation with certainty, several prominent sources in the Darfurian Arab community reported to the Panel that since his current standoff with the Government of the Sudan began, Hilal has tried to develop connections in Libya in order to get support. As mentioned above (see para. 28), in late September, RSF killed 17 of Hilal’s men returning from Libya, whom the Government of the Sudan characterized as “human traffickers”. Several North Darfur Arab sources contradicted this version of events, indicating that Hilal’s men were in fact returning from a mission in Libya aimed at establishing links with Libya-based actors to prepare for a potential confrontation with the Government of the Sudan. According to these sources, RSF held the 17 men in the desert for two days and then executed them after failed negotiations for their release, reportedly in a bid to sever Hilal’s connections with Libya.

30. The Darfurian rebel groups are keen to take advantage of the divisions between Hilal and the Government of the Sudan. According to well-informed sources, JEM and SLA/MM have recently reached out to Hilal to form a military alliance against the Government. There have been discussions of holding a joint conference in a foreign country, with the participation of a high-level representative from Hilal, to declare such an alliance. However, these discussions have not led to any military cooperation yet.

31. On 26 November, fighting erupted between Musa Hilal’s forces and the security forces in Misteriha area. Musa Hilal was captured in the fighting. The Panel is monitoring the situation closely in view of its potential implications for the security situation in Darfur.

V. Regional dynamics

A. Regional relations

32. President Idriss Déby Itno of Chad continues to be a solid partner for the Sudan, working jointly with the Government to maintain stability in Darfur and in the border areas between the two countries. President Déby and President Omar Hassan

13 Savanna, a Mahamid former rebel commander, had joined SAF in East Darfur after concluding a security arrangement with the Government. He defected from SAF and rallied to Musa Hilal after the launch of the current disarmament campaign.
15 While this incident occurred outside the reporting period, the Panel considered it sufficiently important to include in the present report.
Al-Bashir have a good, sustained dialogue. President Déby continues to use his influence, his tribal networks and his personal relations within the Darfurian groups to divide the groups and convince some of their leaders and commanders to join the Government of the Sudan, for the benefit of the latter. In recent months, President Déby facilitated the rallying of JEM cadre Abu-Bakr Hamid Nur to the political process in Khartoum and supported Mr. Nur’s efforts to convince JEM commanders and cadres to join new, separate peace discussions with the Government of the Sudan. On 30 May 2017, Mr. Nur, Suleiman Jamous and other JEM defectors returned to Khartoum, where they engaged in peace talks with the Government.

33. According to several sources, President Déby has a specific concern with the Government’s Darfur policy, which is RSF. He is aware that many Arabs of Chadian descent, including former members of Chadian rebel groups, are active in RSF and fears that RSF elements might someday get involved in Chad, for instance by joining or supporting a new Chadian Arab rebel movement.

34. In recent months, the diplomatic crisis between Qatar and the Gulf countries has brought about new dynamics in regional relations, in Libya in particular, which could contribute to straining the relations between the Sudan and Chad. An alliance between General Haftar, Chad, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates has been developing against the Libyan Misrata faction, Qatar and Turkey. The Sudan, which has usually been close to Misrata Islamists and Qatar, and Chad are increasingly finding themselves on different sides of this divide. In the meantime, recent significant security incidents have demonstrated that the situation remains volatile in the border areas between Chad and Darfur. The two Governments will have to ensure that their differences on regional matters do not affect their bilateral relations, in particular their security cooperation in border areas.

35. During the reporting period, the relations between the Sudan and Egypt have been tense. They started to deteriorate early in 2017, when President Al-Bashir made several accusatory statements against the Egyptian authorities, in particular the intelligence services. These verbal tensions escalated further following the May rebel incursions into Darfur, when President Al-Bashir implied that Egypt had armed the rebels. From its side, the Egyptian security apparatus considers that the Sudan is not cooperating genuinely on counter-terrorism with Egypt. Moreover, the two countries increasingly find themselves on different sides on several regional issues, including Libya, the Nile Basin and South Sudan.

B. Darfurian rebel groups in South Sudan

1. Overview

36. Darfurian rebel groups have maintained a significant and constant military presence in South Sudan since 2011. This allowed them to set up rear bases and to receive support from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in the form of fuel,
food, medical treatment and ammunition. The Government of South Sudan has used the presence of Darfuri rebel groups in both its domestic and regional politics. The Darfuri rebels constitute a form of leverage of the Government of South Sudan on Khartoum in the context of the difficult relations between the two countries since the independence of South Sudan. In addition, SPLA has used them as auxiliaries against South Sudanese rebels in the ongoing civil conflict which broke out in December 2013. For instance, Darfuri rebel groups were active alongside SPLA against South Sudanese rebels in 2014 in Unity State. Since mid-2014, Darfuri rebel groups have been mostly located in the Western Bahr el Ghazal region.

37. Several Darfuri rebel groups — JEM, a JEM splinter group, SLA/MM and SLA/TC — are currently present in South Sudan.21 The bulk of their forces has been located in the area of the town of Raja (capital of Lol State), where the groups have provided military support to the security forces and local administration against South Sudanese rebels, as discussed in annex VI.

38. JEM has by far the largest presence and the bulk of its assets (commanders, troops, vehicles and equipment) in South Sudan, mostly in the Raja area. However, the group is experiencing difficulties, including internal dissent, and runs the risk of becoming militarily irrelevant, as reflected in annex VII.

2. Relations with South Sudanese authorities

39. In addition to arrangements with SPLA units and local government in the Raja area, the Darfur groups maintain relations with the Government of South Sudan in Juba, which are managed by the South Sudanese military. Until his dismissal in May 2017, the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong Awan, was the key military official running the relationship with the Darfuri rebels, including SPLA support to the groups and military cooperation. Within SPLA, Military Intelligence 22 and Special Operations — a desk working under the Chief of General Staff and Military Intelligence — are in charge of liaising with the Darfuri armed groups. Akol Majok (reportedly a Malong loyalist), who runs the Special Operations desk, is the key focal point for Darfur groups according to several sources, including some from rebel groups.

40. Since late 2016, the Government of the Sudan and the international community have stepped up their pressure on the Government of South Sudan to stop hosting and supporting the Sudanese rebel groups, including the Darfur rebels. As a result, South Sudanese authorities, keen to improve their relations with Khartoum, have pressured the Darfuri groups to leave, both in public statements and privately. For instance, in a meeting with the Panel in February 2017, JEM leader Gibril Ibrahim said that Military Intelligence had recently asked the group to move out of South Sudan. According to several rebel and South Sudanese sources, in December 2016, several prominent Darfuri commanders23 based in South Sudan were summoned to Juba for a meeting with SPLA authorities, who asked the Darfuri groups to leave the

21 Since the SLA/MM and SLA/TC incursions in May, their presence in South Sudan has been very limited.

22 Before the appointment of Malong in April 2014, Military Intelligence was reportedly playing a major role in the relationship with the Darfuri groups. However, its influence decreased under Malong, whose office became increasingly involved. According to SPLA sources, Malong brought the budget dedicated to Special Operations under his office, depriving Military Intelligence of significant resources which had partly been used to support the Sudanese rebel groups.

country. Owing to a disagreement on the conditions of the departure of the groups, the commanders were then placed under house arrest in Juba until April 2017.

41. Consequently, concrete steps were taken by the Darfurian rebel groups and the Government of South Sudan to organize the relocation of the groups outside South Sudan. Following the release of “Tarrada” and other commanders in April, SLA/MM and SLA/TC tried in May to return to Darfur from the Raja area. JEM and the South Sudanese authorities also explored the possibility of JEM transferring from South Sudan to areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM/N) in Southern Kordofan. According to several sources, the Government of South Sudan, including President Salva Kiir, mediated between SPLM/N and the Darfurian groups to convince SPLM/N to accept the Darfurians back in Southern Kordofan. The then-SPLM/N leadership told the Panel that Gibril Ibrahim had phoned them in December 2016 to discuss this issue. In February 2017, Gibril Ibrahim told the Panel that most JEM troops had moved from South Sudan to Southern Kordofan, in agreement with SPLM/N. In October 2017, the Deputy Chair of JEM, Ahmed Adam Bakhit, explained to the Panel that the bulk of JEM forces was now in the Jau Lake area (border area between Southern Kordofan and Unity State of South Sudan).

42. However, the Panel has been unable to confirm that this relocation actually took place. According to various sources, JEM is still present in the Raja area of South Sudan. SPLM/N representatives and civil society in Southern Kordofan have indicated that they were not aware of a JEM presence in that region.

C. Presence of Darfurian rebel groups in Libya

1. Overview

43. Since the first half of 2015, an important development regarding both the Darfur conflict and regional dynamics is the significant participation of Darfurian armed elements in the Libyan conflict. Following the rapprochement between Chad and the Sudan in 2010 and the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, external support for the Darfurian groups shrank. Moreover, their presence in Darfur became increasingly difficult owing to enhanced government military campaigns, involving RSF, since 2014. The ongoing conflict in Libya has been a lifeline for Darfurian rebels, providing them with opportunities to establish rear bases, generate revenues, access modern, heavy weapons and recruit new personnel.

44. According to various sources, Darfurian rebels’ involvement in the Libyan conflict resulted from two types of connections. First, at local level, through tribal relations, Tebu militias from southern Libya asked some Darfurian commanders to help them in their community conflicts against the Zuwaya Arabs in Kufra and the Tuaregs in Ubari in 2015. There were also higher-level contacts between representatives of the Libyan factions and the Darfurian groups, sometimes facilitated by former Gaddafi operatives who had worked with the Darfurian groups during the Gaddafi era.

45. During the reporting period, Darfurian rebel groups have been operating alongside various sides in the Libyan conflict. These include General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), Islamist factions (Misrata, Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB)) and the pro-Gaddafi faction that has been emerging as an independent force since the release of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in June 2017.

46. Among other operations, Darfurian fighters participated in the military operations in the oil crescent in March 2017, which pitted BDB against LNA. During these clashes, Darfurian fighters defected from LNA, allowing BDB to briefly seize Sidra and Ras Lanuf. Darfurian fighters played a major role in the LNA offensive in
Jufra in June 2017, which allowed LNA to take control of the area. The participation of Darfurian auxiliaries has been reported in LNA operations in the Benghazi and Derna areas in 2017. In September and October 2017, a group of Darfurian fighters participated in the failed military operation of a pro-Gaddafi Libyan commander in the Tripoli area. During the reporting period, LNA used Darfurian groups as a security force to protect remote oil fields, such as Zella and Sarir, and oil terminals in the oil crescent.24 Annex VIII provides detailed information on the presence and activities of various Darfurian groups in Libya.

2. Libyan partners

47. On the ground, the tribal, localized and fragmented nature of Libyan politics means that in order to gain ground, larger factions with a national agenda, such as LNA, Misrata or the Tripoli-based Government, forge alliances with local tribes and militias. Frequently, local militia or tribal leaders act as intermediaries and manage the day-to-day relations between the Darfurian groups and the big factions. These local strongmen are often only loosely aligned with the larger factions and have their own agenda. This fluid situation has been complicated further by the recent emergence of an independent pro-Gaddafi faction, attractive for former supporters of the Gaddafi regime. The Panel has been able to identify several Libyan individuals who have been involved with the Darfurian groups, as detailed in annexes IX and X. Additionally, internal LNA correspondence contained in annex XI illustrates the cooperation between LNA and Darfurian groups.

VI. Political process and progress towards removing impediments to the peace process

A. Peace process

48. During the reporting period, the peace process has stagnated. No direct talks between the Government and the two Darfurian rebel groups engaged in peace talks (SLA/MM and JEM) have taken place. The core problem remains that the expectations of the Darfurian groups, both in terms of desired government posts and policies,25 exceed the concessions that the Government is prepared to make to strike a deal.

1. The parties’ positions

49. The Government of the Sudan seems in no hurry and has no real incentive to reach an agreement. The Government’s general view is that the situation in Darfur is now under control and that the Darfurian groups have been irremediably weakened. Therefore, the Government is interested only in an agreement on its own terms and is reluctant to make concessions to the rebel groups. Moreover, most members of the international community involved in mediation efforts do not strongly press the Government for concessions, because they are generally appreciative of its role in various regional matters26 and increasingly see it as a legitimate partner. Many in the international community have grown frustrated with the Darfurian rebel groups,

24 A local source reports that, since the Darfurians’ defection during the BDB attack on the oil crescent in March, LNA no longer uses them for protection of the oil terminals.
25 For example, on the administrative status of Darfur and compensation for the victims of the conflict.
26 Among other issues, on counter-terrorism, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, South Sudan and Yemen.
which they consider unreliable and not representative of the Darfuri civilian population, which puts the Government in a comfortable position.

50. SLA/MM and JEM are finding it hard to come to terms with the fact that, owing to their weak military position, they are less relevant in the eyes of the Government and the international community, and are therefore unlikely to get a favourable deal. Moreover, on the basis of their previous engagements with the Government, they have little trust in its genuine commitment to implementing any potential agreement, as well as in some of the mediators, Qatar and Thabo Mbeki, Chair of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, in particular, whom they consider biased. As a result, while remaining engaged in peace initiatives to keep the ball rolling, they continue to build up their military capability, in particular by engaging in the Libyan conflict. By doing so, they hope to be taken more seriously by the Government and therefore strengthen their position at the negotiating table. It also allows them to keep open the option of an armed struggle, should the regional environment change in their favour or the regime be affected by an internal crisis.

51. There are nuances in the two groups’ positions on the peace process. JEM leader Gibril Ibrahim appears more open to a compromise with the Government on issues such as the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the Qatari mediation. 27

52. Abdul Wahid al-Nour, the head of SLA/AW, remains uninterested in engaging in the current peace process. In early May 2017, Jeremiah Nyamane Kingsley Mamabolo, the Joint Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, met with him. According to the Joint Special Representative and his team, Mr. Nour agreed to make a statement in the following weeks outlining his views and strategy for peace and started working on the statement with the UNAMID team. However, in a meeting with the Panel in May, Mr. Nour denied having made such a commitment and to date, the declaration has not been released. This would not be the first time that Mr. Nour, when pressed by a mediator, reluctantly accepts to take a step towards the peace process before backtracking. Mr. Nour continues to insist on certain preconditions before joining the peace process — namely the disarmament of pro-Government Arab militias, genuine security for the internally displaced persons and return of land to its rightful owners — and these demands appear unrealistic at this stage.

2. Stalled peace process

53. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel is the internationally recognized mechanism to deal with the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas. During the reporting period, the mediation by the Implementation Panel has not made inroads. The Implementation Panel was unable to convene a new round of talks between the Government of the Sudan, SLA/MM and JEM (for the Darfur track) and the Government and SPLM/N (for the Two Areas track). This is partly attributable to an internal rift in SPLM/N, which resulted in delays in the peace talks. However, factors related to the Implementation Panel itself also limit its influence on the Darfur peace process, namely Mr. Mbeki’s lack of leverage on the Government and mistrust between him and the Darfuri groups.

54. UNAMID is mandated to mediate between the Government of the Sudan and Darfuri armed groups. In May and June, the Joint Special Representative and head of UNAMID met with SLA/MM and JEM in Paris to discuss the way forward for the peace process, and separately with Mr. Nour. However, owing to its other tasks and limited resources, UNAMID is not in a position to engage fully in peace negotiations.

27 This may reflect the weaker military position of JEM on the ground at the moment, as highlighted in annex VII.
55. During the reporting period, several institutions, Member States and organizations have engaged in various initiatives and meetings regarding the Darfur peace process. While all of these initiatives are useful to keep the peace process alive and resolve the current deadlock, leadership and coordination could be improved. When not properly coordinated with the Implementation Panel and UNAMID, these initiatives can generate confusion and allow the Sudanese parties to engage in forum-shopping and delaying tactics. The United States currently seems better placed to take the lead in the peace negotiations given its resources, expertise on the issue and influence with the Government.

56. The status of the 2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur continues to be a sticking point between, on the one side, the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Qatar — who consider the document to be the basis of future talks and immutable — and, on the other, SLA/MM and JEM, who never signed the document and have asked for a new process, or at least for reconsideration of the document. In their most recent engagements with the international community, SLA/MM and JEM proposed to discuss a framework agreement with the Government as a preliminary step to resuming talks on cessation of hostilities. However, the Government insists that the Darfurian groups must first recognize the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the basis of future political discussions.

57. A series of initiatives by the Joint Special Representative and the United States, among others, have attempted to resolve the deadlock. These meetings generated some progress, as the various parties agreed that the Doha Document could be supplemented by protocols and annexes. However, the scope and the status of these protocols is still an open question.

58. Moreover, the diplomatic crisis over Qatar has presented the Darfurian rebel groups — in particular SLA/MM, which has always been hostile to the Doha Document and suspicious of Qatar as a mediator — with an opportunity to question the Doha Document and the Qatari mediation. The Darfurian groups are lobbying for new mediators to complement the Qatari mediations and those of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, such as the European Union and Saudi Arabia, hoping that they will be more sympathetic to their demands.28

B. Implementation of the Doha Document during the reporting period

59. In June 2016, the Government declared that the implementation of Doha Document for Peace in Darfur was complete. The Darfur Regional Authority — the body in charge of implementing the Doha Document — was dismantled at the end of its term, on 7 September 2016. Relevant bodies were subsequently put in place to implement the remaining measures of the Doha Document. President Al-Bashir issued a decree on 6 January 2017 creating the Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office, headed by Magdi Khalafalla, and a further decree on 17 January appointing the heads of six commissions under the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office.29

60. There are disagreements among the signatories of the Doha Document30 on the extent to which it was implemented. The former chair of the Darfur Regional

28 Interview with the SLA/MM negotiating team.
29 The six commissions are the Darfur Land Commission, the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission and the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund.
30 These are the Government of the Sudan; the National Liberation and Justice Party of Tijani al-Sisi; the Liberation and Justice Party of Bahar Idriss Abu Garda; the Justice and Equality Movement of Bakheit Abdalla Abdelkarim Dabajo; and the Sudan Liberation Army-Second Revolution of Abulgasim Imam Elhaj.
Authority, Tijani al-Sisi, as well as the Government, consider that the Doha Document was 85 per cent implemented. Other signatories are much more critical, putting the level of implementation below 50 per cent.\(^{31}\)

61. At the time the Doha process was concluded and the Darfur Regional Authority was closed, the degree of implementation of the Doha Document varied across the components. For instance, the power-sharing political arrangements had successfully been put in place. The security arrangements for the signatory groups had also generally been implemented, including the integration of former fighters in the security forces. However, implementation of several key aspects was lacking, including the return of internally displaced persons, compensation for internally displaced persons, promotion of Darfurians in administration and disarmament of pro-Government militias, among others.

62. At the time of writing, the six commissions tasked with implementation of the remaining measures under the Doha Document are still not operational, effectively undermining the capacity of the Government of the Sudan to deliver on its commitments. The organizational chart of the commissions has not been approved by the Government, staff have not been appointed and the budget has not been allocated. It is difficult to know whether this is because of slowness of bureaucratic processes, financial issues or lack of interest on the part of the Government. In September the signatory groups held a meeting with Bakri Hassan Saleh, the Prime Minister and First Vice-President, to raise the matter, and expressed the hope that it would be resolved soon.

VII. Progress towards reducing violations of the arms embargo

A. Arms embargo violations


1. Darfurian rebel groups in Libya and South Sudan

64. The presence and activities of SLA/MM, SLA/TC and JEM in both Libya and South Sudan constitute a violation by those States of the arms embargo, which requires States to take measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel and the provision of assistance to Darfurian rebel groups by their nationals or from their territories (see resolution 1556 (2004), paras. 7 and 8).

65. The gravity of this situation was highlighted in May when large groups of rebels attempted to return to Darfur. The rebel groups based in Libya and South Sudan will continue to have access to logistical resources, which will allow them to conduct illegal armed activities in Darfur and in the region in the future.

2. May incursions by Darfurian rebel groups

66. On 20 May, two large convoys of Darfurian rebel groups entered Darfur from Libya and South Sudan, resulting in large quantities of vehicles, weapons and ammunition being brought into Darfur.

67. Photographs provided to the Panel by NISS immediately after the incursions depicted arms and related materiel that were allegedly part of the rebel convoy either

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\(^{31}\) The Panel met with various representatives of signatories of the Doha Document, including the leaders of all signatory groups and several former ministers of the Darfur Regional Authority.
68. Between 30 July and 4 August, Government authorities invited the Panel to examine the weapons captured by its forces during the May incursions. This inspection included a briefing in El Fasher on 1 August by the Deputy Wali of North Darfur, the State Security Committee and the NISS Director for North Darfur. The officials told the Panel that SAF had received advance intelligence of the incursions from its sources in Libya and South Sudan, which had enabled its forces to intercept the rebels in remote locations away from large civilian settlements. They also stated that SAF had deployed its military aircraft for reconnaissance purposes only and used RSF units to engage with the rebel forces on the ground.

69. The Panel was informed that, on 5 June 2017, SAF arranged a public display of the captured materiel in El Fasher to which the media and UNAMID were also invited. NISS provided the Panel with a digital video of this display. Analysis of the video reveals the following items of interest:

(a) Approximately 20 Toyota 4x4 vehicles (mix of Land Cruiser and Buffalo models);

(b) 5 Streit Cougar armoured cars;

(c) 1 recoilless 106mm rifle;

(d) 1 multiple rocket launcher 107mm (possibly type 63);

(e) BM21 122mm rocket tubes;

(f) RGD-5 and F1 hand grenades;

(g) NR PRB 434 rifle grenades.

70. Following the briefing in El Fasher, on 3 August 2017, the Panel was taken to a military facility in Taiba, south of Khartoum, to examine some of the captured weapons. The SAF representative in Taiba explained that most of the captured materiel previously displayed in El Fasher had since been moved to other military facilities and was not available for inspection by the Panel. He further stated that the remaining vehicles and equipment seen in photographs provided by NISS was assumed to have returned to Libya or South Sudan with the rebel elements who evaded capture.
71. The Panel conducted a technical inspection of the captured materiel presented by SAF at its Taiba facility and identified the following items of interest:

(a) 5 Streit Cougar armoured cars bearing chassis numbers JTFLU71 J9F4324770 (light small arms damage), JTFLC71 J3F4324702 (light small arms damage), JTFLU71 J0F4324768 (light damage to body), JTFLU71 J3F4324747 (moderate small arms damage) and an unknown chassis number (moderate small arms damage);

(b) 1 M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank rocket launcher, serial number P-00643/90, lot number TB 8704;

(c) 1 anti-tank guided missile launcher, 9P135 series (NATO designation AT4 Spigot), lot number 03-76-MK;

(d) 1,600 rounds of 12.7 x 108mm armour-piercing incendiary tracers, head stamp Arab Republic of Egypt, Factory 27, 1986.

72. The Panel has requested information to assist in the tracing of the above vehicles from the respective manufacturer and is awaiting a reply. Further details on the investigation into the captured vehicles are provided in paragraphs 148 to 150 below. Comparison of the M79 rocket launcher lot number to those listed in the Conflict Armament Research database suggests a possible link to Iraq based upon the recording there of the same weapon with similar lot numbers. The Panel has yet to establish this link, which may indicate a transfer of weapons from this region into Darfur. The Panel has not deemed it appropriate at this time to trace the provenance of the other inspected items owing to their age, prevalence within the region and lack of supporting evidence to directly connect them to the Darfurian rebel incursions.

73. The transfer into Darfur in May by SLA/MM and SLA/TC forces of the above vehicles, weapons and associated materiel constitutes a violation of the arms embargo (Security Council resolutions 1556 (2004), para. 7 and 1591 (2005), para. 7).

3. Offensive military overflights

74. During the Panel’s visit to Darfur in May 2017, Panel members observed Sudanese Air Force assets at El Fasher airport. These included attack and transport helicopters not previously seen by the Panel. The airfield is jointly operated with UNAMID, and SAF aircraft could be clearly observed being serviced and prepared for missions. The following aircraft were seen regularly by the Panel between 16 and 24 May 2017:

(a) Two MiG-29 (tail numbers 602 and 612);

(b) Two Su-25 (tail number not seen);

(c) Two Mil Mi-35 (tail numbers 902, 912 and 965), not previously seen by the Panel in Darfur;

(d) One Mil Mi-17 (tail number 549), not previously seen by the Panel in Darfur;

(e) One Antonov 26 (tail number not seen).

75. These aircraft were seen deploying and returning on several occasions, most notably during the reported clashes with the rebel groups. Government representatives stated that the aircraft were used for reconnaissance only role during those missions. The Panel did not see the above aircraft during its subsequent visits to El Fasher in August, September and October 2017, suggesting that their deployment was in direct response to the threat posed by the rebel incursions.
76. The Panel has previously reported on the use and maintenance of these aircraft and associated munitions in Darfur as a violation of the arms embargo (see S/2011/111, S/2013/79 and S/2015/31). Investigations by the Panel have revealed that the fast jets and helicopters were acquired between 2005 and 2012 with end user certificates from several Member States.

77. The transfer into Darfur by SAF of the above aircraft without the prior approval of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan constitutes a violation of the arms embargo (Security Council resolutions 1556 (2004), para. 7 and 1591 (2005), para. 7).

4. Deployment of the Rapid Support Forces into Darfur for disarmament operations

78. According to Government of the Sudan sources, approximately 10,000 RSF troops were deployed into Darfur in October from locations elsewhere in the Sudan to support the forced collection of arms from both militias and civilians. The additional troops have been sent in to ensure that weapons can be collected regardless of the level of opposition.

79. This deployment includes approximately 1,000 vehicles, plus small arms, heavy weapons, ammunition and associated materiel for the RSF units, which the Panel believes were deployed from military bases around Khartoum during October. In 2014, the Panel reported a similar deployment of RSF troops from Kordofan into Darfur as a violation of the arms embargo (see S/2015/31). The Panel has obtained digital images of the RSF convoy deploying from Khartoum to Darfur from a confidential source (see figures I and II).

Figure I
Column of RSF troops driving SAF tank transporters loaded with armoured personnel carriers, possibly Shareef 1 variants

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32 Meeting with Government of the Sudan officials in El Fasher.
Figure II
RSF troops driving a column of armoured personnel carriers (possibly Shareef 1) into Darfur

80. The Shareef 1 armoured personnel carrier is the Sudanese variant of the BTR 70 and BTR 80. The database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that the Sudan acquired 60 BTR 80A vehicles in 2009 and 2010, and these are believed to have been modified into the Shareef 1 by the Military Industry Corporation. The database also shows that the Sudan acquired one BTR 70 vehicle in 2012 and 28 BTR 70 vehicles in 2015.

81. The transfer into Darfur by SAF of the RSF units with their vehicles, weapons and materiel without the prior approval of the Committee is a violation of the arms embargo (resolutions 1556 (2004), para. 7 and 1591 (2005), para. 7).

B. Armed violence monitoring in Darfur

82. Analysis of armed violence reporting for Darfur during 2017 reveals a significant reduction of civilian casualties from previous years, following the cessation of Operation Decisive Summer, no reported offensive military overflights and increased efforts by the Government of the Sudan to improve internal security in Darfur. Figures III to V depict the trends in armed violence up to 31 October, based on reporting by various media sources.
83. The Panel has conducted detailed research into open-source reporting on armed violence in Darfur throughout 2017 in order to identify trends and analyse the impact on the civilian population. The data have been collated from a variety of publicly available sources such as traditional media, social media and humanitarian and academic reporting. The data have been corroborated, where possible, with additional reporting by United Nations agencies and information gathered in the Panel’s field visits.
84. Trend analysis from open-source reporting provides a general understanding of the conflict dynamics. However, it does not yield actual incident or casualty totals. For reporting purposes, the Panel has divided the reported incidents of violence into the following categories:

(a) Military (15 per cent) — armed violence involving SAF and Darfurian rebel groups;
(b) Militia (39 per cent) — armed violence perpetrated by militia groups;
(c) Intercommunal (20 per cent) — armed violence between communities;
(d) Criminal (20 per cent) — armed violence by individuals or organized crime gangs;
(e) Unexploded ordnance (6 per cent) — incidents involving explosive remnants of war and unintended explosions in munitions sites.

Figure VI
Reported incidents of armed violence in Darfur in 2017

85. According to open-source reports, in 2017 there have been 321 incidents in Darfur involving small arms and light weapons. These incidents resulted in a reported total of 789 people killed and 925 injured, including civilian victims of crime or militia armed violence, as well as casualties from intercommunal armed clashes and military operations (see figure VII).

Figure VII
Breakdown of casualties in Darfur by month in 2017

86. As shown in figure VIII, military operations accounted for almost 28 per cent of all reported casualties (killed and injured). The May incursions (see para. 67 above)
were the major cause of reported casualties attributed to military operations. Intercommunal incidents, while only half as frequent as militia-related incidents (see figure VII), resulted in a significantly higher number of casualties. One incident of intercommunal violence can be prolonged over several days or weeks, with retaliatory armed violence between the two sides, until mediation or resolutions can be achieved. An example includes the reported clashes between the Misseriya and Salamat tribes, which began on 16 May as a result of the theft of livestock and continued until 23 May, resulting in 70 deaths and 28 injuries in the Um Dukhun area of West Darfur.

87. Militia violence often takes the form of intimidation, robbery or rape of internally displaced persons, as well as acts of carjacking or abduction, but the casualties are often in single figures for each incident. Armed criminal incidents are common in towns and displaced person camps and also generally produce small numbers of casualties per incident. The reported number of such incidents varied little from 2013 to 2017.

Figure VIII
Breakdown of casualties by incident type in 2017

88. The number of incidents of armed violence reported in 2017 varies widely among the states. The states with the highest levels of reported armed violence are North and Central Darfur, followed by South, West and East Darfur.

Figure IX
Breakdown of incidents of armed violence in 2017 by state

89. Figure IX highlights the geographic areas where provision of security forces is most needed. In West Darfur, there has been a recent agreement to extend the capacity of the Joint Border Force and increase the number of manned border crossing points...
to improve response to intercommunal violence and reduce levels of trafficking between Chad and the Sudan.

90. A total of 18 unexploded ordnance incidents have been reported so far in 2017, resulting in 20 deaths and 279 injuries, almost a fifth of all reported casualties in Darfur. As more people return to former conflict areas, more incidents are likely to occur. In areas like Jebel Marra, which have been exposed to shelling and aerial bombing over the years, children are particularly at risk of exposure to unexploded ordnance. The UNAMID Ordnance Disposal Office is working closely with the Government of the Sudan to improve risk education and clearance of explosive remnants of war. However, the scale of the task is significant and the number of Ordnance Disposal Office teams available to conduct clearance activities is limited by the availability of funding.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

91. A five-year national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was established in 2014 by Presidential decree. This initiative is aligned to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and was originally supported by several international partners, including the African Union, the United Nations Development Programme, UNAMID and the Bonn International Centre for Conversion. The Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, chaired by the Second Vice-President, provides high-level governance while regional technical committees conduct the programme on the ground.

92. The proliferation of small arms throughout the region has been identified by many agencies as a major factor affecting the security situation in Darfur. Many sources quote 2 million as the estimated number of small arms in Darfur. In 2012, the Sudan engaged with its regional partners and the Bonn International Centre to address the issue of small arms control. This initiative includes Libya, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, and is known as the Small Arms Control Mechanism.

93. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is focused on developing community engagement as well as demobilizing and creating jobs for former fighters. The primary employment opportunities are in the agriculture and mining sectors, with microfinancing available for those wanting to develop their own businesses. In May 2017, the Panel was informed by the West Darfur Wali that his state had been one of the worst affected by armed violence but now had good levels of stability and peace. As an example of community development in the framework of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives, he stated that local authorities were building 199 returnee villages, with 300 schools also planned, and had built 40 police stations and 15 medical centres, but were still in need of capacity-building for local law enforcement. All of these plans and initiatives were, however, wholly dependent upon donor funding and international assistance being provided.

94. The lack of engagement by all parties with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, coupled with lack of funding and ongoing violence, among other issues, has delayed the progress of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The Panel was informed that over 10,000 former Darfurian fighters (from a target of 30,000) had been disarmed and demobilized. In addition, according to Government of the Sudan authorities, over 20,000 weapons have been registered and marked in accordance with International Tracing Instrument standards. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion produced a detailed report in 2015 identifying

33 Many sources quote 2 million as the estimated number of small arms in Darfur.
34 The “non-paper” is entitled So far, so dubious: DDR in Darfur.
potential risks for international donors interested in supporting this programme. From a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration perspective, most of the points raised in the report appear to be remain valid.

95. In 2017, the programme has been extended to include civilian arms control and disarmament of all militias and civilians in Darfur. The aim is to reduce the prevalence of armed violence and strengthen the rule of law. Government authorities have indicated in many meetings with the Panel that they are reinforcing efforts to reduce armed violence through negotiations between tribal groups and the use of security forces to de-escalate tensions between communities and to enforce the rule of law.

96. Incidents of intercommunal armed violence appear to have declined significantly in 2017 (see figure X), which is likely to be a result, in part, of efforts by the Government of the Sudan to contain and mediate tribal disputes.

Figure X
Incidents of intercommunal armed violence, 2013–2017

97. Another major source of armed violence in Darfur is the numerous armed militias who routinely attack civilians, internally displaced persons and security forces. While the rule of law is still absent in many parts of Darfur owing to the remoteness of certain communities, Government authorities have indicated an increase in the deployment of police in and around the main towns, as well as an increase in the numbers of military units deployed in rural areas to support internal security operations. Open-source reporting also suggests a reduction of militia armed violence in 2017. However, this does necessarily reflect the reality on the ground.
Voluntary disarmament was the first phase of the arms collection programme, which began in July 2017, and has not been widely accepted in Darfur. There have been varying results recorded in all states. Some tribal leaders have viewed the disarmament as an attempt by the Government to weaken them. Others have viewed it as an opportunity to demand compensation for their weapons, and some, such as Musa Hilal, have simply refused to comply. There have been several reports of armed clashes between Government forces and armed groups as a result of attempts to disarm communities. The use of RSF to enforce disarmament is likely to result in an increase in armed clashes between the Government and Darfur communities.

Presidential decree No. 419, issued on 6 August 2017, stated that all unlicensed weapons were to be handed in to the authorities. Second Vice-President Hassabo visited Darfur in August 2017 to meet with local authorities and tribal leaders to explain the programme’s aims and encourage participation.
100. UNAMID sources indicate that results for voluntary arms collection include:

(a) East Darfur: 1,326 weapons have been handed in, but fears of attack by neighbouring tribes have resulted in many caching their weapons. Also, there have been reports of heavy weapons being smuggled into North Darfur to avoid disarmament operations;

(b) South Darfur: 2,579 weapons have been handed in by the Border Guards and the Popular Defence Forces (PDF);

(c) West Darfur: 1,486 weapons have been handed in by PDF;

(d) North Darfur: Some nomadic tribes and militias have handed in weapons, but most refuse to disarm;

(e) Central Darfur: Leaders of internally displaced persons have welcomed the disarmament programme and reported that it has stopped night movements of armed militias through their camps.

101. Efforts to encourage disarmament include restrictions on “technical” vehicles and motorcycles within towns, on the wearing of face masks and on the open carry of weapons by off-duty service personnel in public. Signs are displayed throughout Darfur to inform the population of the new regulations, and the media routinely provide messages to reinforce changes in legislation. Special courts have also been established in Darfur to process all cases of illegal weapons and vehicle possession. Military personnel are required to hand in their weapons when not on duty and are no longer permitted to retain them for personal use.

Figure XIII

Road sign in El Fasher announcing a ban on certain vehicles and light weapons

102. Since July, the disarmament campaign has been in its second phase, which involves the collection of arms by force if necessary and the arrest of those found to be holding illegal weapons. The Panel will continue to monitor this situation, as it has the potential to develop into armed violence between the Government of the Sudan and those unwilling to disarm, especially the larger, well-equipped militias such as that of Musa Hilal in North Darfur. Recent reporting on forced disarmament includes an account of a significant armed clash between RSF and a Ma’alia tribal group resulting in 21 deaths in Kilkil, East Darfur.
VIII. Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights

103. During the current mandate, the Panel has continued to monitor violations against international humanitarian law and human rights by the parties to the conflict in Darfur.

A. Clashes between Government and rebel forces in May 2017

104. The Panel has been investigating violations of international humanitarian law by Government forces during the May clashes, in particular in and around Ain Siro, in North Darfur, as elaborated in annex XIII.

105. During those clashes, Government forces reportedly captured over 150 rebel fighters. In one incident on 21 May, SAF apprehended 15 SLA/MM soldiers after they had surrendered their weapons and sought refuge at the UNAMID team site in Muhajiriyah, East Darfur. Sudanese forces forcefully removed these rebels from the team site, despite the intervention of UNAMID personnel. The whereabouts of these 15 individuals is not known. Additionally, according to various sources, some rebel fighters, including “Tarrada” and SLA/MM commander Juma Mindi, were executed by Government forces after laying down their weapons.

106. Following the May clashes, some sources expressed their concern to the Panel that Sudanese authorities were not complying with their obligation under international law to treat the prisoners humanely, and were subjecting them to cruel treatment and torture. In meetings with the Panel, representatives of SLA/MM and SLA/TC indicated that the whereabouts of those captured was not known, and appealed to international agencies to intervene with Government authorities to locate them and ensure their humane treatment in detention (see annex XIV). While Government authorities initially invited the Panel to meet with some of the prisoners, the meeting was not organized in the end.

B. Humanitarian access

107. During the reporting period, humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in Darfur improved significantly. The humanitarian guidelines adopted by the Humanitarian Aid Commission of the Sudan in December 2016 are being implemented, and in most areas, humanitarian personnel are required to notify the authorities 48 hours prior to deploying to the field. Humanitarian agencies and Government authorities have been working to ensure consistent implementation of these directives in all Darfur states at both the central and local levels.

108. While access to the Jebel Marra region is not as difficult as in previous years, humanitarian agencies have not yet secured unfettered access to the region. The agencies’ activities in the region continue to be conducted under tight government oversight. During the reporting period, access has been gained to previously inaccessible areas in Jebel Marra, such as Golo, Rokero and, most recently, Deribat. As a result, humanitarian agencies have been able to scale up their response to communities in need in the region. In meetings with the Panel, Government authorities explained that restrictions on access to Jebel Marra are due to the presence of and sporadic clashes with SLA/AW. Areas under the control of SLA/AW remain largely inaccessible.

109. During the May clashes, the Government denied the requests of humanitarian agencies to access the Ain Siro area of North Darfur to assess the situation on the
ground and confirm reports of displacement. Access was finally granted some months later.

C. Situation of internally displaced persons

110. Despite the cessation of hostilities, the situation of internally displaced persons remains a significant impediment to restoring peace and stability in Darfur. According to United Nations estimates from October 2017, there are 2.1 million internally displaced persons in Darfur, 1.6 million of whom are in 60 camps. During 2017, there was significantly less displacement in Darfur than in previous years. Most of the displacement was the result of intercommunal violence.

111. As detailed in annex XV, the presence of armed men and armed militiamen in and around internally displaced persons camps continues to pose a major security threat to civilians. Incidents of physical assault, harassment, rape, robbery and intimidation have been routinely reported, for example, during the current year’s farming season. Internally displaced persons are also subjected to excessive demands for compensation in intercommunal disputes, kidnapping-for-ransom and illegal taxes by armed elements. In particular, clashes between armed Arab groups and remnants of SLA/AW and splinter groups in different localities negatively affect the lives of the internally displaced, as illustrated by the case of Sortony in annex XVI. The poor security situation negatively affects the right to freedom of movement of internally displaced persons.\(^{35}\)

112. The Government’s announcement of plans to enter internally displaced persons camps to search for weapons, as part of the 2017 arms collection campaign, gave rise to tensions. In September, clashes erupted between Government forces and internally displaced persons at Kalma camp, South Darfur, during a protest against a visit of President Al-Bashir to the area, as described in annex XVII.

113. Government authorities have developed a three-pronged strategy on displacement, focused on the voluntary return of the displaced to their areas of origin, their integration in their current host communities or their relocation to other areas.\(^{36}\) The Government, together with United Nations agencies and the country team, are working on a plan for durable solutions for communities of the internally displaced in Darfur. The plan involves a profiling exercise, to be conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which will include an intention survey and a needs assessment focused on identifying tailored solutions. The profiling exercise is to be launched in the coming months as a pilot project in Abou Shok, a long-standing community of internally displaced persons in El Fasher. The survey tools developed for this exercise will later be used in other communities.

114. In order to adequately address displacement in Darfur, Government authorities must comprehensively tackle the root causes of the conflict. Progress on this front remains very limited. Issues of land rights, use of natural resources (in particular land and water), illegal occupation of land by some communities, marginalization of certain ethnic groups, insecurity and lack of rule of law remain core unresolved issues.


\(^{36}\) Meeting with the Humanitarian Aid Commissioner in Khartoum.
D. Sudanese refugees in Chad

115. In recent years, Sudanese refugees based in camps in eastern Chad have slowly begun returning to different localities in Darfur. Details of these refugee returns are provided in annex XVIII.

E. Situation of Darfurian university students

116. During the reporting period, the Panel received reports of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests of university students from Darfur by Government authorities. Benefitting from tuition exemptions and admission quotas, many Darfurian students, including the children of internally displaced persons, have chosen to pursue higher education in universities across the country. These students frequently face different forms of discrimination and violence. Many are suspected of being affiliated with the Darfurian rebel movements and put under surveillance. Those who engage in political activism and speak publicly about the conflict in Darfur are often repressed by NISS and the police. Others are subjected to arrests and prolonged detention, as well as mistreatment and torture in detention, in particular in NISS custody. Some of the reported incidents of abuse of Darfurian students are summarized in annex XIX.

117. Owing to the frequent targeting by security forces and the perceived lack of opportunities in the Sudan, many Darfurian university students have chosen to leave the country. Those who attempt the journey to Europe at times perish in Libya or while crossing the Mediterranean.38

F. Sexual and gender-based violence

118. Sexual and gender-based violence remains a constant threat for civilians in Darfur, in particular women and girls.39 The proliferation of weapons, criminality and sporadic intercommunal clashes make civilians more vulnerable to such violence.

119. While crimes of sexual violence occur both in urban and rural settings, women and girls in displaced persons camps and in rural communities are systemically preyed upon by armed men, especially when they are on the move and engaged in livelihood activities. As in previous years, there was a peak in sexual violence cases during the 2017 farming season, in particular in areas with a high presence of armed militia and other armed actors, such as North and Central Darfur.40 While in certain instances these acts are opportunistic, in others they are aimed at instilling fear in the victims and their communities.41 In rural communities, women and girls are often in charge of farming and essential sustenance activities, and one of the means used by armed actors to deter them from cultivating their lands is the threat of rape. These incidents also affect the freedom of movement and livelihoods of women.

120. Sexual violence also affects the possibility of return of civilians to their places of origin. For example, in For Baranga, West Darfur, a Darfurian family — which had formerly been living in Chad as refugees — returned to Chad after a family member

37 See Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, art. 14; and 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, art. 14.
38 Interviews with aid workers, migrants and migration researchers. See also sect. IX below.
39 Although less frequently reported, sexual violence against men and boys is also perpetrated by different actors in Darfur.
40 For example, in the areas of Tawila and Korma, in North Darfur, and in and around Nertiti, in Central Darfur.
41 Interviews with various aid workers, human rights activists and UNAMID staff.
was gang-raped, fearing further attacks by the perpetrators. These cases highlight the need for enhanced security and basic services in areas of origin to facilitate the return of those displaced by the conflict.

Improving accountability and access to justice for survivors of sexual violence must be an integral part of peacebuilding efforts in Darfur. Judicial authorities are making some efforts to deal with the issue. For example, in late October, four Arab men accused of raping two female schoolteachers from Adar village, 20 km from El Geneina, were sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment by the local General Court. The victims had been abducted from their guesthouse in February and held at the men's settlement, where they were beaten and raped. Local justice authorities have stressed their commitment to ensuring greater accountability for such crimes, highlighting the deployment of additional prosecutors and police, including to rural areas. They have also expressed concern over the increase in reported cases of child rape. It should be noted, however, that, the bulk of sexual violence cases handled by justice authorities are not conflict-related.

Despite these efforts, significant challenges remain in combating impunity for sexual violence. First, sexual violence remains a sensitive subject for local authorities, who frequently downplay its prevalence and deny its occurrence. In addition, underreporting — owing, among other reasons, to fear of reprisals, harassment and social stigma — remains a key concern. When incidents are reported, lack of follow-up and inadequate response by police and judicial authorities represent significant challenges, in particular when the perpetrators are alleged to be armed actors or of Arab ethnicity. Protection for victims and witnesses who come forward is also lacking; at times, victims face pressure not to file complaints or are intimidated to drop charges. Finally, the victims' limited access to essential medical and psychosocial services, the lack of trained personnel and the weak referral pathways are additional impediments to curbing sexual violence. Aid and health workers can at times face restrictions imposed by the authorities on the provision of services to survivors and on prevention and monitoring activities, which in turn limits the accurate collection of data on cases.

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42 Information provided by UNAMID.
43 According to the Doha Document, the provision of security is one of the pre-conditions for voluntary returns to places of origin.
44 The crimes of rape and child rape are specific crimes within the mandate of the office of the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes, although other prosecution offices also have jurisdiction over these crimes. In 2015, article 149 of the Sudanese Criminal Act was amended to define rape more consistently with international standards. Statutory rape of children under the age of 18 is defined in article 45 of the Child Act of 2010, and is punishable with a sentence ranging from 20 years' imprisonment to death.
45 The accused were also sentenced to 200 lashes and a fine.
46 Meetings with the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes in El Fasher.
47 When the Panel raised this issue with the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes, he explained that it was due to the limited number of conflict-related sexual violence cases reported to his office.
48 Information based on interviews conducted with aid workers, human rights activists and UNAMID staff.
49 Many victims choose not to file complaints because they have no confidence in local authorities to investigate cases or arrest perpetrators. Depending on the ethnicity of the perpetrators, health centres — which may be the first point of call for the victims — may not record cases of sexual violence or refer them to the police, for fear of reprisals. Perpetrators can at times also put pressure on health services not to report cases.
50 In addition, victims can face procedural obstacles to obtaining health services. Up until 2005, victims of sexual violence were not allowed to receive medical care until they reported their case to the police and obtained a medical evidence form known as “Form 8”, which was used by the health provider to record physical injuries and could be used as evidence in legal proceedings. Although victims are no longer required to obtain “Form 8” before seeking medical treatment, in practice many health providers still require it.
G. Violations and serious abuses against children

123. The Panel continues to focus on monitoring violations and serious abuses against children.

124. The Panel is encouraged by the progress made by Government authorities, in particular SAF and the police, in implementing the action plan for the protection of children from violations in conflict, adopted in March 2016. Its implementation has included issuing command orders to troops, adopting disciplinary measures for breaches of those orders and putting in place basic protocols for screening children and conducting age assessment verifications. SAF has also provided regular access to the United Nations for monitoring and verification of its barracks and has been vigilant to ensure that minors are screened out when former rebel fighters are integrated into the army. Despite the progress noted, measures are required to ensure the implementation of the action plan by NISS and RSF so that these forces do not use or recruit children.\(^{51}\)

125. Additionally, the Panel notes the Government of the Sudan has been conducting public awareness campaigns to address the issue of children with guns in Darfur. Specifics measures are, however, needed to ensure that militias and armed tribal groups do not recruit children.

126. During the current mandate, the Panel received reports of recruitment and use of children by rebel groups, as detailed in annex XX.

127. Finally, as noted above, Government judicial authorities have highlighted the increase in reports of cases of sexual violence against children. Pursuant to the 2010 Sudan Child Law Act, which protects children against all forms of sexual violence, a number of perpetrators have been prosecuted and sentenced to maximum sentences in the last year.\(^{52}\)

H. Attacks against United Nations and humanitarian personnel

128. There have been a limited number of incidents of attacks against United Nations and humanitarian personnel during the reporting period. A number of carjacking incidents involving vehicles belonging to United Nations entities and international non-governmental organizations have been recorded since March, in particular in Nyala, South Darfur. In one incident in Nyala town on 31 May, five unidentified armed men carjacked a UNAMID vehicle, shooting and killing a Nigerian battalion soldier while another soldier escaped.

129. On 7 October, four armed men driving a Toyota Land Cruiser abducted a Swiss aid worker outside her home in El Fasher, North Darfur. She was released on 14 November. This is the first incident involving a relief worker since UNAMID began downsizing its forces.

IX. Migrant smuggling from and through Darfur

130. During the current mandate, the Panel has been investigating migrant smuggling through and out of Darfur into neighbouring countries, in particular through Libya and Chad and onwards to Europe. The Panel has focused on this issue owing to its cross-cutting character relating to different areas of its mandate, namely the

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\(^{51}\) NISS and RSF are currently not part of the technical committee put in place to implement the action plan.

\(^{52}\) Meeting with the Special Prosecutor for Darfur Crimes in El Fasher.
humanitarian and human rights situation in Darfur, illicit cross-border activities, the financing of different Darfurian armed actors and, more broadly, regional stability. The present section contains the Panel’s preliminary findings on this issue.

131. Migration from Darfur is not a new phenomenon and has multiple drivers. These include insecurity, violence and attacks against civilians, poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities, among others. Additionally, the Sudan serves as a country of transit and destination for migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa, Central Africa and West Africa.

132. Although the numbers have varied over time, between January and October 2017, Sudanese were among the top four nationalities of migrants in Libya\(^{53}\) and among the top 10 nationalities reaching Italy through the Central Mediterranean route,\(^{54}\) one of the main corridors used by migrants and refugees to reach Europe. While Darfurians have long considered Libya an important destination for migration and livelihood opportunities, there has been an increase in the number of those transiting through Libya to reach Europe in recent years.\(^{55}\) These include individuals travelling from Sudan as well as Darfurians living in Chad as refugees since the outbreak of the Darfur conflict. In addition, many Darfurians who had been living in Libya prior to outbreak of the conflict in that country have sought to escape the escalating violence.

133. A trend observed since at least 2015 is the arrival in Europe of greater numbers of Darfurian migrants and refugees who recently left the Sudan.\(^ {56}\) This trend would tend to suggest greater availability and better organization of the smuggling networks operating in the Sudan, Libya and Chad, which facilitate this journey. It also suggests that more Darfurians are opting to travel to Europe than to remain in Libya, because of the ongoing conflict. Several international agencies have also registered an increase in the number of unaccompanied children reaching Europe, including from Darfur.\(^ {57}\)


\(^{55}\) Although it is difficult to estimate the number of Darfurians using the Central Mediterranean route, they represent an important percentage of the Sudanese arriving in Europe and requesting asylum. Sudanese using this route also originate from other conflict-affected areas of the Sudan, namely Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, as well as from other parts of the Sudan. (Information obtained in interviews conducted in France, Italy and the Sudan with migration authorities, humanitarian agencies, international agencies and researchers on migration trends).

\(^{56}\) Interviews with migrants, migration authorities, humanitarian agencies and researchers on migration trends in various countries.

A. Routes

134. While the most commonly used and shortest route for migrant smuggling to the Libyan border is the Khartoum route (via Dongola and Northern State),\textsuperscript{58} the Darfur route (via El Fasher, in North Darfur) has gained importance as an alternative route, in particular in 2017.\textsuperscript{59} Darfurian networks, mostly based in El Fasher,\textsuperscript{60} are moving migrants and refugees along this route. This route is primarily used by Sudanese, and increasingly also by nationals from other countries.\textsuperscript{61} It should be noted, however, that there are no clear data on the exact numbers of migrants travelling on this route.

135. The Darfur route has two main bifurcations.\textsuperscript{62} One runs from El Fasher to the areas of Mellit and Malha, in North Darfur, and then further across the desert to the border. An alternative route runs from El Fasher towards the Tine border area, in north-western Darfur, across the border into Chad, and then up north along the border between eastern Chad and North Darfur. Various sources indicated that smugglers change the route depending on the presence of security forces along border areas. The same routes used for migrant smuggling in Darfur have also traditionally been used by different trading communities and armed groups to smuggle other commodities across border areas, including weapons, drugs and fuel.

136. The modalities of travel differ depending on the economic means and place of departure of the migrants. For example, Darfurian migrants who made this journey in 2017 described taking public transport or travelling by car from Khartoum to El Fasher, where they were met by a fixer who arranged their transport in a 4x4 vehicle north to the Libyan border. Others travelling from within Darfur recounted that they had headed to El Fasher and then to Malha district by bus or on a truck, where they met other migrants and continued their journey. Some recounted crossing the border with Libyan vehicle smugglers from Kufra, who had come to Malha to sell their vehicles (see para. 152 below).

137. Once across the border, migrants are usually handed over to various networks that facilitate their journey onwards. Others seek to find a smuggler to continue their journey once in Libya. There is no permanent military presence along the Libya/Sudan border. The conflict and chaos in Libya have allowed smuggling networks to operate with impunity.

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\textsuperscript{59} This is not a new route, but is increasingly being used as an alternative owing to the presence of security forces along the Khartoum route.

\textsuperscript{60} Also based in Nyala, according to some sources.

\textsuperscript{61} For example, several sources noted that this route is used by Somalis, Eritreans and Ethiopians and, to a lesser extent, by Syrians.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview with migrants conducted in Europe and the Sudan.
B. Involvement of Darfurian armed actors

138. In addition to organized criminal gangs, different Darfurian armed actors are facilitating migrant smuggling through and from Darfur as a means of financing. These include former Darfurian rebels who have demobilized and are said to be transporting migrants from various localities of Darfur to the border areas. For example, confidential sources informed the Panel that former members of SLA/AW, currently based in El Fasher, have been participating in this activity. Other sources indicated that elements of SLA/MM have been actively involved in this trade, in particular along the North Darfur-Chad border. Khater Shatta, a former SLA/MM commander based in North Darfur, is said to have been one of those involved in arranging transport for migrants from North Darfur into Chad and onwards. Reports further indicate that armed groups and militias are levying unofficial taxes to allow the passage of migrant convoys through their areas in North Darfur. A SLA/AW commander based in Jebel Isa, North Darfur, is alleged to be among those benefitting from this illegal taxation. Finally, various sources indicated that Arab militia groups, in particular those based in the Wadi Howar and Saraf Umra areas, are facilitating the transport of migrants across North Darfur to border areas. The Panel is investigating the links between these smuggling networks and those operating in Libya.

139. According to various sources, in recent years there has been an increase in the recruitment of Darfurians by rebel groups operating in Libya. Typically, fixers working for these rebel groups lure Darfurians to Libya to work as mercenaries with offers of financial compensation, and with promises of later assisting them in their

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63 As noted in annex III, Khater Shatta was killed by Government of the Sudan forces in June.
passage across the Mediterranean, if they wish to continue their journey.\textsuperscript{64} According to various sources, many young Darfurians consider working as a mercenary in Libya to be less risky than attempting the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean, and more profitable than working as an illegal migrant in Europe.\textsuperscript{65} The Panel has received credible reports of such recruitment taking place in different communities in South and North Darfur. It has also received reliable information about recruitment by the rebel groups in other regions of the Sudan. For example, a confidential source noted an increase in recruitment in Darfurian farming communities in Gezira State, a region south-east of Khartoum, between February and May 2016, and again between February and May 2017.\textsuperscript{66} According to Government authorities, Darfurian rebel groups are also recruiting in the refugee communities in eastern Chad.\textsuperscript{67}

140. Government sources allege that Musa Hilal and his militiamen are actively involved in migrant smuggling in Darfur. As noted in paragraph 30 above, in a contested incident in late September, RSF killed 17 of Hilal’s men who were returning from Libya and whom the Government said were “human traffickers”. While the Panel has no direct evidence of Hilal’s involvement in this activity, it has received credible reports that members of the Border Guards, acting individually or in small groups, have been organizing the transportation of migrants, including foreign nationals, to border areas as a means of financing.

141. Anecdotal evidence from migrants further suggests that, at times, Sudanese security forces in border areas in Darfur turn a blind eye to the passage of migrants, in exchange for payment. The Panel has no evidence to suggest that this is a concerted effort, and believes that low-ranking individuals exploit migrants for their own personal gain.

C. Costs and duration

142. The cost and duration of the journey from Darfur to the Libyan coast vary greatly and depend on several factors. These include the network involved, the nationality and economic means of the migrants, their final destination and the security situation on the ground, among other factors. Sudanese are said to pay less than foreign nationals. Darfurian migrants who made the journey from El Fasher to the Libyan coast in 2016 and in 2017 indicated that the journey is normally paid for in tranches, with the first payment made at departure (for example, in El Fasher or Nyala), a second payment made at the point of entry into Libya (frequently Kufra district) and a last payment made to smugglers operating on the Libyan coast.\textsuperscript{68} The amounts paid vary widely. Some indicated that they paid small amounts to reach Libya and then worked to pay for continuation of the journey, while others said they paid thousands of dollars for the journey. For example, some Darfurian migrants recounted paying 4,000 Sudanese pounds (about $600 dollars) to travel from El Fasher to Kufra; others recounted paying $2,500 to $3,500 dollars to reach the Libyan coast from Darfur, and approximately $1,000 dollars to cross the Mediterranean. Several Darfurian migrants who opted to travel through Chad recounted spending a few months working in artisanal mining in the Tibesti region, in northern Chad, to make money to pay for the next leg of the journey.\textsuperscript{69} Various

\textsuperscript{64} Interview with confidential sources.

\textsuperscript{65} Interviews with migrants, humanitarian workers, civil society and international agencies.

\textsuperscript{66} These periods coincide with the end of the harvest season in the region, when potential migrants would have the necessary financial means to make the journey. Interview with a confidential source.

\textsuperscript{67} Meeting with Government authorities in Khartoum.

\textsuperscript{68} While the more established smuggling networks use the traditional \textit{hawala} system for money transfers, some Darfurian networks operate with cash payments.

\textsuperscript{69} Interviews with migrants in Europe.
sources indicated that the cost of the journey to the Libyan coast has increased over the past year.

D. Abuses against migrants

143. Since 2016, RSF and other security forces have been deployed at different periods in the triangle border area between the Sudan, Libya and Egypt to curb illegal migration flows, among other reasons. These forces have intercepted a number of convoys of migrants along the border.\(^70\) This increased security presence has heightened the risk for migrants, as it has forced smugglers to take longer and more dangerous routes across the desert to avoid security patrols. Security forces have been finding migrants stranded in the desert, in poor condition, in the triangle border area.\(^71\) Moreover, several sources have raised concerns with the Panel about the involvement of security forces like RSF in curbing migrant smuggling, given their lack of training in handling migrants. The Panel has received allegations that these forces on occasion mistreat migrants captured along the routes, in particular foreign nationals. Additionally, as noted in paragraph 141 above, security forces at times illegally illicit money from migrants. The Panel has further been informed that foreign migrants who are caught without papers are often arrested and fined by local authorities for immigration violations, and can face deportation back to their countries of origin, which can expose them to abuses.\(^72\) Migrants are also vulnerable to exploitation by the smuggling networks. These issues highlight the need for Sudanese authorities to improve the protection provided to migrants.

144. In meetings with the Panel, Government authorities have indicated their commitment to fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the Sudan, while at the same time acknowledging the challenges they face.\(^73\) In particular, they have noted that the vast and porous nature of the Sudan-Libya border, the lack of trained personnel and the desert terrain make it difficult to patrol border areas. Among other initiatives, training is being provided to justice and law enforcement authorities, with international funding, to strengthen local capacities in tackling criminal networks; these efforts are mainly focused in Khartoum and in eastern Sudan. Cooperation is also being strengthened between the Sudan and other countries of the region. On 8 November, the Government launched its first national plan aimed at combatting human trafficking.\(^74\) While these efforts are important, understanding and addressing the root causes of migration is key to improving migration management and to adequately protecting migrants from violence and abuse.

145. Finally, while it exceeds the scope of the present report to document abuses against Darfurian migrants in Libya, the Panels notes that those interviewed consistently recounted being subjected to various forms of abuse and violence by armed elements at different localities in Libya.\(^75\) The increased border monitoring,

\(^70\) In meetings with the Panel, North Darfur authorities indicated that they had intercepted several convoys of migrants along this route, mainly from Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia.

\(^71\) Meeting with North Darfur authorities.

\(^72\) This is particularly the case for Eritreans deported back to Eritrea by Sudanese authorities.

\(^73\) Meetings with representative of the National Committee for Combatting Human Trafficking in Khartoum and with North Darfur authorities in El Fasher.

\(^74\) The National Committee for Combatting Human Trafficking initiated this plan with technical support from IOM.

\(^75\) The lines between migrant smuggling and human trafficking are often blurred once migrants reach Libya. The Panel has received multiple accounts of Darfurian migrants being subjected to killings; illegal detention, at times in inhumane conditions and for prolonged periods of time; kidnapping for ransom; different forms of physical abuse and torture; forced labour and exploitation without financial compensation, at times for many months; and sexual violence and sexual exploitation.
coupled with public reports of abuse of migrants in Libya, have deterred many migrants from attempting to cross into Libya from the Sudan.\textsuperscript{76}

E. \textbf{West Africans transiting through Darfur}

146. According to various sources, in recent months there has been an increase of West Africans transiting through West and North Darfur, as well as Chad, to reach Libya. While the migration of West Africans through Darfur is not new, the reported increase coincides with the crackdown by Nigerien authorities on the main migrant smuggling route through Niger into Libya,\textsuperscript{77} and may constitute a new stream of that route. An issue of concern among experts is the dissipation of the main West Africa-Libya route into many smaller and much riskier streams, for example through Chad and Darfur, increasing the human cost and exposure of West African migrants to criminal networks.\textsuperscript{78} The Panel is investigating which networks are conducting smuggling operations in Darfur.

X. \textbf{Transport and customs}

147. During the reporting period, the Panel focused on three major areas relating to transport and customs: (a) arms movements into Darfur through various means, including military flights by the Government of the Sudan, civilian flights on behalf of the Government and border crossings by land from Libya and South Sudan; (b) the cross-border activities of Darfurian armed groups and other criminal groups and armed militias; and (c) cross-cutting activities, including movement of illegal migrants through Darfur. At the time of writing, some information requests sent are pending.

A. \textbf{Tracing of vehicles used by Darfurian rebel groups}

148. The Panel has traced five Streit Cougar armoured cars presented by SAF at its Taiba facility on 3 August (see para. 71 above) and established that these military vehicles were stocked and sold from Dubai. Four of these military vehicles have since been confirmed to have been on the stock list of a company called Global LAV. In response to the Panel’s request for information, Global Lav confirmed that it had had the four military vehicles on its list for sale, adding that it had obtained them from the Dubai subsidiary of a Canadian company called Streit. The Panel has tried to obtain further information about these vehicles directly from Streit. At the time of writing, Streit has not replied to the Panel’s request for information.

149. The Panel received details from NISS of another five Toyota 4x4 vehicles allegedly used by Darfurian rebel groups during the May incursions. The Panel has investigated the supply chain of these vehicles on the basis of the vehicle identification numbers and has found the following:

\textsuperscript{76} At different periods during the past year, migrants have attempted to make their journey to Europe through Egypt, at times falling into the hands of criminal networks operating along the Sudan-Egypt border. Sudanese migrants and nationals of other African countries, in particular Eritrea, are said to be using this route.

\textsuperscript{77} For more information, see Fransje Molenaar and others, “A line in the sand: roadmap for sustainable migration management in Agadez” (Clingendael Institute, October 2017). Available from www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Roadmap_for_sustainable_migration_management_Agadez.pdf.

\textsuperscript{78} Interviews with migration researchers and experts in various countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle identification number</th>
<th>Final destination</th>
<th>Recipient name</th>
<th>Delivery date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTFLU71J6A4301584</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Sumitomo Corporation</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTGRB71J2E7018650</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Automotive and Machinery Trading Center</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTGRB71JXF7019532</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Saud Bahwan Automotive LL</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFLU71J3F7018985</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFLJ71J098019793</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150. The Panel has contacted the above-mentioned companies to obtain further information about the sale of these vehicles. That information is necessary to establish how the vehicles were provided to the Darfuri rebel groups. At the time of writing, the requests are pending.

B. Smuggling and other illicit cross-border activities

151. During the reporting period, the Panel analysed reports from various sources on illicit cross-border activities. In the North Darfur-Chad-Libya triangle, there is unrestricted movement of persons and goods. Officials of the Government of the Sudan and other interlocutors have expressed a general consensus that this vast border is not fully controlled by the respective national authorities. Smuggling of goods and movement of the various criminal groups is contributing to the overall rise in criminality in Darfur, thereby becoming a threat to peace and stability in Darfur and the broader region. As illustrated by the incident described in annex XXI, the interconnections among the armed groups operating in the Darfur-Chad-Libya triangle facilitate these illicit activities.

152. The porous nature of the borders between Darfur and neighbouring States contributes to illicit cross-border movements, including of Darfuri rebel groups, other armed actors and criminal groups. The Panel received credible reports that, in 2016, thousands of vehicles were smuggled into Darfur from Libya. The influx of unlicensed vehicles coincided with increased criminal activities, especially in North Darfur State. A market for smuggled vehicles and other goods emerged in Darfur, including in Malha, according to confirmed reports.

153. In April 2016, the Government of the Sudan established a committee within the Ministry of Finance to regulate the import of such vehicles by requiring payment of certain fees in lieu of customs duties and providing registration documents and license plates after payment. In June 2016, a joint campaign by NISS and the traffic police in North Darfur led to the seizure of dozens of illegally smuggled vehicles. 79 Accordingly, the Panel requested the Government to share the salient details of the report submitted by the committee. In a letter dated 7 August 2017, the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations alleged that the Darfuri rebel groups in Libya “took advantage of the situation to smuggle a lot of four-wheeled vehicles to Darfur using Sabha city as an advanced centre for financing, through buying and looting vehicles inside Libya”.

154. In his tour of Darfur in April 2017, President Al-Bashir directed the authorities of all Darfur states to register the smuggled vehicles, reportedly to prevent serious crime using such vehicles. This is one of the various measures and initiatives being

implemented to address the border control issues. In July 2017, Libyan authorities closed the Sudanese consulate in Kufra, escalating the tensions between the two countries and leading to a declaration of closure of the Sudan-Libya border.

155. More recently, in October, the Government of the Sudan informed the Panel that it had deployed security forces, mainly RSF, to the Sudan-Libya border to strengthen security. The capacity and capability of Government security forces to control the border is yet to be determined owing to the complex nature and scope of the task.

156. To ensure the effective implementation of the sanctions regime, it is necessary to strengthen the border control capacity of Member States, especially the Sudan and neighbouring States. In previous reports, the Panel has recommended the strengthening of border control through technical assistance and capacity-building. For example, in 2007, the Panel recommended that States bordering Darfur, and other States of the region, be supported through capacity-building in border control measures (S/2007/584, para. 139). Similarly, in 2016, the Panel recommended that the Committee encourage the Government of the Sudan to cooperate with the World Customs Organization and other interested delivery agencies in developing a border management capacity-building programme to strengthen the capacity of the relevant Sudanese border management agencies (S/2016/805, para. 208 (f)).

XI. Financing of Darfurian armed groups

157. As mandated by the Security Council in paragraphs 20 and 22 of its resolution 2340 (2017), the Panel has examined various sources of financing of Darfurian armed groups.

A. Rebel groups in Libya

158. The presence and involvement of Darfurian rebel groups in Libya is discussed in detail in paragraphs 43 to 47 above.

1. Mercenary activities

159. Darfurian rebel groups are acting as mercenaries in Libya for monetary benefits. Owing to the heavy casualties sustained in the conflict since 2011, Libyans have become increasingly wary of fighting, and the role of mercenaries has gained significance. It is also financially more beneficial for Libyan factions to engage foreign mercenaries. If Libyans get killed during conflict, their tribe demands blood money, which is to be paid by the Libyan faction responsible for the death. The concept of blood money is, however, not applicable to foreign mercenaries.

160. Libyan factions use Libyan intermediaries to pay Darfurian field commanders for mercenary activities (see S/2017/466, para. 84). The field commanders then pay their fighters on the ground, after keeping their share. Darfurian mercenaries are used mainly to protect oil installations or secure areas against attacks from rival forces, and to fight in takeovers of new areas or installations. The remuneration is reportedly higher in the second scenario. The Panel has gathered that the remuneration of Darfurian fighters ranges from 250 to 500 United States dollars per month. Darfurian fighters also have the option of receiving weapons and vehicles, in lieu of

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80 Meeting with NISS authorities in El Fasher.
81 Some Darfurian sources have reported payments as high as $1,500 dollars for working as mercenaries in Libya.
cash payment. Darfurian rebel groups have been demanding higher remuneration for some time, owing to the depreciation of the Libyan dinar.

2. **Criminal activities**

161. The Darfurian rebel groups have reportedly carried out kidnapping for ransom, extorted money from civilians and commercial truck drivers and set up checkpoints on the road between Ajdabiya and Kufra, the road that supplies Kufra with food, fuel and other commodities. Further, Darfurian rebel groups have ambushed vehicles carrying commercial goods on the roads connecting Kufra with Jalū, Tazirbu, and Rabyanah. In 2015, they operated illegal checkpoints on the road connecting Kufra and Jalū, which were later removed. Darfurian rebel groups also engage in looting of areas attacked by the Libyan warring faction to which they are aligned. For example, when participating in September 2016 in operation “Swift Lightning”, which resulted in the capture of the oil crescent (Brega, Sidra and Ras Lanuf), the Darfurian rebel groups are said to be have looted civilian goods in the Ajdabiya area.

3. **Smuggling of vehicles from Libya to Darfur**

162. As mentioned in paragraphs 152 and 153 above, Darfurian rebel groups smuggled thousands of 4x4 vehicles from Libya to Darfur. This activity resulted in substantial profits, given that the Libyan dinar has depreciated since 2014 and the groups avoided paying taxes and customs tariffs by exploiting the security situation in Libya and the porous Darfur-Libya border. Some of the vehicles were reportedly looted in Libya.

4. **Smuggling of fuel to Darfur**

163. An additional revenue stream of Darfurian rebel groups emanates from the smuggling of fuel in tankers from Libyan port installations in Misrata and Zlitan into Darfur. According to confidential sources, these tankers are driven from northern Libya to Sabha and onwards across the border to Darfur.

5. **Smuggling of weapons**

164. Darfurian rebel groups are making financial gains by smuggling small arms from the Sudan to Libya. These groups are also smuggling heavy weapons such as anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns into Darfur from Libya.

B. **Rebel groups in South Sudan**

165. The presence and involvement of Darfurian rebel groups in South Sudan are discussed in paragraphs 36 to 38 above.

1. **Robbery of Ivory Bank, Raja**

166. The Ivory Bank branch in Raja, South Sudan reportedly lost 30 million South Sudanese pounds in a robbery on 15 June 2016. 82 According to several local sources in Raja, Darfurian rebel groups committed the robbery after repelling an attack by a Fertit militia in the town. The Panel has been informed that the then manager of Ivory Bank in Raja is in detention in Juba, accused of negligence and suspected of colluding with the looters. The Panel requested the Government of South Sudan to provide the statement of the bank manager and any investigation reports that may have been filed. This request is pending.

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2. Robbery of Kenya Commercial Bank and Ivory Bank, Bentiu

167. Darfuri rebel groups were allegedly involved in looting oil installations and two banks, Kenya Commercial Bank and Ivory Bank, in Bentiu, South Sudan, in January 2014. According to media reports, the looting was perpetrated by JEM. The Government of South Sudan has been requested to share information about the perpetrators, and a response is awaited. It is almost certain that members of Darfuri rebel groups participated in the looting. Further, they are reported to have looted oil installations and civilian property, including food and medicines belonging to humanitarian agencies.

3. Providing security to local authorities

168. As detailed in annex VI, Darfuri rebels provide security support to the Governor of Lol State, Rizig Zakaria Hassan, in and around Raja town. During the third week of August 2017, they allegedly fired shots in the air in Raja to protest the Governor’s failure to pay for their service.

4. Providing security service to commercial convoys

169. Darfuri rebels are also reported to be providing security to commercial goods convoys of Darfuri traders, for a fee. For example, when a Darfuri trader needs to send a convoy of goods from Juba to the Sudan, the security for the Juba-Wau-Aweil route is entrusted to the members of a Darfuri rebel group. This route is around 900 km long and has witnessed several looting incidents in the past. The convoy’s driver carries an identification card of a Darfuri rebel group and keeps a weapon on board. On this route, there are checkpoints operated by SPLA and some illegal checkpoints are also reported to exist, which do not have fixed locations. The driver is paid roughly $80 to $100 dollars for providing safe passage to the convoy.

C. Companies and business establishments providing income streams

170. The Panel has gathered that Khalil Ibrahim, founder of JEM, opened many companies outside the Sudan in the airlines, banking and shipping sectors and that he possibly diverted profits from these companies to the cause of JEM. The Panel understands that most of the companies owned by Khalil Ibrahim until his death in 2011 are now owned and/or controlled by Khalil’s brother, Gibril Ibrahim, current JEM chairman. The Panel has gathered that a portion of the profits earned by some of these companies are possibly still being used to fund JEM activities. In May and June 2017, the Panel sent information requests to some Member States to ascertain details of these companies. The Panel also received information about some business establishments located outside the Sudan, which are reportedly owned by members of Darfuri rebel groups. A portion of the profits earned is purportedly being diverted to fund the activities of Darfuri rebel groups. The Panel is pursuing these leads.


84 In South Sudan, people generally do not differentiate among Darfuri rebel groups, referring to them as JEM. It is therefore difficult to assign the incidents to a specific group.
D. Rebel groups in Darfur

1. Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid

171. SLA/AW solicits contributions from the internally displaced persons camps as a means of financing. Some Fur communities have been providing financial support to SLA/AW for many years. Among other means, the group uses a series of videos and audios released by Abdul Wahid to communicate its demands. For example, the Panel is in possession of a video recording in which Abdul Wahid: (a) demands that each camp pay large sums of money to ensure the liberation of Darfur; (b) asks internally displaced persons and refugees to send their sons and daughters to SLA/AW camps, both in the Sudan and outside; and (c) threatens the internally displaced persons with “destruction” if they do not pay (see annex XXII). In May 2017, SLA/AW issued a directive to camps in Zalingei to contribute money, but the residents did not comply because the sum demanded was too large and they were committed only to supporting the SLA/AW troops directly, if needed.

172. Several incidents of rustling of livestock by members of SLA/AW have been reported. For example, on 17 October 2016, SLA/AW elements allegedly stole 315 camels belonging to Arab nomads in Nertiti. Similarly, in September and December 2016, SLA/AW elements stole 113 camels from the Kila area and 190 camels from Shangil Tobayi. The estimated value of the assets seized in these incidents is close to half a million United States dollars. Additional incidents of cattle rustling have been reported in 2017.

173. In the areas controlled by SLA/AW in Jebel Marra, members of the group reportedly receive food from the internally displaced persons camps; collect taxes from merchants; collect taxes and fuel from the vehicles passing through their area; and beat and/or impose fines on anyone who refuses to abide by their directions. The armed group has reportedly set up collection points in some internally displaced persons camps. The group has imposed a tax of 150 Sudanese pounds on all traders at the market in the Kalma camp. In late October 2016, SLA/AW members abducted some traders in eastern Jebel Marra, accusing them of not supporting the movement, and asked their families to pay 30,000 Sudanese pounds per abductee.

2. Sudan Liberation Army/Peace and Development

174. As explained in annex XVI, SLA/Peace and Development (SLA/PD), led by “General” Sadiq Al Foqa, is quite active in Sortony. SLA/PD has imposed a tax of 300 Sudanese pounds on each hammer milling machine owner. According to various sources, “General” Sadiq considers these machines as an investment, and claims that the money collected is to be used to buy ammunition to provide security and protect displaced persons’ farms from Arab militias. SLA/PD has also imposed a tax of 400 Sudanese pounds on each trader at the Sortony displaced persons’ gathering site. Defaulters are threatened with detention and are made to pay an additional tax of 450 to 500 Sudanese pounds.
In one incident on 15 September 2017, “General” Sadiq’s men approached a displaced person who owned a hammer mill shop and ordered him to pay 600 Sudanese pounds, in addition to the 300 Sudanese pounds he had paid SLA/PD men four months ago. On refusing to pay the extra taxes, he was badly beaten.

3. Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi

176. Prior to the May clashes, SLA/MM had been intermittently manning illegal checkpoints at several locations. For example, SLA/MM elements were occasionally stopping vehicles on the road connecting Kornoi and Tina in North Darfur State, close to the Chadian border. The fees levied at the checkpoint ranged from 50 Sudanese pounds for small vehicles to 1,100 Sudanese pounds for commercial trucks. SLA/MM members had also erected an illegal checkpoint at Wadi Howar targeting vehicles arriving from Libya, imposing fees ranging from 2,000 to 2,500 Sudanese pounds and 5 to 10 barrels of gasoline per truck. It is reported that these checkpoints have not been operational since the May clashes.

4. Rezeigat Arab militias in North Darfur

177. The Rezeigat Arab militias in North Darfur have been funding themselves through illegal levies on artisanal gold mining activities, kidnapping for ransom, armed robberies, cattle rustling and facilitating the smuggling of drugs and migrants across Darfur borders.85

XII. Assets freeze and travel ban

178. The Panel continues to monitor the implementation of the assets freeze and travel ban measures by Member States, including the Sudan.

85 Interviews with confidential sources.
179. In paragraph 1 of resolution 1672 (2006), the Security Council designated four individuals. No additional designation has been made since then. In respect of these four individuals, investigations have continued for the purpose of identifying assets; gathering intelligence on new cases of possible violations of the travel ban; and following up on violations identified in earlier reports of the Panel.

A. Implementation by Member States

180. As a follow-up to the recommendations contained in the Panel’s first report (unpublished), the Committee sent a note verbale to those Member States that had not yet done so to submit an implementation report with an emphasis on obstacles to implementing the sanctions measures. The Panel intends to collate, analyse and bring to the attention of the Committee the difficulties being faced by Member States, along with viable solutions.

B. Implementation by the Government of the Sudan

181. During the Chair’s visit to the Sudan in May 2017, as well as in meetings with the Panel, the national focal point addressed the issue of implementation of the assets freeze and the travel ban, indicating that the Government was implementing both measures to the extent feasible. However, this does not appear to be the case in practice, as discussed below.

1. Assets freeze

182. In response to the Panel’s request, the national focal point indicated that the designated individual Gaffar Mohammed Elhassan (permanent reference number SDi.001) had no bank account, and that his retirement pension had been disbursed as lump-sum cash. However, during an October 2012 interview with the Panel, Mr. Elhassan had stated that the Government had taken no action to freeze his salary or assets and had also mentioned that he used to receive a monthly rent from his property. Similarly, in the past, Musa Hilal (permanent reference number SDi.002) used to receive a Government salary as a National Assembly representative and special adviser to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The Committee has never received any exemption request regarding these designated individuals, indicating a lack of implementation by the Government of the Sudan of the assets freeze measures.

2. Travel ban

183. During the Chair’s visit, the national focal point also mentioned his Government’s intention to notify the Committee about Musa Hilal’s travel — to the extent possible — noting that it was difficult to monitor it owing to his “nomadic lifestyle”. In a letter dated 7 June 2017, the Panel drew the attention of the Government of the Sudan to a Committee letter dated 22 May 2014, in which the Committee had requested that the Sudan restrict the travel of designated Sudanese individuals to other countries. In its previous report (see S/2017/22, para. 93), the Panel established that Musa Hilal had travelled to Cairo from Khartoum on 15 July 2015, on board flight MS-854. In that instance of travel ban violation, Musa Hilal would have undergone immigration procedures in Khartoum. If the Government had issued the necessary instructions to the immigration department to restrict the travel of the four designated individuals, the immigration department could have prevented the travel or, at a minimum, alerted Egyptian border control authorities of the impending arrival of Musa Hilal, enabling Egypt to prevent his entry. The Panel has
sent repeated information requests to the Sudan seeking the passport details used by Hilal for his visit to Cairo in 2015, but no response has been received from the Sudan.

3. Information requested from the Government on implementation measures

184. While appreciating the updates that were provided orally during the visit of the Chair to the Sudan in May 2017, the Panel requested, in its letter dated 7 June 2017, that the Government of the Sudan provide information on the general measures put in place to: (a) identify the assets of the four designated individuals; (b) freeze the assets, should assets be identified or discovered; and (c) restrict the travel of any designated individual, should there be an intention to travel. As a follow-up to the recommendation contained in the Panel’s first report (unpublished), the Committee sent a letter urging the Government to expedite response to this and other information requests. In the absence of an adequate response, the Panel believes that the stance taken earlier by the Government (see S/2015/31, para. 28) has not changed, indicating its lack of political will to implement the travel ban and assets freeze measures.

C. Ongoing investigations

1. Closure of a long-pending travel ban investigation

185. An investigation into the alleged travel of the designated individual Musa Hilal to the United Arab Emirates from November 2012 to February 2013 had been pending since 2013. In response to a letter from the Panel dated 10 July 2013, the Government of the United Arab Emirates had initially indicated in October 2013 that no official records had been found regarding Musa Hilal’s entry into that country. In a subsequent communication of December 2013, the Panel provided additional information to the Government, including the name of the hotel where this individual had reportedly stayed. In June 2015, during a meeting with the Panel, Musa Hilal confirmed that he had visited the United Arab Emirates from November 2012 to February 2013. After receiving the confirmation by the designated individual, the Panel requested the Government of the United Arab Emirates on several occasions to scrutinize its immigration records for all the aliases and other details of Musa Hilal, as appearing on the sanctions list and on his diplomatic passport.

186. In a letter dated 21 September 2017, the Government of the United Arab Emirates confirmed that Musa Hilal had entered the country on 23 November 2012 and departed on 24 January 2013, using diplomatic passport No. D009889. The Government also shared a copy of his passport with the Panel. The letter mentioned that Musa Hilal had stayed at Al Raya Hotel Apartments in Dubai during that period, paying the hotel in cash. The Government explained that it had not been able to prevent the entry of Musa Hilal into the United Arab Emirates because: (a) the name used in his diplomatic passport differed slightly from the name that appears in resolution 1672 (2006); and (b) the diplomatic passport used to enter the country in 2012 was not on the sanctions list. In September 2017, the Panel informed the Committee about the details of the passport of Musa Hilal, provided by the United Arab Emirates, and the sanctions list was updated.

2. Alleged travel of Musa Hilal to Chad

187. The Panel continues to investigate the possible travels of Musa Hilal to Chad. In July 2014, the Panel had written to the Government of Chad to confirm his alleged travels. During a meeting with the Panel in June 2015, Musa Hilal confirmed that he had travelled to Chad in 2011 to present the President, Idriss Déby Itno, his condolences on his mother’s passing, and again between 2013 and 2014 to attend a
peace conference with the knowledge of the Government of Chad. He claimed to have used his Sudanese diplomatic passport for those visits.

188. In letters dated 7 July 2014 and 16 October 2014, the Panel requested information from the Government of Chad on these possible travel ban violations. During a mission to Chad in May 2015, the Panel renewed its request. The Panel sent two reminders during the current mandate, in July and September 2017. No response has been received. To facilitate their review of immigration records, in September 2017, the Panel shared with Chadian authorities the details of a diplomatic passport held by Musa Hilal between 2011 and 2013.

189. As a follow-up to the recommendation contained in the Panel’s first report (unpublished), the Committee sent a letter urging the Government of Chad to expedite a response to the Panel. No response has been received to date.

3. **Alleged travel of Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu to Chad**

190. The Panel is also investigating the alleged travel of Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (permanent reference number SDi.004, also known as “Tek”) to N’Djamena in October 2013 with a Darfur Regional Authority delegation (see S/2014/87, paras. 179 and 180). “Tek” confirmed to the Panel that he had been to eastern Chad for three weeks to visit his mother. In its letters to the Government of Chad mentioned in paragraph 188 above, the Panel requested further details about the alleged travel of “Tek”. Concurrently to this investigation, the Panel is trying to ascertain whether “Tek” is a dual Sudanese-Chadian national (see para. 197 below).

D. **Updating the identifiers of designated individuals**

191. To facilitate effective implementation of the travel ban by Member States, the Panel has endeavoured to gather updated identifying information on the four designated individuals.

1. **Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem**

192. Musa Hilal’s passport on the current sanctions list expired in February 2015. The Panel has taken steps to obtain his current passport details to allow Member States to adequately enforce the travel ban.

193. In respect of Musa Hilal’s travel to Egypt in 2015 (see para. 183 above), the Panel has made separate requests to the Governments of the Sudan and Egypt to provide the passport details. Further, it has requested Egypt Air to provide the passenger manifest for the concerned flight that would contain the details of the passport used for the visit. A response is awaited.

194. In September, the Panel informed the Committee about additional passport details provided by the United Arab Emirates, and the sanctions list has been updated accordingly (see para. 186 above).

2. **Adam Yacub Sharif (permanent reference number SDi.003)**

195. The Panel has taken steps to confirm the death of Adam Yacub Sharif. In 2013, the Panel reported that SLA/MM had mourned the death of Adam Yacub Sharif, alias “Bambino”, after a brief illness, in its communiqué of 7 June 2012. In 2015, the Panel requested that the Government of the Sudan confirm this individual’s death. On 29 June 2017, the Panel renewed that request, attaching a copy of the passport issued under the name Adam Shareif to assist the authorities in identifying the individual.
196. In an earlier report (see S/2013/79, annex VII), the Panel had mentioned the passport details of Adam Yacub Sharif. As it is highly probable that he is deceased, the sanctions list was updated to include “reportedly deceased” under the heading “Other information”. However, as the confirmation of his death is not forthcoming from the Government of the Sudan, the sanctions list and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)-United Nations Security Council special notice could be updated to incorporate his passport details.

3. Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (permanent reference number SDi.004)

197. It is highly probable that Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu (also known as “Tek”) holds both Chadian and Sudanese nationality. To facilitate the implementation of the travel ban, the Panel has taken steps to formally confirm this fact. If it were confirmed, his visit to Chad mentioned above would not constitute a violation of the travel ban.

198. It is almost certain that “Tek” participated in the operation which brought Idriss Déby Itno to power in 1990; that he occupied various official positions in the Chadian Armed Forces, including in the elite Garde républicaine and the Garde spéciale présidentielle; and that he participated in Chadian operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and reached the rank of Colonel before joining the Darfur rebellion in 2003. The Panel has shared this information with the Government of Chad, requesting the details of the passport or other identification documents, if any, issued to this individual for inclusion in the sanctions list and the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council special notice.

199. The Panel gathered from reliable sources that “Tek” visited south-eastern Libya in mid-2015, where some of his fighters have been acting as mercenaries since March 2015. He is also associated with criminal networks in Darfur.

E. Updating of the sanctions list and INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council special notices with photographs of designated individuals

200. The resolution 1591 (2005) sanctions list and INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council special notices issued in relation to Musa Hilal, Adam Yacub Sharif and “Tek” do not have their photographs (see annex XXIV). Providing photographs of designated individuals on the sanctions list and INTERPOL notices will facilitate the implementation of the travel ban. The sanctions list could be considered for updating and INTERPOL may also be requested to include the photographs in the three notices.

F. Challenges in the identification of designated individuals in transit

201. Pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of resolution 1591 (2005), all States are required to take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of designated persons. After looking at the systems in place in many Member States, the Panel observes that there are challenges in implementing the transit aspect of the travel ban. The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation sets out the principle of free transit through international areas of airports and allows individuals to transit through a Member State without the need for an airport transit visa and without being checked by immigration or customs authorities. It is thus difficult for a Member State to prevent the transit of a designated individual through its territory unless specific information of the transit is received. Further details of the challenges faced are discussed in annex XXIII.
XIII. Recommendations

202. The Panel recommends that the Committee:

(a) Continue to monitor the presence and activities of Darfurian rebel groups in Libya and South Sudan, including by organizing regular meetings between the relevant sanctions committees and their panels of experts (see paras. 36–47 above and annexes VI–VIII);

(b) Consider updating the sanctions list to include the photographs of three designated individuals and the passport details of one designated individual, and consider requesting INTERPOL to update its special notices accordingly (see paras. 196 and 200 above and annex XXIV);

(c) Consider encouraging the Government of the Sudan to instruct its border control agency to monitor the designated individuals’ movement abroad with a view to either restricting their travel at the onset or to informing the border control authority of the transit or destination country (see para. 201 above and annex XXIII).

203. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

(a) Urge Member States, in particular Libya and South Sudan, to take all necessary measures to comply with paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004) to prevent the supply of arms and related materiel and financing to Darfurian rebel groups (see paras. 64 and 65 above);

(b) Urge Member States to support capacity-building for border control, especially of the borders between Darfur and neighbouring States. This support could take the form of developing the capability of the Joint Border Force, establishing permanent border posts at known crossing points and provision of monitoring technology (see paras. 151–156 above);

(c) Consider seeking information from other sanctions committees on the implementation of travel ban with regard to transiting passengers, and disseminate the best practices among the Member States (see para. 201 above and annex XXIII);

(d) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to strengthen its efforts to combat sexual and gender-based violence in Darfur, including conflict-related sexual violence (see paras. 118–122 above);

(e) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to respect the rights of freedom of expression, association and assembly of Darfurian students across the Sudan, and promote their right to higher education as guaranteed by the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the Constitution of the Sudan (see paras. 116 and 117 above and annex XIX);

(f) Encourage the Government of the Sudan to facilitate the fulfilment of the Panel’s mandate in the best possible environment, including by providing multiple-entry visas to all Panel members in a timely manner and by granting unlimited access to Darfur (see paras. 9 and 10 above).
Annex I: Mandate and methodology

Mandate

1. In paragraph 7 of resolution 1556 (2004), the Security Council mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.

2. In paragraph 8 of the resolution 1556 (2004), the Council further mandated all states to take the necessary measures to prevent any provision to the non-governmental entities and individuals identified in paragraph 7, by their nationals or from their territories of technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in paragraph 7.

3. In paragraph 7 of its resolution 1591 (2005), the Council extended the arms embargo to include all parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in the aforementioned areas in Darfur.

4. In its resolution 2035 (2012), the Council extended the reference to the three states of Darfur to all the territory of Darfur, including the new states of Eastern and Central Darfur created on 11 January 2012.

5. The enforcement of arms embargo was further strengthened, in Paragraph 10 of the resolution 1945, by imposing the condition of end user documentation for any sale or supply of arms and related materiel that is otherwise not prohibited by resolutions 1556 and 1591.

6. In paragraphs 3 (d) and 3 (e) of resolution 1591 (2005), the Council imposed targeted travel and financial sanctions on designated individuals (the listing criteria were further extended to entities in resolution 2035 (2012)), to be designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution. In its resolution 1672 (2006), the Council designated four individuals.

7. The Panel operates under the direction of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005). The mandate of the Panel, as set out in resolution 1591 (2005), is:
   a. To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the arms embargo;
   b. To assist the Committee in monitoring implementation of the targeted travel and financial sanctions; and
   c. To make recommendations to the Committee on actions that the Security Council may want to consider.

8. In its resolution 2340(2017) and preceding resolutions, the Security Council also requested that the Panel:
   e. Continue to coordinate its activities, as appropriate, with the operations of the UNAMID, with international efforts to promote a political process in Darfur, and with other Panels or Groups of Experts, established by the Security Council, as relevant to the implementation of its mandate;
f. Assess in its first and final reports;

g. Progress towards reducing violations by all parties of the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556(2004), paragraph 7 of resolution 1591(2005) and paragraph 10 of resolution 1945(2010);

h. Progress towards removing impediments to the political process and threats to stability in Darfur and the region;

i. Violations of violations of international humanitarian law or violations or abuses of human rights, including those that involve attacks on the civilian population, sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses against children; and

j. Other violations of the above-mentioned resolutions;

k. Provide the Committee with information on those individuals and entities meeting the listing criteria in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591(2005);

l. Continue to investigate the financing and role of armed, military and political groups in attacks against UNAMID personnel in Darfur, noting that individuals and entities planning, sponsoring or participating in such attacks constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and may therefore meet the designation criteria provided for in paragraph 3 (c) of resolution 1591(2005); and

m. Investigate any means of the financing of armed groups in Darfur.

Methodology

9. The Panel followed a professional and technical methodology underpinned by the maintenance of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. It worked in full conformity with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). Emphasis was placed on adherence to standards regarding transparency and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources and providing the right of reply to interlocutors. The Panel based its reasoning on a balance of probability to ascertain that a reported fact or piece of information can be substantiated on the basis of credible sources or verifiable evidence.
### Annex II: Panel official outgoing correspondence in 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel OC No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Outgoing</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17-Jan-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>17-Jan-17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18-Jan-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Postponement of proposed Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>18-Jan-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Sudanese Embassy in Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2-Feb-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Cancellation of visit to Ethiopia in February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8-Feb-17</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Qatar Embassy in Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8-Feb-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Libyan Embassy in Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8-Feb-17</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8-Feb-17</td>
<td>League of Arab States (LAS)</td>
<td>Request for meeting with representatives of League of Arab States in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8-Feb-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10-Feb-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of South Sudanese Embassy in Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2-Mar-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>2-Mar-17</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3-Mar-17</td>
<td>Chair of the Committee</td>
<td>Letter to the Chair on Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10-Mar-17</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>20-Mar-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>20-Mar-17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>6-Apr-17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>6-Apr-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Panel visit, and request for multiple-entry visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>6-Apr-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Sudanese embassy in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2-May-17</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2-May-17</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>2-May-17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>3-May-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Sudanese Embassy in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>4-May-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>8-May-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Requesting for investigation reports on a bank robbery committed in June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>8-May-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for setting up meetings in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>12-May-17</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Request for information on finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>12-May-17</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>31-May-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>31-May-17</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>7-Jun-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for setting up meetings in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>12-Jun-17</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>16-Jun-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>21-Jun-17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>29-Jun-17</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Panel visit, and request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>29-Jun-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel OC No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Request for information on asset freeze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>30-Jun-17</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>12-Jul-17</td>
<td>Sudan cc National Focal Point</td>
<td>Request for visas to Panel members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>14-Jul-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>21-Jul-17</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>3-Aug-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Panel’s visit and request for facilitation of visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>11-Aug-17</td>
<td>Sudan cc Japan</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>11-Aug-17</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>14-Aug-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for meeting with officials of Sudanese Embassy in Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>15-Aug-17</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>17-Aug-17</td>
<td>SRSG UNSMIL</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>23-Aug-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>23-Aug-17</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>1-Sep-17</td>
<td>Sudan cc National Focal Point</td>
<td>Request for facilitating visa to Panel members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>1-Sep-17</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>8-Sep-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Request for meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>12-Sep-17</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>15-Sep-17</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Panel visit, and request for visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>26-Sep-17</td>
<td>1591 Chair</td>
<td>Information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>26-Sep-17</td>
<td>Toyota cc Japan</td>
<td>Request for information on cross-border activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>27-Sep-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Request for information on financing of armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel OC No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Outgoing</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>4-Oct-17</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Cross-border activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc Saud Bahwan Automotive LLC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc Sumitomo Corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>UAE Global LAV and USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>29-Sep-17</td>
<td>Yemen Automotive and Machinery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trading Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>3-Oct-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Request for visas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc National Focal Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>5-Oct-17</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Request for information on activities of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Darfurian rebel groups in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>11-Oct-17</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>20-Oct-17</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>20-Oct-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Reminder on pending information requests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc National Focal Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>20-Oct-17</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Panel visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>20-Oct-17</td>
<td>Global LAV</td>
<td>Request for information on cross-border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc UAE and USA</td>
<td>activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>25-Oct-17</td>
<td>CEO Egypt Air</td>
<td>Request for information on travel ban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>25-Oct-17</td>
<td>STREIT</td>
<td>Request for information on cross-border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cc UAE</td>
<td>activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>14-Nov-17</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Request for information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex III: May-June incursions in Darfur by SLA/MM and SLA/TC

1. On 20 May, SLA/MM and SLA/TC entered Darfur jointly from Libya and South Sudan, in two coordinated columns. The bulk of SLA/MM and SLA/TC forces participated in these incursions. The column coming from Libya was the largest, comprising about 160 vehicles (the majority of them belonging to SLA/MM), according to various government sources. The column coming from South Sudan comprised about 60 vehicles (roughly half of them belonged to SLA/TC). Some sources have indicated that elements of the column from the south were trying to reach Jebel Marra, while some others aimed at joining the Libyan column, and then reaching Libya. According to various sources, the Libyan column aimed to divert the Sudanese security forces and attract them to the north, in order to allow the smaller column to enter Darfur from South Sudan. It also reportedly sought to post some rebel elements in SLA/MM former strongholds of North Darfur, specifically in Wadi Howar and the Ain Soro mountain area. In order to prepare these incursions, SLA/MM elements operating across the Darfur/Libya border had established some arms and fuel caches in the Wadi Howar area of North Darfur in the prior months.

2. The main entry point for the Libyan column was the Wadi Howar area. According to several sources, some elements of this column entered Darfur from Chad, after crossing from the Libyan area of Sarra to northern Chad. The bulk of the South Sudan column entered mainly from the Bahr el Arab area, into the Assalaya locality of East Darfur. The elements coming from South Sudan were intercepted by the security forces in the Esheraya and Muhajeria areas of East Darfur on 20 May. Clashes continued on 21 and 22 May, mostly in the Adola mountains. The security forces engaged with the elements coming from Libya on 20 and 21 May, specifically in the areas of Wadi Howar, Nubit, and Bir Margi. A second phase of those clashes occurred on 28 and 29 May in the Ain Soro area, as the security forces tried to dislodge rebel elements who had taken shelter in this mountainous area. Further clashes were later reported in the Um Baru area and along the Darfur-Libya border between some rebels fleeing the Ain Soro area and the government security forces.

3. The rebels suffered significant losses, both in terms of equipment and personnel. Considerable amounts of military equipment and vehicles were destroyed or seized by the security forces. Many of the main rebel commanders were either captured or killed in the clashes. In particular, the column from South Sudan was badly hit, based on Mr Minawi’s own admission. The General Commander Juma Mendi were killed, while Nimur Abdel-Rahman and SLA/MM Military Spokesman Ahmed Hussain Mustafa “Adrop” were captured. However, several sources suggest that a few elements from the South Sudan column managed to reach Jebel Marra. Although the column coming from Libya was not completely defeated, two of the most prominent SLA/MM commanders in that column, Khater Shatta and Rajab Jawa, were killed. It is unclear whether a few troops of the column from Libya managed to remain in North Darfur, or if all troops returned to Libya following the clashes. The RSF, the main security forces engaged in the fighting, also suffered losses. According to various sources, several dozen RSF members were killed, including Deputy-Commander Hamdan al-Samih.

4. SLA/MM and SLA/TC seemed to be pursuing different military objectives in the incursions. SLA/MM reportedly wanted to re-establish a local presence in some former strongholds, such as Ain Soro, in order to bolster its credentials as well as to be able to fight in Darfur again. According to an SLA/TC official interviewed by the Panel, SLA/TC wanted to return to Jebel Marra.

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1 Several sources report that some SLA/MM remained in Libya as back-up forces.
2 These elements responded to SLA/MM field commander Khater Shatta. In North Darfur, they operated in small, scattered groups, in order not to be located by the Sudanese security forces.
3 A number of sources, several RSF commanders who were previously SLA/MM commanders played a major role in fighting the rebels in Ain Soro, taking advantage of their first-hand knowledge of the terrain and of the SLA/MM arms caches and hideouts in the area. Mohamed “Ork kor” is the most prominent one. He used to be one of most important SLA/MM commanders in North Darfur, until he defected to the Government in 2014 with the help of President Teodoro Obiang. Along with him, however, defected another former SLA/MM who participated in this operation was Benhim El Faki.
4 Meeting of the Panel with Mr Minawi.
5 According to various sources, “Tarrada” and Mindi were captured and then executed.
5. According to some sources, JEM had been approached by SLA/MM to participate in the incursions, but declined to join. Based on the JEM Goz Dongo defeat of April 2015 against the RSF, JEM Chairman Gibril Ibrahim reportedly felt the operation was too risky and warned against it.\footnote{According to a rebel source, Mr Minawi, Mr Ibrahim and Mr Nour held a meeting a few weeks before the incursions to discuss the operation.}
Annex IV: SLA/AW presence

1. In its Jebel Marra historical stronghold, SLA/AW presence is now restricted to some pockets of territory. These include the Kurulong-Banj area (south east of Jebel Marra), where commander Abdelrahman Ibrahim “Gaddura” is operating with the biggest force; some locations in the area of Kibi village (central of Jebel Marra), where troops are led by Mugeeb Al Ahman, Osman Alzain and Mubarak Aldok;7 and the Bule area (southeast of the Sortony displaced persons gathering site), where the field commanders are Abubakr Ahmed Abass and Youssif Abdu Al-Kareem Hamid. According to various accounts, the group now has between several hundreds and 1,000 fighters in Jebel Marra, and no more than a few vehicles. The political leadership in exile is reportedly not in a position to provide significant financial and material support to the fighters on the ground.

2. Outside Jebel Marra, the group had until recently a presence in the Ain Siro area. However, the main commander there, Ismail Adam “Abunduluk”, concluded an agreement with the Government in September 2017, and is reportedly about to be integrated into the RSF with several dozens of his fighters. According to sources, Abunduluk’s defection is an unexpected consequence of the SLA/MM and SLA/TC May incursions. In order to track down SLA/MM elements who had retreated in Ain Siro, the RSF deployed in the area, which weakened Abunduluk’s military position and constrained him to seek a deal with the Government.

3. The group also retains a presence in the Jebel Isa area of North Darfur, under commander Saleman Marajan. However, although this group is still formally part of SLA/AW, it reportedly has a tacit non-aggression pact with the local security forces, and has not engaged in any fighting for several years.

4. SLA/AW also has a small force between South Sudan and South Kordofan. It reportedly comprises between 20 and 30 vehicles, and is led by Commander Abdu Haran. This force was deployed from Jebel Marra to South Kordofan around 2012-2013 to contribute to the joint military force of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), of which Haran was then Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of logistics.8 Haran’s force later moved to South Sudan, after the SRF joint military force became dysfunctional due to differences between the groups constituting it. Though this force is reportedly better-equipped than the troops in Jebel Marra, it has not returned to Jebel Marra. According to several sources, Haran’s force did not join the SLA/MM and SLA/TC column which entered Darfur from South Sudan in May.

5. On the ground, the group is undermined by internal divisions. According to several local sources, “Gaddura”, the historical General Commander of the movement, was dismissed recently of this position, and relations between the SLA/AW groups located in Jebel Marra are tense.

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7 This group is reportedly the most loyal to Abdul Wahid, because its leaders are his relatives.
8 The SRF is a coalition formed in November 2011 by the SPLM-N and the three main Darfur groups, JEM, SLA/MM and SLA/AW. After some initial military successes, the coalition has now collapsed over leadership issues between the SPLM-N and the Darfurian rebel groups.
Annex V: Militias in North Darfur

1. Musa Hilal is one of the most prominent tribal leaders and militia commanders in North Darfur. He is the head of the Um Jahal clan of Rezeigat, as well as the head of all Mahamid in North Darfur. His main area of control is Kabbabiya (his stronghold is Misteriha) and Kutum. In the early years of the Darfur conflict, he acted as interface for the Government of Sudan (GoS) to develop Arab militia groups in North Darfur, and convinced other tribes to join the GoS as proxy groups. Musa Hilal has had difficult relations with the GoS for several years as he has tried to demonstrate his autonomy and independence from the authorities. While Musa Hilal had been the most important Darfurian Arab militia leader in the Government’s countermilicing campaign in the first years of the Darfur conflict, there have been on-and-off tensions between him and the Government since at least 2007, as he increasingly tried to carve out a space for himself and displayed political ambitions. In particular, he repeatedly criticized the Government for dividing Darfur tribes and instrumentalizing Darfurian Arabs against Africans.

2. One of Musa Hilal’s representatives and spokesperson is Haroun Medeikhir. He is a member of the Kababiba Native Administration and, on occasions, represents Musa Hilal in resolving tribal disputes between communities in the area. Ahmed Abakar is another Musa Hilal’s close representatives, while Hilal’s son Habib is also very influential.

3. An-Nur Ahmad (aka An-Nur “Guba”) from the Mahamid Arab tribe is a militia commander based in the village of Guba, in the Kutum area. He heads one of the strongest pro-government militias and is a member of the Border Guards. He is said to have had close ties with former North Darfur Wali Osman Kibir, and his forces work closely with the RSF. During the May and June clashes with the rebel movements, An-Nur “Guba” and his men allegedly participated in operations with the RSF in North Darfur, in particular in the area of Am Siro. His men reportedly also looted a number of villages in the area. An-Nur “Guba” and his men are notorious and have reportedly been responsible for numerous violations against civilians.

4. Hafiz Dawood, also from the Mahamid Arab tribe, is another prominent militia commander, and a close associate of Musa Hilal. He had been granted a military rank. His men are said to have participated in operations with the RSF during the May and June clashes with rebels in North Darfur.

5. Badr Abu Kmeish was an Arab militia commander active in the Shangil Tobai area, and former member of the Border Guards, and participated in support of GoS operations. He has since joined the GoS and is now based in El Fasher.

6. Former North Darfur governor Youssef Osman Kibir (2003-2015) was known for his laissez-faire approach towards the militia. Between 2011 and 2015, he armed and used non-Arab militias, commonly known as “Kibir’s militias”, to target tribes opposed to the GoS and to control land. Since he left office in 2015, some of his men are said to have been integrated into the RSF, while others have reportedly joined other groups, such as Hilal’s, or are acting independently.

7. In the area of Mulha and Mellit in northern North Darfur, the Meido tribe has its own militia group, which is said to be aligned with the GoS.

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9 His relations with former governor Kibir were notoriously bad.
10 He is said to be one of the first militia leaders to broker a deal with SLA/AW in 2006. He later switched sides and joined the GoS. He has been given the rank of brigadier.
11 Some sources indicate that this group has between 400-500 armoured vehicles and more than 3,000 soldiers. According to other sources, his forces number 600 men recruited among various Mahamid clans, and they have about 100 vehicles. See Small Arms Survey, Remote Control Breakdown, HSBA, April 2017, pg. 6.
12 In the past, he has tended to side with RSF commander “Hemeti”, rather than with Musa Hilal.
13 For example, this militia group is said to have participated in numerous attacks against villages in Jebel Marra during the 2015 and 2016 GoS offensives.
Annex VI: Presence and activities of Darfurian rebel groups in Raja area, South Sudan

1. During the reporting period, Darfur rebel groups present in South Sudan (SLA/MM, JEM, SLA/TC and a JEM splinter group) were mostly based in the Raja area. Several military bases of Darfuri groups in the area have been reported to the Panel by local sources:
   - In Haja-Nus, about 30km north of Raja, on the road to Timsaha;
   - In Khor Shamam, about 12km east of Raja, on the road to Aweil;\(^\text{15}\)
   - In Yangoshi, in a farm, 8km south-east of Raja, on the road to Deim Zubeir;\(^\text{16}\)
   - Next to an old UN camp, a few km south-east of Raja; and
   - Near Newsite, about 12km north of Raja.

2. The Darfur groups\(^\text{17}\) provide military support to the local SPLA battalion in the Raja area. According to sources, the local SPLA relies heavily on them to keep control of Raja and the main roads against SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) rebels and Fertit militias. For instance, the Darfur groups played a key role in repelling Fertit militia attacks on the town of Raja on 14 April 2017 and 15 June 2016. This kind of military support takes place on an ad-hoc basis. The Darfur groups have their own bases and are not integrated within the SPLA.

3. According to several sources, including within Darfur groups, the Darfur rebels have a solid working relationship with Rizig Zakaria Hassan, the Governor of Lol State (and former Governor of Western Bahr el Ghazal State), who reportedly facilitated their settlement in the Western Bahr el Ghazal region.\(^\text{18}\) Governor Zakaria appears to be the focal point for the relations with the Darfur groups in the area. Several sources based in Raja have reported to the Panel that he relies on members of the Darfur groups for his personal security in the Raja area.\(^\text{19}\)

4. The difficult economic situation of the SPLA and the South Sudanese Government means that the Darfur groups now get very little in return for their assistance. Provision of fuel, medical supplies and medical treatment in the Raja hospital and in the local SPLA medical facilities have been reported to the Panel. Recently, this situation has reportedly generated discontent among the Darfur groups, who feel they should receive more for the security support they provide in the Raja area.

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\(^\text{15}\) According to most sources, this base is run by JEM. It was the target of air strikes by the Sudanese Armed Forces in 2014.

\(^\text{16}\) This camp has reportedly been set up recently.

\(^\text{17}\) The Panel could not establish which Darfur groups present in the area were involved with the SPLA and the local authorities, most local sources being unable to differentiate between them.

\(^\text{18}\) According to sources, these relations date back to before the independence of South Sudan.

\(^\text{19}\) In a meeting with the Panel in October 2017, Governor Zakaria denied cooperating with the Darfur groups.
Annex VII: JEM in South Sudan

1. JEM has the bulk of its resources—between 60 and 85 vehicles and a few hundred troops according to various sources—in the Raja area of South Sudan. Its senior military leadership is there, including General Commander Siddiq “Bongo” and Chief of Staff Tijani al-Diheb. Other prominent members present in the country include Omda Tahir (advisor to Gibril Ibrahim); Bukhari Abdallah, who oversees JEM relations with the SPLA, including SPLA provision of logistical support to the group; Naqdullah Khalil, who reportedly manages some of the movement’s investments in South Sudan.

2. JEM is currently going through difficult times. The Goz Dongo defeat against the Sudanese security forces in April 2015 destroyed the majority of its fighting capacity, triggering a downward trend. Its experienced military leadership was decimated and its military relevance diminished, fuelling internal discontent against Gibril Ibrahim’s leadership. Due to the difficult economic and security conditions in South Sudan, the group has nothing to gain from remaining in the country and from being dragged further into the South Sudanese civil conflict. However, due to the new balance of forces with the Government of Sudan, JEM has no immediate prospect for return to Darfur, and it has no real possibility to engage in the more profitable Libyan conflict.

3. As a result of these difficulties, internal dissent and disillusion about armed struggle have been growing, resulting in high-profile defections. In March, several field commanders led by Abdul Rahman Arbab, Mohamed Daftallah and Arbab Abdallah Younis defected with their troops, and this has resulted in the de facto split of the movement in two groups in the field in the Raja area. The dissidents have about 20 vehicles and half of the troops, according to some assessments. The split appears to have tribal undertones. Most dissident commanders are from non-Zaghawa tribes, mostly Massali, echoing recurrent accusations that JEM leadership is increasingly dominated by a small Zaghawa clan and marginalizes non-Zaghawa. Since June, JEM Deputy-Chair Ahmed Adam Bakhit has moved from Kampala to South Sudan to try and contain the rift, reportedly with no success so far. This split is likely to further undermine the group’s military relevance.

4. With the South Sudanese government pressing the Darfur groups to leave, and no serious prospect of moving to Darfur or Libya, the way out for JEM seems to be South Kordofan. According to internal sources, both JEM and the new splinter group have approached the new SPLM/N leadership, elected in October 2017 and led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu, in order to explore the possibilities to move to South Kordofan. They hope to move their forces there after the rainy season in late 2017-early 2018.

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20 According to recent sources, “Bongo” is currently outside due to health reasons.
21 Tijani al-Diheb has been arrested by JEM several months ago, reportedly because he was suspected of planning to defect to the Sudanese government or to a JEM splinter group.
22 According to some sources, Bukhari Abdallah resigned from JEM a few months ago.
23 Important cadres Mahdi Adam Ismael “Jebel Moon” and Bashir Semoussi left South Sudan and joined the government of Sudan in 2016; the group led by Abu-Bakr Hamad Noor returned to Khartoum in 2017.
24 According to several sources, the dissident commanders joined New JEM, a dissident JEM movement launched by Mansour Arbab in 2015.
Annex VIII: Darfurian rebel groups operating in Libya

1. SLA/MM has been by far the biggest Darfurian rebel group in Libya since it entered Libya from North Darfur in early 2015. Most of its resources (commanders, troops, equipment) are now in Libya, mostly in the Jufra region, in particular in Hun (including on the air base controlled by LNA affiliates) and in farms in the Zella area. SLA/MM operates in support of the LNA, through the intermediary of local militias. The group has been able to significantly increase its capability because of its participation in the Libya conflict. According to several reliable sources, the group now has several hundred fighters and approximately 150 vehicles. While the political leadership, including Minni Minawi, is away from the field, the military leadership of the group is in Libya, including chief of staff Juwa Haggag,25 his deputy Jabir Ishag, Faisal Saleh,26 Abd al Majid Ali Senine27 and Mohamad Shono.28

2. The group is well-structured and organized. Although he is away from the field, Minni Minawi remains in charge, and makes the strategic, big decisions, according to various sources. However, ill feelings appear to have emerged between Minawi and military leadership on the ground lately. In the May-June clashes in Darfur, SLA/MM lost three top field commanders (Jawa, Shatta and Mindi) whom Minawi reportedly trusted and relied on to lead the movement, based on clan relations. Minawi reportedly does not have the same trust in the current military leadership. Moreover, the troops in Libya get paid directly by their Libyan employers, which gives them increased autonomy from the political, exiled leadership. Tactical differences also exist between the military commanders and the political leadership. Moreover, the commanders reportedly increasingly resent Minawi’s absence from the field. According to several reliable sources, Minawi has recently been planning to visit Libya, probably to reassure his authority.

3. JEM has a limited presence in Libya—a few dozens of fighters and a few vehicles. When the current conflict in Libya broke out in 2014, the bulk of JEM troops were in South Sudan, making it difficult for the group to deploy to Libya. However, according to internal sources, JEM leadership is aware that the situation in Libya offers more opportunities than South Sudan, and would like the group to get more involved in Libya. To that end, an experienced commander, General Abdel Karim Cholloi, former General Commander of JEM forces, was sent to Libya in early 2017, in order to explore ways for JEM to enhance its presence there. Cholloi was deployed to Libya because, as an ethnic Gourane from Chad, he knows the region and the routes to Libya.29 One of JEM main financiers, Bushara Saleman, was also present in Libya during most of the reporting period in order to reinforce JEM’s operations in that country. However, to move the group from South Sudan to Libya appears difficult and risky, in particular concerning the military equipment. Several sources, both in Libya and within rebel groups, reported to the Panel that JEM has been working with the Misrata faction and the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB). Both SLA/MM and JEM leadership officially deny the presence of their groups in Libya.

4. SLA/AW has no significant presence in Libya. A historical SLA/AW commander, Yusuf Ahmad Yusuf “Kajakala”, moved from the Ain Siro area (North Darfur) to Libya several years ago. Although he did not officially break away from SLA/AW, he has been de facto independent from Abdul Wahid al-Nour since 2014. SLA/TC, a dissident group from SLA/AW,30 is also present in Libya with a small force, in support of the LNA alongside SLA/MM; its General Commander, Saleh Jebel Si, is reportedly leading its force in Libya. In a meeting with the Panel in June 2017, Mr Nour said he was trying to reach out to Khalifa Haftar in order to propose to him some of his manpower, on the ground of a shared interest in fighting Islamism in the region. However, this proposal sounds unrealistic. It would be very difficult for SLA/AW troops to move from their strongholds in Jebel

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25 Haggag joined Libya from South Sudan a few weeks before the incursions into Darfur.
26 Reportedly in charge of operations.
27 Reportedly in charge of artillery.
28 Reportedly in charge of intelligence and security.
29 Cholloi was one of the architects of the JEM raid to Tripoli in August 2011, which allowed the group to infiltrate the movement’s then-leader, Khalil Ibrahim.
30 See para. 19.
Marra to Libya, due to their logistical issues and the significant presence of Sudanese security forces and paramilitary between Jebel Marra and Libya.

5. In July 2017, three small Darfur rebel groups based in Libya since 2015-16, the SLA/Unity of Abdallah Yahia, the SLA-Justice of Taher Hajeir and a group led by ex-JEM Abdallah Jamma formed a new coalition, the Sudan Liberation Force Alliance (SLFA). According to sources, the new coalition has several dozens of vehicles, and a few hundreds of fighters. Its main field commanders are Ahmed Abu Tonga, Musa ‘Com’Groupe’ (SLA/Justice), Aboud Adam Khater and Imam Daoud (SLA/Unity). The group was reportedly present in the Bizeima, Waw an Namus and Sabha areas. The SLFA is now having talks with SLA/MM to discuss a potential unification of the two groups. Hajeir and Yahia have close relations with President Deby of Chad, who once tried to convince them to participate in Government of Sudan’s National Dialogue. These good relations with President Deby should encourage the SLFA not to work with Islamist factions against General Haftar, whom President Deby supports.

6. In September–October, several dozens of SLFA troops, led by Imam Daoud, participated in a military operation led by Mahrouk Hannaich, a Libyan commander aligned with the pro-Gaddafi Libyan faction. The force led by Hannaich and comprising SLFA elements left Sabha in late September and settled in the Warshafanah area, south west to Tripoli. The goal of the operation appears to have been the destabilization and possible seizure of Tripoli, in coordination with other pro-Gaddafi forces. In early October, both Daoud and Hannaich were captured by a Tripoli militia. A local source indicates that the SLFA elements stayed in the area until early November, when they were expelled by pro-Tripoli government forces after clashes where they suffered significant losses.

7. Several individual, independent Darfuri commanders are also present in Libya. They act as mercenaries in the conflict and/or engage in various businesses and trafficking. Several of these commanders were part of rebel groups which signed peace deals or security arrangements with the Government of Sudan, but then moved to Libya to enjoy the economic opportunities offered by the conflict. Commanders operating in Libya include Abdallah Banda, Gibril “Tek”, Mohamed Dardong, Zekeri al-Duch (all formerly JEM), Abass Aseel (formerly SLA/AW).

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31 Hajeir is the SLFA Chairman. Yahia is his deputy, and Jamma is the General commander of the military forces. The three groups constituting the coalition hail mostly from the Zaghawa tribe.
32 Interview with Minni Minawi, October 2017.
33 To the extent that Chadian rebel groups suspect that President Deby may want to use the SLFA to monitor the activities of Chadian rebels in Libya (according Chadian rebel sources).
34 See annex IX.
35 The force was also ambushed by a local militia on the way to the Warshafanah area, suffering losses.
36 See annex IX.
37 Al-Duch, a former JEM commander from Mahamid tribe, is also an ally of Musa Hilal, and reportedly one of his current contact points in Libya.
Annex IX: Photographs of captured commanders Mabrouk Hanaich and Imam Daoud

Photograph 1 – Depicting Mabrouk Hanaich (top) and Imam Daoud (bottom)
Photograph 2: Depicting
Mabrouk Hanitch
Annex X: Libyan commanders cooperating with Darfurian rebel groups

1. According to several sources, Hilal Musa, a militia leader from Zella, plays the central role in mobilizing and organizing Darfurian fighters, SLA/MM in particular, in support of LNA operations. A former supporter of Gaddafi regime now aligned with the LNA, he looks after those Darfurians and provides them with logistical support in the Zella area.

2. Nasser Ben Jerid, a Gaddafi militia leader and former supporter of Gaddafi regime, also manages some Darfurian groups, reportedly in the Sabha area, according to several local sources. While he was doing so until recently for the LNA, he now reportedly rallied Safi al-Islam’s pro-Gaddafi group with his Darfurian auxiliaries.

3. Mabrouk Hanich is also a key focal point for Darfur groups in Libya. A military officer during Gaddafi era from Megrawa tribe, he is the commander of the “219th People’s Reinforced Infantry Battalion”, a militia made up mostly of Megrawa and Gaddafi tribesmen. In 2016, Hanich was aligned with the LNA, and was managing some Darfur groups on its behalf. In recent months, he started operating as part of Safi al-Islam’s pro-Gaddafi group, bringing some Darfurian fighters with him, as illustrated by the participation of SLFA elements in his failed military operation in Tripoli area in October.

4. Hassan Keley, a Tebu militia leader from Kufra, is another key Libyan partner for Darfurian (and Chadian) groups operating in Libya. He contributed to involving the Darfur groups in Libya, by soliciting some Darfurian commanders (reportedly from SLA/MM) to help the Tebu in their clashes against the Zuwaya in Kufra in 2015. Disappointed with Haftar’s perceived closeness with the Zuwaya, he joined anti-Haftar forces in late 2016, reportedly becoming the advisor to Defence Minister Mahdi Al-Borgathi (Haftar’s opponent, known supporter of the BDB, currently suspended). In this role, he has been a key intermediary between anti-Haftar forces, in particular Misrata and the BDB, and Darfurian and Chadian fighters. For instance, according to several sources, he played a major role in the defection of some Darfurian fighters from Haftar forces during the BDB attack on the oil crescent in March 2017.

5. Abulgasim Abaj plays an important role in linking the Darfurian groups and the LNA, according to several sources. A member of the Zuwaya tribe from Kufra, he was a high-profile intelligence operative in southern Libya during the Gaddafi regime, in charge of linking with, and providing logistical assistance to, the Darfur groups. Captured by anti-Gaddafi forces in 2011, he was released in late 2016–early 2017. According to sources, after his release he joined Haftar forces, for the benefit of which he reportedly uses his solid, personal relations with Darfurian leaders and commanders.

6. General Abdullah Nuraldin al-Hamid, from Ferjani tribe and a former member of the military under Gaddafi, was the head of LNA operations room in the Jufra area until 28 August 2017, and was one of the key officers involved in the seizure of the Sirte Basin by the LNA in 2016. According to several sources, he used Darfurian auxiliaries in support of LNA military operations, through the intermediary of Hilal Musa and others. His successor, General Ali Mohamed Omar Saad (reportedly from Megrawa tribe), also cooperates with Darfurian rebels, as illustrated by the documents in Annex XI.

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38 Reported from Gaddafi tribe.
39 According to a well-informed source, Hilal Musa hosted an important group of Darfurian fighters with their vehicles in a location called ‘Haql Zuweitina’, between Zella and Jebel al-Hanaj (28°34’35’’N – 017°19’49’’E).
40 According to a Darfurian commander, Hanich was in contact with the Darfurian groups in the Kufra area as early as 2007. See photos in annex IX.
41 He reportedly has a good relationship with Ali Kana, a major figure of former Gaddafi regime.
42 According to local sources, SLA/MM elements are not working with Hanich and were not involved in his operation in Waddafana area.
43 For instance, when the Darfurian leaders went to Libya for peace talks on Darfur.
Annex XI: LNA letters regarding Darfuri groups

Transcribed from Arabic

Libyan Arab Armed Forces
General Command
Jufrah Operations Room

To: All security gates and checkpoints

Captain Abdulmajid Sanin Ali

The above-mentioned officer is a member of the Zillah Martyrs Battalion, which is under the authority of the Jufrah Operations Room. He is authorized to travel from the Zillah area to the Unam al-Aranib area and then return, in order to carry out the duties he has been assigned. He will be accompanied by three vehicles, one of which is equipped with a Dushka. Individuals are authorized to bear arms.

Please take note and facilitate procedures.

(Signed) Staff Brigadier General Ali Muhammad Umar Sa’id
Commander, Jufrah Operations Room

cc:
Military Intelligence Directorate (for information)
Military Police Directorate (for information)
General file (for retention)

Subject: [illegible]
File No.: [illegible]
Date: 17 [illegible] 2017
To: Sabha military region
All security gates and checkpoints

At 7 a.m. on Tuesday, 3 October 2017, a group of 17 vehicles armed with medium weapons will be moving from the Jufrah area to the Umm al-Araib area via the Sabha area. They will be commanded by Major General Jabir, a Sudanese opposition leader, and belong to the Jufrah Operations Room.

Please take note.

(Signed) Staff Brigadier General Ali Muhammad Umar Sa'id
Commander, Jufrah Operations Room

cc:
General Command (for information)
Central Military Region (for information)
Control Authority (for information)
Jufrah Intelligence Branch (for information)
General file (for retention)
Transcribed from Arabic

Libyan Arab Armed Forces
General Command
Jufrah Operations Room

Subject: Movement order
File No.: [illegible]
Date: __________ 2017

To:
No.:

Vehicles (type) __________ colour ____________ chassis number ____________ will be under your command.

1. Purpose: administrative work
2. Departure point: Zillah
3. Date of departure: 24 June 2017 Time of departure: 3 a.m.
4. Speed limit: 60 km/h for trucks, 80 km/h for buses and 100 km/h for small vehicles
5. Stopping: vehicles can stop for 10 after two hours of travel, in order to rest
6. Travel will be via public roads
7. Stages: Zillah/Waw airport/Unnu al-Aranib/Murzuq
8. Administrative matters
   (a) No movement before first light or last light. Allowed to move at night.
   (b) Each driver shall carry his daily work card and the forms pertaining to the fuel dispensed
       (not [illegible])
9. The movement order shall be inspected by the police for the outbound journey (yes) and the
   return journey (yes)
10. Approval of the Military Intelligence Directorate (must be contacted at time of departure)
11. Use of movement order: This order shall apply to vehicles used for travelling a distance of more
    than 100 km. It does not apply to paramilitary vehicles used for travelling a distance of 100 km,
    unless those vehicles are part of a column. The daily work card mentioned in point (b) above
    shall be utilized.

   Please take action.

   (Signed) Staff Brigadier General Ali Muhammad Umar Sa’id
   Commander, Jufrah Operations Room

cc:
Military Intelligence Directorate (for information)
Military Police Directorate (for information)
General file (for retention)
Note: authorized to carry a weapon
Annex XII: Photographs of arms reported in Darfurian rebel group incursions

Image 1 – Panhard AML with 90mm gun armoured cars (Source: NISS)

Image 2 – Streit Spartan (on left - Black) and eight Streit Cougar vehicles (Source: NISS)
Image 3 – Darfurian rebel group SALW (Source: NISS)

Image 4 – SALW captured by SAF (Source: NISS)
Image 5 – Streit Cougar inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)

Image 6 – Battle damage to Streit Cougar inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)
Image 7 – Rocket & launcher 90mm M79 Osa inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)

Image 8 – Guided Missile launcher 9P135 inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)
Image 9 – Round 12.7 x 108mm APIT inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)

Image 10 – Headstamp of 12.7mm round inspected by the Panel (Source: Panel)
Annex XIII: Attacks on villages in the Ain Siro area, North Darfur

1. In late May, RSF and other units clashed with SLA/MM in and around Ain Siro, in Kutum district, North Darfur.44 These forces were in the area pursuing SLA/MM elements that had entered North Darfur from Libya the prior week. According to reports, several villages were partly burnt down in these clashes,45 a number of civilians were killed and others injured, and the local population was displaced to the surrounding mountains for several weeks.46 Allegedly, several women were raped. A UNAMID patrol assessed the situation in the area on 8 June and observed signs of destruction of villages and looting, including of a childcare centre and a medical facility in the villages of Toom and Mustariha, 2.5 km south of Ain Siro. The patrol also observed that some villages were abandoned. According to local sources, immediately following the operations by the RSF in the area, a large number of armed men, described as Arabs, on vehicles and motorbikes arrived to the villages and looted the houses and the livestock.47 Some of the villages looted included Tumnuu, Mustariha, Dillaiba, Ain Siro and the adjacent villages, including Muttur, Fora, Kolla and Amar, as well as a local dispensary. The Panel has received allegations that the armed men responsible for the looting belonged to the militia groups led by An-Nur “Guba” and Hafiz Dawood.48 Additional information received indicates that the RSF did not stop those carrying out the looting.

2. A UNAMID team visited the area in late July and observed RSF forces occupying the local schools in the villages of Dillaiba, Mustariha and Tumnuu (additionally, these schools had been looted).49 After UN officials raised the issue of the RSF presence at these schools with GoS authorities in El Fasher, the schools were vacated.

44 According to various sources, many of those who participated in this operation were from neighbouring areas and were familiar with the roads and terrain of the Ain Siro area.
45 Unconfirmed reports indicated that the villages attacked included Ain Siro, Farang East and Farang West, Tumnuu, Mustariha, Dillaiba, Kolla, Fora, and Muttur, Takjo, among others.
46 The Panel was unable to verify initial reports that these clashes had resulted in the displacement of the population to Kutum. In June, government authorities publicly denied that civilians were displaced from the Ain Siro area as a result of the recent fighting.
47 Information provided by UNAMID.
48 Interviews with local sources.
49 Some of the RSF members seen in the school at Mustariha were of Fur ethnicity, and are believed to be local recruits.
Annex XIV: List of the SLA/MM and SLA/TC members allegedly captured during the May clashes

The following list was provided to the Panel by representatives of SLA/TC:

1/ Nimir Mohamed Abdelrahman
2/ Fadul Hussain Abdalla Altom
3/ Yagoub Mohamed Hassan
4/ Mohamed Abdalla Ibrahim
5/ Mohamed Ishaq Abdalla
6/ Ahmed Yahya KhaBr
7/ Ahmed Hussain Mustafa Bakheit
8/ Babikir jar Ahmabi Hussain
9/ Saboon Yahya Jibril Abdulkarim
10/ Ahmed Aihaj Mohamed Sulaiman
11/ Arabi Mahmoud Arabi Adam
12/ Mohamed Ibrahim Adam
13/ Salih Abdallah Haroun Mohamed
14/ Yousuf Ibrahim Haroun Ahmed
15/ Alsadiq Abdulrahman Abdalla
16/ Alfadiil Ahmed Adam Sulaiman
17/ Musa Abdalla Salih Omer
18/ Abdalla Adam Bakheir
19/ Abdalla Mohamed Musa Mohamed
20/ Abubakre Adam Abdalla Abdel Gawi
21/ HaPa Yagoub HaPa Shalla
22/ Juma'a Issa Andel Khair
23/ Ali Ahnour Hammad Ali
24/ Abdeljabbar Adam Issa Da'oud
25/ Mubarak Adam Ibrahim
26/ Abdulgani Hussain
27/ Salih Mohamed Hussain
28/ Ishaq Mohamed
29/ Ibrahim Abdalla Altom
30/ Yousuf Yagoub Abdalla "Abu Kilo"
31/ Ali Mukhtar Ali
32/ Juma'a Sulaiman Mohamed Shogar
33/ Nourkdeen Mohamed Ahmed Issa
34/ Harry Ismael Nimeri
35/ Hamid Mohamed Salih
36/ Hussain Ahmed Mohamed
37/ Haroun Osman Sam
38/ Ismael Ishaq Mohamed
39/ Omer Hussain Ahmed
40/ Abdalla Osman Ishaq
41/ Adam Yagoub Ismael
42/ Omer Adam Mohamed
43/ Abdullahi Abdurrazziq Omer
44/ Ahmed Siddeeqa Imam
45/ Ali Omer Issa
46/ Mohamed Osman Bakheit
47/ Omer Shabor Abukkar
48/ Ali Ismat AUa
49/ Kiku Youss
50/ Ahmed Abakkar Ali Ibrahim
51/ Nourain Adam Ali Mohamed Salah
52/ Musa Eltahir Musa Da'oud
53/ Yagoub Haroun Ibrahim Ali
54/ Omer Abdulsalim Ibrahim
55/ Alsaid Kuwa Abdelrahman Adam
56/ Abdellah Mohamed Abdallah Khamis
57/ Yahya Abdelrahman Abbakar Ishaq
58/ Isa Aldouma Adam Daw el Bait
59/ Mohamed Ibrahim Elgizouli Ahmed
60/ Yousuf Tutu mameour Kafi
61/ Nourdeene Shabah Hassan Osman
62/ Bakri Arbab Ishaq Abdalla
63/ Zackaria Adam Tar Ismael
64/ Osman Khalil Ahmed Abdelrahman
65/ Mohamed Abbakar Mursal Ibrahim
66/ Mohamed Mursal Awad
67/ Anwar Yagoub Abbakkar
68/ Adam Hassan Adam Osman
69/ Alnazer abdalla Mohamed
70/ Saddam Hussain Abdalla
71/ Mohamed Ali Ibrahim Abdalla
72/ Juma'a Adam Yahya Garad
73/ Musa Ismael Ibrahim
74/ Abdalla Ibrahim Ismail
75/ Peter Hassan Tahir Nourain
76/ Osman Ahmed Abdalla Omer
77/ Hussain Mohamed Iman Mohamadain
78/ Adam Osman Abdelhassoul Mohamed
79/ Mubarak Juma'a Ahmed Abdelhassoul
80/ Abdulazim Ahmed Mohamed ShaPa
81/ Mohamed Adam Ali Khannis Juma'a
82/ Ahmed Hassan Tahir Yagoub
83/ Samawi Issa el Heiniir Kuku
84/ Omer Kuwa Mejo
85/ Issa Kuwu Salateen Ismael
86/ Bahreledeen Adam Musa
87/ Mukhtar Adam Arbab
88/ Issa Mohamed Ahmed Elhaj
89/ Ishaq AUf Abdalla Mohamed
90/ Jamal Yousuf Ishaq Musa
91/ Motaz Ibrahim Adam Issa
92/ Salih Hussain Ahmed Balheir
93/ Mohamed Omer Mahdi
94/ Ali Abbakkar Yagoub
95/ Yom Dal Yom
96/ Elhaj Ahmed Mohamaddain
97/ Shams eldeen Adam Ibrahim
98/ Mubarak Idriss KliaBr
99/ Ayoub Hassan Ali
100/ Mujahid Hussain Kamal
101/ Absouze Hussain Gumbala
102/ Ahmed Mohamed Omer
103/ Ibrahim Yahya Da'oud
157/ Mustafa Ibra Ali Abend
158/ Yousuf Absulhadi Yousuf
159/ Hussain Younas Ibrahim Taha
160/ Mohamed Adam Arbab Abakkar
161/ Tbrlain Alamed Abakkar
162/ Amjed Ahmed Ibrahim
163/ Abdalla Mohamed Ali Adam
164/ Ali Haroun Mohamed Yousuf
165/ Adam Ishaq Adam Abdalla
166/ Hussain Sulaiman Omer
167/ Tiya Abdelrahim Teriya
168/ Hussain Mohamed Kuwa Kuku
169/ Jiddh Lehal Sukous
170/ Mohamed Adam hamid Abdallah
171/ Abu el Gasim Mohamed Khamis
172/ Ali Bukhari Abbas
173/ Saddam Elhaj Adam Khamis
174/ Mohamed Abdalla Omer Abdulseed
175/ Di'oud Yahya Adam Bakheit
176/ Alrasheed Deng Akot
177/ Jama'a Kuku Juma'a Khair
178/ Nouredeen Taha Arbab
179/ Yousuf Ibrahim
180/ Haroun Ishaq Khamis
Annex XV: Situation of Internally Displaced Persons

1. There has been significant less displacement this year compared to prior years. Between late February and early March 2017, roughly 8,000 civilians fled their homes in East Darfur and sought refuge in different villages of El Fasher locality, in North Darfur, as a result of clashes between the Berti and the Ma’alai tribes. In May, an estimated 4,000 people were reportedly displaced to Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, due to clashes in the Jongom-West area, in Central Darfur, between the Salamat and Misseriya tribes over cattle theft and land occupation.

2. During this year’s farming season, there were frequent reports of harassment and violence by armed men described as Arabs against internally displaced persons (IDPs) when they farming, fetching water or conducting other life-sustaining activities outside the camps. Reports of destruction of farms by animals of nomad communities were also common. For example, in several camps and villages around Tawila, North Darfur, IDP leaders reported that they were being forced to make payments to Arab nomads in order to gain access to farmlands. The lack of adequate attention to this problem has diminished the trust of IDPs in the authorities. There were also numerous reports of physical attacks, rape or attempted rape, and harassment of women and girls during farming activities by perpetrators described as armed Arabs. For example, in July, two men physically assaulted and stabbed an IDP woman returning from her farm to Hashaba IDP camp, in South Darfur.50

3. Difficulties in accessing farmlands for IDPs due to the presence of these armed elements have resulted in food insecurity in certain communities. When the Panel visited Straha camp, in Nertiti town, in May 2017, IDP leaders complained about having limited access to their farmlands outside Nertiti town due to the presence of armed Arab groups and noted a lack of adequate nutritious food for vulnerable persons, in particular those displaced in last year’s Jebel Marra offensive and whose farmlands had been destroyed. Since the Panel’s visit, the situation in and around Nertiti has remained tense, with cases of abduction of civilians, rape, and attacks on farms by Arab men (Nawaiba) being reported in various localities.

4. Moreover, according to aid workers, factors such as inadequate rainfall, increased desertification and climate change have resulted in this year’s seasonal harvest being insufficient to meet the food security needs of some communities in Darfur, increasing their vulnerable situation.

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50 Information provided by UNAMID.
Annex XVI: Case: Sortony IDP gathering site, North Darfur

1. The IDPs at the Sortony gathering site have been subjected to threats, harassment and acts of violence by different armed elements since they arrived in the area in January 2016, during last year’s fighting in Jebel Marra. The presence of armed Arabs nomads, led by commander Daoud, and of SLA/PD, led by “General” Sadiq Al Foga, has been a source of tension and insecurity for the IDPs. Both groups have been responsible for numerous acts of violence in and around the camp against the IDPs. According to the IDP leaders, women and girls have been particularly at risk of sexual violence and sexual harassment by different armed elements both inside the gathering site and when they leave to fetch water, grass, or conduct other life sustaining activities.

Girls school at the Sortony gathering site (Source: Panel)

2. In May 2016, the Arab group led by commander Daoud, which has ties to local authorities, began blocking the Kabkabiya-Sortony road, preventing regular access of the IDPs to the Kubu water point (on the same road) and to local market. The blocking of this road followed an attack by the group on Sortony that month, which resulted in eight IDPs killed and six others injured. Two members of Daoud’s group were arrested by UNAMID peacekeepers for this attack and are standing trial in El Fasher. The road closure continued this year, with GoS authorities claiming at different periods that it had been reopened. In a meeting with the Panel on 1 August 2017, NISS authorities of North Darfur explained that Daoud’s group had closed the road because of the presence of Sadiq’s men in and around Sortony camp, partly to stop them from moving freely outside the Sortony area.

3. SLA/PD members have been present in Sortony since at least January of this year, after “General” Sadiq signed an agreement with the Government to join the peace process. Many SLA/PD members have their families in the camp. At that time, around 500 fighters belonging to this group were estimated to be present in Sortony and the surrounding area, although the actual numbers of this group was not known. After the May incursions, Sadiq was rumoured to be rejoining SLA/AW, which he refuted, maintaining that the peace agreement he signed with the GoS remained in place.

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51 The IDPs have demanded the payment of compensation (Dinor or blood money) for those killed and injured in the May 2016 attack; as well as for a number of rapes which they claim were perpetrated by the Arab group. The Native Administration and local authorities in Kabkabiya, supported by UNAMID, have engaged in negotiations with the two communities to reach a peaceful settlement.

52 Interview with members of SLA/PD in Sortony.
4. Sadiq and his men have regularly harassed the IDPs, including by imposing illegal taxes on them. The group has also been involved in cattle rustling incidents in the area, provoking attacks on the camp by the Arab nomads. Additionally, on several occasions earlier this year, Sadiq’s group tried to forcibly recruit male IDPs in the camp, reportedly to bolster the group’s numbers prior to their integration into the SAF. On 17 April, following several incidents of forcible recruitment, “General” Sadiq signed an agreement with the elders at Sortony, promising to refrain from interfering in the affairs of the IDPs and from recruiting civilians without their consent. Further, GoS authorities have accused Sadiq’s group of hiding weapons in the gathering site.

5. The tension between armed Arab nomads and SLA/PD in the Sortony area escalated in June and July, with clashes between the two groups over various cattle rustling incidents. In November, UNAMID forces from the Sortony team site intercepted a group of Arab nomads who were shooting randomly close to the team site. The group demanded the return of their stolen animals and the withdrawal of “General” Sadiq and his men from the gathering site, threatening to attack the IDPs. A few days later, in separate incidents, two IDPs were abducted and later released, and an IDP was shot and wounded, allegedly by the same Arab group.

6. SLA/PD members were expected to be transferred to El Fasher at the end of June for integration into SAF. However, at the time of writing, the transfer of Sadiq’s group out of the Sortony area has not taken place. The delay in this transfer appears linked to Sadiq’s failure in presenting the numbers of men he alleged to have, which has resulted in him not obtaining a senior-ranking position within the SAF. In a meeting with the Panel in October, GoS authorities indicated that they have made attempts to integrate SLA/PD members into the SAF. They claimed that SLA/PD presented large numbers of children for integration into the SAF, and these were screened out in the integration process. GoS authorities have also claimed that Sadiq presented a large number of men from the Beni Hussein tribe from Saraf Umra, who were not originally part of his group, for integration into the SAF, and that these recruits were rejected.

7. During the Panel’s various visits to the camp this year, the IDP leaders have expressed their concern with the situation, stressing that despite the dire conditions in the camp, they are unable to return to their villages of origin because many of their villages were destroyed during last year’s fighting. If integrated into the SAF, “General” Sadiq is expected to be redeployed to the Sortony area to provide security for the IDPs.

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53 See paras. 174-175.
54 UNAMID has informed the Panel that it is closely monitoring the integration of SLA/PD into SAF to ensure that no minors are integrated. On a number of instances, UNAMID Team Site personnel have observed youths carrying weapons and/or wearing camouflaged clothes with Sadiq’s men at the gathering site. The exact age of these youths has not been verified.
Annex XVII: Clashes between Sudanese forces and IDPs at Kalma camp, South Darfur

1. On 22 September 2017, at least five IDPs were killed, and some 27 others were injured following a clash between GoS security forces and the IDPs at Kalma camp, South Darfur. The incident occurred during a demonstration by the IDPs against the visit of President Al-Bashir to the area, and was part of several days of protests which began on 19 September. Different accounts have emerged on what transpired. According to some sources, while President Al-Bashir was holding a rally in Beleil, 1km from Kalma, RSF personnel violently dispersed the IDPs’ peaceful protest, firing shots in the direction of the crowd, which comprised of men, women, and children. Other reports indicate that some IDPs were carrying sticks, machetes, and had set tyres alight in the vicinity. Local authorities allege that the IDPs engaged in acts of violence and provoked the response by the security forces, detonating a hand grenade. Additional information received alleges that persons in civilian clothes may have entered the camp and provoked the violence. Many of the injured bore shrapnel wounds. Three members of the security forces were also injured in the incident.

2. GoS authorities have always had a tense relationship with the IDPs at Kalma camp, who predominantly support SLA/AW. Since mid-2008, local authorities have had no presence in the camp. Local authorities have accused the IDPs of hiding weapons inside the camp. From their part, the IDPs mistrust these authorities and refuse to accept local law enforcement presence in the camp.

3. Local authorities have indicated that they will fully investigate the incident. UNAMID is also conducting its own investigation into this event.
Annex XVIII: Sudanese refugees in Chad

1. Sudanese refugees living in Chad since the outset of the conflict have slowly began returning to communities in Darfur. The largest number of returns has so far been registered in Um Dukhun, Central Darfur. The reduction in humanitarian aid and the limited livelihood opportunities in eastern Chad are prompting some of these returns. However, some of these returns have been temporary, due to seasonal farming. Sudanese refugees have also been leaving the camps to seek livelihood opportunities in other areas of Chad, for example in the mining areas in north-eastern Chad, as well as in neighbouring countries and beyond.

2. On 31 May 2017, Chad, Sudan and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement on the voluntary repatriation of Sudanese refugees from Chad and of Chadian refugees from Sudan. A tripartite commission has been put in place to oversee the implementation of the agreement. During an intention survey conducted by UNHCR in early 2017, in collaboration with the Chadian Commission on refugees, some 3% of the approximately 300,000 Sudanese refugees in eastern Chad indicated their willingness to return to Sudan. The tripartite agreement is to serve as a basis to ensure that any future returns occur in conditions of safety and dignity, guided by the principle of voluntariness of return. In October, for the first time in ten years, 25 Sudanese refugee leaders from Chad participated in go-and-see visits to Sudan to assess the possibility of return. This is a significant development that may facilitate further returns.

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56 Commission National d’Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Repatriés.

Annex XIX: Reports of excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests by Government security forces against university students from Darfur

1. The Panel received reports of a number of incidents involving excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests against Darfuri students this year, including the following:

   a) In January 2017, NISS officials reportedly raided a student dormitory housing Darfuri students in Omdurman, outside Khartoum, arresting five students.

   b) In March, Darfuri students from the University of Holy Qur’an and Islamic Sciences in Gezira State organized a peaceful protest against the refusal of university authorities to honour the fee exemption policy for Darfuri students. Security forces used tear gas to disperse the crowd, carrying out a number of arrests.

   c) In May, NISS and pro-government students disrupted a public forum of the Darfuri student union at Al-Azahri University, in Khartoum, at which students were calling on university authorities to respect the fee exemption policy. Several students were injured and some twenty arrested in this incident.

   d) In mid-July, more than 1,000 Darfuri students from Bakh Al-Ruda, in White Nile State, resigned en masse after 14 of their colleagues were expelled by university authorities. They were also protesting the arrest of 10 students accused for the killing of two policemen in May.38 Seeking to present their grievances to authorities in Khartoum, the students decided to march to the capital, but were blocked by NISS and police forces in Sheikh El Yagont village, south of Khartoum, where they remained for three days without basic supplies before travelling to Darfur onboard buses. According to various sources, once in El Fasher, local authorities denied access to the town to those students who were not from El Fasher. Many of the students involved in this incident have since been unable to resume their studies.

   e) On 22 August, Nasreddin Mokhtar, former head of the Darfuri Student Association from University of Holy Qur’an in Omdurman, and originally from Nyala, South Darfur, was arrested outside the University by security forces; at the time of writing, he remains in detention for unknown charges. Several sources expressed concern about this detention to the Panel, alleging that in a prior detention in 2015, he had been subjected to torture.

   f) In October, police and NISS disrupted a student sit-in in a hall at the Faculty of Education in Khartoum University, organized in support of colleagues who had been dismissed by university authorities after calling for university reform. When security forces attempted to break the sit-in, they reportedly beat a number of Darfuri students in the hall and arrest at least four others. Those arrested were reportedly boarded onto the back of a pickup and beaten, one of them severely. The police later partially shaved their heads on way to the police station, releasing them after two days in custody.

   g) Twelve other arrests of Darfuri students by security forces in Khartoum were reported to the Panel in September and October, mainly linked to protests regarding university fee exemption and the discriminatory treatment of Darfuri students.

2. Darfuri university activists are regularly subjected to different forms of mistreatment in police and NISS custody. According to multiple sources, students undergo extensive questioning in custody, including about their activism and their suspected links to the Darfuri rebel groups, and are often pressured into denouncing other students. Reportedly, during interrogations, the students are subjected to: beatings with batons, metal rods, and fists; kicking; slapping; torture through electroshock;59 racial slurs; and other forms of degrading treatment. The NISS offices in the Bahri neighbourhood of Khartoum and in Omdurman are reportedly notorious for these abuses. The Panel also received reports indicating that female

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38 On 9 May, two policemen were killed when security forces violently disrupted clashes between pro-government and opposition students at this University.
39 Using cattle prodders or tasers.
Darfurian student activists can at times be subjected to sexual violence in detention. Students are often held for prolonged periods without judicial review and without access to a lawyer or to their families.

3. Darfurian students are also exposed to violence from other students affiliated to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) party. For example, in one incident in late August, a group of pro-NCP students clashed with Darfurian students at Al-Neelain University, in Khartoum, reportedly stabbing three, who later died from their injuries. Also in August, two Darfurian students from El Fasher University were arrested after pro-NCP students clashed with student supporters of SLA/MM; they were released after four days. According to various sources, GoS authorities do not always adequately investigate attacks against Darfurian students or hold those responsible accountable.
Annex XX: Reports of recruitment of child soldiers by Darfurian rebel groups

1. During this mandate, the Panel received reports of various cases of child recruitment by Darfurian rebel groups.

2. While in Sudan in September, the Panel was informed that four minors—aged between 16–17—who were captured by GoS forces during the May clashes with Darfurian rebel groups. The Panel requested access to the captured minors and was allowed to interview them, in the presence of GoS authorities.13 Three of them recounted that they had been forcibly recruited in South Sudan, between 2016 and early 2017—two said that they were recruited by SLA/MM and one by SLA/TC. The fourth minor recounted that he had been forcibly recruited by SLA/MM sometime in the first part of 2017 in the area of Wadi Howar, North Darfur. All four recounted that they participated in the May incursions with their respective rebel groups and were captured by GoS forces, three in South Darfur and one in North Darfur. In October, the four children were transferred from the military jurisdiction to civilian authorities. GoS authorities have indicated that the charges against the children will be dropped, and efforts are underway to locate their family members.

3. In October, the Panel met with Minni Minawi and raised these reports of child recruitment by his group. Mr Minawi strongly denied these allegations, and said that his rebel group does not recruit children. He indicated that he has adopted different measures to prevent the recruitment of children, including issuing orders to all commanders on the ground not to recruit children and appointing a child protection officer to monitor compliance with these orders. Representatives of the rebel group provided the Panel with a copy of these orders and also indicated that the group is planning to organize a joint monitoring visit of its camps with the UN in early 2018. However, the Panel received limited information regarding where this visit will be conducted, and how the orders issued by the group’s leadership are being implemented by the chain of command on the ground.

4. The Panel also raised these reports with a representative of SLA/TC, who denied the group’s involvement in child recruitment and insisted that their forces comply with international law. He also indicated the group’s willingness to engage with UN officials to discuss the adoption of an action plan.

5. During a meeting with the Panel in September, representatives of the National Council for Child Welfare and SAF indicated that earlier this year, in an effort to bolster its numbers, SLA/PD presented a large number of children for integration into the SAF. According to these authorities, SAF officials screened these children out during the integration process. The Panel is seeking further information on this incident.

6. In October, the Panel received allegations that armed men belonging to a rebel group led by Mohamed Dardoug, a former JEM commander operating in Libya, recruited tens of children in the area of Mallia, North Darfur, in March of this year. The Panel is looking into these allegations.

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13 While in custody, the four minors underwent different age verification assessments, one carried out by military authorities and another by a civilian medical body.

14 Representatives of SAF, the National Council on Child Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the interviews. Although GoS authorities had initially accepted the Panel’s request to interview the children privately, the Panel was unable to meet with the children without the authorities present.

15 One of the three is South Sudanese, while the other two are Darfurians.
Annex XXI - Cross-border affiliations in the Darfur–Chad–Libya triangle

1. On 18 August 2017, an incident between armed men and a patrol of the Chadian National Army resulted in significant losses for the Chadian armed forces: a dozen of casualties, including two colonels. The Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République (CCMSR), a Chadian rebel group based in Libya and led by Mahamat Hassan Boubnaye, claimed responsibility for the incident. According to several Chadian rebel sources, the incident happened when a convoy of between 6 and 8 vehicles, including a truck, led by Bechir Faik, a veteran Chadian Arab rebel, and Margui Djourou, a commander of UFR Chadian rebel group, was intercepted by the Chadian patrol. According to several sources, the convoy was transporting supplies (mostly food) from Libya to Musa Hilal in Darfur. In Darfur, the convoy was reportedly going to buy a shipment of weapons that it would sell in Libya after returning. After being engaged by the Chadian army, the traffickers called CCMSR for help; some CCMSR elements joined the fighting, helping to defeat the patrol.

2. This incident illustrates the cross-border interconnections between the situations in Darfur, Libya and Chad, the porosity between rebel and/or militia activities and trafficking and the shifting and multi-layered loyalties of armed men in the region. Bechir Faik has had many hats. A Mahamid from Chad, in the 1980s, he was a commander for the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), a mostly Arab Chadian rebel group based in Darfur. After the CDR concluded an agreement with the Chadian government in the late 1980s, Faik stayed in Darfur, where he worked with Musa Hilal (also a Mahamid), including reportedly as part of Hilal’s Janjaweed militia in the Darfur conflict. When the Chadian rebellion settled in Darfur again in 2005-2006 with the support of the Government of Sudan, he joined it, reportedly as a commander for the Front of the Salvation of the Republic (FSR), a mostly Arab group led by Ahmad Hassaballah Soubiane. After the 2010 Sudan–Chad rapprochement and the subsequent end of Sudanese support for Chadian rebellions, he stayed in Darfur. There, he continued working with Musa Hilal, reportedly briefly joined Hemetti’s RSF, and engaged in cross-border trafficking between Darfur and Libya, including of weapons both ways, and of vehicles from Libya to Darfur. Since the beginning of the conflict in Libya between Haftar and the Tripoli government, he has oscillated between rebel, mercenary and trafficking activities. He works closely with the CCMSR, was reportedly a mercenary for the Benahazi Defence Brigades in May-June 2017, and continues his cross-border activities, as illustrated by the 18 August clashes.

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63 Flows of weapons between Darfur and Libya happen both ways: generally, light weapons go from Darfur to Libya while heavier weapons go from Libya to Darfur.
Annex XXII: Transcript of video clip by Abdul Wahid

Translated from Arabic

[Caption below speaker’s face]
The rebel Abdulwahid Muhammad Nur

[Statement]

I demand that displaced persons and refugees...any camp that has 300 to 500 million Sudanese pounds on a monthly basis...any camp with 300 to 500 million Sudanese pounds...that is for liberation!

Second, you must send me your sons and daughters who are in the camps, in the country and abroad...

Moreover, those who won’t pay us, they have to be aware that we will destroy their money [property] instead of allowing it to go to the Government, so that they can use it against us. Your money [property] will be destroyed, and we’ll destroy you afterwards.
Annex XXIII: Challenges to implementing the travel ban measure

1. Pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of the resolution 1591(2005), all States are required to take the necessary measures to prevent entry or transit of designated persons through their territories.

2. To prevent the entry of a designated individual into a Member State, there are dual controls in place. First, a Member State can deny the individual in question a visa, when a visa is required. Second, at the time of entry, the border control authority can deny entry. Border control authorities of all Member States have access to INTERPOL-UNSC Special Notices.

3. However, implementation of the travel ban measure during the transit of a designated individual through the territory of a Member State presents challenges. This could be attributed to the principle of free transit through international areas of airports, enshrined in Annex 9 of Convention on International Civil Aviation. In most cases, no airport transit visa is required to transit through the territory of a Member State. Further, in transfer/transit areas of the international airports, there are usually no systematic passport checks. Against this backdrop, a Member State can prevent the transit of a designated individual only when it has specific information available.

4. Few exceptions exist to the principle of free transit. For example, in annex IV to regulation no. 210/2009, the European Union listed certain countries whose nationals are required to hold an airport transit visa. This list does not include Sudan, and would therefore not apply to the individuals designated on the sanctions list.

5. To prevent transit of a designated individual, use of an Advance Passenger Information (API) system is advocated. An API is an electronic communications system that collects data from the passenger’s passport or other government-issued travel document. The data of all passengers of a departing flight is electronically transmitted to border control authorities of the Member State, where the flight is scheduled to arrive. This data is sent before the departure of flight to give sufficient notice to the Member State to perform checks on passengers. If a traveller’s name appears on any Interpol watch list, the transiting individual can be intercepted upon arrival. At present, approximately 75 countries use API systems.

6. Sudan does not have an API system in place. As there is no requirement for Sudanese nationals to seek an airport transit visa for any country, the border control authority in a transit country is unable to prevent the transit of a designated individual.

7. In its letter dated 22 May 2014, the Committee requested that Sudanese authorities restrict the travel of the designated Sudanese individuals to other countries. While Sudanese nationals have the right to travel outside their country pursuant to international instruments, Member States like Sudan are entitled to put in place restrictions on the travel of their nationals. Therefore, the Committee could encourage Sudan to instruct Sudan’s border control agency to monitor the designated individuals’ movement abroad, with a view to either restrict their travel at the onset, or to inform the transit or destination country so that the travel ban can be successfully implemented by the transit or destination country.

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64 International Civil Aviation Organization, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 7300/9, 7 December 1944, annex 9, paras. 3.57. Also known as the Chicago Convention, and with 191 signatory member state, the Convention states: “where airport facilities permit, Contracting States shall make provision by means of direct transit areas or other arrangements, whereby crew, passengers and their baggage, arriving from another State and continuing their journey to a third State on the same flight or another flight from the same airport on the same day may remain temporarily within the airport of arrival without undergoing border control formalities to enter the State of transit”.


66 See article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Cf. article 12 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
8. Further, the Council may like to seek information from other Sanctions Committees on the implementation of travel ban with regard to transiting passengers, and disseminate the best practices among the Member States.
Annex XXIV: Updated information on the designated individuals

Part A—Photographs of three designated individuals

Musa Hilal Abdalla Alnsiem [SDi.002]

Adam Yacub Sharif [SDi.003]

Jibril Abdulkarim Ibrahim Mayu [SDi.004]

Part B—Proposed amendment to Sanctions List

SDi.003 Name: 1: ADAM 2: YACUB 3: SHAREIF 4: na
# Annex XXV: Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>API</td>
<td>Advance Passenger Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APIT</td>
<td>Armour Piercing Incendiary Tracer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUHIP</td>
<td>African Union High-level Implementation Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDB</td>
<td>Benghazi Defence Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMSR</td>
<td>Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNA</td>
<td>Libyan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISS</td>
<td>National Intelligence and Security Service (Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Popular Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Rapid Support Force(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms &amp; Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA/AW</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid</td>
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<td>Sudan Liberation Army/Arkou Minni Minawi</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SLFA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Force Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army (South Sudanese Army)</td>
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<td>SPLM/N</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Sudanese Revolutionary Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFR</td>
<td>Union of Forces of Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Special Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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