President: Ms. Rice ........................................ (United States of America)

Members: 
Azerbaijan ........................................... Mr. Mehdiyev
China .................................................. Mr. Li Baodong
Colombia .............................................. Mr. Osorio
France ............................................... Mr. Briens
Germany ............................................. Mr. Wittig
Guatemala ............................................ Mr. Rosenthal
India ................................................... Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri
Morocco ............................................... Mr. Loulichki
Pakistan ............................................... Mr. Tarar
Portugal ............................................... Mr. Cabral
Russian Federation ................................. Mr. Churkin
South Africa ......................................... Mr. Sangqu
Togo .................................................... Mr. Menan
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ...

Mr. Parham

Agenda

Maintenance of international peace and security

Nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security

Letter dated 5 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2012/194)
The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Maintenance of international peace and security

Nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security

Letter dated 5 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2012/194)

The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2012/194, which contains a letter dated 5 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting a concept paper on the item under consideration. I also wish to draw the attention of members to document S/2012/207, which contains a letter dated 9 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon. I should like to inform Council members that the Secretary-General will have to leave for another important engagement at 11.15. I now give him the floor.

The Secretary-General: I commend the United States for convening this follow-up meeting to the Security Council summit presided over by President Obama in September 2009 (see S/PV.6191). Many welcome developments have occurred since then. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a 64-point action plan for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I look forward to constructive discussions at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference, which will start at the end of this month.

The Russian Federation and the United States are reducing their deployed nuclear arsenals under the New START agreement — and, together with other nuclear-weapon States, they are holding consultations on implementing disarmament commitments and increasing transparency around their nuclear arsenals. For the first time, NATO has put the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world on its agenda. The upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago will be an important opportunity to develop a common approach.

There have also been innovative efforts by non-nuclear-weapon States. They include efforts to conclude a nuclear-weapon convention backed by strong verification; the 10-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative; the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy; and further progress towards a Southeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty. We are also preparing for a conference in Finland later this year on establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., agreed on a detailed work plan aimed at improving nuclear security, securing nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism. I welcome the new commitments made at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, as well as the focused discussion on increasing the synergy between nuclear safety and security. I thank President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea for his leadership. At that Summit, I highlighted the need for us to strengthen our efforts to prevent the financing of proliferation and terrorism-related financing. I am therefore encouraged that today’s draft presidential statement recognizes the importance of proliferation financing.

The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is enhancing international cooperation aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I commend the decision of the Council to extend the Committee’s mandate until April 2021. In order to help strengthen the legal framework for preventing nuclear terrorism, I will convene a high-level event this fall to promote universal adherence to, and the full implementation of, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

In spite of such progress, much work remains to be done. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons continue to threaten humankind. Billions of dollars are being spent to modernize them, despite pressing social needs and growing global expectations for progress on
disarmament. Sixteen years after its adoption by the General Assembly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force. I warmly welcome its ratification by Indonesia and call on all other annex 2 States to follow suit.

Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains deadlocked. Let me repeat, the current stalemate is unacceptable. If the Conference cannot begin work this year, then the General Assembly must exercise its primary responsibility in carrying forward the disarmament process. To facilitate negotiations in the CD, the five nuclear-weapon States may consider elaborating elements on a fissile material cut-off treaty. As Secretary-General, I am willing to consider establishing a group of eminent persons to help in that task.

The tragic nuclear accident at Fukushima underscored the urgent need to enhance nuclear safety and the international emergency response framework. I commend the International Atomic Energy Agency for its work. At the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, I set out five areas for strengthening the global nuclear safety regime and promoting synergy between nuclear safety and nuclear security. The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognized the importance of addressing those challenges and sharing best practices. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference should devote specific time to those issues.

Let me also stress the importance of full compliance with Security Council resolutions. I welcome the Council’s presidential statement of 16 April (S/PRST/2012/13), which strongly condemned the launch of a so-called application satellite by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Council has sent a firm and unified message. I urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to immediately comply fully with its obligations under resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). As demanded by the Council, it should not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, any further nuclear tests or any further provocation. I renew my call on the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to build confidence with neighbouring countries and improve the lives of its people, who face serious food and nutrition needs. I also reaffirm my commitment to working for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

On Iran, the only acceptable outcome is a peaceful settlement that restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, in conformity with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that regard, I welcome the initial round of talks held in Istanbul between Iran and the E3+3. I hope that the parties will build upon that at their next meeting, in Baghdad. It is important to agree on concrete and reciprocal steps towards a comprehensive negotiated solution.

I once again commend the focus of this meeting. I hope that the Security Council will continue to highlight that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitute a threat to international peace and security, as highlighted in relevant resolutions, including resolution 1887 (2009). These discussions should be sustained at the highest levels.

As I have often said, the 2009 Security Council summit presided over by President Obama (see S/PV.6191) should not be a one-time event. I invite Council members to seriously consider follow-up at the opening of this year’s session of the General Assembly. The international community looks to the Security Council to continue its leadership in generating the political momentum needed to achieve the peace and security of a world free from nuclear weapons.

The President: I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Council.

Mr. Osorio (Colombia) (spoken in Spanish): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his important statement.

This Security Council debate on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security is a timely opportunity to reiterate the need for all Member States to fully comply with their obligations and commitments with regard to arms control, disarmament and all aspects of the non-proliferation of every type of weapon. We believe that international peace and security will only be fully achieved when the world is free of weapons of mass destruction, the threat they pose and the risk that they could be used by terrorists and non-State actors.
In 1967, with the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American and Caribbean region became the world’s first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone. That Treaty served as a model for the establishment of other such zones in Africa, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Central Asia, as well as for the recognition of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free country. The rejection of the possession, use or manufacture of this type of weapon by more than 100 States members of nuclear-weapon-free zones provides an important contribution to non-proliferation, while also serving as a confidence-building measure in the area of disarmament, thereby contributing to the maintenance of regional and international peace and security.

Colombia, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and a country that does not possess nuclear weapons, has been an advocate for the universalization and effective implementation of that international instrument. In fulfilment of its obligations, Colombia has established a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as an additional protocol thereto.

Although there has been progress in reducing nuclear arsenals — in connection with which I should like to commend the entry into force, on 5 February 2011, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms — much remains to be done to achieve their total elimination. All nuclear-weapon States without exception should make progress on that commitment in a verifiable, irreversible and definitive manner.

As a State party to annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, we would like to reiterate the importance of the Treaty’s entry into force. While the declarations of moratoriums on nuclear tests made by various nuclear-weapon States constitute progress on the issue, only a legally binding commitment will prevent the carrying out of new nuclear explosions and their negative effects on international peace and security, as well as on human beings and the environment.

As a State member of the Conference on Disarmament, Colombia believes that, in order to overcome existing differences between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, there is a need to adopt a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

While the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones include additional protocols aimed at ensuring respect for non-nuclear status and against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, so long as general and complete nuclear disarmament is not achieved and the category of nuclear-weapon State continues to exist, it will continue to be urgent and necessary for the Conference on Disarmament to make genuine substantive progress on negotiating an agreement on this issue.

A fissile material cut-off treaty is another legally binding instrument that remains to be negotiated in that multilateral forum in order to contribute significantly to non-proliferation — for non-proliferation also entails preventing access to fissile materials and technologies, including knowledge and information about nuclear weapons. We reiterate our willingness to work with every member of the Conference on Disarmament to ensure that the Conference resumes negotiations on pending international agreements in the area of disarmament and is able to emerge from the paralysis it has experienced for the past decade.

Nuclear terrorism poses a threat for every State without exception. It is therefore necessary that we join efforts to effectively confront it. Colombia, which understands the scope of the threat, has undertaken the necessary domestic legislative steps to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

I should also like to refer to resolution 1540 (2004), which not only complements international efforts in the areas of disarmament, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism, but also identifies the new threat posed by the possession by terrorists and non-State actors of such weapons, their delivery systems and related material. The resolution provides for international cooperation and assistance to be provided to States to ensure its effective implementation as a central element of prevention.

With the support of the Organization of American States, the Stimson Centre and the Stanley Foundation, the first Andean workshop on resolution 1540 (2004)
was convened in our country. At the workshop, the countries of the region provided information about the progress they had made in the implementation of the resolution and their requirements in that respect.

Finally, my country views nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as part of a comprehensive process aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament in all its aspects and with regard to all types of weapons. It is thus important that all United Nations organs, within their respective purviews, commit themselves in a resolute manner to achieving the tangible objectives that have been set, which include the adoption of an arms trade treaty, strengthening the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Mr. Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan): First of all, I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his comprehensive briefing. Azerbaijan shares the position of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the issue, as reflected in the letter and the annexes thereto contained in document S/2012/223.

Azerbaijan shares the common concern of the international community over the growing nuclear dangers and risks. Since the very first days of its independence, my country has attached great importance to nuclear security. We acknowledge the international efforts made to ensure the strict global implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

At the same time, we see that the international mechanism and verification regime are not strong or effective enough to prevent the illegal proliferation of nuclear technologies. In that regard, there is a need to further strengthen the concept of the generally accepted legally binding commitments concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies for military purposes.

International cooperation has always been at the centre of Azerbaijan’s efforts in the field of nuclear security and safety. Our activities have been target-oriented and conducted in a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation. Azerbaijan, which recognizes and commends the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the development of nuclear security regulations and standards, has engaged in successful cooperation with the Agency on various aspects of nuclear security.

 Needless to say, nuclear security and non-proliferation issues are closely interconnected. We believe that Azerbaijan’s proposal on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Caucasus will be supported by the neighbouring countries and the broader international community.

Against the background of emerging proliferation threats and due to my country’s geographic location, we attach the utmost importance to the prevention of the use of our territory as a transit route for illicit nuclear trafficking. In close cooperation with our international partners and in line with international standards, we have developed a comprehensive national export control system with a solid legislative basis. To date, the system has proved to be a reliable mechanism in the prevention of illicit nuclear trafficking.

At the same time, due to the continued occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan by neighbouring Armenia, we are unable to ensure proper control over a considerable part of our State border.

We believe that nuclear security and safety needs should be directed primarily at the enhanced security and safety of civilian nuclear facilities, taking into account geographical peculiarities and transboundary environmental implications in the light of possible nuclear incidents.

In that regard, we are seriously concerned about the nuclear safety situation in our region, which is affected by the presence of the outdated Metsamor nuclear power plant in neighbouring Armenia. According to international monitors, that nuclear power plant represents a danger to the entire region, and its reactor belongs to the oldest and least reliable category of all 66 Soviet reactors built in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the plant in question is situated in a highly seismically active mountainous terrain and lacks suitable water resources for cooling its ageing reactor. We believe that the operation of the Metsamor nuclear power plant must cease without delay to prevent a tragic accident in future.

As contribution to international efforts on nuclear security and as a country committed to combating nuclear terrorism, Azerbaijan has become a party to
key international instruments in the field of nuclear security, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. I am also pleased to announce that Azerbaijan recently endorsed the statement of principles for joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in its capacity as a partner country.

Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India): India welcomes the initiative taken by the United States to convene a meeting of the Security Council on nuclear security. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing.

India fully shares international concerns about the serious threat posed by nuclear terrorism and clandestine proliferation to international security. In recent years, there has been heightened awareness of the threat of terrorists and traffickers seeking access to nuclear material and technologies for malicious purposes. Addressing that threat requires sustained and effective international cooperation to supplement responsible national actions.

India’s resolution in the General Assembly on measures to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction, which has been adopted by consensus since 2002, and the recently extended work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) are important in that regard. So are international legal instruments on national security, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We support the universalization of those instruments and the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in strengthening the international global nuclear security architecture.

We welcome the successful outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit held on Seoul on 26 and 27 March 2012, which sets new benchmarks for nuclear security and new frameworks for international cooperation. India’s Prime Minister participated in the Summit. India has contributed to the Nuclear Security Summit process, including by hosting a Sherpa meeting in New Delhi this year.

While nuclear security is primarily a national responsibility, there are benefits to supplementing responsible national actions through sustained and effective international cooperation.

We have made progress in the establishment of the global centre for nuclear energy partnership. The physical infrastructure for the centre is being set up, and cooperation agreements have been signed with several countries and the IAEA. Off-campus courses are already under way.

India will contribute $1 million to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund for the years 2012 and 2013 and will participate in the Agency’s 2013 International Coordinating Conference on various nuclear security activities, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, of which we are a member.

India intends to host a 1540 workshop this year to strengthen its implementation. We believe that the best guarantee of nuclear security is a world free of nuclear weapons. The Rajiv Gandhi action plan, submitted nearly 25 years ago, remains the most comprehensive and elaborate proposal to achieve the objective of global nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework.

Attaining the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world will require commitments embedded in an agreed multilateral framework involving all States possessing nuclear weapons. This should include measures to reduce nuclear dangers by reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and by increasing universal restraints on the first use of nuclear weapons. Working towards the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will require a steadfast commitment to multilateralism, which has proved its worth in the case of conventions banning two other categories of weapons of mass destruction.

The United Nations disarmament machinery, especially the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, should play its role. We support the early commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which has since 1993 been envisaged as a significant contribution to non-proliferation in all its aspects.

States should fully and effectively implement the obligations arising from the agreements and treaties to which they are parties. The role of the Security Council should be in accordance with the Charter and applicable provisions of international agreements that provide for such a role. India has never been a source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We are
determined to further strengthen our export control systems to keep them on a par with the highest international standards. We have already adhered to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

As a country with the ability and willingness to promote global non-proliferation objectives, we believe that the next logical step is India’s membership in the four export control regimes. All States have the right to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in accordance with the international obligations they have undertaken. Given India’s growing energy demands, we see nuclear energy as an important component of our energy mix. We are taking forward our three-stage nuclear programme based on a closed-fuel cycle, with new safety features and proliferation-resistant technologies. Our goal is to generate 62,000 megawatts from nuclear energy by 2032. We are determined that our expanding nuclear power programme will follow the highest standards of nuclear safety and security.

We hope that this meeting of the Security Council will help draw attention to the challenges posed by nuclear terrorism and reinforce national and international commitments to strengthen nuclear security and contribute to the enhancement of the global nuclear security architecture.

Morocco’s commitment to the subject of disarmament is a strategic choice that reflects our commitment to peace and security and to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are a State party to the full range of multilateral instruments pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. Morocco remains committed to strengthening multilateralism for general and complete disarmament, in particular with regard to the disarmament of nuclear weapons in a verifiable, irreversible and definitive manner.

The destruction of weapons of mass destruction is crucial, as they pose an ongoing risk that places a burden on the future of the world. Collective security requires a renunciation of proliferation and further commitments towards achieving complete and total disarmament. In the absence thereof, the risk of the acquisition of such weapons by non-State actors is not a mere hypothesis. It is therefore our duty to do our utmost to achieve the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime and of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

It is undeniable that the universalization of a treaty as important as the NPT must be a common objective for our collective security. As a result of the successful outcome of the eighth NPT Review Conference, in 2010, we have seen that through dialogue it is possible to attain commitments that allow us to make progressive steps towards attaining the NPT objectives. At the same time, it remains necessary for all States parties to play their role fully and to shoulder their responsibilities, in order to build upon the progress that has been made.

Morocco underscores the importance of adherence to the NPT and the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by all States of the Middle East region, including Israel. We believe that it is crucial to abide by the 2012 deadline for the holding of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, by carrying out the Plan of Action for the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The 2012 conference will be a historic opportunity to trigger a process that will make it possible to free this zone of weapons of mass destruction. In that context, we welcome the appointment of the facilitator and of the host country,
as well as the consultations that have been convened, which we hope to see intensified so that the conference can be convened as soon as possible.

Morocco remains firmly convinced that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world requires the use of United Nations disarmament mechanisms, in particular the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The efficacy and the strength of these mechanisms depend, of course, on the political resolve of States, as well as on their compliance with the obligations and commitments they enter into. The lethargy that for years has been the hallmark of the Conference on Disarmament stands in marked contrast to the evolution of the international situation and the new security challenges that the world faces, which are undermining the shared goals of the international community, namely, the achievement of general and complete disarmament. We share the view that the problems of the CD are due to political events. We appeal for political flexibility so that the Conference can reach agreement on a programme of work that is balanced and makes it possible for the Conference to play its full role as a negotiating forum in the field of disarmament.

Based on a complete prohibition of nuclear tests, my country regrets the late entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In that regard, we reiterate our appeal to all States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty. Morocco, which from 2009 to 2011 worked together with France in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty, is encouraged by the new ratifications and the possible ratification by an annex 2 State.

In order to meet non-proliferation objectives and to enact the nuclear security measures that have been established by the relevant international entities in this field, it is crucial that all agreements be scrupulously and universally observed. Morocco welcomes the central role played by the IAEA in that regard. We call for support for those efforts and for increasing the Agency’s financial and human resources. While adapting to meet the new global challenges, strengthening these norms and standards, however, should not become in itself an obstacle to development and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for reasons of economic and social development. In this spirit, my country welcomes the outcome of the IAEA conference on nuclear safety, as well as the holding of the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security held at the initiative of the Secretary-General. We hope that the political will that was expressed on those two occasions will coalesce and lead to tangible measures that support the IAEA’s activities, in particular its Plan of Action for strengthening nuclear security.

Morocco welcomes the outcome of the Seoul Summit. We believe that our active participation in a number of multilateral initiatives, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the summit process on nuclear security, is a reflection of the importance that my country attaches to strengthening international and regional cooperation on nuclear security and on the fight against illicit trafficking in radioactive nuclear material. The exchange of expertise and experience in such initiatives helps to strengthen multilateral action in the field of non-proliferation and nuclear security. Accordingly, Morocco has organized a number of activities, including an international exercise on the response to a malicious act involving radioactive material, which was held in Rabat in March in collaboration with our international partners, including the IAEA.

One week from now, the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT will be held in Vienna. In the following months, the Review Conference of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the United Nations Conference on an Arms Trade Treaty will take place. All of those opportunities make it necessary that we demonstrate political will and harness our efforts in order to ensure a successful outcome to those meetings, showing our firm commitment to multilateralism in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that peace through disarmament is a common good of humankind and we must spare no effort in order to help build a nuclear-weapon-free world to help break away from the arms race and to focus instead on the fight against poverty, pandemics and the obvious environmental deterioration.

Mr. Cabral (Portugal): I would like to thank you, Madam President, for convening this important and timely meeting. This is indeed the right moment to take stock of international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security and to reaffirm our shared commitment to seek a safer world
for all. I also thank the Secretary-General for his statement and for his support.

Nuclear disarmament and preventing proliferation are at core of our common concerns when addressing international security priorities. Portugal is deeply committed to global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Like most countries around the world, we believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, represents a major threat to international peace and security, and we call for a coordinated and resolute response by the international community as a whole.

We are conscious of, and encouraged by, the enormous amount of work and resolute efforts that were accomplished in recent years. We stand by the basic deal that President Obama outlined in Prague three years ago to build on a consensus that all nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy, that nations with nuclear weapons have the responsibility to move towards disarmament, and that those without such weapons have the responsibility to forsake them. There have been positive developments, but it is crucial to continue advancing the agenda with energy and persistence. Nuclear-weapon States have to do more, and the non-proliferation regime has to be strengthened in a credible and verifiable way. In that regard, I will limit myself to a few key issues and priorities.

First, we have to reaffirm that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the core of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We have to build on the positive outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking forward the three pillars of the NPT in a comprehensive and balanced approach. The Treaty must be strengthened and must become universal. We must also promote and universalize the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency and ensure sufficient resources and means to enhance the monitoring and verification capabilities of the Agency.

Secondly, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a vital element of the international disarmament machinery. We urge all remaining States, especially those whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the Treaty’s entry into force, to renew their political commitment and to take all the necessary measures in order to achieve that crucial goal.

Thirdly, we have to address the risks posed by terrorist groups acquiring the equipment and the technology to produce a nuclear device. In that regard, we have to ensure the effective implementation of, and full compliance with, resolution 1540 (2004), as well as the enforcement of strict export controls for sensitive materials and technologies. We have to make full use of non-proliferation mechanisms, like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other international cooperative instruments, as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Fourthly, we are concerned about the paralysis in the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. A consensual programme of work should be formulated and negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty should begin without delay. In that regard, Portugal is convinced that the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference should be recognized as an important step to revitalize disarmament negotiations.

Finally, issues of security are indivisible and global. Compliance, enforcement and verification are key concepts to be put into practice if we want to move forward on those matters. We must strengthen mutual trust and confidence. That is why we attach great importance to the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East. We are confident of the necessary follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference to start a process for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

As recent events have shown, the Middle East is one of the most unstable regions in the world, where serious risks of internal and international conflict are present. Furthermore, any conflict in the region has a particular potential to reverberate in a much wider area, with a serious danger of increasing any confrontation. To add nuclear weapons to that situation only reinforces existing mistrust and fear. It is for that reason that I very much wish for the success of the diplomatic conference to be hosted by Finland. A successful outcome, which rests on the engagement and support of the countries in the region and other stakeholders, will substantially contribute to peace and stability at the regional as well as at the global level.

The United Nations has a pivotal role to play in nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security. In
that context, I would like to conclude by reaffirming Portugal's full support and active contribution to our common goals.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for his briefing. I would also like to thank you, Madam President, for your efforts in convening this meeting. Continuing to promote international nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and nuclear security is of great significance to the maintenance of international peace and security. China supports the Security Council in playing its role in that regard. With regard to the common efforts of the international community, the areas of arms control and non-proliferation have seen some positive developments. At the same time, the nuclear proliferation issue remains acute. We have a long way to go to achieve nuclear disarmament. The nuclear security situation remains grave. The international community needs to enhance its coordination and cooperation in that regard and join hands to face the challenge.

China believes that to maintain international peace and stability and to achieve general security in the world, we must uphold a new security concept based on mutual trust, benefit, equality and coordination, with a focus on building a peaceful and stable international environment, building inter-State relations based on mutual trust and understanding, adhering to multilateralism, consolidating collective security with the United Nations at its core, adhering to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and resolving hotspot problems and international disputes through dialogue and negotiations so as to eliminate the root cause of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

We must honestly address nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a balanced manner. We must vigorously promote the nuclear disarmament process, maintain global strategic balance and stability, and abandon nuclear deterrence policies based on the concept of first use of nuclear weapons to effectively reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. We must consolidate international nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms, fully respect the rights of countries to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and avoid double standards. At the same time, we must adhere to scientific and rational concepts of nuclear security, strengthen capacity-building in that regard, deepen international communication and cooperation, raise the global level of nuclear security and achieve the common goal of general nuclear security.

Safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region and promoting denuclearization on the peninsula are the common interest and responsibility of all. Dialogue and consultation is the only correct way to address the peninsula issue. We hope that all sides will make efforts to maintain and implement the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-United States 29 February common understanding. We also hope that all sides will maintain calm and show restraint, remain engaged in dialogue, commit to the Six-Party Talks, promote the denuclearization process in the shared interest of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Committing to dialogue and negotiation in addressing the Iran nuclear issue is of great significance for maintaining stability and peace and avoiding greater upheaval in the Middle East region. All sides must maintain the existing common understanding, engage in constructive dialogue, cooperate in good faith, gradually build mutual trust and eventually address the Iran nuclear issue in a comprehensive, just and appropriate manner.

Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and nuclear security are long-term tasks before us. China is prepared to work with the international community in strengthening communication and cooperation and make our contribution to promoting the relevant processes and building lasting peace and shared prosperity for all.

Mr. Wittig (Germany): At the outset, I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security. I would also like to thank him for his leadership in that important area over the years.

Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control play a key role in Germany's foreign and security policy. We are therefore pleased that those topics are high on the international agenda again. We see the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that the NPT is in need of constant strengthening.
In 2010, NPT States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty in all its aspects. The parties adopted a comprehensive Action Plan covering all three pillars of the Treaty. That outcome was extremely important at a time when the global non-proliferation regime had been confronted with serious proliferation challenges. The 2010 Action Plan sets a broad agenda. It spells out a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to make further efforts to advance the disarmament of all types of nuclear weapons, with the final objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Along the same lines, I should like to express my appreciation to the United States presidency, which has organized today’s important briefing at the Security Council. We welcome the opportunity to take stock of the achievements made during almost three years since the historic Security Council summit (see S/PV.6191) that adopted resolution 1887 (2009). In that resolution, the Council expressed its commitment to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. My Government actively supports the vision presented by President Obama in his 2009 Prague speech of “a world without nuclear weapons”. The entry into force of the New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation was a first step in the right direction. More steps towards that long-term goal are necessary. Together with partners in the 10-country Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Germany has made concrete proposals to promote the implementation of the key elements of the Action Plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

It is our firm belief that non-proliferation and disarmament are joint security interests of all nations and have to be pursued simultaneously. We also promote accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty with a view to its universalization.

Likewise, we hope for an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and urge the eight remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the CTBT. We see a fissile material cut-off treaty as the next crucial step towards achieving the ambitious goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We remain entirely engaged in supporting an early start of the negotiations. In that context, Germany wishes to see a Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that is working effectively.

Germany sees nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as mutually reinforcing processes — or, as we say, two sides of the same coin — based on our firm conviction that progress in disarmament can contribute to diminishing proliferation risks. At the same time, in order to make substantial disarmament possible, we need an effective non-proliferation regime.

We therefore cannot turn a blind eye to the ongoing proliferation crises. They threaten the very foundation of the global non-proliferation regime, in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They also endanger regional stability.

We are directly involved in the efforts with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme. Germany remains engaged in finding negotiated and sustainable solutions to the outstanding questions. We strongly advocate negotiations and dialogue to find a long-term comprehensive solution that restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The last meeting with Iran in Istanbul opened prospects for a new negotiation process. Our efforts in the framework of the E3+3 are aimed at facilitating a sustained and intensive process of serious dialogue. That dialogue must lead, in a short time, to concrete confidence-building measures based on reciprocity. We do not want talks for the sake of talks. We have to ensure that Iran meets all obligations, while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We are convinced that the measures taken played an essential role in moving Iran back to the negotiation table, so we must maintain the pressure.

On North Korea, the Security Council clearly stated, just a few days ago (see S/2012/PRST/13), that the recent launch using ballistic missile technology constituted a serious violation of its relevant resolutions. As further provocations cannot be ruled out, the international community must remain firm and united with regard to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: no more nuclear tests, no launches using ballistic missile technology, a retraction of the announcement of withdrawal from the NPT, the abandonment of existing nuclear programmes, and a swift return to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We will stay the course and remain firm in our efforts to leave no room for doubt that all countries
must be held accountable for their obligations under the NPT.

Both the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction lie at the very heart of Germany’s foreign and security policy. If the two were to merge, we would all be confronted with the most dangerous and devastating situation of our globalized world. We welcome that the Council, which is tasked to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security, has seized the opportunity today to deal with this sensitive issue of the utmost importance.

Of all of the non-proliferation initiatives that Germany is supporting, one deserves particular attention, in particular from the New York perspective. Under the wise leadership of my South African colleague, Ambassador Sangqu, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) helps States to prevent weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery from being proliferated to non-State actors. We welcome the 10-year extension of the mandate of that important Committee.

To demonstrate our support, Germany and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs are organizing a conference in Wiesbaden, to take place next week. At that conference, the Committee will seek direct interaction with relevant industries and industry groups on ways to jointly facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

Nuclear security is a precondition for nuclear non-proliferation. Securing nuclear material is a common global challenge. In an age marked by globalization and international terrorism, a lack of security in just one of our countries poses a serious threat to all of us. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.

Following the successful 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., on the protection of weapons-grade materials, we welcome the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, held less than a month ago. My Minister emphasized that we must now focus our efforts on civilian uses. They, too, pose a risk, especially with regard to the threat of a dirty bomb.

Almost every country in the world has radioactive sources for civilian purposes. Those are often indispensable in medicine, research and industry. We must, however, act to prevent their misuse and make sure that we have put in place the best possible security measures to safeguard nuclear materials.

Let me conclude by stressing the importance of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. Disarmament does not endanger our security, it increases it. So do non-proliferation and securing nuclear and radioactive materials. Those are the three pillars for greater global security and stable peace around the world. Let us continue to work together towards that end.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): As one of the more advanced nations from the standpoint of developing nuclear energy technologies, the Russian Federation attaches great importance to ensuring the maintenance of a high level of nuclear security, not only in our country but also worldwide. We are fully implementing our international obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security, and we reaffirm the political obligations in that context set forth in the final documents of the Nuclear Security Summits held in Washington, D.C., and Seoul.

In Russia, the physical protection of nuclear material remains at the requisite level. All nuclear material in our territory and corresponding installations has been provided with reliable, physical protection. On Russian territory, no nuclear material or installation entails a level of physical protection that could cause fear. Russia continues to enhance those protections according to the norms governing physical and technical nuclear security.

We are maintaining our consistent policy of supporting international efforts aimed at strengthening nuclear security across a broad spectrum on this topic, including through the organization in Russia of international training courses to train experts in that area on various subjects.

We are pleased with our engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on those issues. Our reaffirmed intention to support the Agency in that area is represented by our decision to earmark, beginning in 2010, annual voluntary contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.

The recent Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul saw the President of the Russian Federation announce Russia’s plan to hold in Russia, in the third
quarter of 2012, exercises under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism on the theme of curbing the illicit movement of nuclear material and radioactive sources. We anticipate that they will involve numerous representatives from Member States participating in the initiative from various regions worldwide. We also hope that they will serve as a concrete contribution to developing the unique and important area of ensuring physical nuclear safety.

In the area of nuclear crime, we are currently accelerating our work within the country as well as our international cooperation. We are strengthening our system for monitoring the movements of nuclear and radioactive materials, including customs controls. In the area of Murmansk, we are developing a pilot programme for the prevention of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials.

We have set forth in greater detail our achievements in the area of physical nuclear safety in our memorandum prepared for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, which has been published on the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It is unfortunate that, for various reasons, many countries have still not given due attention to those important issues.

The world continues to face the threat of nuclear terrorism and the possibility of trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. In that context, export-control measures are not always sufficiently effective. We are also concerned that States are not hurrying to assume their specific legal obligations in that area. In particular, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto, as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, have not yet become fully universal legal instruments.

The Russian Federation intends to build on its capacities in the area of nuclear energy, viewing it as one of the strategic areas for our country’s development. We are certain that despite the gravity of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, alternatives in the near future to nuclear energy do not exist. Without that, it will not be possible to meet the challenge of supplying humankind with energy.

As of today, among the major sources of energy, nuclear energy is not only environmentally friendly and cost-effective, it is also a safe source of energy — if one treats it responsibly, of course.

A mandatory condition for the use of nuclear energy is ensuring and maintaining a high level of physical and technical safety. The accident at Fukushima demonstrated the need to strengthen the international legal basis for ensuring the safety of nuclear energy facilities, in terms of building and operating such installations.

In that respect, in 2011 the Russian Federation introduced amendments to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and also initiated the strengthening of the IAEA nuclear safety standards. We are confident that the early adoption of our proposals will help to avoid or to minimize the negative consequences of nuclear accidents in the future.

Mr. Menan (Togo) (spoke in French): First of all, Madam President, I would like to welcome your country’s selection of the theme for this very important debate, which is directly in line with the international efforts aimed at supporting initiatives on non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Following the adoption of resolution 1887 (2009), which reaffirmed the leading role of the Security Council in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament, many events of no less importance have occurred on those topics, thereby proving the existence of a climate conducive to dialogue and negotiation. In that context, the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on 24 September 2010, preceded by the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., on 13 March 2010, may be cited as examples and as reaffirming multilateralism as the fundamental principle underpinning negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The entry into force of the new Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, on 5 February 2011, represents an important milestone in the process of reducing nuclear stockpiles. The Paris meeting on 30 June and 1 July 2011 of the five permanent members of the Security Council, as part of the 2005 London conference on confidence-building measures towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, has enabled the nuclear-weapon States to renew their
full support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. I should not fail to mention the latest Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul on 26 and 27 March. Togo welcomes those various initiatives, which attest to the growing political resolve of nuclear-weapon States and the international community to promote disarmament and non-proliferation.

Today’s debate is therefore taking place at a time when the international community is continuing its efforts to make further progress in those areas. Our enthusiasm, however, cannot conceal the fact that the non-proliferation regime is still facing considerable difficulties, in particular the threat of nuclear arms or materials falling into the hands of non-State actors, especially terrorists.

It is in that context that violations by certain States of their commitments continue to be of concern to my country inasmuch as they shake the confidence of the international community and undermine the integrity of the NPT regime. In that regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are particularly notorious and have also been subject to sanctions in connection with their nuclear programmes. The launch on 12 April of a missile by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, intended, it claimed, to be put into orbit as an Earth observation satellite, confirmed that that country has not halted the development of its military nuclear programme, despite the Council resolutions prohibiting it.

Iran, for its part, has continued to pursue its sensitive nuclear activities, according to the latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also in violation of the relevant resolutions of the Council. While we reaffirm the right of those and all other countries to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, Togo asks that they comply with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and with their commitments under the international legal instruments to which they are party. We also ask them to spare no effort in continuing good-faith negotiations aimed at reaching agreements that preserve the rights of all the parties and that help ensure international and regional peace and security.

While article IV of the NPT permits all countries to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, developing countries, in particular those in Africa, do not currently derive genuine benefit from that right, as the severe energy crises they have faced in recent years have shown. Besides helping them to deal with such energy issues, nuclear technology should be available for them to use in the fields of health, industry, agriculture and other related activities. Doing so would enable them to cope with the numerous challenges they face in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. My country believes, however, that African countries will be able to achieve those goals only in the context of cooperation with nations that possess such technology.

All States, whether or not they are parties to the NPT, should contribute to the global goal of disarmament by helping to create the necessary secure environment, to reduce regional tensions, to promote collective security, to ensure that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains solid and reliable and to make progress in all areas of disarmament. In that regard, my delegation wishes to reiterate its firm commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament, as well as to the elimination of all nuclear stockpiles. We remain convinced that cooperation in the field of non-proliferation must also involve strengthening the regime established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction. In addition to being a key element of the fight against terrorism, resolution 1540 (2004) is also a crucial instrument in combating weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, we welcome the efforts that the representative of South Africa, as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), has made in this area.

Multilateralism and international cooperation remain essential to achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. That is why negotiations on all matters involving disarmament and non-proliferation must be conducted in a spirit of openness and commitment, with the single aim of preserving international peace and security through the adoption of confidence-building measures and the protection of nuclear sites. We therefore believe that it is crucial that negotiations be resumed within the Conference on Disarmament on every subject area, including fissile material. The Conference can no longer be held hostage by a small minority of States at a time when humankind is haunted by the potential threat of terrorists acquiring such materials.
My country requests that the International Atomic Energy Agency continue to play a central role in negotiations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA remains the go-to international mechanism on issues of nuclear security, while giving international efforts coherence and consistency. It should therefore continue to receive sufficient financial resources.

In conclusion, Togo believes that the international community must spare no effort in responding more firmly to nuclear proliferation crises, supporting the work of the IAEA and pursuing concrete efforts towards achieving nuclear disarmament while also, as the NPT stipulates, cooperating in order to promote the responsible development of non-military nuclear technology.

Mr. Briens (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement and commend his personal commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation.

I would also like to thank you, Madam President, for organizing this debate. Three years after the Council’s groundbreaking summit on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of September 2009 (see S/PV.6191) and the unanimous adoption of resolution 1887 (2009), it is important that the Council address once again the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, which continues to be one of the chief threats to international peace and security.

Three years ago, along with the other heads of State and Government at the Council summit on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the President of France reiterated our commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to working with all States to establish the conditions necessary for a nuclear-weapon-free world, in accordance with the aims of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Various successes and initiatives testify to the new momentum that the international community has demonstrated since then. I am thinking, first of all, of the success of the NPT Review Conference held in May 2010. The adoption by consensus of a concrete, balanced Action Plan based on the three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear power — and on the Middle East, was a result of major importance. It demonstrated the shared commitment of the international community to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime, and is testament to its deep appreciation for the NPT, an irreplaceable instrument of our collective security.

That Action Plan is our shared road map for the years ahead; its implementation is the responsibility of all of us. It is up to each State party to fulfil its part of that contract so that we can move towards a safer world. France, together with its partners, the other four permanent members of the Council, is ready to shoulder its responsibilities.

We have made significant efforts with regard to nuclear disarmament, including quantitative reductions, irreversible steps, transparency and confidence-building measures, and having to do with doctrine.

Our willingness to work with other nuclear-weapon States is also quite clear. In July 2011 in Paris, France organized the first meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) to follow up the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That successful meeting made it possible once again to underscore the determination of the five nuclear-weapon States to pursue the implementation of concrete efforts aimed at ensuring full respect for the commitments undertaken with regard to the Treaty.

I also welcome the progress made during the discussions among the P-5 and the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with regard to the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. We hope that the Protocol will be signed very soon.

Moreover, I welcome the fact that the United States and the Russian Federation, the two countries whose arsenals constitute almost 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, agreed on important steps with the signing and entry into force of the New START agreement. We also welcome the recent ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular by Indonesia, which is an annex 2 State, as well as by Guatemala.

Additional success in other disarmament areas should also be underscored, such as the entry into force of the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions and the
positive outcome last December of the Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Some progress was also possible with regard to non-proliferation, including new ratifications of the Additional Protocol, the 10-year extension of the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) by resolution 1977 (2011), and developments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And, of course, we welcome the fact that, a few days following the Seoul Summit, meaningful efforts were made at the highest level to improve nuclear security and to better understand the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and the need to secure the most vulnerable sources. Those efforts must be pursued in the run-up to the third Summit, to be held in the Netherlands in 2014.

With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, many initiatives have been launched to promote nuclear safety following the accident at Fukushima. In that regard, I have in mind the adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Action Plan on Nuclear Security. France actively contributed to the Plan, in particular by organizing, in June 2011 in Paris, an international seminar on nuclear safety.

Lastly, with regard to the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, the preparatory process led by the facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, is moving in the right direction. We should all work together on conditions conducive to the holding of the Conference this year with all the stakeholders concerned.

All those efforts will be in vain if we do not respond to the current challenges facing the non-proliferation regime, and especially if we do not firmly address the serious proliferation crises before the Council. The number one priority is combating proliferation. Let us be clear: nuclear proliferation threatens the security of all. By undermining mutual confidence, it poses an obstacle to the development of civil nuclear cooperation. It also slows down progress on nuclear disarmament.

In order that the right of the vast majority of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy not be put into question, the international community must deal firmly with those who violate the common rules. Above all, that means responding to the major proliferation crises before the Council. The situation since September 2009 has not improved — far from it.

In November 2010, a secret enrichment programme was uncovered in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). As we know, with the launching of a missile in recent days, the Council was faced a new violation of those resolutions.

With regard to Iran, last Saturday in Istanbul the E3+3 resumed discussions with that country on its nuclear programme. The E3+3 were once again united in its determination to carry out a serious dialogue with Iran, with the goal of ensuring that the country responds to the concerns of the international community with regard to the nature of its programme and that it fully respects its international obligations. Future discussions will be important. Iran must take concrete steps to restore confidence, in accordance with the resolutions of the Council and of the IAEA Board of Governors.

More generally speaking, strengthening the non-proliferation regime is also a priority, including universalizing the IAEA safeguards system, in particular by general acceptance of the additional protocol. Lastly, we must take concrete steps to halt the spread of proliferation and continue our efforts to combat the threat posed by nuclear and radiological terrorism.

Secondly, we should also pursue disarmament efforts in every area. I should recall that France fully meets its responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are prepared to continue those efforts but, as recalled in resolution 1887 (2009), all of us should make progress together. Every State, whether it has nuclear weapons or not and whether or not it is a party to the NPT, should contribute to disarmament by creating the necessary security environment and making progress in all areas of disarmament.

With regard to nuclear disarmament in particular, there is indeed a need for reductions but, first of all, there is a need to stop arming. In addition to halting nuclear tests, that entails that all States concerned put an end to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and to dismantle the relevant facilities, as France has already done. That also requires that we step up our efforts to ensure that all States that have not yet done so ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and that the Disarmament Commission
immediately start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, and lastly, we must ensure the responsible and sustainable development of civil nuclear energy. In order to overcome the challenges of climate change, we cannot deprive ourselves of the contribution of nuclear energy. However, the Fukushima accident has reminded us that it is not possible to use nuclear energy without public confidence. It also shows the degree to which we need to strengthen safety rules throughout the world, as well as to put in place national and international capabilities to respond in the event of an accident. That is the reason that we should apply the most rigorous standards in the areas of non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, all the while promoting universal adherence to the conventions in force on nuclear responsibility.

Those are all things we can do, not in the distant future but in the months and years to come, in order to together create a safer world.

Mr. Rosenthal (Guatemala) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to thank you, Madam President, for convening this meeting on topics supposedly related to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. I say supposedly as a reflection of our disappointment that, after several days of discussing a draft presidential statement as the outcome document to crystallize the results of this meeting, nothing remains on the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. I say supposedly as a reflection of our disappointment that, after several days of discussing a draft presidential statement as the outcome document to crystallize the results of this meeting, nothing remains on the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. At any rate, we appreciate the concept paper (S/2012/194, annex) circulated by your delegation to substantiate our debate, Madam President, which by itself has the merit of focusing on the differences that persist on the matter between the members of the Council.

In spite of that, recent circumstances have demonstrated that it has become more pressing and necessary than ever to advance on the road towards a world free of nuclear weapons — a goal that your own head of State, Madam President, articulated in a visionary manner as the ultimate goal that we must aspire to. Nuclear disarmament is the only sensible way to forge a more secure world. Nothing would contribute more to reducing the risk of the proliferation or use of nuclear weapons than their total elimination.

With respect to the issues under consideration today, Guatemala’s position reflects that of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is contained in document S/2012/223. Allow me, however, to make some remarks in my national capacity.

Guatemala reaffirms the validity of the norms that underpin the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the commitments that we have undertaken, particularly in the framework of the Review Conferences of the parties to the Treaty, most recently in 2010. While it is true that the new challenges that we currently face have given rise to divergent views regarding our next steps, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Treaty was adopted as the cornerstone of disarmament, arms control and the peaceful prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Guatemala believes in the universality of the NPT and the strict observance of each of its provisions. We stress that compliance is a legal obligation and that all States parties must give clear evidence of their commitment to the spirit and the letter of that international legal instrument.

Furthermore, we deem it crucial to maintain the moratorium on nuclear tests until the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enters into force. We wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm our country’s support for the Treaty, which we signed on 20 September 1999 and ratified, as was recalled by the representative of France, on 12 January 2012.

We must devise ways to strengthen activities aimed at nuclear disarmament, which requires, above all, an expression of clear political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States, as well as a set of concrete, time-bound and verifiable actions that will make it possible to abandon the type of rhetoric that obliges us to acknowledge progress even as nuclear weapons continue to exist in vast quantities and attempts are being made to broaden their scope.

We note certain positive political signals emanating from the nuclear-weapon States that suggest their renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament at the bilateral and multilateral levels, and we hope that this will translate into concrete measures in the near future. In that respect, we view the New START treaty, signed between the United States and the Russian Federation, as a step in the right direction. In the same vein, we believe that initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and the agreements that were reached between the countries that participated in the Seoul and Washington, D.C., summits represent an important
contribution to the process of reviewing nuclear-weapons-related security doctrines.

We are convinced that to ensure that those agreements yield the best possible results, we must keep in mind at all times that just as progress must be made on nuclear disarmament, we must also make advances in the area of non-proliferation. In that regard, we the non-nuclear-weapon States must also comply with own responsibilities under the NPT, reaffirming our commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons while preserving our inalienable right to accede to, develop and, in future, participate in nuclear technologies for exclusively pacific uses.

On the other hand, nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking in nuclear material pose a grave threat to security, which must be addressed through a global commitment. It is imperative that all States comply with the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004).

Finally, all of these measures — in the areas of both disarmament and non-proliferation — must be implemented in an environment that is conducive to verification and transparency, with a view to restoring confidence among the parties to the Treaty. We therefore underline the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the verification of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Guatemala is proud to be a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone on the planet and has served as an example and an inspiration for the creation of other such zones. The consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean was also aimed at preserving the area from the risk of a nuclear threat.

In closing, we wish to affirm that this meeting represents an opportunity to assess the goodwill of all parties in terms of meeting and honouring their commitments and the resultant expectations. We must not renege on those commitments; rather, we must reaffirm the unequivocal pledges that have been made to date and address the new challenges that we face. It is on the basis of that understanding that together we must progress towards agreement on a common agenda to maintain international peace and security.

Mr. Sangqu (South Africa): At the outset, Madam President, allow me to thank your delegation for having convened this timely debate on the issues of nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament and nuclear security. My delegation also wishes to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing to the Council earlier today.

We align ourselves with the letter dated 13 April 2012 (S/2012/223) from the Chair of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the President of the Security Council.

It remains South Africa’s firm conviction that weapons of mass destruction do not guarantee security but, rather, detract from it. As long as those weapons exist, humanity will continue to face the threat of catastrophe. That conviction informs our firm commitment to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which are both key contributions to the system of collective security envisaged in the United Nations Charter. South Africa remains fully committed to a world free of nuclear weapons and to the multilateral system that seeks to advance that objective.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NPT represents a historic bargain between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States, in terms of which the former have undertaken to eliminate their nuclear weapons based on the reciprocal understanding by the latter not to pursue the nuclear weapons option.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, South Africa wishes to reiterate its principled position that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation should be parallel to simultaneous efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament. In acting on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations, we therefore believe that it is imperative for the Council to address both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation dimensions with equal vigour. In that regard, South Africa welcomes as a positive development the fact the Security Council again reaffirmed the need for all Member States to comply fully with their obligations and fulfil their commitments in relation to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.

While the implementation of all nuclear non-proliferation commitments no doubt remains essential, the attainment of true international peace and
security also requires the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments, while ensuring that the inalienable right of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is upheld. South Africa is of the view that non-nuclear-weapon States have on the whole made great strides in their efforts to implement their non-proliferation obligations, including pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). It is essential that nuclear-weapon States similarly abide by their own commitments and obligations.

While remaining firm in our view and in our resolve to combat proliferation, the international community must remain respectful of the need for developing countries to use nuclear energy in the context of sustainable and accelerated economic growth. Our approach to nuclear issues should also strike an acceptable balance between the concerns of States regarding their energy security and the non-proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies, while upholding the right enshrined in article IV of the NPT. State choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their fuel cycle policies.

South Africa welcomes the progress made by States to strengthen nuclear security at a national level and through the relevant multilateral organizations, especially the International Atomic Energy Agency. We should, however, remain vigilant regarding the continued risk posed by nuclear terrorism, illicit nuclear networks and criminal acts, and the use of nuclear or other radioactive material for malicious acts. South Africa believes that through a cooperative approach with the relevant multilateral organizations, the international community can effectively deal with those risks.

In conclusion, South Africa affirms that the international community needs to work together towards the goal of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. That endeavour should not be undercut by any process outside of the already established multilateral negotiating processes.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): We thank the United States of America for convening this meeting and we take note of the briefing by the Secretary-General.

Pakistan is fully committed to nuclear security. We are active participants in global nuclear security efforts and in the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on nuclear security. We have worked closely with other Governments within the Nuclear Security Summit process and have attended such Summits at the highest level. We have participated constructively in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and in its implementation and assessment group.

Pakistan’s perspective on nuclear security was clearly articulated last month by Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. He made the following major points.

The international community together has taken steps to create a secure world that will not live under the fear of nuclear terrorist attack. We firmly believe that nuclear materials must never fall into the hands of terrorists. National measures are the most important part of our efforts to enhance nuclear security. If nations do not move, nothing will move. If nations move feebly, nuclear risks increase many times. Nations need to move together and to learn from each other.

As a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Pakistan has been contributing substantively to the nuclear security framework. Our commitment is evidenced by our consistent observance of the IAEA Code of Conduct and our participation in the Agency’s illicit trafficking database.

Nuclear security within States is a national responsibility. Within this framework we have worked with international partners, and will continue to explore cooperation on nuclear security through voluntary national actions plans and in pursuance of international obligations. The existing international framework, which is quite extensive, covers the measures taken by the IAEA, by the United Nations and by various conventions and initiatives. The Nuclear Security Summit participants therefore agreed that there was no need for a new, parallel institution or mechanism for nuclear security. In that context, we
reaffirm the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA.

Pakistan’s nuclear security regime has four pillars.

First, we have a well-defined, robust command and control system, comprising the National Command Authority, the Strategic Plans Division and the Strategic Forces Command. That mechanism exercises control over all aspects of policy, procurement, operations and, most important, nuclear security. The Strategic Plans Division develops technical solutions, personnel reliability programmes and intelligence capabilities to deal with nuclear security, non-proliferation, accidents and weapons of mass destruction terrorism.

Secondly, we have a rigorous regulatory regime covering all matters related to nuclear safety and security, including physical protection of materials and facilities, material control and accounting, transport security, the prevention of illicit trafficking, border controls, and plans to deal with possible radiological emergencies. The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, an autonomous oversight body, regulates the safety and security of civilian nuclear materials and facilities. It works closely with the IAEA and benefits from its recommendations and guidance.

Thirdly, we have a comprehensive export control regime. Our export control laws are at par with international standards.

Fourthly, we engage in international cooperation consistent with our national policies and interests, as well as international obligations.

Pakistan is focused especially on capacity-building and interaction with the international community, in particular with the IAEA. We have established a centre of excellence for training that conducts specialized courses in nuclear security, physical protection and personnel liability. We have offered the centre as a regional and international hub for training. We are deploying special nuclear material portals at key entry-exit points to detect, deter and prevent illicit trafficking in radioactive materials. We are implementing our nuclear security action plan in cooperation with the IAEA. We have also developed a strong nuclear emergency response mechanism.

Pakistan fully supports the globally agreed objectives of promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We will continue to cooperate with all international efforts that seek to promote fair and equitable solutions to disarmament and non-proliferation challenges. Pakistan shares the majority view among the Members of the United Nations that the Security Council should refrain from assuming stewardship over global non-proliferation and disarmament issues. The Council, composed of 15 States, is not a representative body. Global disarmament and non-proliferation can be achieved in a more universal forum where all States have the right to participate, negotiate and evolve agreed outcomes.

Pakistan is a nuclear-weapon State and cannot accept unrealistic references, including in resolution 1887 (2009), calling for joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

We underline the importance of recognizing regional realities in South Asia and the need for mainstreaming non-NPT States into the NPT regime. Pakistan’s position on the fissile material cut-off treaty has been unequivocal. The Conference on Disarmament is not a single-agenda-item body. The Conference has more pressing agenda items, such as nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances, which have been pending matters for decades. Progress on those two most consequential matters would advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

We wish to recall that the Non-Aligned Movement, comprising 120 Member States, has transmitted its views on nuclear security as well as on the larger disarmament and non-proliferation issues. Those letters are contained in document S/2012/223. We fully support its contents and its annex.

Safe and sustainable nuclear energy is essential to advancing our economic agenda. In view of Pakistan’s growing energy needs and existing energy shortfall, and to respond to the future requirements of a growing population and economy, the National Command Authority has approved the Nuclear Power Programme-2050. We urge the international community to give Pakistan access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis.

Pakistan qualifies to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other export-control regimes. Last year, the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously approved the safeguards agreement in
connection with our two civil nuclear power plants. That shows the international community’s continued confidence in the safety standards and security measures maintained by Pakistan.

Mr. Parham (United Kingdom): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing earlier this morning. We all agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global peace and security. The recent Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea reinforced political will and mobilized the technical expertise necessary to fulfil the commitments made in Washington, D.C., two years earlier. In Seoul, we saw 53 countries make more than 100 new commitments to improving global nuclear security.

To maintain that momentum, we need a serious discussion around standards and common rules for nuclear security. To that end, we encourage countries to engage with international nuclear security initiatives and adhere to relevant conventions and for those that have not yet done so, to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We also encourage all States to work with and through the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the context of civilian nuclear use.

For our part, the United Kingdom Government is committed to the long-term objective of a world without nuclear weapons and has pledged to press for multilateral disarmament in line with our commitment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are determined to work with the international community to control proliferation, to make progress on multilateral disarmament, to build trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and to take tangible steps towards a safer and more stable world where countries with nuclear weapons ultimately are able to relinquish them.

The United Kingdom wants to work with the international community to tackle effectively those nuclear programmes of concern. On Iran, the United Kingdom is committed to a peaceful negotiated solution to the nuclear issue. We welcome the most recent round of E3+3 talks, on 14 April, as a first step towards that objective. We now need agreement on urgent practical steps to build confidence that Iran does not intend to build a nuclear weapon.

We are also deeply concerned about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s failed satellite launch on 13 April, which is a clear violation of resolution 1874 (2009). We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to suspend all missile and nuclear-related activity and to commit to re-engaging with the international community, including by returning to the Six-Party Talks. In that area, as in any other, all Member States should comply fully with their obligations under Security Council resolutions.

A fissile material cut-off treaty is a critical component of achieving the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. That treaty would put a stop to the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes and a limit on the amount of such material available globally. The United Kingdom is committed to achieving a fissile material cut-off treaty and to the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Unilaterally, we have had a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons since 1995. The international community expects progress. Let us be clear. Progress in the Conference on Disarmament in delivering meaningful negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty will determine the Conference’s continuing viability.

The United Kingdom continues to work to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to strengthen the non-proliferation architecture. We want to see a universal, strengthened, safeguards system, with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol as the universal standard and norm for verification. We are committed to supporting the expansion of civil nuclear use while ensuring that neither safety nor security is compromised, nor nuclear proliferation tolerated.

The United Kingdom looks to see the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Committee build on the success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, at which a cross-pillar Action Plan was agreed by consensus for the first time. We must maintain that positive momentum right through this review cycle to the 2015 Review Conference.

The Council has a unique responsibility to ensure that the atom is used for peace, and not as a threat to peace and security. Working with the wider United Nations community and Member States, we can ensure that agreed rules and norms are enforced and
commitments met so that nuclear proliferation is prevented, and the risk of nuclear terror with it, so that a world without nuclear weapons is made a reality and so that the atom is used to power development and stability, not conflict.

The President: I now shall make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the United States.

I want to thank the Secretary-General for his participation and leadership on this issue, as well as my fellow Council members for today’s discussion of an issue at the very top of our agenda and for their agreement to the presidential statement that I will read out shortly.

When it comes to the urgent nuclear threats we have discussed today, including nuclear terrorism, the Security Council must embrace its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As President Obama stated three years ago this month in Prague, the explosion of a single nuclear weapon would have catastrophic consequences for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy and even our very survival. We all share an interest in preventing and containing nuclear threats. During the Security Council’s historic September 2009 summit on non-proliferation and nuclear security (see S/PV.6191), heads of State reaffirmed that shared interest by adopting the landmark resolution 1887 (2009), which resolved, in its first preambular paragraph, to “seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”.

Resolution 1887 (2009) was the Council’s first comprehensive action on those issues since the mid-1990s. Building on the momentum of the 2009 summit, the Security Council and the world have made significant progress. In a historic first, the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons resulted in a final document that included a comprehensive Action Plan, adopted by consensus, on the steps to strengthen all three pillars of the Treaty.

There is no denying that the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As President Obama said in Seoul last month, “we’ve upheld the basic bargain of the NPT. Countries with nuclear weapons, like the United States and Russia, will move towards disarmament. Countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them. And all countries can have access to peaceful nuclear energy.”

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has continued to play an essential role in implementing safeguards and promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The combination of an NPT safeguards agreement and an additional protocol is widely recognized as the standard for strengthened IAEA safeguards.

To date, 115 States, including the United States of America, have brought into force an additional protocol granting to the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites. We continue to seek partners in the effort to expand and accelerate IAEA activities in order to strengthen the Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear activities.

In 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 1977 (2011), which extended the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) for an unprecedented 10 years. The 1540 Committee’s work to help States prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-State actors is a crucial part of the international non-proliferation regime. The United States fully supports 1540 implementation efforts and made a voluntary contribution of $3 million last year to promote the work.

Finally, the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, held in Washington, D.C., was followed by a second summit last month. More than 50 heads of State met in Seoul and reaffirmed their commitment to combat nuclear terrorism and increase nuclear security. The actions and commitments undertaken by participating States are being translated into tangible steps to protect against nuclear terrorism.

The United States is also strengthening global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The 2010 United States Nuclear Posture Review outlined our approach to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and pursuing the goal of a world without such weapons. Through the Posture Review we announced that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations. We also emphasized our collective interest in ensuring that the record of more than six decades of nuclear non-use continues forever.

The New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, which entered into force on 5 February 2011, is being implemented successfully. The Treaty illustrates yet again the strong commitment of the United States to meeting its disarmament obligations. When the Treaty is fully implemented, the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will reach their lowest level since the 1950s. The rigorous provisions of the New START agreement testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations.

Continuing the process of engagement by the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) established through the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P-5 conferences, the United States will host a P-5 conference in Washington, D.C., later this year to continue discussions on verification, transparency and confidence-building measures. The P-5 process now under way expands the long-standing United States-Russia nuclear disarmament dialogue into an ongoing process of P-5 engagement on issues related to nuclear disarmament, consistent with our obligations under article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is also an essential step towards a world without nuclear weapons. The United States remains committed to working towards our ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force. We continue to maintain our voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, which went into effect two decades ago. We call upon all States to refrain from nuclear explosive testing.

Despite those many multilateral and national efforts, much work remains to be done. We must continue to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security efforts. We cannot let our guard down.

Certain countries continue to pursue nuclear-weapon capabilities, in violation of Security Council resolutions and contrary to the clearly expressed will of the international community. The dangers we face and the price of complacency remain much too high. We cannot, for example, allow the NPT to be weakened by tolerating non-compliance with its requirements or violations of international safeguards agreements. The implications of any case of non-compliance, whether by North Korea or Iran, concern more than just the offending country and its neighbours. Every violation of the NPT has the potential, if left unchecked, to erode confidence in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We cannot, and we will not, let that happen.

Beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty is the next logical step in nuclear arms control. It is therefore a great disappointment that, due to one country, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to agree to move forward. The Conference should agree to commence negotiations without further delay.

We must also sharpen our commitment to nuclear safety and security. The terrible accident at the Fukushima plant last year was a reminder of our shared vulnerability as much of the world looks increasingly to nuclear power to fuel economic growth and development.

The choice safely to develop and maintain nuclear power is, and should remain, a national one. However, we will continue strongly to support international efforts, led primarily by the IAEA, to facilitate better nuclear safety training and cooperation and to improve accident response capacities. The United States believes that it has a moral responsibility to lead and act now, in cooperation with members of the Council and the international community, to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Today’s meeting and draft presidential statement mark a milestone on that path. As President Obama remarked in Seoul last month, “no one nation can do this alone.”

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

After consultations among members of the Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on their behalf:

“The Security Council reaffirms that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

“The Security Council remains gravely concerned about the threat of terrorism, and the risk that non-State actors may acquire, develop,
traffic in or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

“The Security Council reaffirms the need for all Member States to comply fully with their obligations and fulfil their commitments in relation to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

“The Security Council reaffirms its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim it is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States Parties to those treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability.

“The Security Council reaffirms resolution 1540 (2004), which affirms that States shall take effective measures to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, recognizes States’ progress in implementing resolution 1540 (2004), endorses the work carried out by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and, in that regard, recalls resolution 1977 (2011), which extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee for 10 years.


“The Security Council welcomes the commitments made by Nuclear Security Summit participants to take national actions, as appropriate, to increase nuclear security domestically and to work through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to improve nuclear security and encourages all States to take national actions to this end.


“The Security Council recalls that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and renews its call on all States to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

“The Security Council affirms the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework and also supports the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013.

“The Security Council welcomes the adoption of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, recalls the IAEA June 2011 ministerial conference on nuclear safety and the September 2011 United Nations high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security convened by the Secretary-General and values various international initiatives and efforts to that end.

“The Security Council affirms the essential responsibility and central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security framework and also supports the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013.


“The Security Council recognizes the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

“The Security Council emphasizes the importance of the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.


“The Security Council encourages States to participate in the IAEA illicit trafficking database programme.

“The Security Council appreciates the efforts of the International Criminal Police Organization in the field of countering illicit nuclear trafficking, including through the
establishment of its radiological and nuclear terrorism prevention unit.

“The Security Council takes note of international efforts towards preventing the financing of proliferation-related activities and takes note of the work of the Financial Action Task Force.

“The Security Council welcomes the establishment of the European Union chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk mitigation centres of excellence.

“The Security Council calls upon States that have not yet done so to submit a first report on implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), and encourages all States to provide, when appropriate or upon the request of the 1540 Committee, additional implementation information.

“The Security Council calls upon all States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the Amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and purposes of the Amendment until such time as it enters into force, and also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt its Amendment as soon as possible.

“The Security Council encourages all States that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encourages discussions among States parties to consider measures to effectively implement the Convention.

“The Security Council underlines the importance for States to share best practices with a view to improved nuclear security practices to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks, encourages all States to implement the IAEA's most current recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5), encourages efforts to secure radioactive sources, and calls for States to support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013 and to make voluntary contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund.

“The Security Council calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, including relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States in the position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard.

“The Security Council, in this regard, encourages States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to strengthen export controls, to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, to prevent proliferation financing and shipments and to secure sensitive materials.

“The Security Council encourages all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert to the use of low-enriched uranium fuels and targets research reactors and radioisotope production processes taking into account the need for assured supplies of medical isotopes.”

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2012/14.

There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.