



Security Council

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Letter dated 27 February 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the fifth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations that took place from 21 January 2014 to 21 February 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

In its decisions of 27 September 2013 (EC-M-33/DEC.1) and 15 November 2013 (EC-M-34/DEC.1), the Executive Council of OPCW established a series of intermediate milestones, as well as a deadline for the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The intermediate milestones included dates for the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment, unfilled chemical munitions, containers with residual mustard agent, specialized features and buildings related to chemical weapons production facilities. The intermediate milestones also included the removal of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction outside the country, and the destruction of isopropanol inside the country.

The Syrian Arab Republic met the early milestones, including the functional destruction of its capacity to produce, mix and fill chemical weapons munitions, and the destruction of all unfilled chemical munitions. It destroyed its mobile production facilities and specialized equipment and special features at a number of chemical weapons production facilities. In addition, during the last reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic made considerable progress in destroying the isopropanol inside the country.

Two intermediate milestones, 31 December 2013 and 5 February 2014, for the removal of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction outside the country were not met. As a result, the process of eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has fallen behind schedule. This delay is not insurmountable. It does, however, require an acceleration and intensification of efforts by the Syrian Arab Republic, based on timely, predictable and volume-based movements of chemical materials.



Activities towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

During the reporting period, the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (Joint Mission) continued to work with Member States to ensure that the Syrian Arab Republic has the equipment and materials required to meet its obligations. The Joint Mission assisted the Syrian Arab Republic in its planning and implementation of preparatory activities in Damascus, in Latakia and at the chemical weapons sites. The Joint Mission continued to monitor, verify and inspect the progress related to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Syrian Arab Republic has pre-positioned the majority of packaging and loading equipment at identified sites. As a result of a test conducted by the Joint Mission on containers carrying liquid chemicals in order to verify compliance with international standards for the handling of hazardous goods, the Syrian Arab Republic was advised to decant select chemicals into new drums supplied by Member States. This would serve to mitigate the risks of accidents and spillage during transportation. The Syrian Arab Republic took action accordingly. Based on the advice of the Joint Mission, and as part of the effort to accelerate activities, the Syrian Arab Republic carried out internal movements to consolidate the chemical material in fewer sites and, in one case, to better secure chemicals stored in a site reported as being under threat of attack by armed opposition groups.

Further to a decision taken by the OPCW Executive Council on 30 January 2014 regarding the destruction of isopropanol inside the country, the Syrian Arab Republic destroyed a large majority of this chemical over a four-day period in early February 2014. This was verified by Joint Mission personnel. The small percentage that remains is stored at a site that is currently inaccessible owing to the security situation. It is scheduled to be destroyed by the Syrian Arab Republic and verified as such by the Joint Mission as soon as access becomes permissive.

On 27 January 2014 and 10 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic carried out movements of chemical weapons material from a number of sites to Latakia port. The material was processed in the port and loaded onto cargo vessels by Syrian personnel who have received appropriate training for this purpose. On 27 January 2014, the security situation did not permit Joint Mission verification at the sites from where the chemicals were to be transported; however, remote verification was conducted using camera surveillance equipment. On 10 February 2014, Joint Mission personnel conducted physical verification at the sites of origin prior to movement. On both dates, the Joint Mission conducted verification activities prior to the containers being loaded at the port. The cargo vessels remain in international waters waiting for additional movements, accompanied by a naval escort from participating Member States.

There have been no further movements of chemical material during the period covered by this report. The Syrian Arab Republic has reiterated its intent to complete the full removal of its chemical material for destruction, as required in relevant Executive Council decisions. Upon request, and in close consultation with the Director-General of OPCW and the Joint Mission, the Syrian Arab Republic has produced a sequenced plan regarding future movements. Further to discussions with

OPCW and the Joint Mission, the Syrian Arab Republic subsequently resubmitted the plan with a revised timeline.

The Syrian Arab Republic insists on the need for certain additional security assets that it deems essential for the security of the movement operation in-country. This includes so-called armoured jackets that the Syrian Arab Republic has procured locally with funding provided by the Joint Mission from the United Nations trust fund. These jackets are intended to shield the containers carrying certain chemical material during movement to Latakia. An initial batch is now available and the remainder are to be delivered throughout February. This also includes other security assets identified by the Syrian Arab Republic as being necessary for further movements such as explosive detection devices and electronic countermeasures. It is understood that this issue is being resolved on a bilateral basis.

During the reporting period, the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission continued her engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. She maintained regular contact with me and with the Director-General of OPCW to ensure close coordination between the Joint Mission, OPCW headquarters and United Nations Headquarters.

The Joint Mission continued its liaison and coordination activities respectively from its offices in Damascus, Latakia, New York and Nicosia. In Damascus, Joint Mission personnel continued daily meetings with the Syrian authorities focusing on accelerating ground movements, and inspectors accompanied Syrian counterparts to various sites to verify and inspect progress. In Latakia, the Joint Mission worked with port authorities to enhance preparedness to receive and quickly process chemical material and to further bolster emergency response capabilities. In New York the Joint Mission maintained its regular liaison and outreach to Member States, as well as engaging with relevant entities across the United Nations Secretariat to ensure coherence and coordination with the United Nations. In Nicosia, the Joint Mission continued to facilitate information-sharing and coordination with maritime task force partners on relevant maritime issues.

The Joint Mission continued to work with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess environmental and public health risks related to these activities and to provide timely advice to the Syrian authorities on appropriate mitigation measures. UNEP and WHO experts visited Latakia to discuss measures with the local authorities. WHO, in close consultation with the Joint Mission, is organizing training and providing equipment to strengthen the ability of local health-care facilities to respond to any possible incident that could occur during the removal of the chemical materials.

As reported, the security situation inside the Syrian Arab Republic remained precarious during the reporting period. Syrian authorities informed that there had been two attempted attacks on convoys carrying chemical material on 27 January 2014. In addition, Syrian authorities indicated that ongoing military activities rendered two sites inaccessible during most of the reporting period, delaying in-country destruction of the final quantities of isopropanol, preventing some activities to consolidate chemical material into a reduced number of locations, and preventing the physical verification of chemical material prior to movement on 27 January 2014.

The security of the Joint Mission ultimately remains the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, the Joint Mission continuously assesses the security situation to identify threats and to mitigate risks to its personnel and assets. In response to threats received, the Joint Mission continued to reinforce its safety and security procedures and enforced additional security measures for all its personnel based inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

In accordance with paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations, OPCW and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic signed the tripartite status of mission agreement on 5 February 2014. A memorandum of understanding for the provision of medical services was also signed on the same day, the text having been agreed earlier.

Conclusion

The elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic stands at a critical juncture. Measurable progress has been made over the last months in the destruction of critical equipment and special features at a number of chemical weapons production facilities, as well as unfilled chemical munitions. As a result, the production, mixing and filling capabilities of the Syrian Arab Republic have been rendered inoperable.

The international community has continued its support for the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic declared chemical weapons programme both directly and through generous funding of both United Nations and OPCW trust funds; through the provision of considerable quantities of material and equipment; and through the deployment of a significant maritime presence in the eastern Mediterranean. These actions are being carried out at great expense and remain a clear demonstration of the commitment of the international community to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

While progress has been attained under challenging circumstances, it is clear that the Syrian Arab Republic must further intensify and accelerate its efforts towards the full elimination of its chemical weapons programme by 30 June 2014. In this regard, I now expect the Syrian Arab Republic to uphold its commitment to the systematic, consistent and volume-based movement of chemical weapons material from all remaining sites to the port for onward transportation and out-of-country destruction.

I would like to reiterate my gratitude to all Member States who have made available funding and assets to advance the process of eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am also grateful to the Special Coordinator and the staff of the Joint Mission for their work under hazardous and difficult circumstances inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN Ki-moon**

Annex**Letter dated 26 February 2014 from the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme” prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 January 2014 to 22 February 2014 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(Signed) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,
French, Russian and Spanish]

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter the “Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1), dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the fifth such monthly report.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of this decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2 (f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 January to 22 February 2014.¹

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1 (c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of EC-M-34/DEC.1 establish intermediate completion dates for the removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons prior to their complete elimination in the first half of 2014. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling these obligations is described below:

(a) Pursuant to subparagraphs 2 (a) (ii) and (iii) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, all chemicals listed in those subparagraphs were due to have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic by 31 December 2013 and 5 February 2014, respectively. However, these objectives were not met. In this regard, the Director-General encouraged the Syrian authorities to provide a time frame for the expeditious removal of these chemicals. On 27 January and 10 February 2014, further limited shipments of priority chemicals were transported to the port of embarkation at Latakia and loaded onto the Danish and Norwegian cargo ships, which means that 4.5% of Priority 1 chemicals have now been removed from the Syrian Arab Republic and, combined with the destruction of certain chemicals

¹ This report takes into account information relating to an amended time frame for the transportation of all chemicals, as submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Director-General on 23 February 2014.

within the Syrian Arab Republic as described in subparagraph 4 (d) below, a total of 17.2% of declared priority chemicals have either been destroyed or removed;

(b) In response to the Director-General's request, on 14 February 2014 the Syrian authorities provided a timeline for the removal of chemicals outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. The timeline, based on a total of 31 sequential movements of chemicals from the chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs) to the port of embarkation, estimated that complete removal could be achieved in approximately 100 days, with completion at the end of May 2014. On 13 and 14 February 2014, this timeline was discussed in the framework of the Operational Planning Group (OPG), which developed an alternative plan envisaging that chemicals could be removed by 31 March 2014, while addressing Syrian concerns regarding security and the availability of equipment and personnel. The Director-General encouraged the Syrian authorities to give serious consideration to this alternative plan. In a communication received on 20 February 2014 from the Head of the Syrian National Authority and Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Faisal Mekdad, it was mentioned that the Syrian Arab Republic was reviewing its timeline and will seek to shorten it to the extent considered possible. On 23 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic provided a revised time frame. According to this schedule, the Syrian Arab Republic aims to complete the removal of all chemicals from its territory by 13 April 2014, except for chemicals located in facilities that are presently inaccessible. These chemicals could be removed whenever conditions are deemed suitable for movements from these sites but in any event are scheduled for transportation by 27 April 2014, according to the revised schedule;

(c) Pursuant to subparagraph 2 (b) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is requested to destroy all of its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) by 15 March 2014. As previously reported, a total of 26 CWPFs were declared. As at the cut-off date of this report, of these 26 CWPFs: eight mobile units had been destroyed and verified; at one CWPF, all declared specialized buildings and equipment had been destroyed and verified; at four CWPFs, all declared specialized/standard buildings and equipment had been destroyed but verification was pending; and at 13 CWPFs, either standard equipment and/or specialized/standard buildings remained to be destroyed and verified;

(d) Pursuant to paragraph 9 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to submit, not later than 1 January 2014, for review by the Council not later than 15 January 2014, its plan for destroying, on its territory, isopropanol and residual mustard agent in containers previously containing mustard agent. The plan (EC-M-38/P/NAT.1, dated 14 January 2014) was noted by the Council at its Thirty-Eighth Meeting on 30 January 2014, at which meeting the Council also adopted a decision on verification measures for the destruction of isopropanol (EC-M-38/DEC.2, dated 30 January 2014). On 6 February 2014, the Syrian authorities submitted an amendment to the initial declaration correcting the amount of isopropanol declared. Subsequently, on 13 February 2014, the Syrian authorities submitted to the Secretariat information on the destruction of 93% of the declared amount of isopropanol. In the monthly report EC-M-39/P/NAT.1 (dated 18 February 2014), the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that the remaining amount of isopropanol will be destroyed as soon as circumstances permit access to the storage facility; and

(e) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its

territory related to the destruction of chemical weapons and CWPFs. The third such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 18 February 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-M-39/P/NAT.1).

5. In accordance with subparagraph 1 (e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter “the Joint Mission”) in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period. On 5 February 2014, the OPCW and the United Nations concluded an agreement concerning the status of the Joint Mission with the Syrian Government as required by United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). A memorandum of understanding for the provision of medical services and emergency medical evacuation services was signed at the same time.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

6. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organizations and between the offices in New York, The Hague, Cyprus and Damascus. As at the cut-off date of this report, 16 OPCW staff members were deployed with the Joint Mission in Damascus and Latakia, and one logistics officer in Beirut.

7. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the joint Mission, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. The Special Coordinator briefed States Parties at OPCW Headquarters on 7 February 2014. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 12 February 2014, the Director-General met with a visiting delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has continued to provide weekly information briefings to States Parties in The Hague.

8. The Joint Mission verified the packing and loading of chemicals, prior to their transportation to the port of embarkation at Latakia. On 27 January 2014, for security reasons, the physical presence of inspectors at the relevant CWSFs was not possible and remote verification was therefore undertaken instead, with a full inventory being conducted at the port. The physical presence of inspectors was possible for the movement on 10 February 2014, and activities at the relevant CWSFs included verifying the chemicals against the initial declaration, taking an inventory of the chemicals loaded into each shipping container, conducting sampling on a random basis, and sealing the containers. Upon the arrival of the containers at Latakia, the inventory documents for each shipping container were checked, the integrity of the seals was confirmed, and the contents of the containers were verified on a random basis. Once the containers were securely loaded on board the cargo ships, they returned to international waters, where, along with the naval escorts, they will await further deliveries of chemicals to Latakia.

9. The Joint Mission also conducted inspections at several CWSFs to verify the destruction of isopropanol carried out by Syrian personnel as reported in subparagraph 4 (d) above. As at the cut-off date of this report, the destruction of 93% of the total declared quantity of isopropanol had been verified in accordance

with the verification measures contained in EC-M-38/DEC.2. In addition, the Joint Mission has verified as destroyed 87% of containers previously containing mustard agent. The remaining quantity of isopropanol and the remaining containers are at locations that are currently assessed as being inaccessible for security reasons. Decanting of certain chemicals into new storage containers, suitable for transportation, was also verified at several CWSFs, in preparation for their onward transportation to the port of embarkation.

10. On 6 February 2014, representatives of the Secretariat participated in a preparatory meeting at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, which is where chemicals will be transloaded from the Danish cargo ship onto the United States vessel, the *MV Cape Ray*, for eventual destruction. At the port, discussions were also held with the representatives of local agencies involved in the operation, as well as representatives of Denmark, Italy and the United States of America.

11. Following a rigorous solicitation process, on 14 February 2014 the Director-General announced that contracts for transport, treatment, and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals, effluents, and related materials with respect to the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons had been awarded to Ekokem Oy Ab from Finland and Veolia Environmental Services Technical Solutions, LLC from the United States of America. As previously reported, in response to the call for proposals that had been issued on 20 December 2013, 14 bids had been received by the deadline of 19 January 2014. Qualifying bids underwent a thorough process of technical and commercial evaluation before the preferred companies were selected for award of the contract by the Director-General. The conclusion of the solicitation process represents an important step towards the complete destruction of Syrian chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

12. On 14 February 2014, consultations were held with the Syrian Arab Republic with respect to the destruction of 12 declared Syrian CWPFs.

13. Informal consultations have been conducted on a model agreement specifying the arrangements governing on-site inspections at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 or sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2. The model agreement was approved by the Council at its Thirty-Eighth Meeting (EC-M-38/DEC.1, dated 30 January 2014). The Secretariat has initiated negotiations on such an agreement with the two States Parties hosting the commercial facilities selected as a result of the solicitation process described in paragraph 11 above, with the model agreement serving as a basis for these negotiations. The model agreement will also serve as the basis for agreements with the Governments of Germany and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of the commercial facilities directly sponsored by these States Parties and which will destroy certain chemicals as part of their in-kind contributions.

14. As reported previously, the Secretariat, as required by paragraph 13 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, has developed a draft facility agreement for Syrian CWSFs and submitted the draft to the Syrian authorities for their comments.

Supplementary resources

15. As reported in the previous monthly report, several States Parties are providing assistance and resources for the purposes of the transportation, removal, and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. All equipment requested by the Syrian Arab Republic has now been provided, either through the Joint Mission or under bilateral arrangements. On 13 February 2014, the *MV Cape Ray* arrived in the region. Along with the outcome of the solicitation process described in paragraph 11 above, these developments mean that all the elements necessary for the removal of chemical weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and their subsequent destruction are now in place.

16. As at the cut-off date of this report, the balance in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 16 million. Contributions have been received from Australia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. Further contributions of EUR 2 million and approximately EUR 350,000 are expected from Italy and the Republic of Korea respectively. In addition, on 23 January 2014, an agreement was signed with India for a voluntary contribution of approximately EUR 736,000. On 24 January 2014, the Government of Canada announced a voluntary contribution of approximately EUR 6.6 million, part of a line of support that includes another CAD 5 million to support destruction operations aboard the United States vessel *MV Cape Ray*. On 17 February 2014, the Director-General travelled to Brussels to sign an agreement for a voluntary contribution of EUR 12 million by the European Union. The Japanese Government has decided to contribute USD 18 million (approximately EUR 13.2 million) jointly to the OPCW and the United Nations.

Conclusion

17. The Syrian Arab Republic has reaffirmed its commitment to the elimination of its chemical weapons programme in a timely manner. All the elements of the removal and destruction plan, including additional security equipment that the Syrian Arab Republic had considered essential and armour jackets for protection of the ISO containers, are now in place. It should therefore be possible to begin immediately the process of removal of chemicals in earnest through a cascade of activities that should yield significant and sustained movements.
