

The Financing of AU Peace Support Operations: Prospects for Progress in the Security Council?



AMISOM Force Commander visits troops in Beledweyne, Somalia
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Introduction

The financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) has been an issue in the relationship between the UN and the AU in general, and between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in particular, since 2007. In this time, the Security Council’s discussion of this issue has evolved, with Council members increasingly recognising the AU’s proactive role on matters of peace and security in Africa, including its enhanced capacity to respond expeditiously to conflict and crises on the continent, particularly through the deployment of AU Peace Support Operations (AUPSOs). Nonetheless, despite advances in recent years, the AU’s

Achilles heel remains the lack of adequate resources to support and sustain these operations.

To address this challenge, the AU has since 2007 been seeking UN-assessed contributions for adequate, sustainable, and predictable funding for AUPSOs. The African members of the UN Security Council (A3) have tried, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion of the financing of AUPSOs through UN-assessed contributions, and the Security Council has adopted several resolutions and presidential statements recognising the need to provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing for AUPSOs.

Introduction

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In 2018, the A3 proposed a draft resolution which sought a clear commitment from the Council to finance AUPSOS from UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The draft text placed in blue¹ in December 2018 garnered the support of most Council members, but was never put to a vote because of one permanent member's strong opposition. In August 2019, as South Africa tried to advance the issue, the AUPSC called on the A3 to suspend their efforts pending the AU's development of a common position on some of the contentious issues raised during the 2018 negotiations. The AU endorsed a common position in February 2023.

There has been renewed momentum in the Security Council regarding the discussion of financing AUPSOS since mid-2022. Following a debate on peace and security in Africa during the Chinese presidency in August 2022, the Council adopted a presidential statement. Among other things, the presidential statement requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the

commitments set out in resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016 on cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations, and resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017 on peacekeeping reform.²

The Council asked that the Secretary-General's April 2023 report include "recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources". It is likely to stimulate further discussion and can be expected to encourage the A3 to resume negotiating a substantive Council outcome on the financing issue later in 2023.

In this research report, Security Council Report offers insights into how the Council has dealt with the financing issue by examining past Council meetings and outcomes. It will also reflect on recent efforts to revive the discussion in the Council—in a changed geopolitical context to that of 2018—examine the prospects for progress in this regard, and analyse potential Council dynamics on the financing issue in 2023 before offering some concluding observations.

Early Council Discussions on the Financing Issue

Since the establishment of the African peace and security architecture (APSA)³ in 2002, the AU has shown greater willingness and readiness to respond to conflicts and crises on the African continent. Over the past two decades, it has deployed 27 AUPSOS to stabilise conflict situations or monitor the implementation of ceasefire agreements in places where the UN was unable to intervene or took a long time to do so. Some of the early AUPSOS include the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which in 2022 became the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)⁴.

From the start, the AU recognised the difficulties of supporting and sustaining

these operations solely through ad hoc financial and logistical arrangements. An AU Peace Fund was established in 2002 as part of APSA to finance the peace and security activities of the organisation. It was initially composed of six percent of the AU's regular budget, as well as voluntary contributions from member states, donors, and other sources. From its revitalisation in 2016 to 1 September 2022, the peace fund mobilised USD 321,504,709.15. However, the funds mobilised through the Peace Fund have traditionally fallen far short of what is needed to support and sustain AUPSOS. Although the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget increased from six percent to 12 percent in 2009, the AU had to continue relying

1 When the Security Council approaches the final stage of negotiating a draft resolution, the text is printed in blue.

2 These are commitments to finalise the AU's human rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance frameworks for AU peace support operations, to achieve greater accountability, transparency, and compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable, and with UN conduct and discipline standards, to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse and to establish clear, consistent and predictable reporting channels, including on fiduciary matters and mandate delivery.

3 APSA is comprised of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the AU Commission, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the AU Peace Fund.

4 See complete list of AUPSOS in Table 1.

Early Council Discussions on the Financing Issue

on external donors, particularly the EU, which established the African Peace Facility in 2004 to support its peace and security efforts on the continent.⁵ The UN also provided light and heavy support packages for AMIS, which included the payment of troop costs and allowances during its deployment in Sudan from 2004–2007 before the mission transitioned to the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the Logistics Support Package for AMISOM/ATMIS, which includes the provision of equipment and services. However, these support packages were not considered adequate for the sustainability and predictability of financial support for AUPSOs partly because it took a long time to obtain their authorisation (18 months to two years in the case of AMIS and AMISOM).⁶

Securing adequate, sustainable, and predictable financing for AUPSOs became a critical issue in the cooperation between the UN and the AU in general and between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC in particular. The AU continues to argue that it is deploying AUPSOs on behalf of the Security Council and, therefore, should be able to access support from UN-assessed contributions. In 2007, it formally requested the UN to examine the possibility of funding such operations from the UN-assessed contributions.⁷ Since then, African members have been working, individually and collectively, to advance the discussion on this issue in the Security Council.

2007–2009: The Prodi Report

During its membership of the Security Council in 2007–2008, South Africa took the lead in organising high-level meetings on the financing of AUPSOs. This resulted in the Security Council adopting a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to present specific proposals on how to further the cooperation and coordination between the UN and the AU on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter⁸, which allows for the involvement of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Security Council in this regard. In his 7 April 2008 report, the Secretary-General proposed setting up an AU-UN panel to consider the modalities of support for peace support operations undertaken by regional organisations such as the AU and to make concrete recommendations.⁹

The Secretary-General's report was discussed at a high-level Security Council meeting initiated by South Africa on 16 April 2008. At that meeting, the Council adopted resolution 1809,¹⁰ recognising for the first time the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of financing regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate and welcoming the Secretary-General's proposal to set up an AU-UN panel. The

panel,¹¹ which was chaired by Romano Prodi, former prime minister of Italy, presented its report on 31 December 2008 with two recommendations.¹² The first was to establish a multi-donor trust fund to consolidate the various sources of support for AU peace and security efforts and to secure additional resources from existing and new donors, building on the EU-funded African Peace Facility. The second recommendation was to utilise UN-assessed contributions to support UN-authorized AUPSOs for a period of no longer than six months on a case-by-case basis, based on the understanding that they would transition to UN peacekeeping operations.

When the panel's report was discussed in the Council on 18 March 2009, then-AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra welcomed it as "timely, innovative and worthy of everyone's support", while then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon considered it a first step, whose recommendations, particularly on the use of assessed contributions, required detailed analysis.¹³ The Council requested Ban to submit another report with a detailed assessment of the recommendations contained in the Prodi report, including on the financing of AUPSOs.¹⁴

Mindful of the divergent views among member states on the issue, the UN Secretariat apparently sought to build an effective partnership with the AU by enhancing the relations between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council as well as strengthening collaboration between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, while seeking to advance the discussion regarding support modalities for AUPSOs.¹⁵ The establishment of the UN Office to the AU in July 2010 was an example of the strengthened partnership between the two organisations. The Secretary-General's follow-up to the Prodi report, published on 18 September 2009, provided recommendations on strategic and operational coordination and consultation between the UN and the AU at various levels.¹⁶ It furnished an analysis of the Prodi Panel's recommendations and the five financing mechanisms used at the time to fund AUPSOs: AU-assessed contributions; contributions through individual AU troop-contributing countries; voluntary contributions; UN support packages financed through UN-assessed contributions; and a combination of these mechanisms. The report considered the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund proposed by the Prodi panel to be an attractive option, while underscoring the need to harmonise donors' administrative and financial management frameworks to make it effective.¹⁷

After having discussed the Secretary-General's report on 26 October 2009, the Council expressed its intention to keep all of the options under consideration.¹⁸ The A3 were disappointed by the Council's indecisiveness about providing effective support to

5 The EU Commission website states that this facility has provided EUR 2.7 billion since 2004.

6 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations authorized by the United Nations: A/64/359-S/2009/470", 18 September 2009.

7 African Union, "Assembly of the African Union Eighth Ordinary Session," 29–30 January 2007.

8 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council: S/PRST/2007/7," March 28, 2007.

9 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security: S/2008/186**," April 7, 2008.

10 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1809 (2008)," April 16, 2008.

11 The AU-UN Panel was established in September 2008 and its members included Ms. Monica Juma (Kenya), Mr. James Dobbins (United States of America), Mr. Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mauritius), Mr. Toshiyuki Niwa (Japan), and Mr. Behrooz Sadry (Islamic Republic of Iran).

12 United Nations Security Council, "Identical letters dated 24 December 2008 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: A/63/666-S/2008/813," December 31, 2008.

13 United Nations Security Council, "Peace and Security in Africa: S/PV.6092 (Resumption 1)," March 18, 2009.

14 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Security Council: S/PRST/2009/3" March 18, 2009.

15 United Nations, "Note to the Secretary-General: Follow-up to the AU-UN Panel (Prodi Report)", 5 May 2009.

16 Op. cit., "Report of the Secretary-General on Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations authorized by the United Nations: A/64/359-S/2009/470"

17 Ibid.

18 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Council: S/PRST/2009/26*," October 29, 2009.

Early Council Discussions on the Financing Issue

AUPSOs, but some Council members felt that it was premature to consider the use of UN-assessed contributions. They were favourably inclined towards the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund, while others prioritised the need to build the AU's capacity and foster enhanced UN-AU strategic partnerships. One elected member particularly insisted on the need to follow the UN Charter in considering the options, stating that only UN peacekeeping operations are allowed to have access to UN-assessed contributions.¹⁹

It was against this backdrop that the UN Office to the AU (UNO-AU) was established on 1 July 2010 to strengthen the UN-AU partnership in the area of peace and security and provide coordinated support to the AU's long-term capacity-building and short-term operational needs.²⁰ This was followed by the launching on 25 September 2010 of the UN-AU Joint Task Force on peace and security to enable the two organisations to enhance their cooperation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding in Africa.²¹

2014: Africa's Push for a Substantive Council Decision

Amidst the lack of progress in securing a clear commitment from the Council on the financing issue, the AU continued to respond to crises on the continent. Following the onset of the Malian crisis in 2012, the AUPSC deployed an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to assist the Malian authorities in restoring effective control of the state throughout the territory. In July 2013, the AUPSC also deployed an African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) to protect civilians and stabilise the security situation in that country. Both of these missions, which had been authorised by the UN Security Council, were later rehatted into UN peacekeeping missions—the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), respectively.

These cases suggested an AU comparative advantage in responding speedily to crises until the UN was able to decide on, and deploy, peacekeeping forces. (It should be noted that not all AUPSOs will be rehatted into a UN peacekeeping operation. AMISOM is an example in this regard.) The A3 highlighted these cases to make the argument for giving AUPSOs more predictable and sustainable funding. At the same time, elected members were steadily becoming more amenable to supporting AU peace operations through UN-assessed contributions, although some still had hesitations.²² On 28 July 2014, the Security Council adopted resolution 2167, which requested the Secretary-General to undertake a lessons-learned exercise together with the AU on the transitions from AUPSOs to UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and the CAR and provide specific recommendations on possible future transitional arrangements.²³

The Secretary-General submitted his report on 5 January 2015 and recommended a joint AU-UN review to assess the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of financing AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council.²⁴

Both the Security Council and the AUPSC endorsed the recommendation. The joint review, which was published on 28 September 2016, noted the division of labour that had emerged, with the AU increasingly taking on responsibilities that the UN had not been able or willing to undertake. But it also acknowledged the capacity constraints facing the AU in handling those responsibilities alone and stressed that AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council needed the support to discharge their responsibilities effectively in increasingly challenging environments.²⁵

2015: The HIPPO Report

In October 2014, Ban Ki-moon appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)²⁶ to undertake a comprehensive assessment of UN peacekeeping operations. The panel carried out extensive consultations, including with the AU. The AU had developed a common position on the UN review of peace operations²⁷ by outlining the principles that it believed should underpin the UN-AU partnership and making a case for the use of UN-assessed contributions to support AUPSOs. The common position document argued that “[T]rust Funds are neither reliable, predictable nor easily accessible, especially for high-tempo operations where troops on the ground are faced with well-resourced, determined and highly networked armed groups, the very types of operations that the AU has tended to deploy into, and which are not suited to UN peacekeeping doctrine”.²⁸

The HIPPO report, which was released in June 2015, addressed the strategic partnership with Africa, emphasising the significance of the UN's engagement with the AU.²⁹ Regarding support to AUPSOs, the report recommended that “United Nations-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council, including the costs associated with deployed uniformed

19 United Nations Security Council, “Peace and Security in Africa: S/PV.6206,” October 26, 2009.

20 United Nations Office to the African Union, “Background: UN-AU partnerships in Peace and Security.”

21 UN News, “UN and African Union launch joint task force on peace and security,” September 25, 2010.

22 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: S/PV.7228,” July 28, 2014.

23 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 2167 (2014)” July 28, 2014.

24 United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 2 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council: S/2015/3,” January 5, 2015.

25 United Nations, “Identical letters dated 22 September 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, A/71/410-S/2016/809,” September 28, 2016.

26 Members of the Panel were José Ramos-Horta (Chair), Ameerah Haq (Vice-Chair), Jean Arnault, Marie -Louise Baricako, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Abhijit Guha, Andrew Hughes, Alexander Ilitchev, Hilde F. Johnson, Youssef Mahmoud, Ian Martin, Henrietta Joy Abena Nyarko Mensa-Bonsu, B. Lynn Pascoe, Floriano Peixoto Vieira Neto, Rima Salah and Wang Xuexian.

27 African Union Peace and Security Council, “Common African Positions on the UN Review of Peace Operations,” April 29, 2015.

28 Ibid.

29 United Nations General Assembly, “Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council: A/70/95-S/2015/446*,” June 17, 2015.

2014: Africa's Push for a Substantive Council Decision

personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States".³⁰

This HIPPO report recommendation gave renewed impetus to the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs. The AUPSC welcomed the report and appreciated that the panel had taken into account the common African position. It also acknowledged that the panel had resuscitated the Prodi panel recommendations calling for the financing of AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council from UN-assessed contributions and requested the Africa Group in New York to follow up these recommendations with the relevant UN bodies.³¹

The Kigali AU decision

The HIPPO recommendations were followed by a landmark AU decision to revitalise its peace fund. This was done with the aim of lessening the organisation's dependence on partners to finance its programme budget and demonstrating its commitment to sharing the burden of financing AUPSOs by mobilising resources from the continent. The July 2016 AU Summit in Kigali decided to endow the peace fund with \$400 million by 2020 in member state contributions to be drawn from a 0.2% import levy on all eligible imported goods into the continent.³² (The 35th ordinary session of the Executive Council held in Niamey in 2019 decided to extend the target date for mobilising the \$400 million endowment by 24 months. The AU has so far mobilised \$321 million through the peace fund.)³³ The new endowment was meant to "enable the AU to fully finance mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, institutional readiness and capacity, maintain a crisis reserve facility as well as meet its commitment to finance 25% of its peace operations budget".³⁴

The AU relied on three different AUPSO cases to assess the financial implications of the Kigali decision to finance 25 percent of the budget for AUPSOs. These were the experiences of the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) deployed in Central Africa from 2012-2018; the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF), which is still active in the Lake Chad basin; and the AU Human Rights Observers and Military Experts' Mission deployed in Burundi in 2015. (AMISOM/ATMIS, which remains the largest AUPSO, was not among the examples considered.) Based on the three cases, the AU came up with an average budget estimate of \$772 million, anticipating two possible missions with 15,000 uniformed personnel and taking into account five percent inflation over five years.³⁵

Scenarios for AUPSO budget³⁶

	Total Cost (mil USD)	2016 5%	2017 10%	2018 15%	2019 20%	2020 25%
Baseline Scenario	1,200	49	103	163	228	299
Minimalist Scenario	236	12	25	39	55	72
Middle Scenario	772	38	81	128	179	235

The AU's commitment to financing 25 percent of its peace operations budget was welcomed by the UN and other international partners. In his 2 September 2015 report on the future of UN peacekeeping operations, the Secretary-General "commend[ed] the African Union's commitment to self-reliance, including to financing 25 percent of future African Union peace operations".³⁷ In his remarks at the Security Council on 18 November 2016, former EU Permanent Representative to the UN João Vale de Almeida also considered it "a sign of strong ambition and ownership by the continent".³⁸ However, issues were raised about the implementation of the Kigali decision both from within and outside the continent, particularly in relation to the 0.2 percent import levy (discussed further below).

2016: Council Readiness to Consider the AU Proposal

Following the HIPPO recommendations and the Kigali decision, the A3 once again sought to advance the financing issue in the Council. Senegal took the lead in 2016 by convening a debate on "Strengthening the UN-AU partnership in peace and security". Senegal proposed a draft resolution on the topic of the debate, working together with the US, whose position had evolved by this time to a recognition that AUPSOs are well-positioned to respond to crises in Africa but cannot depend on ad hoc arrangements to build their capacity.³⁹ This was late in the Obama administration, which had hosted summits on UN peacekeeping in 2014 and 2015. The US also announced in August 2014 its African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership⁴⁰ to build the capacity of a select number of African militaries rapidly to deploy their forces in response to emerging conflicts and crises.

However, during the negotiations, Egypt and the US questioned the compatibility of the 0.2 percent import levy introduced by the Kigali decision with the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and principles, particularly the Most-Favored Nation clause.⁴¹ The AU felt 0.2 percent was a very small levy that would not have much impact on trade but would make a huge difference in helping the organisation raise funds and enhance its self-reliance. This was based on the experiences of some African regional economic communities,

30 Ibid.

31 African Union Peace and Security Council, "Press Statement: 532nd Meeting" August 10, 2015.

32 African Union, "Decisions and Declarations: Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session," July 17-18, 2016.

33 African Union, "Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for African Union Peace and Security Activities."

34 African Union, "Press Release: The African Union Adopts the AU Peace Fund," July 18, 2016.

35 African Union, "Report on the Relevant Provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2320 (2016) on UN-Assessed Contributions for AU-Led Peace Operations Authorized by the Security Council," May 30, 2017.

36 Source: AU Report on the relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) on UN-assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations authorised by the Security Council

37 United Nations, "Report of the Secretary-General: The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations: A/70/357-S/2015/682," September 2, 2015.

38 United Nations Security Council, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations: S/PV.7816," November 18, 2016.

39 Ibid.

40 The White House, "FACT SHEET: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa," August 6, 2014.

41 Security Council Report, "Debate and Resolution on Strengthening the UN-AU Partnership," November 17, 2016.

2014: Africa's Push for a Substantive Council Decision

such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had been able to use similar import levies in their regions within the framework of their customs union and free trade area agreements to finance themselves.⁴²

As this did not allay the concerns of some AU member states and other external partners, the AU looked for answers through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which was established in 2018 to create a single African market which justifies the application of such a levy on imports from outside the continent through an Africa-wide customs union. 43 AU member states have so far ratified the agreement establishing AfCFTA, which entered into force on 30 May 2019,⁴³ but only 17 member states were collecting the 0.2 percent levy in 2020, according to the AU Commission. Some member states, which have a zero-tariff commitment to the WTO or are constrained by its Most Favored Nation clause, could not collect the levy. Others with weak economies or no productive industry were unable to impose the import levy. Therefore, the AU adopted a flexible approach in implementing the 0.2 percent levy, allowing member states to determine the appropriate form and means they will use to comply with the Kigali decision (for example, those who cannot collect the import levy can pay their contribution through the regular assessment), in line with their national and international obligations. Nonetheless, they are also expected to adhere to the principles of predictability and compliance, as affirmed by the 32nd AU Summit decision in February 2019.⁴⁴

The draft resolution proposed by Senegal and the US was adopted unanimously as resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016. The resolution took note of the AU-UN joint review of available mechanisms for financing and expressed the Council's readiness to consider the AU's proposals for the support of future AUPSOs. In this regard, it requested the Secretary-General, working closely with the AU, to submit a detailed report refining options on the AU's proposal on the financing of AUPSOs.⁴⁵ Resolution 2320 was considered a milestone not only in acknowledging the need for financing of AUPSOs but also in expressing the Council's readiness to consider proposals in this regard. It also paved the way for further discussion on how to translate this commitment into action. But the resolution also recognised the need to do more work on the proposal and its administrative, financial, and governance implications, including compliance with AU and UN norms and international obligations.

2017: Calls for Practical Steps

In May 2017, the Secretary-General presented his options pursuant to resolution 2320. Aside from voluntary contributions through a UN-managed trust fund, the report also considered other possible options through which UN-assessed contributions could be used, such as a subvention in exceptional emergency situations; joint financing of a jointly developed budget; establishment of a UN support office; or joint financing of a hybrid mission.⁴⁶

The AU also presented a report to the AUPSC in May 2017 on the relevant provisions of resolution 2320 explaining the evolution of AUPSOs; the lessons learned at the political, institutional, and operational levels in the deployment of such operations; the imperative of strengthening AU's performance and effectiveness, improving its financial and administrative procedures, planning and management capacities; and addressing gaps in human rights compliance and conduct and discipline.⁴⁷

When the Secretary-General's report was discussed by the Council in June 2017, the A3 (then Egypt, Ethiopia, and Senegal) called on the Council to take practical steps towards financing AUPSOs by adopting a substantive resolution establishing the principle that AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council could be financed through UN-assessed contributions.⁴⁸ This meeting happened not long after Secretary-General António Guterres and Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat took up their positions heading the UN and the AU, respectively, and signed a framework agreement to address common challenges to peace and security in Africa, including by enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for AUPSOs. They also instituted the annual UN-AU Conference to monitor their joint commitments in this regard.⁴⁹

In September 2017, Ethiopia tried to build on the momentum generated by the HIPPO report, the Secretary-General's follow-up report, the adoption of resolution 2320, and the enhanced UN-AU partnership to advance the discussion on financing AUPSOs in the Council. It organised a high-level open debate on 20 September 2017, where the issue was considered as part of the broader discussion on peacekeeping reform. In his remarks at the debate, the Secretary-General called on the Security Council to enhance its support to AUPSOs, including through predictable funding.⁵⁰ Ethiopia proposed a draft resolution on the theme of the debate, which also contained references to the financing of AUPSOs in the context of enhancing peacekeeping partnerships, particularly with the AU.

At this stage, Council members seemed broadly supportive of the financing issue but were not ready to make any concrete commitment in response to the options presented by the Secretary-General. They wanted the UN and the AU to work together to put in place the necessary frameworks for oversight and accountability, human rights compliance, conduct and discipline, standardised mandate delivery, and fiduciary reporting requirements. Therefore, the draft text, adopted as resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017, expressed the Council's intention to give further consideration to practical steps that can be taken to partly finance AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter through UN-assessed contributions, on a case-by-case basis.⁵¹ The resolution was considered a step forward in terms of recognising the HIPPO recommendations and securing the Council's commitment to taking practical steps for their implementation.

42 African Union, "Does the 0.2% Levy Contradict International Norms."

43 Ibid.

44 African Union, "Financing the Union: Towards the Autonomy of the African Union," June 16, 2020.

45 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2320 (2016)", November 18, 2016.

46 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations: S/2017/454," May 26, 2017.

47 Op. cit., "AU Report on the relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) on UN-assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council."

48 United Nations Security Council, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: S/PV.7971," June 15 2017.

49 United Nations and African Union, "Joint United Nation-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security," April 19, 2017.

50 United Nations Security Council, "United Nations peacekeeping operations: S/PV.8051," September 20, 2017.

51 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2378 (2017)" September 20, 2017.

2014: Africa's Push for a Substantive Council Decision

2018: The A3 Draft Framework Resolution

Building on the momentum generated by the adoption of resolutions 2320 and 2378, the AU continued to exert efforts to secure adequate, predictable, and sustainable funding for AUPSOs. On 2 May 2018, the AUPSC appealed to the A3 to continue spearheading the common African position on this issue in the Security Council.⁵² The Secretary-General's annual report on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, published on 6 July 2018, provided important updates on the progress made in the implementation of the AU Peace Fund and the development of compliance and reporting frameworks.⁵³ This helped to form the basis for further discussion in the Council on the financing of AUPSOs and created an environment conducive to further efforts by the A3 to advance a substantive resolution in the Council.

In August 2018, the A3, then composed of Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, and Ethiopia, initiated a draft Council resolution based on the AUPSC decision and organised various formal and informal meetings to build momentum for its adoption. Côte d'Ivoire organised an open debate on the cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations during its Council Presidency on December 2018, where Faki further underscored the AU position on the financing of AUPSOs and called on the Security Council to adopt the draft A3 resolution.⁵⁴ On the same day, Guterres and Faki signed a joint declaration outlining the guiding principles underpinning the cooperation between the two organisations in responding to conflict and crises in Africa, including support for AUPSOs, progress in the implementation of resolutions 2320 and 2378, and key priorities.⁵⁵

Negotiations on the draft A3 resolution started in November 2018. Operative paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, which was put in blue on 10 December 2018, states that the Council: "Decides in principle that United Nations-assessed contributions can be provided, with decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis, to support African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council, by the existing financial rules of the United Nations to complement annual funding from the African Union and/or its Member States".⁵⁶

The majority of Council members supported the draft resolution and 87 UN member states co-sponsored it, but the US expressed serious reservations, as it was trying to cut the peacekeeping budget and enforce a cap on its contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget at 25 percent. The US, then under the Trump administration, set out eleven conditions, including the need for the AU to meet benchmarks and standards on human rights, conduct and discipline, financial accountability and transparency; affirm its commitment to sustainably fund 25 percent of the budget for AUPSOs; and agree to the Security Council's oversight and control of such operations utilising

UN funds. It also wanted the AU to submit a progress report within six months of the adoption of the resolution, the Secretary-General to provide an assessment of progress within 90 days of receiving the AU report, and the Security Council to consider and decide on the matter in December 2019.⁵⁷

For the sake of achieving consensus, the A3 tried to accommodate most of the points outlined by the US but felt that it could not accept postponing the decision on financing until December 2019.⁵⁸ The vote, which was scheduled for 10 December 2018, had to be postponed to allow time for further consultations. Subsequently, the introduction of a compromise text by France, which was based on the points raised by the US, created divisions within the A3 when Côte d'Ivoire placed it in blue. The US, which during this period used veto threats more broadly than it had habitually done, made clear that it would veto the original A3 text but indicated that it would support the compromise text if it were tabled for a vote alone.⁵⁹ Finally, the A3, unable to agree to the compromise text, referred the matter to the AUPSC, which discussed the issue on 24 December 2018 and requested the AU Commission to submit a report on the developments in relation to the negotiations on the A3 draft resolution. Although this report was supposed to be discussed in January 2019, the meeting did not take place and the AU Commission did not report what transpired during the negotiation.⁶⁰

2019: Another Push by South Africa

In 2019, South Africa joined the Security Council as an elected member replacing Ethiopia, which was behind the A3 effort to advance a framework resolution on the financing issue during its 2017-2018 term. South Africa, which had played an important role in facilitating the adoption of resolution 1809, strove to address the issues raised by the US during the 2018 negotiations. The A3 permanent representatives also visited Washington to consult with US interlocutors, including the Department of State, the National Security Council, and members of the US Congress.⁶¹

After the original A3 text and the compromise text were withdrawn, South Africa proposed a revised draft text in August 2019, which reportedly reflected developments since December 2018, and welcomed the work undertaken by the UN and the AU in developing and adopting relevant compliance standards. The draft maintained operative paragraph 16 from the original A3 text but also drew heavily from the compromise text that France had proposed in 2018 in an apparent effort to facilitate agreement. Intent on having the draft text adopted during its Council Presidency in October 2019, South Africa sent it to the AUPSC for inputs and comments ahead of Council negotiations.⁶²

After having looked at the draft, however, AUPSC members were apparently uncomfortable with the way the AU's 25 percent

52 African Union Peace and Security Council, "Communique: 770th Meeting," May 2, 2018.

53 United Nations Security Council, "Strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union: S/2018/678," July 6, 2018.

54 United Nations Security Council, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: S/PV.8414," December 6, 2018.

55 United Nations, "Note to Correspondents: Joint Declaration of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations," December 6, 2018.

56 United Nations Security Council, "Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia: draft resolution: S/2018/1093," December 8, 2018.

57 United States Permanent Mission to the United Nations, "Copy of the US eleven-point proposal on the A3 draft resolution," 2018.

58 Ethiopian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, "Chronology of Events with Regard to the Draft Resolution on the Financing of African Union Led Peace Support Operations," 2018.

59 United States Permanent Mission to the United Nations, "Correspondence with an A3 member of the Security Council," December 21, 2018.

60 Amani Africa, "Briefing on Sustainable financing of African Peace & Security Agenda under the UN Charter," September 19, 2019.

61 Priyal Singh and Gustavo de Carvalho, "Looking Back, Looking Forward: South Africa in the UN Security Council," Africa Portal, March 25, 2020.

62 Op.Cit., "Briefing on Sustainable financing of African Peace & Security Agenda under the UN Charter," September 19, 2019.

2014: Africa's Push for a Substantive Council Decision

contribution was presented, in particular that it committed the organisation to share the burden of each future AUPSO, which is mandated or authorised by the Security Council and receives support from UN-assessed contributions. They also felt that the draft text would undermine the AUPSC's mandate in the promotion of peace and security in Africa, as enshrined in the AU Constitutive

Act and the Protocol establishing the AUPSC, by agreeing to the Security Council's oversight and limiting the AU's role to operational issues. Therefore, they sought to defer consideration of the draft text by the UN Security Council pending the elaboration of a common African position on these and other related matters.⁶³

2021: Renewed Momentum

After a two-year lull in the discussion of the financing issue, interest among Council members revived with the change of administration in the US in 2021 and the shift in global dynamics following the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Biden administration's keen interest to strengthen US relations with Africa appears to have opened fresh opportunities to revive the financing discussion. The US launched a new strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa in August 2022⁶⁴, expressed full support for Security Council reform to include permanent representation for Africa in September 2022 at the UN General Assembly⁶⁵, and hosted the US-Africa Summit in December 2022.⁶⁶

An AU extraordinary summit that took place on 6 December 2020 via video teleconference requested the AUPSC to articulate a common African position on the financing of AUPSOs to guide the A3 in facilitating the adoption of a substantive resolution to enable Africa to access UN-assessed contribution.⁶⁷ What made the issue all the more critical for Africa were the emerging peace and security challenges facing the continent. On 28 May 2022, the AU held another extraordinary summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, to discuss the growing threat of terrorism and violent extremism as well as the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government. The summit reaffirmed "the imperative of adequate, sustainable and predictable financing for counterterrorism efforts on the Continent and consequently renew[ed] the call to the United Nations, particularly the UN Security Council, for use of assessed contributions for AU-mandated Peace Support Operations (PSOs), to further strengthen counter-terrorism efforts and promote stabilization in the Continent".⁶⁸

Against this backdrop, the AU Commission started drafting a common position paper to help resuscitate the financing discussion. The draft was subsequently considered by the AUPSC in 2021, but the finalisation of the paper took some time; it was adopted at the AU Summit in February 2023. Meanwhile, the A3 (then Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya) revived the discussion in the Security Council. On 27 July 2022, Ghana convened an

Arria-formula meeting on "Collective security through equitable burden sharing: strengthening regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security".⁶⁹

On 8 August 2022, China convened a Security Council open debate on capacity-building for sustaining peace, during which the financing issue was again raised. Following the meeting, China proposed a draft presidential statement, which was adopted on 31 August and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfill the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378. The report is also expected to include "recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources".⁷⁰

The financing of AUPSOs was a topical issue during the Gabonese and Ghanaian Security Council presidencies in October and November 2022, respectively. It was discussed at the 16th annual consultation between members of the Security Council and the AUPSC held in New York on 14 October 2022,⁷¹ as well as during the Security Council's annual debate on the cooperation between the UN and the AU on 11 October 2022.⁷² In November 2022, Ghana organised two signature events to promote discussions on how UN peace operations can better respond to long-standing and new peace and security challenges. One event focused on "Integrating Effective Resilience-Building in Peace Operations for Sustainable Peace", and the other on "Counter-terrorism in Africa— an imperative for peace, security, and development". Ghana raised the financing issue in the context of supporting resilience-building against terrorism, particularly in the Sahel region and coastal West Africa.⁷³

2023: The AU Consensus Paper

The adoption of the 31 August 2022 Security Council presidential statement accelerated the discussion on the AU common position paper. The draft document, labeled as a consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for AU peace and security

63 Ibid.

64 The White House, "U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan Africa," August 2022.

65 The White House, "Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly," September 21, 2022.

66 U.S. Department of State, "U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit," December 16, 2022.

67 African Union, "Decisions of the 14th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union on Silencing the Guns in Africa," December 6, 2020.

68 African Union, "Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa," May 28, 2022.

69 Security Council Report, "Arria-formula Meeting: 'Collective Security through Equitable Burden Sharing: Strengthening Regional Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security'," July 27, 2022.

70 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President of the Council: S/PRST/2022/6," August 31, 2022.

71 African Union, "Sixteenth (16th) Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between Members of the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, 14th October 2022," October 14, 2022.

72 United Nations Security Council, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: S/PV.9149," October 11, 2022.

73 Security Council Report, "November Monthly Forecast", October 31, 2022.

2021: Renewed Momentum

activities, was submitted to the AU Assembly and adopted in February 2023 during the 36th AU Summit held in Addis Ababa.⁷⁴ The consensus paper describes the progress in the operationalisation of the AU peace fund with the setting up of its governance and management structures. At its 36th summit, the AU approved the use of the fund to support the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force, which is being deployed in eastern DRC as part of the regional initiative to address the deteriorating security situation in the region. It also decided to do the same in support of ATMIS, which has been facing a funding shortfall.⁷⁵

The consensus paper tries to explain the Kigali decision that created confusion during past negotiations. It says that the 25 percent contribution was not meant for each AUPSO mandated or authorised by the AUPSC and the Security Council; rather, it was a commitment to finance the AU's peace and security activities, which include, but were not limited to, AUPSOs.⁷⁶ The paper also looks at the various financing options presented by the Secretary-General's May 2017 report and maintains that two of them—joint financing of a hybrid mission (the UNAMID model) and the establishment

of a UN support office (the AMISOM/ATMIS model)—provide a good basis for a discussion on the financing options for AUPSOs. It also suggests a third option to support sub-regional peace support operations, namely a combination of the UN support office model and the logistical support package.⁷⁷

The paper further sets out progress in enhancing the AU's Compliance Framework (AUCF), which is one of the benchmarks set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378 for advancing the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs. It notes that several key documents have been adopted, such as policies and guidelines on conduct and discipline, the prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse, child protection, the protection of civilians, and the selection and screening of personnel for AUPSOs. The paper also describes the AU's efforts to mainstream compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as other international norms and standards in the planning, implementation, management, and liquidation of AUPSOs. The paper particularly refers to the tripartite project signed by the AU, EU, and UN in February 2021 to support the AU's efforts in enhancing its AUCF.⁷⁸

Potential Dynamics in 2023

2023 appears to be a critical year for advancing the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs. The US, which was opposed to the adoption of a substantive resolution in 2018, now appears more amenable to serious discussion. But the Biden administration will have to persuade the US Congress about the imperative of supporting AUPSOs, including its advantage in cost effectiveness. The US is also likely to continue insisting on some of its earlier positions in future negotiations. US Permanent Representative Linda Thomas-Greenfield's statement at the annual debate on UN-AU cooperation in October 2022 is instructive: "The implementation of [international humanitarian law and human rights law] frameworks, as well as other oversight mechanisms outlined in resolutions 2320 and 2378, remain key considerations for any discussions about the use of UN-assessed contributions".⁷⁹ The Secretary-General's upcoming report, which is expected to be published by the end of April 2023, may include elements that spur discussion of these issues, including on AU Compliance Framework progress.

In 2022, the challenges that larger UN peacekeeping operations in Africa faced in their relations with host countries and communities also injected new dynamism into the discourse. At the same time, there were increasing calls for robust regional and international engagement to deal with the threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups in countries where these peacekeeping operations are deployed. Changing geopolitical dynamics on the continent—including the increasing tendency by some African countries

to rely on mercenary groups such as the Wagner Group, a Russian private security company—have also created serious concerns on the part of the United States and its allies. As a result, some Council members seem to have grown more inclined to favour UN support to AUPSOs.

China, which is the second largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget with 15.21 percent, worked closely with the A3 on the financing issue to help build momentum ahead of the adoption of resolution 2378 and the negotiation on the A3 resolution in 2018. Last year, China proposed the 31 August 2022 presidential statement, which requested the Secretary-General to present a report. It is expected to continue supporting the A3 in advancing a substantive resolution.

France contributes 5.61 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget, has been supportive of the financing issue and worked closely with the A3 during the 2018 negotiations. French President Emmanuel Macron, who attended the 2018 AU Summit in Nouakchott, expressed strong support for the AU's request for adequate, predictable, and sustainable funding for its peace support operations. He was particularly keen to secure the necessary financial support for the Group of Five for the Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) and promised to engage with President Donald Trump.⁸⁰ When the A3 encountered serious difficulties with the US, France advised the A3 to postpone the vote to allow more time for consultations and strengthen support for the resolution from other member states.⁸¹ However, as

74 African Union, "Decisions, Declarations, Resolution and Motion: Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session," February 18-19 2023.

75 Ibid.

76 African Union, "Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for African Union Peace and Security Activities."

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 United Nations Security Council, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: S/PV.9149," October 11, 2022.

80 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, "Speech by President Emmanuel Macron - Ambassadors' Conference 2018," August 27, 2018.

81 AU Observer Mission to the United Nations, "Readout of the meeting between A3+ France and the AU Permanent Observer on the Draft Resolution of Financing of AU led Peace

Potential Dynamics in 2023

discussed, the A3 was later divided when France introduced a compromise text which Côte d'Ivoire placed in blue.

The UK contributes 5.79 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget and supported the original A3 resolution in blue, but did not co-sponsor it. During the negotiation, it took a strong stance on some issues, including compliance and accountability, planning and oversight, and burden sharing. It argued that only AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council could be eligible to access UN-assessed contributions and that this contribution should constitute no more than 75 percent of the cost of these operations. It is likely to focus on these same issues in future negotiations.

Russia contributes 3.04 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget and supported and co-sponsored the A3 resolution in 2018. At the annual debate on UN-AU cooperation held in October 2022, it expressed its readiness to engage constructively in future discussions and attached particular importance to “a shared assessment by the countries of the region of existing threats and ways to overcome them, as well as their willingness to bear the risks involved and to create a coherent and effective command-and-control system”.⁸² Russia also underscored the need for regional countries to be able to “retain the space to make their own policy decisions to counter threats rather than having them imposed by others”.⁸³

Among the A3, Ghana appears willing to take the lead in advancing the financing discussion in the Council in 2023, also using its concurrent membership of the Security Council and the AUPSC to build momentum. With the adoption of the consensus paper by the AU summit in February, it may propose a substantive draft resolution later in the year. While the AU consensus paper may have raised AU members' expectations, some Council members feel that it may not provide satisfactory answers to all the outstanding issues.

The AU has, of course, explained that its 25 percent contribution is meant for all its peace and security activities, including the deployment of AUPSOs. But this may not prove sufficient for some Council members, which continue to insist on the need for the AU to demonstrate its commitment to sharing the specific burden of peace operations. The other contentious issue is likely to be the AU's broader definition of AUPSOs to include various types of operations

deployed by regional mechanisms. In the options outlined in its consensus paper, the AU envisages these operations also benefiting from access to UN-assessed contributions. This corresponds to the growing calls by African countries and regions for robust regional and international engagement to deal with the serious security threats posed by terrorists and other armed groups.

In his remarks at the 36th AU Summit, Guterres said that he “wholeheartedly support[s] the creation of a new generation of robust peace-enforcement missions and counter-terrorist operations, led by the African Union with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and with guaranteed, predictable funding, including through assessed contributions”.⁸⁴ This is particularly relevant to the Sahel and West Africa region, which has been facing a serious security challenge.

On 25 September 2022, the UN, the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and FC-G5S jointly launched a high-level independent panel under the leadership of the former president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to undertake a strategic assessment of “the underlying challenges in the Sahel, including the surge in violent extremism, growing fragility of the economies of the region due to the impact of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as complex political transitions”.⁸⁵ The panel's report and findings, due to be released in June, are expected to recommend a coordinated regional and international response to the complex political, security, and development challenges of the Sahel. The Issoufou Panel report will also feed into the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs.

Regardless of the findings of the Panel, Council members seem to believe that the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs should be limited to those operations deployed under the AU's authority and management. They remain extremely reluctant to provide support to African counter-terrorism operations through the UN because of accountability and oversight issues, preferring to continue channeling their support through bilateral arrangements. Others are concerned about compromising the basic principles of UN peacekeeping—consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

Support Operations,” 2018.

⁸² United Nations Security Council, “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security: S/PV.9149,” October 11, 2022.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ United Nations, “Secretary-General's remarks to the Opening Ceremony at the 36th ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly [as delivered],” February 18, 2023.

⁸⁵ United Nations, “Note to Correspondents: High-Level Meeting on the Sahel: The United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel formally launch the Independent Panel on Security and Development,” September 24, 2022.

Observations

Since the discussion on the financing of AUPSOs started in 2007, Council members' positions have evolved with the enhancement of the UN-AU partnership and the AU's increasing operational capacity to respond rapidly to crises in Africa. There now seems to be a broader agreement in principle that the UN should provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financing to AUPSOs. The challenges to accessing support from UN-assessed contributions appear threefold: doctrinal (that UN resources cannot be used to fight counter-terrorism operations), accountability and oversight (that the AU meet the necessary financial, administrative, and accountability standards), and burden-sharing (that the AU contribute 25 percent of the cost of AUPSOs).

The A3's main objective in 2018 and 2019 was to secure a clear commitment from the Security Council on the financing of AUPSOs and agree on the broader frameworks and parameters of doing so in the future on a case-by-case basis, as recommended by the HIPPO report. While the 2018-2019 efforts did not lead to a concrete result, future discussions and negotiations on a substantive resolution are likely to build on the work done in the past. Nonetheless, Council members will need to come to an understanding on some of the outstanding issues, including on burden-sharing, which some Council members consider a red line, notably the arrangement described in the consensus paper whereby the AU would fund 25 percent of its peace and security activities as a whole, rather than of each individual AUPSO.

Regarding accountability and oversight, the AU continues to work towards fulfilling the requirements set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378 with the support of the UN and other partners; some Council members are likely to insist on the AU taking further steps, while others may argue for the need for the Council to show flexibility.

The A3 may have the difficult task of taming expectations in Addis Ababa about UN support for regional operations in Africa. Council members could be willing to provide support bilaterally or through a multi-donor trust fund, but they do not seem ready at this stage to do so through UN-assessed contributions. In its consensus paper, the AU has already indicated its preference for the hybrid and the support office options, which have their advantages and disadvantages. The AU believes that the hybrid option guarantees predictable and sustainable funding, but it also requires a high degree of UN-AU coordination on planning, decision-making, management, and oversight, including shared political analysis of the conflict situation. Some of these issues created challenges for the sole hybrid experience in Africa to date, the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur, known as UNAMID: the Secretary-General's report on lessons learned from the experience of UNAMID (S/2021/1099) notes that "achieving the necessary alignment on a common vision and political direction between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council proved challenging because of diverging views among the membership of the Councils".

The support office option appears relatively attractive to both the UN and the AU. In the case of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)/African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the UN provides a logistical support package, whereas the AU would also seek troop allowances. In his upcoming report, the Secretary-General may share the UN's views on which of these options is the more feasible.

In terms of future negotiations, the A3 may have to learn the lessons from the experiences of 2018 and focus on maintaining its unity and cohesion to be able to advance the discussion in the Council. It could be helpful for the A3 to convene a series of formal and informal meetings to continue building momentum on the financing issue over the coming months ahead of negotiations on a substantive resolution. One possible option is for Mozambique, as chair of the Security Council Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, and Ghana, as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, jointly to organise a meeting on the AU consensus paper and enhance the awareness of Council experts of the salient issues raised in the document. Another option is for the A3 to convene an Arria-formula meeting on the AUCF and invite officials from the AU and the UN to brief members on the progress made and the work that lies ahead. Furthermore, the A3 may need to coordinate with like-minded members to convene a formal Council meeting to deliberate on the upcoming report of the Secretary-General.

These A3 efforts will have to be buttressed by the strong mobilisation of the African Group in New York, which may have to carry out advocacy work not only in the Security Council but also in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, which is responsible for budgetary decisions. Equally important is the need for the AUPSC and the AU Commission to avoid contradictory messages that could potentially complicate the A3's position in negotiations. Keeping Addis Ababa in the loop every step of the way might be critical for the A3 to avoid confusion and secure consistent support from AU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

The AU may also have to pursue high-level engagement with the US, particularly with the relevant congressional committees, ahead of negotiations on a substantive Council resolution, factoring in sufficient time for these engagements to secure the necessary support. The window of opportunity for advancing the discussion on the financing issue seems to be narrow because of the 2024 US elections.

The A3 also cannot take for granted the support from other Council members and will need to continue engaging at various levels over the coming months. What is likely to make the upcoming discussion different from that of 2018-2019 is the sharp shift in geopolitical dynamics in Africa and the prevailing tension among the major powers. This may require the A3 to maintain a difficult balancing act and tread carefully to secure the necessary support from all Council members.

Selected Documents on the Financing of AUPSOS

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

[S/RES/1809](#) (16 April 2008) is on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

[S/RES/2033](#) (12 January 2012) is on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security.

[S/RES/2167](#) (28 July 2014) is on peacekeeping operations.

[S/RES/2320](#) (18 November 2016) is on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

[S/RES/2378](#) (20 September 2017) is on peacekeeping reform.

SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS

[S/PRST/2007/7](#) (28 March 2007) is on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

[S/PRST/2009/3](#) (18 March 2009) is on peace and security in Africa.

[S/PRST/2009/26](#) (26 October 2009) is on peace and security in Africa.

[S/PRST/2010/21](#) (22 October 2010) is on peace and security in Africa.

[S/PRST/2014/27](#) (16 December 2014) is on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security.

[S/PRST/2015/22](#) (25 November 2015) is on the maintenance of international peace and security.

[S/PRST/2021/21](#) (28 October 2021) is on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security.

[S/PRST/2022/6](#) (31 August 2022) is on peace and security in Africa.

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORTS

[S/2008/186](#) (7 April 2008) is on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

[S/2009/470](#) (18 September 2009) is on the support to AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN.

[S/2015/682](#) (2 September 2015) Report of the Secretary-General on the future of UN peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.

[S/2016/809](#) (28 September 2016) is on the joint African Union-UN review of available mechanisms to finance and support AU peace support operations authorised by the UN Security Council.

[S/2017/454](#) (26 May 2017) is on options for authorisation and support for AU peace support operations.

[S/2018/678](#) (6 July 2018) is strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the UN Office to the AU.

OTHER DOCUMENTS

[S/2008/813](#) (31 December 2008) is on the report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations.

[S/2015/446](#) (17 June 2015) is the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership, and people.

Comprehensive List of Peace Support Operations and Missions⁸⁶

MISSION NAME	COUNTRY	TROOP/POLICE/CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES	YEARS ACTIVE
AFRICAN UNION-MANDATED MISSIONS			
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) Transitioned into the United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB)	Burundi	Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique.	2003 - 2004
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) I	Sudan	Algeria, Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.	2004 - 2005
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) II <i>Transitioned into the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur</i>	Sudan	TCCs: Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, The Gambia, Chad, Kenya, South Africa MILOBs: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia.	2005 - 2007
African Union Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOOC)	Comoros	Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Togo	2004
African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda.	2006
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) <i>Transitioned into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia</i>	Somalia	TCCs: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, (Sierra Leone (2013/14), Uganda. Staff Officers: Benin, Chad, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia. PCCs: Ghana (FPU/IPO), Kenya(IPO), Nigeria(FPU/IPO), Sierra Leone (FPU/IPO), Uganda (FPU/IPO), Zambia (IPO).	2007 - 2022
African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal.	2007-2008
United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	Sudan	TCCs: Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Pakistan, Tanzania PCCs: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Brazil, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Magnolia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Nepal, Rwanda, Pakistan, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Other Contributors of Military Personnel: Bhutan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Iran, Magnolia, Malaysia, Malawi, Namibia, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.	2008 - 2021
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)	Mali	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda.	2013
African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic [Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique sous Conduite Africaine] (MISCA)	CAR	Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda.	2013- 2014

86 Source: AU Commission

Comprehensive List of Peace Support Operations and Missions

MISSION NAME	COUNTRY	TROOP/POLICE/CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES	YEARS ACTIVE
African Union Human Rights and Military Observer Mission in Burundi (AUHRME)	Burundi		2015-2021
African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU)	Burundi	Mandated but not implemented	2015
African Union Technical Support Team to the Gambia (AUTSTG)	The Gambia	Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda.	2017-2021
African Union Military Observers Mission to the Central African Republic (MOUACA)	CAR	Benin, Congo, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa.	2020 - Present
African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)	Somalia	TCCs: Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda. Staff Officers: Benin, Chad, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia. PCCs: Ghana (FPU/IPO), Kenya(IPO), Nigeria(FPU/IPO), Sierra Leone (FPU/IPO), Uganda (FPU/IPO), Zambia (IPO).	2022 - Present
AFRICAN UNION-AUTHORIZED MISSIONS			
Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Comoros	Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal.	2008
The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda.	Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Uganda.	2011-Present
Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko-Haram (MNJTF-BH)	Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria.	Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria.	2015-Present
Joint Force of the G5 Sahel (G5-Sahel)	Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger	Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger.	2017 – Present
DEPLOYMENTS BY REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES/REGIONAL MECHANISMS			
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)	Liberia	Mali, Nigeria, Senegal	2003
ECOWAS Forces in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)	Cote d'Ivoire	Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo	2003
Multinational Force for Central African Republic [Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale] (FOMAC)	CAR	Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon	2003
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Central Africa (MICOPAX)	CAR	Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon	2013
ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)	Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, Niger	2012
SADC Preventive Mission in the Kingdom of Lesotho (SAPMIL)	Lesotho	Angola, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe	2017 - 2018

Comprehensive List of Peace Support Operations and Missions

MISSION NAME	COUNTRY	TROOP/POLICE/CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES	YEARS ACTIVE
ECOWAS Intervention Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG)	Gambia	Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Togo	2017
SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM)	Mozambique	Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Rwanda, South Africa, Zimbabwe	2021
HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND NATURAL DISASTER SUPPORT (HANDS) MISSIONS			
African Union Support to Ebola in West Africa (ASEOWA)	Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone	TCCs: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Tanzania, Uganda. Volunteers: Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe.	2014 - 2015
African Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in DRC (ASEDCO)	DRC		2019 – Present
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) OBSERVER MISSIONS			
The Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG I & II)	Rwanda	Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe	1991– 1993
OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB)	Burundi		1993 – 1996
OAU Mission in Comoros I (OMIC I)	Comoros	Egypt, Senegal, Tunisia	1997 – 1998
OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE)	Ethiopia/ Eritrea		2000
OAU Mission in Comoros II&III (OMIC II & III)	Comoros	South Africa	2001 – 2002
OAU Military Observer Mission to the Comoros	Comoros		2001 – 2002

Chronology: Security Council actions on the financing of AUPSOs

Date	Action	Facilitated by	Reference
28 March 2007	The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a report, in consultation with the relevant regional organisations, in particular the AU, on specific proposals on how the UN can better support arrangements for further cooperation and coordination with regional organisations on Chapter VIII arrangements in order to contribute significantly to the common security challenges in the areas of concern and to promote the deepening and broadening of dialogue and cooperation between the Security Council and the AUPSC.	South Africa	S/PRST/2007/7
7 April 2008	The Secretary-General proposed setting up an AU-UN panel consisting of distinguished persons to consider in depth the modalities of how to support regional organisations when they undertake a peacekeeping operation under a UN mandate, including financing, peacekeeping operations undertaken by regional organisations, in particular as related to start-up funding, equipment and logistics, and make concrete recommendations.	Secretary-General's report	S/2008/186
16 April 2008	The Security Council recognised the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations when they undertake peacekeeping under a UN mandate and welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal to set up an AU-UN panel consisting of distinguished persons to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support such peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics and to consider in-depth lessons from past and current AU peacekeeping efforts.	South Africa	S/RES/1809
31 December 2008	The Prodi Panel made two recommendations: to establish a multi-donor trust fund to consolidate the various sources and secure additional resources from existing and new donors building on the EU-funded African Peace Facility or to utilise UN-assessed contributions to support UN-authorized AUPSOs for a period no longer than six months on a case-by-case based on the understanding that they would transition to UN management.	Prodi report	S/2008/813
18 March 2009	The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on practical ways to provide effective support for the AU when it undertakes peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN, that includes a detailed assessment of the recommendations contained in the Report of the AU-UN Panel, in particular those on financing, as well as on the establishment of a joint AU-UN team.	Libya	S/PRST/2009/3
18 September 2009	The Secretary-General's report analysed the Prodi Panel's recommendations and examined the five financing mechanisms used at the time to fund AUPSOs: AU-assessed contributions; contributions through individual AU troop-contributing countries; voluntary contributions; UN support packages financed through UN-assessed contributions; and a combination of these mechanisms. The report considered the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund proposed by the Prodi panel as an attractive option and offered support to harmonise donors' administrative and financial management frameworks in this regard.	Secretary-General's report	S/2009/470
12 January 2012	The Security Council requested the Secretary-General in consultation with the AU to conduct a comprehensive analysis of lessons learned from practical cooperation between the UN and the AU, in particular with regard to the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) as well as the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in order to improve coordination when appropriate.	South Africa	S/RES/2033
28 July 2014	The Security Council requested the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the AU Commission and EU to produce, not later than 31 March 2015, an assessment report and recommendations on the progress of the partnerships between the UN and relevant regional organisations in peacekeeping operations.	Rwanda	S/RES/2167
5 January 2015	The Secretary-General recommended a joint AU-UN review to assess the various mechanisms available to improve the predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of financing AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council.	Secretary-General's report	S/2015/3
17 June 2015	HIPPO recommended the use of UN-assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council, including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.	HIPPO report	S/2015/446
2 September 2015	In his report on the future of UN peace operations and the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations, the Secretary-General concurred with the panel's call for sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AUPSOs. He also commended the AU's commitment to self-reliance, including to financing 25 percent of future AUPSOs and urged Member States to give urgent consideration to how the UN can respond to that initiative.	Secretary-General's report	S/2015/682

Chronology: Security Council actions on the financing of AUPSOs

Date	Action	Facilitated by	Reference
28 September 2016	The joint UN-AU review looked at the evolution of the AU-UN partnership, the various types of support provided to AUPSOs and the recurrent capacity gaps, mandate and doctrine issues, accountability, reporting and oversight, and adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights law.	Joint UN-AU review	S/2016/809
18 November 2016	The Security Council took note of the AU-UN joint review of available mechanisms for financing and expressed the Council's readiness to consider the AU's proposals for the support of future AUPSOs and requested the Secretary-General, working closely with the AU, to submit a detailed report refining options on the AU's proposal on the financing of AUPSOs.	Senegal and the US	S/RES/2320
26 May 2017	The Secretary-General presented his options pursuant to resolution 2320. Aside from voluntary contributions through an UN-managed trust fund which was in use at the time, the report also considered other possible options through which UN-assessed contributions could be used, such as a subvention in exceptional emergency situations; joint financing of a jointly developed budget; establishment of a UN support office; or joint financing of a hybrid mission.	Secretary-General's report	S/2017/454
20 September 2017	The Security Council expressed its intention to give further consideration to practical steps that can be taken to partly finance AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter through UN-assessed contributions, on a case-by-case basis.	Ethiopia	S/RES/2378
10 December 2018	The A3 initiated a draft resolution which, among other things, proposes for the Security Council to decide in principle that UN-assessed contributions can be provided, with decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis, to support AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council, by the existing financial rules of the UN to complement annual funding from the AU and/or its Member States.	A3	Original A3 text in blue
20 December 2018	Côte d'Ivoire placed in blue a compromise text which requests the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with a detailed report on the AU's efforts and progress to strengthen financing, human rights protections, accountability, transparency, performance, and conduct and discipline standards, and compliance with applicable international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, across its peace support operations based on which the Security Council subsequently will determine whether and how UN-assessed contributions can be provided, with decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the existing financial rules of the UN, to support future AU-led peace support operations authorised by the Security Council and utilised by the Security Council in accordance with article 53 (1) of the Charter.	Côte d'Ivoire	Compromise text in blue
28 October 2021	The Security Council recognised that one major constraint facing the AU in effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources. It also recognised that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for AUPSOs authorised by the Security Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter may impact the effectiveness of these peace support operations, and encourages further dialogue on options for addressing this issue.	Kenya	S/PRST/2021/21
31 August 2022	The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, no later than 30 April 2023, with a report that provides update on progress made so far by the United Nations and the AU to fulfil the commitments as set in Security Council Resolution 2320 (2016) and Resolution 2378 (2017), and recommendations on moving forward that reflect good practices and lessons-learned with the view to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources.	China	S/PRST/2022/6

Security Council Report Staff

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Executive Director

Shamala Kandiah Thompson
Chief Operating Officer

Paul Romita
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Anna Haven
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Gaurav Redhal
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Mai Nguyen
Research Intern

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Design Point Five, NY

Security Council Report
711 Third Avenue, Suite 1501
New York NY 10017

Telephone +1 212 759 9429

Web securitycouncilreport.org

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