



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
10 January 2013

Original: English

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### Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2063 (2012), by which the Council requested me to continue reporting every 90 days on progress in the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It includes an update on the situation in Darfur covering the period between 1 October and 31 December 2012. The present report also includes, in paragraphs 61 to 64, an assessment of the progress made by UNAMID against the updated benchmarks and indicators contained in my previous report to the Council, dated 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I).

#### II. Political developments

##### Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, the signatory parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), continued to work towards its implementation, primarily with regard to the provision related to power-sharing and the preparations for a stakeholder conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations and a Darfur donor conference.

3. On 4 October, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, which was initiated by the Darfur Regional Authority and international partners in May 2012, concluded a series of State-level workshops in Darfur aimed at assessing the economic recovery, development and poverty eradication needs of Darfur. A total of 1,423 stakeholders representing Government officials, the native administration, civil society groups, women and youth participated in workshops held in the five states of Darfur to identify, assess and prioritize critical needs across 10 thematic areas. This process has informed the drafting of a state-based results framework for peace, development and poverty eradication projects to be presented at a donor conference in Doha planned for early 2013. UNAMID provided substantive support for the facilitation of the workshops, as well as logistical support, including air and ground transportation.

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\*\* Reissued for technical reasons on 21 January 2013.



4. In accordance with the power-sharing provisions of the Doha Document, on 14 October the Government of the Sudan issued a decree appointing 42 people, including 17 LJM members and 25 members of the Darfur state legislatures, to the Darfur Regional Authority Council. The 67-member Council is responsible for supervising and monitoring the work of the Authority's Executive Council. The remaining 25 positions are reserved for representatives from the Eastern Darfur State Legislature and for representatives of armed movements that may sign the Doha Document in the future. On 26 November, the Executive Council of the Darfur Regional Authority held its fourth meeting to discuss ways to accelerate implementation of the Doha Document, which has thus far been slow. The Government also confirmed 25 LJM nominees to the respective state legislative councils in Darfur, in accordance with the allotment specified in the protocol on their political participation. Consultations are under way on the representation of LJM in the national legislature.

5. National universities and state-run higher education institutions began implementing the affirmative action provisions of the Doha Document. On 5 December, in Wad Madani, Al Jazirah State, Darfuri students petitioning the university administration for exemption from registration fees were violently attacked by student militias, the Central Reserve Police and national security personnel. According to national media, the incident left 4 students dead and resulted in the arrest of 56 other students, sparking demonstrations across the country. In response, the Minister of Justice of the Sudan called for a criminal investigation into the incident. On 10 December, the Government also issued a directive to institutions of higher education across the country to exempt all students from Darfur from the payment of registration and tuition fees for the 2012 academic year, until the Darfur Regional Authority completes the process of determining the status of such students, in accordance with the Doha Document.

6. The office of the special prosecutor for crimes committed in Darfur commenced its work. On 12 December, it informed UNAMID that it had opened investigations into 10 cases, among them crimes committed in 2005, 2010, 2011 and 2012. One of the cases involved a deadly attack on UNAMID peacekeepers in Western Darfur on 2 October 2012 (see para. 37). A total of 25 military personnel and 8 national police officers have been arrested in conjunction with these investigations.

7. Progress in the implementation of the bulk of the provisions of the Doha Document, however, continued to lag despite the decision taken in July 2012 to extend the implementation timeline by one year. Four months after the revised deadlines, the Government of the Sudan has yet to transfer funds to the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, including the first instalment of \$200 million, intended to facilitate the implementation of tangible peace dividends across Darfur. The establishment of the microfinance system for income-generating activities through small loans to individuals and groups also remained outstanding.

8. The second meeting of the Joint Commission, provided for in the Doha Document, was held on 15 October. At the meeting, participants considered, in particular, issues related to the inconclusive verification of LJM forces and the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups in Darfur. Participants agreed that the parties, under the supervision of the Ceasefire Commission, should conclude the verification of LJM forces in the areas previously identified but not verified because

of a lack of preparedness by LJM or because of accessibility issues, and conduct a desk review of the outcome of the entire verification exercise by 15 November 2012. They also agreed that the Government of the Sudan would respond to the observations of the Chairperson of the Ceasefire Commission on its plan for the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups by 12 November.

9. LJM representatives boycotted a meeting of the Ceasefire Commission scheduled for 21 October that had been planned to discuss arrangements for the implementation of these decisions. Consequently, the decisions of the Joint Commission were not implemented by the determined deadlines. UNAMID continued to urge the parties to overcome this impasse. On 5 December, the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked an LJM convoy on the outskirts of El Fasher, which resulted in the death of two LJM personnel. A spokesperson for the Sudanese Armed Forces alleged that the LJM forces had proceeded outside the cantonment area designated by the Ceasefire Commission. The incident was referred by the parties to the Commission for investigation.

10. The Implementation Follow-up Commission on the Doha Document held its fourth meeting on 12 November in Doha. The Commission considered the progress made in the implementation of the Doha Document and expressed concern that the slowness of the process could seriously undermine the agreement's credibility and jeopardize the support of the international community. The Government of the Sudan and LJM representatives at the meeting attributed the lack of progress to the economic challenges facing the Sudan but nevertheless reiterated their commitment to the agreement's full implementation.

11. UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued to assist the signatory parties in implementing the Doha Document. In the context of the integrated strategic framework for United Nations system-wide support to the parties in the implementation of the agreement, UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued to refine, on the basis of an agreed strategy for coordinated assistance, the specific activities they could carry out in this regard. Six joint thematic working groups, each focused on one of the first six chapters of the Doha Document, were established. The working groups held several working-level sessions to formulate eight proposals and associated funding modalities for joint activities and programmes in the following areas: transitional justice and human rights, governance, voluntary return, early recovery, and dialogue and reconciliation. These areas are to be considered during the next senior-level meeting between UNAMID and the United Nations country team, planned for the first quarter of 2013.

### **Negotiations towards an inclusive peace agreement**

12. During the reporting period, the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, continued to promote the resumption of talks between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements. On 17 October, in Doha, she facilitated talks between representatives of the Government, led by Amin Hassan Omer, and 31 members of a faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Mohammad Bashar. As indicated in my previous report (S/2012/771, para. 10), Mr. Bashar and a group of second-tier members of the JEM Executive Council broke away from the movement in September 2012, creating the JEM Interim Military Council. On 22 October, the parties signed a declaration of

cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process and agreed to resume negotiations on the basis of the Doha Document. The two parties, however, have not yet reached an agreement on a framework for negotiations. On the one hand, the Government insists that the negotiations be limited to power-sharing and security arrangements; on the other hand, the JEM Interim Military Council insists that the entire agreement be reopened for discussion.

13. On 14 November, the military commanders of the Kordofan sector of JEM announced their defection to the JEM Interim Military Council. In doing so, they declared their adherence to the declaration of cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process signed by the JEM Interim Military Council faction and the Government of the Sudan on 22 October. On 19 and 20 November, Mr. Bashar convened a meeting of members and supporters of the JEM Interim Military Council in Darma (240 km north-east of El Fasher, Northern Darfur). Participants elected Mr. Bashar president of the movement and Bakhit Abdullah Abdul Karim top general. Approximately 500 fighters with 70 military vehicles attended the event.

14. On 16 November, UNAMID met with the leadership of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid in Kampala to discuss humanitarian access and child protection issues. The movement's leader, Abdul Wahid, expressed interest in a future bilateral meeting with UNAMID leadership to continue engagement on humanitarian access to areas under his control.

#### **Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process**

15. The Darfur Regional Authority continued to prepare for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document. In this regard, a conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, whose aim was to identify and ensure that the concerns of internally displaced persons and refugees would be included in the implementation of the relevant sections of the agreement and to initiate an agenda for a donor conference, was postponed indefinitely owing to an outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur.

16. From 1 to 16 October, the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission of the Darfur Regional Authority, in collaboration with UNAMID and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), organized preparatory workshops in the five Darfur state capitals for some 850 representatives of local authorities, civil society and internally displaced persons. Participants expressed concern about the provision of security, the disarmament of combatants, the availability of basic services in areas of return, land and compensation, justice and reconciliation, how to encourage non-signatory movements to join the peace process, vocational training for youth in camps and increased participation of women in the peace process. Some camps of internally displaced persons, including Hamadiya camp in Western Darfur, where many residents support SLA-Abdul Wahid, boycotted the workshops. UNAMID monitored the conditions in which the workshops were held and advised the Commission on the need for broader representation of internally displaced persons and women among the participants. It is envisaged that preparatory workshops for refugees from Chad will be held closer to the date of the conference (see para. 15 above).

17. Consultations among the African Union, UNAMID and the Government of Qatar on the modalities for the conduct of the Darfur internal dialogue and

consultations continued during the reporting period. In this connection, UNAMID circulated to the facilitators a draft strategy to guide the development of the consultations, including for defining the process and approach for the conduct of the consultations, logistical support, funding, a timeline and the conditions to be met for an enabling environment.

### **III. Protection of civilians from physical violence**

18. During the reporting period, several clashes involving Government forces, pro-Government militias and the non-signatory armed movements continued to be a major source of insecurity for the civilian population in some parts of Darfur. In Northern Darfur, on 3 October, after having been repeatedly prevented by Government forces from accessing Hashaba (56 km north-east of Kutum), UNAMID proceeded to the area to verify reports of an attack on civilians that had occurred on 25 September. Community sources informed the patrol that what had initially begun as a dispute over land access between nomads and farmers had escalated, with the involvement of SLA-Minni Minawi and SLA-Unity personnel. Pro-Government militias had then attacked the Hashaba area. Aircraft of the Sudanese Armed Forces had bombed a nearby gold mine controlled by the armed movements. It was reported that upwards of 70 civilians had been killed during the attack. UNAMID observed one bomb crater, three decomposed bodies and what was alleged to be an area containing 16 graves.

19. Between 4 and 16 October, several attempts by UNAMID to return to Hashaba to gather more information on the incident and enhance security in the area were denied by alternating restrictions imposed by Government forces, pro-Government militias and the armed movements on grounds of insecurity. Subsequently, on 17 October, a UNAMID fact-finding mission to Hashaba came under attack by unidentified armed assailants firing heavy machine guns, mortars and rocket-propelled guns. One peacekeeper was killed and three others were injured during the exchange of fire.

20. Although UNAMID has engaged with Government officials on the ambush, the perpetrators have yet to be brought to account. For its part, the mission is continuing its efforts to engage the various armed groups active in Hashaba so that it can return to the area to enhance security for the civilian population and open space for humanitarian assistance.

21. Further south, on 17 October, the mission received reports from community sources in Abu Delek (approximately 50 km south-east of El Fasher, Northern Darfur) of intense clashes among the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Popular Defence Forces and SLA-Minni Minawi. On 25 October, UNAMID personnel on patrol to verify the information and assess the impact of the violence on the civilian community encountered gunfire by unidentified assailants in the surrounding area. Unable to assess the security situation ahead, the patrol was aborted.

22. On 6 November, UNAMID confirmed an attack on Sigili village (30 km south-east of El Fasher), which is predominantly populated by Zaghawa people, on 2 November. The local community reported that the attack had been perpetrated by the Popular Defence Forces, drawn from the Berti, Bergid and Tunjur tribes. A UNAMID patrol observed a largely abandoned village where 12 houses had been burned down, property had been looted and livestock had been killed. A total of

10 civilians were allegedly killed during the attack and several others had been displaced.

23. Three days before UNAMID was able to access the site of the attack, approximately 200 persons carrying 10 corpses staged a demonstration in protest of this incident in front of the UNAMID compound in El Fasher. Demonstrators alleged that the attack had been perpetrated against the Zaghawa community in Sigili in retaliation for earlier hostilities among Government forces, the Popular Defence Forces and SLA-Minni Minawi on 17 October at Abu Delek. Having been denied access by the Popular Defence Forces two weeks earlier, on 20 November, UNAMID gained access to Abu Delek to assess the human rights, humanitarian and security situation following reported clashes in the area. Local community sources alleged that Abu Delek and surrounding villages had been the target of attacks by Zaghawa-affiliated armed groups on five occasions since the beginning of the year. Fifteen persons had reportedly been killed during the recent fighting, on 17 October. UNAMID initiated regular patrols to enhance security in the area and continued to support traditional conflict resolution initiatives that sought to engage the Zaghawa and Tunjur tribal leaders in dialogue through separate meetings held on 29 November and 1 December.

24. The International Organization for Migration verified that 423 persons had been displaced to Zam Zam camp from Sigili and its surrounding areas, while an estimated 380 had been displaced to other areas around El Fasher. Humanitarian agencies provided the new arrivals with medical services, non-food items and emergency shelters. Latrines are being constructed and a hygiene campaign is under way.

25. On 9 November, a Sudanese Armed Forces convoy was ambushed by SLA-Minni Minawi forces (40 km north-east of Shangil Tobaya, Northern Darfur). A number of weapons and vehicles were stolen and an unknown number of Government military personnel were allegedly captured. The following day, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped three bombs in the vicinity of the ambush. Four days later, a UNAMID patrol accessed the site and observed that five military vehicles and one fuel truck had been destroyed; it also saw 18 corpses. That same day, the patrol also observed Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropping four bombs, approximately 3 km from the area.

26. Hostilities between Government forces and the armed movements continued, with Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombing suspected rebel locations on 12 and 14 November in Abu Zerega, Shangil Tobaya and Tawilla, in Northern Darfur. On 16 November, an exchange of indirect fire took place between Government forces stationed near El Fasher airport and an unidentified armed group operating from Shagra village (approximately 26 km west of El Fasher). On 19 November, a UNAMID verification patrol to Shagra village was stopped at a Government checkpoint just outside El Fasher and denied further passage. The patrol proceeded instead to nearby Saluma village (approximately 15 km west of El Fasher), where local residents said that there had been a heavy exchange of fire in the area. No casualties were reported. A spokesperson for SLA-Minni Minawi later alleged that the movement had engaged Government forces in the vicinity of the airport.

27. On 17 November, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped four bombs at Um Kadada (20 km north of Shangil Tobaya), reportedly destroying seven rebel vehicles. Further west, Darfur authorities reported that a Sudanese Armed Forces

camp in Ed Al Nagab, near Kabkabiya, had been attacked on 23 November. It was reported that 22 Government military personnel had been killed, an unspecified number injured and several vehicles and weapons stolen. UNAMID was unable to verify the reported incidents and the number of associated casualties owing to restrictions imposed by Government authorities, who cited active military operations in the area. On 3 December, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft reportedly dropped bombs in the vicinity of Foula village (approximately 14 km north of Shangil Tobaya). On 7 December, a UNAMID patrol to the area found the entire village burned and abandoned. Neither casualties nor the number of displaced persons could be readily determined.

28. Pro-Government militia attacks, followed by Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombing, continued further north-west of Shangil Tobaya, targeting alleged rebel locations in and around the villages of Dali, Nemra, Massalit and Tukumare on 12, 17 and 18 December, respectively. Repeated attempts by UNAMID to verify the attacks and the humanitarian impact on the civilian population were unsuccessful, as Government authorities denied the mission access on the grounds of insecurity.

29. In Eastern Darfur, on 20 and 21 November, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombed Samaha village (200 km south-east of El Daein) in an attempt to cut off resupply lines and curtail the movement of Darfuri armed movements between South Sudan and Darfur. It was alleged that 11 civilians had been killed, an unspecified number injured and several residents temporarily displaced to surrounding areas. The displaced were reported to have returned as soon as the situation had normalized. UNAMID was unable to verify this information independently because of ongoing restrictions imposed by Government authorities to areas in close proximity to the country's southern border.

30. In Western Darfur, local community sources reported that SLA-Abdul Wahid had attacked Sudanese Armed Forces personnel on 24 December in Golo (90 km north-east of Zalingei), attempting to take control of the area. Allegedly, 20 Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and several others injured. Owing to access restrictions imposed by the armed movements on UNAMID in the area, the mission has been unable to verify the incident. Further reports were received by the mission of the build-up of Government forces near Khore Ramla (approximately 40 km south-west of Golo).

31. In response to heightened intercommunal violence, which featured heavily during the previous reporting period, UNAMID increased its engagement with local authorities and traditional community leaders in the affected areas to promote intercommunal dialogue and reconciliation. Throughout October, traditional leaders of the feuding Zayadiya and Berti tribes kept UNAMID abreast of a Government initiative to investigate and reconcile the dispute between the two tribes over land in Mellit (65 km north of El Fasher). On 12 November, following UNAMID interventions with local authorities and traditional leaders to promote peaceful coexistence in Kutum and Al Waha (Northern Darfur), the two localities formed a joint mechanism for conflict resolution and reconciliation to ease the intercommunal tensions that had flared up following the killing of the commissioner of Al Waha locality in August 2012.

32. Similarly, in an effort to alleviate tensions between farming communities and nomadic groups, UNAMID supported several local initiatives across Darfur to sensitize farmers and nomads in areas prone to disputes over grazing rights and crop

destruction during the ongoing harvest and nomadic seasonal migration. This included, on 16 October, a UNAMID-facilitated meeting at the Hassahisa camp for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur among leaders of internally displaced persons, youth leaders, members of the peaceful coexistence committee and pastoralist groups to promote regular coordination and awareness-raising meetings and better relations with local law enforcement authorities to support a peaceful harvest season. UNAMID also provided technical and logistical support for a crop protection awareness campaign that was conducted by tribal and religious leaders in 33 locations across Western Darfur and that concluded at the beginning of December. It also facilitated an awareness-raising workshop on 5 December for traditional leaders, farmers and nomads in Kabkabiya locality, in Northern Darfur.

33. UNAMID conducted 17 workshops on conflict management and conflict resolution and reconciliation throughout Darfur. Over 1,000 participants (250 of whom were women) attended the workshops, including community leaders, refugees, internally displaced persons, the native administration, peace committees, nomadic groups, farmers, State and local government officials, religious and ethnic groups, and women and youth groups. Among the topics discussed were communication in conflict resolution and the role of strengthening the local, traditional conflict resolution mechanism.

#### **IV. Security situation and freedom of movement**

34. Between 1 October and 25 December 2012, the mission's movements over land were restricted on 38 occasions, compared with 29 in the previous reporting period. In the same period, Government authorities denied 82 of 3,938 flight requests, a decrease from 108 of 4,928 in the previous reporting period. Government authorities cited a lack of sufficient notification, a lack of written authorization and insecurity or active military operations as reasons for denying access. The majority of the restrictions continued to be imposed by Government forces or armed movements on UNAMID movements into areas of hostilities. The mission continued to call on Government authorities to allow it unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur, in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

35. During the reporting period, aid workers continued to experience access restrictions and bureaucratic impediments. It became more difficult to secure Darfur travel permits for United Nations staff and humanitarian and development partners, whether to some field locations in Darfur or from Khartoum to Darfur. In October and November, a total of 71 incidents relating to access constraints were recorded by United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur. These included restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan and restrictions necessarily imposed by humanitarian actors, in certain areas, in accordance with the United Nations threat assessment.

36. Access to some areas, including parts of Western Darfur, Eastern Jebel Marra in Southern Darfur and Hashaba in Northern Darfur, remained restricted; no inter-agency mission has been permitted access to Western Jebel Marra since August 2011. Since September 2012, United Nations agencies in Northern Darfur have been advised by the Northern Darfur Humanitarian Aid Commissioner to secure an additional travel permit for all field missions conducted within that State. The



Humanitarian Aid Commission has also requested that its staff be paid a daily subsistence allowance by the United Nations country team when accompanying personnel on field missions in Northern Darfur.

### **Safety and security**

37. There were two fatal attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers during the reporting period, including the attack on a UNAMID verification patrol in Hashaba, Northern Darfur, in which one peacekeeper was killed and three others were injured (para. 19). On 2 October, four peacekeepers returning to their base from a logistical and administrative patrol were killed and eight were injured in an ambush by unidentified armed assailants near the UNAMID compound in El Geneina, Western Darfur.

38. On 24 and 25 December, three national UNAMID staff members were arrested by national security officers in Nyala, Southern Darfur. According to Government officials, the staff members were detained for their alleged involvement in anti-Government activities. UNAMID has protested their detention and is seeking the intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure the release of the three staff members and ensure that the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement are strictly observed.

39. The kidnapping of United Nations and humanitarian personnel and the carjacking of vehicles remain matters of concern. On 2 January, through the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and UNAMID, the two UNAMID formed police unit personnel who had been taken hostage in Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, on 20 August 2012 (see S/2012/771, para. 37) were released unharmed after 136 days in captivity. One UNAMID vehicle and one United Nations agency vehicle were carjacked during the reporting period (compared to four vehicles carjacked in the previous reporting period). Although the United Nations agency vehicle was later recovered, with prompt support from Government security authorities, carjacking remains a major security threat in Darfur.

## **V. Humanitarian situation**

40. During the reporting period, the Federal Ministry of Health informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of an outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur. As at 9 December, the total number of suspected cases had reached 788, including 166 related deaths. Federal and State authorities, together with humanitarian partners, worked to contain the outbreak. The Federal Ministry of Health received 2.4 million doses of the yellow fever vaccine from the WHO International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision to conduct a mass vaccination campaign in 12 priority localities. Approximately \$1.7 million was mobilized at the country level and operational support was provided by international non-governmental organizations and the Government of the Sudan. A further \$2.6 million was approved by the Central Emergency Response Fund. UNAMID provided security and logistical support to WHO and the Federal Ministry of Health for the conduct of the immunization campaign, including the provision of generators, fuel, oil and tents, as well as the use of UNAMID medical facilities when needed.

41. The delivery of humanitarian assistance was constrained by the Humanitarian Aid Commission, which deregistered and stopped the operations of six national

non-governmental organizations working in Southern Darfur, including the Sudan Council of Churches, Al-Manal Charity Organization, the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, Fatima Al-Zahra'a for Child Care, Al-Malam Keila and Al-Ban in October 2012. The Sudan Council of Churches was accused of having a religious mandate, not a humanitarian one, while a variety of other allegations including misappropriation of donor funds and corruption were cited against the other organizations. This deregistration of local non-governmental organizations disrupted educational, health and food-security activities for an estimated 30,000 beneficiaries.

42. The Return and Reintegration Working Group, led by UNHCR, confirmed that 105,471 people had voluntarily returned to their original homes in Darfur from 1 January to 30 September 2012, while projecting year-end totals at 120,000 to 130,000 individuals. Meanwhile, some 90,000 to 100,000 people were estimated to have been displaced during 2012, many temporarily.

## **VI. Rule of law, governance and human rights**

43. The overall number of documented human rights violations decreased from 159 cases involving 321 victims in the previous reporting period to 94 cases involving 204 victims in the current reporting period (44 victims of violations of the right to life, 100 victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 13 victims of arbitrary arrests and detention and 47 victims of sexual and gender-based violence). Of the 94 documented cases, 44 were reported to Government authorities, 13 of which are under investigation.

44. Attacks on internally displaced persons have continued, resulting mostly in violations of the right to physical integrity. UNAMID recorded 37 incidents involving 100 victims, a decline from the 49 incidents involving 153 victims recorded in the previous reporting period. Disputes between farmers and pastoralists over issues of crop destruction and livestock rustling have been an underlying cause of these attacks. With the commencement of the harvest season, UNAMID is supporting several local initiatives to sensitize farmers and nomads in areas prone to disputes over grazing rights and crop destruction and has increased vigilance, particularly in areas where internally displaced persons are engaged in farming activities.

45. The number of arbitrary arrests and detentions recorded by UNAMID declined from 40 incidents involving 46 victims in the previous reporting period to 6 incidents involving 13 victims in the current reporting period. In two of the incidents, torture and subsequent intimidation were alleged. In 1 of these incidents, 8 persons accused of stealing money belonging to a national security officer were arbitrarily arrested and detained by national security on 10 November in Mershing, Southern Darfur. The victims were reportedly tortured to elicit confessions and then released several hours after their arrest. The incident was reported by the victims to the national police and investigations are under way. Meanwhile, UNAMID is aware that at least four of the victims have since been intimidated so that they would withdraw their complaints to the police and is monitoring the situation. In another incident, a community leader from the Zam Zam camp for internally displaced persons was arbitrarily arrested on 2 October by national security personnel in

El Fasher with the accusation of being an SLA-Minni Minawi supporter, tortured and detained until 10 October.

46. UNAMID recorded 33 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence involving 47 victims, 20 of whom were minors. This represents a slight increase from 30 cases involving 42 victims, including 13 minors, in the previous reporting period. Ascertaining an accurate picture of the level of sexual and gender-based violence incidents remains a challenge, as fear of social stigma is cited by many victims as an impediment to filing a complaint, especially to Government police. In an effort to address this concern, UNAMID and its partners, both governmental and non-governmental, continued to work on capacity-building training and outreach events related to sexual and gender-based violence. In this connection, from 25 November to 10 December they promoted the observance of “16 days of activism on violence against women” through the conduct of a variety of activities, including sensitization campaigns, workshops, television programmes and sport and cultural activities promoting the eradication of sexual violence against women and girls across Darfur.

47. In an effort to build the capacity of the judiciary and prison authorities throughout Darfur, on 26 November UNAMID facilitated training on criminal investigations for 40 police investigators and 10 personnel from the prosecutor’s office. It also handed over to local and State corrections and judicial authorities three completed quick-impact projects, including one involving a rural court house in Tawilla, Northern Darfur, and one that had led to the renovation of a dormitory for women and a delivery room at the Nyala Central Prison in Southern Darfur.

48. In addition, UNAMID conducted 16 capacity-building training sessions on international human rights law, humanitarian law and transitional justice for 786 participants, including representatives of local administration and security authorities, civil society and LJM from throughout Darfur. Participants also received training on relevant Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security.

### **Child protection**

49. On 6 November, the SLA-Historical Leadership submitted to UNAMID its second progress report on the implementation of its action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In the report it was stated that the movement had submitted a list to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission of 120 former child soldiers for reintegration. On 16 November, UNAMID met with the leadership of the SLA-Abdul Wahid in Kampala to discuss the movement’s initiation of an action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. At the meeting, Abdul Wahid, the movement’s leader, was informed that his movement had been included since 2007 in the list of perpetrators of violations against children that appears in my annual report on children in armed conflict (see the most recent report, A/66/782-S/2012/261, annex I). The movement agreed to consider implementing such an action plan in the areas under its control. In parallel, JEM said it had established a follow-up committee to ensure the implementation of the action plan it had signed on 25 September.

## VII. UNAMID deployment and operations

50. As at 6 December, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 85 per cent of the approved strength of 5,277 (1,097 international staff, 2,930 national staff and 449 United Nations Volunteers).

51. The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 16,367, including 15,749 troops, 305 staff officers, 234 military observers and 79 liaison officers.

52. The strength of UNAMID police personnel stood at 2,746, comprising 84 per cent men and 16 per cent women. Of the authorized 17 formed police units, 16 have been deployed.

53. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2063 (2012), implementation of the results of the review of UNAMID uniformed personnel continued. The repatriation of a logistics company with multiple roles was completed and the repatriation of one infantry battalion and one signal company are under way. While adjustments continued to be made to police contingents, the issuance of visas has necessitated that they be achieved through attrition by scheduled redeployments. Reductions to the mission's overall troop and police strengths are on schedule to reach the authorized ceilings by 1 September 2013 and 31 January 2014, respectively.

54. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted 7,086 patrols, including 2,784 routine patrols, 547 short-range patrols, 198 long-range patrols, 1,020 night patrols, 736 humanitarian escorts and 1,801 administrative patrols. UNAMID police personnel conducted a total of 9,316 patrols, including 7,719 inside camps for internally displaced persons, villages, towns and markets, 1,139 medium-range patrols, 250 long-range patrols and 208 firewood and farm patrols.

55. From 1 October to 22 December, Government authorities issued 741 new entry visas for UNAMID personnel. As at 22 December, 1,613 visas were pending, 1,169 of which were for civilian police officers, 148 for contractors, 112 for United Nations Volunteers, 93 for civilian personnel, 72 for military personnel, 16 for official visitors and 3 for consultants. UNAMID continued to urge the authorities to approve all visa requests promptly.

56. Regarding the operational and self-sustainment capabilities of troop and police contingents, of the 46 military and police units currently deployed to UNAMID, 32 have achieved a serviceability rate of their major equipment above the 90 per cent threshold. In the area of self-sustainment capabilities, only 12 units meet the requirements stipulated in the relevant memorandum of understanding. The shortfalls that pertain mainly to the serviceability of armoured personnel carriers continue to have an adverse impact on operations. Some troop- and police-contributing countries took positive steps to address the shortfalls by deploying the required equipment and resupplying spare parts and consumables. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to engage with troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure that they swiftly address shortcomings in contingent-owned equipment.

57. During the reporting period, a total of 20 quick-impact projects were completed; 108 additional projects are ongoing and at various stages of completion.

58. UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. A total of 131 km<sup>2</sup> of land and 1,280 km of roads and pathways were assessed as free of unexploded ordnance. In addition, 14 items of unexploded ordnance and 5 pieces of small arms ammunition were destroyed. A total of 18,086 beneficiaries received unexploded ordnance risk-awareness training.

59. UNAMID and local partners continued to implement 17 community-based labour-intensive projects for 2,335 youth assessed as at risk of joining armed groups or gangs, with a view to reducing violence throughout Darfur. As these near completion, additional projects are being developed.

60. No progress was made during the reporting period to secure the issuance of a radio broadcasting licence for UNAMID by the Government of the Sudan in conformity with the status-of-forces agreement. UNAMID continued to urge the Government to issue the licence, which would enable UNAMID to broadcast more frequently and through its own radio station.

### **VIII. Progress against benchmarks**

61. Paragraphs 61 to 64 contain information on the progress made by UNAMID against the updated benchmarks and indicators contained in my previous report, dated 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I). Some progress was made against the first benchmark, which pertains to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in Darfur. This was mainly due to the conclusion of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission and the completion of preparations, including initial consultations with Darfur stakeholders, in advance of the planned conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, which was postponed due to the recent outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur (see paras. 3, 15 and 16). Only limited progress was made towards the implementation of the majority of the provisions of the Doha Document, with little or no progress recorded with respect to the provisions on justice, reconstruction, security or wealth-sharing. On the inclusiveness of the Doha Document, there remain only two signatory parties. The Government of the Sudan and the JEM Interim Military Council have, however, signed a declaration of cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process, which could represent an important step towards increasing the inclusiveness of the process. Commencement of negotiations is pending agreement over the scope of the talks.

62. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, increased hostilities involving Government forces, pro-Government militia and the non-signatory armed movements, particularly in Northern Darfur, as well as increased attacks and restrictions on UNAMID, undermined progress against this benchmark. Many of the affected areas could not be accessed by UNAMID or humanitarian actors due to restrictions imposed by Government authorities and armed groups citing reasons of insecurity. For its part, UNAMID concentrated its efforts on engaging Government authorities and the various armed groups in the affected areas to gain access to enhance security for the civilian population and open humanitarian space.

63. The third benchmark concerns the strengthening of the rule of law, governance and protection of human rights. The general human rights situation in Darfur remained of concern, particularly regarding violations of the right to life, violations

of the right to physical integrity and the perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence (see paras. 43-46). Of the 94 human rights violations documented, only 13 are currently under investigation and 1 is to be adjudicated by the court. UNAMID continued to carry out initiatives for both Government authorities and non-governmental groups to strengthen their ability to protect and promote human rights and uphold the rule of law. However, indications of progress against this benchmark were limited.

64. The fourth benchmark relates to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and conduct of early recovery. Deterioration in the security situation in some parts of Darfur, particularly in the north, increased the need for humanitarian access and assistance to the affected populations. Denial and restriction of access by Government authorities and armed movements remained a significant impediment to humanitarian operations in some areas of Darfur, including Hashaba, Abu Delek and Sigili, in Northern Darfur and Jebel Marra. In addition, humanitarian personnel and visiting delegations were prevented from accessing some deep-field locations or from travelling to Darfur from Khartoum (see paras. 35 and 36). Moreover, the delivery of humanitarian assistance was further constrained by Government authorities deregistering six national non-governmental organizations working in Southern Darfur, disrupting basic services for an estimated 30,000 beneficiaries (see para. 41).

## **IX. Observations**

65. The adoption, in July 2011, of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the Government of the Sudan and LJM was a long-awaited breakthrough in the Darfur peace process. The faithful and timely implementation of the Doha Document afforded the Government of the Sudan an opportunity to demonstrate to the non-signatory armed movements and their supporters that their interests could best be addressed through participation in the peace process. Eighteen months since its adoption, however, limited progress has been made in the implementation of the vast majority of the provisions. I am increasingly concerned that this lack of meaningful progress will erode the confidence of the people of Darfur and the international community in the Doha Document, and dissuade major non-signatory movements from pursuing a negotiated settlement for Darfur.

66. It is particularly regrettable that, among others, provisions that hold the promise of delivering tangible improvements for the people of Darfur through reconstruction and development, security, the disbandment of militia, support for voluntary return and the promotion of justice and reconciliation remain outstanding. In this regard, I call on the parties to refocus their efforts on the implementation of those provisions of the Doha Document that would create concrete peace dividends for the benefit of the neediest segments of the Darfur population.

67. I recognize that the economic challenges facing the Sudan and the focus on relations with South Sudan have contributed to the slow implementation of the Doha Document. However, I agree with the signatory parties that these challenges are not an excuse for not consolidating peace for Darfur and urge them to do so now.

68. I take note of the conduct of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission and commend the Darfur Regional Authority, United Nations agencies, UNAMID and international development partners for their invaluable support in making the

assessment possible. If the findings of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission are to be effectively implemented through reconstruction and development projects, the parties must ensure that the Darfur Regional Authority is sufficiently resourced to fulfil its responsibilities. Addressing the inconsistent funding for the administration of the Authority and continued delays in the transfer of the first portion of the funds for reconstruction and development projects remains a prerequisite for the mobilization of donor support at the Darfur donor conference scheduled to be held in the first quarter of 2013.

69. Ongoing impediments imposed by the Government of the Sudan on UNAMID, humanitarian aid workers and international development partners, including restrictions on movement, denial of access and difficulties with the issuance of visas and Darfur travel permits, not only seriously hamper the implementation of the mission's mandate but also undermine international support for humanitarian assistance and early recovery and development for Darfur. I urge the Government of the Sudan to cooperate fully with UNAMID, the humanitarian community and international partners, and to allow them to operate freely in accordance with their respective mandates.

70. I take note of the preparations for the holding of the Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultation, in accordance with the Doha Document. I urge the African Union, the Government of Qatar and UNAMID to facilitate the conduct of the dialogue and consultation in a timely manner and call on the parties to ensure that it is held in an environment of respect for civil and political rights, where participants are able to move freely and express their views without fear of retribution and stakeholder groups are represented equitably.

71. I remain gravely concerned about the intensification of conflict involving militia groups, the Sudanese Armed Forces and non-signatory armed movements in parts of Darfur, particularly Northern Darfur. I commend the persistence of UNAMID in investigating hostilities affecting civilians and its efforts to enhance security for civilians by providing support to traditional conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence mechanisms. I call on the Government to exercise fully its responsibility to protect civilians, and on all parties to the conflict to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure that civilians are not harmed.

72. The principal objective of achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in Darfur will not be realized until all belligerent parties abandon violence and return to the negotiation table. I commend the mediation efforts to re-engage the Government of the Sudan and the non-signatory movements in peace talks and welcome the forthcoming resumption of talks between the Government and the JEM Interim Military Council faction. I reiterate my call to the remaining hold-out groups, namely SLA-Minni Minawi, SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM, to join the peace process immediately and without preconditions, and call on the Government to show flexibility in negotiations towards reaching a comprehensive agreement.

73. I am deeply concerned about the impact of the prevailing insecurity in Darfur on UNAMID and humanitarian personnel working throughout Darfur. In this connection, I condemn in the strongest possible terms the attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers of 2 and 17 October, which resulted in the deaths of five peacekeepers. These heinous crimes can only serve to undermine our collective

efforts to achieve peace in Darfur. I call on the Government of the Sudan to conduct a full investigation into these incidents and bring the perpetrators to account.

74. I welcome the release of the two UNAMID formed police unit personnel who were abducted in Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, in August 2012 and thank the Government of the Sudan for its efforts to secure their safe release. I urge the Government to do all it can to bring those responsible to justice and ensure that such incidents are not repeated.

75. I remain concerned about the detention of three UNAMID national staff members by the National Intelligence and Security Services. I expect the Government to release them immediately and present any evidence of wrongdoing it may have to my acting Joint Special Representative, in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

76. In conclusion, I would like to thank the acting Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Aichatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, and all the men and women of UNAMID for their tireless efforts to implement the mission's mandate and facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive peace for Darfur. Lastly, I thank the humanitarian community, who endure difficult circumstances in order to sustain and improve the lives of Darfuris affected by conflict.

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