Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1590 (2005) of 24 March 2005, the Security Council expressed its determination to help the people of the Sudan to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability and to build a prosperous and united Sudan in which human rights are respected and the protection of all citizens is assured. Recognizing that international support for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is critically important, the Council responded positively to the request of the parties to the Agreement and decided to establish the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Through my Special Representative for the Sudan, I was requested, inter alia, to coordinate all activities of the United Nations system in the Sudan, to facilitate coordination with other international actors of activities in support of the transitional process established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to provide good offices and political support for efforts to resolve all ongoing conflicts in the Sudan.

2. The present report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 1590 (2005), provides an assessment of the overall situation in the country since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005 and sets out the context for the implementation process and the establishment of UNMIS. It also provides an update on the implementation of the Agreement by the parties since my previous report to the Council on the Sudan (S/2005/57) and outlines the progress made to date and the challenges encountered in establishing a United Nations mission in the Sudan.

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

3. In my report of 31 January 2005, I set out the key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and indicated the daunting challenges awaiting the parties and those assisting them in the implementation phase. I also noted that political solutions would have to be found for violent and unstable regions, in particular Darfur.

4. By signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the parties have set very high standards for their own performance during implementation. The Agreement is a programme of major change. The Government of the Sudan and the Sudan
Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to share responsibility, over a period of six and a half years, for creating a new model of governance by restructuring the political system on the principles of democracy and respect for human rights; fundamental change in legal, economic and political systems to ensure fair access to national resources and wealth; and redressing the social and cultural injustices accumulated through decades of civil war, underdevelopment and neglect of the population in the marginalized areas of the Sudan. These challenges are enormous and require from the two parties full mobilization of their institutional capacity, human resources and political will.

5. While the two parties have not been able to adhere strictly to the timetable they set for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, they have fulfilled their commitments and demonstrated a realistic appreciation of the tasks involved as well as respect for the expectations of the Sudanese people for peace after more than two decades of war.

6. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement sets out a broad framework for an inclusive implementation process, efforts to bring other political parties into it have only begun. Many of the political players in the north, as well as some forces in the south, have been hesitant to commit themselves to an agreement they were not party to and especially to the governance and wealth-sharing arrangements stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

7. After months of effort and inconclusive talks, at a meeting of the National Democratic Alliance and the Government held in Cairo on 18 June 2005 under the auspices of Egypt and including the presence of John Garang, Chairman of SPLM/A, an agreement was finalized that will enable the Alliance to participate in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In another example of broadening engagement in the Agreement, the South-South Dialogue Conference, organized by the Moi African Institute, was held in Nairobi from 18 to 21 April and was attended by more than 100 political leaders and representatives of civil society. The delegates signed a covenant pledging to defend the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and declared their commitment to a process of reconciliation and national healing. They also adopted a number of resolutions that addressed various steps to be taken in support of the implementation of the Agreement. While the achievements of the conference are important, adequate follow-up will be essential, particularly in the convening of a meeting with armed groups still outside the process. Notwithstanding the non-participation of some parties, modest gains have been made during the past three months, including the return of members of the Sudanese political diaspora. However, more needs to be done to encourage this trend, including the release of all political detainees as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the same time, on 1 June 15 Sudanese political opposition parties, including the Umma National Party and the Popular National Congress, signed a political declaration pledging to work together, but not in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

8. Now, at the end of the pre-interim period of six months, the parties can rightly claim that some progress has been achieved in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Following its establishment in Nairobi on 9 March, the Joint National Transition Team started to carry out its duties related to the implementation of the Agreement. The Transition Team played a crucial role in preparing for the establishment of Government at the national, southern Sudan and state/regional
levels. It also developed fund-raising strategies for the smooth and timely commencement of the interim period, for example by finalizing the joint Government-SPLM/A position for the donors’ conference held in Oslo on 11 April 2005.

9. In addition, a large SPLM/A advance delegation arrived in Khartoum on 2 April to establish the Movement’s presence in the capital. Some members of the delegation have been working with the Government on a variety of issues, while others travelled to key areas of southern Sudan currently under Government control to establish SPLM/A political structures and begin working with the National Congress Party and local authorities.

10. After a slow start, the inauguration of the National Constitutional Review Commission on 30 April represented an important step forward in the implementation process. Composed of representatives from the Government, SPLM/A and some northern- and southern-based political opposition parties, the Commission has met in both Khartoum and Rumbek. During my recent visit to the region, I had an opportunity to speak to Commission members in Rumbek and encouraged them to complete their work, as the quality of the interim constitution will strongly influence the success of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in areas such as protection of the human rights of the Sudanese people. The Commission is expected to conclude its work by the end of June, paving the way for the establishment of the Government of National Unity and the swearing-in of the new Presidency, comprising Omar Bashir as President, John Garang as First Vice-President and Ali Osman Taha as Second Vice-President. However, the absence of prominent political parties from the Commission is a cause for some concern. The Government and SPLM/A should redouble their efforts to demonstrate an inclusive approach in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement so that all Sudanese feel ownership of the process, and the other parties should grasp the opportunity before them to become fully involved in building the Sudan’s future institutions. I stressed this message when I met with Vice-President Taha during my recent visit to the Sudan.

11. Another issue which requires particular attention is the handling of the Abyei area. The parties agreed that the Abyei area is a bridge between the north and the south. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides for a special procedure to address the issue of Abyei by according special administrative status to the territory during the interim period. In early March, the Abyei Boundaries Commission was constituted in Nairobi and visited the area in April and May 2005. The Commission was supported by a group of international resource persons who provided it with an assessment of the Abyei issue. Its report will be submitted in June. I am, however, concerned that the activities of the Commission in Abyei were obstructed by rogue elements who were the cause of a number of security incidents that could, and should, have been prevented.

12. Numerous armed groups in southern Sudan, either allied with the parties or acting independently, present a potential or immediate security threat to the population and the international personnel on the ground. If this factor is not properly addressed by the parties, these groups might become spoilers during the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The parties have agreed to expedite the process of incorporation and integration of the allied militias within one year of signing the Agreement. To address this issue, SPLM and the
Government have had an initial meeting of the Collaborative Committee of Other Armed Groups. Since then, no further meetings have been held, nor has progress been made on a related task — the establishment of the incorporation and reintegration ad hoc committees. It is hoped that the Collaborative Committee will resume its activities without delay. As a permanent observer to the Collaborative Committee, UNMIS is fully prepared to support the Committee in its work. The positive outcome of the South-South Dialogue will also have a significant impact on the work of both committees, which will find difficulty in attaining their objectives outside of the Dialogue.

13. From the date of signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the parties have agreed to launch and sustain during the interim period an information campaign in all languages to popularize the Agreement and foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding. The Joint Media Commission, established by the parties in early March, has held a number of meetings in Nairobi and Khartoum. Its activities are expected in particular to improve the population’s awareness of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, address the issue of hostile propaganda and help develop a cooperative relationship between the two parties in the area of public information. The parties have agreed to collaborate on the dissemination of the Agreement to the Sudanese people. SPLM has conducted a tour of the territories under its control explaining the effect of the Agreement. The Government has begun a similar tour and has made available CD-ROM copies of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Copies of the Agreement are widely available for purchase in markets. However, despite these efforts, awareness of the Agreement and its provisions remains limited outside Khartoum.

14. UNMIS has initiated contacts senior Government and SPLM/A representatives on the Joint Media Commission to explore means by which the Mission can support the parties in their responsibility to disseminate information about the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. UNMIS has prepared an explanatory booklet, in simplified language, about the rights and responsibilities of the people under the Agreement. Draft copies of the booklet have been shared with members of the Joint Media Commission. UNMIS has also initiated a series of round-table meetings between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and key journalists and columnists in the national media to explain the Agreement and the role that UNMIS is requested to play in support of the peace process.

15. Vast areas in southern Sudan are severely polluted by mines and unexploded ordnance. While the Government has the requisite capacity and expertise to deal with the issue, SPLM/A does not. However, the parties were able to overcome their lack of mutual trust on this sensitive security issue and developed a coordinated national strategy on mine action. Southern and northern mine action mechanisms and the related United Nations coordinating mechanism have been formed, but resources for implementing effective mine action are still limited. It is imperative that the international community support the parties across the whole spectrum of demining activities, as restoration of secure transportation lines is important for the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons and for economic recovery and rehabilitation, particularly in the agricultural and construction sectors.

16. In accordance with chapter VI of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, concerning arrangements, the parties have undertaken to form joint integrated units to be deployed in the ceasefire areas and in Khartoum. The Government has
reportedly identified all of its participants for the units while SPLM has identified some. The Government and SPLA have held discussions in the Nuba Mountains on the formation of the units in Southern Kordofan. However, there has been no action so far on disengagement and separation of forces associated with this task throughout the ceasefire zone.

17. Providing UNMIS with the latest and full information on the deployment and composition of their forces is one of the main responsibilities of the parties identified by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Information on forces in Southern and Western Kordofan has been made available to UNMIS by the joint military commission deployed in the Nuba Mountains since April 2002. However, while the Government has provided full details of its forces in other ceasefire areas, SPLM has not yet done so.

18. In the past, the parties have demonstrated their commitment to the Agreement on the Temporary Cessation of Hostilities signed in October 2002. They continued to respect the ceasefire obligations after the signing of the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement on 31 December 2004. Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), no ceasefire violation report has been formally submitted to UNMIS by the Government or SPLM/A. However, in the Nuba Mountains, the Government has lodged 19 complaints with the joint military commission, of which six were sustained and three remain unresolved. SPLA lodged 10 complaints, of which two were sustained and two are unresolved. The complaints pertain primarily to troop movements, harassment and violence directed at civilians and arbitrary detentions.

19. Regarding the release of prisoners of war, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had previously identified 750 prisoners under SPLM control. Some 150 have already been released, although without the participation of ICRC, which is required by the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement. It should be recalled that the Chairman of SPLM/A made a public statement during the signing ceremony on 9 January that all prisoners of war would be released immediately. Five months into the pre-interim period, some of them are still detained. It is imperative that all remaining prisoners be released without delay, in coordination with ICRC. The Government, for its part, has stated that it does not hold any prisoners of war and has signed a memorandum of understanding with ICRC to coordinate and mediate on these issues. SPLM however has refused to sign the memorandum of understanding, apparently in protest that ICRC has not enquired into the Government’s assertion that it has no detainees.

20. Many mechanisms and structures envisaged by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, such as the Presidency, can only be established after the adoption of the Interim National Constitution. This approach re-emphasizes the primacy of law in the overall reconciliation and reconstruction strategy of the Agreement. Consequently, many of the core institutions that are vital for the success of the implementation could not be legally established before the creation of judicial and executive branches at the national level. That explains why bodies such as the Ceasefire Political Commission, the Joint Defence Board, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the National Land Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, the National Petroleum Commission and some key institutions at the level of southern Sudan and the states have yet to be launched. These institutions can be established only by the two parties working together and ensuring
that other political forces and groups are included, as provided for in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

III. Implementation of the UNMIS mandate

21. The mandate of UNMIS reflects the breadth and complexity of challenges
facing the parties as they implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The
Security Council has clearly given my Special Representative the lead role in
coordinating the activities of the United Nations in the Sudan, a task he performs
regularly through various mechanisms, including his leadership of the United
Nations country team; mobilizing resources and support from the international
community for immediate assistance and long-term economic development;
facilitating coordination, with other actors, of activities in support of the transition
process established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and providing good
offices and political support for efforts to resolve all ongoing conflicts in the Sudan.
With the parties having entered a critical stage in addressing power-sharing and
security arrangements, UNMIS, led by my Special Representative, continues to
carry out its broad mandate with the overarching goal of supporting implementation
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in its entirety.

22. Close cooperation between the parties and UNMIS is crucial to the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. During my meetings in the
Sudan late in May with the First Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha, and the Chairman
of SPLM, John Garang, I was reassured of their commitment to interact with
UNMIS in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Agreement. The parties
provided similar assurances to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, and to my Special Adviser, Lakdhar Brahimi,
when they visited the Sudan in early May.

23. The security environment in the Sudan, including in the south, the three
transition areas, eastern Sudan and Darfur, remains unsettled. Violence related to
economic and political grievances, clan fighting, militia clashes and cattle looting
all contributed to the suffering of the population and impaired humanitarian access.

24. Incidents of banditry are increasing in areas that do not usually see such
occurrences. Areas previously assessed as safe for operations by United Nations
entities are now under scrutiny as cooperation between former warring factions has
deteriorated. There has also been an increase in tension in areas where oil
exploration and extraction activities are taking place. The areas of Abyei, Malakal
and Bentiu/Rubkona remain volatile, with the local population and returnees in all
three areas suffering from an insecure environment caused by militia activity.

Military aspects

25. The deployment of the UNMIS military elements commenced in the first week
of April with the arrival of United Nations staff officers of the force headquarters
and the integrated support services of the Mission in Khartoum. This enabled the
force headquarters in Khartoum and the Joint Monitoring Coordination Office
responsible for support to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee in Juba to achieve
initial operating capability on 8 May 2005, in accordance with the terms of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
26. At the time of drafting of the present report, 115 military staff officers, 127 United Nations military observers and 579 troop-contributing country personnel (the Nepalese contingent and the engineering platoons of India and Bangladesh), totalling 821 all ranks, were deployed in the mission area.

27. The timely deployment of UNMIS is essential to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Mounting this large and complex operation in a vast country like the Sudan, as I have indicated in previous reports, is a major challenge. Unfortunately, a number of factors have caused delays in the deployment of peacekeepers to southern Sudan. Chief among these has been changes in the composition of the force at the request of SPLM/A and the inability of the troop-contributing countries to meet adjusted deployment plans. In some cases, the Government has been unresponsive in providing land for the military camps, while the SPLM/A authorities have yet to operationalize their policy on the issue of land allocation for UNMIS.

28. The delay in deployment has been compounded by the lack of a signed status-of-forces agreement. UNMIS, in coordination with United Nations Headquarters, has been engaged in consultations with the two parties on a status-of-forces agreement as called for by the Security Council. These consultations are now in the final stage and the parties have reassured the Secretariat that the process would be concluded before 9 July 2005. Finally, the onset of the rains has created another serious obstacle to deployment by making transportation and all other logistical and preparatory activities tremendously difficult.

29. While the deployment of military staff officers for the force headquarters and of United Nations military observers required for carrying out verification and monitoring tasks remains broadly on target, the factors mentioned above have seriously restricted the number of United Nations military observers that the Mission has been able to deploy forward. At the same time, the delay in troop-contributing country deployment has left sector headquarters without the necessary security and medical coverage required to deploy substantial numbers of United Nations military observers, police and civilian personnel to the field. As a consequence, the deployment plan is currently under revision. It is expected that commercial medical teams will be deployed to the region at the end of June to provide interim medical support prior to the arrival of troop-contributing country medical capabilities. However, the decision on the revised deployments will be taken only after a careful review of the security situation and safety conditions, including the casualty treatment and medical evacuation capabilities available.

30. It should be recalled that in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement the parties assigned the United Nations the task of chairing the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee. In the first meeting of the Committee on 8 May 2005, chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander, the parties participated as observers. At the second meeting, held on 24 May, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to abide by the procedures listed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The parties affirmed their full support for the implementation of the Agreement and expressed their willingness to work jointly in the area of mine action. At the third meeting of the Committee, held on 7 June, the parties accepted a list of tasks, based on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as the basis for future deliberations in the Committee. They also decided on a wide range of issues, including the collection of information on the size and composition of their forces and issues related to
prisoners of war and other detainees. The Government confirmed that it had issued instructions to stop all national service recruitment and training within the areas covered by the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement.

31. In accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the joint military committee operating in the Nuba Mountains and the verification and monitoring team operating in southern Sudan have, thanks to support from donor countries, continued to carry out verification and monitoring tasks in their respective areas of responsibility under the operational control of UNMIS. The joint military committee was phased out as planned on 20 June and its responsibilities handed over to UNMIS. The verification and monitoring team is expected to continue with its mission until such time as UNMIS is fully operational in southern Sudan. Both mechanisms have been performing their tasks well.

32. The United Nations military observers deployed in the sectors have established liaison with the parties and are conducting limited patrols. The Nepalese contingent has completed its deployment to Kassala (eastern Sudan), established the redeployment coordination headquarters and carried out the required liaison with the parties for the creation of the area joint military committee. The parties have yet to nominate their representatives for the military committee at Kassala and, during its last meeting, the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee decided to address the matter at the earliest possible opportunity.

Rule of law

33. Progress is being made by United Nations agencies, in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in engaging SPLM/A and the Government on rule of law issues through policy dialogue, awareness raising and capacity-building at both central and state levels. At the state level, an international rule of law presence has been established in Darfur, the three conflict areas and southern Sudan. However, it will be feasible to substantively address the independence of the judiciary and legal reform only after the Interim National Constitution is adopted and the National Judiciary Service Commission is established.

Civilian police

34. To assist the parties in promoting the rule of law and law enforcement, United Nations civilian police have developed good relations with both parties’ police forces. Significant constraints have been experienced in relation to the availability of sector and forward team locations, causing a slowing in the anticipated rate of deployment. These delays notwithstanding, it has been possible to establish an operational presence in Juba and the Juba sector team began patrols in the area within two days of its arrival. Although a “residential” presence has not yet been established outside Juba, regular confidence-building and familiarization patrols are made to Yei, Rumbek and Torit. Sector II (Wau) is now managed from Juba, and this arrangement will continue until such time as it is possible to deploy at the location. At the time of writing, 33 civilian police officers were deployed in the mission area.

35. While both parties have agreed to a meeting of police at the most senior levels, no such meeting has yet taken place. UNMIS has suggested that a joint senior police committee be formed to deal with policy questions at the highest operational level. The first meeting of the committee is planned to take place in Juba late in June.
Earlier in the month, 40 SPLM nominees commenced a six-month basic training course for police personnel. United Nations police have met representatives from the Government police in order to identify training programmes and the needs for future police training in the Sudan. A programme of community-police engagement has also been launched with a focus on building confidence and establishing trust with young people.

Return of internally displaced persons and refugees

36. The voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, in conditions of dignity, is of crucial importance for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, the conditions for a large-scale, organized return are still not in place. The spontaneous return of internally displaced persons and refugees is nevertheless ongoing, and the number may well reach into the hundreds of thousands this year. This is due partly to increased trust in the peace process but also results from political pressure and the demolition of settlements of internally displaced persons in Khartoum. For example, on 18 May, violent clashes occurred in the Soba Aradi camp in south Khartoum, prompted by the Government’s unfortunate attempt to relocate the camp’s population. The clashes resulted in the tragic deaths of about 14 policemen and an unconfirmed number of civilians.

37. Although spontaneous returns of internally displaced persons to the south peaked in February-March and began to decrease in May with the onset of the rains, recipient communities have been under increasing pressure as more returnees have arrived. Some returnees stranded en route by rains are also in need of humanitarian assistance. The illegal taxation of both returnees and humanitarian vehicles by various militias is an ongoing concern in this regard.

38. The United Nations intends to provide a broad range of services and support to those populations who choose to return spontaneously. Consistent policies and coordination between the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the United Nations and partners is crucial to avoid a fragmented and piecemeal response to returns. In order to rapidly scale up the returns, resettlement and reintegration programme, UNMIS established a core Group on Returns, which has produced an operational plan to support spontaneous returns, including humanitarian assistance and protection in areas of displacement, en route and in places of arrival.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

39. The Sudanese and the international community will need to focus their efforts on promoting a far-reaching disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and reconciliation process. The overarching objective of the programme in the Sudan is to help create an environment conducive to improved human security and to support post-peace agreement social stabilization across the Sudan, as well as to operationalize, at the grass-roots level, the process of national reconciliation throughout the country. Even before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the parties were able to improve the political climate within which action on disarmament and demobilization can take place. Following the signing of the Agreement, the parties appointed interim authorities for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which are currently establishing regional offices and deploying field officers. The interim authorities have developed a draft policy

40. An interim disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, covering the period from mid-2005 to mid-2006, was also prepared by the Government and SPLM interim authorities with support from the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Unit of UNMIS. The programme has been submitted for approval by the Government and SPLM leadership.

41. It is now critical that both parties fully disclose the status of their armed forces, as agreed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to enable UNMIS to assist them in the preparation of a full-fledged disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for 2006. The special needs of women who have played a role (formally or informally, voluntarily or involuntarily) during the conflict will be carefully addressed to ensure that they are included in the process.

Protection of civilians

42. The protection of civilians throughout the Sudan continues to be a major challenge for the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well as for the international community. It is not possible for the United Nations to protect all Sudanese civilians under threat; this is the obligation of the relevant authorities. The United Nations and partners are focusing their attention on vulnerable groups, such as returning populations and those in volatile areas. The need for action has already been demonstrated by reports of extortion of returnees, looting of their possessions, physical attacks, sexually based violence and forced conscription along return routes. Peacekeeping patrols will be used to support the parties in ensuring the protection of civilians, while United Nations civilian police deployments will lend expert support to law enforcement entities throughout the country and, where necessary, for policymaking in law enforcement.

Mine action

43. United Nations mine action activities aimed at supporting mission deployment focused on the clearance of the Lokkichoggio-Kapoeta-Torit-Juba road, the Yei-Juba road, and the Malakal-Kosti road as well as on general coordination between the UNMIS military component, United Nations agencies and national and local authorities. The plan is to open the strategically important Yei-Juba road around 9 July. However, the start of the rainy season and difficulties in cross-line movements have slowed down the pace of activities. Due to limited resources, humanitarian mine action was mainly conducted in the Nuba Mountains, Rumbek, Yei, Kapoeta and El Fashir. An immediate expansion of survey, clearance and mine risk education capacities is vital to allow the local population to resume their economic activities, to facilitate the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees and to enable humanitarian aid agencies to operate without the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance.

Human rights

44. UNMIS has begun consultations with the parties and non-governmental organizations to develop programmes to support the implementation of human rights elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including the establishment of a national human rights commission for the promotion and protection of human rights.
45. UNMIS has also accelerated the deployment of United Nations human rights personnel to Darfur. There are now 41 international human rights officers, including 10 international United Nations Volunteers, deployed in the region. These staff monitor human rights violations in Darfur and bring them to the attention of the authorities and the United Nations. They provide assistance to victims, follow up on cases and work with local authorities and other stakeholders in order to enhance the protection of the human rights of civilians. In addition to the work of human rights officers on the ground, UNMIS often engages the Government and other stakeholders in dialogue to address major obstacles to the improvement of the human rights situation in Darfur and to assist the Government, when necessary, in redressing violations. UNMIS is now exploring appropriate ways of establishing effective civilian protection teams in Darfur, including through cooperation with the African Union Mission in the Sudan. UNMIS is expecting the number of human rights officers in Darfur to increase to 65 during July, despite logistical and security constraints on deployment.

HIV/AIDS

46. UNMIS embarked on the implementation of its HIV/AIDS programme in accordance with the plan of action prepared by the Mission. A Mission-wide task force to coordinate activities in the HIV/AIDS area has been established. Several hundred United Nations staff, both civilian and military, have attended sensitization sessions as part of their induction training. UNMIS coordinates its activities with other stakeholders, including the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNAIDS and the Sudan national AIDS programme, and provides various other actors with technical support in this area.

Gender

47. The protracted conflict in the Sudan has taken a particularly heavy toll on women. As part of its efforts to address gender inequalities and mobilize women’s participation in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, UNMIS has initiated training programmes on gender concepts for Sudanese counterparts. UNMIS pre-deployment training included instruction on gender sensitivities in the context of the diverse cultural environment of the Sudan.

Code of conduct

48. The overarching goal of the United Nations for its personnel, both military and civilian, is to ensure that they conduct themselves at all times in a manner that reflects the utmost respect for Sudanese customs and traditions and above all the Sudanese people.

49. In the area of sexual exploitation and abuse, UNMIS has a special section in the induction training programme for all new personnel, military and civilian, defining and explaining the Secretary-General’s bulletin of 9 October 2003 (ST/SGB/2003/13) and the United Nations policy of zero tolerance. UNMIS has also initiated a programme of outreach to the most vulnerable sector of Sudanese society — destitute women and children. A series of meetings, including a three-day community workshop, has been held in Juba and will be replicated in all areas of UNMIS deployment in order to explain the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse, to identify points of contact within UNMIS where
allegations of violations can be reported, and to utilize networks within Sudanese society to help protect vulnerable women and children.

**Public information**

50. UNMIS is helping the parties to promote an understanding of the peace process and to disseminate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. UNMIS has also initiated activities to raise the population’s awareness of its role in the implementation of the Agreement. Consultations have begun with the Media Commission, in which the parties to the Agreement are represented, concerning the type of assistance UNMIS can provide to the parties on the dissemination of further explanatory information at the community level. In addition, UNMIS has led a multidisciplinary assessment team to the eastern part of the country to explain the role of UNMIS, as defined in the Agreement and in resolution 1590 (2005), to community leaders and to assess attitudes towards the United Nations military and civilian presence. Similar missions to other sensitive areas of the country will follow.

51. UNMIS plans to establish a radio station that will broadcast news and current affairs programmes and provide a platform for dialogue within and between Sudanese communities and with the Mission. UNMIS has started training Sudanese nationals for positions in the radio station. Editorial policies are in place and programme scheduling has started. UNMIS radio will start production in August in Khartoum and commence broadcasting at the beginning of September. A relay station in Juba and additional short wave coverage in other regions of the Sudan will be initiated at the same time as transmission in Khartoum. Production of specialized programming for the south is scheduled to start in October.

52. Consultations have taken place over recent months with the Ministry of Information, the Sudan Radio and Television Corporation and the National Telecommunications Corporation. The telecommunications corporation has agreed in principle to assign a requested frequency for UNMIS radio, pending political approval by the Council of Ministers and the Sudan Radio and Television Corporation as the current licensing agency. The approval has not yet been given. SPLM has generally been cooperative with UNMIS radio and a technical committee has been set up at the Mission’s request to discuss radio in southern Sudan. Further progress for UNMIS radio is expected after the Government of National Unity is installed and the status-of-forces agreement is signed.

**Support from donors**

53. The authorities, humanitarian partners and the population at large hold very high expectations of the peace process and the speed of its implementation. Against requirements of $1.56 billion outlined in the United Nations workplan for 2005, donors have provided some $748 million to date. This amount falls short of what is required to carry out essential United Nations responsibilities in the Sudan. Of particular concern is the 27 per cent response to the needs in the south and the 13 per cent response for other areas of the Sudan, which notably include the critical transition areas and the east, where conflict threatens. The World Food Programme has still only received about 25 per cent of required funding and has borrowed approximately $40 million from other operations to support southern Sudan.
activities. The funding shortfall for food is matched in other sectors, with only 26 per cent of requirements for southern Sudan met at the time of writing.

**Freedom of movement**

54. Free access for all UNMIS personnel and staff of United Nations agencies and programmes is required for successful implementation of the Security Council mandate. Recent discussions with the parties have opened the way for approval of scheduled United Nations flights across what had traditionally been considered the front lines of the north/south conflict. The humanitarian arm of SPLM/A, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC), dropped the requirement for staff of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations with Sudanese visas to travel from the north to the south with special SRRC permits. The Government no longer requires special clearance for United Nations humanitarian staff and their partners with the SRRC permits, or Sudanese visas to travel anywhere else within the Sudan.

55. Progress was made recently in preparing for the transfer of the overall management of humanitarian operations in the south to the United Nations and SRRC. The United Nations facilitated the first meeting in the post-peace agreement period between the Government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission and SRRC. This meeting resulted in a reaffirmation of their commitment to the agreed policy framework on returns and the establishment of joint coordination mechanisms, and paved the way for cross-line humanitarian operations. The first cross-line distribution of assistance to both SPLM and Government-controlled areas by a north-south team including the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and the Government was carried out in May 2005.

**Composition of UNMIS**

56. As at 21 June, the Mission has on board 351 international staff, 60 of whom are on temporary duty, 430 national staff and 27 international United Nations Volunteers. The recruitment of an additional 130 international staff who have been selected is currently in progress. Some 180 national staff are under recruitment, and additional United Nations Volunteers have been selected.

**IV. The United Nations role in Darfur**

57. As stipulated in resolution 1590 (2005), since its establishment, UNMIS has liaised and coordinated closely at all levels with the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) to reinforce African Union-led efforts to foster peace in Darfur, especially with regard to the Abuja peace process and through logistical support and technical assistance to AMIS. In Khartoum, my Special Representative and the Special Representative of the African Union Chairperson in the Sudan are working together with a singularity of purpose to support efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement to the conflict in Darfur and ensuring its integration in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement process. In Addis Ababa, a United Nations assistance cell, which is part of UNMIS, is working on a daily basis with the African Union Commission and partners, providing logistical and planning advice for the African Union task force responsible for AMIS deployment. On the ground,
UNMIS has deployed military and police liaison officers to AMIS headquarters in El Fashir.

58. The consolidation of UNMIS offices in Darfur contributed to broadening cooperation with AMIS beyond political cooperation and military planning. Cooperation now includes concerted effort in the domain of humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights. AMIS provides escort to humanitarian assistance convoys when requested by the United Nations on the ground. It has also been agreed that AMIS would provide escort and protection for UNMIS human rights officers who need to travel to areas of conflict, which are usually the areas where the most grave human rights violations occur and have thus far been inaccessible to UNMIS human rights personnel. AMIS human rights officers will also provide briefings to AMIS personnel on human rights issues and share information with AMIS when its intervention could contribute to more effective protection against human rights violations. UNMIS and AMIS are also planning to establish cooperation on public information, including through launching a joint public information campaign in Darfur.

59. UNMIS has been following closely and supporting the African Union-led efforts to restart the political talks at Abuja since the last round was interrupted in December 2004. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his team have been in close contact with the African Union mediation team in Addis Ababa as well as with other international partners who are involved in the political process. UNMIS also maintained dialogue with the parties to encourage them to return to the negotiating table and to cooperate with the African Union proposals. Shortly after the appointment of Salim Ahmed Salim as the new Special Envoy of the African Union for the Peace Talks on Darfur, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General travelled to Dar es Salaam and discussed with him measures that could be taken to ensure that UNMIS provided the maximum support possible to the African Union political mediation. The Special Representative participated at the opening of the talks in Abuja and engaged in talks with the parties in order to encourage them to focus on the substantive issues at hand and reach a political agreement soon. UNMIS also has two political staff members at Abuja to support the African Union mediation team.

V. Visit of the Secretary-General to Addis Ababa and the Sudan

60. As the Council is aware, in May I chaired jointly with Alpha Oumar Konaré, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, a meeting in Addis Ababa where the international community committed itself to support an expansion of AMIS to more than 7,000 military and police personnel with the required equipment and resources, including strategic airlift, the flexible use of funds and a planning and coordination capacity. I went from Addis Ababa to the Sudan, where I had meetings with the First Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mustafa Osman Ismail, on a number of issues, including the Security Council resolutions on the Sudan adopted in March 2005, Darfur and African Union deployment to the region. Unfortunately, my scheduled meeting with President Bashir had to be cancelled after a severe sandstorm made it impossible for me to return to the capital before concluding my visit to the Sudan. In addition to pledging its commitment to
cooperate with UNMIS on the status-of-forces agreement, the Government expressed the view that a comprehensive peace agreement on Darfur could be concluded by the end of the year. The decision to resume the Abuja talks on 10 June and the appointment of Salim Ahmed Salim as the African Union mediator for the Darfur talks were also welcome developments.

61. I also met with Chairman Garang in Rumbek, where we discussed, inter alia, the importance of maintaining momentum in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the funding crisis for humanitarian assistance in the south and the importance of resolving the crisis in Darfur. Mr. Garang also confirmed SPLM/A intentions to cooperate fully with UNMIS.

62. While in the Sudan, I travelled to Darfur where I visited Kalma camp in Nyala before proceeding to Labado. During my visit to southern Darfur, where I was accompanied by my Special Representative and the Special Representative of the African Union Chairperson, I met local authorities and had discussions with internally displaced persons. I was particularly moved by a meeting I had with a group of women at Kalma, who were still living in fear despite the marked improvement of living conditions that had come with the arrival of AMIS.

VI. Observations

63. While international support for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is critically important, the Agreement is first and foremost owned by the two parties and they are fully responsible for its implementation. Their great obligation now is to make this a dynamic and inclusive process. The Government and SPLM/A have developed a strong track record of partnership during the negotiations, as well as in the course of the pre-interim period. The parties now have to prove that they can work together in establishing a new system of governance that is based on full respect for the law, is politically inclusive, transparent and accountable to the people and appeals to their aspirations. The parties were engaged in civil war for more than two decades. They must now overcome the legacy of those years and become partners who, as members of the same Government, will face a daunting task. To achieve this goal the parties must also redouble their efforts to reach out to other political forces in the north and in the south, consulting civil society and ordinary citizens on the course of transformation that they designed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. UNMIS, led by my Special Representative, will do its utmost to support and promote this process of inclusion.

64. There is a palpable sense of approval of the presence of UNMIS among Sudanese people. They seem to perceive it as a sign of hope that a very long period of suffering, losses and violence is at last coming to an end. In my exchanges with the political leaders of the Sudan, both in the north and in the south, this feeling has been reinforced by an expression of preparedness on their part to extend to UNMIS full cooperation in fulfilling its mandate. Although there have been a number of administrative teething problems over the reporting period, the Mission is confident that they are being overcome.

65. With the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers, expectations that the situation will improve significantly are running high. This requires the special attention, in particular, of external actors. It is now the turn of the international community at large to respond to these expectations. The donor community, which
contributed so much to the success of the peace process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and strongly reconfirmed its readiness to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Oslo, has now to prove its resolve by providing — in a coordinated and efficient manner — the resources and expertise required to address the challenges of the peace process, as well as recovery, reconstruction and development throughout the Sudan.

66. The expected presence of UNMIS in many parts of the country will have to serve as a catalyst for positive change. This is particularly important in the area of overall security, most significantly implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement. UNMIS will also focus on providing the parties with support in areas that will contribute to long-term peace and stability, including the urgent task of facilitating the return of millions of internally displaced persons and refugees. The integrated approach adopted by the United Nations in the Sudan will help to ensure that the Organization does its part in meeting the challenges facing the Sudan in the process to reach sustainable peace.

67. The success of the implementation during the first half of the interim period is heavily dependent on respect for the security arrangements and the Permanent Ceasefire, an area in which the role of UNMIS will be crucial. I am therefore concerned about delays in the deployment of some elements of the UNMIS military component. Carefully worked out plans for the deployment were based on a practical assessment of the requirements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as the environmental and security conditions. It will be critical that UNMIS is given sufficient capability to perform at the level assigned to it by the Security Council and anticipated by the parties to the Agreement. I urge those troop-contributing countries that have committed themselves to UNMIS to deploy their forces in a timely manner.

68. As the parties take the first steps in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it is worth noting that progress made on political issues and ceasefire monitoring will matter little if the lives of ordinary Sudanese do not improve. Conflict has destroyed the economy, infrastructure and services across the Sudan, particularly in the south. Six months into the year, the much hoped for support pledged in Oslo has yet to materialize in any significant form. The commendable preparatory work done so far in the areas of returns, rule of law and institution-building must be rapidly reinforced by large-scale contributions to the United Nations and its partners to produce a peace dividend. Failure to do so could undermine the dynamic created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the same time, it will be important to move efforts, through a coordinated strategy, from relief to recovery and development. In this respect, capacity-building programmes, including those described by the African Union-led joint assessment mission of March 2005, should also be a priority.

69. The tremendous work done by the parties, IGAD, its partners and the United Nations last year, particularly in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, must now rapidly be strengthened. As a matter of priority, the parties in their turn should do their best to engage properly with other armed groups in the Sudan and ensure that the national healing process is genuinely inclusive. This will have a positive effect on other challenges of transition, including addressing the specific needs and participation of women in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The parties should also mobilize their resources and political will in solving the problems of human rights and protection of the civilian population.

70. In the meantime, the parties to the conflict in Darfur must make every effort to successfully conclude the current round of talks in Abuja. International partners must also continue to provide the African Union mediation with all necessary support, while making clear to the parties that the conflict will only end through political settlement, and that the Abuja talks are the only acceptable forum for achieving this goal. The United Nations, in collaboration with its implementing partners, will continue to assist the African Union Commission in ensuring adequate follow-up to the 26 May pledging conference for AMIS.

71. It is also important to stress that those responsible for the atrocities committed in Darfur will be held accountable for their actions. Impunity will not be tolerated. Subjecting these individuals to the rule of law and due process will send a clear and powerful message that the Sudan is beginning to fulfil the promise of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which envisages a just, prosperous and democratic country where all Sudanese live in safety and in dignity, with full faith in the future.
# Annex

**United Nations Mission in the Sudan: military and civilian police strength (as at 12 June 2005)**

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>United Nations military observers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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