



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 28 October 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the first monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (see annex). This letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations related to the implementation of the resolution from 27 September to 22 October 2013.

#### Introduction

At the outset, I would like to congratulate OPCW for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I pay tribute to the leadership of the Director-General, to the professionalism and dedication of OPCW staff, and to their work, which has earned them this year's Nobel Peace Prize.

I wish to recall your letter of 11 October 2013 ([S/2013/603](#)) conveying the Security Council's decision to authorize the establishment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission as proposed in my letter of 7 October 2013 ([S/2013/591](#)). I am pleased to confirm that, on 16 October 2013, the Director-General of OPCW and I established the Joint Mission and concluded a Supplementary Arrangement concerning cooperation between the United Nations and OPCW for the implementation of Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) relating to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Also on 16 October 2013, in close consultation with the Director-General, I appointed Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator to head the Joint Mission. I have every confidence that the strong cooperation that has already defined the work of OPCW and the United Nations will bolster the role of the Special Coordinator and guide the efforts of our two organizations, within our respective roles and responsibilities, to fully implement the Executive Council decision and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

Upon appointment, the Special Coordinator immediately assumed her responsibilities and continued the effective and efficient functioning of the Joint Mission to date. After a series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters she travelled to OPCW headquarters in The Hague for consultations on 19 and 20 October with the Director-General and his staff, along with other stakeholders.



On 21 October 2013 the Special Coordinator travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic to begin her work from the Joint Mission operations base in Damascus. She met with the Foreign Minister, Walid Al-Moualem, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Faisal Mekdad, and other Syrian counterparts to identify ways to finalize phase II-related activities and discuss arrangements for phase III destruction, as described in my letter of 7 October 2013. During those discussions the Government reiterated its support to the Joint Mission, its commitment to fully implement the requirements of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the decisions of the Executive Council of OPCW. While in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Special Coordinator visited a chemical weapons production facility on 22 October and observed the early results of destruction activities.

The Special Coordinator travelled to Cyprus on 23 October to develop the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base and convened a planning conference attended by OPCW and United Nations officials. The planning conference focused on phase III activities, and made important progress on key operational matters. The participants finalized a mission concept, a planning framework, a draft operational plan, and a range of supporting documentation.

Thus far the Joint Mission, in particular OPCW, with the support of the United Nations, has focused on clarifying elements contained within the Government disclosure submitted to OPCW on 21 September 2013, ahead of an initial declaration to be submitted by 27 October 2013. The Joint Mission has conducted verification activities at 37 out of 41 disclosed facilities. As the Director-General of OPCW indicates in his attached report, Joint Mission personnel have not been able to visit a few locations because of highly insecure conditions at those locations. The security situation at each of the locations is under constant review by the Joint Mission, in close consultation with the Syrian authorities, with the intention of visiting them as soon as conditions permit. The Joint Mission has confirmed the functional destruction of the production, mixing and filling capabilities at all the sites it has inspected. In all of these activities the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has extended consistent, constructive cooperation.

### **United Nations activities**

Since the adoption of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), the United Nations has worked first to deploy and support the OPCW-United Nations advance team, and subsequently to launch the Joint Mission. To this end, and guided by the principles of the Organization's global field support strategy, the United Nations has rapidly deployed a range of personnel, assets and capabilities to the Syrian Arab Republic and Cyprus. To accomplish this, the United Nations has drawn from other missions in the region and from Headquarters, with the flexible allocation of personnel, assets and capabilities. As I indicated in my letter of 7 October 2013, I intend to make full use of the authorities provided to me to ensure the timely achievement of the mandate of the Mission in a safe manner. The costs of these United Nations activities and deployments will be met by the Joint Mission budget, and will not come at the expense of other missions' financial resources.

Currently, there are 26 OPCW experts and 50 United Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers fluctuate constantly, depending on operational requirements. In addition, some of the United

Nations support responsibilities are being met through temporary surge deployments of United Nations personnel who provide short-term capabilities critical for the start-up of the Joint Mission, but whose services are required only for a short time and who are temporarily Joint Mission staff.

During this reporting period, the United Nations has worked to develop the Joint Mission's operational capability across a range of areas. The United Nations has established office and personnel accommodation for the Mission, deployed 22 armoured vehicles with the support of donors, a diesel fuel tanker, and an armoured ambulance. The United Nations is also providing logistic, administrative and public information support as well as medical assistance, including a United Nations doctor and nurse who work in concert with OPCW paramedics. The United Nations has also provided emergency trauma bags for office premises and vehicles, together with scheduled related training, and a range of chemical protection equipment. The Mission has established a strategic communications network by linking through other United Nations missions in the region, establishing a VHF base station, and providing computers and satellite and mobile telephones. The United Nations has provided for the Geographic Information System requirements of the Joint Mission, including affiliated equipment. Finally, the United Nations has been central to the outreach effort to Syrian, international and local partners.

The safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel are a central concern for me and for the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic remains difficult and unpredictable. The security of OPCW and United Nations personnel remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission has taken a proactive role in assessing the security context, working with the host Government to ensure the necessary security arrangements, and advising on and supporting the conduct of operations. The United Nations liaises with the Government and local groups with regard to site access. Opposition groups have a central role in ensuring the safety of the Mission and access to sites where they may exert influence. One of the primary risk mitigation measures employed by the Joint Mission is to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic only staff that need to be in the country to perform their function, and to keep staff in the country only as long as their presence there is operationally required. In this regard, the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base in Cyprus will play an increasingly important role as staff are deployed there in support of the Mission, but also as staff move between Damascus and Cyprus.

In other efforts to establish the Mission, and further to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), in which the Council called on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modality agreements with the United Nations and OPCW, on 16 October 2013 the United Nations and OPCW jointly proposed a draft tripartite status-of-mission agreement to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to concluding the agreement by 1 November 2013.

The United Nations and OPCW have also concluded a tripartite exchange of letters with the Government of Cyprus, for the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base. Arrangements have also been put in place in Lebanon to facilitate the transit of Joint Mission personnel and equipment. The United Nations and OPCW appreciate the support of both Governments.

On the same day that the Joint Mission was officially launched on 16 October, both the United Nations and OPCW launched trust funds to support our respective

contributions to this mission. There has been donor interest in both funds and discussions are ongoing with a number of countries relating to contributions to the United Nations trust fund.

### **Phase III activities**

It is clear that the Joint Mission, and in particular OPCW, has a vital role in verifying Syrian activities with respect to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Less clear, but vital to the work of the Joint Mission, is the degree to which the Mission will be expected to provide direct support to Syrian authorities in their own planning or operations. The role of the Joint Mission, if any, in conducting actual operations, for instance in the packing, safe transport, and possible removal from the Syrian Arab Republic of chemical agents, requires further consultation and review. The Joint Mission is prepared to contribute to the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme in the most efficacious manner possible, consistent with the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and the resolution of the Security Council. I have asked the Special Coordinator, operating under the guidance of the OPCW Director-General and myself, to rapidly conclude the necessary consultations with the Syrian authorities and relevant stakeholders in order to arrive at a shared understanding of the operational role to be played by the Syrian Arab Republic, by the Joint Mission, and possibly by Member States. This is an urgent task if the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Joint Mission, working together, are to meet the envisaged deadlines.

As part of this effort, the Joint Mission will identify areas where support may be required from Member States or other organizations. I am grateful for the offers of assistance that have been made thus far to OPCW and to the United Nations for this mission. Already the Joint Mission has received valuable support from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. This support has included armoured vehicles vital to the operational activities of the Joint Mission, airlift capacity for personnel including the Special Coordinator and for material including armoured vehicles and mapping information. In addition, Sweden has agreed to place an aircraft at the disposal of the Joint Mission for an initial period of two months. The aircraft will be based in Cyprus and used primarily to transport personnel between Cyprus and Beirut for onward travel to Damascus.

Related to possible areas of support for the Joint Mission's work is support that the Syrian authorities may require or benefit from for the conduct of their activities related to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme. The Syrian authorities have developed an initial security plan for the transport of materials associated with the chemical weapons programme within the country. That plan will be further discussed between the Joint Mission and the Government. In addition, the Syrian Arab Republic is obliged to submit its destruction plan to OPCW by 27 October 2013. The Executive Council of OPCW will consider the plan and take a decision by 15 November 2013 outlining the detailed requirements for the complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment. The Special Coordinator will work closely with OPCW headquarters, the Syrian authorities and interested Member States to ensure synchronization of the related planning efforts.

The Syrian Arab Republic remains responsible for the destruction of its chemical weapons programme and has delivered a copy of a letter addressed to the

OPCW Director-General by the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister that contained a list of “requirements for the implementation of the security plan”. The extensive list included items related to transportation, material packing and handling, communications, safety and security, power generation, and personnel support. The Joint Mission is currently analysing the list. The United Nations, possibly using the trust fund that I have established for this operation, will consider meeting certain of the validated support requests either through the direct provision of assistance to the Government, through the conditional loan of material assistance to the Government, or through its own direct operational engagement, acting through the Joint Mission. Some of the support requested by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic could potentially be used for legitimate purposes associated with the destruction of the chemical weapons programme, while at the same time have practical military applications. The United Nations will not procure or otherwise provide such dual-use material to the Government. Any assistance provided by the United Nations will be subject to strict conditions in order to ensure that it is used solely for the intended purposes.

The Special Coordinator will consult with the Syrian authorities, and OPCW and United Nations Headquarters as appropriate, in order to develop as quickly as possible a list of support requirements for the Syrian Arab Republic and separately for the Joint Mission, which she will share with interested Member States as soon as it is available.

As part of its planning activities, the Joint Mission, with support from the Health and Safety Branch of OPCW and the United Nations Environment Programme, has developed an initial environmental protection and health and safety analysis. Both parties are prepared to provide additional assistance once more detail regarding the overall operational plan of the Joint Mission is established. The United Nations is also in contact with the World Health Organization regarding the possible public health implications of activities associated with the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

## **Conclusion**

The Security Council demonstrated the importance of eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic when it unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (2013). The Director-General of OPCW and I, together with our staffs, have acted on this mandate with singular focus to ensure timely progress for the sake of the Syrian people and for the sake of regional and international peace and security. OPCW and the United Nations have managed within the brief time of the reporting period to establish a fully functioning Mission capable of confronting the challenging tasks and operating in a dangerous and volatile environment.

The decisions taken by the two Councils rightly accorded operational priority to disabling the capability to produce chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic from their separate component parts. Accordingly, since the initial deployment of a joint advance team less than one month ago, OPCW, with the support of the United Nations, has verified the destruction of critical equipment in chemical weapons production, mixing and filling facilities. The functional destruction of the declared capacity of the Syrian Arab Republic to produce chemical weapons is expected to be completed as planned by 1 November 2013, a mere 34 days after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), with the possible exception of two sites that could not be

accessed for security reasons. Efforts will continue to conduct verification of destruction work at those sites.

Let me reiterate that all destruction of chemical weapons facilities, stocks and associated materials is the responsibility of the Syrian Government. Neither OPCW nor the United Nations is mandated to conduct actual destruction activities. First and foremost, success of this Joint Mission will depend on the sustained commitment by the Syrian authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and the resolution of the Security Council. Without sustained, genuine commitment by the Syrian authorities, the Joint Mission will not fulfil its objectives.

I would also like to emphasize that the Joint Mission is carrying out its work in an extremely dangerous, volatile and unpredictable environment. That has an impact on the ability of the Joint Mission to conduct its highly technical work, and we should remain vigilant to do all in our power to support the men and women of OPCW and the United Nations who have worked so hard and so well together to achieve these initial steps. However, the job is far from complete and much important work remains to be done. The United Nations will continue to act in partnership with OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to implement the provisions of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) in their entirety.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* **BAN** Ki-moon

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**Annex****Letter dated 25 October 2013 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme” prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/Dec.1 and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 27 September to 23 October 2013.

*(Signed)* Ahmet **Üzümcü**

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English,  
French, Russian and Spanish]

### **Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme**

1. The Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting, held on 27 September 2013, adopted a decision entitled “Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons” (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013). This was followed by the adoption on the same day by the United Nations Security Council of resolution 2118 (2013), which endorsed the decision by the Council. That resolution, inter alia, welcomed the Council decision, requested the Director-General and the Secretary-General to closely cooperate in the implementation of the Council decision, and requested further that the Director-General report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General.

2. In subparagraph 2 (f) of its decision, the Council requested the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) to “report to the Council on a monthly basis on implementation of this decision including progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of this decision and the Convention, activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic, and its needs for any supplementary resources, particularly technical and personnel resources”. In paragraph 12 of resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations Security Council decided to “review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 27 September 2013 and this resolution”, and requested the Director-General to “report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General”.

3. This first monthly report covers the period from 27 September to 22 October 2013. The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) entered into force for the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 October 2013.

#### **Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1**

4. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling its obligations as established in paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 is described below:

(a) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (a) of the Council decision, on 4 October 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted information to supplement that provided on 19 September 2013, on the chemical weapons and other relevant capabilities that it owns or possesses, or has under its jurisdiction or control. Information required in points (i) to (iii) of subparagraph 1 (a) of the Council decision was provided. As required by subparagraph 2 (a) of the Council decision, the Secretariat made this supplementary information available to all States Parties within five days of its receipt. The Syrian Arab Republic has also provided additional information to the Secretariat, including: inventories of chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs) (munitions, chemical agents and precursors); site diagrams for CWSFs, including buildings and their current condition; information regarding components of binary weapons; site diagrams and process



flow diagrams for certain chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs); information on the nature of activities conducted and current status of CWPF buildings and equipment, including mixing and filling facilities (both fixed and mobile); information about the nature of activities at research and development facilities; and information about the test and evaluation site. In total, the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted information on 41 facilities<sup>1</sup> at 23 sites (18 CWPFs, including filling facilities, 12 CWSFs, eight mobile filling units, and three chemical weapons-related facilities), approximately 1,000 metric tonnes (MTs) of Category 1 chemical weapons (largely binary chemical weapon precursors), approximately 290 MTs of Category 2 chemical weapons, and approximately 1,230 unfilled chemical munitions. In addition, the Syrian authorities have reported finding two cylinders not belonging to them, which are believed to contain chemical weapons.

(b) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (b) of the Council decision, the Syrian Arab Republic shall submit the initial declaration required by Article III of the Convention not later than 30 days after the adoption of the Council decision, that is, not later than 27 October 2013. The Secretariat continues to assist the Syrian authorities in compiling the initial declaration, and it is expected to be submitted prior to the aforementioned deadline.

(c) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (c) of the Council decision, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. The Secretariat is working with the Syrian authorities to develop the general plan for destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and CWPFs, which is due to be submitted as part of the initial declaration required by Article III of the Convention not later than 27 October. In this regard, as at the cut-off date for this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had destroyed 12 items of Category 3 chemical weapons (unfilled munitions).

(d) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (d) of the Council decision, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 1 November 2013, the functional destruction (rendering useless or inoperable) of chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment. In this regard, as at the cut-off date for this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had functionally destroyed items of critical chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment at 20 of the 26 CWPFs (including mixing and filling facilities). It is anticipated that all relevant equipment will have been functionally destroyed by 1 November 2013.

(e) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (e) of the Council decision and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of their implementation. The Syrian authorities have extended the necessary cooperation to the OPCW team in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

(f) In accordance with subparagraph 1 (f) of the Council decision, the Syrian Arab Republic shall designate an official as the main point of contact for the Secretariat and provide him or her with the authority necessary to ensure that the

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<sup>1</sup> Following the receipt on 23 October 2013 of the initial declaration required by Article III, the number of declared facilities has been amended to a total of 41. One of the disclosed CWPFs was unintentionally counted twice in the disclosure made on 19 September, while one of the disclosed CWSFs was found to be completely empty and thus not declarable as a CWSF.

decision is fully implemented. Through a letter dated 4 October 2013, the Syrian authorities informed the Secretariat that the Syrian National Authority had been established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that an official, who has the rank of Vice-Minister, had been designated as the main point of contact.

**Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic**

5. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (b) of the Council decision and paragraph 8 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Secretariat promptly deployed a team, totalling 19 persons, to the Syrian Arab Republic on 1 October 2013, in close coordination with the United Nations. At the request of the Syrian authorities, some members of the team conducted a technical-assistance visit. Additional personnel arrived in Damascus on 10 October 2013. The overall objectives of this initial deployment were to:

- (a) assess the information submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to subparagraph 1 (a) of the Council decision;
- (b) develop a programme of activities; and
- (c) verify the destruction of critical items of chemical weapons production equipment.

6. Various meetings have been held with Syrian government officials, including the main point of contact referred to in subparagraph 4 (f) above. These meetings allowed for ensuring the engagement of relevant Syrian authorities in terms of: promoting understanding by the Syrian Arab Republic of its obligations pursuant to the Council decision as well as resolution 2118 (2013); explaining the operational needs regarding information and technical expertise required from relevant Syrian authorities and experts; clarifying the information submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic referred to in subparagraph 4 (a) above; and developing plans for inspecting the facilities contained in such information pursuant to subparagraph 2 (c) of the Council decision.

7. Additional meetings have been held in The Hague between Secretariat personnel and relevant representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic. Such meetings were intended to provide assistance to the Syrian authorities in the compilation of the initial declaration and general plan for destruction as required by Article III of the Convention. The Director-General has also met with senior Syrian officials in The Hague.

8. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (c) of the Council decision, within the reporting period, Secretariat personnel completed inspections at 37 of the 41 facilities about which the Syrian Arab Republic provided information to the Secretariat. As at the cut-off date of this report, the findings of the inspections corroborated the information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic about the above-mentioned facilities. Secretariat personnel continue to carry out activities aimed at assessing the information submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic. It is estimated that, in light of the current rate of progress and subject to the resolution of current security restrictions in the country, the Secretariat personnel should be able to complete all inspections pursuant to subparagraph 2 (c) of the Council decision within the time frame established therein. A small number of the sites that remain to be inspected pose particular security challenges. Inspections of these sites are subject to regular risk assessments by the United Nations Department for Safety and

Security, with input from the Syrian authorities. Currently they are considered too dangerous to visit.

9. During the inspections, and in light of the timelines contained in the Council decision, Secretariat personnel have also overseen the functional destruction of items of critical chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment, as described in subparagraph 4 (d) above.

10. Furthermore, the Secretariat personnel, during the inspections, have overseen the destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons, as described in subparagraph 4 (c) above.

11. The Syrian Arab Republic requested assistance from the OPCW with regard to the procurement of sufficient equipment to complete the functional destruction of critical chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment within the established time frames. The Secretariat and United Nations personnel facilitated the procurement of such equipment.

12. Following the Framework Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, these two States Parties offered to assist the Secretariat with regard to possible destruction options for Syrian chemical weapons and chemical weapons production and mixing and filling facilities. The Secretariat facilitated informal discussions at OPCW Headquarters to develop concepts and options for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and related equipment, with the participation of Syrian officials. Based on these discussions, the Secretariat provided advice to the Syrian Arab Republic on the methodologies for the functional destruction of critical items of chemical weapons production and mixing and filling equipment and on the prioritisation of facilities.

13. In addition, an Operational Planning Group (OPG) will provide advice on operational and logistical aspects relating to the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. The OPG will provide advice with regard to the identification of requirements for possible in-kind contributions from States Parties. The OPG consists of OPCW and United Nations personnel and national experts provided by States Parties in a position to do so.

#### **Supplementary resources**

14. On 16 October 2013, the Secretariat issued a call for voluntary contributions for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons ([S/1132/2013](#), dated 16 October 2013). As described in the Note, the Secretariat has established a trust fund to provide funding to facilitate the technical activities of the OPCW in support of the verification of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. The United Nations has established, in coordination with the OPCW, a trust fund to support efforts to destroy Syrian chemical weapons in accordance with resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). The OPCW trust fund had a balance of EUR 4 million as at the cut-off date of this report, having received contributions from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States of America. A further four States Parties had made pledges to contribute an additional amount of EUR 2.7 million. The Director-General would like to express his appreciation to those States Parties that have already made voluntary contributions to the trust fund, or have committed to doing so.

15. It is the assessment of the Secretariat that its existing personnel resources are sufficient for operations to be conducted in October and November 2013. The Director-General has engaged two former staff members on the basis of special-service agreements. Using funds provided in the regular Programme and Budget for 2013 and contributions made to the trust fund described in paragraph 14 above, the Secretariat has acquired various items of equipment identified as necessary for operations in the Syrian Arab Republic. As and when requirements for either technical or personnel resources dictate, the Secretariat will inform States Parties accordingly. The Secretariat would like to express its gratitude to those States Parties that have already provided support, namely: Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands for air transportation for the deployed teams; the European External Action Service, some European Union Member States, and the United States of America for providing armoured vehicles; and Canada for providing air transportation for the vehicles supplied by the United States of America.

#### **Establishment of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria**

16. As from the deployment of the OPCW personnel to the Syrian Arab Republic on 1 October 2013, the United Nations has provided safety and security support, as well as logistical, medical, and administrative support, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

17. On 16 October 2013, the OPCW and the United Nations established an OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria (JMIS), which was described in the letter submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General, to the United Nations Security Council on 7 October 2013. Also on 16 October 2013, the Director-General and the United Nations Secretary-General signed the “Supplementary Arrangement Concerning Cooperation Between the United Nations and the OPCW for the Implementation of the OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 and United Nations Security Council Resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) Relating to the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons”. The United Nations Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General, appointed Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator of the JMIS to provide overall coordination of the Joint Mission. Ms. Kaag visited the OPCW on 19 October 2013 to meet with the Director-General and other Secretariat officials. The OPCW and the United Nations have initiated negotiations with the Syrian Arab Republic on a Status of Mission Agreement concerning the status of the JMIS.