Executive Summary

This is the sixth research report by Security Council Report (SCR) dedicated to the women, peace and security agenda. This report reviews the period since SCR's last research report, and covers in detail developments during the three years from 1 January 2017 to 31 December 2019, while also making some general comments on events in the first months of 2020. Ahead of the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325, the inaugural resolution on women, peace and security in 2000, this report examines whether the agenda is regressing, progressing or being maintained.

• Firstly, this report takes a close look at the prevailing political climate surrounding women, peace and security at the Council, which has become more contentious and less conducive to a progression—or even maintenance—of the agenda.
Executive Summary

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• Secondly, the report considers the work of the Informal Experts Group (IEG) on women, peace and security and concludes that Council members appreciate the way the IEG functions at the moment, and would wish to maintain it as is.
• This report then sets out the Security Council’s normative framework on women, peace and security. It concludes that stakeholders find the framework adequate, and consequently prioritise its maintenance and implementation over efforts to develop it further.
• The report examines the practice of briefings to the female representatives of civil society, finding these a consolidated and increasing practice.
• The report then moves on to the Secretary-General’s reporting on women, peace and security. The examples show that not every report integrates women, peace and security issues in a systematic manner.
• In the next section, this report looks into how the Council has integrated elements of the agenda into resolutions and presidential statements during the three-year period under review. The negotiations around the two prominent 2019 resolutions on women, peace and security were very contentious, showing some Council members’ resistance to progressive development of the agenda and in parts even to its maintenance.
• This report further examines changes in sanctions regimes, including the addition of stand-alone criteria for the commission of sexual and gender-based violence and requests to include gender expertise in the Panels of Experts assisting sanctions committees. Despite these developments, few changes are observed in new listings.

Overall, this report argues that the Council should focus its attention on the maintenance and implementation of the agenda ahead of its 20th anniversary.

Political Framework

Recent years have shown a sharper dichotomy in Council members’ approaches to the women, peace and security agenda. On the one hand, there are states such as former Council member Sweden (2017-2018) which have declared a “feminist foreign policy”. On the other hand, there are states that have pushed back, at the Council, against language previously adopted by consensus. The US, for example, threatened to veto a draft resolution on conflict-related sexual violence in April 2019 over language on sexual and reproductive health rights that had been included in past Council decisions. Negotiations on this resolution—2467, adopted with China and Russia abstaining—and on resolution 2493, adopted by consensus in October of the same year—were extremely difficult. Ahead of the adoption of resolution 2467, many advocates from civil society questioned whether it was strategic to pursue a resolution on conflict-related sexual violence at that time, considering the political environment. As a result of the contentious negotiations over resolution 2467, it seems that most Council members were wary of seeking another resolution half a year later. Draft resolution 2467 initially proposed the establishment of a working group on conflict-related sexual violence and the first draft of resolution 2493 called on the chairs of the IEG to submit an annual update on progress towards implementing its recommendations. These attempts to further develop the agenda were met with resistance by some Council members arguing that they constituted an unjustified expansion of the Council’s responsibilities and an infringement on the competencies of other parts of the UN system.

At the same time, there have been examples of Council members, notably elected members, seeking to anchor aspects of the existing normative framework in the Council’s own work. One example, which this report will return to in greater detail, is the inclusion of sexual and gender-based violence as a listing criterion under the Libya sanctions regime through resolution 2441 of 5 November 2018, spearheaded by then-members the Netherlands and Sweden. That proved to be difficult: the resolution was adopted, but with China and Russia abstaining.
The scrutiny that the women, peace and security agenda is under in the Council from some members extends to other parts of the UN system as well. Following the adoption of peace operations mandates, their budgets are decided by the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Some UN member states have reportedly raised concerns in the budget process about posts related to women’s protection and gender. In 2017, 2018, and 2019, no such posts were cut, however.

A fundamental difference has opened up among Council members over how the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda relates to the Council’s core mandate of maintaining international peace and security. Resolution 1325 acknowledged that equal participation by women in the maintenance of international peace and security, an increase of women’s roles in preventing and resolving conflict, and women’s protection all contribute to the fulfillment of the Council’s mandate of maintaining international peace and security. During the April 2019 annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence, however, Russia said that “it is also important not to underestimate the significance of maintaining a united approach to understanding the scope of the Security Council’s mandate on combating sexual violence in conflict and of refraining from attempts to broaden its interpretative and take the Council beyond its remit of maintaining international peace and security”. Explaining his country’s abstention on resolution 2467, the Chinese representative emphasised that “we believe that the Council should address sexual violence in conflict in line with its mandate, instead of going too far to address what should have been entrusted to other bodies”.

On the other hand, during the 2019 annual open debate on women, peace and security, the UK representative said that “we need to ask ourselves, 20 years and 10 resolutions later, why is there still such a stark implementation gap when all the evidence suggests that incorporating the gender perspective helps achieve sustainable peace and security”. During that same debate, the Russian representative made clear in his statement that the Council should “focus on situations that present an unquestionable threat to international peace and security”, arguing—as China had in the April 2019 debate—that other parts of the UN system also play a role and that there should not be an overlap. A grim assessment of the state of the agenda came from the French representative, who said that the 2020 anniversaries, including the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325, “will unfortunately not resonate as victories”.

In sum, the two hard-to-negotiate resolutions of 2019 brought widespread recognition of a deepened gulf among members over aspects of the Council’s women, peace and security agenda, and over its relationship to international peace and security. (Similar questioning by some members can also be observed in some form around climate security, criminal accountability, aspects of the protection of civilians agenda and human rights, among other issues.) With this has come the sense that attempts to add progressive elements to resolutions in the run-up to the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325 might further impair the political climate around this agenda.

Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security

In resolution 2242, the Council recognised “the need to address challenges linked to the provision of specific information and recommendations on the gender dimensions of situations on the Council’s agenda, to inform and help strengthen the Council’s decisions”. It expressed its “intention to convene meetings of relevant Security Council experts as part of an Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security to facilitate a more systematic approach to Women, Peace and Security within its own work and enable greater oversight and coordination of implementation efforts”. This objective was further refined in the IEG’s guidelines (S/2016/1106) to include implementation “efforts by Headquarters-based actors and field actors”. The IEG provides a space for systematic discussions of country-specific situations on the Council’s agenda between senior UN representatives from the field and Council members’ country experts and women, peace and security experts with the goal of informing the work of the Council and UN activities in the field and to “mainstream the agenda”.

Because of the status of the IEG as an experts group, the IEG co-chairs are not included on the list of chairs and vice-chairs of Council subsidiary bodies, issued annually as Council document number 2. The IEG’s meetings are also not reflected on the Council’s subsidiary organs programme of work, and there is no obligation for Council members to attend, although most do. China and Russia appear to be mostly absent.

According to the IEG’s guidelines, “the meetings are attended by relevant experts from Security Council member States (on the country under study and on women and peace and security)”. This means that, ideally, the Council member’s country expert as well as its women, peace and security expert both attend the IEG meetings. The IEG is chaired by two countries, currently the Dominican Republic (during its second year on the Council in 2020) and Germany (2019-2020). According to the IEG guidelines, “whenever possible, the Co-Chairs should be geographically diverse and fulfill this role for the duration of their term”. The UK, the penholder on women, peace and security, “will continue to provide overall leadership for the functioning of the group, alongside the Co-Chair(s)”.

Past co-chairs were Spain and the UK (2016), Sweden and Uruguay (2017), Peru and Sweden (2018), and Germany and Peru (2019).

A summary of every IEG meeting is circulated as an annex to a letter from the co-chairs and the penholder to the Secretary-General and published as a document of the Security Council. UN Women acts as the IEG secretariat, organising and preparing meetings. Countries under discussion are selected on the basis of different criteria, including a “strategic opportunity for impact by the Council”, such as ahead of a Council visiting mission. The IEG met on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in September 2018 ahead of an October 2018 Council
Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security

visiting mission to the country, for example. Another criterion, according to the IEG’s guidelines, is a “diversity of country situations, both geographically and with regard to conflict phase, whether at risk, active or in transition and recovery”.

Usually, there is a follow-up meeting a few months after a country situation is discussed. Between February 2016 and December 2019, there were 31 country-specific meetings. They included four meetings each on Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and Iraq, three meetings apiece on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, and Yemen, two meetings each on the Lake Chad Basin and on South Sudan, and one meeting each on Mali and the Sahel, Myanmar, and Sudan. The IEG convened one thematic meeting, on 10 November 2016, with women’s protection advisers, taking advantage of their presence in New York for their annual workshop.

Recently, there has been some resistance to the work of the IEG. The initial draft of resolution 2493, circulated in September 2019, had called on the co-chairs of the IEG to submit an annual update on progress towards implementing its recommendations. This followed a recommendation made in the Secretary-General’s 2019 annual report on women, peace and security. This language never made it into the final draft of the resolution.

After the adoption, China stressed that “the Group is not an official body of the Council” and that “the work it does in the name of the Council must respect the views of all Council members in a manner consistent with the Security Council mandate and the rules of procedure, or its decisions will not be authoritative or morally binding”. Russia added that the IEG “has not fully succeeded in becoming a coordinating link in the chain of the work in this area. It has been unable to avoid a certain degree of politicization in

its work or to develop genuinely transparent and democratic procedures for reaching and adopting decisions, which is an essential condition for sustaining dialogue between Governments on such an important subject. It will be crucial to address these shortcomings in order to meet the expectations of States that are dealing with conflict”.

In his 2019 annual report on women, peace and security, the Secretary-General made a few suggestions on the work of the IEG. One was to “track and regularly follow up on implementation of recommendations presented at IEG meetings and raised by civil society briefers, including by requesting updates from senior leadership through periodic reports and briefings”. Another recommendation was that “the IEG co-chairs should circulate annually a comprehensive update on progress towards implementing IEG recommendations as an official document of the Security Council. In all formal Council meetings on situations discussed by the IEG, the co-chairs should include updates related to the recommendations in their regular statements to the body”. These recommendations are in line with the broader question of how the impact of the IEG can be assessed and potentially improved.

Some suggestions for how the IEG could maintain the quality of its work might be worth considering. The co-chairs could aim always to have the most senior leadership from the UN field mission brief the IEG, focusing the UN country presence on women, peace and security issues. This would also give Council members at the expert level the opportunity to engage with and question the senior UN leadership directly. A few countries and regions on the Council’s agenda have so far not been discussed in the IEG, such as Burundi, Colombia, Haiti and Somalia. Mindful of the practice of having regular follow-up meetings about countries already on the IEG’s agenda, the co-chairs might want to consider including these countries on the agenda at some point; this would also introduce post-conflict situations (such as Colombia) and countries in transition (such as Haiti).

A further option would be to regularise the in-person meetings with women’s protection advisers when they come to New York for their annual workshop, as was done in 2016. Among the actions that could be taken by Council members, the IEG guidelines suggest increased coherence with subsidiary bodies, including those on counter-terrorism and sanctions regimes. One option could be to invite IEG briefings from experts assisting sanctions committees who are investigating conflict-related sexual violence. Additional recommendations included in the IEG guidelines might also be considered, such as field visits by the IEG and bilateral demarches with stakeholders such as representatives of the country under discussion at the IEG.

It seems that Council members, relevant parts of the UN system, and civil society agree that the IEG works well as an informal body and that there is no current need to further institutionalise it, such as turning it into a formal subsidiary body of the Council. Council members were not in agreement on how the formal subsidiary body should continue to meet during the COVID-19 special measures taken at UN headquarters beginning on 16 March 2020, a matter that requires a consensus decision. Not being a formal subsidiary body allowed the IEG to continue its work smoothly. On 29 April 2020, the IEG also held a meeting on COVID-19. The constructive way forward appears to be to continue the IEG in its current form and to focus on implementing its recommendations.

Normative Framework

Resolution 1325 of 31 October 2000 was introduced under a new Security Council agenda item, added earlier that month: “women and peace and security”. This first resolution on the issue recognised that armed conflict has a differential and disproportionate impact on women. It further acknowledged that equal participation by women in the maintenance of international peace and security, an expansion of women’s roles in preventing and resolving conflict, and women’s protection can all contribute to the Council’s fulfilling its mandate of promoting and maintaining international peace and security. The Council’s normative work developed, accordingly, along four main paths: protection, participation, prevention, and relief and recovery. The protection
Further strengthening the mandate of the Special Representative, resolution 1960 of 16 December 2010 requested the Secretary-General to add an annex to the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence listing conflict parties “that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the Security Council agenda”. In the resolution, the Council expressed its intention to use this annex “as a basis for more focused United Nations engagement with those parties”, which could include targeted sanctions. Furthermore, the Council called upon the parties to armed conflict “to make and implement specific and time-bound commitments to combat sexual violence”. Through this resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to track and monitor the implementation of such commitments and to provide updates to the Council in the relevant reports and briefings.

Resolution 2106 of 24 June 2013 emphasised that the prevention of sexual violence in the context of international crimes “significantly contribute[s] to the maintenance of international peace and security”. It further stressed that the participation of women is “essential to any prevention and protection response”.

In its resolution 2122 of 18 October 2013, the Council addressed the participation aspect of the agenda. It requested senior UN staff to include information on the women, peace and security agenda in their regular Council briefings and reports. The Council also showed deep concern “about persistent implementation deficits” of the agenda. It further invited the Secretary-General “to commission a global study on the implementation of resolution 1325”.

Resolution 2242, adopted on 13 October 2015, incorporated recommendations from that global study. It called upon the Secretary-General to present within five years a revised strategy for doubling the number of women in police and military contingents of UN peacekeeping operations. The resolution also addressed the Council’s own working methods and introduced two significant elements. For one, the Council expressed its intention to convene an IEG on women, peace and security and expressed its intention to invite female civil society briefers to country-specific and thematic meetings. Also, in the same resolution, the Council committed itself “to ensuring that the relevant expert groups for sanctions committees have the necessary gender expertise”. It called on UN member states and the UN itself for a greater integration of the women, peace and security agenda with the agendas related to countering terrorism and violent extremism.

On 11 March 2016, in resolution 2272, the Council addressed sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers. Among other measures in response to the problem, it endorsed a previous decision by the Secretary-General to repatriate units in peacekeeping operations in cases “when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit”.

After no resolutions on women, peace and security in 2017 and 2018, two were adopted in 2019. Resolution 2467 of 23 April focused on conflict-related sexual violence, “recognizing the need for a survivor-centred approach to preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations”. Resolution 2493 of 29 October that same year reiterated the need for the full implementation of the women, peace and security agenda and expressed deep concern about the existence of persistent barriers to that end.

Based on interviews conducted while preparing this report, most Council members, concerned parts of the UN system, and civil society seem to agree that the normative framework of the women, peace and security agenda is strong and does not need further elaboration but rather than on norm-creation. Maintaining the agenda represents a positive approach, and one with its own challenges, given efforts by some members in the Council to roll back existing norms, also examined in this report.

The participation agenda was normatively strengthened with resolution 1889 of 5 October 2009, which noted that obstacles remained towards women’s full participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding. The Council requested the Secretary-General to submit indicators to track the implementation of resolution 1325.
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Departments of Peacekeeping Operations
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cil is regularly engaged with), the UN Office
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civil society briefers were female; in 2018, the
number was 24 out of 30, and in 2019, there
were 42 female civil society briefers of the
53 in all. 'The majority of Council members
appear to appreciate this practice. There are
some discussions of country situations, how-
ever, where current dynamics at the Council
have precluded the participation of female
civil society briefers, including Burundi and
Kosovo, for reasons pertaining to overall Council dynamics rather than to any country
specifics. The president of the Council invites
the briefers, and while Council members’ dis-
agreements over a briefer’s participation can
be pushed to the point of a procedural vote,
this is not thought to have taken place in
respect of any civil society speakers.
Addressing the Council can have repercus-
sions for briefers, however, both male
and female. In a 2 May 2019 letter to the
president of the Security Council, the chargé
d’aﬀaires of the Permanent Mission of Libya
to the UN strongly criticised a briefing given
by Inas Miloud, co-founder and director of the
Tamazight Women’s Movement of Libya,
during the annual open debate on conflict-
related sexual violence at the Council. In
response, the ambassadors of seven Coun-
cil member states—Belgium, the Dominican
Republic, France, Germany, Peru, Poland and
the UK—signed a letter of 10 May 2019 to the
president of the Security Council saying that
“notwithstanding the disagreement of the Gov-
ernment of National Accord with the content
of Ms. Miloud’s briefing, we trust that she will
be allowed to continue her work unhindered.
In his 2019 annual report on women, peace
and security, the Secretary-General signalled
his extreme concern over such reports, as he
did in his 9 September 2019 report on “Coop-
eration with the United Nations, its represen-
tatives and mechanisms in the ﬁeld of human
rights”, where he referred to the case of Radhia
Al-Mutawake of the Yemeni Mwatana Orga-
nization for Human Rights who briefed the
Security Council in 2017. She was reportedly
arbitrarily detained and her passport conﬁs-
cated, seemingly for her engagement with the
UN, when attempting to ﬂy out of Yemen.
During the 2018 annual open debate on
women, peace and security, Randa Siniora
Atallah from Palestine briefed the Coun-
cil in her capacity as the General Director
of the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and
Counselling. At the end of the debate, Israel
requested to make an additional statement,
in which its representative called her brieﬁng
the Council “a questionable choice” by Bolivi-
ia, the Council president at the time. Bolivia
responded, emphasising that the Council as
a whole had invited Atallah to speak.
Civil society briefers regularly provide speci-
ciﬁc recommendations for Council action. It
is unclear how Council members make use of
them. In his 2019 annual report on women,
peace and security, the Secretary-General
encouraged Council members to consider
options for following up on briefings made
by civil society representatives. Members
could address such points with UN briefers
in closed consultations or in bilateral conver-
sations with UN officials or representatives
of the country concerned, including taking them
up in Council negotiations as appropriate.
Overall, the practice of having female
members of civil society brief the Council
appears well-established, and there seems to
be general consensus among Council mem-
bers—including those more sceptical about
the women, peace and security agenda—to
continue the practice. Over the three years
2017-2019, the proportion of female civil
society briefers grew—marking progress in
implementing this part of the women, peace
and security agenda, albeit unevenly distrib-
uted across country situations.

Female Civil Society Representation at the Security Council

Resolution 2242 expressed the Council’s
“intention to invite civil society, including
women’s organizations, to brief the Coun-
cil in country-speciﬁc considerations and
relevant thematic areas”. Since this resolu-
tion was adopted in 2015, the Council has
made considerable strides in more egalitarian
representation of civil society. The numbers
of civil society female briefers have steadily
increased. In 2017, 10 out of the Council’s 14
civil society briefers were female; in 2018, the
number was 24 out of 30, and in 2019, there
were 42 female civil society briefers of the
53 in all. 'The majority of Council members
appear to appreciate this practice. There are
some discussions of country situations, how-
ever, where current dynamics at the Council
have precluded the participation of female
civil society briefers, including Burundi and
Kosovo, for reasons pertaining to overall Council dynamics rather than to any country
specifics. The president of the Council invites
the briefers, and while Council members’ dis-
agreements over a briefer’s participation can
be pushed to the point of a procedural vote,
this is not thought to have taken place in
respect of any civil society speakers.
Addressing the Council can have repercus-
sions for briefers, however, both male
and female. In a 2 May 2019 letter to the
president of the Security Council, the chargé
d’aﬀaires of the Permanent Mission of Libya

In resolution 2122, the Council asked the
Departments of Peacekeeping Operations
and Political Affairs to “systematically include
information and related recommendations
on issues of relevance to women, peace and
security, in their reports to the Council”. This
section looks at a few examples: the report-
ing on Syria (a country situation the Coun-
cil is regularly engaged with), the UN Office
in West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS, a
special political mission), the UN Multi-
dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA, a peacekeeping mis-
ion), and the African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID, a
joint AU-UN peacekeeping mission).

SYRIA
State and non-state actors as parties to the
Syrian conﬂict are listed in the annex to the
Secretary-General’s 2019 report on conﬂict-
related sexual violence as “credibly suspected
of committing or being responsible for pat-
terns of rape or other forms of sexual vio-
ence in situations of armed conﬂict on the
agenda of the Security Council”. Resolution
2332 of 21 December 2016 and the subse-
quent resolutions on the humanitarian situ-
ation in Syria recall “the legal obligations of
all parties under international humanitarian
law and international human rights law, as
well as all the relevant decisions of the Secu-
ры Council, including by ceasing … sexual
and gender-based violence”. The Secretary-
General’s written reports on Syria between
2017 and 2019 include references to activi-
ties by the United Nations Population Fund
and UNHCR related to sexual and gender-
based violence but do not report on the issue
as such.
Of all the public Security Council meet-
ings on the humanitarian situation or the
political process in Syria in the past three
years, the issue of sexual and gender-based
violence is only raised in a few. On 30 August
2017, Stephen O’Brien, then the Under-Sec-
retary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator, said in rela-
tion to crimes by the Islamic State in Iraq

1. Numbers kindly provided by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security.
and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) that “we were at a loss for words at reports of Yazidi girls scratching their faces out of fear of being bought and sexually enslaved”. On 16 March 2018, Staffan de Mistura, then the Special Envoy for Syria, drew on the fact that “the safety of Syrian women in particular is threatened when they are evacuated following the lifting of a siege or end of a battle. Threats include widespread sexual and gender-based violence, which has been widely documented and mentioned by women’s groups. The protection and needs of women must be at the forefront of our response”. On 27 March 2018, Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that almost 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta who were being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus faced a number of serious protection concerns, including the risk of gender-based violence. In a 19 November 2018 meeting, de Mistura reported from the area of Rukban that his colleagues had “returned from the area expressing shock at the terrible human misery in that stretch of the desert, including reports of severe protection issues, such as sexual and gender-based violence…” . And on 29 August 2019, Geir Pedersen, Special Envoy for Syria, said that families in Syria faced “multipronged dangers”, including gender-based violence. 

There is no sanctions regime for Syria, and therefore no Council mechanism such as a sanctions committee and a Panel of Experts that could report on these issues. The IEG held its first meeting on Syria on 26 February 2020. Another avenue for the Council to receive information on sexual and gender-based violence is from the Human Rights Council-established Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which has briefed the Council in the past in the informal Arria format. From 2017 and March 2020, there were three such Arria-formula meetings, but their informal nature means that there is no official written record of those meetings.

**UNOWAS**

In a presidential statement of 24 July 2017 on UNOWAS (S/PRST/2017/10), the Council looked forward to “efforts to enhance ongoing activities undertaken by UNOWAS”, including gender mainstreaming; this was echoed by the subsequent presidential statement on UNOWAS on 30 January 2018 (S/PRST/2018/3). All written reports on UNOWAS between 2017 and 2019 contain both a dedicated section on gender issues as well as information related to the women, peace and security agenda systematically woven in throughout the reports. Examples include gendered dimensions of terrorism, organised crime, and security sector reform in countries of the region. 

However, this reporting has not necessarily been matched by information provided in oral briefings to the Council. In his public briefings in 2017 and 2018, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative and head of UNOWAS, addressed regional efforts for female participation in political processes, while in his 24 July 2019 briefing, he also referred to the connection between high levels of inequality in the region and gender-based violence.

**MINUSMA**

Since the establishment of MINUSMA by resolution 2100 in 2013, the mandate has required the peacekeeping operation “to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate”. The Secretary-General’s written reports on MINUSMA between 2017 and 2019 do not contain a section dedicated to gender issues. However, the reports cover diverse issues related to the women, peace and security agenda, such as participation in political processes in the country, as well as gender-aggregated data related to MINUSMA’s own capacities. As with UNOWAS, however, inclusion in written reports does not translate into the same degree of coverage in oral reports by the Special Representative and head of MINUSMA. Through all ten 2017-2019 public Council briefings on MINUSMA by representatives of the Secretary-General, the word “gender” is absent.

General information on women, peace and security in briefings is not incorporated as a cross-cutting issue, and it is mostly Council members drawing attention to gender-related issues.

**UNAMID**

Resolution 2296 of 29 June 2016 requested UNAMID to “strengthen its reporting on sexual and gender-based violence”. State and non-state actors as parties to the conflict in Darfur are listed in the annex to the Secretary-General’s 2019 report on conflict-related sexual violence as “credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council”. The Secretary-General’s reports on UNAMID do not contain a separate section on sexual and gender-based violence but do mention instances and UNAMIDs efforts to combat them. Resolution 2429 of 13 July 2018 made “the protection of civilians, monitoring and reporting on human rights, sexual and gender-based violence” a strategic priority for UNAMID. Benchmarks related to a reduction in sexual and gender-based violence joined the indicators of achievement for UNAMID’s strategic priorities in October 2018.

After that, the Mission’s oral reporting to the Council began to address sexual and gender-based violence. A practice has developed in the last three years of briefings to the Council by senior UN officials who have travelled to a country or region to focus on women, peace and security, strengthening the systematic integration of these issues into country-specific agendas. From 2017 and through 2019, four such meetings took place at the Council. In August 2017 the Council was briefed after a joint UN-AU trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria, as it was in July 2018 after a joint UN-AU mission to the Sahel region. In July 2019, the Council was briefed following a “solidarity mission” to Afghanistan intended to draw attention to the situation in Afghanistan ahead of the elections, and developments in the peace process, with a specific focus on the situation of women. The delegation was led by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and included Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo, Executive Director of the UN Population Fund Natalia Kanem, and the Executive Director of UN Women, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

In October 2019 another “solidarity mission” took place, this time to the Horn of Africa and together with the AU. It was led by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and Bineta Diop, the AU Special Envoy for women, peace and security. The Council was briefed on the trip on 4 November 2019.
Reporting by the Secretary-General

These examples illustrate that there can be information gaps in reporting on women, peace and security issues by representatives of the Secretary-General, with some representatives not flagging the principal women, peace and security concerns. One option for closing this gap would be requesting briefings by representatives of the office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict or UN Women. In some situations, moreover, there is a limited UN presence on the ground or no mandated reporting requirement by the Council. Another forum to close the information gap remains the IEG. Council members supporting increased reporting could also raise this aspect in bilateral conversations with UN officials. As has happened in the case of Syria, Council members may organise Arria-formula meetings that would inform them on aspects of the women, peace and security agenda. In the case of UNAMID, including benchmarks related to a reduction in sexual and gender-based violence as part of the indicators of achievement for UNAMID’s strategic priorities has led to increased reporting on these issues.

Decisions Adopted by the Security Council

The dynamics around including language on the women, peace and security agenda in Council decisions, both thematic and country-specific, have become more difficult in recent years. In particular, the restatement of previously agreed language and references to the IEG proved problematic. The examples below are illustrative.

The 2019 resolution on conflict-related sexual violence was preceded by complicated negotiations which continued even during the annual open debate on the topic, at which its adoption was foreseen. On 23 April 2019, resolution 2467 was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). During the negotiations, three permanent members of the Council–China, Russia, and the US—had expressed opposition to several aspects of the text, and at various stages each threatened to use their veto. Shortly before the debate, Russia put an alternative Chinese-Russian draft resolution in blue but withdrew the text later.

The initial text, put forward by Germany, ambitiously sought progressively to develop the agenda, including by establishing a formal subsidiary body on conflict-related sexual violence. In his 2019 report on conflict-related sexual violence, the Secretary-General had recommended “to consider establishing appropriate arrangements, including […] the possibility of a formal mechanism”. This idea, however, did not resonate with a number of Council members; one of the counter-arguments was that such a mechanism would potentially duplicate the work of the IEG. Russia said after the vote that it was concerned “about the efforts to increase the number of bureaucratic United Nations bodies in order to create the appearance of robust activity”.

There was also resistance to including previously agreed-upon language on sexual and reproductive health rights of victims of sexual violence, and the new resolution could only maintain a reference to the resolution where the formulation had originated. References to new tasks of the IEG were contentious as well, and were not included. Some observers, especially civil society advocates, questioned the insistence on seeking a resolution at a time when the US administration’s reservations on sexual and reproductive health rights were well known. The experience with resolution 2467 suggests that for the time being, the Council may struggle with decisions that seek to develop—and even to maintain—the existing women, peace and security agenda.

On 29 October 2019, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2493 on women, peace and security. Some members were disappointed that the language of the resolution was not more ambitious, a view shared by some members of civil society who felt that the text did not add new elements to the agenda. The negotiating process had been contentious, requiring South Africa, as initiator, to make several concessions to obtain a text acceptable to all; some members came away believing that this process had exacerbated the already difficult climate surrounding women, peace and security at the Council.

South Africa had intended for the resolution to focus on the “full implementation” of the women, peace and security agenda. Women’s sexual and reproductive health rights were never explicitly mentioned in any of the drafts. The US apparently argued that its national position on sexual and reproductive health meant that it could not support the implementation of the entirety of the agenda, as that would include resolutions of the Council referring to these rights. The US reportedly argued for replacing “full” implementation with “effective” implementation, but the formulation “full implementation” was retained. After the resolution was adopted, the US representative said that the US could not “accept references to sexual and reproductive health”.

Other members used their statements after the vote to emphasise their opposing views. The UK’s ambassador said, “[W]e endorse its confirmation of the Council’s call for full—and I stress the word “full”—implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) […]. The emphasis on full implementation—and again, I stress “full”—is vital”, adding that “an effective response to conflict-related sexual violence […] needs to include sexual and reproductive health services”.

Other contentious issues included the role and protection of women human rights defenders. Such references were met with strong resistance from both China and Russia, while the absence of such references was contested by a number of Council members who threatened to abstain on the resolution. The compromise formulation in the resolution’s operative paragraph 6 “encourages Member States to create safe and enabling environments for civil society, including formal and informal community women leaders, women peacebuilders, political actors, and those who protect and promote human rights, to carry out their work independently and without undue interference, including in situations of armed conflict, and to address threats, harassment, violence and hate speech against them”.

After the adoption, Russia said in its statement, “[W]e feel obliged to point out that the resolution contains a number of provisions that go beyond the Security Council’s mandate. It is overloaded with issues relating to the promotion and protection of human rights, which the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council already deal with successfully and effectively. We urge the Security Council to adhere strictly to its mandate, and we do not support attempts to justify its interference in matters that are part of the remit of other organs”. China set out its negotiating position in its statement during the open debate, saying that, “Non-governmental organisations are expected to play a constructive role by observing the laws of the countries concerned, respecting the ownership of the host Government and fully consulting with them”. China went on to say that it “therefore reserves its position vis-à-vis paragraph 6 of resolution 2493 (2019), which we have just adopted”.

Another controversy centred on the reference to the IEG. The initial draft called on the co-chairs of the IEG to submit an annual update on progress towards implementing its recommendations and encouraged “the UN Secretariat to use their periodic briefings and reports to keep the Security Council updated on their implementation”. China and Russia opposed this and ultimately the resolution merely takes note of the IEG’s work “to facilitate a more systematic approach to Women, Peace and Security within its own work and enable greater oversight and coordination of implementation efforts”, as stated in resolution 2242.

On 25 June 2019, resolution 2476 established the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) until 16 October 2020, transitioning from the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). The resolution called on BINUH to assist the government of Haiti with various duties, including the reinforcement of the Haitian National Police through training on human rights and responding to gang and sexual and gender-based violence. Germany apparently had suggested further language in relation to the women, peace and security agenda, specifically on conflict-related sexual violence, but this was not taken up by the US, the penholder on Haiti.

On 12 September 2019, Council members renewed the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 15 September 2020 in resolution 2486. It seems that a few members, including Belgium and Germany, would have liked to see language explicitly requesting UNSMIL to monitor the situation with respect to both women, peace and security and children and armed conflict in Libya. During closed consultations following an open meeting on 4 September 2019, it appears that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salamé, stressed that UNSMIL’s capacity is stretched as is, so the penholder did not include such provisions.

With respect to Security Council presidential statements, the trend of consistent references to elements of the women, peace and security agenda has continued during the period covered by this report. While the 63 presidential statements adopted in 2017 through 2019 suggest that the inclusion of such references can be considered a consolidated practice, negotiations on some recent presidential statements have featured difficult elements because of language on women, peace and security.

A stark example was the presidential statement of 7 May 2019 on peacekeeping, initiated by Indonesia (S/PRST/2019/4). Despite efforts by a number of member states, the final version did not include a single reference to women, sexual and gender-based violence, or other aspects of the women, peace and security agenda. In the presidential statement on youth, peace and security adopted on 12 December 2019 (S/PRST/2019/15), two references to “young women” represent hard-fought gains by supporters of the agenda, with China and Russia having strongly opposed further language.

A presidential statement on the Peacebuilding Commission’s advisory role to the Security Council on peacebuilding and sustaining peace was adopted on 18 December 2018 as S/PRST/2018/20. The initial draft welcomed “the new gender strategy of the Peacebuilding Commission”, but this language was not included in the final statement. Language referring to the “full and effective participation of women” being “key to advancing national peacebuilding processes and objectives” was retained, however, and the Council also emphasised “the substantial link between women’s full and meaningful involvement in efforts to prevent, resolve and rebuild from conflict and those efforts’ effectiveness and long-term sustainability” and encouraged the PBC to continue to pursue such efforts.

The initial draft of what would be adopted on 8 October 2019 as S/PRST/2019/11 on South Sudan had called for “the full participation of women in the formation of a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity”. Russia broke a silence procedure over that language and it was not included in the final document. Instead, the Council urged the parties “to continue taking steps [...] to promote the meaningful participation of women”. Further language that was excluded due to Russian opposition included a reference to gender-based violence in the context that it was a tactic by the parties to the conflict. The penholder on South Sudan, the US, accommodated the Russian position. The Council eventually condemned the “continued use of sexual violence as a tactic by the parties to the conflict against the civilian population”.

Security Council Sanctions Regimes

In resolution 1820 of 19 June 2008, the Council expressed its intention to consider the use of targeted sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict. In the following years, language related to conflict-related sexual violence increased steadily in sanctions resolutions with a trend towards including separate sanctions criteria.

Mali is one such example. On 5 September 2017, in resolution 2374, the Council established a sanctions regime for Mali. In the preambular part of the resolution, the Council

Decisions Adopted by the Security Council
Security Council Sanctions Regimes

strongly condemned “all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Mali, including those involving [...] sexual and gender-based violence”, and called upon all parties “to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law”. In the resolution’s operative part, the Council decided that the sanctions measures (travel ban and assets freeze) would apply to designated individuals and entities that are “responsible for or complicit in, or hav[e] engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali [...] planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including [...] through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence)”. As of March 2020, of the eight individuals targeted by the 2374 Mali Sanctions Committee, one is listed for sexual violence. According to the narrative summary of reasons for the listing of individuals and entities, Mahamadou Ag Rhissa has “held and facilitated sexual exploitation of at least two women, releasing them only after a payment of CFA 150,000-175,000”.

The Council has also sought to strengthen the capacity of sanctions committees to consider sexual violence issues. In resolution 2242 of 2015, the Council committed to “ensuring that the relevant expert groups for sanctions committees have the necessary gender expertise”. On 5 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2441, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions, China and Russia. During the negotiations, the Netherlands and Sweden jointly proposed a designation criterion for sanctioning individuals for acts that “include the necessary gender and sexual violence expertise” in their tasks. China and Russia did not support these additions, arguing that they were not relevant in the Libyan context.

After abstaining on the vote, the Russian representative explained that “the authors incorporated into the resolution a provision specifying sexual and gender-based violence as a separate criterion for sanctions, although such actions are fully covered in the existing listing criteria. The existence of precedents [...] does not mean that the practice should automatically apply to all country situations, each of which is unique. Any unjustified appearance of a gender component in the work of the Panel of Experts [...] will distract the experts from their main tasks”. He further stressed a point frequently made by Russia, that sexual and gender-based violence falls within the purview of other parts of the UN system. During negotiations, China also argued that such provisions were not needed in Libya.

In their 2019 final report, the Libya Panel of Experts “identified individuals that had more likely been subjected to abuse and sexual and gender-based violence”. However, “the necessary evidential levels for reporting to the Committee could not be met”. The panel explained that it was, among other things, unable to access locations where interviews with victims might be conducted in confidence or obtain the expert opinion of independent trauma and psychological counsellors. No individuals have been listed for sexual and gender-based violence under the Libya sanctions regime so far.

On 27 January 2017, Council members adopted resolution 2339, renewing the sanctions regime for the Central African Republic and the respective Panel of Experts for 12 months. Before the adoption of that resolution, individuals could be designated if they were “Involved in planning, directing, or committing acts [...] that constitute human rights abuses or violations [...] including acts involving sexual violence”. Under resolution 2339, individuals and entities could now be explicitly sanctioned for involvement “in planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence in the CAR”. Several non-state parties in the CAR are listed in the annex to the Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence as “parties credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the agenda of the Security Council”. No individuals or entities have been listed under that designation criterion since it was added. Resolution 2339 also added a request for the Panel of Experts “to include the necessary gender expertise”. At the time of writing, gender issues are largely the purview of the panel’s humanitarian expert.

On 14 November 2018, the Council adopted resolution 2444, renewing the Somalia sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another 12 months. The Council added a separate criterion related to “engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia” and decided that “such acts may also include the planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence”. Since 2011, the Somalia sanctions regime had included a listing criterion referring to responsibility “for violations of applicable international law [...] involving the targeting of civilians including children and women in situations of armed conflict, including [...] sexual and gender-based violence”. Resolution 2444 also added a call for this panel to “include the necessary gender expertise”. The panel’s experts on armed groups, and on armed groups and natural resources, received dedicated gender training. No individuals have been listed following the adoption of that resolution. State as well as non-state actors in Somalia continue to be named in the annex of the annual Secretary-General’s report on conflict-related sexual violence.

Resolution 2428, adopted on 13 July 2018 with nine votes in favour and six abstentions (Bolivia, China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, and Russia) renewed the South Sudan sanctions regime and mandate of the Panel of Experts until 31 May 2019 and 1 July 2019, respectively. It also established an arms embargo. The countries abstaining were critical of both the establishment of an arms embargo and the sanctions regime expanding its references to sexual and gender-based violence. Since the South Sudan sanctions regime was established by resolution 2206 of 3 March 2015, it had included a listing criterion referring to “the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence)”. Resolution 2428 added “planning,
directing, or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence” as a separate listing criterion and requested the panel to have the requisite gender expertise. The resolution adds two individuals (Paul Malong Awan and Malek Ruben Riak) to the sanctions list for the commission of sexual violence, among other reasons. The penholder, the US, opted for including the names of individuals to be targeted by the sanctions in the resolution establishing the measures rather than leaving it to the sanctions committee—which is the usual practice—because the committees operate by consensus and any of the 15 members can block a decision. No other individuals have been listed for sexual and gender-based violence since the adoption of the resolution. Both state and non-state actors in South Sudan are listed in the Secretary-General’s annual report on conflict-related sexual violence.

In February 2019, the Council considered adding both a separate listing criterion and the requirement for gender expertise to the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime. There was much opposition from Council members who at the time wanted to see the Sudan sanctions regime lifted in the near future.

These examples show that adding a sanctions criterion for sexual and gender-based violence does not necessarily lead to the sanctions committee listing any individuals. Council members interested in seeing progress on the issue could therefore focus their efforts on listing perpetrators of these crimes.

Looking Forward

Developments in the Council over the past three years, along with a broader look at the years since the adoption of resolution 1325, point to the conclusion that the women, peace and security agenda has a strong normative foundation but that additional elements may be difficult to develop, for now. Several Council texts seeking to develop features of the framework found strong resistance, especially by permanent Council members China, Russia, and on some aspects, the US; at times these attracted veto threats and even the rejection of previously agreed language. The minefield of thematic Council texts on women, peace and security notwithstanding, some of its practices have been consolidated and strengthened, and it is on these practices that advocates for the women, peace and security agenda may now be inclined to focus. These include the work of the IEG, briefings to the Council, and the work of sanctions committees and their panels of experts.

The IEG has provided a venue for substantive discussion of country-specific women, peace and security topics. While continuing the practice of following up their previous meetings, more follow-up options might also be considered: adding new countries in different stages of conflict to the group’s agenda, using the information gleaned for bilateral demarches, and having the IEG co-chairs make statements in that capacity during country-specific meetings of the Council. Using the information obtained through the IEG more broadly also makes the IEG more visible, and underlines its value to the Council as an informal, expert-level subsidiary body.

The proportion of women civil society briefers has grown over the past three years, and could warrant the effort to extend this practice to all country situations discussed by the Council. More broadly, Council members could consider how to make best use of the information obtained through civil society briefings, for example by bringing it up in meetings with UN officials or representatives of the country in question.

A review of written and oral reporting by representatives of the Secretary-General indicates that it leaves the Council at times reliant on other sources and formats for country-specific information on women, peace and security. This can reinforce the impression that the issue is not a primary priority.

There has been significant progress in the sanctions regimes, five of which saw new or expanded listing criteria for individuals and entities related to sexual and gender-based violence: Mali, Libya, Central African Republic, Somalia and South Sudan. The Council also indicated that the respective sanctions committees’ panels of experts members should have gender expertise. With only three individuals listed under the criteria for sexual and gender-based violence during the years covered by this report, however, the use of listings has the scope to move from being largely a theoretical possibility to becoming a deliberate tool.

As the clock ticks towards the 20th anniversary of resolution 1325, continuing to develop and integrate existing tools from the women, peace and security agenda into Council country- or situation-specific decisions may present the most productive way forward. Supporters of the women, peace and security agenda may find themselves needing to weigh up carefully where to focus their efforts, and towards what outcome, in a Council now marked by challenges to elements of that agenda and a readiness by some members to question its connection to the mandate of the Security Council.
Annex I: Key UN Documents on Women, Peace and Security

Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/2493 (29 October 2019) was on the full implementation of the women, peace and security agenda and was adopted unanimously.

S/RES/2486 (12 September 2019) was on UNSMIL.

S/RES/2476 (25 June 2019) established BINUH.

S/RES/2467 (23 April 2019) was on conflict-related sexual violence. It was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia).


S/RES/2441 (5 November 2018) extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.

S/RES/2429 (13 July 2018) was on UNAMID.

S/RES/2428 (13 July 2018) renewed the South Sudan sanctions regime and mandate of the Panel of Experts.


S/RES/2332 (21 December 2016) was on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

S/RES/2296 (29 June 2016) was on UNAMID.

S/RES/2242 (13 October 2015) established the Informal Experts Group on women, peace and security.

S/RES/2206 (3 March 2015) established the South Sudan sanctions regime.

S/RES/2122 (16 October 2013) addressed the persistent gaps in the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. The resolution further requested senior UN staff to include information on the agenda in their regular Council briefings and reports.

S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013) emphasised that prevention of sexual violence in the context of international crimes “significantly contribute[s] to the maintenance of international peace and security”.

S/RES/2100 (25 April 2013) established MINUSMA.

S/RES/1960 (16 December 2010) requested the Secretary-General to add an annex to the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence listing conflict parties “that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the Security Council agenda.” The Council intended to use this annex “as a basis for more focused United Nations engagement with those parties”, which may include targeted sanctions.

S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009) noted that obstacles towards women’s full participation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding remained.

S/RES/1888 (30 September 2009) established the position of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008) addressed sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. It noted that sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide. The Council also expressed its intention to consider the use of targeted sanctions against perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict.

Secretary-General’s Reports

S/2019/800 (9 October 2019) was the annual report on women, peace and security.

S/2019/280 (29 March 2019) was the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence.

S/2018/900 (9 October 2018) was the annual report on women, peace and security.

S/2018/250 (23 March 2018) was the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence.

S/2017/861 (16 October 2017) was the annual report on women, peace and security.

S/2017/249 (15 April 2017) was the annual report on conflict-related sexual violence.

Security Council Presidential Statements

S/PRST/2019/15 (12 December 2019) was on youth, peace and security.

S/PRST/2019/11 (8 October 2019) was on South Sudan.

S/PRST/2019/4 (7 May 2019) was on peacekeeping.

S/PRST/2018/20 (18 December 2018) was on the Peacebuilding Commission’s advisory role to the Security Council on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

S/PRST/2018/3 (30 January 2018) was on UNOWAS.

S/PRST/2017/10 (24 July 2017) was on UNOWAS.

Security Council Letters

S/2019/914 (29 November 2019) was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.

S/2019/591 (22 July 2019) was the summary of the IEG’s 4 June 2019 meeting on Myanmar.

S/2019/296 (8 April 2019) was the summary of the IEG’s 25 March 2019 meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

S/2019/253 (20 March 2019) was the summary of the IEG’s 4 March 2019 meeting on Yemen.

S/2019/232 (11 March 2019) was the summary of the IEG’s 28 February 2019 meeting on South Sudan.

S/2018/1139 (14 December 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 28 November 2018 meeting on Libya.

S/2018/1087 (5 December 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 18 October 2018 meeting on the Central African Republic.

S/2018/885 (2 October 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 4 September 2018 meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

S/2018/881 (28 September 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 13 April 2018 meeting on Libya.

S/2018/688 (11 July 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 5 June 2018 meeting on Mali and the Sahel.

S/2018/475 (17 May 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 29 March 2018 meeting on Iraq.

S/2018/362 (16 April 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 28 February 2018 meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

S/2018/168 (23 February 2018) was the summary of the IEG’s 30 January 2018 meeting on the Lake Chad Basin.

S/2018/11 (22 December 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 5 December 2017 meeting on Afghanistan.

S/2017/1041 (11 December 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 2 November 2017 meeting on the Central African Republic.

S/2017/1040 (11 December 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 22 November 2017 meeting on Yemen.

S/2017/827 (16 July 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 23 March 2017 meeting on Yemen.

S/2017/626 (18 July 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 4 May 2017 meeting on Mali.

S/2017/625 (18 July 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 27 February 2017 meeting on the Lake Chad Basin.

S/2017/624 (18 July 2017) was the summary of the IEG’s 14 June 2017 meeting on Iraq.

S/2016/1107 (27 December 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 10 November 2016 meeting with women’s protection advisers.

S/2016/1105 (22 December 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 7 December 2016 meeting on the Central African Republic.

S/2016/1104 (22 December 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 18 October 2016 meeting on Iraq.

S/2016/1103 (22 December 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 14 September 2016 meeting on Mali.

S/2016/1106 (22 December 2016) were the guidelines for the IEG.

S/2016/1059 (14 December 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 28 November 2016 meeting on Afghanistan.

S/2016/672 (2 August 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 15 June 2016 meeting on the Central African Republic.

S/2016/683 (29 July 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 29 April 2016 meeting on Libya.

S/2016/682 (29 July 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 29 February 2016 meeting on Mali.

S/2016/673 (27 July 2016) was the summary of the IEG’s 13 July 2016 meeting on Afghanistan.

Security Council Meeting Records

S/2016/857 (4 November 2019) was a briefing on a joint UN-AU solidarity mission to the Horn of Africa.

S/2016/849 (29 October 2019), S/2016/849 (Resumption 1) and S/2016/849 (Resumption 2) was the annual open debate on women, peace and security and the adoption of resolution 2493.

S/2016/850 (29 August 2019) was on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

S/2015/858 (26 July 2019) was a meeting on Afghanistan with a focus on women, peace and security.

S/2015/858 (24 July 2019) was on the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel.

S/2015/854 (23 April 2019) was the annual open
debate on conflict-related sexual violence and the adoption of resolution 2467.

S/PV.8406 (19 November 2018) was on the political situation in Syria.

S/PV.8382 (25 October 2018) was the annual open debate on women, peace and security.

S/PV.8306 (10 July 2017) was a meeting on women, peace and security in the Sahel region.

S/PV.8234 (16 April 2018) was the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence.

S/PV.8217 (27 March 2018) was on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

S/PV.8206 (16 March 2018) was on the political situation in Syria.

S/PV.8079 (27 October 2017) was the annual open debate on women, peace and security.

S/PV.8036 (30 August 2017) was on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

S/PV.7938 (15 May 2017) was the annual open debate on conflict-related sexual violence.

Other Documents
S/2019/333 (22 April 2019) was the Chinese-Russian draft resolution on conflict-related sexual violence put in blue.

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Annex II: Meetings of the Informal Experts Group on Women, Peace and Security, 2016-June 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>DATE HELD</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS OF THE IEG</th>
<th>MAIN BRIEFER(S)</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>29 February 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) country representative in Mali</td>
<td>S/2016/682</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>29 April 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Special Representative Deputy Special Representative for Iraq UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
<td>S/2016/683</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>15 June 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Deputy Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>S/2016/672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>13 July 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) Director of the Human Rights Unit</td>
<td>S/2016/673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (the second meeting, the first one was held on 29 February 2016)</td>
<td>14 September 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Special Representative and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Deputy Special Representative Country representative of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) in Mali</td>
<td>S/2016/1103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq (the second meeting, the first one was held on 29 April 2016)</td>
<td>18 October 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs, UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>S/2016/1104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special meeting with women's protection advisers</td>
<td>10 November 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women's protection advisers from:</td>
<td>S/2016/1107</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) • UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) • UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) • AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) • UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) • UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) • UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) • Sexual and gender -based violence focal point on the human rights team of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex II: Meetings of the Informal Experts Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security, 2016-June 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>MAIN BRIEFER(S)</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (the second meeting, the first one was held on 13 July 2016)</td>
<td>28 November 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative</td>
<td>S/2016/1059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (the second meeting, the first one was held on 15 June 2016)</td>
<td>7 December 2016</td>
<td>Spain/UK</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative and Deputy Head of Mission of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>S/2016/1105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lake Chad Basin</td>
<td>27 February 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Nigeria</td>
<td>S/2017/625</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>23 March 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Special Envoy for Yemen</td>
<td>S/2017/627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali (the third meeting, the second one was held on 14 September 2016)</td>
<td>4 May 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>S/2017/626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (the third meeting, the second one was held on 18 October 2016)</td>
<td>14 June 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq</td>
<td>S/2017/624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (the third meeting, the second one was held on 7 December 2016)</td>
<td>2 November 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative and Deputy Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>S/2017/1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (the second meeting, the first meeting was held on 23 March 2017)</td>
<td>22 November 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Special Envoy for Yemen</td>
<td>S/2017/1040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan (the third meeting, the second meeting was held on 28 November 2016)</td>
<td>5 December 2017</td>
<td>Sweden/Uruguay</td>
<td>Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</td>
<td>S/2018/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Chad Basin (the second meeting, the first meeting was held on 27 February 2017)</td>
<td>30 January 2018</td>
<td>Peru/Sweden</td>
<td>UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria</td>
<td>S/2018/188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>28 February 2018</td>
<td>Peru/Sweden</td>
<td>Special Representative and head of MONUSCO</td>
<td>S/2018/362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (the fourth meeting, the third meeting was held on 14 June 2017)</td>
<td>29 March 2018</td>
<td>Peru/Sweden</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>S/2018/475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex II: Meetings of the Informal Experts Group (IEG) on Women, Peace and Security, 2016-June 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPIC</th>
<th>DATE HELD</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS OF THE IEG</th>
<th>MAIN BRIEFER(S)</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS SUMMARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>13 April 2018</td>
<td>Peru/ Sweden</td>
<td>UN Deputy Special Representative and Deputy Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)</td>
<td>S/2018/881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali and the Sahel</td>
<td>5 June 2018</td>
<td>Peru/ Sweden</td>
<td>Special Representative for Mali and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)</td>
<td>S/2018/688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (the second meeting, the first meeting was held on 28 February 2018)</td>
<td>4 September 2018</td>
<td>Peru/ Sweden</td>
<td>Special Representative and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>S/2018/885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (the fourth meeting, the third meeting was held on 2 November 2017)</td>
<td>18 October 2018</td>
<td>Peru/ Sweden</td>
<td>Special Representative for the Central African Republic and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)</td>
<td>S/2018/1067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya (the second meeting, the first meeting was held on 13 April 2018)</td>
<td>28 November 2018</td>
<td>Peru/ Sweden</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)</td>
<td>S/2018/1139</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>28 February 2019</td>
<td>Germany/Peru</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>S/2019/232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (the third meeting, the second meeting was held on 22 November 2017)</td>
<td>4 March 2019</td>
<td>Germany/Peru</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen</td>
<td>S/2019/253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (the third meeting, the second meeting was held on 4 September 2018)</td>
<td>25 March 2019</td>
<td>Germany/Peru</td>
<td>Special Representative and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>S/2019/296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Myanmar | 4 June 2019 | Germany/Peru | Special Envoy on Myanmar  
Resident Coordinator in Myanmar  
Resident Coordinator in Bangladesh | S/2019/591        |