President: Ms. Rice ....................................... (United States of America)

Members: Azerbaijan ..................................... Mr. Musayev
        China ......................................... Mr. Wang Min
        Colombia ...................................... Mr. Alzate
        France ......................................... Mr. Araud
        Germany ........................................ Mr. Wittig
        Guatemala ...................................... Mr. Rosenthal
        India .......................................... Mr. Manjeev Singh Puri
        Morocco ....................................... Mr. Bouchaara
        Pakistan ....................................... Mr. Tarar
        Portugal ....................................... Mr. Cabral
        Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Pankin
        South Africa .................................... Mr. Sangqu
        Togo .......................................... Mr. Menan
        United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . Sir Mark Lyall Grant

Agenda

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2012/231)
The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (S/2012/231)

The President: In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2012/231, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the situation in Darfur and the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

I would like to start with the peace process. The Darfur Regional Authority is preparing strategies and workplans to progress in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. While UNAMID and the United Nations country team are looking at how they can support this process, concerns have been raised by the Darfur Regional Authority about the lack of funding from the Government. In his address to Parliament on 23 April, the Chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority, El Tigani Seisi, stated that unless funding was provided the process could collapse.

Regarding the security provisions of the Doha Document, the parties must resolve a number of issues to move beyond the initial verification of the forces of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM). The LJM and the Sudanese Armed Forces were to move in parallel through a process of verification, disengagement, redeployment, limited arms control and finally, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Moreover, in accordance with the agreement, the LJM has requested the Government to provide non-military logistical support to its verified forces.

Now the Government and the LJM must decide how to proceed. Will the Government be ready to move through the process in parallel with the LJM, or will the LJM accept an amendment to the synchronization of the process? In that connection, it is important that a time frame be established for the provision of non-military logistical support. We have, of course, encouraged UNAMID to work with the parties towards the resolution of those issues.

On a positive note, as agreed with the LJM, UNAMID and its partners are undertaking further screening of LJM elements to dissociate children assembled with the Movement’s forces.

Prospects for the resumption of negotiations between the Government and non-signatory movements do not look good at present. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi — which are both members, as the Council is aware, of the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance — have informed the Joint Chief Mediator ad interim that they will negotiate only over national, political and economic reforms. The Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid has stated that it is not willing to negotiate until the root causes of the Darfur conflict have been addressed. For its part, the Government is willing to negotiate only on the basis of the Doha Document on issues related to Darfur.

Regarding internal dialogue on the peace process, the parties are due to complete in June the Doha Document information campaign and the canvassing of Darfuri stakeholders’ views on the conditions they consider important to a credible dialogue. A preliminary analysis has indicated that the stakeholders are in favour of such a dialogue, but have concerns related to equitable representation, freedom of expression, the security of the participants and the commitment of the signatory parties to respecting the outcome. UNAMID will continue to work with the Government, the LJM and the Darfuri stakeholders to address those issues and will work towards strengthening its monitoring capacity.

Turning now to the implementation of the protection mandate of UNAMID and, further, to the incidents outlined in the report, on 17 April unidentified armed movement forces attacked a place...
called El Simah near the border of Eastern Darfur and
South Kordofan; Um Dafok, on the border of Eastern
Darfur and the Central African Republic; and Saysaban
in Southern Darfur. While the fighting has since
subsided, the potential for additional clashes remains.
UNAMID has assessed that the incidents are related to
hostilities between South Sudan and the Sudan and, of
course, remains vigilant within its capacity in
monitoring the security situation along the border
between Southern Darfur and South Sudan.

Attempts by UNAMID and humanitarian
agencies to access those areas and other areas affected
by fighting, including Jebel Marra, have been
repeatedly obstructed by Government authorities. At
the most recent tripartite meeting held in Addis Ababa
in February, Government officials committed
themselves to ensuring that UNAMID and
humanitarian agencies had unhindered access
throughout Darfur. In reality, however, UNAMID has
continued to face access restrictions, particularly in
militarily sensitive areas.

In other security incidents, the targeting by armed
groups of South Sudanese in camps in Eastern Darfur
is of concern. On 9, 17 and 18 April, groups of armed
assailants attacked Dinka refugees in three camps near
El Daein, in Eastern Darfur. In response, UNAMID has
increased patrolling in the area and additional
Government police have been deployed to deter such
attacks. This brings me to the subject of the safety and
security of the Mission and humanitarian personnel.

The three fatal attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers
that have occurred since the beginning of the year are
of serious concern. That includes an attack on a
UNAMID convoy in Western Darfur on 20 April that
resulted in the death of a Togolese police officer. I
again express my condolences to the Ambassador of
Togo over that loss. We are also deeply concerned
about the World Food Programme staff member who
was kidnapped in Nyala on 6 March. Of course, I call
on the Government to spare no effort to secure his safe
release. Furthermore, I would strongly urge the
Government of the Sudan to release the two staff
members of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan
who have been detained in Eastern Darfur since
24 February.

I will now turn to operational issues and the
review of uniformed personnel. In regard to the police
component, one of the key findings of the review is an
increased risk to civilians from violent crimes,
particularly in urban areas and camps for internally
displaced persons (IDP), as opposed to armed conflict.
Further, the review found that formed police unit
operations in outlying areas overlap with military
patrols. It therefore recommends that formed police
unit deployment be reconfigured from outlying to
urban areas and sensitive IDP camps, thereby
increasing their capacity for 24/7 patrolling and
providing the security necessary for individual police
officers to facilitate their community policing work. In
so doing, the overall requirement for formed police
units can be lowered from 19 to 17.

The community policing concept was reviewed in
the light of the trend in some areas towards returns,
criminality in urban areas and IDP camps, and the
potential benefits of co-locating police with military
for security reasons. The review noted that, of the
69 planned community policing centres, 49 are
operational, of which 36 are in temporary facilities or
colocated with team sites. The concept of community
policing will be maintained, but the community
policing centres have not been as effective as was
hoped in facilitating outreach to local populations. That
is due to challenges related to acquiring land for
construction and the requirement for a military or
formed police unit presence to secure individual police
officers.

UNAMID will maintain the 13 community
policing centres already fully constructed, but dispense
with plans to utilize 20 centres not yet constructed. The
others will be moved to team site locations, which in
many cases are close to IDP camps and local
communities. Co-location will alleviate the
requirement for UNAMID troops to provide static
security at community policing centres and team sites,
thus enabling resources to be redirected towards more
proactive protection activities. It will also improve
coordination among military, police and civilian
personnel at the team site level, affording greater
flexibility in assisting IDPs and local communities as
the situation requires.

The impact will be a police component that is
more flexible, more mobile and better able to patrol
where assistance is most needed. The result of these
measures would be a recommended decrease of 663
individual police officers.
The review also found that a further reduction of 107 police officers who fulfil functions at mission or sector headquarters similar to those already undertaken by civilian personnel, including in the areas of gender, human rights and child protection, could be made without any significant impact on operations.

Turning to the military component, the total adjustment to the number of currently deployed military personnel would be 3,260, including 1,600 infantry. The proposed reduction in infantry is due mainly to improvements in security along the Chad-Darfur border and in far northern Darfur following rapprochements between the Sudan and Chad, and between the Sudan and Libya. The changed security situation also makes it prudent to redeploy 29 out of a total of 64 infantry companies from areas where the security threat has diminished to potential flashpoints and areas of higher threat. This relates principally to transferring forces to a relatively populous band that runs from east to west through the centre of Darfur, from the border with Chad to the border with Kordofan.

As deployment is largely complete, the number of engineering personnel would be reduced by 450 from the current deployment figure of 981, and the remaining personnel and assets reconfigured into a multirole engineering capability that would enhance the mobility of the force. Moreover, the currently deployed number of transport and logistics personnel will be adjusted downward by 525 in the light of plans to outsource those functions to commercial providers.

With regard to aviation units, a reduction of 200 personnel is recommended in connection with the proposed redeployment of tactical helicopters. This is in the light of a decline in the requirement for aerial fire support due to the reduction in hostilities between Government and movement forces. Military aviation support would therefore consist of eight military medium-utility helicopters to facilitate the changed needs of the force, conduct aerial surveillance and enhance the mobility of the reserve units.

In addition, a reduction of 240 reconnaissance unit personnel is recommended, as the need for them has diminished now that units are familiar with the area of operations. Current deployment figures would also be reduced by 245 signal elements, as units have deployed with that capacity embedded. The number of military police would also be reduced commensurately with the overall reduction in the force.

Additional recommendations for the military component include elevating the status of the three sector reserve units to force reserve units to place them at the direct disposal of the Force Commander, thereby increasing their mobility and the speed at which they can respond to incidents. Other measures include improved military planning and procedures, coordination and operational control, such as joint military, police and civil planning at the team site level, to improve incident responses and conflict mitigation.

The implementation of the adjustments would be completed over a period of 18 months, in accordance with pre-existing rotation schedules. The estimated cost savings in the 2012/2013 financial year would be $76.1 million against the mission’s budget of $1.5 billion and approximately $135 million per annum in subsequent years.

In the months ahead, we will continue to streamline and strengthen the effectiveness of UNAMID uniformed personnel. On the political front, progress has been affected by the internal problems in the Sudan as a whole and, needless to say, the hostilities between the Sudan and South Sudan. Nevertheless, I call on the signatory parties to live up to their commitment to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur for the sake of the long-suffering people of Darfur.

The President: I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.