



Security Council

Distr.: General
27 December 2013

Original: French

Letter dated 27 December 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the third monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of OPCW and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations that took place from 27 November to 20 December 2013 related to the implementation of the resolution.

During the reporting period sustained progress has been realized in eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission of OPCW and the United Nations in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to verify the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme while accelerating the planning and preparations for phase III activities related to the removal of precursor, binary and end-state chemical agents from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The United Nations continued to coordinate and engage with Member States while benefiting from their willingness to provide assistance in the furtherance of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). The Joint Mission worked closely with Syrian counterparts to support and verify their full adherence to relevant decisions of the Executive Council of OPCW and the resolutions of the Security Council, while recognizing the challenges and complexities involved in implementing the third phase of its work in eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

Phase II activities

The Joint Mission continued with ongoing phase II inspection and verification activities. The security situation has continued to prevent the physical inspection of 3 of the 23 sites declared by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The security situation also continued to prevent verification of one remaining site, although this site has been declared as inactive by the Government. A verification visit to the site will take place as soon as conditions permit.

During the reporting period, Joint Mission personnel conducted visits to verify the complete destruction of category 3 unfilled munitions at all relevant sites in the Homs area. On 6 December 2013, the Joint Mission confirmed that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had completed the destruction of all category 3 unfilled chemical munitions well ahead of the timeline set by the OPCW Executive Council in its decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 of 15 November 2013.



The Joint Mission continued verification of the destruction of specialized and standard equipment belonging to chemical weapons production facilities and verified the destruction of special features of buildings and standard buildings at the same locations. During the reporting period, three site visits were conducted in this regard.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has declared 26 production, mixing, filling and storage facilities for chemical weapons, including buildings, mobile units, aircraft hangars and underground structures. The Joint Mission is working to verify building destruction activities. All mobile facilities have been verified as destroyed. The destruction of the aircraft hangars and the underground structures pose particular technical and practical challenges. Technical experts from the Syrian Arab Republic, OPCW and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention continue to explore various destruction options in this regard.

In early December 2013, the security situation deteriorated to the north and east of Damascus, impacting phase II activities. The authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic recommended the temporary cessation of verification activities until the situation improved. On 17 December 2013, Syrian authorities informed the Joint Mission that the road from Damascus to Homs had been reopened after several weeks of closure. However, due to continuing military operations to the north and east of Damascus, the situation remains highly volatile.

Phase III activities

On 17 December 2013, the Executive Council of OPCW accepted a plan submitted by the Director-General whereby the destruction of the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic would take place outside the country. Destruction activities will be carried out in line with this plan, which was guided by the initial declaration of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 October 2013, its subsequent amendment dated 21 November 2013, and key preparatory documents submitted by the Government and by the Joint Mission. It also reflected the outcome of bilateral and multilateral consultations by the Joint Mission with the Member States that have offered to provide assistance for this purpose. The plan outlined phased activities and relevant responsibilities to be undertaken during the days and weeks ahead by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with the support of the Joint Mission and the assistance of Member States. It also set out key considerations, including with regard to safety and security, the protection of the environment and overall costs.

During the reporting period, the Joint Mission focused its planning and preparation for phase III on the following activities.

Facilitation of the delivery of assets and other initial pre-planning

The Joint Mission facilitated the delivery of packaging and handling materials provided by the United States of America to the Joint Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic. These materials were delivered to a staging area in Damascus for further distribution and use by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Joint Mission is in the process of facilitating the delivery of heavy transport and technical equipment, also provided by the United States. These non-expendable assets will be fitted with GPS locator systems. The approximately 260 shipping containers in which the chemical agents will be transported will also

be fitted with GPS locator systems. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will distribute these assets to the sites and will be responsible for the safe packaging and loading, in accordance with the standards of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, and for the transportation of the chemical agents to Latakia.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic identified a number of additional assets necessary to ensure the security of the convoys moving from the storage sites to the port of Latakia. In this regard, the Russian Federation provided support to the Syrian authorities to assist with the safe transportation of the chemical agents inside Syrian territory. China has indicated its interest in providing surveillance cameras and ambulances to the Syrian authorities to support the safe transportation of the chemical agents.

Advice on sequenced packaging, loading and ground transportation

To enhance efficiency and coordination, the Joint Mission provided advice to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in developing a sequenced plan to package, load and transport chemical agents from the relevant sites to the port of Latakia. On 12 December 2013, the Government submitted its plan for the transportation of chemical agents from the sites to the port of Latakia to OPCW. As part of this effort, the Government stated that it intended to implement a comprehensive security and safety plan to ensure the effective monitoring and oversight of the process and the physical security of chemical agents during transit. The convoys carrying chemical agents will travel in coordination with security and hazardous material response elements of the Syrian Arab Republic. Appropriate separation of potentially hazardous materials will be observed.

The Joint Mission engaged in discussions with relevant Syrian authorities regarding the use of the port of Latakia as a point of disembarkation for the removal and maritime transport of the chemical agents to be identified by OPCW. As a result of the visit of the Special Coordinator on 29 November 2013 and other planning meetings, the Joint Mission established a presence at the port on 3 December 2013 to liaise with the port authorities and coordinate with maritime planners in Cyprus to ensure that the port is prepared for the arrival and subsequent removal of the chemical agents.

Coordination of offers of assistance related to maritime transportation

In accordance with my exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council on 10 and 11 December 2013 (S/2013/730 and S/2013/731), the United Nations solicited and coordinated support from Member States, in close consultation with the Director-General of OPCW, for the removal and maritime transport of chemical agents.

The Governments of Denmark and Norway indicated their intention to provide cargo vessels and military escorts in furtherance of the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). Denmark and Norway also identified an agreed operational framework for cooperation in order to enable the implementation of the required tasks under their national flags, with unified command and control under a Danish lead. In this regard, planning took place in Copenhagen, and liaison officers conducted forward planning in Cyprus, in close coordination with the office of the Joint Mission. In addition, the Russian Federation and China offered to provide additional maritime security.

The Joint Mission engaged in planning with Member States involved in the maritime transportation and the final destruction of chemical agents. From 11 to 13 December 2013, a team from the Joint Mission, as well as representatives from OPCW and the United Nations, participated in a meeting in Stuttgart, Germany, organized by some of the Member States providing resources to the maritime phase of the forthcoming activities. Participants at the meeting conducted an overview of the multinational operation and agreed on respective roles and responsibilities; common understandings were reached between the assisting States, on the basis of which Denmark and Norway confirmed their offers of assistance on 20 December 2013. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic confirmed its consent for the entry of the Danish and Norwegian vessels into its territorial waters on 23 December 2013.

Danish and Norwegian cargo vessels and their military escorts have arrived at the port of Limassol in Cyprus. The ships have contingency management capabilities for unforeseen events and flexibility to meet diverse situations. The vessels are equipped with: medical facilities; chemical weapons emergency-response capabilities provided by Finland; firefighting units; and self-defence contingencies. The Special Coordinator visited the vessels on 15 December 2013 and met with the Danish Minister of Defence on board the Danish vessel.

As reported by the Director-General of OPCW, Italy will provide a port for the trans-loading of the priority chemicals from the Danish/Norwegian vessels to the United States ship.

Development of verification procedures

The Joint Mission is developing plans to implement required verification procedures to confirm the removal and ensure the non-diversion of chemical agents, as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention and relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive Council. In this regard, Joint Mission personnel will conduct verification activities that include the use of tags and seals, site visits, the analysis of representative samples of the chemical agents and the use of remote video photography.

At the port of Latakia, Joint Mission personnel will verify the inventory of the chemical agents, inspect seals and take representative samples. After the chemical agents are removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, OPCW will verify their neutralization aboard the United States vessel and their destruction within commercial chemical disposal facilities.

Assessment of risks

In my letter of 7 October 2013 to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/591), I noted that I would consult, as appropriate, on the potential environmental aspects related to the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and seek to ensure that destruction does not put the Syrian people and the environment at risk. In this regard, the Joint Mission has worked with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess risks concerned and to provide advice on risk mitigation to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. A UNEP expert held meetings with the Syrian authorities in Damascus, and visited the Danish and Norwegian military vessels and the Danish cargo vessel in Limassol. Risk mitigation measures on board the ship were also discussed.

In accordance with the OPCW Executive Council decision of 15 November 2013 (EC-M-34/DEC.1), the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic will be responsible for all the packaging and safe transportation of chemical agents until they are loaded onto the maritime vessels. Once on board the maritime vessels, relevant Member States will assume their respective responsibilities through the multilateral legal framework established by the Security Council in its resolution 2118 (2013) and by the decisions of the OPCW Executive Council.

Joint Mission operating environment

The Joint Mission is situated in five locations: its headquarters in Damascus; a presence in Latakia; small offices in Cyprus and New York; and a presence at OPCW headquarters in The Hague. The Joint Mission continues to draw on United Nations resources in the region as well as on the resources of OPCW and of United Nations Headquarters, including through temporary short-term deployments in critical functional areas, as required.

The Special Coordinator continued to engage with Member States in order to provide updates on the progress of the Joint Mission, enhance coordination between the multiple components involved in the forthcoming phase III activities and seek important financial and in-kind voluntary contributions required to implement and finance forthcoming activities. Assistance from Member States remained central to substantial progress to date in eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The United Nations trust fund currently includes \$2 million from the United States and pledges in the amount of more than \$2.1 million from the Netherlands, \$250,000 from Denmark and €250,000 from Luxembourg. The Joint Mission would not have been able to implement its mandated tasks without this assistance. The Joint Mission has also received valuable in-kind contributions from Canada, China, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and the European Union. The Government of Japan has also indicated its decision to allocate a total of approximately 1.5 billion Japanese yen to both the OPCW and United Nations trust funds, subject to parliamentary approval.

The United Nations and OPCW are still negotiating the tripartite status of mission agreement with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the time of the writing of the present report, a tripartite memorandum of understanding for the provision of medical services and emergency evacuation services between OPCW, the United Nations and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic was about to be signed.

The United Nations has provided security advice and risk assessments, logistical expertise and logistical and administrative support to the Joint Mission, as well as reporting and information assessments and communications and outreach with interested partners.

During the period under review, additional security enhancements were undertaken to safeguard Joint Mission personnel at Mission headquarters in Damascus, while the standard safety and security procedures remained in place for all personnel. The Joint Mission is also conducting risk mitigation measures in

Latakia, both at the hotel accommodations and the port facilities made available by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The security situation within the Syrian Arab Republic remains precarious, and recent military operations to the north-east of Damascus have led to the cancellation of important planning and verification activities, and to heightened risks to Joint Mission personnel. The Joint Mission has continuously assessed the security situation to identify threats and to mitigate risks to its operations.

Conclusion

The Joint Mission has continued to make notable progress in the support and verification of the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Phase II activities continued, and new milestones achieved, despite the immensely challenging situation inside the country. Significant strides towards implementation of phase III activities were also made.

Member States made this possible through the provision of funding to the relevant trust funds, the procuring, sourcing and deploying quantities of assets, equipment and material, and the planning and deploying of considerable naval and support assets to the eastern Mediterranean. As the Director-General of OPCW reported to the Executive Council, one month ago it would have been difficult to predict the availability of the very significant assets that are now in place in support of this undertaking.

The tremendous effort involved in this undertaking has not been without problems. At times, schedules have been disrupted by factors outside the control of the Joint Mission, including security concerns, clearance procedures for international transit and inclement weather conditions. Conscious of the OPCW Executive Council's timelines, the Joint Mission has coordinated closely with concerned Member States to proactively seek solutions to problems in order to advance its mandated tasks in the quickest and safest manner possible.

As the Security Council is well aware, the Joint Mission is working to achieve unprecedented objectives in a uniquely challenging environment, and in an extremely short period of time. Implementation of the mandated tasks cannot occur without conditions inside the Syrian Arab Republic that are conducive to the carrying out of these tasks. In this regard, the continuing volatility and unpredictability of the situation inside the country has an impact on the timely achievement of the mandate.

I remain deeply concerned about the safety and security of Joint Mission personnel. I remind the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, and all parties inside the country, of their obligations to safeguard Joint Mission personnel, and to do everything to facilitate their full and unfettered access in the furtherance of their mandated tasks.

The Special Coordinator remains in constant contact with the Director-General of OPCW and myself to ensure that the OPCW headquarters in The Hague and the United Nations Secretariat are fully informed of the evolving situation, the progress made and the challenges faced in implementing mandated tasks. The Joint Mission will continue to do everything possible to achieve its objectives in supporting and verifying the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic in the quickest and safest manner.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Special Coordinator and all the staff of the Joint Mission as they work to fulfil their extraordinarily challenging and critically important tasks.

I should be grateful if you would urgently bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Letter dated 24 December 2013 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme”, prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of the decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 November to 22 December 2013 and also covers the reporting requirements set out in decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of OPCW, dated 15 November 2013.

(Signed) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

Note by the Director-General

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013, the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) reports to the Executive Council (hereinafter the “Council”) on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of the decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The first such report by the Secretariat was submitted to the Council on 25 October 2013 (EC-M-34/DG.1, dated 25 October 2013) and covered the period from 27 September to 22 October 2013. The second report was submitted to the Council on 25 November 2013 (EC-M-35/DG.1, dated 25 November 2013) and covered the period from 23 October to 22 November 2013.
3. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of this decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
4. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 November to 22 December 2013.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

5. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of EC-M-34/DEC.1 establish intermediate completion dates for the removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons prior to their complete elimination in the first half of 2014. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling these obligations is described below:

(a) As reported in the previous monthly report, Syrian personnel have continued to destroy specialised and standard equipment and special features of declared buildings and structures at chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). As at the cut-off date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic has destroyed specialised equipment at 17 CWPFs (including eight mobile CWPFs) and standard equipment at six of these CWPFs. At seven CWPFs, special features of buildings and structures have been destroyed and specialised buildings have been destroyed at five CWPFs. As reported in paragraph 8 below, the Secretariat has verified some of these destruction activities, and verification of others will be undertaken when conditions permit. Following extensive consultation with the Secretariat, on 6 December 2013,

the Syrian Arab Republic submitted the final version of its detailed plans for destruction in respect of CWPFs (EC-M-36/P/NAT.1, dated 6 December 2013).

(b) On 16 December 2013, in advance of the 1 January 2014 deadline, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Secretariat a plan for the destruction of isopropanol and residual mustard agent as required by paragraph 9 of EC-M-34/DEC.1. The Secretariat and the government of the Syrian Arab Republic are currently clarifying some aspects of the plan. As required by EC-M-34/DEC.1, this plan should be reviewed by the Council not later than 15 January 2014.

(c) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of chemical weapons and CWPFs. The first such report was submitted on 20 December 2013 (EC-M-37/P/NAT.1, dated 20 December 2013).

(d) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of their implementation. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW team in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

6. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter “the Joint Mission”) has continued with close coordination between the two organisations and between the offices in New York, The Hague, Cyprus and Damascus. From 11 to 13 December 2013, Secretariat personnel from The Hague and Joint Mission personnel from Damascus participated in a meeting hosted by the United States of America in Stuttgart to coordinate the maritime contributions offered by States Parties. As at the cut-off date of this report there were 15 OPCW staff members in Damascus and Latakia, one logistics officer in Beirut and two staff in transit to Damascus.

7. The Special Coordinator, Sigrid Kaag, addressed the Eighteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties on 2 December 2013. While maintaining close contact with Ms Kaag, the Director-General has also met with senior representatives of the States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction.

8. During the reporting period, OPCW members of the Joint Mission have continued to conduct verification activities and to undertake planning for the forthcoming transportation phase. As reported in the previous monthly report, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Secretariat on 18 November 2013 that it had destroyed all unfilled chemical munitions (Category 3 chemical weapons) and the Secretariat was able to verify the destruction of more than 60% of such munitions. During the current reporting period, Secretariat personnel were able to verify the destruction of the remaining Category 3 chemical weapons. Pursuant to paragraph 21 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat can therefore confirm that the Syrian Arab Republic has met the requirement of subparagraph 2(a)(i) of that decision to destroy all declared Category 3 chemical weapons ahead of the 31 January 2014 deadline. Secretariat personnel have also verified the destruction of 64% of the empty HD containers and cylinders declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. With regard to

CWPFs, Secretariat personnel have verified the destruction of the eight mobile CWPFs and of specialised equipment at a further seven CWPFs, of standard equipment at four of these CWPFs, of special features of buildings at five CWPFs and of one building at another CWPF.

9. On 15 December 2013, pursuant to paragraph 8 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Director-General submitted a plan for the destruction of chemical weapons outside the Syrian Arab Republic (EC-M-36/DG.3, dated 15 December 2013). The Council considered the plan at its Thirty-Sixth Meeting and adopted a decision on it welcoming the assistance offered for specific stages of the plan and the voluntary financial contributions made by States Parties (EC-M-36/DEC.2, dated 17 December 2013). The Director-General will report to the Council on the implementation of this plan not later than 7 January 2014.

10. Pursuant to the plan, the Syrian Arab Republic will conduct packaging activities and transport the chemical weapons from the 12 CWSFs to the port of embarkation in Latakia from where they will be removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction. All activities related to possible reloading and packing will be verified and the shipping containers will be fitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) trackers and anti-intrusion devices. Due to the security situation, verification activities during the transportation phase will combine on-site inspection and verification by monitoring; random sampling may also be done on site. Appropriate resources for the packaging and transport from the chemical storage sites to the embarkation point are being provided by China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Sequenced Syrian convoys transporting chemical materials will arrive at Latakia where further verification activities will be conducted, which will include an inventory of the chemicals, individual storage containers, and shipping containers, inspection of seals, and analysis of representative samples.

11. To enable the destruction of mustard agent and key binary chemical weapon components DF and A the United States of America will provide technology to neutralise the chemicals aboard a sovereign United States vessel, the MV Cape Ray, at sea. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will destroy the key binary chemical weapon components B, and BB, including BB salt, at a commercial facility. Italy will provide a port for the transloading of the mustard agent, DF and A from the Danish/Norwegian vessels onto the MV Cape Ray.

12. In anticipation of the beginning of the transportation phase, a small team of Joint Mission personnel deployed to Latakia on 3 December 2013 to prepare for the arrival of the chemical weapons identified for removal from the Syrian Arab Republic and for the conduct of verification activities at the port. This team will be augmented in the near future. Close coordination has been established with the Joint Mission office in Cyprus and with those planning the maritime transportation phase.

13. Pursuant to paragraph 13 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat has developed a draft facility agreement to be concluded with the Syrian National Authority covering the CWSFs in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Director-General will inform the Council accordingly upon the conclusion of the agreement.

14. As requested by paragraph 15 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat and the United States of America are developing an agreed detailed plan for verification and a draft facility agreement for the destruction facilities that are being installed on

board the MV Cape Ray. Members of the Secretariat toured the vessel on 10 and 11 December 2013. Selected Secretariat personnel will travel to the United States of America in late December 2013 to receive training to enable them to verify destruction activities. The detailed plan and the draft facility agreement will be submitted to the Council for its review and approval at its Thirty-Seventh Meeting on 8 January 2014.

15. As required by paragraph 16 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat submitted combined plans for the destruction and verification of CWPFs in the Syrian Arab Republic to the Council on 9 December 2013 (EC-M-36/DG.2, dated 9 December 2013). These plans cover the demolition of the eight mobile units that are considered to be CWPFs, and the buildings at the “Tudmur”, “Al-Dhamir 1”, “Al-Dhamir 3”, “Al-Nasiriyah 2”, “Tel Kurdi”, and “500 (Aleppo)” CWPFs. At its Thirty-Sixth Meeting, the Council agreed to these plans (EC-M-36/DEC.1, dated 17 December 2013). On 16 December 2013 the Secretariat submitted to the Council an addendum to the plans (EC-M-36/DG.2/Add.1, dated 16 December 2013) which contains the results of the review conducted by the Secretariat in accordance with subparagraph 1(a) of decision EC-M-35/DEC.2. The results of the review are that, given the destruction of specialised and standard equipment and of special features of buildings at 12 other CWPFs (“Shayrat”, “Tha’lah”, “Al-Sin”, “Al-Nasiriyah 3”, “Baly”, “Khalkhalah”, “Dhabaa”, “Hafir 1”, “Hafir 2”, “Al-Sayed”, “Al-Dhamir 2”, and “Al-Nasiriyah 1”), destruction of these facilities must be completed not later than 15 March 2014. On 14 December 2013, technical consultations facilitated by the Secretariat took place in Moscow on this issue. The Secretariat will continue technical consultations with a view to arriving at practical recommendations regarding methods for destruction of specialised and standard buildings at these 12 CWPFs. The Secretariat will inform the next meeting of the Council of the outcome of these discussions.

16. As required by paragraph 24 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Director-General has explored options for destruction in commercial chemical disposal facilities of the chemicals referred to in subparagraphs 3(a) and (b) of that decision. Since the call for expressions of interest was issued (S/1142/2013, dated 22 November 2013), the Secretariat has reviewed the expressions received and has shared the results of this review with States Parties (S/1143/2013, dated 9 December 2013). On 16 December 2013, the Secretariat submitted to the Council a Note by the Director-General: “Call for Proposals for the Treatment and Disposal of Chemicals, Effluents, and Related Packaging Materials with Respect to the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons” (EC-M-36/DG.4, dated 16 December 2013) outlining the tendering process which was initiated on 20 December 2013. This process will involve, inter alia, commercial as well as technical evaluations of proposals within an expedited schedule that retains the fundamental and essential characteristics of open, transparent, and competitive bidding. The Council considered and took note of the tendering process as outlined in the Director-General’s Note.

17. As required by paragraph 25 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Director-General reported to the Council (EC-M-36/DG.1, dated 2 December 2013) regarding the implementation of that decision.

Supplementary resources

18. As alluded to above and as reported by the Director-General during the Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Council (EC-M-36/DG.5, dated 17 December 2013), a number

of States Parties are assisting in the removal of Syrian chemical weapons. The United States of America is providing a destruction technology for priority chemicals on board the MV Cape Ray and is also supplying nearly 3,000 container drums of various capacities, providing GPS trackers, loading, transportation, and decontamination equipment. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will destroy the key binary chemical weapon components B and BB at a commercial facility. The Russian Federation is providing large capacity and armoured trucks, water tanks, and other logistical supplies. It has also indicated the possibility of further monetary or material assistance, as well as security for cargo operations at the port and in Syrian territorial waters. China is providing surveillance cameras and 10 ambulances.

19. Denmark and Norway will provide vessels to transport the chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic, and China, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will provide naval escorts for the maritime transportation of the Syrian chemicals, and subsequently for the transportation of chemicals that are to be disposed of at commercial facilities. Finland has offered chemical weapons emergency-response capabilities. Italy has decided to offer a port for the transloading of the priority chemicals from the Danish/Norwegian vessels to the United States ship.

20. As at the cut-off date of this report, the balance in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons currently stands at EUR 10.2 million. Contributions have been received from the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Special Trust Fund for Destruction. A further contribution of approximately EUR 350,000 is expected from the Republic of Korea. In addition, the European Union has decided to contribute EUR 12 million, and the Japanese Government has decided, subject to parliamentary approval, to contribute an amount of nearly USD 15 million (approximately EUR 11 million), which will be shared between the OPCW and the United Nations.

Conclusion

21. The Syrian Arab Republic has formulated a plan for the transportation of the chemicals within its territory from the 12 storage sites to the port of Latakia, where these will be loaded onto maritime vessels. It also indicated that it would implement a security and safety plan during the movement of materials within the Syrian Arab Republic. In accordance with the separation of obligations at various stages of the transportation and destruction process, as established in EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic will be responsible for all the packing and safe transportation of chemicals within its territory until they are loaded onto the maritime vessels.

22. As the Director-General reported to the Council at its Thirty-Sixth Meeting: "At times, schedules have been disrupted by a combination of security concerns, clearance procedures in international transit and even inclement weather conditions. These circumstances, which have been beyond the control of the assisting States Parties, the Joint Mission, and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, have, however, added pressures to the time frames. The continuing heavy fighting in the

Qalamoun and surrounding areas and the closure of a major arterial road between Damascus and Homs, pose risks to the timely execution of the operation. The possibility of some delays cannot be discounted.” In EC-M-36/DEC.2, the Council noted that “technical factors have caused delays regarding some aspects of removal operations for high-priority chemicals and may also affect future implementation activities”.

23. As the date for the removal of priority chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic is approaching, the Director-General and the Special Coordinator have, in their regular conversations with the Syrian authorities, underscored the importance of commencing the process at the earliest. For this purpose they have encouraged the Syrian authorities to look at all possible options for risk mitigation in the absence of some equipment requested by the Syrian Arab Republic which, despite all possible efforts, have not been found readily available on the international market.
