



# General Assembly

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## Sixty-third session

Agenda item 118

**Programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009**

### **Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council**

**Thematic cluster I. Special and personal envoys, special advisers and personal representatives of the Secretary-General and Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

**Report of the Secretary-General**

**Addendum**

#### *Summary*

The present report sets out the proposed resource requirements for 2009 for seven special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, special advisers to the Secretary-General and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon.

The estimated requirements for 2009 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$16,385,900. After taking into account the estimated balance of \$1,357,700 expected to remain unencumbered for the seven missions at the end of 2008, the additional requirements being sought for the seven missions amount to \$15,028,200.



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## I. Financial overview

1. The estimated requirements for 2009 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$16,385,900 (net). Requirements by mission are set out in the table below.

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>1 January to 31 December 2008</i>			<i>Requirements for 2009</i>			<i>Variance analysis 2008-2009</i>
	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>Variance</i>
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	781.9	614.8	167.1	753.2	586.1	—	(28.7)
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	298.5	1 625.3	(1 326.8)	4 321.8	5 648.6	29.0	4 023.3
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	1 595.0	1 143.3	451.7	1 332.5	880.8	—	(262.5)
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	867.4	585.4	282.0	628.4	346.4	—	(239.0)
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	931.0	690.6	240.4	852.0	611.6	—	(79.0)
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	7 159.1	5 899.8	1 259.3	6 722.8	5 463.5	524.3	(436.3)
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord's Resistance Arm-affected areas	1 846.8	1 562.8	284.0	1 775.2	1 491.2	—	(71.6)
<b>Total</b>	<b>13 497.7</b>	<b>12 122.0</b>	<b>1 357.7</b>	<b>16 385.9</b>	<b>15 028.2</b>	<b>553.3</b>	<b>2 906.2</b>

## II. Special political missions

### A. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar

(\$753,200)

#### Background, mandate and objective

2. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar was appointed in accordance with the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, most recently in its resolution 62/222, to continue to provide his good offices, to pursue his discussions on the situation of human rights and the restoration of democracy with the Government and the people of Myanmar, including all relevant parties to the national reconciliation process, and to offer technical assistance to the Government in this regard.

3. After two years without high-level dialogue between the United Nations and Myanmar, the then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs visited Myanmar twice, in May and November 2006, in the context of the Secretary-General's good-offices mandate and at the invitation of the Government. On both occasions, the Under-Secretary-General met with the senior leadership and Government counterparts and with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Following those visits, the Government made progress on some issues, including the release of some political prisoners in November 2006 and January 2007 and an agreement reached with the International Labour Organization in February 2007 on a mechanism to address complaints of forced labour.

4. On 22 May 2007, the Secretary-General designated his Special Adviser for the International Compact with Iraq and Other Political Issues to serve as his Special Adviser on Myanmar to continue to pursue the good offices mandate given by the General Assembly. Upon his appointment, the Special Adviser engaged in extensive consultations with key interested Member States, including through visits to capitals in the region, to ensure broad international support for the implementation of the Secretary-General's good offices.

5. Following the Government's response to popular protests in August and September 2007, the Special Adviser visited Myanmar in October 2007 at the invitation of the Government, to find ways to resolve the crisis and to strengthen engagement and dialogue between the Government, the opposition, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and other parties to the national reconciliation process. In his discussions with the Government of Myanmar, the Special Adviser urged the Government: (a) to resume dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi; (b) to broaden the political process with a view to enhancing its credibility and inclusiveness; and (c) to find ways to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations in the humanitarian, socio-economic and governance areas.

6. The Special Adviser returned to Myanmar in November 2007, at the invitation of the Myanmar Government, to pursue his discussions with the authorities of Myanmar and other interlocutors on outstanding issues and initial results, including, measures taken by the Government to reduce tensions in the wake of demonstrations, the release of persons detained during the demonstrations and the appointment by the Government of a Minister for Liaison with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the meetings that followed between them. He also engaged with the Government on socio-economic and governance issues.

7. Following the completion of the National Convention in September 2007 and the establishment of a constitution-drafting committee in December 2007, the Government of Myanmar announced on 9 February 2008 that a draft Constitution had been completed. The draft Constitution was adopted in a national referendum on 10 and 24 May 2008.

8. At the invitation of the Government, the Special Adviser returned to Myanmar in March 2008 to continue his consultations with the Government, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and political parties, as well as to discuss the issues related to the socio-economic situation of the country. Following the devastation caused by cyclone Nargis, which struck Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008, the Secretary-General visited Myanmar on 22 and 23 May and engaged with the Government on humanitarian issues in connection with the natural disaster. He returned to Myanmar on 25 May to preside over a pledging conference organized in Yangon. The

Secretary-General expressed his commitment to broaden and deepen his good offices to address the challenges ahead.

9. In 2009, the Special Adviser and his team will accord priority to consolidating the political process and promoting dialogue to achieve national reconciliation. In this regard, the efforts of the Special Adviser and his team will focus on ensuring the resumption of dialogue between the Government and other actors, notably Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic minority groups, including armed groups. There will also be a focus on broadening the political process and ensuring the conduct of credible and inclusive elections. In addition, the increased engagement of the good offices will focus on strengthening and regularizing cooperation between the United Nations and the Myanmar authorities in the human rights, socio-economic and governance areas. Furthermore, a continued cooperative dialogue with Myanmar's important neighbours, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other concerned Member States will continue to be a priority for the work of the Special Adviser.

10. In implementing the mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General by the General Assembly, the Special Adviser cooperates and works closely with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the country team in Yangon, as well as other entities of the United Nations system. It has become established practice for the Special Adviser to meet with members of the country team when he visits Myanmar and for the Resident Coordinator and other members of the country team to meet regularly with the Office of the Special Adviser when they visit Headquarters. The Special Adviser also consults with relevant United Nations officials and entities to ensure coordinated engagement by the various parts of the United Nations system on Myanmar.

11. As part of the implementation of the good-offices mandate, the Special Adviser also consults regularly with key interested Member States, including through visits to neighbouring countries and other countries of the region and through focused discussions in the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, which was established in December 2007. It has also become established practice for the Special Adviser to report to the President of the General Assembly upon return from his visits to Myanmar. At the invitation of the President of the General Assembly in December 2007, the Special Adviser briefed the General Assembly in an informal meeting on the situation in Myanmar. The Secretary-General remains committed to providing his good offices and to pursuing discussions with the Government and the people of Myanmar on the situation of human rights, the national reconciliation process and the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. In this context, the Secretary-General has expressed his commitment to broaden and deepen the scope of his good offices to address the various challenges ahead.

12. The good-offices efforts of the Secretary-General will no longer be required when national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar are achieved on the basis of the participation of all parties concerned and in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Until that objective is achieved, it is anticipated that the General Assembly, during its sixty-third session, will extend the

mandate of the Secretary-General to continue to pursue his good-offices role to facilitate the process.

13. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

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**Objective:** To advance the national reconciliation and democratization process in Myanmar.

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*Expected accomplishments*

*Indicators of achievement*

(a) Progress towards national reconciliation, including the restoration of the freedom of movement of political and other leaders	(a) (i) Release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her deputy from house arrest  <i>Performance measures:</i> 2007: 0 releases Estimate 2008: 0 releases Target 2009: 2 releases  (ii) Release of other political prisoners  <i>Performance measures:</i> 2007: limited releases of political prisoners Estimate 2008: limited releases of political prisoners Target 2009: release of most political prisoners  (iii) Increased dialogue among the Government, the National League for Democracy and ethnic minority and non-ceasefire groups  <i>Performance measures:</i> 2007: 4 dialogues Estimate 2008: 4 dialogues Target 2009: 8 dialogues  (iv) Agreement between the United Nations and the Government on a framework for broad-based national economic dialogue  <i>Performance measures:</i> 2007: 0 agreements Estimate 2008: 0 agreements Target 2009: 1 agreement
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(b) Progress towards the restoration of democracy, including the reinstatement of political activities

(b) (i) Establishment of sound guidelines for the registration of political parties

*Performance measures:*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: not applicable

Target 2009: 1 set of guidelines

(ii) Establishment of an independent election commission

*Performance measures:*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: not applicable

Target 2009: 1 commission

(iii) Adoption of an inclusive and sound electoral law

*Performance measures:*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: not applicable

Target 2009: 1 electoral law

(iv) Reopening of the offices of the National League for Democracy (NLD) throughout the country

*Performance measures:*

2007: 1 NLD office

Estimate 2008: 1 NLD office

Target 2009: 50 per cent of NLD offices

(c) Progress towards improvement of the socio-economic situation and the advancement of good governance

(c) (i) Agreement between the United Nations and the Government on the establishment of the national economic forum

*Performance measures:*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: not applicable

Target 2009: 1 agreement

*Outputs*

- Regular engagement and consultations with the Government of Myanmar and other relevant parties on the national reconciliation process. Regular engagement and consultations with key interested Member States, including countries of the region and neighbouring States, to develop common approaches in addressing the situation in Myanmar
- Annual report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and to the Human Rights Council
- Briefings by the Special Adviser to the General Assembly and, as requested, to the Security Council
- Technical assistance to the Government, upon request, on the establishment of an electoral framework, including an electoral commission and election laws
- Technical assistance to the Government, upon request, in advancing good governance and rule of law

**External factors**

14. The good-offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through the Special Adviser, is expected to achieve its objective provided that the Government of Myanmar and other relevant parties to the national reconciliation process have the willingness and commitment to reach a political solution and that the international community, especially the countries of the region, provide support for the Secretary-General's efforts.

**Resource requirements**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1 January to 31 December 2008</i>			<i>Requirements for 2009</i>			<i>Variance analysis</i>
	<i>Appropriations</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Net requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>Variance</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)=(1)-(2)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(4)-(3)</i>	<i>(6)</i>	<i>(7)=(4)-(1)</i>
Civilian personnel costs	493.5	345.4	148.1	501.1	353.0	—	7.6
Operational costs	288.4	269.4	19.0	252.1	233.1	—	(36.3)
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>781.9</b>	<b>614.8</b>	<b>167.1</b>	<b>753.2</b>	<b>586.1</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(28.7)</b>

15. The estimated requirements in 2009 for the Special Adviser amount to \$753,200 net (\$837,700 gross). This amount would provide for the salaries and common staff costs of three existing positions (\$501,100), travel of staff (\$236,200) and communications, information technology and supplies (\$15,900).

16. Of this amount, \$167,100 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirements for the Special Adviser on Myanmar for 2009 amount to \$586,100. The savings are due mainly to the delayed recruitment of the P-4 and the General Service (Other level) posts, the encumbrance of the P-4 position at a lower level (P-3) for seven months and reduced requirements for consultancy services during 2008.

## Staffing requirements

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Local</i>		
										<i>Security Service</i>	<i>Service</i>		<i>Officers</i>	<i>level</i>		
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

17. The total staffing for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar for 2009 will remain unchanged.

## B. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$4,321,800)

### Background, mandate and objective

18. The question of Cyprus has been on the United Nations agenda for over four decades and remains unresolved despite numerous initiatives undertaken by the United Nations and the international community to support Cypriot efforts towards a comprehensive settlement. The most recent large-scale United Nations effort to assist in the efforts aimed at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem culminated in separate simultaneous referendums on the island in April 2004, in which the comprehensive settlement plan put before voters did not pass. A period of relative inactivity followed, until the United Nations began to step up once more its level of engagement in 2006.

19. The February 2008 elections in Cyprus brought to power Dimitris Christofias, who, immediately upon assuming office, expressed his intention to reach out to the Turkish Cypriots and their leadership. For his part, Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, congratulated Mr. Christofias and expressed hope for the start of a new era in Cyprus. On 21 March 2008, only three weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Christofias, the two leaders met and agreed on a path towards a comprehensive settlement. The agreement also entailed the establishment of a number of working groups to consider the core issues pertaining to an eventual settlement plan, and of technical committees to seek immediate solutions to everyday problems arising from the division of the island.

20. At the request of the Secretary-General, in late March 2008 the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs undertook a mission to Cyprus, as well as Athens and Ankara, with a view to determining how best the United Nations could assist Cypriots in the new process launched by their leaders. All parties confirmed their commitment to reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem under the Secretary-General's auspices and their willingness to engage fully and in good faith to achieve that goal. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs briefed the Security Council on 15 April, expressing his confidence that the Secretary-General would at the appropriate time decide to appoint a high-level

envoy (special adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus) to facilitate the negotiating process. On 17 April, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/9) in which it warmly welcomed the agreement reached by the leaders as well as the readiness of the Secretary-General to assist the parties in Cyprus, and the prospect of the appointment of a special adviser to facilitate movement towards a comprehensive settlement.

21. On 14 April 2008, the representatives of the two leaders requested the United Nations in writing to “provide the required infrastructure and personnel support to allow the parties to carry forward the process” leading to a comprehensive settlement. More specifically, at meetings between the representatives of the leaders and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), it was agreed that the United Nations would assist the parties through the provision of facilitators, meeting venues and logistical support. The six Working Groups (on governance and power-sharing; European Union matters; security and guarantees; territory; property; and economic matters) and seven Technical Committees (on crime and criminal matters; economic and commercial matters; cultural heritage; crisis management; humanitarian matters; health; and environment) began meeting on 22 April, and by late June had convened more than 180 times.

22. During the preparatory process, members of the Working Groups and Technical Committees were tasked with identifying to the greatest extent possible areas of both convergence and disagreement, while preparing options, where feasible, on the more sensitive elements for the two leaders to consider, once formal negotiations begin; and, on the technical issues, to seek immediate solutions to everyday problems arising from the division of the island. The leaders’ representatives act as an interface between the Working Groups and the Technical Committees on the one hand, and the leaders, on the other. The leaders will ultimately use the results of the Working Groups and the Technical Committees during their talks, and will address outstanding elements. It is envisaged that the leaders will also be able to call on further technical support from the Working Groups and Technical Committees, once full-fledged negotiations commence.

23. On 23 May, the leaders held another meeting and issued a joint statement reconfirming their commitment to a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions”. They also said in the statement that the “partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status”. The two leaders instructed their representatives to review the work of the Technical Committees within 15 days and consider other confidence-building measures.

24. In his June 2008 report to the Security Council on the United Nations Operations in Cyprus (S/2008/353), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the positive and rapid developments on the island, and expressed his firm commitment to helping the parties in Cyprus move forward to the formal talks as expeditiously and smoothly as possible.

25. On 13 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 1818 (2008), extending the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 December 2008. The resolution urged the parties to build on the existing momentum and continue their efforts to identify to the greatest possible extent areas of convergence and disagreement, while preparing

options where feasible on the more sensitive elements, and to work to ensure that full-fledged negotiations can begin expeditiously and smoothly, in line with the agreement of 21 March and the joint statement of 23 May.

26. On 20 June, the leaders' advisers announced six confidence-building measures in the areas of cultural heritage, environment, health and road safety, which emanated from the Technical Committees. They also announced that the leaders would meet on 1 July in accordance with the joint statement of 23 May.

27. During their meeting on 1 July, the leaders undertook the first review of the work of the Working Groups and Technical Committees and agreed to meet again on 25 July to undertake a final review. For the purpose of the present report, it is assumed that by January 2009 full-fledged negotiations will be in progress, assisted by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General.

28. In his letter dated 10 July 2008 to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456), the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to appoint Alexander Downer as his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008. The President of the Council, in his letter of 14 July 2008 (S/2008/457), informed the Secretary-General that members of the Council had taken note of the intention expressed in his letter.

29. In order to ensure coherent and effective support for the peace effort, there will be maximum synergy among the members of the United Nations family. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission of UNFICYP will act as Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on issues relating to the Secretary-General's good offices and will continue to coordinate and be the conduit for support provided by UNFICYP and the United Nations country team to the Secretary-General's good offices.

30. With regard to UNFICYP, the substantive pillars (civil affairs, military, civilian police) will support the good-offices efforts through expertise and institutional knowledge, in particular by assisting the parties in devising and implementing confidence-building measures; administrative and infrastructure support will also be provided.

31. Regarding the United Nations country team, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will coordinate expertise from various sources, including the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and United Nations agencies, inter alia the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in order to contribute to efforts to create an enabling environment for full-fledged negotiations. In sum, all United Nations efforts will be directed, through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission, acting in his capacity as Deputy Special Adviser, to support the Secretary-General's good offices and the final expected outcome of a mutually agreed comprehensive settlement.

32. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

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**Objective:** To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

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*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

Progress in the full-fledged negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement

(i) Parties reaching agreement on core and substantive issues

*Performance measures:* increased number of meetings between the leaders

2007: 1 meeting

Estimate 2008: 10 meetings

Target 2009: 40 meetings

(ii) Intensified discussions in the Technical Committees and Working Groups, as well as at the level of the representatives of the two leaders

*Performance measures:*

(a) Increased number of meetings between the representatives of the leaders

2007: 22 meetings

Estimate 2008: 50 meetings

Target 2009: 100 meetings

(b) Increased number of meetings of the Working Groups and Technical Committees

2007: 0 meetings

Estimate 2008: 600 meetings

Target 2009: 1,000 meetings

(iii) Implementation of confidence-building and other agreed measures

*Performance measures:* increased number of implemented confidence-building measures

2007: 0 measures

Estimate 2008: 25 measures

Target 2009: 50 measures

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*Outputs*

- Facilitation of full-fledged negotiations at the level of leaders
- Advisory services at the highest level on substantive issues in support of full-fledged negotiations
- Briefings for the diplomatic community on the island and special envoys for the Cyprus question
- In-depth assessment of the political situation in Cyprus and in the region

- Facilitation on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues in support of the activities of the Working Groups and Technical Committees
- Press releases, press conferences: press meetings with the Cypriot press; press releases, establishment and maintenance of contact with the media; daily press reviews and media analysis
- Reports to and briefings of the Security Council (4)

### External factors

33. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that the current political will of the leaders prevails and that there is continuing support from the international community.

### Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
Civilian personnel costs	173.1	786.4	(613.3)	3 304.6	3 917.9	—	3 131.5
Operational costs	125.4	838.9	(713.5)	1 017.2	1 730.7	29.0	891.8
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>298.5</b>	<b>1 625.3</b>	<b>(1 326.8)</b>	<b>4 321.8</b>	<b>5 648.6</b>	<b>29.0</b>	<b>4 023.3</b>

34. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus for 2009 amount to \$4,321,800 net (\$4,804,400 gross). This amount would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the 3 existing positions as well as the establishment of 21 new positions (\$3,304,600), travel of staff (\$442,000), facilities and infrastructure, including utilities and acquisition of equipment and supplies (\$155,300), air transportation (\$32,100), rental and maintenance of vehicles (\$130,100), communications and public information services (\$183,600), information technology services (\$24,900) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$49,200).

35. Owing to developments in Cyprus during 2008, the Office of the Special Adviser began its expansion after a request for support was received from parties involved in the peace process. The amount of \$1,326,800 has been redeployed from projected unencumbered balances within the approved appropriation for special political missions in 2008 to cover the additional requirements in 2008. Therefore, the overall funding requirements for the Special Adviser in 2009 amount to \$5,648,600 net (\$6,240,100 gross).

## Staffing requirements

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officers</i>			<i>Local level</i>
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	1	4	7	1	—	14	3	4	21	—	3	—	24
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	1	4	6	1	—	12	3	3	18	—	3	—	21

36. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus is the most senior official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1250 (1999). In 2008 significant progress has been made. The Cypriot leaders agreed on a path towards a comprehensive settlement through the establishment of 13 Working Groups and Technical Committees, which were tasked with preparing the ground for negotiations on a settlement under United Nations auspices. In order to implement the expanded tasks, the following additional positions are proposed for establishment:

(a) Fifteen substantive positions: a Coordinator (D-1); four Thematic Experts for committees (P-5); six Facilitators for technical workshops (P-4); a Political Affairs Officer (P-3); and three General Service (Other level);

(b) Three administrative positions: Drivers (General Service (Local level)) to drive and maintain the vehicles rented for the Office of the Special Adviser;

(c) Three security positions: Security Officers (Field Service) to provide close protection to the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General.

### C. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$1,332,500)

#### Background, mandate and objective

37. Following the Security Council's invitation to the Secretary-General in its resolution 1366 (2001) to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Secretary-General, in his letter dated 12 July 2004 (S/2004/567), informed the President of the Council of his decision to appoint a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply of 13 July 2004 (S/2004/568), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's decision.

38. According to the outline of the mandate contained in the annex to the aforementioned letter of the Secretary-General, the Special Adviser's responsibilities are the following: (a) to collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not

prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; (b) to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide; (c) to make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide; and (d) to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.

39. The primary normative reference of the work of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide is drawn from, in addition to the exchange of letters, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the wider body of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law; and resolutions of the General Assembly, Security Council and Human Rights Council, including the 2005 World Summit Outcome, as adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/1.

40. At the end of May 2007, the Secretary-General appointed his new Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, in a continuing effort to strengthen the United Nations role in this area. Since his appointment, the Special Adviser has consulted actively on his mandate both within the Secretariat and with Member States. In his consultations, the Special Adviser has relied upon a positive approach to sovereignty as responsibility, as reflected in Member States' commitment in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome to a responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Office of the Special Adviser seeks to carry out its activities through support for States and United Nations departments in meeting their responsibilities to protect populations from genocide.

41. During 2008, the Office of the Special Adviser, in consultation with United Nations departments and programmes, Member States and experts, developed a strategy and methodology paper, building upon the strategic approach of the Special Adviser's predecessor. The Special Adviser conducted a mission to Kenya, briefed the Secretary-General on his analysis and discussed the situation with the Permanent Representative of Kenya. The Special Adviser participated in regional expert consultations on concerns related to his mandate in Ethiopia and South Africa. Furthermore, he maintained close contact with the special representatives of the Secretary-General in relevant peacekeeping missions and provided guidance to the Department of Public Information on indicators for and the prevention of hate speech and incitement.

42. The Office of the Special Adviser participated in numerous public international and academic events, maintained contact with civil society organizations and non-governmental groups involved in early warning activities and contributed to the dissemination of information on genocide prevention through media events and opinion pieces published with the assistance of the Department of Public Information.

43. In 2009, the Office will seek constructive engagement with Member States and promote cooperation in the detection of the precursors of genocide and best practices from those countries that have averted such mass atrocities. Constructive engagement, consensus-building and transparency are fundamental tools of the Office of the Special Adviser in coordinating and leading international efforts to support States in preventing large-scale atrocities and genocide. On the basis of the

methodology developed, the Special Adviser will focus on three activities: awareness-raising; monitoring and response; and the building of capacity worldwide to prevent genocide.

#### **Awareness-raising**

44. Raising awareness about generic and specific situations is a preventive measure that will be carried out in collaboration with Member States, academic and research institutions, human rights and humanitarian organizations, the United Nations system and others concerned with the prevention of genocide. It will be conducted through a process of country and regional consultations. Awareness-raising will also involve dissemination of information about the Office of the Special Adviser and its role as a catalyst in engaging Governments and other actors constructively to take preventive action.

#### **Monitoring and response**

45. In cases of genocide, there is an element of zero-sum identity conflict, emanating not from mere differences but from perceptions of and actual disparities, discrimination and gross inequalities. Monitoring will draw upon relevant human rights, political, development and humanitarian information, including the reports of the Human Rights Council's universal periodic review, treaty bodies and special procedures, with particular attention to generic indicators and contexts.

46. As needed, the Office of the Special Adviser will present situations of concern and pertinent recommendations to the Secretary-General and other senior officials. In addition, the Office may conduct advocacy in support of prevention, including towards State authorities and the international community at the United Nations.

47. A strategic contribution by the Office of the Special Adviser will be to ensure that risks of large-scale violence are understood and given the appropriate priority by both the Secretariat and Member States at the United Nations.

#### **Capacity-building**

48. The Office of the Special Adviser serves as a catalyst to identify, draw attention to and strengthen key elements of capacity that help States and United Nations entities contribute to the prevention of genocide. The Office will encourage relevant parties of the United Nations system to assist States in establishing the framework necessary to ensure genocide prevention and to explore approaches that promote increased United Nations collaboration with regional actors.

49. During 2008, the Office of the Special Adviser continued to operate in close collaboration with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and deepened its exchanges and collaboration with the European Union and the African Union. Moreover, the Special Adviser participated in the Executive Committee on Peace and Security and the Interdepartmental Framework Team, providing participants with guidance on genocide prevention and requesting information relevant to his mandate; discussions of the Policy Committee that had a bearing upon his mandate; and a number of interdepartmental task forces and working groups on issues related to the mandate, including several pertaining to specific

peacekeeping operations. At the request of the Human Rights Council, the Special Adviser submitted a report and made a presentation to the Council.

50. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Adviser are presented below.

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**Objective:** To prevent massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of a national, ethnic, racial or religious character that could lead to genocide.

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*Expected accomplishments*

*Indicators of achievement*

(a) Greater awareness by State, non-State and regional actors of the importance of prevention and situations and conditions that could lead to genocide

(a) (i) Increased number of new State, non-State and regional actors engaged in analysing indicators of massive and serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law of an ethnic, racial, national or religious character, as well as the development of possible mitigating factors

*Performance measures:*

2007: 20 actors

Estimate 2008: 25 actors

Target 2009: 30 actors

(ii) Increased number of commissioned and publicly available studies on genocide at the national and international levels, including the identification of effective measures to prevent situations that could lead to genocide

*Performance measures:*

2007: 2 studies

Estimate 2008: 6 studies

Target 2009: 10 studies

(iii) Increased number of requests for information on early warning indicators and/or methodology from Member States, civil society and United Nations departments and agencies

*Performance measures:*

2007: 0 requests

Estimate 2008: 4 requests

Target 2009: 8 requests

(b) Increased capacity of Member States and regional organizations to effectively protect their populations from genocide and to combat precursors of genocide

(b) Increased number of developed and implemented procedures and cooperative frameworks among the Office and the broader United Nations system and Member States and regional organizations to review and analyse situations and conditions that could lead to genocide

*Performance measures:*

2007: 1 cooperative framework

Estimate 2008: 4 cooperative frameworks

Target 2009: 6 cooperative frameworks

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*Outputs*

- Advice to Member States through advisory missions, consultations and liaison activities on the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities (approximately 100)
  - Quarterly participation in interdisciplinary familiarization and confidence-building missions to regions of tension or conflict
  - Early analysis of indicators for genocide and/or massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law of an ethnic, racial, national or religious nature (approximately 20)
  - Public advocacy campaign on preventive action in situations that could lead to genocide or mass atrocities, including the commissioning of studies, development of the website and outreach activities (1 campaign; 1 website development; 2 studies)
  - Expert group meetings (4) and workshops (2) on early warning signs of situations that could lead to genocide
  - Establishment and compilation of a roster of experts and further development of a system/database for information-gathering and analysis
  - Reports to and briefings of the Human Rights Council and, through the Secretary-General, the Security Council (1 report to the Human Rights Council and 1 briefing to the Human Rights Council)
- 

**External factors**

51. The objectives would be achieved on the assumption that there is political will on the part of members of the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies to engage with the Special Adviser in order to consider and, as necessary, act upon his analysis and recommendations; that there is willingness among Member States that are host to critical events to allow access to and engage with the Special Adviser; and that there is goodwill and active involvement of regional and other organizations.

## Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
Civilian personnel costs	971.4	800.3	171.1	979.7	808.6	—	8.3
Operational costs	623.6	343.0	280.6	352.8	72.2	—	(270.8)
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>1 595.0</b>	<b>1 143.3</b>	<b>451.7</b>	<b>1 332.5</b>	<b>880.8</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(262.5)</b>

52. The estimated requirements for the Special Adviser amount to \$1,332,500 net (1,494,200 gross). This amount would provide for international staff costs (\$979,700), official travel (\$238,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$81,900), ground transportation (\$2,400), information and communications technology (\$26,600) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,000).

53. Of this amount, \$451,700 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirement for the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide for 2009 would be \$880,800. The savings are due mainly to the delay in the recruitment of the P-3 and General Service (Other level) posts and the lesser number of trips undertaken by the Special Adviser.

## Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above								General Service and related categories		National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total	
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officers			Local level
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	4	—	2	6	—	—	—	6
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	4	—	2	6	—	—	—	6
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

54. The total staffing requirements for the Office for 2009 will remain unchanged.

## D. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$628,400)

### Background, mandate and objective

55. In his letter dated 25 July 2005 (S/2005/497), the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Envoy for Western Sahara and indicated to the Security Council that the Envoy would assess the situation and explore with the parties, neighbouring States and other stakeholders how best to overcome the prevailing political impasse. Following that communication, the President of the Security Council informed the

Secretary-General, in a letter dated 28 July 2005 (S/2005/498), that the decision to appoint a Personal Envoy had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council and that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's intention.

56. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General will continue to provide his good offices and to pursue efforts for a lasting solution to the question of Western Sahara. Since his appointment, the Personal Envoy has established contacts with the parties concerned, with neighbouring States and with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara to ascertain their views on the political situation and has assessed their positions towards the various initiatives presented in past years.

57. In its resolution 1754 (2007), the Security Council called upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the developments of the past few months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. In addition, it requested the Secretary-General to set up the negotiations under his auspices and invited Member States to lend appropriate assistance to such talks. In implementation of that resolution, four meetings of a negotiating process took place in June and August 2007 and in January and March 2008.

58. During 2009, the Personal Envoy will continue to hold consultations and to facilitate the negotiations with the Government of Morocco and the leadership of the Frente Polisario for reaching a political solution on the question of Western Sahara. The Envoy will also continue to hold consultations with the neighbouring States, Algeria and Mauritania, and to coordinate closely with interested Member States both in New York and in capitals.

59. In carrying out his mandate, the Personal Envoy reports on his findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. In support of his mandate, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat closely coordinate policy initiatives and provide guidance and periodic updates on political developments in the region and on the situation on the ground, as well as political analysis and advice. The Department of Field Support of the Secretariat provides logistical support during visits of the Personal Envoy to the region.

60. After four rounds of talks, the conflict is still at an impasse. In April 2008, the Security Council, in its resolution 1813 (2008), welcomed the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations-sponsored talks; called upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring the implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007) and the success of negotiations; and affirmed its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context.

61. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievements of the Personal Envoy are presented below.

**Objective:** To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara.

*Expected accomplishments*

*Indicators of achievement*

Progress towards the comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara

The parties participate in, and contribute fruitfully to, the negotiations towards the settlement of the question

*Performance measures:*

(i) Number of meetings between the parties to discuss resolving the impasse

2007: 2

Estimate 2008: 5

Target 2009: 6

(ii) Agreement reached or not reached

2007: No

Estimate 2008: No

Target 2009: Yes

*Outputs*

- Negotiations between the parties concerned, and political consultations with the parties, neighbouring States and the international community
- Reports to and briefing of the Security Council

**External factors**

62. The efforts under the good-offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through his Personal Envoy, are expected to achieve their objective provided that the two parties have the willingness and commitment to reach a political solution, and that the neighbouring States and the international community provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

**Resource requirements**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
Civilian personnel costs	139.1	130.9	8.2	158.7	150.5	—	19.6
Operational costs	728.3	454.5	273.8	469.7	195.9	—	(258.6)
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>867.4</b>	<b>585.4</b>	<b>282.0</b>	<b>628.4</b>	<b>346.4</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(239.0)</b>

63. The estimated requirements for the Personal Envoy amount to \$628,400 net (\$678,900 gross). This amount would provide for international staff costs

(\$158,700), consultants (\$48,500), official travel (\$245,200), communications (\$2,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$173,800).

64. Of this amount, \$282,000 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirement for 2009 for the Personal Envoy would be \$346,400. The savings are due mainly to the unutilized provision under consultants, as desk officers from the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were able to provide assistance to the Personal Envoy, and to the lesser number of trips taken and the change in the venue of the meetings.

### Staffing requirements

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officers</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

65. The staffing requirements for the Office of the Personal Envoy for 2009 will remain unchanged.

### E. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$852,000)

#### Background, mandate and objective

66. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had decided to appoint Terje Roed-Larsen as his Special Envoy for the implementation of Council resolution 1559 (2004) in order to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Member States to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution.

67. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted its resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed, and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting Lebanon's sovereignty,

territorial integrity and political independence and improving the relations between the two countries, thus contributing positively to stability in the region, and urged both parties to make efforts through further bilateral dialogue to that end. These provisions of resolution 1680 (2006) have not yet been implemented.

68. In August 2006, the Security Council adopted its resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon; and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

69. Since the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004) on 2 September 2004, the parties concerned have made progress towards its implementation. In particular, the requirements concerning the withdrawal of Syrian troops and military assets, as well as the conduct of free and credible presidential and parliamentary elections, have been met. However, the provision calling for the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government has not yet been fully implemented. Moreover, the provision calling for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias has not been implemented.

70. From November 2006 to May 2008, Lebanon experienced a severe political crisis, manifested by, inter alia the delay in electing a President of the Republic. The electoral void fuelled political polarization and impeded the normal functioning of the legitimate constitutional institutions of the country, leading, at times, to violent confrontations between the opposing parties. The political crisis that haunted the country for more than 18 months has slowed down progress in the implementation of the resolution. The violent clashes that occurred in the spring of 2008 raised, in particular, the need for tangible progress on the disarming and disbanding of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. In this connection, in his seventh semi-annual report (S/2008/264) the Secretary-General noted that the situation in Lebanon proved that the provisions of the resolution remain as relevant as they were when it was first adopted. Meanwhile, the overall implementation of all provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) are not solely domestic matters. The Secretary-General is mindful of the negative role played by external forces, intermingling with Lebanese internal dynamics, in contributing to the political stalemate in the country. For the next 12 months, the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy intend to continue their efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of the resolution, in the best interests of stability in the region.

71. The Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, who informs the Special Envoy on a regular basis about political developments in Lebanon and carries out ad hoc political missions on the ground with the Special Envoy. Furthermore, the Special Coordinator, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and the United

Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process provide logistical support for the trips of the Special Envoy to the Middle East.

72. The mandate of the Special Envoy will be deemed completed when the Security Council certifies that its resolution 1559 (2004) has been fully implemented. However, to date, the fragile situation in Lebanon and in the region has made the accomplishment of further progress towards the full implementation of the remaining provisions of the resolution more complex.

73. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Office of the Special Envoy are presented below.

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**Objective:** To implement fully Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council, in particular resolution 1680 (2006) and the relevant provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

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*Expected accomplishments*

*Indicators of achievement*

(a) Facilitation of strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory

(a) (i) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts towards the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Security Council; and the delineation of the international boundaries of Lebanon with those Member States, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(ii) Facilitation of increased extension of authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(iii) Support by the Special Envoy for the cessation of the illegal flow of weaponry to Lebanon

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(b) Facilitation of the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias

(b) (i) Increased accession by the Government of Lebanon to the right to exercise a monopoly on the use of force throughout its territory

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(ii) Support by the Special Envoy for a reduction in the number of groups other than the official armed forces carrying arms

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(iii) Support by the Special Envoy for a reduction in the number of militias or other armed groups operating in Lebanon

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(c) Facilitation in support of a strengthened response by all relevant Governments to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)

(c) (i) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts by the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council to engage in regular bilateral dialogue, including enhanced bilateral relations, bearing in mind that the establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

(ii) Encouragement by the Special Envoy for increased efforts to encourage the establishment of full diplomatic relations and representation between the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council

*Performance measures:* number of interactions with relevant parties

2007: 23 interactions

Estimate 2008: 25 to 30 interactions

Target 2009: 30 to 35 interactions

#### *Outputs*

- Regular meetings of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments
- Support for the Government of Lebanon in the implementation of the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular through good offices
- Support for the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias, in particular through meetings with the Government of Lebanon
- Facilitation of dialogue between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias, in particular through meetings with the PLO/Palestinian Authority and good offices between the PLO and the Government of Lebanon

- Good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner
- Good offices and consultations with the Governments of Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council
- Good offices and facilitation of bilateral and multilateral dialogue between Lebanon and the Member States mentioned in Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and related statements of the President of the Council
- Regularization and clarification of Lebanon's borders
- Semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

### External factors

74. The objective and expected accomplishments would be achieved on the assumption that: (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region and in the country are not resumed; (c) there is political goodwill on the part of the parties concerned; (d) the political goodwill of Member States has a positive influence on the parties concerned; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and its neighbours.

### Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
Civilian personnel costs	242.8	209.4	33.4	257.3	223.9	—	14.5
Operational costs	688.2	481.2	207.0	594.7	387.7	—	(93.5)
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>931.0</b>	<b>690.6</b>	<b>240.4</b>	<b>852.0</b>	<b>611.6</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(79.0)</b>

75. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2009 amount to \$852,000 net (\$894,800 gross). This would provide for international staff costs (\$257,300), consultancy services (\$28,700), travel (\$475,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$1,500), ground transportation (\$19,800), communications (\$46,000), information technology (\$6,500) and miscellaneous supplies and services (\$16,800).

76. Of this amount, \$240,500 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirement for 2009 for the Special Envoy would be \$611,600. The savings are due mainly to the lesser number of trips undertaken and lower-than-anticipated requirements for consultancy services owing to the volatile security situation in Lebanon.

## Staffing requirements

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officers</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	3
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	1	—	—	—	3
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

77. The total staffing requirements for the Office for 2009 will remain unchanged.

## F. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

(\$6,722,800)

### Background, mandate and objective

78. The situation in southern Lebanon after the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces in May 2000 was characterized by a high degree of political instability and the risk of continued conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Hence, it was decided that there should be a United Nations political presence in Beirut to lend support to international efforts to maintain peace and security in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, the Office of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon was established in August 2000.

79. Beginning in 2004, Lebanon experienced several serious political changes resulting in the Secretary-General's decision in October 2005 to expand the mandate of the Office of his Personal Representative for Southern Lebanon. With this mandate enhancement, the Office was responsible for the coordination of all political and politically related United Nations activities in Lebanon, serving as the lead political office for Lebanon while maintaining its peace and security mandate for southern Lebanon.

80. With the military conflict between Lebanon and Israel in July 2006, the country entered into a phase of ongoing political crises, recurring security incidents and continuing instability. The repercussions of the conflict also presented Lebanon with even larger political, financial, development and socio-economic challenges. The political involvement of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and support for overall peace and stability in Lebanon continued to expand during the conflict and in the period following it. During the conflict, the Office of the Special Coordinator worked closely with the Government of Lebanon, the relevant Lebanese political parties and the international diplomatic community to formulate a political framework that would allow an end to hostilities and shape the post-conflict environment in a manner that would sustain a cessation of hostilities and, ultimately, a permanent ceasefire.

81. Political events and developments in Lebanon led to a deeper and broader United Nations involvement in that country, requiring increased activities in Lebanon over the past years, and even greater information-sharing and coordination

within the United Nations system. To strengthen the Organization's ability to deliver coordinated and effective support across the broad spectrum of its expertise, the Secretary-General decided in 2007 to appoint a Special Coordinator for Lebanon and a Deputy Special Coordinator.

82. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon is the senior United Nations official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). In fulfilling these new and broader responsibilities, the Special Coordinator serves as the Secretary-General's representative to the Government of Lebanon, all political parties and the diplomatic community based in Lebanon, and coordinates the activities of the United Nations country team with the Government of Lebanon, the international donor community and international financial institutions in line with the overall objectives of the United Nations in Lebanon, with a particular emphasis on reconstruction, development and reform. The Office of the Special Coordinator provides political guidance to the country team and the Political Affairs Office of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), institutionalizes close working relationships and creates increasingly systematic mechanisms that enable regular consultations, information-sharing and greater coordination and complementarity among the Organization's various activities. As the Secretary-General's representative to the core group of countries supporting Lebanon's financial and socio-economic development, the Special Coordinator and his or her Deputy will also play a key role in advocating for continued international donor assistance to support reconstruction and development work in Lebanon. The Office has increased its interaction with United Nations entities in the country, within the context of United Nations country team meetings involving all United Nations agencies, including UNDP and UNIFIL, enabling a greater degree of information-sharing and policy coordination. A close working relationship is maintained with the United Nations Resident Coordinator/Deputy Special Coordinator on these issues.

83. The Deputy Special Coordinator is responsible for planning and coordinating the development and humanitarian efforts of the United Nations in Lebanon. At the same time, the Deputy Special Coordinator also functions as United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon.

84. Since its establishment, the Office of the Special Coordinator has been actively engaged in the provision of good offices and the facilitation of dialogue among the parties. It has played a key role in working with all parties concerned to support efforts to defuse tensions, both within the national Lebanese political environment and across the Blue Line, through constant analysis, reporting and preventive diplomatic action. In southern Lebanon, this action has taken place in coordination with UNIFIL. The political efforts of the Office have increased during 2008 because of the increasingly complex political environment and the threatening security environment, in which, among other incidents, several explosions have been directed at UNIFIL.

85. The Office of the Special Coordinator continued to achieve progress in 2008 by maintaining a political dialogue with the various Lebanese parties and lending diplomatic support for the peaceful resolution of their internal disputes. It continued to work with Lebanon and Israel in seeking to maintain calm along the Blue Line and to prevent violations by either side. The challenging task of reaching national consensus on key issues significantly increased mistrust between the parties and created an additional socio-economic challenge for the country to address. Sectarian

tensions, political assassinations and a general deterioration in the security climate have also imposed great obstacles to achieving its key objectives. In spite of encouraging developments, such as the election of a President on 25 May 2008 after a vacuum had endured since 24 November 2007, and the announcement of the formation of a Government of national unity on 11 July 2008, other aspects of the political and constitutional issues affecting Lebanon still need to be addressed.

86. The general political and security situation in Lebanon has remained precarious throughout 2008. The situation along the Blue Line in southern Lebanon has continued to remain tense, with the possibility that further serious breaches of the cessation of hostilities may occur.

87. With regard to the internal political situation in Lebanon, the need for a continued United Nations political presence in Beirut remains paramount in order to lend support to Lebanese and international efforts to resolve political differences peacefully. In the current state of elevated political tension, despite the election of a new President on 25 May 2008, such United Nations support will remain of crucial importance until the parties themselves are able to resolve their differences exclusively through a political process of dialogue and compromise through State institutions. Relevant indicators would include progress on key constitutional issues, national consensus on presidential and parliamentary elections and an effective national dialogue on pivotal issues of national concern.

88. The Special Coordinator, in close coordination with the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, prepares draft reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and works closely with the Department of Political Affairs on the production of analytical papers, briefing notes and talking points for the Secretary-General's meetings with interlocutors on the situation in Lebanon and specific issues relating to mandate of the Office. The Special Coordinator maintains a constant dialogue on all key political and organizational issues relating to Lebanon, while the Department of Field Support provides administrative and logistical support to the Office.

89. Political and diplomatic United Nations support will also remain necessary to work with Lebanon, Israel and key States of the region in order to move from the cessation of hostilities that prevails in southern Lebanon towards a more sustainable ceasefire and eventually an armistice agreement that will help to provide stability and security in southern Lebanon. In this regard, successful conclusions to the key political questions, a resolution of the Shab'a farms issue, the cessation of Israeli overflights, full Lebanese control over the country's borders and the full resolution of the issue of armed groups in Lebanon will signify the existence of a Lebanese political landscape in which a United Nations political presence may be reduced or phased out as progress is achieved. Fulfilling the humanitarian aspects of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) on 16 July 2008 was an encouraging step.

90. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Coordinator are presented below.

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**Objective:** To achieve political stability and enhanced development outcomes in Lebanon and the maintenance of international peace and security in southern Lebanon.

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*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

(a) Sustained political dialogue among Lebanese parties on key issues

(a) (i) Holding of 2009 parliamentary elections

*Performance measures*

2007: 0 elections

Estimate 2008: 0 elections

Target 2009: 1 election

(ii) Increased number of days that the Cabinet's composition includes participation of all major confessional groups

*Performance measures*

2007: 0 days

Estimate 2008: 180 days

Target 2009: 365 days

(iii) End of politically motivated targeted assassinations

*Performance measures*

2007: 3 assassinations

Estimate 2008: 1 assassination

Target 2009: 0 assassinations

(iv) End of politically motivated demonstrations that disrupt public order

*Performance measures*

2007: 1 demonstration

Estimate 2008: 2 demonstrations

Target 2009: 0 demonstrations

(b) Respect for cessation of hostilities in southern Lebanon and concrete moves towards a sustainable ceasefire within the framework of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

(b) (i) Elimination of incidents of unauthorized weapons on display in the area south of the Litani River

*Performance measures*

2007: No weapons on display

Estimate 2008: 1 incident of weapons on display

Target 2009: No weapons on display

(ii) Elimination of violations of the Blue Line by air, sea or land

*Performance measures*

2007: 1,721 violations

Estimate 2008: 1,800 violations

Target 2009: 0 violations

(iii) Establishment of an institutional mechanism to determine and negotiate the status of the Shab'a farms

*Performance measures*

2007: Establishment of provisional delimitation of contested area

Estimate 2008: 0 mechanisms

Target 2009: 1 mechanism

(iv) Increased percentage in the implementation of Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) recommendations to strengthen the border regime

*Performance measures*

2007: Substantive follow-up of LIBAT recommendations

Estimate 2008: 50 per cent implementation of LIBAT recommendations

Target 2009: 80 per cent implementation of LIBAT recommendations

(c) Coordinated response to humanitarian and reconstruction needs as well as gradual implementation of the reform agenda (Paris III)

(c) (i) Increased number of laws passed to implement the Paris III reform agenda

*Performance measures*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: 1 law

Target 2009: 2 laws

(ii) Increased number of donor coordination meetings

*Performance measures*

2007: 8 meetings

Estimate 2008: 12 meetings

Target 2009: 20 meetings

(iii) Increased percentage of refugees from Nahr el Bared who return and live in reconstructed housing in the camp

*Performance measures*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: 10 per cent

Target 2009: 30 per cent

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*Outputs*

- Meetings at the ministerial level between the Special Coordinator for Lebanon/Deputy Special Coordinator and key Government interlocutors to facilitate the implementation of the Government's reform agenda and to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction activities
- Public statements supporting political dialogue/consensus (36)
- Briefings to diplomatic community and other envoys on the political/security situation in Lebanon and reconstruction/development agenda for Lebanon
- Briefings to the Security Council (12)
- Monthly monitoring of diplomatic actions between Lebanon and Israel to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (12)
- Analytical reports on the political and security situation, including policy recommendations (45)
- Public statements encouraging full respect for the Blue Line and implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and condemning violations of the Blue Line (21)
- Joint preventive diplomatic initiatives with UNIFIL (21)

- Meetings with all parties to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and the issue of Shab'a (10)
- Follow-up assessment missions to facilitate the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (2)
- Participation in relevant multilateral meetings on border issues and holding of discussions with key Lebanese interlocutors on border management issues (12)
- Reports to the Security Council on implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (3)
- United Nations country team or policy-group or working-level coordination meetings (biweekly) on the implementation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework
- Meetings with the Government and Lebanese parties on the implementation of the reform agenda (12)
- Meetings with the donor community on the United Nations humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to advocate for continued donor involvement and to coordinate programmes and activities (12)
- Facilitation through technical assistance of the Government's donor coordination mechanisms (4)
- Establishment of contingency planning for emergency response (2) by the Office of the Special Coordinator in collaboration with the United Nations country team, the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNIFIL and the Government of Lebanon
- Coordination meetings for the reconstruction of Nahr el Bared camp (12)

### External factors

91. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that the domestic political situation, overall security situation, regional developments and prevailing socio-economic situation in the country will not adversely affect stability in Lebanon and along the Blue Line.

### Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
Civilian personnel costs	5 376.7	3 749.1	1 627.6	5 252.9	3 625.3	—	(123.8)
Operational costs	1 782.4	2 150.7	(368.3)	1 469.9	1 838.2	524.3	(312.5)
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>7 159.1</b>	<b>5 899.8</b>	<b>1 259.3</b>	<b>6 722.8</b>	<b>5 463.5</b>	<b>524.3</b>	<b>(436.3)</b>

92. The estimated requirements for the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon for 2009 amount to \$6,722,800 net (\$7,683,500 gross). This amount would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 80 existing positions, the reclassification of two Field Service positions (Security Officer and Information Technology Assistant) to the P-4 level as Chief of the

Security Unit to oversee the expanded security team and to the P-3 level as a Budget and Finance Officer to handle increased budget and finance responsibilities that result from growing number of staff, as well as the establishment of a new Human Resources Assistant position (General Service (Local level)) (\$5,252,900), consultants (\$76,800), travel of staff (\$154,400), ground transportation (\$145,400), facilities and infrastructure (\$600,500), information and communications technology (\$418,800), medical services (\$8,800) and other services, supplies and equipment (\$65,200).

93. Of this amount, \$1,259,300 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirements for the Office of the Special Coordinator for 2009 would amount to \$5,463,500. The savings are due mainly to the vacancy rates of 21.7 per cent for international staff and 42.1 per cent for national staff being higher than the budgeted vacancy rates of 20 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. Those savings are partly offset by overexpenditures on operational costs related to the relocation of the Office.

### Staffing requirements

	<i>Professional category and above</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>		
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Officers</i>		<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
Approved 2008	1	1	—	1	3	2	3	2	13	8	2	23	2	55	—	80
Proposed 2009	1	1	—	1	3	3	4	2	15	6	2	23	2	56	—	81
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	2	(2)	—	—	—	1	—	1

94. Owing to the sensitive security environment in Lebanon and the expansion of its Security Unit, the Office of the Special Coordination needs to strengthen its security operations with a Chief of the Security Unit (P-4) to oversee the Office's security functions, which has been recommended by the Department of Safety and Security. This new P-4 position would be accommodated through the reclassification of an existing Field Service position in the Security Unit. The Security Unit has been expanded from 13 close protection officers (national and international) to 52, including one P-2 supervisor, 6 Field Service protection officers and 45 national security staff (static guards and close protection officers). They are responsible for the security of office premises, the security of the residences of the Under-Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General and their personal security. The proposed P-4 position is expected to oversee the management of activities undertaken by the close protection officers and static guards and ensure implementation of security functions according to established United Nations policies, procedures and best practices. The Chief will provide direction and assistance on all security issues during crises and ensure that a response mechanism is in place. The incumbent will ensure that the Mission has complied with all the United Nations security management rules, procedures and guidelines, including the minimum operating security standards.

95. The Office of the Special Coordinator has increased its staff from 28 in 2007 to 80 in 2008. In the light of the additional workload resulting from the expansion of

the Office and in line with the objective of having adequate capacity to handle the increased budget and finance responsibilities resulting from the increased number of staff, the mission needs an international staff member to focus on day-to-day budget and finance matters. A Budget and Finance Officer (P-3) is hereby proposed. This new P-3 position will be provided through the reclassification of an existing Field Service position in administration. In addition, the establishment of a Human Resources Assistant (General Service (Local level)) position is proposed to cope with the increased number of staff being administered.

## **G. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord's Resistance Army-Affected Areas**

(\$1,775,200)

### **Background, mandate and objective**

96. The conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda has continued since 1986, displacing an estimated 1.7 million people in northern Uganda alone. The conflict encompasses mainly northern Uganda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In December 2003, the Government of Uganda referred cases against LRA to the International Criminal Court, leading to the issuance of arrest warrants against LRA leaders in October 2005. Successive Uganda military operations in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan have largely driven LRA into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After several unsuccessful attempts to peacefully resolve the conflict, in April 2006 the Government of Southern Sudan initiated contacts with LRA and the Government of Uganda, took on the role of mediator and established a mediation secretariat to help resolve the conflict and facilitate the talks.

97. Since July 2006, a series of peace talks have been held between the Government of Uganda and the LRA leadership, under the mediation of the Government of Southern Sudan and the community of Sant'Egidio. The two negotiating parties concluded a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 26 August 2006, which had a positive effect on the humanitarian and security situation in northern Uganda. In September 2006, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs launched the Juba Initiative Project to provide technical support to the peace mediation secretariat and the cessation of hostilities monitoring team. However, the talks stalled in December 2006 after the decision of LRA not to return to Juba.

98. On 1 December 2006, the Secretary-General appointed the former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, as his Special Envoy for the LRA-Affected Areas, with a broad mandate to address the implications of the activities of LRA in the region, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Southern Sudan, northern Uganda and, recently, the Central African Republic. Since then, the peace talks between the Government of Uganda and LRA have gained momentum, especially with the resumption of the talks in April 2007 as a result of the efforts of the Special Envoy, which also led to the extension of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement until June 2007. On 2 May 2007 the Special Envoy also facilitated the signing of the protocol on the root causes of the conflict and its comprehensive solutions. On 29 June 2007, the Government of Uganda and LRA signed an agreement on the principles of accountability and reconciliation.

99. After months of negotiations that delayed the consultations between the Government of Uganda and the LRA delegations from August to December 2007, the peace process resumed in Juba on 30 January 2008. The parties signed all the remaining agreements:

- (a) the annex to the agreement on accountability and reconciliation;
- (b) the protocol on comprehensive solutions;
- (c) the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement;
- (d) the agreement on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- (e) the agreement on implementation and monitoring mechanisms;
- (f) the addendum to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

100. The parties ended their negotiations in March 2008, when they initialled the Final Peace Agreement and concluded the schedule for its implementation. The peace process suffered a major setback on 10 April, after LRA leader Joseph Kony failed to appear for the expected signing of the Final Peace Agreement in Ri-Kwangba. He requested further clarifications on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the relationship between the proposed traditional and formal systems of justice, especially Mato Oput and the Special Division of the High Court. The Ugandan authorities remain committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict in northern Uganda. They have agreed to give more time to the LRA leader, despite the risk that disagreements over Joseph Kony's concerns may prolong the talks and delay the signing of the Final Peace Agreement and its implementation.

101. The Juba peace process is at a serious, challenging stage that may trigger additional obstacles. Therefore, the Chief Mediator and the facilitation role of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General will remain critical in order to help the parties overcome those obstacles and create a propitious environment for the smooth implementation of the Final Peace Agreement.

102. The Special Envoy regularly consults with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) at the head-of-mission level on matters involving LRA activities in the region. This is expected to become even more intensive in the implementation phase. The Special Envoy's Office and MONUC exchange political, security and military information on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. MONUC and UNMIS continue to provide logistical and security support for the Juba peace process within their current mandates and capabilities.

103. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to develop a relationship of mutual trust among the parties and build their confidence in the political process, coordinate efforts of regional players, donors and civil society organizations, follow up the peace talks and promote a peaceful agreement between the Government of Uganda and LRA. The Office of the Special Envoy will coordinate the activities of the five African ambassadors who are guarantors of the peace process, including the coordination of international activities in support of the talks. The Office will liaise with all stakeholders in Uganda and in the region to monitor and analyse internal and regional political and security developments in Uganda and in neighbouring

countries, coordinate the activities of the unit in Juba and maintain close consultation with MONUC and UNMIS on security and military issues.

104. The agreement signed by the parties foresees the establishment of an oversight forum to supervise the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement, resolve disputes and promote confidence-building measures. The Special Envoy is expected to play an important role within the forum, and his Office is expected to provide technical and administrative support for its functioning. The oversight forum is supposed to remain in place for at least nine months after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement. Moreover, the Special Envoy is needed for the overall political oversight of the implementation of the Agreement.

105. The permanent ceasefire would enter into force 24 hours after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement, to be followed immediately by a transitional period of one month, during which the parties would prepare for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and other steps enshrined in the Agreement. The lack of trust among the parties might, however, further delay the signing and smooth implementation of the Final Peace Agreement. It would therefore be essential for the Special Envoy to continue providing, on behalf of the Secretary-General, good offices and facilitation.

106. A discussion has already taken place between the Special Envoy and the United Nations family to the effect that when the Final Peace Agreement is signed, the Special Envoy will entrust its implementation to UNMIS and the United Nations country team in the Sudan and Uganda, as requested by the parties. Upon the completion of disarmament and demobilization in Southern Sudan, the Ugandan authorities would assume responsibility for implementation in Uganda. With the support of the United Nations country team, the Ugandan authorities would manage the relief, recovery and reintegration process, as well as the development of regions affected by the conflict.

107. If the Final Peace Agreement is not signed and the peace process collapses, then the Special Envoy, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations family will collectively rethink the way out of the deadlock. In the event that the current timetable is not met because of the fragility of the peace process, the facilitation role of the Special Envoy will be needed beyond 31 December 2008.

108. In performing his functions, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General benefited from the support of the existing United Nations structures and operations in the region. The United Nations country team, MONUC and UNMIS have continuously provided logistical and security support to the Special Envoy and the Juba peace process within their current mandates and capabilities, including during his meetings with the LRA leadership in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Southern Sudan, as well as significant logistical and airlift support for the mediation efforts and the cessation of hostilities monitoring team on an as-needed and as-possible basis. This support has been critical to the facilitation of dialogue among the parties. The Special Envoy and the African ambassadors assisted the Chief Mediator in helping the parties resume talks in January 2008, which concluded with the adoption of the remaining agreements (see para. 99 above).

109. The objective, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement of the Special Envoy are presented below.

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**Objective:** To foster peace in northern Uganda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo by formally ending the conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda.

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*Expected accomplishments**Indicators of achievement*

(a) Successful signing of the Final Peace Agreement	<p>(a) (i) The Final Peace Agreement is signed by President Yoweri Museveni and LRA leader Joseph Kony</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i></p> <p>2007: no</p> <p>Estimate 2008: yes</p> <p>Target 2009: yes</p> <p>(ii) Increased regular meetings between the parties to append their signatures to the Final Peace Agreement</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i></p> <p>2007: not applicable</p> <p>Estimate 2008: 4 meetings</p> <p>Target 2009: 4 meetings</p>
(b) Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement	<p>(b) (i) Establishment of the mechanisms to disarm and demobilize LRA combatants</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i></p> <p>2007: not applicable</p> <p>Estimate 2008: not applicable</p> <p>Target 2009: all combatants</p> <p>(ii) Assemble LRA combatants in Ri-Kwangba</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i></p> <p>2007: not applicable</p> <p>Estimate 2008: not applicable</p> <p>Target 2009: all combatants</p> <p>(iii) Reintegrate LRA ex-combatants in northern Uganda</p> <p><i>Performance measures:</i></p> <p>2007: not applicable</p> <p>Estimate 2008: not applicable</p> <p>Target 2009: all combatants</p>

(iv) Establishment of the oversight forum

*Performance measures:*

2007: not applicable

Estimate 2008: 3 meetings of the secretariat of the forum

Target 2009: 12 meetings of the secretariat of the forum

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*Outputs*

- Meetings between the parties in preparation for the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (4)
  - Regular consultations with the Government of Uganda, LRA, the mediation team, countries of the region involved in the peace talks and the United Nations country team
  - Facilitation of mediated tripartite meetings (Government of Uganda, LRA, Government of Southern Sudan) (4)
  - Organization of coordination meetings with representatives of neighbouring countries to coordinate their activities aimed at ensuring regional stability and successful implementation, with UNMIS and MONUC assistance (4)
  - Establishment of the secretariat to support the oversight forum (related to Final Peace Agreement implementation, resolution of disputes, building confidence)
  - Monthly high-level meetings with leaders of neighbouring countries, including heads of MONUC and UNMIS, to coordinate the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement
  - Public statements on the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement (3)
  - Briefings to the Security Council
- 

**External factors**

110. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that the parties continue to welcome facilitation efforts and implement the agreement reached with the support of the Special Envoy, the mediation process, the donors, the United Nations country team, the regional players and the international community.

## Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2008			Requirements for 2009			Variance analysis 2008-2009	
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)	
Civilian personnel costs	834.5	624.2	210.3	847.6	637.3	—	13.1	
Operational costs	1 012.3	938.6	73.7	927.6	853.9	—	(84.7)	
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>1 846.8</b>	<b>1 562.8</b>	<b>284.0</b>	<b>1 775.2</b>	<b>1 491.2</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>(71.6)</b>	

111. The estimated requirements for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for 2009 amount to \$1,775,200 net (\$1,919,600 gross). This would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of six existing positions (\$847,600), consultancy services (\$210,700), official travel (\$272,500), maintenance and rental of premises, including security services (\$55,500), ground transportation (\$32,400), air transportation (\$308,300), information and communications technology (\$34,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$14,100).

112. Of this amount, \$284,000 would be met from the unencumbered balance against the appropriation for 2008. Thus, the overall requirement for the Special Envoy for 2009 would amount to \$1,491,200. The savings in 2008 are due mainly to the co-location of the office with MONUC, resulting in lesser expenditures incurred for facilities and infrastructure, and the vacancy rate of 33 per cent, against the budgeted rate of 10 per cent.

## Staffing requirements

	Professional category and above									General Service and related categories		National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Service	General Service	Total inter- national	National Officers	Local level		
Approved 2008	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	—	1	—	6
Proposed 2009	1	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	4	—	1	5	—	1	—	6
<b>Change</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

113. The total staffing requirements for the Office for 2009 will remain unchanged.