Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sahel region

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2056 (2012), in which the Council requested me to develop and implement, in consultation with regional organizations, a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues, and to resolution 2071 (2012), in which the Council welcomed my appointment of a Special Envoy for the Sahel to mobilize international efforts, formulate a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and engage actively in defining the parameters of a comprehensive solution to the Malian crisis. The report provides an update on the situation in the Sahel, the activities of my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, since his appointment in October 2012, and the formulation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (see annex), taking into account existing regional and international initiatives.

II. Background

2. For much of the past year, the world watched in horror as long-standing political grievances in Mali were overshadowed by appalling acts of violence carried out by insurgents linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Since the beginning of the Malian crisis in January 2012, more than half a million people are estimated to have fled and sought refuge either in Malian host communities or in neighbouring countries. Serious human rights violations committed by armed groups and Government soldiers, including summary executions and illegal arrests, recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against women and children, abductions of children and destruction and looting of property, are currently under investigation, while access to basic social services is limited, particularly in the north. In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, 53 per cent of schools remain closed, while in the Kidal region, schools have not reopened at all.

3. Considerable efforts have been made by France, Chad, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and the Security Council to help the people of Mali in stabilizing their country. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MISNUSMA) will play a key role in consolidating these hard won gains. However, the problems in Mali
should not be seen in isolation. While the deployment of peacekeepers is a critical component of the international response to the current crisis, the countries of the region recognize that sustainable peace and security will require collective action in addressing the root causes of instability that extend well beyond Mali’s borders.

4. The Sahel stretches from Mauritania to Eritrea, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan, a belt dividing the Sahara desert and the savannahs to the south. The historic trade routes across Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are the most vulnerable to terrorist and criminal networks. The terrain is harsh and, in the best of cases, extremely difficult to control. The Algeria-Mali border alone stretches for 1,300 km. Moreover, developments in the Sahel-Sahara region affect and are affected by developments in North and West Africa. It will therefore be necessary to remain flexible and inclusive, engaging Governments and the population in Sahelian States as and when problems affect them.

Governance and security challenges

5. Countries in the Sahel have been dealing with successive political and humanitarian crises for years. Weak governance and its impact on State institutions, including insufficient border management, have dramatically diminished the capacity of the Sahelian States to effectively deliver basic services, promote broad-based political participation and protect human rights. Widespread corruption, coupled with the inability of States to deliver basic services such as effective policing, justice, access to water, affordable health care and education, has resulted in a widening gap in State-society relations. At the same time, chronic political instability, evident in recurrent unconstitutional changes of government, violent electoral processes and social conflicts, is a direct result of the lack of institutionalized political dialogue, weak parliaments and contested judicial systems.

6. The situation has left the Sahelian countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity resulting from armed conflict, terrorist activities, illicit trafficking and related organized crime. I am particularly concerned by the apparent links between criminal syndicates involved in drug trafficking and related organized crime, as well as non-State armed groups active in the region. I am also alarmed by the activities of terrorist organizations and other militant groups, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, as well as other transnational criminal organizations. They have committed acts of terrorism and abuses of human rights, increased the widespread flow of arms and engaged in human trafficking, drug trafficking and other illicit practices, while eroding State authority in many of the most vulnerable sections of society in the countries of the Sahel. In doing so, they have restricted opportunities for development.

7. The double attack by the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest suicide bombers on a barracks and a French-operated uranium mine in the Niger on 23 May 2013, which killed 35 people and wounded dozens, demonstrates that the Sahel remains vulnerable to the scourge of terrorism. Compounding this challenge, terrorism also has the potential to infiltrate into the wider region, as demonstrated by a serious hostage-taking incident at a natural gas complex in Algeria on 19 January 2013 that resulted in numerous deaths. The Government of Libya has repeatedly conveyed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya, Tarek Mitri, its concerns about the threats posed by terrorists and
organized criminal groups to the region and to its own internal security. Like other
countries in the region, Libya’s borders are vast and porous, which makes effective
patrolling extremely difficult.

8. In 2012, it was estimated that 18 tons of cocaine amounting to $1.25 billion
transited through West Africa, a portion of which allegedly passed through the
Sahel. the lack of economic opportunities, limited regional cooperation, weak
security and defence sectors and porous national borders have also hampered efforts
to counter the spread of illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism.

9. The issue of cross-border criminal activities, such as trafficking in drugs,
persons, firearms and cigarettes, terrorism and money-laundering is often linked to
persons or organizations located well beyond the Sahel and even the African
continent. I call upon all the concerned Member States to do their part to prevent the
use of their territory for criminal activities that exploit the Sahel’s weak governance
and contribute to the misery of the people of the region. I urge all Member States to do
their utmost to tackle drug trafficking, both at its source and at its destination points.

10. There is also a lack of government capacity to ensure the protection of basic
human rights, both a root cause and a symptom of recurrent crises in the region.
Human rights challenges arise from a combination of long-standing weaknesses in
the rule of law, a general lack of accountability, social and gender inequities and
repeated discriminatory practices against certain vulnerable groups, such as women,
including less access than men to land, agricultural assets, inputs and services, and
rural employment opportunities, as well as lack of participation in political life.
Conflicts and widespread instability have further worsened the human rights
situation and are drivers of forced displacement in the Sahel. The Malian crisis is
the latest example of large-scale refugee movements, with nearly 200,000 refugees
sheltering in neighbouring countries, increasing the pressure on host communities
and the environment.

Development and humanitarian challenges

11. The Sahel is confronted with acute development and humanitarian challenges.
Human development in the region is among the lowest in the world. Over the years,
recurring food and nutritional crises caused by climate change, environmental
degradation, drought, floods, poorly functioning markets, low agricultural
productivity, poverty and conflict have seriously eroded the ability of households to
withstand repeated and increasingly frequent shocks. Good rains and better harvests
in 2012 notwithstanding, at least 11.4 million people in the Sahel remain food
insecure. Some 5 million children under the age of five are at risk of acute
malnutrition, of whom some 1.5 million are at risk of severe acute malnutrition. The
prices of cereal, the staple food in the Sahel, have been increasing since October
2010 and are above the last five-year average, leading to a significant decrease in
the purchasing power of vulnerable households. In addition, the Sahel faces major
and recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as meningitis, polio and cholera,
which present significant challenges for weak health-care systems and can be
addressed only through a long-term regional approach aimed at building resilience.

12. Despite its marginal productivity, the Sahel supports some 150 million people.
At current growth rates, its population is likely to balloon in the next 25 years to
nearly a quarter of a billion people. Agriculture and pastoralism sustain the major
portion of the population. However, traditional livelihoods alone will evidently not
be sufficient and a significant transformation will be required throughout the region. The convergence of chronic underinvestment in the agricultural and energy sectors, ineffective social protection systems, inequitable access to basic social services, such as nutrition, education, health care, water and sanitation, environmental degradation and rapid population growth will only result, without the commitment of sustained investment and cooperation in these areas, in a further deepening of vulnerability.

13. The regional climate trends observed over the past 40 years in the Sahel show that the impact of changing climatic conditions on the availability of natural resources (land and water), coupled with other magnifying factors, has led to increased competition over natural resources and tensions between communities. While migration and the movement of people and livestock are an integral part of the ancestral livelihood strategies of the Sahel, they also occur as a result of multiple climate and market shocks.

14. In particular, many families and communities do not have the capacity to safely and appropriately withstand the damaging effects of climate, poor results in the agro-pastoral sector, market fluctuations and other socioeconomic shocks facing them. Conflict further exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. The adoption of negative coping mechanisms, such as selling valuable assets, including agricultural inputs and livestock, incurring debt, migrating to urban areas, pulling children out of school and reducing the quantity and nutritional quality of purchased food leads to a vicious downward spiral of diminished coping capacity, hunger, poverty and destitution. Poverty and destitution are also among the underlying reasons why children from the region are associated with armed groups, as demonstrated by reports of cross-border recruitment of children from Burkina Faso and the Niger by armed groups operating in Mali.

Way forward

15. Despite the daunting multifaceted challenges facing the Sahel, the unity now demonstrated over Mali gives me confidence that the political will exists, both regionally and internationally, to address the interrelated root causes of the crisis in the region. We must take advantage of the international consensus, which was evident during the high-level meeting on the Sahel that I chaired on the margins of the general debate of the General Assembly on 26 September 2012. Working with the Governments of the region, our objective should be to bring about long-term change through a comprehensive strategy, taking into account existing efforts. This approach needs to be firmly anchored in strong resilience-building efforts as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

III. Existing national, regional and international initiatives to address the challenges in the Sahel

16. Over the years, the countries of the Sahel region have initiated a series of national reforms aimed at addressing chronic governance, security, development and humanitarian challenges faced, although the scale of these challenges varies from country to country. Flagship programmes have been launched in a number of countries in support of these efforts. For example, in 2012, the Government of the Niger launched the Strategy for development and security in the Sahel-Saharan areas of the Niger. In 2011, it also launched the widely known 3N initiative, “les
Nigériens nourrissent les Nigériens” on food security and nutrition. The Government of Mauritania has been in the forefront of efforts to promote enhanced regional border management and, in this regard, hosted an African Union ministerial conference on security cooperation in the Sahel-Sahara region on 17 March 2013. The Government of Mauritania has also developed a food security strategy, a social protection strategy, a joint programme on nutrition and a Millennium Development Goal acceleration framework on maternal health. The Government of Burkina Faso is leading ECOWAS mediation efforts in Mali, while on the domestic front it has put in place a plan of action to address long-term food insecurity. The Government of Chad has committed itself to raising $400 million between 2012 and 2015 for rural sector transformation to build the foundation for sustained food security and, in January 2013, it provided a significant and timely contribution to peacekeeping efforts in Mali. Following an end to major hostilities, the interim Government of Mali has, for its part, developed and launched a comprehensive plan for sustainable recovery for 2013 and 2014. The plan includes pillars on infrastructure, basic social services, food security, governance and decentralization.

17. At the subregional and regional levels, the African Union and ECOWAS have developed comprehensive regional frameworks to promote development, good governance, peace and security in the region. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is an AU strategic framework for pan-African socioeconomic development, with several programmes in the areas of integration and infrastructure, agriculture and food security, and climate change and national resource management. Other important frameworks include the 2008 ECOWAS Strategic Framework for Conflict Prevention, the 2011 Praia Declaration on Elections and Stability in West Africa, the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy and Plan of Action (2012-2017), and the 2008-2011 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse, which was extended until the end of 2015 at the forty-second ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Côte d’Ivoire in February 2013. At the same session, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government also adopted the Political Declaration on a Common Position against Terrorism, which includes a counter-terrorism strategy and implementation plan.

18. In addition to the progress at the regional level in the Sahel, interregional cooperation with West Africa and the Maghreb requires greater attention, since many of the challenges faced, including environmental degradation, terrorism and organized crime, are interregional in nature. The African Union, for its part, is supporting the implementation of its 2013-2017 Plan of Action on Drug Control and Crime Prevention. Through the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, located in Algiers, the African Union supports member States in implementing its legal framework on counter-terrorism through regional and international information-sharing, cooperation and coordination. In addition, four countries of the Sahel, namely, Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, have established two mechanisms aimed at addressing transnational threats and enhancing intelligence cooperation: a common operational joint chiefs of staff committee located in Tamanrasset, Algeria, and a unified fusion and liaison cell. However, those mechanisms need to become fully operational. In addition, the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) has an important role to play in monitoring and analysing agriculture production and food prices in the region, while the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States is prepared and needs support to take more action, as demonstrated in March 2013 at its most recent meeting.

19. At the international level, in March 2012, the European Union launched its strategy for security and development in the Sahel. The strategy is aimed at addressing the root causes of poverty in the region and creating conditions for economic and human development. The European Union-led Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative was officially launched on 6 December 2012 to address the causes of food insecurity in the region. On 18 March 2013, the European Union appointed a special representative for the Sahel to lead the Union’s contribution to regional and international efforts to foster lasting peace, security and development in the Sahel. The European Union also authorized an assistance mission to reinforce efforts to help Libya manage its borders more effectively. A number of other actors have also appointed special envoys for the Sahel, including the African Union, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and a range of bilateral actors.

20. In 2007, the Government of the United States of America launched the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership aimed at enhancing the capacity of countries in the pan-Sahel region to tackle terrorism and facilitating cooperation between Sahel countries and Maghreb partners, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, on counter-terrorism issues. Within the framework of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Algeria and Canada co-chair the Sahel Working Group on Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building. International financial institutions have been providing direct financial assistance to the countries and have funded infrastructure development projects throughout the region. The World Bank is in the process of drafting a development strategy for Mali and the wider Sahel subregion, and the African Development Bank is working on a Sahel initiative. In addition, non-governmental organizations have been instrumental in developing policies, supporting advocacy efforts and implementing related initiatives, with a focus on the community level.

21. Following the influx of returnees to the region from Libya and the resumption of armed conflict in northern Mali, the Security Council convened a series of meetings and adopted resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), in addition to a presidential statement on 10 December 2012 (S/PRST/2012/26), to effectively address the interrelated challenges facing the Sahel. In April 2012, I appointed a regional humanitarian coordinator to develop and coordinate the humanitarian response in the region. In October 2012, I appointed Romano Prodi as my Special Envoy for the Sahel to lead the Organization’s efforts to develop and implement an integrated strategy for the region. The United Nations also convened, in collaboration with Member States, a series of meetings on border management, including a meeting on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb hosted by Morocco in March 2013. Meanwhile, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, UNSMIL, continues to advise the Libyan authorities on matters relating to border security, and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), and other United Nations missions in the wider region, continue to work on these issues.

22. On the ground, United Nations country teams have been active in providing support to the countries in the Sahel, in particular through the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategy papers or other national development frameworks (accelerated growth and sustainable development strategy, etc.), country-specific United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks, consolidated
appeal processes and Millennium Development Goal Acceleration Frameworks to support the range of humanitarian and development concerns facing the region.

IV. Rationale for a regional approach and United Nations principles of engagement in the Sahel

23. Based on the above analysis of the underlying causes of instability, and taking into account the efforts taken to date to address them, the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, outlined in the annex, aims to support the Governments and people of the region in their efforts to address the causes of instability within a sustainable and long-term perspective. In particular, the United Nations strategy identifies specific objectives and actions under three strategic goals, namely, (a) enhancing inclusive and effective governance throughout the region; (b) strengthening the capacity of national and regional security mechanisms to address cross-border threats; and (c) integrating development and humanitarian interventions to build resilience.

24. The political will of Governments in the region will be required to achieve the objectives and sustain the actions outlined in the United Nations integrated strategy, while ensuring coherence and complementarity with other initiatives. Acting through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, I will continue to use my good offices to foster the necessary political will and mobilize resources, building on the efforts of the United Nations country teams.

25. The multiple national security, governance, development and human rights challenges facing the countries of the Sahel have regional ramifications. Inequitable political participation and access to social services have regional dimensions, given the cross-border ties of marginalized groups. Terrorist and criminal groups act on the national, regional and international levels. The environmental and economic shocks that give rise to humanitarian crises are also regional and international in nature.

26. The challenges facing the Sahel do not respect borders and neither can the solutions. Maintaining the focus on regional cooperation, national capacity-building and information sharing will be particularly important. Ensuring proper information flow, coordination and complementarity has proven to be a major challenge for the initiatives taken to date at the regional level. A number of worthy initiatives have suffered from inadequate coordination and have failed to take into account the broader regional dimensions of the problem, partly owing to lack of trust, lack of effective regional instruments or lack of information.

27. The Governments and peoples of the region must lead the coordination process. However, the United Nations, acting through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, will also do its part to improve coordination among the following sets of actors: (a) the Governments of the region; (b) the international community, including international financial institutions; (c) the people of the region, by reaching out to them through existing United Nations civil society consultation mechanisms; and (d) the various entities of the United Nations system. Bringing together these four spheres of coordination, the United Nations system will help to integrate efforts to address
issues related to governance, security and resilience, which constitute the three overarching goals of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

28. Fostering coordination among the Governments of the region is a top priority. Continuing to build trust and confidence among the countries of the Sahel will be a cross-cutting objective of the United Nations integrated strategy, which aims to improve governance structures in the region in a manner that legitimately elected Governments are able to sustain and build upon, with as little dependency as possible on international assistance.

29. Coordination within the broader international community will be important to make optimal use of the limited resources available in the current global economic climate. In this regard, collaboration with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, the African Union and the European Union, in addition to international financial institutions, bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations, will be important in order to generate, sustain and coordinate international engagement in support of the national efforts by Sahelian countries to address the multifaceted challenges they face.

30. The people of the region must be heard and made part of any solution affecting their lives. Consultations with the people of the region will be based on existing United Nations mechanisms and will include civil society, tribal and religious leaders, representatives of academia and think tanks and women and young people, with particular attention to the marginalized.

31. The United Nations integrated strategy is designed to foster system-wide unity of purpose and to provide a basis for coherent United Nations engagement in the Sahel. It envisages a range of innovative actions related to, inter alia, the enhancement of regional security analysis and regional capacity to manage borders, the strengthening of local government and State capacity to distribute resources more equitably, the provision of support to vulnerable households and the enhancement of food and nutritional security.

32. The United Nations integrated strategy seeks to enable a multisectoral approach to the problems of the region and to ensure that the design and implementation of actions bring together the strengths and capacities of the various entities of the United Nations system. It also seeks to build, strengthen and further integrate national capacity-building initiatives into the wider development and security efforts, taking into account the policies, priorities and needs of each of the countries in the Sahel. Moreover, the integrated nature of the strategy means that it will be based on joint analysis of cross-cutting issues throughout the Sahel, drawing on inputs and data from all the countries in the region. The integrated strategy is designed to facilitate the prioritization and sequencing of efforts, so that achievements in a given area reinforce implementation in other areas. It also allows for common reporting and analysis on how each area of action affects the others. An integrated approach will also facilitate the development of common messaging and advocacy.

33. The following principles will guide the engagement of the United Nations in the Sahel:

   (a) Focus on regional-level interventions and cross-border issues and threats, allowing for coherence and coordination among short-term, medium-term and long-term measures;
(b) Anchor regional United Nations engagement in national ownership and accountability and ensure that it is grounded in international human rights standards and principles;

(c) Promote the integration of regional priorities into national planning and programming to ensure coherence and mutually reinforcing action across the region;

(d) Promote an equitable approach to development in order to accelerate achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and support social cohesion and conflict prevention;

(e) Maximize the impact of the United Nations system in addressing the continuing challenges of the region and focus on areas in which the United Nations has, or can have, added value to address crises, while building on existing initiatives and continuing efforts;

(f) Ensure free, active and meaningful participation of people and communities at risk throughout all programming phases, including needs assessments and the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes;

(g) Promote cooperation and coordination among national, regional, subregional and international partners, strengthening partnerships with regional and subregional institutions and stakeholders within their respective mandates and reaching out to new potential partners;

(h) Ensure that gender concerns are included in all regional and national efforts targeting the Sahel, including through free, active and meaningful participation of women and their organizations in decision-making;

(i) Encourage South-South cooperation and sharing of best practices among the countries of the Sahel.

V. Activities of the Special Envoy for the Sahel

34. Since his appointment, my Special Envoy has started to foster the close coordination we need. He has undertaken considerable consultations with key actors working in or on the Sahel. He has visited the region on several occasions, along with my Special Representative for West Africa, and has met Heads of State, government officials and civil society actors in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger, in addition to the Chair of ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire. He has held consultations with the African Union, its High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and the ECOWAS Commission. He also visited Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.

35. My Special Envoy has placed a strong emphasis on the need for regional development in the Sahel and, to that end, has visited a number of key international partners, including China, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the United States, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and has maintained close contact with them. On 7 December 2012, he convened the first-ever coordination meeting with special envoys and mediators for the Sahel. He has engaged regularly with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West

36. During his visits to the region, my Special Envoy has held meetings with civil society representatives, including women. In April 2013, together with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Acting Head of UN-Women, my Special Envoy hosted a conference on women’s leadership in the Sahel, looking at issues involving women as economic and political drivers of change, in addition to the role of women in conflict mediation. He will continue these consultations with the support of the respective Governments of the region with the aim of facilitating more inclusive governance processes.

37. On 1 March 2013, my Special Envoy co-hosted, with my Special Adviser on the Millennium Development Goals, a seminar in Dakar that brought together local academics, experts and representatives of United Nations agencies and international financial institutions to discuss and identify innovative approaches to fundamental development issues facing the region.

38. The United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and bilateral donors have developed strategies to support peace and development in the Sahel. Key partners have encouraged my Special Envoy to support the establishment of a mechanism to enhance coordination among these actors, prioritize actions and mobilize resources, particularly for key regional infrastructure projects that can kick-start growth quickly and effectively, drive regional integration and create employment, especially for youth. To maximize the impact of our collective efforts in this area, I propose that emphasis be placed on the core Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger.

39. Based on the elements outlined above, my Special Envoy’s proposal for a Sahel-owned development plan would include two platforms: a coordination platform and an action fund platform. The coordination platform would focus mainly on regularly updating regional infrastructure priorities, identified through a bottom-up process involving local academics and experts and coordinated by my Special Envoy, in key areas such as agriculture, water management, integrated infrastructure, including telecommunications, solar energy and health care and education. The platform would enable the main multilateral donors to meet every six months to review their strategies, ensure that needs are met and overlap avoided. They would meet with countries concerned to discuss priorities and ensure that the donors and recipient countries agree on priorities for resource mobilization. The inaugural coordination platform meeting could take place on the margins of the General Assembly in September 2013.

40. The funding platform would act as a “clearing house” for the identified regional infrastructure priorities in order to effectively match needs with available resources. Donors would be encouraged to provide support, either financially or in-kind, for the agreed and vetted regional priorities, which would be updated regularly by the above-mentioned coordination platform. In order to facilitate the necessary resource mobilization, my Special Envoy proposes the establishment of a Sahel action fund, which could be managed by a pool of international financial institutions. The fund would aim to attract bilateral and multilateral financial support, while also tracking in-kind contributions and encouraging in-kind
contributors to align their support with the identified regional infrastructure priorities.

41. In keeping with the principle of national ownership, countries in the region will be asked to identify and detail their regional infrastructure priorities. To that end, on 14 June 2013, my Special Envoy convened a follow-up meeting of academics from the Sahel in Bologna, Italy. The meeting constitutes the first step in a process that will allow regional infrastructure priorities to be further developed and refined. Based on the results of the Bologna meeting, my Special Envoy intends to convene the Finance and Planning Ministers of the countries of the Sahel region to review and validate the identified regional infrastructure priorities. To support this bottom-up planning process, my Special Envoy proposes that a small, specialized regional “Sahel Development Research Institute” be established with financing from the action fund.

42. In order to encourage resource mobilization, my Special Envoy will convene another meeting of special envoys for the Sahel to consider the regional infrastructure priorities validated by the Finance and Planning Ministers from the region. He will also continue his discussions with the leadership of the African Development Bank to explore whether, with support from the World Bank, it could lead a pool of international development institutions, including the Islamic Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, to manage the proposed Sahel action fund.

VI. Observations and recommendations

43. The security environment in the Sahel remains fragile. The threat of terrorism, trafficking and organized crime requires a comprehensive response. Our collective focus needs to be simultaneously on security, diplomacy and development, taking subregional and regional threats and opportunities into consideration, including relations with West Africa and the Maghreb. Business as usual is not an option.

44. Given the situation in Mali and the implications for the Sahel, we must target the needs of future generations while more urgently dealing with the pressing needs of the present one. We must promote the political and economic inclusion of marginalized groups, particularly in the border areas. We must develop a comprehensive approach to extremism and criminality, in line with international human rights norms and standards, focused on providing opportunities for young people and other risk groups such as prisoners, giving a voice to women and fighting corruption.

45. Past initiatives aimed at resolving crises and conflict in the Sahel have focused largely on the national level and shown their limits, given the cross-border nature and regional scope of the complex challenges confronting the region. Going forward, the United Nations will need to link national efforts and initiatives to region-wide approaches more effectively. The United Nations integrated strategy is intended to guide the Organization’s efforts to collectively support the efforts of the countries of the Sahel to address those challenges from a regional perspective, while adhering to the principle of national ownership. The approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian, development and security interventions in order to ensure that lifesaving activities meet immediate needs, while building the resilience
of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda for the region.

46. The United Nations integrated strategy builds on existing analyses and recommendations, including the United Nations inter-agency assessment mission to the Sahel conducted in December 2011 with the participation of the African Union, the conclusions of the meeting between the African Union and United Nations experts on the Sahel held in Addis Ababa on 14 and 15 March 2012 (endorsed by the ministerial-level meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held on 20 March 2012 in Bamako), and the United Nations action plan on resilience-building in the Sahel. It is geared towards complementing initiatives and measures taken by the States of the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, in addition to regional entities, including the African Union, ECOWAS, the Arab Maghreb Union and CEN-SAD. The proposed strategy is a living document that will be continuously modified, adapted and adjusted as its implementation progresses and the circumstances on the ground evolve.

47. In implementing the integrated strategy for the Sahel, the United Nations will seek to leverage its comparative advantage based on its long-standing presence in the region and its experience in addressing some of the most acute problems facing the populations concerned. The Organization will draw upon its good offices to facilitate and coordinate the convening of relevant actors to help tackle some of the critical issues as well as support resource mobilization and advocacy efforts. The United Nations alone cannot, however, successfully take on the tremendous challenges facing the Sahel. The countries of the region have to maintain their leadership and ownership of the process. The effectiveness of the strategy must be enhanced through partnerships with other interested major actors in the region, such as the African Union and ECOWAS, international financial institutions, and multilateral and bilateral partners, whose technical and financial assistance will be key to the success of this coordinated approach.

48. Effective regional cooperation among Sahelian countries requires continued engagement. I will continue to use my good offices, including through my Special Envoy for the Sahel and my Special Representatives for West and Central Africa, to help build mutual trust among the States in the Sahel.

49. Nowhere is the development-security nexus more evident than in the Sahel. Only through strong, common and preventative actions geared primarily towards development can we prevent the Sahel from turning into an area dominated by criminal and terrorist groups that undermine our collective security. Regional security, regional development cooperation and greater regional integration are essential, and should go hand-in-hand with one another. We must therefore focus on strengthening regional mechanisms across all sectors and promote integrated and comprehensive national strategies for dealing with terrorism and transnational organized crime that complement these mechanisms. For this reason, the United Nations integrated strategy will be implemented in close cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States, CILSS, the Arab-Maghreb Union and other relevant subregional actors.

50. Building upon national programmes already in place in a number of countries, actions are urgently needed to support inclusive resilience-building. In the short term, humanitarian action will continue to provide lifesaving assistance and address
most of the acute needs. In the medium term, and through a mixture of humanitarian and development assistance, disaster risk reduction and development interventions will aim to rebuild assets, support livelihoods, scale up social protection and provide access to basic services, without any form of discrimination. In the long term, it will be important to consolidate the gains achieved through short-term and medium-term interventions to achieve peace, sustainable growth and human development. In this respect, resilience is also about preventive action.

51. The United Nations strategy needs to be bottom-up and participatory, with clear government leadership, ownership and accountability, including through the allocation of funds. It must ensure that short-, medium- and long-term efforts are captured in integrated, multiyear programming of humanitarian and development assistance in order to respond to immediate needs and reinforce the capacities, livelihoods and opportunities of the most vulnerable people in the long run. Evaluation of the risks to which a community or country may be exposed is also necessary.

52. The implementation of the strategy will require the sustained engagement by the United Nations system as a whole over a period of years. In order to maximize its impact on the ground, its implementation should rest on the strong engagement of UNOWA and the United Nations system in the region. Over time, it should result in a regionally owned implementation mechanism. The strategy must also be reviewed and refined on a continuous basis, through consultation and cooperation with the countries of the region and the international community.

53. In order to deliver on this ambitious agenda, the United Nations will undertake a review of the available resources at the global, regional and country levels currently being marshalled in support of the Sahel to determine how best to focus its support. The United Nations Development Group regional team in Dakar will receive further capacity to pursue this agenda for the region. Building on existing efforts, the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks for the region will be used as the instrument to advance the strategy at the country level. Regional capacity on early warning throughout the Sahel will be strengthened under the lead role of the United Nations Office for West Africa, with the support of all United Nations entities involved in the implementation of the strategy.

54. The implementation of agreed regional infrastructure priorities will be key to driving human and economic development and will directly complement the roll-out of the United Nations integrated strategy. To that end, the proposed establishment of a coordination platform will help to ensure that the efforts of the international community are aligned with the regional needs identified through a bottom-up process. This will help ensure that a coherent and coordinated approach is pursued in the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. My Special Envoy will continue to engage with the international financial institutions and with the World Bank and African Development Bank to explore the possibility of establishing a Sahel action fund for regional infrastructure capable of tracking and channelling both financial and in-kind contributions.

55. I should like to express my appreciation to my Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, and his staff for their efforts to contribute to sustainable peace and development of the Sahel region. I would also like to note the efforts of the United Nations offices throughout the Sahel region for their continued commitment.
Annex

United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel

The United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel is built around three broad areas of support formulated as strategic goals and organized according to key themes. The strategic goals are aimed at supporting and strengthening continuing initiatives and addressing previously identified gaps. A series of specific objectives and indicative actions are proposed to achieve these goals. The three areas of support are complementary and form an integrated response to the Sahel crisis. In particular, the approach is premised on the integration of humanitarian and development interventions, ensuring that lifesaving activities meet immediate needs while building the resilience of people and communities as part of a long-term development agenda.

Strategic goal one: inclusive and effective governance throughout the region is enhanced

Effective governance rests on State legitimacy, based on: political inclusion; the rule of law; State capacity to deliver basic services; and accountability in delivering such services. United Nations good offices are focused in part on helping countries of the region to attain State legitimacy when and where required, and the programmatic activities of the system are geared to building the needed capacity and accountability mechanisms. Good governance, including in the security sector, is an essential element of United Nations programming, as reflected in the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks and poverty reduction strategy papers or national development frameworks. The goal of effective and inclusive governance can be broken down into the following objectives and indicative actions:

Objective 1.1
Strengthens institutions to foster democratic practices, including political dialogue, free, fair and transparent elections, and broad-based participation

Indicative actions:

(a) Support programmes aimed at empowering political parties in Sahelian countries to promote peaceful politics and the political participation of women, including through the establishment of inclusive inter-party dialogue frameworks (Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women));

(b) Promote the exchange of knowledge and the sharing of experiences among electoral management bodies in the Sahel on issues pertaining to the prevention of election-related conflicts, including gender-based violence (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, UN-Women);

(c) Support the establishment of national early warning mechanisms to prevent, respond to and mitigate potential conflict throughout the electoral process (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP);
(d) Foster the active, meaningful and free participation of civil society members, including young people, women and minority groups, and the media, in the political life of the respective countries (UNDP, UN-Women);

(e) Support the development of programmes to build the capacity and oversight functions of parliaments and enhance the capacity of parliamentary committees (UNDP);

(f) Promote greater participation of women from the Sahel region in all international forums and peace talks to resolve the crises in the Sahel, building on the European Union/United Nations high-level conference on women’s leadership in the Sahel, held on 9 April 2013, and on other relevant international and regional frameworks (UN-Women, Department of Political Affairs);

(g) Build the capacity of governmental and non-governmental national and regional actors, including regional economic communities, on issues relating to facilitation, dialogue and mediation, to foster peace and reconciliation, manage political risks and promote collaborative processes (Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, UN-Women).

Objective 1.2
Support local governance and the extension of government services throughout national territories

Indicative actions:

(a) Promote and support the drafting and implementation of legislation on decentralization and deconcentration in the Sahelian countries (UNDP);

(b) Build the capacities and accountability mechanisms of national and local institutions to deliver quality basic social services, which include health care, education, water and sanitation, promote equitable access to such services and enhance resilience at the local level (United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA));

(c) Build the capacity of local authorities and institutions to establish and implement mechanisms for broader and more inclusive participation of the community and vulnerable groups, including women, in local development (UNDP, UNICEF, UN-Women).

Objective 1.3
Strengthen State capacities to ensure more equitable access to resources and socioeconomic services

Indicative actions:

(a) Support the development and enhancement of policies and practices aimed at improving public sector resource management, allocation and accountability, including independent oversight (UNDP);

(b) Strengthen the capacity of Governments and other relevant stakeholders to harness natural resources to advance human development in four interdependent areas: participatory legislation, policy and planning; people-centred exploration; effective revenue collection and management; and investing in human development and structural transformation (UNDP).
Objective 1.4
Assist the Sahelian countries to strengthen regional mechanisms for economic governance

Indicative actions:

(a) Develop the capacity of regional economic communities and support their regional action plans to ensure ownership among countries in the implementation of public finance reforms, in order to reinforce results-based management and accelerate regional integration (UNDP, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA));

(b) Support, at the regional level, the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)).

Objective 1.5
Strengthen national and regional human rights mechanisms to combat impunity and assist the Sahelian countries to strengthen independent national justice systems to effectively address corruption

Indicative actions:

(a) Promote the ratification and implementation of international and regional human rights instruments as well as the use of such regional human rights mechanisms as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR));

(b) Establish a regional platform to share experiences, discuss common challenges and define common regional priorities of parliamentary committees in the Sahel (UNDP, United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA));

(c) Support the establishment of national human rights institutions in conformity with international standards and help to establish a network of such institutions for the Sahel (OHCHR);

(d) Help to design and support truth-seeking processes, national consultations on transitional justice, judicial accountability mechanisms, reparation programmes, including for victims of sexual violence, and provide advice on relevant institutional reforms (OHCHR, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP);

(e) Support the countries of the region to put in place appropriate anti-corruption legislation and action plans in accordance with international and regional conventions (the United Nations Convention against Corruption, African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption and ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption); and strengthen the capacity and functioning of national anti-corruption commissions to better prevent, detect and fight corruption (UNDP, UNODC);

(f) Support the strengthening of internal and external oversight, as well as integrity safeguard mechanisms, for law enforcement and judicial personnel (UNODC).
Objective 1.6
Support community security and social cohesion

Indicative actions:

(a) Support the development of a community security and social cohesion strategy, through participatory and inclusive dialogue, for Sahel countries (UNDP, UNOWA, UNODC);

(b) Enhance community security, social cohesion and the provision of judicial services at the local level, including police stations, courts, legal aid and correction facilities, for easy access to responsive, accountable and effective security and judicial services (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP, UN-Women).

Objective 1.7
Assist the Sahelian countries to develop national and regional early warning systems to address potential governance challenges and security threats

Indicative actions:

(a) Support Governments, ECOWAS and other regional entities in enhancing existing early warning mechanisms, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), and promoting linkages among them and in strengthening their analytical capacities (UNOWA, UNDP);

(b) Promote regional dialogue among traditional and community leaders and leaders of faith-based organizations to address, inter alia, recruitment by extremist groups and promote the establishment of community-based conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms (Department of Political Affairs, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(c) Support increased participation of young people, women and gender experts in peace talks, negotiations of peace agreements and efforts at national reconciliation (UNOWA, UNDP, UN-Women).

Objective 1.8
Foster sustainable security sector governance in the Sahelian countries through the promotion of and support to professional, accountable and regulated security and justice institutions

Indicative actions:

(a) Build the capacity of national and regional institutions to enhance security sector governance in the Sahel through: (i) supporting the creation of a coordinating framework to link national, regional and international efforts in the area of security sector reform; (ii) supporting existing national initiatives on security sector reform and, especially, defence sector reform with strategic and technical assistance (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);

(b) Enhance and expand the activities of existing joint subregional forums to facilitate the exchange of lessons, best practices and information on security and defence governance matters in West Africa, including by supporting efforts by ECOWAS to finalize and implement its subregional security sector governance policy framework and action plan (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations).
Strategic goal two: national and regional security mechanisms are capable of addressing cross-border threats

National, subregional and regional security mechanisms, grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, need to be strengthened and made fully operational. The countries of the region, in response to the crisis in Mali, have taken initial steps towards greater cooperation, including in information-sharing. The African Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS and CEN-SAD have played important roles in this area. It is important to build upon these efforts, both to foster trust among the countries whose cooperation is vital and to strengthen their capacity to address cross-border threats. United Nations entities such as UNOWA, UNODC, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the 1267 Monitoring Team and OHCHR undertake important initiatives in these areas. In addition, in tackling the current crisis in the Sahel, it is crucial for the United Nations family to align its various initiatives in a comprehensive and integrated manner, ensuring that they are grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law, given the prevalence of illicit trafficking, transnational organized crime and terrorism in the region — serious problems that do not always receive sufficient attention. Key objectives and indicative actions include:

Objective 2.1
Enhance United Nations regional security analysis and monitoring of cross-border threats in the Sahel

Indicative actions:

(a) Building upon existing mapping of security measures and mechanisms, including the report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region (S/2012/42, annex) and detailed mapping exercises that have already been undertaken by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the United Nations system will collaboratively identify gaps in existing frameworks aimed at combating transnational organized crime and terrorism. It will also step up its efforts to raise the awareness of national stakeholders of the available strategies and technologies, with a view to making optimum use of resources (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, UNODC, UNOWA);

(b) In fulfilment of its preventive diplomacy mandate, UNOWA will work with the rest of the United Nations system to strengthen its analytical capacity and improve information-sharing within the United Nations system in the subregion. As part of this effort, a United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) liaison officer, based in UNOWA, will collaborate with Department of Safety and Security analysts in the region, the 1267 Monitoring Team and other relevant United Nations personnel, such as the peace and development advisers, in support of the analytical capacity of UNOWA (UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Safety and Security).
Objective 2.2
Enhance national capacity, including through improved coordination among relevant national institutions, to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime, in line with international human rights standards

Indicative actions:

(a) An important step towards more effective border management in the region is to ensure a more coordinated and coherent approach at the national level. Security sector agencies will need to integrate and coordinate their border management activities. By way of response, the United Nations counter-terrorism entities (the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA and UNODC will lead United Nations efforts in supporting the countries of the region to establish coordinating mechanisms to combat terrorism and organized crime, so that police, border guards, the army, customs and national security advisers can work together in a manner that is coherent and compliant with human rights standards and the rule of law. A mechanism for sharing information among coordinating mechanisms in neighbouring countries will also be established. It is expected that in 2013, an initial project in the Sahel will be piloted in Burkina Faso by the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, in collaboration with relevant United Nations entities, under the Task Force’s Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism (I-ACT) Initiative. Once other projects in the region have been initiated, efforts will be made to establish a regional network that would contribute to the building of an effective regional early warning mechanism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA, UNODC);

(b) Use the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force as a coordination platform for the United Nations counter-terrorism entities in providing country-focused solutions for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the Sahel, including pillar IV on respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, UNOWA);

(c) Strengthen efforts to facilitate the delivery of technical counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance for police, prosecutors and the judiciary in the Sahelian countries, within the framework of respect for human rights (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNDP, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);

(d) Support the upgrading of the curriculums of law enforcement and judicial training institutions and improve skills and techniques pertaining to in-depth investigations, in line with international human rights laws and rule of law standards. This includes improving cooperation between law enforcement and justice institutions. Special emphasis would be placed on drug and arms trafficking, trafficking in human beings, terrorist activities and financial investigations (UNODC);

(e) Further improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement and judicial response to money-laundering and financial crime. This will require all authorities concerned to systematically pursue an asset-oriented approach when investigating or prosecuting cases relating to illicit trafficking or terrorism, to actively engage with
their country’s financial intelligence unit, and to further develop or strengthen national regimes on the identification, seizure, confiscation and management of proceeds of crime (UNODC).

**Objective 2.3**  
Enhance national capacities for effective border management, including through improved coordination among relevant national institutions

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Promote the development of national integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that include a border security component (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Support the development of customs information-sharing and analysis units for effective border control (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force);

(c) Support the implementation or enhancement of automated data management systems at border crossings with links to national and international alert databases for the purpose of detecting and preventing the cross-border movement of terrorists and other criminals (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force);

(d) Raise awareness among and train front-line customs officials on the detection and prevention of the illicit movement of cash and bearer negotiable instruments and to combat drugs and arms trafficking (Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNODC);

(e) Provide advice to the Governments of the region on developing effective border management strategies, in line with international human rights standards, including best practice modalities for coordinated border controls by relevant agencies at the national level and with neighbouring States for addressing illicit trafficking and cross-border movements of criminals, including terrorists, and the scaling up of border management capacity in so-called “hub cities” through which large quantities of illicit goods transit (UNODC, UNOWA).

**Objective 2.4**  
Strengthen regional capacity to tackle terrorism and transnational organized crime

**Indicative actions:**

(a) Support the African Union in the implementation of the conclusions of the meeting on security cooperation and the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Sahara region, held in Mauritania on 17 March 2013 (UNOWA, UNODC, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Provide technical assistance and support the implementation of the 2008-2015 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan to Combat Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa (UNODC, UNOWA, Department of Peacekeeping Operations);
(c) Support regional and subregional organizations and their mechanisms, such as the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, to enable enhanced sharing of information and best practices (UNOWA, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate).

Objective 2.5
Enhance regional and interregional cooperation among Sahelian, West African and Maghreb States, including through the development of harmonized approaches aimed at combating illicit trafficking, controlling arms and movements of armed and criminal elements, including terrorists, and reinforcing the 1267 arms embargo mandate

Indicative actions:

(a) Strengthen existing subregional judicial cooperation mechanisms, notably the Regional Judicial Platform of Sahel countries and the Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors in West Africa, especially with regard to the drafting and processing of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests, in line with international human rights law and rule of law standards (UNODC, Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate);

(b) Sensitize the Governments of the Sahel and civil society actors about the 2012 International Small Arms Control Standards developed under the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism, which provide clear guidance on putting in place and maintaining controls on small arms and light weapons. Efforts will also be made to support the countries of the region to fully implement the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials (Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism);

(c) Building on the conclusions of the conference of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force-United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on border control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb, held in Rabat from 13 to 15 March 2013, facilitate the convening of annual meetings of border control and security officials (customs, border police and intelligence officials) of the concerned States, with a view to developing expert networks and strengthening information exchange and border control cooperation in a manner that is human rights compliant (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 1267 Monitoring Team);

(d) Support the establishment of bilateral or multilateral agreements, memorandums of understanding or other arrangements to enable cooperation and coordination of border control efforts in West Africa and the Sahel (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, UNOWA);

(e) Sustain an up-to-date sanctions regime on Al-Qaida and affiliates under the 1267 regime (Security Council resolution 2083 (2012)). This will include a regional meeting of intelligence services to exchange information on the threat from Al-Qaida and affiliates and to update information relevant to the 1267 targeted sanctions regime (1267 Monitoring Team);

(f) Support efforts to improve communication and exchange of intelligence, in line with international human rights standards, among airports in Latin America, West Africa, the Sahel, the Maghreb and Europe, in order to tackle illicit trafficking
at source, transit and destination points, including by enforcing relevant travel bans (UNODC);

(g) Improve coordination among concerned States to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property and protect Mali’s ancient manuscripts and other types of protected movable cultural heritage, in accordance with the provisions of the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in particular its article 9, and the 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) (UNESCO, MINUSMA).

Strategic goal three: humanitarian and development plans and interventions are integrated to build long-term resilience

Multisectoral approaches build the resilience of the Sahelian people by bridging humanitarian and development programming with the aim of addressing underlying causes and subsequent consequences of food and nutrition insecurity and other vulnerabilities and promoting long-term development. Coherent, mutually reinforcing and harmonized planning and implementation through humanitarian and development activities will help to deliver a successful resilience package to the most vulnerable communities. Food and nutritional security will remain at the centre of the resilience strategy. Central to this effort are the following objectives and indicative actions:

Objective 3.1
Support local, national and regional stakeholders to better identify and track vulnerable households, in a participatory manner

Indicative actions:

(a) Ensure effective national and regional disaggregated data collection and information management to enable better identification and tracking of vulnerable populations (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, UNFPA);

(b) Support mechanisms and networks in the region (Cadre harmonisé bonifié, Dispositif régional de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (PREGEC), Réseau de prévention des crises alimentaires (RPCA)) in delivering quality and timely food security and nutrition information and analysis to effectively guide decision-making and mobilize preventative and early action (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP, UNICEF).
Objective 3.2
Support Governments and other stakeholders to provide equitable and effective coverage of basic social services and promote effective social protection systems

Indicative actions:

(a) Support the development of effective monitoring systems (UNICEF);

(b) Ensure that vulnerable populations have access to adequate and inclusive basic social services without discrimination, social protection and safety nets, as the basis of building and protecting human capital and assets and reducing the vulnerability of households to internal and external shocks (UNICEF, UNDP, WFP);

(c) Support the development and implementation of comprehensive national social protection policies and laws and corresponding institutional and budgetary frameworks, in line with national and international human rights standards (UNDP, UN-Women, UNICEF, International Labour Organization (ILO));

(d) Support the development and implementation of policies, strategies and budgetary frameworks specific to nutrition (UNICEF, WHO, WFP, FAO);

(e) Ensure that communities are provided with information on the availability of basic services; facilitate community participation in the identification of constraints and the design of local solutions that improve community resilience; and reinforce the ability of communities to demand basic services (UNICEF, International Organization for Migration (IOM), WFP).

Objective 3.3
Strengthen household, national and regional risk management capacities

Indicative actions:

(a) Support regional-level initiatives and cooperation on disaster risk reduction and management (UNDP, UNESCO, WFP);

(b) Strengthen and promote participatory risk management capacities at the local, national and regional levels (UNDP, UN-Women, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, IOM, WFP);

(c) Support the establishment of national and regional food security stocks, with the aim of regulating markets and covering transient food needs (WFP);

(d) Reinforce national and regional humanitarian supply mechanisms for timely and effective response delivery (UNICEF, WFP, IOM);

(e) Support behaviour change communication strategies to promote individual and societal changes leading to the adoption of practices that strengthen individual and family resilience, including through the promotion of better nutrition (UN-Women, UNICEF, UNFPA);

(f) Map and encourage the use of indigenous knowledge to inform early warning systems; strengthen networks of vulnerable groups around advocacy issues identified through the participatory vulnerability analysis (UNESCO).
Objective 3.4
Strengthen sustainable livelihoods

Indicative actions:

(a) Map livelihoods and the capacities of economic actors at the national level and provide support to sustainable livelihoods and the creation of employment, including sustainable jobs, with just and favourable conditions of work (UNDP, ILO, FAO);

(b) Protect productive capacities of populations by supporting the development of programmes that have a bearing on nutrition, including in the sectors of agriculture and food security, poverty reduction and development, public health, education and social protection (UNICEF, FAO, WFP, World Health Organization (WHO));

(c) Provide enhanced agricultural and pastoral livelihood opportunities through increased investment, the use of resistant seeds and species, rural extension services and new infrastructure (FAO, WFP, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD));

(d) Strengthen small farmers’ links to the private sector by facilitating access to inputs, improving access to markets and strengthening value chain systems (FAO, IFAD, WFP);

(e) Support land ownership rights and responsibilities at the local and national levels (FAO, IOM);

(f) Promote alternative livelihoods through the development of value chains, the promotion of food processing and micro-enterprises, access to rural microcredit, vocational training, the promotion of regional trade and access to sustainable energy, including solar energy and green jobs (UNDP, FAO, UNESCO, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ILO);

(g) Promote and support employment schemes linked to maintaining, rehabilitating and improving essential infrastructure and productive assets (ILO, WFP, FAO);

(h) Support and protect farmers by ensuring access to reliable rural microcredit facilities, crop insurance schemes and other financial services (WFP, FAO, United Nations Capital Development Fund);

(i) Support the mapping of local knowledge of livelihoods and local coping and resilience-enhancing mechanisms (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNDP, WFP).

Objective 3.5
Promote environmental sustainability through national and regional natural resource management mechanisms and climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes, with a special focus on water

Indicative actions:

(a) Support the systematic integration of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability policies and programmes with legal frameworks that encourage the preservation of ecosystems, land use and territorial planning, with an emphasis on ecologically integrated approaches (UNDP, UNEP);
(b) Provide technical assistance to and strengthen the capacity of the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel and other subregional bodies on regional natural resource management (FAO, UNEP, UNDP);

(c) Scale up farmer-based management of natural resources, livestock and other productive activities (FAO, WFP, IFAD);

(d) Strengthen water and land management mechanisms and provide technical assistance and capacity-building to the Niger Basin Authority, Senegal River Basin Organization and Lake Chad Basin Commission (UNEP, UNESCO).