



# Security Council

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## Special report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

### I. Introduction

1. As indicated in my report of 9 December 2011 (S/2011/759), the United Nations has been working closely with the African Union in planning future operations for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), taking into account new realities in Mogadishu and southern Somalia described in that report. On 5 January, the African Union Peace and Security Council, at its 306th meeting, endorsed a communiqué (S/2012/19) urging the United Nations Security Council to expeditiously consider and authorize additional support for the joint African Union-United Nations strategic concept for AMISOM operations.

2. This special report presents the request of the African Union, for the consideration of the Security Council, in the context of the political, strategic and operational dynamics in Somalia; identifies the support implications; and provides my recommendations. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2010 (2011), the report also provides an update on the relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to Mogadishu.

### II. Strategic context

3. To inform the deliberations of the Security Council on the African Union request, I will first provide an update on recent progress and ongoing challenges in respect of the political strategy on Somalia and the United Nations broader security, humanitarian and recovery goals. I intend to present a comprehensive update in my regular report in April 2012.

4. Since 2008, the international community has pursued an ambitious political strategy on Somalia. We have aimed, first, to support the Transitional Federal Government in completing the tasks needed to end the transition, notably finalization of a constitution; second, to assist the Transitional Federal Government to broaden the base of the peace process through outreach and reconciliation; and third, to support the development of basic State governance and institutions, especially in the security sector. The comprehensive road map for ending the Somali transition, signed in Mogadishu on 6 September 2011, articulated specific tasks to be achieved in this regard before August 2012.



5. In recent weeks, efforts to agree to arrangements for the end of the transition have made significant progress. At the first Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference, held in Garowe, “Puntland”, from 21 to 23 December 2011, the leaders of the transitional federal institutions, “Puntland”, “Galmudug” and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a agreed on a detailed approach for ending the transition according to the Transitional Charter. The “Garowe Principles” provide for the adoption of the provisional constitution by a Constituent Assembly to be nominated by all road map signatories and civil society, and for the creation of a bicameral federal legislature, comprising a lower house of 225 representatives, and an upper house comprising representatives of federal States and regional administrations. The representatives of the Constituent Assembly and the lower house in its first four-year term would be selected through the 4.5 clan distribution formula; this formula would thereafter be abolished and elections would be conducted for subsequent parliaments.

6. The increasing momentum and the deepening of the political process are important steps forward. In taking forward the Garowe Principles, however, the parties must ensure genuine inclusiveness in the process. My Special Representative has been encouraging the parties to ensure that the constitution-drafting process, the Constituent Assembly and new bodies reflect the diversity of Somalis, including civil society, women and youth.

7. The approaching end of the transition raises the stakes for political actors in the current transitional federal institutions and continued political challenges are to be expected. The prolonged crisis in the Transitional Federal Parliament continued throughout January. My Special Representative is using his good offices to facilitate contacts among the parties and to urge them to resolve their differences within the framework of the road map.

8. Security gains continue to be made against Al-Shabaab. The international community has continued its efforts to help the Transitional Federal Government build security in Mogadishu and across the country, in order to enable the conditions for the extension of legitimate State authority and for long-term peacebuilding. In Mogadishu, AMISOM has continued to consolidate its control over all districts of the city and has begun operations in its outskirts. Outside Mogadishu, the combined operations of Kenyan military and Ethiopian troops working with forces allied with the Transitional Federal Government have continued to gain ground, including by taking Beledweyne on 31 December 2011. In an effort to increase State revenues and restrict financial flows to the Al-Shabaab insurgency, the Transitional Federal Government, on 17 December 2011, wrote to all Member States of the United Nations requesting a ban on imports of Somali charcoal, which are exported almost exclusively from Al-Shabaab areas.

9. With the generous support of Member States, troops are being paid and supported, as are 5,700 police. However, equipment, supplies and accommodations for military and police are lacking. Meanwhile, mechanisms for the necessary civilian oversight of the State's defence and security institutions, as well as of justice and corrections and the broader architecture supporting civilian security and the rule of law, are rudimentary. The Joint Security Committee, co-chaired by the Transitional Federal Government, UNPOS, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and with strong

representation from the international community, will continue to play a pivotal role in this regard.

10. Taking advantage of the changed realities on the ground, the Transitional Federal Government has engaged political actors in areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab, especially with a view to reaching agreement on establishing an effective local administration for the next three to six months, and normalizing the situation. A detailed policy has been developed by the Transitional Federal Government on further outreach measures in the areas recently captured from the insurgents. The key priorities of this approach include: (a) promoting social reconciliation and setting up local political administrations; (b) restoring law and order and justice; (c) the containment of heavy weapons, followed by comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; (d) restoring humanitarian relief distribution and the repatriation of internally displaced persons and refugees; and (e) providing basic services.

11. The humanitarian situation remains critical and the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains a challenge. Despite significant progress achieved in pushing back the famine in southern Somalia in 2011, 4 million people are in urgent need of aid in the country and famine continues for up to 250,000 Somalis. The 2012 Consolidated Appeal seeks \$1.5 billion to address the needs of 4 million people who remain in need and to build the resilience that is necessary for households to withstand future droughts and other shocks, reducing dependency on humanitarian assistance. No significant progress has taken place in the area of human rights and humanitarian law, and the military operations in southern Somalia have renewed concerns regarding protection, population displacement and reduced humanitarian access.

12. Sixteen United Nations agencies are working in Mogadishu to implement stabilization and recovery projects covering human security, basic services and employment. On human security, this includes continued work with children and youth; the establishment of women's civil protection units; ongoing mine action work; support to the justice and corrections sector; support to the Somali police force and public radio stations. Also in Mogadishu, the United Nations is working to increase access to social services, including through support to local authorities and direct support to the health and education sectors. Agencies are also providing a social safety net for the most vulnerable through nutritional support. The United Nations is providing direct employment for people in Mogadishu through its public health projects and labour intensive rehabilitation of infrastructure. These efforts fall within the United Nations Mogadishu Stabilization and Recovery Plan but remain underfunded.

### **III. African Union-United Nations strategic concept**

13. At the initiative of the African Union Commission, and against the background of the recent progress on the political and security tracks, African Union and United Nations planners jointly developed a strategic concept for future AMISOM operations in Somalia. The concept aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab, which, in turn, would be critical to extend the authority of the Transitional Federal

Government beyond the capital and to create space for the effective implementation of the road map.

14. The strategic concept was finalized during an African Union-United Nations joint technical assessment mission that included military planners from AMISOM troop-contributing and other interested countries, which took place from 5 to 17 December. The assessment mission concluded that the conditions were ripe to deal a severe blow to Al-Shabaab, despite considerable challenges and risks.

15. Based on a thorough ground assessment, the joint assessment team established that, in order for AMISOM to be able to conduct concurrent offensive operations throughout south-central Somalia, up to 35,500 troop and substantial resources would be required. The team also examined a minimalist option to maintain the status quo in Mogadishu, while rehutting the Kenyan forces in the Juba and Gedo sectors, increasing the troop ceiling to a total of 15,700 troops. This option was found to be sub-optimal by the planners and was not recommended, as it would entail protracted military operations.

### **Recommendations of the joint assessment mission**

16. The joint assessment mission recommended the most realistic and cost-effective option to achieve the objective of significantly degrading the military capability of Al-Shabaab and creating the security conditions for the implementation of the road map to end the transition. It entails raising the troop level to 17,731 uniformed personnel and a set of enablers and force multipliers aimed at achieving a fine balance between the operational requirements and a realistic level of resources through (a) the prioritization of areas of operation; (b) the phasing of the operation without significantly altering the desired objectives; (c) trading force multipliers and enablers for troop levels by maintaining capability; (d) requesting Ethiopia to continue to provide support to Transitional Federal Government/AMISOM operations in the Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions; and (e) the provision of immediate operational logistics support to the Transitional Federal Government security forces.

17. The team assessed that the provision of enablers and multipliers was critical to (a) reduce the number of required troops; (b) enhance force protection; (c) support major offensive operations on multiple fronts; (d) the sustainment of forces in austere environments; (e) conduct timely medical evacuation; and (f) protect Mogadishu port and support sea control operations to impact revenues accruing to Al-Shabaab. Failure to secure this level of enablers and force multipliers would likely have a negative impact on consolidating the gains achieved and expanding operations, requiring higher costs of operations in the long run.

18. In respect of police operations, the assessment team assumed that the immediate focus of the AMISOM police operations will remain on capacity-building and law enforcement support to the Somalia Police Force. In this regard, the recommended option includes, within the recommended 17,731 uniformed personnel, a guard force, the deployment of 260 individual police officers and 2 formed police units, comprising 140 personnel each. The formed police units would be deployed to provide operational support to the Somalia Police Force, including the protection of international personnel in cooperation with the military guard force and, in exceptional cases, also vital installations. It is important to note that formed police units should not be seen as an extension of the military nor as

performing military duties and should be under the command and control of the AMISOM Police Commissioner. Considering the urgent need to re-establish the rule of law in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, the extent of support required for the Somalia Police Force is expanding, and there is a need to enhance AMISOM police capacity, including through the careful selection of necessary specialized police experts, enablers and multipliers to improve the operational effectiveness. While the deployment of international police officers to Mogadishu and the generation of the formed police units could be expedited, in close coordination with the Police Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee, there is an urgent need to develop a revised police concept of operations tailored to operations of the formed police units in this option.

19. The joint technical assessment mission undertook an initial inventory of the Somali security forces, and concluded that, notwithstanding significant international assistance in the past two years, gaps still exist in its areas of command and control, equipment, capacity and funding. The team established that, in addition to continuing efforts to develop the Somali security forces to enable them to eventually assume full security responsibilities from AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces are expected to play a greater role in the ongoing operations, including in holding cities and towns after the removal of Al-Shabaab. In pursuing this more immediate track, the urgent provision of operational logistics support to the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces would be critical to the implementation of the strategic concept.

20. As for the medium- to long-term track of developing the Somali security institutions, the assessment mission acknowledged the significant efforts of bilateral donors and recommended more focused and better coordination in the provision of future technical and material support, including to enhance the command and control architecture, the payment of stipends, ammunition and equipment, within the context of a re-energized Joint Security Committee and its working groups. Enhancing the command and control arrangements of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces was underscored as a vital priority both on the immediate and the medium- to long-term tracks. The assessment mission further identified the need to establish personnel management streamlining policies. It also noted the need for support to be provided to the Transitional Federal Government allied forces, including those of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, in conjunction with the Transitional Federal Government, in all regions where they are currently operating.

21. The team concluded that the planned expansion of AMISOM operations represents a renewed and unique opportunity to further consolidate all efforts on both tracks of the rebuilding of the Somali forces. The role and the responsibilities of the United Nations, AMISOM and bilateral donors in supporting the Somali security institutions, targeting both tracks, requires greater clarification on the basis of an accurate picture of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces. The team also foresaw the need for AMISOM to play a central role in channelling the support under the immediate track to be recognized and supported by all stakeholders.

### **Endorsement by the African Union**

22. The African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the strategic concept on 5 January 2012 and decided, inter alia, on the deployment by Burundi and

Uganda of additional troops to reach the currently authorized strength of 12,000. The African Union Peace and Security Council also requested the United Nations Security Council to expeditiously consider and authorize the support required for the immediate implementation of the strategic concept. Moreover, the African Union Peace and Security Council requested the African Union Commission to accelerate the follow-on planning requirements, including the elaboration and the early finalization of a new AMISOM military concept of operations, a police concept of operations and a support plan to enable the execution of the AMISOM expanded operations.

23. Subsequently, in a letter dated 18 January, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission communicated the outcome of the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the AMISOM troop-contributing countries and other interested countries held in Nairobi on 17 January. The Ministers formulated a series of arrangements that have been brought to the attention of the Heads of State and Governments of the concerned countries. With regard to command and control, the Ministers agreed to establish the Strategic Coordination Mechanism to provide necessary advice to the African Union Commission, which would be responsible for providing strategic guidance and directives to the Mission through the established chain of command. It was also decided that the Force Commander would have two Deputy Force Commanders, one for operations and plans and another for Support, as well as a Force Chief of Staff. The African Union Commission will generate staff officers from the troop-contributing countries and other African Union member States. In addition, in order to enhance the role of the Transitional Federal Government forces and allied forces in the implementation of the strategic concept, the meeting agreed that there shall be stronger coordination and liaison arrangements between AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government at national and sectoral levels.

24. Moreover, without prejudice to the development of the military concept of operations, and as part of a natural evolution of the planning process, the Ministers agreed to reconfigure the sectors identified in the strategic concept by assigning the 17,731 uniformed personnel as follows:

- (a) Sector 1: Banadir (Mogadishu) and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions: the current troop levels with the Burundian and Ugandan contingents shall be maintained (uniformed personnel strength: 9,500);
- (b) Sector 2: Middle and Lower Juba regions (Kismaayo): the troops in this sector will consist mainly of the rehatted Kenyan Defence Force (uniformed personnel strength: 4,700);
- (c) Sector 3: Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Baidoa) and western part of Hiraan regions: the balance of the 12,000 troops to be generated from Burundi and Uganda will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 2,500);
- (d) Sector 4: Galgudud, Mudug and part of the Hiraan regions (Beledweyne): the Djiboutian contingent will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 1,000).

25. Notwithstanding the revised force structure, the Ministers recognized the need to optimize employment of the limited resources through cross-sector operations and support arrangements as designated by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission.

26. The Ministers also confirmed that AMISOM would conduct limited maritime operations in close coordination with the ongoing operations by international partners. In this regard, and taking into account the decision of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 3 December 2011, authorizing the training and the deployment of vessel protection detachments on board supply vessels for AMISOM, a maritime component of the concept of operations will be required.

#### **Operational planning**

27. The joint African Union-United Nations planning team has been reconvened to immediately begin its work to develop a new AMISOM concept of operations, which will further detail the command and control architecture, sector demarcations including specific troops disposition and support plan, and other planning documents, such as the strategic directive, the Mission plan, the Force requirements, the rules of engagement and the status-of-forces agreement. The United Nations stands ready to continue assisting this follow-on planning process.

### **IV. Support implications**

28. The expansion of AMISOM to 17,731 uniformed personnel, deployed across the four sectors listed in paragraph 24 above, has significant resource implications. The increase in support costs will be driven by several factors, including the larger geographical area of operations; climatic conditions; lack of security; weak infrastructure; mobility requirements of a dynamic combat force; the difficulty of using civilian contractors in a war environment; and lack of access in the short term to a proximate seaport in southern Somalia, such as Kismaayo, necessitating the use of circuitous and seasonal land corridors for supply lines. Within the parameters of the African Union strategic concept, greater or lesser levels of support can be envisaged. However, it should be clearly understood that the level of support selected will have an impact on the operational capability of the force.

29. Subject to the decision of the Council, it is envisaged that the existing United Nations logistical support package would be expanded to provide AMISOM with the support needed to operate effectively in all four sectors. Each sector would be provided a logistical hub, with structures, to house headquarters, medical facilities and stores. The remainder of the sector forces would maintain tactical camps to allow them to respond to the changing operational situation. The United Nations would continue to provide the current support package and limited self-sustainment in accordance with previous Security Council resolutions. In addition, the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment, including enablers and multipliers, would be covered from assessed contributions under an extended logistical support package. Only equipment deployed by the troop-contributing countries and considered owned by troop-contributing countries would be reimbursed. Equipment donated to AMISOM or where the ownership still remains with the donor would not be reimbursed.

30. The capacity of the expanded AMISOM to fulfil its objectives will be largely determined by the extent to which the Mission is appropriately resourced, in particular the enablers and force multipliers that are ultimately availed to it, such as a maritime interdiction capacity. Support for the generation of the full force requirements outlined in the strategic concept will allow the Mission to

simultaneously dominate multiple parts of the area of operations, to significantly degrade the military capability of Al-Shabaab and to support the Transitional Federal Government in projecting its authority. Limiting AMISOM to present support arrangements, by contrast, would restrict the force to static positions across its area of operations. This runs the serious risk of allowing Al-Shabaab the opportunity to regroup, losing the strategic opportunity and potentially exposing the force and its support to greater threat.

31. The option to continue the scope at a limited level is more economical in the short term, but offers significantly reduced capacity to positively influence the situation in south-central Somalia. The recommended option of expanding the support scope to include funding for enablers and multipliers promises a far greater impact. A final option that would include more substantial infrastructures within the four sectors is also possible; although it is questionable whether such an option is required in the current situation, as opposed to mobile and tactical arrangements.

32. The structure of United Nations support arrangements would not change appreciably under these arrangements. The United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) would continue to utilize sea resupply, commercial contractors and training uniformed personnel to execute United Nations support tasks. Wherever possible, seaports, such as at Mogadishu and Kismaayo, would be used to keep support costs to a minimum. To support locations in the hinterland, both military and commercial ground transport would be the primary means of supply. For emergency re-supply, commercial air carriers and helicopters can be employed.

33. This expanded package would allow new AMISOM units to deploy in all sectors, providing a limited secure location for political engagement and the protection of nearby populations. However, without multipliers and enablers, these forces would be static and would not be able to effectively engage Al-Shabaab or support the implementation of the road map. The authorization of force multipliers and enablers, including helicopters, transport units and possibly maritime assets, would be essential to provide AMISOM with greater operational capability and flexibility to engage Al-Shabaab over sustained periods.

34. Appropriate explosive threat management capacity should be included in the package to ensure the freedom of movement of AMISOM troops in sectors 2, 3 and 4, including the mitigation of the threat of improvised explosive devices, abandoned stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and other explosive remnants of war. Requirements, while similar to those in Mogadishu, should enable AMISOM troops to cover significantly greater distances and secure areas much larger than the Mission experiences in the capital. As such, the proportionate amount of armoured demining and clearance equipment required will be significantly greater than that which exists in Mogadishu. An additional focus on mentorship will be essential in the realization of the requisite clearance and threat reduction tasks.

35. Level II medical facilities will also be required in sectors 2 and 3. Troop-contributing countries will be required to staff these medical facilities with partners, with UNSOA assisting with equipment, consumables and drugs. UNSOA will continue to provide medical evacuation services using medically equipped helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

36. Strategic communication and information support (public information) activities managed by UNSOA will need to be commensurate with the requirements,

as outlined in the AMISOM strategic concept. Overall coherence will require the establishment of a joint-combined Mission strategic communication mechanism, responsible for command and control and the coordination of and liaison on all public information issues. Operations will focus on the maintenance and enhancement of messaging and communication campaigns in support of security and political tracks. Radio broadcasting in support of AMISOM will be increased to keep pace with the expanded AMISOM area of operations and will be reinforced through efforts to establish a Somali public service broadcaster.

## **V. Relocation of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia**

37. As AMISOM and Transitional Federal Government forces open up more secure space for the peace process, it has become possible for the Special Representative to pursue much of his good offices directly in-country. In this connection, I am pleased to report that, as of 24 January, the Special Representative relocated his office to Mogadishu. Following a concept employed by the Organization in other non-permissive environments, UNPOS will henceforth operate from a main forward headquarters in Mogadishu, while retaining a rear base in Nairobi, until security and logistical conditions permit the relocation of the entire Office to Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia.

38. For the time being, given constraints of resources and the volatile security environment, the Mogadishu headquarters will comprise a team of 10 staff with political, security, human rights, public information and administrative functions supporting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Staff fulfilling tasks that can be accomplished from outside the country will remain in Nairobi, rotating into Mogadishu as required based on security and political priorities. Key tasks for the initial deployment will include good offices with the major Somali political and security actors in Mogadishu; support for the implementation of the road map process; and ensuring effective coordination with AMISOM, IGAD, the United Nations country team and the international community in Mogadishu.

39. The deployment of additional substantive UNPOS staff, with their functions, would require resourcing; for example, additional minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards-compliant offices and living accommodations and supplementary support assets (Communications and Information Technology Section, vehicles, furniture) and services (camp management, travel, rest and recuperation). Planning for this second phase is under way, and I shall report on progress to the Council.

## **VI. Conclusions**

40. As I described to the Council in my previous report and in my briefing of 13 December, the situation in Somalia is at a tipping point. While the political and security situation on the ground remains extremely fragile, the prospects for positive change appear greater than they have been for many years. I am encouraged by the extraordinary international commitment to Somalia shown in recent months, by developments in the security situation and by the commitment of Somali political leaders, outlined in the Garowe Principles, to a clear process and timeline for the

conclusion of the transition. The way ahead, while confronted with risks and challenges, represents a moment of historic opportunity that we cannot let go by.

41. I commend the efforts of the African Union, the AMISOM troop-contributing countries and the countries of the region in developing a comprehensive strategic concept for AMISOM together with the United Nations. This joint process by the African Union and the United Nations has been an exemplary model of collaboration between the two organizations under the leadership of the African Union.

42. An expanded AMISOM is critical to seizing the present moment of opportunity. It represents a chance to support the Transitional Federal Government in extending its authority across a wider area of southern and central Somalia. It offers the Somali leadership the chance to reach out to the population in those areas, at precisely the moment when important decisions must be made about the constitution and the political future of the country in line with the road map. An expanded AMISOM also represents the best opportunity to significantly degrade the military capability of Al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia and to limit the threats it poses to the country and the subregion, while preventing their relocation to other parts of Somalia.

43. It is my assessment that the recommended expansion of AMISOM outlined in the strategic concept and endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 5 January represents the most pragmatic way forward in view of the prevailing circumstances on the ground, even though confronted with risks and challenges. I therefore recommend that the Security Council request the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia, and to increase its force strength from the current mandated strength of 12,000 to 17,731 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate. I further recommend that the Council authorize the development of an appropriately expanded package of logistical support, including support for enablers and force multipliers, to enable AMISOM to deliver its mandate in line with the new strategic concept.

44. As indicated in paragraph 30 above, the degree to which AMISOM will be able to meet its objectives will be dependent on the support it is provided, in particular the enablers and force multipliers. As the Council is aware, AMISOM and its troop contributors also require adequate, sustainable and predictable funding. Failure to provide this in the key areas of AMISOM operations will discourage the timely deployment of additional troops and hinder operations. Recognizing that we are in an environment of global financial constraint, I would ask Council members to ensure that tasks and resources are appropriately matched.

45. I emphasize that the goals and the objectives of the military operations must remain firmly grounded in the political process. It will be critical to establish a flexible mechanism for coordination among troop contributors and African Union, United Nations and Somali actors in Mogadishu. On the United Nations side, this will be facilitated by the relocation of my Special Representative and the deployment of an increased number of civilian staff to Mogadishu. In this regard, there will also be increased demands for security to enable civilians to perform their functions. I recall the request for the African Union to rapidly deploy the guard force, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2010 (2011).

46. The full transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali security sector institutions must remain our ultimate goal. In the long-term, this requires a comprehensive approach to development of the security sector that is anchored in the rule of law and the needs and the aspirations of the Somali people. In the immediate term, the Transitional Federal Government and its allied forces urgently require additional support to enable them to play their part in the ongoing military operations. A key priority that cuts across both tracks is the strengthening of the command and control arrangements of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces. The context created by the expansion of AMISOM represents an opportunity to consolidate all efforts and identify concrete steps in these two tracks. I commend the important efforts of Member States, the European Union, and the African Union, with the United Nations, to work together in these two tracks. I call on the international community to work with my Special Representative within the framework of a re-energized Joint Security Committee. Drawing from similar experiences, the time has come for bilateral actors to expand their engagement in this sector.

47. Addressing the risks and the challenges requires that we continue to work with the Transitional Federal Government and other Somali stakeholders, the African Union and IGAD, as well as the international community at large, to closely align and synchronize the political and the military efforts. It will be essential for the Transitional Federal Government to reach out to newly recovered areas and establish a transparent and inclusive process to engage with the local population and foster development of new administrations in line with the Transitional Federal Charter. It is also imperative to roll out on an urgent basis sustained recovery and stabilization efforts in the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab to meet the rightful expectations of these communities further to the military gains.

48. While we work towards sustainable peace and political stability throughout Somalia, we must recognize that the expansion of military operations is not without risk. It will be important for the Transitional Federal Government, its allied forces and international forces to take all possible measures to ensure that their operations do not negatively impact civilians and further complicate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I call on all parties to respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure that protecting civilians remains a priority.

49. Looking ahead, it is essential to put in place the foundations of long-term economic recovery and reconstruction. We should recognize that long-term economic recovery will require changes in the pattern of development assistance and private investment to address the major infrastructure needs of a country devastated by 20 years of conflict.

50. More immediately, there is a need to consolidate and create incentives to sustain peace and stability. In this respect, support for the stabilization plans for Mogadishu and the areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab become of critical importance. We must provide investment and create incentives for peace and stability. I encourage donors to consider United Nations agencies to rapidly undertake projects that improve human security and access to basic services and create employment in areas that come under the control of the Somali Government.

51. I welcome the contributions from traditional and new donors to all aspects of the international intervention in Somalia. I urge that all support be coordinated

through the existing mechanisms for international support. The upcoming international conferences, including in London on 23 February and later this year in Istanbul, will be an opportunity to take forward the strategy together.

52. I take note of paragraph 14 of the African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué of 2 December in relation to the rehating of AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

53. Finally, I pay tribute to the Governments of Burundi and Uganda for their continued sacrifice and commitment with respect to the cause of peace in Somalia. I reiterate my condolences to the families of the victims, including the relatives of the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, its allies and AMISOM soldiers who have lost their lives.

