



---

## **Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur**

### **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 2173 (2014), in which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The report provides an update and analysis of the situation in Darfur and progress towards achievement of the Operation's strategic priorities and benchmarks for the period from the date of my previous report, 22 July 2014 (S/2014/515), until 15 November 2014. It also includes updates on the measures taken by the mission to implement the strategic priorities outlined in my special report of 25 February 2014 (S/2014/138).

### **II. Overview and analysis of the conflict dynamics and operating environment in Darfur**

#### **A. Analysis of the current trends and conflict dynamics in Darfur**

2. During the reporting period, while military operations decreased overall, possibly because of the rainy season (July to September), clashes between Government forces and armed movements occurred intermittently and aerial bombardments by the Government of the Sudan were reported on a number of occasions. Competition over resources continued to exacerbate the security situation, resulting in deadly clashes between tribes and increased criminality and banditry, all of which had a significant impact on the civilian population, particularly in North, South, East and Central Darfur.

#### **Fighting between Government forces and rebel groups**

3. The recent resurgence of activities by the armed movements in several of their strongholds in North, South and Central Darfur points to their possible regrouping several months after the campaign of the Rapid Support Forces earlier in the year had left them substantially weakened. In September and October, the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) managed to inflict casualties on Government forces in Rockero and Golo (Central Darfur) and in the Jebel Amer area (North Darfur). While the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM)



and the Justice and Equality Movement-Gibril Ibrahim (JEM-Gibril) avoided direct confrontation with Government forces, they asserted their presence by setting up checkpoints in their strongholds of South and North Darfur and extorting cash or fuel from United Nations transportation contractors.

4. In recent months, the military presence and influence of SLA-AW have waned beyond its stronghold in Jebel Marra at the junction of Central, North and South Darfur. Factionalism within the group, triggered by the prolonged absence of Abdul Wahid, has weakened the group both politically and militarily. While there have been reports that internal rifts have affected SLA-AW military operations and effectiveness, clashes between the Sudanese armed forces and SLA-AW demonstrated the determination of core SLA-AW elements to limit Government incursions into the area. Recent fighting sparked by the Government's decision to establish Golo as the capital of the newly created locality of Central Jebel Marra is a case in point. Owing to access restrictions at Rockero, UNAMID was not in a position to verify the exact fallout of these clashes at the time.

5. Further, clashes between Government forces and SLA-AW near the Straha camp of internally displaced persons at Nertiti (Central Darfur) on 15 October resulted in the killing of two members of the Sudanese armed forces and three members of SLA-AW. Thereafter, the Sudanese armed forces instructed internally displaced persons to suspend regular activities outside the camp because of the volatile security situation. After two days, and following UNAMID intervention on the issue, the situation returned to normal.

6. SLA-MM, based mainly in South and East Darfur with traditional strongholds in Shearia, Labado and Muhajeria, bore the brunt of the campaign led by the Rapid Support Forces in the first quarter of 2014. Since July, its combatants have been sighted in Labado and Shearia, though not in active battle. SLA-MM has however been engaged in extortion activities at a number of checkpoints between Nyala and Shangil Tobaya against commercial and Government convoys. On 11 September, a Government convoy travelling from Nyala to El Fasher was ambushed by SLA-MM elements in Nurtic village, near the UNAMID team site at Shangil Tobaya, resulting in the death of four Government personnel. In response, Government security established restrictions on vehicle movement along the El Fasher-Shangil Tobaya road and surrounding areas.

7. Unlike either SLA-MM, whose constituents are mainly Zaghawa, or SLA-AW, which is predominantly Fur, JEM-Gibril has a diverse membership which in the past contributed to its influence throughout Darfur. However, following the split in its ranks after JEM-Bashar (now JEM-Peace) signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and a large number of JEM-Gibril combatants started fighting in Southern Kordofan and South Sudan, JEM-Gibril has not been active in Darfur except in the area between Um Baru and Tine in North Darfur. On 20 October, following air strikes by Sudanese armed forces on villages in Um Baru, JEM placed checkpoints between Um Baru and Tine. There have been no military activities by JEM-Gibril in Darfur during the reporting period.

8. Following information from the population regarding aerial bombardments on 19 October in Abu Leha and Orschi villages near Um Baru, UNAMID established that six bombs had been dropped in the area, killing one civilian. A separate mission undertaken by the UNAMID Ordnance Disposal Office confirmed that no unexploded ordnance remains in either village. Reports were also received of

civilian casualties from bombardments in eastern Jebel Marra on 16 and 30 October. These could not be confirmed by UNAMID. The mission was, however, able to confirm information of a bombardment in Rofata, eastern Jebel Marra (North Darfur) on 5 November. A follow-up verification mission is planned by the Ordnance Disposal Office.

### **Threats and attacks against civilians**

9. A total of 55 cases of violence and attacks against civilians were recorded by UNAMID, of which 16 cases were allegedly perpetrated by Arab militias, 23 by Government forces and 16 by unknown armed elements. For the first time in many years, elements of SLA-AW and SLA-MM were also involved in a number of direct attacks on civilians and acts leading to civilian casualties, injuries and displacements.

10. In August and September, armed Arab militias and the Rapid Support Forces increased their control over areas in North, South and East Darfur with reported attacks on civilians, including internally displaced persons, by the Northern Rizeigat in Korma, Tawilla and Shangil Tobaya (North Darfur) and by the Northern Rizeigat, Southern Rizeigat and Misseriya in Menawashi (South Darfur) and Labado (East Darfur). In addition, 12 alleged attacks by suspected Arab militias against civilians in eight villages in Korma and the Korma camp of internally displaced persons, which included acts of killing, rape, assault, abduction, threat, robbery and livestock rustling, were reported.

11. On 14 August, 45 Arab men dressed in uniforms of the Rapid Support Forces, the Sudanese armed forces and the Border Guard surrounded and threatened to attack the Hamada and Mosku camps of internally displaced persons (South Darfur) over allegations that camp residents had killed two members of the Rapid Support Forces on 9 August. Two days later, 100 Arab men on camels armed with machine guns and assault rifles reportedly fired indiscriminately in the vicinity of Hamada camp for three hours. The Sudanese armed forces intervened and a Government-led mediation resulted in the internally displaced persons paying blood money for the death of the two men. In a separate incident, on 22 September, a group of internally displaced persons were harassed, beaten and robbed of personal belongings and livestock by suspected members of the Rapid Support Forces near Kobi village (South Darfur).

12. Internally displaced persons continued to express concerns about the deteriorating security situation, particularly in Mournei, Hujaj, Abuzar and Al Riyah camps (West Darfur), and Nifasha and Shadad camps (North Darfur). Early in October, the internally displaced in Labado camp (East Darfur) reported to UNAMID of harassment by armed Arab nomads in the area. One incident involved the killing of two internally displaced persons and the subsequent theft of their livestock on 4 October. This was followed by the attempted theft of livestock belonging to internally displaced persons by Arab nomads on 7 October. The ensuing clash led to the death of two Northern Rizeigat tribesmen. UNAMID was able to verify both incidents.

13. The armed movements were involved in several incidents that resulted in the attack or displacement of civilians. On 7 September, elements of SLA-AW kidnapped six leaders of the internally displaced from Nertiti camp (Central Darfur) over accusations that they were encouraging internally displaced persons to

participate in the peace process. The abducted leaders were reportedly detained at the SLA-AW base in Kutum (15 km east of Nertiti) for trial. The head of the group was released on 16 September following negotiations between SLA-AW and the Peaceful Coexistence Committee and Native Administration in the area. The trials were abandoned after UNAMID leadership intervened with the movement's leaders. The other members of the group were released at the end of September.

14. Elements of SLA-AW were also involved in an attack on an Arab Rizeigat nomadic settlement in the Al Wehda area, near Menawashi (South Darfur) on 11 September in which a sheikh and his son were killed along with 10 camels belonging to the community. A pursuit operation by the Rizeigat resulted in an exchange of gunfire at the Dobo Madrasa area and the death of 10 SLA-AW members and injury of two Rizeigat tribesmen. On 1 October, SLA-AW elements reportedly abducted 10 teachers and members of the Parent-Teacher Association at Rockero (Central Darfur). The teachers were accused of participating in a National Congress Party conference in Zalingei (Central Darfur) on 24 September and organizing the elections of April 2015 in the area. The political undertone to several of those attacks characterizes a disturbing trend, particularly in the light of the internal power struggles within the SLA-AW movement.

15. On 11 September, Arab militiamen attacked three villages located 50 km from the UNAMID team site at Shangil Tobaya. The attack was triggered by a cattle-grazing dispute between farmers and nomads and resulted in the deaths of three men, as well as four children burned, four women raped, and displacement to surrounding camps of internally displaced persons.

#### **Local violence and intercommunal conflicts**

16. During the reporting period, intercommunal clashes, largely between ethnic Arab tribes over access to resources, continued to affect and displace civilians: 11 confrontations and 377 reported fatalities were recorded as compared to 24 confrontations and 93 confirmed deaths in the previous period. The conflicts between the Rizeigat and the Ma'alia in East Darfur, the Beni Hussein and the Northern Rizeigat in North Darfur and the Fallatta and the Habbaniya in South Darfur represent the most significant tribal conflicts.

17. Of the reported fatalities, a total of 320 deaths resulted from clashes in August between Southern Rizeigat and Ma'alia in Um Rakuba and Abu Karinka (East Darfur), which were triggered by the theft of cattle by a Southern Rizeigat tribesman at a Ma'alia village in Um Rakuba. The theft sparked an attack by Southern Rizeigat on a Government police station, in which two vehicles and an unknown number of weapons were seized. A pursuit operation by Ma'alia on 16 August resulted in the death of 29 Ma'alia and 35 Southern Rizeigat, with an undetermined number injured. UNAMID was informed by local sources in Adilla that Southern Rizeigat involved in the clash wore uniforms similar to those of the Rapid Support Forces and the Border Guards and were allegedly in possession of high-powered automatic weapons and mortars. The violence continued until 20 August when Southern Rizeigat attacked Ma'alia positions in Um Rakuba, resulting in an undetermined number of dead and injured. Fighting subsided after Ma'alia blocked the strategic El Obeid-El Daein road on 14 September. Tensions again escalated with two additional clashes recorded on 3 and 9 October in Abu Jabra and El Daein and in Abu Dangal in Shearia, respectively.

18. Resource-based intercommunal fighting continued in North Darfur, where Beni Hussein and Northern Rizeigat in the localities of El Sireif and Saraf Umra clashed five times from 25 to 28 August, when 150 camels were stolen by Beni Hussein at Taigai village. In total, at least 16 Northern Rizeigat and 25 Beni Hussein were killed.

19. On 6 September, members of the Fallata and Habbaniya tribes clashed near Shagag village, Buram locality (South Darfur), resulting in two fatalities on each side. Another clash erupted the following day, resulting in the death of two Habbaniya and four Fallata tribesmen. The clashes appeared to have been caused by incidents of animal rustling by both sides. On 30 September, Fallata tribesmen clashed with Southern Rizeigat in Labado (East Darfur).

### **Criminality and banditry**

20. Criminality remains a major concern. It is compounded by the limited capacity of local law enforcement authorities, impunity, proliferation of small arms and a culture of violence stemming from Darfur's protracted conflict environment. Criminal activities during the reporting period included attacks on villages and incidents of rape, hijacking and abduction. However, while recorded crimes decreased to 284 cases from 331 cases in the previous reporting period, several alleged cases of abduction of internally displaced persons by criminal groups were recorded, a majority of the incidents occurring in areas near camps of the internally displaced.

21. Various forms of criminality by suspected Arab militias targeting local communities and internally displaced persons who were farming were also recorded. These involved incidents of murder, rape, physical assault, intimidation and animal rustling. In most cases, the internally displaced persons were warned not to farm in the area.

22. To counter the high number of criminal incidents, on 15 July, the Governor of South Darfur introduced emergency security measures, which included a state-wide curfew, ban on movement of armed civilians, individuals wearing masks and unregistered vehicles, and extensive search operations in camps of internally displaced persons with a view to detaining persons implicated in criminal activities and the illegal possession of arms and alcohol. An emergency court was established and prosecutors appointed. In line with these measures, authorities conducted cordon and search operations in Otash and Al Salam camps of the internally displaced from 3 to 5 August, resulting in the arrest and trial of persons suspected of criminal activities. While these measures have improved the security situation in South Darfur, internally displaced persons continue to express strong resistance to the Government entering camps.

## **B. Humanitarian situation**

23. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in addition to more than 2 million long-term internally displaced persons, the number of people displaced by conflict since the beginning of the year increased from 385,000 in the previous reporting period to 431,300. While 132,000 of these have returned home, 298,700 people remain displaced. The main flash points for displacements during the reporting period involved two major clashes between the

Ma'alia and Hamar and between the Ma'alia and Rizeigat in East Darfur, and between the Beni Hussein and Northern Rizeigat in North Darfur. Returns of internally displaced persons remained sporadic and temporary. Permanent voluntary returns continued to be hindered by insecurity and lack of basic services in places of return, as well as a general reluctance on the part of those persons to relinquish their internally displaced status and associated monthly ration entitlement.

24. Heavy rains and floods affected thousands of internally displaced persons in many parts of Darfur in August. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 9,300 people were displaced into Korma and Zam Zam camps and parts of El Fasher town in North Darfur, where heavy rains destroyed 2,894 homes, partially submerged three hospitals, and affected an estimated 16,600 people. At the request of the State Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization, UNAMID assisted with the draining of stagnant water from parts of the city to reduce mosquito breeding areas. In El Salam camp (South Darfur), 203 homes were destroyed and another 595 damaged by flooding. Impassable roads also led to a reduction in patrols and armed escorts by the mission, including those for humanitarian partners delivering critical assistance to affected communities.

### **C. Operating environment**

25. The operating environment in Darfur continues to be challenging, with insecurity, criminality and restrictions of movement impeding UNAMID mandate implementation and programme delivery by humanitarian actors, and threatening the safety and security of UNAMID and United Nations agency personnel. Restrictions of movement decreased overall during the rainy season, the highest number of restrictions being in North Darfur State. UNAMID leadership engaged the military authorities at local and national levels to address access denials, emphasizing the need for UNAMID to have unhindered access to all areas of Darfur. While access to communities generally improved over the rainy season, UNAMID has again started to experience difficulties in obtaining access to conflict areas, as the examples of Thabit, Kutum and Korma in North Darfur, and Abu Karinka in East Darfur demonstrate. The resulting restrictions of movement have been imposed by both the Government and the armed movements, allegedly on the basis of security concerns.

26. UNAMID personnel were attacked three times during the reporting period, resulting in the death of three UNAMID peacekeepers and one national staff member. On 30 August, in Ardamata, El Geneina, a UNAMID security guard was shot and killed by a Government police officer over a personal matter. On 16 October, a group of unidentified militia attacked a UNAMID patrol guarding a water borehole at Shoba, North Darfur. Two Ethiopian peacekeepers were killed at the scene, and a third later died from his injuries. The perpetrators seized one gun-mounted vehicle and 100 rounds of ammunition before fleeing the scene. On 29 October, a group of unidentified men aboard two gun-mounted vehicles attacked a UNAMID patrol at a water point outside of Kutum, North Darfur. In the ensuing firefight, three South African peacekeepers were injured, one seriously. UNAMID has since taken measures to reduce the exposure of personnel to identified security threats and strengthened the security coordination mechanism with the Government, with joint investigations carried out into incidents affecting United Nations personnel.

27. With regard to abductions, on 25 July, the Head of IOM in South Darfur was released 21 days after being abducted by unknown armed men in Nyala. One UNICEF national staff member and two GOAL international staff members taken hostage on 18 June in Kutum (North Darfur) were released on 19 July after 32 days in captivity.

28. The problem of carjacking and theft of United Nations/UNAMID vehicles during the reporting period was particularly acute in El Fasher owing to the presence of armed elements and criminal gangs. As at 15 November, 13 United Nations/UNAMID and five vehicles of international non-governmental organizations had been carjacked as compared to eight and five, respectively, in the previous reporting period. Six of the vehicles (five United Nations/UNAMID and one belonging to an international non-governmental organization) were recovered as compared to four in the previous reporting period. As at 15 November, a total of 67 incidents (56 affecting United Nations/UNAMID and 11 affecting international non-governmental organizations) involving house break-ins, robbery and theft were recorded, as compared to 77 incidents previously.

29. Road extortion targeting United Nations/UNAMID contracted trucks contributed to road insecurity. On three separate occasions, on 21 and 29 August and 8 September, UNAMID convoys were stopped by SLA-MM at Tangarara (North Darfur) and requested to pay for their passage. At a meeting with SLA-AW, SLA-MM and JEM-Gibril in August in Kampala, UNAMID expressed on the armed movements that the extortion of tolls was unacceptable. Representatives of the armed movements undertook to take corrective measures; no incidences have been reported since.

30. Seven cases of arrest of United Nations national personnel by the Government and armed movements were recorded during the reporting period as compared to three in the previous period. On 8 August, Government police in El Daein (East Darfur) arrested and later released without charge three national staff members (two of UNAMID and one of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) suspected of stealing United Nations-owned equipment from the El Daein UNAMID camp. Further, on 7 September, Government police arrested four UNAMID national staff members linked to theft of United Nations-owned equipment (10 refrigeration cooling units) from the UNAMID warehouse in El Fasher. UNAMID is investigating these allegations. On 14 August, in Kaguro area (North Darfur), one UNAMID individual contractor was arrested and later released by SLA-AW forces for undisclosed reasons.

31. During the reporting period, the Government of the Sudan issued 844 visas for UNAMID personnel, including 23 civilian personnel, 104 military, 430 police, 182 contractors, one consultant, 103 official visitors and one visa for a dependant of a Khartoum-based staff member. As at 10 November, 57 visas were pending for 7 civilian personnel, 3 United Nations Volunteers, 10 military, 4 police, 19 contractors, 2 consultants, 10 official visitors, and 2 dependants.

32. Twenty-four military units and 13 formed police units are currently deployed to UNAMID. Of the 24 military units, 11 are operating at a serviceability rate above 90 per cent, while 11 have a serviceability rate of above 70 per cent. Two units were operating below 50 per cent but have since improved to a rate of approximately 60 per cent. Of the 13 formed police units, the serviceability rates of 11 units are above 90 per cent and the average rate of all units is almost 91 per cent.

Nonetheless, shortfalls in contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment continue to place a burden on the mission's resources and limit the much-needed temporary deployment capability of troop-contributing countries.

33. While humanitarian access remains problematic, some improvements were recorded during the reporting period, and several inter-agency field missions were undertaken in all five Darfur states to assess needs and deliver assistance. As at early November, humanitarian partners estimate that approximately 75 per cent of newly displaced persons had been provided with some form of assistance since the beginning of 2014. In total, humanitarian partners report having undertaken 187 field missions in Darfur from June to October. However, they continue to report challenges in securing sustained access that allows for systematic needs assessment, provision of assistance and protective services, and impact monitoring. The humanitarian response has been adversely affected by insecurity, with rising criminality and banditry representing key operational challenges. Bureaucratic impediments by the Government, impassable roads due to the rainy season, and shortfalls in capacity of humanitarian partners also affected the response, as did funding shortfalls. As at 15 November, funding for the humanitarian workplan for the Sudan stood at only 49 per cent.

### **III. Achievements and impact of the mission**

34. During the reporting period, the mission continued to focus on the three strategic priorities reflected in its revised benchmarks (see [S/2014/279](#)) endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2148 (2014) and further in resolution 2173 (2014).

#### **A. Inclusive peace process**

##### **Negotiation process**

35. The African Union-United Nations Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur continued his consultations with the parties to the conflict in an effort to arrive at direct talks between the armed movements and the Government. From 2 to 6 August, in Kampala, a UNAMID delegation held technical-level consultations with senior officials from JEM-Gibril, SLA-MM and SLA-AW to gauge the movements' interest in participating in the national dialogue announced by President Omar El-Bashir in January. The movements expressed reticence about participating in the national dialogue as conceived, but reiterated interest in direct talks under the umbrella of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) at a venue outside the Sudan. On 8 August, SRF and the National Umma Party (NUP) signed an agreement in Paris, in which SRF declared readiness to cease hostilities as a basis for a credible national dialogue.

36. Further progress was made in synchronizing the mediation tracks on Darfur and the Two Areas. Following a meeting on 18 August in Khartoum between the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy to the Sudan of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, and the Joint Chief Mediator, it was agreed (a) that the High-level Implementation Panel was best placed to leverage its broader Sudan

mandate to urge and facilitate the Sudanese armed movements to join the national dialogue; (b) that pre-talks and confidence-building activities were an essential first step to bridging the gap between the parties; (c) that the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur addressed important local and Darfur-specific root causes, which should continue to be supported; to that end it was agreed to consult and seek the support of the Government of Qatar; and (d) that a time frame for direct talks between the Government and Darfur armed movements would commence in September to influence progress on the national dialogue.

37. As a result of those discussions, from 30 August to 3 September, the High-level Implementation Panel, the Joint Chief Mediator and the United Nations and IGAD Special Envoys held a series of meetings with the leadership of JEM-Gibril, SLA-AW, SLA-MM, the Eastern Front and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) as well as representatives of NUP and the Democratic Unionist Party, to discuss modalities for their participation in the national dialogue. The movements expressed readiness to end the war in the Sudan and insisted on combining the Darfur and SPLM-N mediation processes under one mechanism. While apprehensive of the credibility of the process, they expressed willingness to consider engaging in it if it was comprehensive and included a robust agenda that could lead to peace. They argued that any commitment to pre-talks should be preceded by an agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

38. On 4 September, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel facilitated talks between representatives of the Preparatory Committee and the Paris Declaration Group. The talks resulted in an agreement on initial talks on cessation of hostilities, outside the Sudan, between the Government and the Darfur armed movements as well as the Government and SPLM-N with the same facilitator, the High-level Implementation Panel, but on separate mediation tracks. It was also agreed that the Panel would facilitate preparatory talks on national dialogue procedural issues. As SPLM-N and the Darfur armed movements insisted on signing the agreement as the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the Preparatory Committee declined to sign a joint agreement and instead two identical agreements were signed on 5 September.

39. The pre-talks meetings on the cessation of hostilities, initially scheduled for mid-October in Addis Ababa, were postponed at the request of the Government of the Sudan to allow for the holding of the General Convention of the National Congress Party from 17 to 25 October. The National Congress Party elected President Bashir as the chairman of the party and as the party's candidate for the 2015 presidential elections. The talks on the Two Areas led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel were held in Addis Ababa from 12 to 16 November, while the talks on Darfur are scheduled for 23 to 27 November.

#### **Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur**

40. There has been limited progress on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur during the reporting period. On 25 August, the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission commenced the integration of 1,350 JEM-Sudan combatants into the Sudanese armed forces, with an initial focus on inspecting, registering and collecting long-range and crew-assisted weapons. UNAMID, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Food Programme (WFP) are currently working with the Sudan Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Commission on planning for the demobilization of 724 ex-combatants who failed to meet the integration criteria.

41. JEM-Sudan and the Government of the Sudan have continued to make progress in implementing the power-sharing provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. On 4 September, President Bashir appointed the Movement's Vice-President, El Tom Suleiman, to the position of Federal Minister of Human Resources and Sabri Bakhit as State Minister for Agriculture.

42. Progress on the implementation of the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund has continued. Following the payment of SDG (Sudanese pounds) 800 million by the Government of the Sudan to the Fund last year, the Darfur Regional Authority reported that 70 per cent of the 315 development projects launched early in 2014 were nearing completion. The projects cover education, health, water, reconstruction, and community, youth and women's development centres. On 15 October, the Darfur Regional Authority confirmed receipt of a further SDG 900 million from the Government of the Sudan which will be used to complete all 315 projects. In addition, the State of Qatar and the United Nations Development Group recently signed a US \$88.5 million grant agreement on the execution of reconstruction and development projects in Darfur.

43. Preparations for the commencement of the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process were finalized. In August and September, the Implementation Committee for the process held consultative meetings in the state capitals of North, South and Central Darfur with the Governors, legislative assemblies, members of the Doha Civil Society Follow-up Mechanism and other stakeholders to raise awareness on the internal dialogue process, and enlist cooperation. Similar meetings were held with the Darfuri diaspora abroad, leaders of the non-signatory armed movements and the media. While there is strong support for the process as a whole, continuing insecurity in some parts of Darfur may make it difficult to conduct a comprehensive dialogue in some localities. The internal dialogue process is scheduled to start on 1 December.

44. While Qatar has contributed one quarter of the total budget of the internal dialogue and consultation (\$1.7 million), there is concern that continued delays in the disbursement of financial contributions by the Government of the Sudan and international donors to fund the process will erode the goodwill and momentum generated by the launch of the Implementation Committee on 26 May 2014.

## **B. Protection of civilians**

### **Provision of physical protection**

45. During the reporting period, the mission provided protection to displaced populations in camps and around team sites, in villages, towns, markets, areas of return and firewood collection areas, as well as to other vulnerable local communities. UNAMID military personnel conducted 16,803 patrols, including 9,145 routine patrols, 3,355 night patrols, 1,796 administrative escorts, 1,038 humanitarian escorts, 1,123 short-range patrols, and 346 long-range patrols. UNAMID police conducted a total of 7,628 patrols, including 4,237 inside camps of internally displaced persons, 3,125 in villages, towns and markets, 223 in firewood areas, and 43 in return areas. Of these, 833 were medium-range patrols, 284 long-range patrols and 6,511 short-range patrols.

46. Training courses for Sudanese police officers continued in the areas of community policing, close protection, treatment of suspects, criminal investigation and computer skills. UNAMID police conducted 12 courses for 329 Government police on human rights, basic computer skills, community policing, crime investigation, detention and treatment of suspects and VIP protection courses, and undertook 12 human rights and family and child protection courses for 807 community policing volunteers based in camps of internally displaced persons to prevent criminal acts in the camps and coordinate effectively with Darfur's criminal justice institutions.

47. In August, upon learning of the Government's plan to conduct cordon and search operations inside the internally displaced person camp at Kalma (South Darfur), UNAMID proactively engaged with state and local authorities to attempt to avert violence. While local authorities continue to assert their sovereign right to enter the camp, they agreed that any Government operation would be fully coordinated with UNAMID. UNAMID urged Government authorities to uphold international human rights standards and humanitarian law while implementing security measures. On 20 August, the Joint Special Representative met with camp leaders to reassure them of UNAMID protection should search operations be conducted and urge cooperation with the Government. UNAMID and the United Nations country team then developed response preparedness plans in the event of an escalation of tensions in Kalma camp. Increased UNAMID presence through daily patrols and the establishment of a temporary operating base near the camp enhanced the mission's ability to provide protection. Engagement and focused intervention by UNAMID leadership at national levels further helped to de-escalate tensions and improve the security situation. No operation was conducted in Kalma camp during the reporting period.

48. On 8 October, representatives of the estimated 13,200 internally displaced persons of Labado camp approached the nearby UNAMID Labado team site (East Darfur) to seek protection, fearing retaliatory attacks by armed Arab militias stationed on the outskirts of the camp following clashes with the Northern Rizeigat. UNAMID engaged with key community leaders, the leadership of the internally displaced and the Government to resolve the issue, which led to an agreement and withdrawal of the militia.

49. In Nertiti (Central Darfur), clashes between SLA-AW members and Sudanese armed forces on 15 October also led the internally displaced of Straha camp to seek protection at the UNAMID team site. The mission's response included confidence-building patrols in the area and continued interaction with the internally displaced until the security situation improved.

#### **Logistic and security support to humanitarian operations**

50. Despite the fragile security environment, UNAMID worked closely with humanitarian agencies to access remote locations and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance through provision of escorts and logistical support, integrated joint missions, and contributing to area security. UNAMID provided a total of 293 humanitarian escorts throughout Darfur and together with the United Nations country team facilitated 18 medical evacuations for critically injured civilians. UNAMID also facilitated the transportation of 778 kg of drugs to assist a local clinic at Muhajeria and the internally displaced person clinic in Labado on

5 August. A joint UNAMID-WFP logistics operation facilitated the transfer of 5,690 tons of food and 22 tons of non-food items throughout Darfur.

### **Protective environment**

51. During the reporting period, UNAMID recorded 210 incidents involving 406 victims of human rights violations and abuses across Darfur. Arbitrary arrests and detentions accounted for 10 cases (36 victims). In addition, 87 cases (202 victims) of violation of the right to physical integrity, including 15 cases and 81 victims of abductions; 47 cases (69 victims) of violation of the right to life; and 66 cases (99 victims) of sexual and gender-based violence were reported. Eighty-five of 204 cases were attributed to Government security forces and 3 cases (13 victims) to SLA-AW; 122 cases involving 196 victims were attributed to unknown armed men, in most cases suspected by the victims to be Arab militia. UNAMID verified 167 cases while the remaining 43 could not be confirmed owing to insecurity and difficulties in accessing remote locations.

52. To highlight and make public information concerning human rights issues in Darfur, a public report on the situation of human rights in Darfur for 2013 prepared jointly by UNAMID and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was published on 31 October. Comments by the Government of the Sudan will be published when received.

53. With regard to child protection, SLA-MM established an operational mechanism to end recruitment and use of child soldiers on 6 August. On 6 October, Musa Hilal initiated a community-based strategic plan aimed at ending the use of children to fight in inter- and intra-ethnic clashes in North Darfur. The plan was endorsed by tribal leaders of the Northern Rizeigat, Beni Hussein, Fur, Tama and Gimir in various areas in North Darfur.

54. UNAMID recorded 66 cases involving 99 victims (30 minors) of conflict-related sexual violence. Thirty-six of these were reported to Government police, and only nine were investigated, leading to four arrests. Rape accounted for 55 cases and 88 victims (28 minors) while there were 11 cases and 11 victims (two minors) of attempted rape. In 45 cases (67 victims), the alleged perpetrators were described by the victims as unidentified armed men, while in 21 cases (32 victims), the perpetrators were alleged to be members of the Sudanese armed forces, Rapid Support Forces and Government police. Instances of under-reporting and non-reporting remain a major challenge in the fight against impunity. Victims feared stigma and reprisals and in some cases refused to file complaints against members of security forces, proxy armed forces and paramilitary forces. Many victims also refused to appear in court, resorting instead to out-of-court settlements, sometimes against legal advice. There is a prevailing lack of confidence in law enforcement agencies to take action, particularly when perpetrators belong to armed groups. Many police stations are ill-equipped to act on civilians' complaints.

55. On 18 September, the Special Court for Darfur Crimes in El Fasher delivered final judgement on the case of four persons accused of attacking and robbing UNAMID personnel and raping a female police officer on 10 April in El Fasher. One of the accused was acquitted and the other three found guilty of armed robbery, sentenced to three years' imprisonment and ordered to jointly pay \$6,700 to the victims of the rape and robbery. One of the convicted persons was also found guilty of rape and sentenced to an additional five-year prison term and 100 lashes.

56. On 28 August, a Chadian man accused of the rape and physical assault of a 10-year-old girl in Kulbus (West Darfur) on 16 May was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Another case involving the rape of a 14-year-old internally displaced girl from Ardamata camp, West Darfur, by an airport Civil Defence Officer on 29 December 2013 was dismissed and the accused released, owing to the continuing absence of both complainant and victim from court sessions. On 27 October in El Geneina, a 17-year-old minor was found guilty of raping and impregnating a 14-year-old girl in January 2013 and sentenced to 10 years. On 5 November, a 25-year-old Sudanese armed forces soldier was found guilty of abducting and raping a 13-year-old girl in February 2014 and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment with a court fine of SDG 3,000 and SDG 2,000 compensation to the victim.

57. On 2 November, media sources reported that over 200 women and girls in Thabit (North Darfur) had been raped by members of the Sudanese armed forces on 30 and 31 October. An initial UNAMID military verification mission dispatched on 4 November from Shangil Tobaya to investigate the allegations was denied access to the village. Over the following days, UNAMID continued to engage with the Government, including at the highest levels, to secure access to Thabit. Finally, on 9 November, UNAMID was able to send an integrated mission to interact with the local community. The team's findings, however, were inconclusive, requiring further investigation, owing in part to the heavy presence of military and police in Thabit. UNAMID continues to request the Sudanese authorities to grant access to a small team to investigate the allegations of rape. The team is on standby and ready to deploy immediately by road or by air. The clearance has not yet been received.

58. In support of rule of law activities, UNAMID conducted training on prison management and treatment of offenders for 161 newly recruited prison staff in El Geneina and Nyala. UNAMID also supported a training of trainers course for 20 prison staff and skills training for 32 prisoners in Shallah Federal Prison and Kheir Khanaga Women's Prison on welding, metal works, basketry, beadwork and tailoring to enhance future community reintegration.

59. UNAMID continued the implementation of community-based labour intensive projects aimed at reducing the exposure of youth to potential recruitment into armed groups or engagement in criminal activities. Of the 25 projects approved for the 2013/14 fiscal year, 15 projects have been completed and handed over to local communities through relevant line ministries, while the remaining 10 are in the final stages of completion. The projects targeted over 1,600 at-risk youth through provision of vocational skills training, as well as improved access to health, education, livelihoods, water and sanitation facilities for 70,000 local community members.

60. During the reporting period, UNAMID and the United Nations Mine Action Service began destruction of a stockpile of more than 3 million pieces of small arms ammunition at Zam Zam team site, with over 266,000 pieces of ammunition already destroyed. Weapons and ammunition safety management facilitated the delivery of four sea containers for the storage of surrendered weapons and ammunitions to the Darfur Security Arrangements and Implementation Commission. Support was provided to Government police through the refurbishment of three weapons and ammunition storage facilities in El Fasher.

### **C. Prevention and mitigation of community conflict**

61. In view of the ongoing tribal fighting, UNAMID continued to engage with tribal leaders and the authorities to encourage peaceful coexistence. The mission extensively engaged with the Native Administration and tribal leaders from North and West Darfur, state authorities and the Sudanese armed forces in an effort to contain violent clashes between Northern Rizeigat and Beni Hussein in El Sireif (North Darfur) and pursue genuine reconciliation. From 18 to 21 September, Northern Rizeigat Native Administration leaders and Beni Hussein leaders from El Geneina (West Darfur), Nyala (South Darfur) and Zalingei (Central Darfur), established a peace committee and conducted campaigns in the Jebel Amer gold-mining area.

62. Reconciliation efforts by tribal leaders resulted in ending the conflict and restoring relative calm in El Sireif. UNAMID encouraged leaders to continue consultations with the Northern Rizeigat to open the blockade of the El Sireif-Kabkabiya-Saraf Umra road, which hindered movement of civilians and curtailed commercial activities in the area. The road reopened on 28 September. Tensions remain over the future management of the Jebel Amer gold mine.

63. In response to renewed tensions between the Southern Rizeigat and Ma'alia in East Darfur, UNAMID continued to engage with federal and state authorities and with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. UNAMID actively engaged with the Governor of East Darfur and the Deputy Nazir of the Southern Rizeigat as well as with members of Darfur civil society organizations in Khartoum, urging immediate measures to stop the fighting and relaunch the stalled reconciliation process. A task force consisting of eight representatives from the two tribes was formed to invigorate the reconciliation process. The Prosecutor of East Darfur State informed UNAMID that three suspects were arrested in connection with the Ma'alia-Rizeigat tribal clashes of August 2014 in East Darfur. Four investigators and five judges were appointed to investigate and prosecute persons suspected of involvement in the clashes. Despite these efforts, there was little progress in the reconciliation process during the reporting period. If the authorities do not take concrete steps to resolve the longstanding conflict and address disagreements over ownership, control and utilization of land and resources, the cycle of fighting is likely to continue.

64. Late in July, UNAMID engaged with Native Administration leaders of the Northern Rizeigat and Zaghawa in North Darfur to prevent a further escalation of tensions between the two tribes and encourage the use of dialogue for securing the release of 12 Zaghawa members and two Arab youths abducted the previous month by SLA-Unity in Goba village. A reconciliation conference initiated by Musa Hilal with Zaghawa tribal leaders late in September aimed to resolve tensions between the two North Darfur tribes, and resulted in an agreement between the Zaghawa and Northern Rizeigat which secured the release of the hostages on 26 October.

65. Following a reconciliation conference mediated by a committee composed of leaders from the Nuba, Misseriya, Hawazima, Dar-Hamid, Bidiryia, Berti and Showayhat tribes, and witnessed by the second Vice-President, the State Minister of Justice and the Governors of East Darfur and Western Kordofan, an agreement between the Hammar and Ma'alia was signed in Al Foula, Western Kordofan, on 27 September. The two parties committed themselves to implementing the

agreement, which aims to address issues of resource sharing, the amount of blood money (*diyya*) and the return of Hammar living in Ma'alia territory and vice versa. By the end of October, the Hammar and Ma'alia tribesmen had returned to their respective tribal areas.

66. Following reports of rising tensions between the Fallata and Habbaniya tribes in South Darfur because of incidents of cattle rustling on 6 September, UNAMID held meetings with tribal leaders and state authorities to encourage dialogue between the two communities. This resulted in the creation of a mediation committee to further dialogue and peace. UNAMID also met with South Darfur state officials to urge that the underlying and unresolved issue of border demarcation be addressed, which contributed to the defusing of a potentially volatile situation between the two tribes.

67. Ahead of the migration season, UNAMID continued to promote peaceful coexistence among farmers and pastoralists by engaging with local stakeholders in inter-group dialogue over the sharing of access to natural resources. A total of 32 meetings were held with locality authorities, local leaders of farmers and pastoral communities, the agricultural protection committees and the peaceful coexistence committees in all five states of Darfur in the reporting period. Similar efforts were replicated in Central Darfur on 30 and 31 October with a conference on crop protection and peaceful coexistence, jointly sponsored by the state government and UNAMID, targeting 298 participants of the Native Administration, state institutions, the Council of Political Parties and other state locality representatives.

68. In support of local agricultural protection committees, during September and October, UNAMID collaborated with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to conduct peace campaigns in North and West Darfur targeting farmers and pastoral communities. The campaigns were conducted through joint workshops with traditional leaders and the Darfur Land Commission, which discussed land tenure versus traditional land ownership and raised awareness about natural resource sharing to secure livelihood opportunities and promote peaceful coexistence.

#### **IV. Implementation of the strategic review**

69. Over the past months, the mission has further recalibrated its activities towards the three newly defined strategic priorities, discontinued other tasks, and conducted a comprehensive assessment and adjustment of the structure of UNAMID, its personnel and material capacities as reported to the Security Council in my letter of 16 September (S/2014/670). The UNAMID streamlining exercise has been completed, and 1,260 posts have been identified for abolition. A total of 770 posts are to be abolished in the 2014/15 budget year, with the remaining 490 posts to follow in the 2015/16 budget year. An additional 56 posts will be nationalized in 2014/15.

70. UNAMID has also reconfigured its aviation fleet, reducing it by four fixed-wing aircraft and two helicopters. The mission is deploying 400 vehicles to the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response.

71. UNAMID and the United Nations country team developed the integrated strategic framework for 2014-2016, the principal mechanism for planning, implementing and monitoring joint UNAMID and United Nations country team

initiatives. It focuses on the three strategic priorities and is consistent with key documents and strategies, including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2012-2016, the humanitarian strategic response plan for 2014 and the Darfur Development Strategy.

72. Furthermore, UNAMID, in collaboration with the United Nations country team/humanitarian country team, is finalizing the implementation of an early warning and response system, which includes a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess the impact of the mission's protection of civilians activities.

73. The UNAMID military component increased its engagement with the Government and armed movements to promote freedom of movement of UNAMID personnel by reinforcing relations with relevant authorities at all levels. The military component has also created an Operational Readiness Assessment and Support Team, which visits team sites to ensure the proper implementation of standard operating procedures, directives and instructions. Consultations have continued with troop-contributing countries to improve the standards of their contingent-owned equipment and to enhance operational efficiency and pre-deployment training on protection of civilians issues. It is estimated that the two additional military sectors will be operational by December 2014 to further improve coordination among all UNAMID components.

74. The police component undertook a review of the ways in which patrols are conducted, with a focus on prioritizing quality over quantity. During the reporting period, this resulted in increased interaction with community leaders in camps of internally displaced persons, which has in turn improved information-gathering, including in relation to sexual and gender-based violence. As part of the strategic review implementation plan, the police component, in close coordination with police-contributing countries, also focused on recruitment of officers.

## **V. Financial aspects**

75. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/297 of 30 June 2014, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNAMID in a total amount not exceeding \$639,654,200 for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2014.

76. As at 25 November 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAMID Special Account amounted to \$192.0 million, and the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$2,295.0 million. Also as at that date, reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police unit costs and for contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 31 May 2014 and 31 March 2014, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

## **VI. Observations and recommendations**

77. Since my last report ([S/2014/515](#)), clashes between the Government of the Sudan and the armed movements, and inter-tribal clashes, continued to have a significant impact on civilians across Darfur. Competition over resources, obstruction of migration routes and land ownership continue to fuel intercommunal clashes. I encourage the Government of the Sudan and tribal leaders to enhance

their efforts to contain inter-tribal conflicts, including by addressing the root causes of conflict. The Government of the Sudan should urge the affected communities to respect the efforts of the local mediations and impress on all stakeholders the need to respect signed agreements.

78. Tribal rivalry and intercommunal tensions, particularly in Central, East and North Darfur, as well as clashes and retaliatory attacks between the Government and armed movements and aerial bombardments perpetuate a climate of insecurity and impunity. In some areas this insecurity was compounded by a limited presence of law enforcement officers, raising protection concerns as internally displaced persons and local communities suffered under continuing harassment of Arab militias and SLA-AW rebel forces.

79. I remain deeply concerned about the impact of the prevailing insecurity on UNAMID and humanitarian personnel working throughout Darfur. In this connection, I condemn in the strongest terms the attacks on 30 August and 16 October, which resulted in the deaths of a UNAMID national staff member and three Ethiopian peacekeepers, respectively. I would like to express once again my condolences to the Government of Ethiopia and to the families of the peacekeepers who paid the ultimate price for peace in Darfur. My heartfelt condolences also go out to the family of the United Nations national civilian staff member who died in the line of duty.

80. I welcome the progress in the implementation of provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur relating to power-sharing and security arrangements between the Government of the Sudan and JEM-Sudan. In this regard, I urge the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) to accelerate the completion of the LJM verification process, which is long overdue. I take this opportunity to thank the Government of Qatar for its continuing support and commitment to peace, stability and development in Darfur. The commencement of the Darfur internal dialogue and consultation process should provide much-needed impetus to the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and the peace process in Darfur in general. I therefore call upon other Member States, including the Government of the Sudan, to also make financial contributions towards implementation of the internal dialogue and consultation process.

81. I commend the efforts of the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator to bring together the Government of the Sudan and the leaders of armed movements to hold direct talks on the national dialogue called for by President Bashir. I very much welcome the fact that the mediation tracks on the Two Areas and on Darfur have now been synchronized under the auspices of former Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdulsalami Abubakar, thereby enabling the parties to participate in the national dialogue. The role of the Joint Chief Mediator and my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan in support of their efforts is crucial and I thank them both for their efforts. President Bashir's national dialogue initiative remains the most important avenue to achieve lasting peace in the Sudan, and I am in full support of a transparent and inclusive process.

82. Collaboration and coordination between UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan is essential for the mission to carry out its mandated tasks. During the reporting period the Government and UNAMID worked closely in reducing tensions in Kalma camp and in addressing issues of community conflict. While access in general terms remains good, access to some areas, including in North and East

Darfur, remains a challenge, particularly in areas of ongoing conflict and around some protection issues. I am deeply concerned over access restrictions to the area of Thabit, where UNAMID has tried to investigate fully allegations of mass rape. Tensions around this issue between the Government and the mission need to be reduced and practical steps taken to address the allegations. All efforts need to be made by the Government and UNAMID to ensure that the protection concerns of innocent civilians are addressed. I am ready to engage the Government of the Sudan towards this end and have instructed my senior officials to continue to reach out to their interlocutors in the Government to resolve this issue.

83. I would like to welcome Abiodun Bashua as the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, and Abdul Kamara as Deputy Joint Special Representative. I wish to express my gratitude for the dedicated service of the former Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who completed his assignment with UNAMID on 9 October 2014. Finally, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the men and women of UNAMID and all humanitarian aid workers for their tireless efforts in Darfur towards our common mandate to assist affected and vulnerable populations and support the achievement of a lasting peace for all Darfuris.

---