

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 12 October 2012 from the Secretary-General  
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to transmit the fourth and final report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (see annex).

The report is pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), by which the Council requested the African Union to keep it regularly informed on the implementation of the mandate of AMISOM.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* **BAN** Ki-moon



## Annex

### **Letter dated 5 October 2012 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General**

In pursuance of paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), in which the African Union was requested to keep the Council regularly informed on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), I am pleased to forward herewith the fourth and final African Union Commission progress report on AMISOM (see enclosure).

This report provides an update on the main developments during the period under review, as well as on the deployment of AMISOM and the Mission's efforts in support of the ongoing processes in Somalia. The report concludes with observations on the way forward. In particular, the African Union would appreciate it if the Security Council could authorize a technical rollover of the support package for an additional period of four months, with slight adjustments to take into account pressing issues on the ground. This will enable us to conduct and finalize, in conjunction with the Secretariat, the planned assessment of AMISOM and the Somali defence and security sector, with a view to determining how best the Mission can further support the stabilization of Somalia in light of the recent political and security developments in the country.

I would be most grateful if you could kindly forward the report to the Security Council members for their information and action as may be required. As always, the Commission stands ready to provide any additional information that may be necessary.

I would like, once again, to reiterate the African Union's deep appreciation to the Security Council and to you in particular for the invaluable support being rendered to AMISOM and for the unwavering commitment of the United Nations to the promotion of lasting peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia.

*(Signed)* Jean Ping

## **Enclosure**

### **Fourth and final progress report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012)**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). In that resolution, the Council requested the African Union to keep it regularly informed, through the Secretary-General, on the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and progress made with regard to establishing an AMISOM presence in the four Sectors set out in the Mission's Strategic Concept of 5 January 2012; increasing the force strength of AMISOM from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, composed of troops and personnel of formed police units; and enhancing the effectiveness of the Somali National Security Forces.

2. The report, which is the last to be submitted in accordance with the requirements of resolution 2036 (2012), provides a brief update on the main political and security developments in Somalia during the period under review. It also covers the activities undertaken by AMISOM in furtherance of its mandate. The report concludes with recommendations on the way forward.

#### **II. Main political developments**

3. Since my last report (see S/2012/666, enclosure), tremendous progress has been made in the political process in Somalia. In August 2012, the Somali stakeholders completed the remaining milestones for ending the transition, which began eight years ago. As Council members are aware, on 25 July 2012, the 135 traditional elders selected 825 delegates to constitute the National Constituent Assembly, which adopted the provisional Constitution on 1 August 2012. The traditional elders, acting in accordance with the Garowe I and II principles, and supported by the Technical Selection Committee, also nominated the Members of Parliament to form a new Federal Parliament. This body then proceeded to elect its presiding officers and, subsequently, a new President for the country.

4. Although the process of selecting the Members of Parliament was marred by internal clan disagreements, allegations of bribery and intimidation and concerns that the women's quota might not be filled owing to cultural resistance, it still resulted in the desired outcome, namely the formation of the new Federal Parliament. In the face of these concerns, AMISOM, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) issued, on 9 August 2012, a joint statement in which they condemned the attempts by some individuals to derail the process and warned that those whose actions were found to be undermining the then ongoing efforts would be disqualified from seeking public office and subjected to appropriate action, in line with relevant African Union, IGAD and United Nations pronouncements.

5. Beyond the joint statement, the three entities, which also served as international observers in the Technical Selection Committee, prevailed upon the Somali political leadership, the traditional elders and other stakeholders to rise above their differences and act in the best interest of the Somali people. The members of the Technical Selection Committee were also assured that they could continue their work in an independent and impartial manner, free from intimidation and the fear of reprisals. On the whole, it can be said that the very convening inside Somalia of the National Constituent Assembly, in a context marked by security threats and logistical challenges, constituted an unprecedented achievement for Somalia and its people.

6. Eventually, the Technical Selection Committee, having scrutinized the eligibility of candidates for membership of the new Federal Parliament against the agreed criteria, presented 250 men and women who were sworn in on 20 August 2012. The eldest member of the new Parliament, serving as interim Speaker, chaired the parliamentary sessions that established the procedures to elect a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers and to put in place an electoral committee to supervise the election of the Speaker and the President. On 28 August 2012, a new Speaker, Mohamed Sheikh Osman Jawari, and two Deputy Speakers, Jaylaani Nur Ikar and Mahad Abdalle Awad, were elected.

7. Subsequently, the new Federal Parliament steered the process towards the presidential election, beginning with the establishment of an election commission, the adoption of the criteria for presidential candidates and the nomination of candidates. This was followed by the candidates' presentations of their political programmes to the Federal Parliament on 7 and 8 September 2012. The presidential election was conducted on 10 September 2012, with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud emerging as the winner.

8. I am happy to note that the conduct and outcomes of the election were widely acclaimed to be free, fair and credible. Inside the country, the regional administration of Puntland and Somaliland had also expressed satisfaction and the hope that the outcome of the electoral process would serve as a prelude to peaceful coexistence, security and the establishment of a functional government that would spearhead the election of the next President of Somalia by universal suffrage. The regional States, through IGAD, described the election as a momentous day for the people of Somalia and praised its peaceful nature. The international partners hailed the election as a significant moment for Somalia and an important step towards lasting peace and reconciliation.

9. The inauguration ceremony of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was held in Mogadishu on 16 September 2012. In the statement he made on the occasion, the President outlined his immediate priorities. These revolve around security improvement, national reconciliation, social service delivery, economic development and justice. He also stressed that he would reach out to armed opposition groups and continue the process of dialogue with Somaliland initiated by his predecessor.

10. Significantly, the inauguration ceremony was witnessed by several members of the international community. In particular, mention should be made of the presence of representatives of the countries of the region, namely Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti; Haile Mariam Desalegn, then Acting Prime Minister of Ethiopia; Moses Ali, Third Deputy Prime Minister of Uganda; and Nafie Ali Nafie,

Assistant to the President of the Sudan. I also attended the inauguration ceremony, during which I applauded the former President of the Transitional Federal Government, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, for the role he had played in the country's political process and for accepting the outcome of the election. I called on the Somali people and stakeholders to stay the course and forge ahead with their objective of achieving lasting peace and security, national healing and reconciliation, service delivery and development. I also assured them of the African Union's continued commitment to do its utmost to support them in their efforts.

### **III. Evolution of the security situation**

11. The period under review has witnessed further progress on the ground as the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM continued to expand their areas of control. While Al-Shabaab has been significantly weakened, it still retains the ability to strike. The attempt made on the life of the President on 12 September 2012 at Al-Jazeera Hotel, where he was conferring with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya, attests to this threat.

12. In Sector 1 (Banadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle), following the capture of the strategic town of Balaad, the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM gained control of Km 50, which was used as a base for the operations that subsequently made it possible to seize Shalamboti and the strategic seaport of Marka. On 4 September 2012, the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM captured the seaport of Elman within the Balaad district. Cordon and search operations were also conducted in the areas of Eelasha Biyaha and Lafoole, which harbour Al-Shabaab elements that continuously carry out attacks against positions of the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM. The threat dynamics in Sector 1 will continue to pose a danger to AMISOM and the Somali forces owing to a lack of force multipliers and overstretched communication lines.

13. Significant progress has also been made in Sector 2 (Lower and Middle Juba) during the reporting period. In the first half of September 2012, the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM seized the towns of Miido, Harbole and Bibi on the road between Afmadow and Kismayo. Somali and AMISOM forces then proceeded to secure the town of Jana Abdallah on 17 September 2012. Finally, on 28 September 2012, the operation to capture Kismayo, a key hub for Al-Shabaab's funding, was launched. The city came under the control of AMISOM and the Somali forces on 30 September 2012. The capture of Kismayo highlighted the critical role of maritime assets and capabilities in the ongoing campaign. Indeed, the complex operation that led to the capture of Kismayo involved patrols along the coast, as well as an amphibious assault on the beaches of the city. At the time of finalizing this report, preparations were under way to expand the operations of AMISOM and the Somali forces to Jilib and Jamame. While fleeing Kismayo, Al-Shabaab planted numerous explosive devices and destroyed local infrastructure such as markets, water points and schools. Many civilians, fearful of being caught up in the crossfire, fled the city.

14. The Somali National Security Forces and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces have registered further gains in Sector 3 (Gedo, Bay and Bakool). As indicated in my earlier report, important towns in Gedo, Bay and Bakool have been liberated. However, the vastness of the area and the peculiarities of the terrain have

allowed Al-Shabaab to establish a presence in some villages. Furthermore, AMISOM has deployed 1,060 troops from Burundi and Uganda to this sector. In the coming weeks, additional troops will be redeployed from Sector 1.

15. In Sector 4 (Galgadud and Hiraan), while Al-Shabaab has been pushed out of Beletweyne and Mataban districts, it maintains a presence in the southern and western districts. AMISOM has deployed 235 soldiers and 35 vehicles from Djibouti in Beletweyne. The deployment of the main body of the Djibouti contingent to Beletweyne should be finalized by the end of October 2012. The first convoy of the Djibouti contingent-owned equipment left on 29 September 2012 and is expected to arrive on 5 October 2012. The Ethiopian National Defence Forces, which maintain a presence in Beletweyne, are providing support to the troops from Djibouti. This sector continues to receive large numbers of Al-Shabaab operatives, thus raising the threat level, including the threat of improvised explosive devices, with possible destabilizing effects for Sector 1.

16. As indicated in my last report, following the liberation of Marka in Sector 1, Kuday natural port in Sector 2 and Kismayo, the town of Baraawe is now the main source of revenue for Al-Shabaab and a critical node for its supply line. The poorly monitored maritime corridor from Yemen to Somalia also remains a conduit for the flow of foreign fighters and material support for Al-Shabaab.

17. Al-Shabaab has recently changed its overall structure, making it much leaner and better able to undertake asymmetric warfare. The group has established four regions, each under an overall commander, with a striking resemblance to the AMISOM sector disposition, with the exception of Mudug (Puntland), Hiraan and Galgadud, which have all been brought together, highlighting the growing importance of these three regions for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has relocated much of its manpower and equipment to areas such as Bulo-Burte (Hiraan) and Golis Mountain (Puntland), where the Somali National Security Forces and allied militia have a limited presence. It should also be noted that the group's media platform remains an effective tool for the recruitment of fighters and the mobilization of funding for its activities. In view of the movements of Al-Shabaab, the African Union is envisaging to work with IGAD member States on a joint border patrol and control initiative to stem the flow of foreign fighters and other criminals.

#### **IV. Deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia**

18. Since my last report, three civilian personnel have been recruited and deployed to reinforce the civilian component at the Mission headquarters, in Mogadishu. This deployment brings the total number of civilian personnel working in Mogadishu to 21. Their duties include key operational functions, such as mission management and planning, political affairs, civil affairs, humanitarian liaison and public information, and key mission support functions. Another 46 civilian personnel still operate from Nairobi, handling mainly issues relating to procurement and finance. They will be relocated to Mogadishu once the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) completes the required office and accommodation facilities.

19. The rotation of troops continues to be conducted according to the operational benchmarks endorsed by the Military Operations Coordination Committee at its first meeting on 9 March 2012. This is being done with the active support of UNSOA.

20. During the reporting period, 1,000 Burundian troops were redeployed from Mogadishu to Baidoa. The deployment exercise was completed on 9 August 2012. These new troops joined the 60 military personnel from Uganda in Sector 3, who had been deployed there since April 2012. The Sector Commander from Burundi assumed duty on 12 April 2012 and is coordinating military operations with the Ethiopian National Defence Forces contingent in the area. Furthermore, steps are being taken for the redeployment of 1,440 Ugandan troops from Mogadishu to Sector 3 through the Afgoye-Baidoa corridor. The ultimate objective is to allow for the opening of the corridor and movement of major equipment and supplies to Sector 3 by road. This expansion to Baidoa is not without its logistical challenges, especially in terms of water supply for AMISOM troops. Nevertheless, commendable efforts are being made by both AMISOM and UNSOA to ensure that the major equipment and the initial sustainment package are in place and that the expanded support package will continue to be delivered as the security situation allows.

21. The contingent-owned equipment for the Sierra Leonean contingent was shipped from Freetown on 8 September 2012 and arrived in Mombasa on 2 October 2012. The deployment of the Sierra Leonean contingent will be completed by November 2012. The contingent will be deployed through Kenya to allow the personnel to take possession of their equipment before being inserted into Sector 2 by land.

22. With regard to the deployment of air assets, an advance party composed of 85 personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 2 August 2012. On 12 August 2012, four Ugandan military helicopters (three attack and one utility) started their movement to Mogadishu through Kenya with seven crew members each. They were expected to arrive in Mogadishu by 13 August 2012. However, the operation could not proceed as planned, since three of the helicopters crashed in the vicinity of Mount Kenya on their way to Somalia. Against this background, the African Union, in coordination with UNSOA, is considering alternative options to allow for quick deployment of either military or civilian helicopters which have both logistical and medical evacuation capabilities. Uganda has also indicated its willingness to deploy replacement helicopters.

23. The expanded AMISOM Force headquarters has been operationalized in accordance with the decision of the 306th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council. Seventy-five staff officers out of the planned 85 have assumed duties. As indicated in my previous report, all Sector Commanders have been deployed, with the exception of the Commander of Sector 4, who will be in place once the deployment of the Djiboutian contingent is completed. The Military Operations Coordination Committee has so far met six times. At the sixth meeting, held on 21 September 2012, the Committee discussed AMISOM operational issues in the context of the post-transition environment in Somalia. The Committee recommended a review of the AMISOM deployment upon the completion of the current expansion operations, by the end of October 2012.

24. Progress has also been made in enhancing the role of the police component of AMISOM, especially with regard to capacity-building and operational support to the Somali Police Force. I am pleased to report that the two formed police units, as authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council and endorsed by resolution 2036 (2012), have now been deployed in Mogadishu. The Ugandan unit

was deployed in August 2012, while the Nigerian unit arrived on 16 September 2012. On 17 September 2012, these units conducted robust flag march patrols to reassure the local population about their commitment to supporting the Somali Police Force in the maintenance of law and order. A number of patrols and other related operations have since been conducted. Together with the Somali National Security Forces and the military component of AMISOM, the formed police units contributed to the escorts and guard duties during the inauguration and sessions of the Federal Parliament and the election of the President. The units are also facilitating the institutional capacity-building activities carried out in support of the Somali Police Force, as well as the expansion of its operations to other liberated and Government-controlled areas. The level of the individual police officers remains unchanged at 91, but is expected to increase to 180 by the end of October 2012, while the authorized strength of 260 individual police officers, which is provided for in the Strategic Concept, will be achieved by November 2012.

## **V. Support to stabilization and governance in liberated areas**

25. Somalia is a federal State, and this is enshrined in the newly adopted provisional Constitution. However, fundamental issues related to federalism remain unresolved, in particular the relationship between Somaliland, Puntland and the rest of Somalia, a plethora of self-declared states and semi-autonomous regions, and issues regarding boundaries delineation and revenue collection. Social services delivery at local government levels is also still a challenge.

26. The new Federal Government and AMISOM are expected to play a key role in the stabilization of the liberated areas, especially in the absence of local governance structures. In this respect, the Federal Government is in the process of implementing the national strategy on stabilization and reconciliation in line with the national security and stabilization plan, which was adopted on 8 August 2012. As part of this process, the Federal Government, supported by UNPOS and AMISOM, is rolling out a project on the establishment of district and regional security committees. Efforts by the new Federal Government, with the support of AMISOM, are also under way to facilitate the provision of basic services to the population.

## **VI. Management of disengaged combatants**

27. The national security and stabilization plan has assigned AMISOM, among other stakeholders, with important responsibilities in respect of activities for disengaged combatants prior to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The mechanisms outlined in the plan to manage the disengaged combatants are yet to be established. There are an estimated 3,000 former combatants, many of whom have defected from Al-Shabaab ranks in recent operations. The management of disengaged combatants is critical for the security and stabilization of Somalia.

28. AMISOM is working with the Somali National Security Agency to manage the current caseload of defectors. The defectors have been registered, and there is an urgent need to provide them with shelter and basic sustenance. At the moment, 800 defectors are camped in Marina (Mogadishu), Afgoye (Lower Shabelle), Arbis (Lower Shabelle), Maslah (Middle Shabelle) and Hilweyne (Middle Shabelle). Some of them have been reunited with their families and communities, with plans to

provide them with vocational training. For the long term, AMISOM is working with UNPOS and relevant agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund and the International Organization for Migration, towards the development of a legal framework and standard operating procedures to guide the Mission in the handling of disengaged combatants, in consultation with the Somali authorities. Building on these initiatives, AMISOM, in consultation with all stakeholders, is developing a pilot project to be implemented in Afgoye. The processes and procedures developed in this project will then be replicated in other liberated areas.

## **VII. Support to the Somali National Security Forces**

29. The process of reforming and restructuring the Somali National Security Forces is crucial for the long-term stabilization of Somalia. AMISOM is committed to providing training support to the National Security Forces, in addition to operational guidance and mentoring. The team of staff officers from the East African Standby Force deployed to AMISOM Force headquarters has assisted the Somali authorities in reorganizing the National Security Forces into two divisions of three brigades, composed of three infantry battalions each. One of these divisions has taken part in operations with AMISOM and has conducted itself credibly. This interim reorganization is a short-term solution which should be concurrent with the design and development of the future Somali forces. AMISOM is doing everything practicable to support the National Security Forces in discharging their responsibilities of providing for the safety and security of citizens. Nevertheless, financial and logistical constraints, as well as the amorphous command and control structure of the National Security Forces, are adversely affecting their effectiveness.

30. Most of the liberated areas in south-central Somalia are now in the hands of clan militias that are tenuously linked to the National Security Forces. If the process of reconstituting the security forces marginalizes the militias, there could be clashes pitting them against the new Federal Government. In view of this, the reform and restructuring of the National Security Forces must be approached cautiously to ensure the inclusivity of the process.

31. The adoption of the national security and stabilization plan through a presidential decree on 8 August 2012 was a positive step. The plan focuses on strategic policy issues relating to security and rule of law, including justice. It encompasses various institutions, civilian and military, that are vital to national security in Somalia, including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and National Security, the Ministry of Justice and various other bodies that fall under them, such as the defence forces, the police, the National Security Agency, the custodian corps and immigration authorities. The plan identifies priority actions for each of the above institutions. Those actions are required to put in place security, justice and rule of law institutions that are capable of ensuring the maintenance of law and order in Somalia once AMISOM has withdrawn — the ultimate exit strategy.

32. The national security and stabilization plan recognizes the role of AMISOM in the stabilization of Somalia, but it also emphasizes the importance of national ownership of the comprehensive and broad-based security sector development. While this remains a long-term endeavour, it is necessary for the international

community to provide the Somali National Security Forces with immediate combat supplies and stipends. As previously reported, the African Union assisted in the drafting of a document on the empowerment of the Somalia security and justice sectors, which was endorsed by the Transitional Federal Government. This includes the immediate requirements for the integration and sustenance of the Somali National Security Forces. The African Union Commission is planning to initiate consultations with the new authorities on the document before submitting it to the African Union Peace and Security Council and subsequently the Security Council of the United Nations.

33. With regard to capacity-building for the Somali Police Force, the AMISOM police component, on the basis of a comprehensive training needs assessment, has developed a training package for the Somali Police Force, including a refresher course to prepare newly promoted police lieutenants for duties as station commanders in the liberated areas of Somalia; public order training in consultation with the Angola National Police and the Italian Carabinieri; a search-seize-dispose of explosives course to prepare the police to effectively perform duties in close protection and general law and order maintenance; and a number of training packages in areas such as gender-based violence, child rights and protection in conflict and post-conflict environments, training of trainers, community policing, traffic management and basic criminal investigation courses. AMISOM is also involved in mentoring and advising the Somali Police Force on basic police duties, such as human rights observation, crime prevention strategies, community policing and search procedures.

## **VIII. Protection of civilians**

34. The protection of the civilian population in the AMISOM areas of operation remains of particular concern. The number of internally displaced persons moving into the areas liberated by the Somali National Security Forces and AMISOM continues to increase, especially as the Mission expands its area of operations. This situation took on greater proportions following the operations in Afgoye and Marka, and was similarly noted during the operation to seize Kismayo. The African Union is working to strengthen its capacity to monitor protection risks, threats and vulnerabilities, and to ensure that civilian protection considerations are mainstreamed into the Mission's activities. In this regard, AMISOM has taken steps to strengthen the utilization of public information prior to and during the conduct of military operations, an approach which contributed to civilian protection during operations aimed at securing Afgoye. Valuable lessons are being drawn from this experience, and AMISOM aims to fully utilize public information strategies in a similar manner in the conduct of future operations.

35. Efforts have also been made to ensure the implementation of the Mission's indirect fire policy, which greatly contributed to minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage during the conduct of recent operations. Reports of collateral damage during operations are noted and appropriate follow-up is conducted. AMISOM also continues to work towards the establishment of a civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response cell, as outlined in Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). While the establishment of the cell will no doubt contribute to the reduction of civilian casualties during the conduct of AMISOM military operations, such a

mechanism must be tailored to the evolving context of AMISOM operations and will require significant resources to operate successfully.

36. In light of the increasing use of asymmetrical tactics by Al-Shabaab and the still limited ability of the Federal Government to effectively extend governance and rule of law to the liberated areas, the civilian population in Somalia continues to face a broad range of risks, threats and vulnerabilities. This situation highlights the need for strengthened coordination among all protection actors in Somalia. For its part, the African Union will continue to engage the Somali authorities to ensure that this issue is given the requisite level of attention. To this effect, AMISOM will establish a dedicated protection, human rights and gender section in the coming months.

## **IX. Humanitarian and community support**

37. The prolonged conflict in Somalia has caused the destruction of public infrastructure, including health, education and other services. In such a degraded environment, people, particularly vulnerable groups such as children, women, the disabled and the marginalized, bear the biggest brunt of the conflict.

38. AMISOM is mandated to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Accordingly, AMISOM works towards the establishment of safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy by the various actors operating in areas secured by the Mission. Furthermore, AMISOM supports local non-governmental organizations in training vulnerable groups, especially youths and women, in basic health and sanitation issues.

39. In view of the dire need for humanitarian assistance and the limited presence of humanitarian actors in Somalia, AMISOM also makes efforts to complement the work of humanitarian actors by providing safe and clean drinking water and health-care services to the civilian population in its areas of operation. In addition, AMISOM has extended support aimed at facilitating the functioning of medical service providers. This included the provision of electricity generators to the Banadir Hospital in Mogadishu, as well as working with the office of the Mayor of Mogadishu to rehabilitate four water wells in the Hamarweyne, Hamarjabjab, Wadajir and Dharkenley districts of the capital, with funding support from the Government of Sweden.

## **X. Engagement with Somali civil society, media and diaspora**

40. During the recent elections, many Somalis felt involved, through their representatives, in this remarkable political achievement. The process also generated unprecedented national and international scrutiny and attention, including from members of the Somali diaspora, who demonstrated massive support for the peace process and are now returning in large numbers to contribute to the rebuilding efforts, especially in Mogadishu. The African Union will establish a mechanism to engage with the Somali diaspora in supporting the new Federal Government and in contributing towards peacebuilding initiatives across the country.

41. AMISOM has continued to engage the civil society through consultative meetings. Somali civil society organizations are involved in activities aimed at

raising awareness of the opportunities arising from the improvement of the security situation and the new political dispensation. Clearly, there is need to strengthen the capacity of the civil society to promote reconciliation at local and national levels and bridge social service delivery gaps.

42. AMISOM is cognizant of the use of the media by armed opposition groups to influence the Somali population. Accordingly, the Mission will continue to develop and utilize appropriate and effective media strategies to counter this negative influence. This will involve activities such as capacity-building in support of Somali journalists, in collaboration with the Ministry of Information, local and international media.

43. In view of the failure to achieve the quota of 30 per cent of seats allocated to women in the new Federal Parliament, more considered attention should be given to the role, full participation and representation of women in the Somali peace process. In line with the applicable universal and regional instruments relating to women's rights and their participation in political and State-building processes, it is important to provide the new Federal Parliament and the new Government with the necessary support to develop gender-responsive legislation, policies and actions that will eventually enhance Somali women's visibility and contribution and transform cultural prejudices against this key component of the population. In this regard, AMISOM will support the Government's efforts to operationalize the African Union Gender Policy and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security.

## **XI. Observations**

44. The period under review was marked by remarkable progress in Somalia. The political and military landscape has witnessed a turnaround that few could have expected, given the multiplicity and complexity of the challenges to be overcome. In the two-decade-long conflict experienced by their country, never have the Somalis been so close to realizing their aspiration to peace, security and reconciliation. The Somali stakeholders and people deserve to be commended for the achievements recorded and praised for the maturity and commitment they have displayed over the past few months to complete the transition. While a lot has been achieved, the tasks ahead will be even more demanding. It is therefore critical that they remain steadfast and continue to put the interest of their country above any other consideration.

45. The Somali authorities will soon be articulating their priorities and action plan for the next four years. In this regard, I urge the international community to extend full support to the Somali authorities to enable them to meet the even more demanding and complex tasks ahead.

46. AMISOM has been instrumental in creating an enabling environment for the advancement of the political process and the efforts at economic revitalization in Mogadishu and in some parts of south-central Somalia. The men and women who serve under AMISOM, and their Somali brothers in arms, have demonstrated undeniable courage and commitment. The gains recorded on the ground were achieved thanks to the huge sacrifices they have made. The AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries should once again be commended for their exemplary commitment and spirit of solidarity, in the service of peace, security and

reconciliation in Somalia. Equally, it is important to pay tribute to IGAD and the regional leaders for their leadership and steadfastness. In particular, the role and contribution of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia can never be overstated. As we mourn him, I have no doubt that we can continue to rely on Ethiopia's leadership, as chair of IGAD and neighbour of Somalia, and the personal commitment of Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn.

47. In order to more effectively respond to the changing political situation and to support the Federal Government in meeting the needs of the population, the African Union, working together with the United Nations, intends to undertake a thorough assessment of AMISOM and how best it can contribute to the stabilization of Somalia, in the light of the gains made on the ground and the challenges ahead. This process is expected to start in the next few weeks and to be concluded in the coming months, taking into account the results of the strategic review currently being conducted by the United Nations in relation to Somalia for the period 2012-2016. The outcome of the assessment of AMISOM will be submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council and subsequently to the Security Council of the United Nations.

48. The planned assessment of AMISOM will also address the issue of the funding of the Mission. It is to be recalled that the European Union provides the resources needed for the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility. The European Union has indicated that funds available in 2013 for the payment of troop allowances, on the basis of the current United Nations-authorized strength of 17,731, amount only to 70 million euros. This will cover the required payments for just the first five months of 2013, while other requirements of the Mission will not be catered for, in particular operational costs for the civilian staff and other related expenses. As we reflect on the future of AMISOM and the important contribution it is making to the furtherance of peace, security and reconciliation in Somalia, it is important to bear in mind this major constraint and to give due consideration to the need to improve the predictability and sustainability of AMISOM funding mechanisms.

49. In the meantime, I would like to request that the Security Council authorize a technical rollover of the current support package for four additional months, until February 2013. Some slight adjustments would be necessary in order to take into account pressing issues on the ground. These relate, on the one hand, to the need to further enhance the AMISOM civilian component. Indeed, as the Mission expands its footprint into areas where the presence of international partners and other actors is extremely limited, it is important that AMISOM be empowered to support the Federal Government's stabilization and local reconciliation efforts. This will make it possible to consolidate the military gains and create the necessary conditions for an enhanced international presence, including that of relevant United Nations agencies. To that effect, I would like to request the Security Council to authorize the extension of the United Nations logistical support package to cover the deployment of an additional 50 civilian personnel across the Mission area. Currently, the support package is limited to only 20 civilian personnel.

50. The second urgent need relates to the maritime component of AMISOM. As Council members are aware, the Joint African Union-United Nations Strategic Concept highlighted the importance of this component in preventing Al-Shabaab from benefiting from illegal maritime trade or piracy, and in addressing challenges

on land and at sea comprehensively. In this respect, the enhanced Mission headquarters was to focus initially on conducting limited maritime operations and establishing specific coordination arrangements aimed at (a) protecting AMISOM forces; (b) improving situation awareness; and (c) denying key coastal and inland ports and harbours to Al-Shabaab. However, the support package, as authorized, fell short of the recommendations contained in the Strategic Concept. Considering the critical role of naval assets for the effective implementation of the AMISOM mandate and the stabilization of Somalia, I call upon the Security Council to urgently revisit the issue and to favourably consider the African Union's request in respect of the maritime component.

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