Letter dated 3 February 2023 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2648 (2022) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2648 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2648 (2022), the midterm report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 28 December 2022 and was considered by the Committee on 3 February 2023.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Ruben De Koning  
Coordinator

(Signed) Fadhel Bouzidi  
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(Signed) Jocelyn Gapet  
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Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2648 (2022)

Summary

Political tensions around the constitutional reform process in Bangui and the resurgence of armed group activity across the northern and south-eastern part of the country marked the period under review.

Certain civil society and State-affiliated actors incited violence against the political opposition and foreign business interests with consequences that undermined peace and stability in the Central African Republic. Government reactions in the case of Didacien Kossimatchi were contradictory. His Galaxie nationale association was officially suspended for incitement to commit violence. In his role as teacher, Kossimatchi received a presidential decoration ahead of the 1 December Republic Day celebrations.

Despite being dislodged from mineral-rich areas, such as Nzako (Haut-Mbomou Prefecture) and Sam Ouandja (Haute-Kotto Prefecture), armed groups belonging to the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC) found alternative areas to regroup, resupply and take refuge from United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) and bilateral forces’ operations. These included the territory around Gordil (Vakaga Prefecture) in the north along the Chadian border and Zangba (Basse-Kotto Prefecture) in the south along the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Uprooted from certain territories, armed group actions against the civilian population, humanitarian organizations and the United Nations grew increasingly bold. In Vakaga Prefecture, two complex hostage-taking incidents occurred, one involving civilians from Am Dafok on the Sudanese border and another near Ndiffa on the Chadian border involving two United Nations staff and a representative of the Government of the Central African Republic. At the same time, attacks between armed groups and FACA and reprisals against each other were brutal, involving summary executions and acts of reprisal against civilians. In addition to recent incidents, the Panel was investigating two prior incidents in retrospect: one that took place in Bokolobo on 9 May 2022 and one in Ndassima on 23 April 2022, both in Ouaka Prefecture.

Armed groups’ arms and ammunition supply routes of regularly reported material – for example, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47-type assault rifles and 7.62 mm ammunition – remained largely unchanged, and the intensity of trafficking was difficult to estimate from available footage and seizures. While responsibility had yet to be attributed, the Panel had observed an increasing use of explosive devises across the country, ranging from improvised explosive devices and artisanal airdropped bombs to conventional anti-vehicle, -tank and -personnel mines. Armed groups’ apparent possession and use of uncrewed aerial vehicles was probably a one-off, following the capture of uncrewed aerial vehicles from the FACA or other international security presences.
As was the case for diamonds, at least half of the gold produced in the Central African Republic was currently exported legally. The Panel was yet to identify gold exporters purchasing from problematic areas like Kouki, Ndassima and Gordil, where armed group interference and other forms of violence had been reported. Diamond areas proposed by the Government for lifting of the Kimberley Process diamond export suspension still witnessed armed group disturbances, but those were not systematic. Freedom of movement, another criterion for lifting, was, however, under pressure owing to counter-insurgency operations and illicit rent-seeking by government forces.
I. Background

Mandate and travel

1. On 29 July 2022, the Security Council adopted resolution 2648 (2022), by which it extended the arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze, with exemptions, in the Central African Republic. The Council also mandated the Panel of Experts to continue to assist the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Council resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic. The Panel was tasked, inter alia, with collecting information on the implementation of sanctions measures (arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban), as well as on individuals and entities that may meet the designation criteria in paragraphs 20 to 22 of Council resolution 2399 (2018) and extended by paragraph 5 of resolution 2648 (2022).

2. The Panel was requested to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 31 January 2023. The present report covers the period from 1 September 2022, the beginning of the Panel’s mandate, to 26 December, the drafting completion date, but includes cases and incidents prior to that period.

Cooperation

3. During the reporting period, the Panel travelled twice to the Central African Republic, visiting the capital Bangui as well as Birao (Vakaga Prefecture), Bouar (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture), Bria (Haute-Kotto Prefecture) and Bambari (Ouaka Prefecture). Although it was unable to visit neighbouring countries, the Panel exchanged information with other United Nations panels or groups of experts, in particular the Panels of Experts on Libya and on South Sudan, as well as the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel thanks the Government of the Central African Republic for facilitating its visits and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for its continued logistical support and substantive collaboration.

Methodology

4. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it aims to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose those or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel withholds identifying information. The Panel corroborated its findings by triangulating information with independent and reliable sources.

5. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and strove to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report in relation to which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline.

II. Political process

A. Constitutional Court annulling the Commission for Constitutional Reform

6. On 23 September 2022, the Constitutional Court in Bangui ruled unconstitutional previously issued presidential decrees establishing and appointing a
committee mandated to draft changes to the Constitution that would potentially have allowed President Touadéra to run for a third term in office. The Government’s spokesperson welcomed the Court’s decision. ¹ This was reflected in the opening speech of the President of National Assembly, Simplice Mathieu Sarandji, on 3 October.²

7. Through a decree issued by the Ministry of Public Service on 10 October 2022, the President of the Constitutional Court, Danièle Darlan, was placed on retirement as law professor at Bangui University.³ On 24 October 2022 she was dismissed as President of the Constitutional Court by Presidential decree, citing her retirement as professor as an impediment to continue to serve.⁴

B. Incitements to violence in the context of political contestation

8. On 24 September, a day after the Constitutional Court’s decision, a meeting organized by the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution at a school ground in Bimbo town, adjacent to Bangui, was disturbed by supporters of Galaxie nationale and the Front républicain. According to multiple eyewitnesses, supporters of both associations physically harassed members of the Bloc républicain and prevented stands from being erected.⁵

9. The coordinator of Galaxie nationale, Didacien Kossimatchi (see S/2021/569, para. 149) had on 18 September issued a communiqué branding the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution a criminal organization and alleging that France had donated funds to organize the meeting in Bimbo (see annex 1). Immediately after the ruling of the Constitutional Court, Front républicain President and Chief of Staff of the Minister for Sports, Héritier Doneng (ibid., para. 103), qualified it as biased.⁶

10. The Panel had previously drawn attention to Mr. Kossimatchi’s repeated incitements to violence (ibid., para. 149), which have since only grown more severe (see annex 2). The Panel is also of the view that the confiscation by force of Jet A1 fuel by the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic (FACA) from the company Total at Bangui M’Poko International Airport on 1 July 2022⁷ at the instruction of the Minister for Energy (see annex 3) had been incited by Mr. Kossimatchi. On 17 May 2022, Mr. Kossimatchi had accused Total of having refused to supply FACA and its allies, despite an increase of CPC attacks, and threatened to use the same violent means against Total.⁸

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¹ See www.radiondekeluka.org/actualites/justice/39306-centrafrique-le-gouvernement-prend-acte-de-la-decision-de-la-cour-constitutionnelle.html.
² Opening remarks are archived at the United Nations.
³ Arrêté n°169/MFPRA/DIRCAB/DGFP/DASCFAE/SRR.2022 portant mise à la retraite de certains fonctionnaires cadres de l’enseignement supérieur, 10 October 2022, archived at the United Nations.
⁵ Communications received from members of the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution and bystanders, 24 September 2022.
⁶ Interview available at www.rfi.fr/fr/en-bref/20220923-centrafrique-un-comit%C3%A9-de-r%C3%A9daction-d-une-nouvelle-constitution-invalid%C3%A9-par-la-cour-constitutionnelle.
⁸ Video post available at m.facebook.com/people/Galaxie-Nationale-Beafrika/1000709066216131.
11. On 22 September 2022, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development suspended the activities of Galaxie nationale. The stated reasons were incitement to hatred, division and disturbance of the public order, and disrespect of the statutory dispositions by which the platform had been established (see annex 4). In conversations with the Panel, Central African Government officials, however, justified Mr. Kossimatchi’s actions and statements. Moreover, on 23 November, Mr. Kossimatchi, in his capacity as teacher at Bangui University, was given the decoration of Grand Officer by the President of the Republic ahead of Republic Day celebrations (see annex 5).

C. Government reengagement with armed groups

12. Following a strategic review of the Luanda Roadmap on 4 June 2022, the Government proposed a timetable of priority activities aimed at accelerating implementation.9 Under the first component, the Government aims to (re)engage with armed groups, including those not part of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, for instance, the Misseriya militia (see para. 81).

13. After meeting with representatives of pro-Government factions of 11 armed groups on 14 September 2022, four armed groups announced their dissolution on 4 December 2022.10 Two were of significance, the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), led by the Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, Djono Ahaba, and the Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice, led by Gilbert Toumou Deya, Minister delegate in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. The formal dissolution of RPRC had not had any effect on the ground (see paras. 15 and 17).

14. The Panel was not aware of any engagement between the Government and CPC-affiliated armed groups and deemed it unlikely, considering the highly confrontational conflict dynamics on the ground, despite the Government’s unilateral ceasefire declaration of 15 December 2021.

III. Armed group dynamics

A. Reorganization and radicalization of Coalition des patriotes pour le changement following Zacharia Damane’s killing

15. The armed groups landscape had recently witnessed a profound change in the light of the radicalization and reorganization of CPC. The assassination of RPRC “general” Zakaria Damane and about 20 of his combatants in Ouadda, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, on 12 February 2022, played an important role in this. From the Goula ethnic group, Mr. Damane had remained an ally of the Government (see S/2021/569, para. 144) and had been engaged in the disarmament and demobilization of the rebels in the prefectures of Vakaga and Haute-Kotto. According to local sources in Bria, Mr. Damane had been instrumental in the surrender of a number of rebels who, after their demobilization, had provided security for President Touadera’s election campaign in northern Central African Republic in December 2020.11

9 Timing of implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the Luanda Roadmap, archived at the United Nations.
10 See www.alwihdainfo.com/RCA-4-mouvements-armesannonceur-dissolution-conformement-a-l’accord-de-paix_a119615.html.
11 Meetings in Bria, 28–30 November 2022.
16. Mr. Damane’s assassination not only aroused a feeling of betrayal and revolt within RPRC and the wider Goula community, but also with other main armed groups, such as the ethnic Rounga-dominated Front populaire pour la renaissance du Centrafrique (FPRC), the Fulani-dominated Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), and the Arab-dominated Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique. This feeling of revolt contributed to the reorganization of CPC in July 2022 under the leadership of sanctioned individuals Nourredine Adam (CFi.002) and Ali Darassa (CFi.015) in the prefectures of Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran.

17. With the progressive deployment of FACA in Bria in April 2022, with the support of Russian instructors, FACA targeted Goula armed group leaders in Bria and the Ouadda, Sam Ouandja and Ouanda-Djallé triangle. The attacks were perceived by a section of the Goula community as ethnic targeting and led to the community’s radicalization, despite the 2021 peace agreement signed between the communities of Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto and Vakaga, under the auspices of former President Michel Djotodia. The hostage-taking of Tiringoulou described below (see paras. 70–80) is a further manifestation of this radicalization.

B. Armed group dynamics in eastern Central African Republic

18. In a context of continuous movements and regroupings of CPC in the prefectures of Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-Kotto, following the deployment of FACA supported by Russian instructors, the risk of armed clashes at the start of the dry season had increased.

19. In Haute-Kotto Prefecture, armed UPC and FPRC elements were reported on several axes leading to Bria. The elements allegedly extorted several civilians in villages 35 km south of Aigbando, forcing many civilians to seek refuge in the bush. On 6 December, 40 FACA elements and Russian instructors deployed to Aigbando.12

20. On 7 December 2022, the armed elements of the self-proclaimed FPRC General Mahamat Salleh (see S/2021/569, paras. 21, 23 and 40–42, and photograph in annex 4) arrived at the village of Akocho. Their presence was reported to the Russian instructors based in Aigbando, located 25 km from Akocho. In the early morning of the following day, Mr. Salleh’s forces clashed with Russian instructors and associated Central African trackers in Akocho, causing casualties on both sides.13

21. Earlier, on 13 September 2022, a dozen CPC elements, led by Mr. Salleh, attacked a FACA position in the Gobolo district on the outskirts of Bria. FACA repelled the attackers and prevented them from entering the city.14 On 18 November, CPC also attacked a FACA base in the village Ngouaboudou, located 45 km from Bria on the Bria-Ippy axis, killing one civilian and injuring several others.15

22. Since the beginning of September 2022, armed groups had also multiplied around Sikikede (Vakaga Prefecture). In Mouraye, Arab Misseriya elements had been reported alongside CPC affiliated elements. CPC had erected roadblocks on the Ndïffâ-Gordî to levy illegal taxes. To dissuade CPC and the Misseriya militia from attacking Birao, the capital of Vakaga Prefecture, Russian instructors deployed there on 7 December.16

12 Meeting with community representatives and security forces in Bria, 28–30 November 2022.
14 Meetings with government authorities and community representatives in Bria, 29 November 2022.
15 Ibid.
16 Communication from confidential source, 18 December 2022.
23. Following the withdrawal of the MINUSCA temporary base in the town of Ouadda (Haute-Kotto Prefecture) on 10 November 2022, the security situation had worsened. CPC had regained control of the city on 14 November, set up a de facto administration and started to levy illegal taxes and recruit young people and children.\textsuperscript{17} The self-proclaimed UPC zone commander, Colonel Abdoulaye, patrolled the town and organized the trafficking of diamonds and gold to Chad and the Sudan.

24. In the south-east, suspected CPC armed elements ambushed traders 20 km south of Bakouma (Mbonou Prefecture) on 1 December 2022. The traders had been returning from a weekly market in Ouango, located 134 km west of Bangassou.\textsuperscript{18} Seven were killed and four injured. Their goods were looted. The attack coincided with the movements of armed groups in the area, at the start of the dry season, to control trade routes. In addition, on 26 November 2022, UPC elements attacked a humanitarian convoy on the Pombolo-Kembe axis. A large sum of money and goods were looted.\textsuperscript{19}

C. Armed group dynamics in central Central African Republic

25. See annex 7.

IV. Arms

A. Armed groups’ arms and ammunition supplies

26. As the Panel reported previously (S/2021/569, para. 29–33), the supply of arms to armed groups was unstable and much depended on the geopolitical situation in the region. Instability in Chad and the Sudan generated competing demands for arms, reducing the availability of weapons in the Central African Republic and increasing prices.\textsuperscript{20} Most weapons and ammunition entered the Central African Republic during the rainy season when roads are practically inaccessible to Government international forces that rely on vehicles, while armed groups are still able to move using motorcycles and donkeys (see annex 8).

27. At the same time, armed groups’ financial capacity to procure newer weapons and ammunition appeared limited.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, weapons seized by MINUSCA mostly included AK-47 rifles dating from 1982 to 1986 and home-made single-shot rifles.\textsuperscript{22}

28. Armed groups were currently most active along the northern borders of the Central African Republic, which served as a bridgehead for logistics and facilitated refuge and tactical withdrawal when Government and allied forces advanced. Where there was proximity and a high risk of being overrun, armed groups had set up underground ammunition and weapons caches all along the axes of progression with precise geographical location. Annex 9 contains images of one such cache, reportedly maintained by the armed group Retour, réclamation et rehabilitation (3R) west of Koui (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture). The Panel observed five routes of arms and ammunition supplies (see annex 10).

\textsuperscript{17} Meetings with confidential sources in Bria, 28–30 November 2022.
\textsuperscript{18} Communication with multiple local community sources in Bakouma, 3 December 2022.
\textsuperscript{19} Meeting with Parliament Member from Kembé, Bangui, 2 December 2022; communication from local sources, 2 December 2022.
\textsuperscript{20} Confidential report, 25 August 2021.
\textsuperscript{21} Meeting with confidential sources in Bangui, 25 November–4 December 2022.
\textsuperscript{22} Confidential reports, 16 September and 11 October 2022. Weapons seizures also include rocket-propelled grenades and 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition.
B. Use of explosive devices and uncrewed aerial vehicles

29. On the basis of confidential statistics, the Panel noted a slight decrease in the number of incidents involving landmines and explosive devices. For the period May to November 2022, 21 incidents were recorded, compared with 32 during the same period in 2021. While the number of deaths had been 30 in 2021, only four deaths had been recorded to date in 2022. The number of people injured decreased by approximately 50 per cent, from 33 in 2021 to 16 in 2022, the majority of whom were civilians during both years.23

30. While the number of incidents may be decreasing, the use of explosive devices had diversified and spread to areas other than the north-west (see S/2021/569, annex 3.16; and S/2022/527, para. 51). Besides describing incidents illustrating novel uses of explosives devises, the Panel also for the first-time noted the possession and use of uncrewed aerial vehicles by armed groups.

Bossangoa bombing incident

31. During the night of 27 to 28 November, at approximately 2.56 a.m., witnesses heard four successive detonations in the vicinity of the Russian instructors’ base in Bossangoa, which was adjacent to the factory of the Office national du cotton on the main road to Bangui. Witnesses also heard an aircraft flying over the area, but because it was dark they could not determine the nature or direction of the aircraft. One hour later, two explosions were also heard coming from the same direction, with light weapons being fired.24

32. Explosives only hit the cotton factory and no injuries or deaths were reported. Parachutes were found on the scene. These had presumably been used to delay the explosions to allow for the aircraft to move to a safe distance. Judging from the visible impacts in the roof of the factory, as well as the fact that the top branches of trees in the surrounding had been ripped off, the Panel estimated that the first four explosions had occurred at a height of about 30 metres. Two craters were also observed, the first next to the factory fence outside and the second inside the factory. These were likely to have been caused by the second set of explosions heard.

33. Besides the parachutes, iron shrapnel measuring 6, 10 and 12 mm, made from metal rods, was found and their impact visible on buildings and trees (see annex 11). This points to artisanal manufacture, at least of the dropped bombs, that were possibly equipped with a timer or altimeter to set them off.

Koui anti-vehicle mine incident

34. See annex 12.

Carnot improvised explosive device incident

35. The Panel recorded with concern the first proven case of fabricating an improvised explosive device. On 26 October 2022, a device exploded on the terrace of an uninhabited building in the city centre of Carnot, killing a young man. It appeared he had been handling a grenade that went off when he tried to add shrapnel made of screws and bolts and make a priming system in the form of a metal box that would release the leverage of the grenade when opened.25

23 Confidential statistics, no date.
24 Meetings with confidential sources in Bangui 29–30 November 2022.
25 Correspondences from confidential sources, 30 May 2022.
Koméblé anti-personnel mines

36. See annex 13.

Armed groups possibly using looted uncrewed aerial vehicles

37. During September 2022, MINUSCA spotted several mini-uncrewed aerial vehicles in the air: in Nzako on 7 and 21 September at 7.00 p.m. and in Ouanda-Djallé on 28 September at 6.00 p.m. and again on 29 September.26 In Ouanda-Djallé, the uncrewed aerial vehicles were suspected to be of the type “DJI MAVIC II”. This type of vehicle appeared in video footage obtained by the Panel showing UPC fighters displaying an uncrewed aerial vehicles recovered from the backpack of a neutralized FACA fighter following confrontations in Nzako in May 2022 (see S/2022/527, para. 36). No uncrewed aerial vehicle had ever been notified to or exempted by the Committee. FACA denied possession of the above-mentioned drones (see annex 14 for additional information, analysis and photographs).

C. Arms embargo monitoring

38. Since the adoption on 7 August 2020 of the general regime for conventional weapons and their components, parts and ammunition, the national implementing decree with provisions on weapons marking, seizures and transfers was still pending. In the meantime, the technical guidelines for the verification of weapons and ammunition of May 2019 (see annex 15) applied to all transfers of weapons into the Central African Republic, although the guidelines were initially drafted for deliveries from the Russian Federation that had been exempted by the Committee.27 The guidelines called for collaborative verification teams, including those from MINUSCA (Mine Action Service and the security sector reform division), the European Union Training Mission and the Panel, to be called upon by the Ministry of Defence’s Directorate General of Technical Services to inspect the shipments of exempted products.

39. Such inspections had taken place on two occasions in 2019 and concerned exempted deliveries by France, following a similar protocol, and the Russian Federation, but no inspections of delivered weapons and ammunition had taken place since. The Panel had attempted on multiple occasions to schedule a meeting with the Minister for Defence and the General Directorate of Technical Services to discuss the status of inspections and propose ad hoc information-sharing with the Panel to verify transfers. In preparation of a possible meeting, the Chief of Staff of the Minister had questioned the necessity of the Panel’s endeavours to verify transfers in the light of the further easing of the arms embargo under Security Council resolution 2648 (2022).28 No meeting was accorded to the Panel during its visits in October and December 2022.

40. In cooperation with the Panel, MINUSCA was mandated, in accordance with paragraph 37 (b) of Security Council resolution 2659 (2022), to monitor implementation of the arms embargo and exemption and notification procedures. The monitoring role of MINUSCA at Bangui M’Poko International Airport had been

26 Confidential reports, 8, 22 and 29 September 2022.
27 Meeting with the Executive Secretary of the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons of the Central African Republic, who also chairs the Technical Secretariat of the Interministerial Coordination Committee, 21 October 2022.
28 Whereas previous resolutions renewing the arms embargo progressively subjected categories of weapons to a notification rather than an exemption procedure, Security Council resolution 2628 (2022) subjects to notification all supplies of weapons and ammunition to the Central African security forces for support of or use in its security sector reform process.
constrained because of the illegal removal on 10 June 2022 (see S/2021/569, para. 100) of its high-performance camera fixed on the control tower by presidential guard elements. 29 The Ministry of Defence in the Central African Republic acknowledged taking away the camera for “reasons of the state” (see annex 16).

Deliveries of weapons and ammunition by Member States in non-compliance with or in violation of the arms embargo

41. The Panel documented violations of the arms embargo and non-compliance with the notification regime in relation to recent deliveries from the Sudan. On two occasions, on 18 August and 19 November 2022, the same Antonov An-32B with registration ST-PAW of the Sudan Police Air Wing arrived at Bangui M’Poko International Airport to offload military goods onto FACA vehicles (see annex 17).

42. The Panel can rule out the possibility that the deliveries had been covered by notifications to the Committee. On 9 June 2022, 100 FACA soldiers that were part of the tripartite force had been notified to rotate from Am Dafok, the Sudan, but just one flight, the second, coming from Khartoum, carried eight passengers in addition to the crew. 30 On 10 August 2022, the Central African authorities also notified the Committee regarding the arrival of two trucks, 7.62 mm ammunition and rocket-propelled grenades from the Sudan-based Military Industry Corporation, but they omitted crucial details required under paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2488 (2019), such as the anticipated arrival date and mode of transportation. The military supplies were too large to be transported by an An-32 aircraft. They were most likely transported from the Sudan aboard an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft with registration EX-76005 on 22 October 2022, which offloaded military cases and two trucks.

43. The most likely contents of the containers unloaded from the ST-PAW on 19 November 2022 were assault rifles of the AK-47 type. For the 18 August delivery, the image captured does not clearly show the form of the item carried into the FACA truck (see annex 17). The Panel wrote letters to the Governments of the Central African Republic and the Sudan requesting more information regarding the three aircraft from the Sudan, but neither has answered.

Provision of other assistance related to military activities in violation of the arms embargo

44. In follow up to the findings in its 2021 final report (S/2021/569), the Panel continued to identify and trace the origin of aircraft used in military activities but not exempted by or notified to the Committee. To note beforehand, aircraft registered with and in propriety of the Ministry of Defence in the Central African Republic had registration numbers starting with K, while aircraft registered with the civil National Aviation Authority had registration numbers starting with A.

45. In response to a letter sent by the Panel, Kratol Aviation, a company operating from Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, acknowledged former ownership of two Antonov An-28 small aircraft currently having registration numbers TL-KFT and TL-KPF. Both aircraft had been mentioned in the Panel’s 2021 final report as being involved in military activities (see S/2021/569, para. 81). The company stated that it had sold both aircraft to a Central African Republic-registered company, Mining Industries, in February 2021, just before the two aircraft were transferred to the

29 Meeting with diplomatic source in Bangui, 12 July 2022; meetings with multiples confidential sources working at Bangui M’Poko International Airport, 25–30 November 2022.
30 Confidential communication, 25 November 2022.
Ministry of Defence on 4 March 2021. The certificates of registration from the Ministry of Defence supplied by the company, however, stated that Kratol Aviation had been the previous owner of TL-KPF and operator of TL-KFT (see annex 18).

46. The Panel also received information that Kratol Aviation had been the previous owner of an Ilyushin II-18 passenger aircraft, (MSN: 186009403) that had arrived in Bangui on 30 August 2021 with registration number TL-KBR. The company, however, denied owning that aircraft, stating that it had managed certain maintenance from April to June 2021 and that the aircraft had been supposedly transferred from a foreign private company to a Central African private company in July 2021. Kratol also denied having owned or operated an Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN: 83485561) that had arrived in Bangui on 29 May 2021 with registration number TL-KMZ.

47. The Aero Transport Data Bank had indeed momentarily listed both aircraft under civilian Central African registration: TL-ART for the II-76 and TL-ARN for the II-18. However, the Central African Republic National Aviation Authority denied having ever registered the two aircraft. The authority did mention that the owners or operators of two An-28, the II-18 and the II-76 had requested civilian registration, but that it had had to be denied because the aircraft were over 30 years old.

48. To clarify the registered tail numbers, prior owners and operators transferring the aircraft to the Ministry of Defence, the Panel requested registration certificates for the II-18 and II-76 from the Central African authorities, but had not yet received a response.

49. The presence of a Mi-17 military helicopter was also observed by the Panel as either non-notified or non-exempted. The helicopter was photographed at Birao Airport on 7 December 2022 and flew above Bangui on 1 December 2022 (see annex 19), but it may have been in the country since July 2021, when the Panel observed the same type of helicopter.

**Follow-up on the seizure of weapons and ammunition and arrest of a French national in Bangui on 10 May 2021**

50. On 10 May 2021, French national Juan Remy Quignolot was arrested by the Central Office for the Suppression of Banditry on suspicion of possessing weapons and fomenting armed unrest. During a search of his home, firearms, ammunition and other military and hunting equipment were confiscated (see S/2021/569, annex 3.6). During his initial hearing before the Bangui district court on 18 May 2021, Mr. Quignolot declared he had stored some weapons on behalf of a colleague working for the European Union-funded Ecofaune project (see also S/2017/1023, para. 174).

51. In June 2021, the Panel inspected weapons and ammunition supposedly found in the possession of Mr. Quignolot and sent tracing requests to several Member States and entities. The Panel was able to trace one type of 9mm ammunition, of which a box of 50 cartridges was supposedly found in the possession of Mr. Quignolot. However, information from a source in contact with Mr. Quignolot gave the Panel...
reasonable doubt that Mr. Quignolot had been in the possession of this type of ammunition. The Panel will seek to clarify whether Mr. Quignolot was in the possession of this type of ammunition before reporting on its origin.

52. While in Bangui in early December 2022, the Panel attempted to meet with Mr. Quignolot, as he had been released provisionally on 28 September 2022. Owing to time constraints, his lawyer was unable to arrange a meeting. The Panel transmitted a letter to Mr. Quignolot via his lawyer to ask whether, and if so, how he had gained custody of the ammunition in question but was yet to receive a response.

V. Natural resources

A. Diamonds

Pending Kimberley Process review visit

53. See annex 20.

Security concerns in sub-prefectures where the lifting of the Kimberley Process suspension is proposed

54. The Panel monitored security incidents from January 2022 in the five sub-prefectures in the west where the Government had proposed the lifting of the Kimberley Process suspension, relying on MINUSCA reporting, communications with local mine operators and interviews with various sources in Bouar during a mission from 17 to 19 October 2022.

55. Incidents of armed group incursions had occurred in two of the five sub-prefectures, Abba and Gamboula (see annex 21). Incidents mostly concerned gold mines, although some affected sites produced gold and diamonds. Regular illicit taxation of miners, mostly by 3R, as reported by previous Panels in 2020 (See S/2020/662, para. 83; S/2021/569, paras. 45–48), no longer took place in the two sub-prefectures. The deployment of FACA, with the support of Russian instructors early in 2021, had dispersed and driven many 3R combatants across the border with Cameroon, from where they now undertook hit-and-run operations closer to the border. These also happened to be gold rather than diamond mining sites.

56. At the same time, instances of violent treatment and extortion of miners and collectors accused of being associated with armed groups limited freedom of movement in the area. Often, extortion and ill-treatment by FACA were entirely motivated by economic gain. This conduct had reportedly also affected artisanal miners in Sosso Nakombo sub-prefecture, where there was no presence of armed groups (see annex 21).

57. Also, in August 2021, FACA prevented MINUSCA from patrolling and undertaking demining activities on a stretch of a road in Baboua sub-prefecture from Bondiba to Nguia-Bouar, close to the Cameroonian border, but leading to sites in Abba, where incidents had been reported. Access continued to be difficult owing to multiple FACA checkpoints erected on that road and further into Abba sub-prefecture.

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38 This also affects Baboua sub-prefecture, where artisanal mining exclusively concerns gold. It is therefore not proposed that the suspension be lifted for Baboua.
39 Confidential report 24 February 2022; meeting with confidential source in Bouar, 18 November 2022. A response of the Ministry of Defence in the Central African Republic to the incident is included in annex 16.
58. As regards Bria sub-prefecture, recent armed group disturbances had occurred when FPRC “General” Mahamat Salleh (see para. 20 above) and UPC general Abdoulaye Machai (see para. 62) moved with their elements from the Bakouma area northwards towards Gordil during September 2022. On 22 September, an artisanal miner living in the Ndourou II district in Bria, was robbed of his three diamonds and CFAF 7,000,000 ($11,317) by Mr. Machai and his men. Another miner, living in the Mande III district of Bria, was robbed of his diamonds at the Yanga mining site by Mr. Salleh and his men.\(^{40}\)

B. Gold

Increased legal exports

59. Legal exports of gold from the Central African Republic showed an upward trend. Between January and September 2022, over one ton of gold was exported from the Central African Republic,\(^{41}\) against an estimated production of close to two tons per year in 2018 (See S/2019/930, para. 156). Production was likely to have increased in recent years, but it could safely be said that the larger share of gold production of the country was now legally exported. This was in line with diamonds produced in the compliant sub-prefectures in the west of the country, as the Panel had calculated in its previous final report (see S/2022/527, para. 31). Legal exports totalled 235 kg for the same period in 2020,\(^{42}\) 142 kg in 2019 and 108 kg in 2018 (see S/2019/930, annex 8.2). The Panel has no data for 2021.

60. A handful of smelters and buying houses were responsible for exports of Central African gold. Smelters typically sourced from a variety of locations in eastern and western Central African Republic. The Panel obtained one export certificate for 15 kg by a smelter, declaring the provenances to be Bossangoa, Bambari, Bozoum, Gamboula, Alindao and Bagandou (see annex 22). These were references to towns and villages and thus not site-specific, making it difficult to assess whether there were any armed group-occupied mines involved. The Panel was engaging with gold smelters and buying houses to encourage them to implement the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.\(^{43}\)

Security concerns in major gold production areas

61. As the Panel indicated in its previous final report (see S/2022/527, para. 38–39) the security situation in the major gold mining sites in the vicinity of Gordil, near the Chadian border in the Vakaga Prefecture, and in the vicinity of Kouki in Ouham Prefecture, remained volatile. Regarding Gordil, the Panel had received information that the main productive pit of Mandjan had attracted Tom (Anour) Adam, alias “Ben Laden” (S/2021/87, para. 26), who had been dislodged from diamond-rich Sam Ouandja by FACA and MINUSCA in a joint operation in August 2022.

62. Other elements dislodged from Sam Ouandja had set up camp at equally diamond rich Mbangana, 100 km south from the town towards Bria, including Djuma

\(^{40}\) Meetings with local authorities and community representatives in Bria, 28–30 November 2022.

\(^{41}\) Official export figures, archived at the United Nations.

\(^{42}\) See www.mines.gouv.cf/actualite/141/exportation-de-diamants-bruts-et-lor-au-cours-du-periode-de-janvier-septembre-2020#:~:text=La%20R%C3%A9publique%20Centrafricaine%20export%C3%A9rite%20l%20FCFA.

\(^{43}\) By its resolution 2262 (2016) on the Central African Republic, the Security Council welcomed measures taken by Member States to promote the use by economic actors of due diligence frameworks such as those of the OECD.
Alanta (S/2021/87, para. 26) and Hissein Damboucha, the FPRC leader from Bria (see S/2019/930, paras. 89–91). There they had been joined by UPC general Abdoulaye Machai, who had been identified as one of the main perpetrators of sexual violence in Bakouma sub-prefecture in 2021. There had been initial discussions between those elements and representatives of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, but the groups’ leaderships had opted to go from controlling one lucrative site to another rather than entering the much-underfunded disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

63. In its previous report, the Panel had published records for gold payments in Gordil, indicating purchases by jeweller shops in Chad (see S/2022/527, para. 38). Those jewellers are were in violation of the United Nations sanctions regime, considering the armed groups’ control and illicit taxation in the source locations. The Panel had not found evidence that Bangui-based smelters or buying houses had also purchased from those areas.

64. Besides the area of Gordil, the Panel was concerned with the security and human rights situation in the gold mining area of Ndassima (see S/2021/87, paras. 51, 54, 61–64) north of Bambari (Ouaka Prefecture). While UPC had been forced out the area in February 2021 by FACa and Russian instructors, killings and disappearances had continued. On 9 December, armed forces arrested five individuals working in the artisanal mining sector who remained missing. On 23 April, six burned bodies were found near Ndassima, including the Imam of the town and five people working inside the mining concession operated by MIDAS Ressources (see S/2021/87, paras. 61–64). The Panel continued to investigate both cases.

VI. Humanitarian affairs

A. Evolution of humanitarian needs in the Central African Republic

65. See annex 23.

B. Armed groups pushed out of mining areas target humanitarian actors

66. In recent months, military offensives against armed groups by MINUSCA and FACa with support of Russian instructors had driven armed groups away from important mining areas, such as Nzako and Sam-Ouandja, thus cutting them off from

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45 The Panel was also informed that Chadian jewellers had also recently started to purchase diamonds from northern Central African Republic.
46 Meetings with confidential sources in Bambari, 28–30 November 2022.
47 Ibid.
48 Other attacks and killings the panel is investigating (not necessarily related to natural resources) include: (a) Bokolobo (Ouaka Prefecture) where on 9 May 2022, UPC attacked the FACA position, the latter retaliating against the civilian community; (b) the slaying of three Fulani herdsmen in Mbinaye near Bang (Ouham-Pendé Prefecture) on 15 October 2022; (c) the killing of one FACA element and two mine workers at Thien Pao mining concession in Ndiba by anti-balaka and 3R combatants (Nana-Mambéré Prefecture) on 13 October 2022; (d) the summary execution by security and defence forces of two alleged CPC combatants at Sans Souci village south of Aigbando (Haute-Kotto prefecture) in mid-January 2022; and (e) a UPC attack on Nzako killing eight FACA soldiers on 21 May 2022.
significant revenue. Partly as a result, armed groups had in some areas turned to humanitarian organizations. For example, in Basse-Kotto Prefecture, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had experienced an intensification of armed robbery in recent months.

67. International NGOs that managed cash-based programmes and those that transported and disbursed salaries and incentives in cash had been particularly targeted. UPC elements had been very active on the Kembe-Mingala axis and Kembe-Dingbi axis. On 26 November, suspected UPC/CPC elements robbed an International NGO of cash that had been intended to be paid to teachers as incentives. The NGO had since suspended all transport of cash and was reassessing the situation. There were indications that armed groups had prior knowledge of organizations transporting cash and on which dates.

68. To date, those robberies seemed to be motivated by opportunism and the need for armed groups to substitute the loss of income from illegal, artisanal mining, so as to secure basic supplies for their group.

69. In the Vakaga Prefecture, armed groups had also turned to kidnapping for the release of captives and ransom. In its November confidential update to the Committee, the Panel already described one case in October 2022 involving the Misseriya militia, which is described further in annex 24. The most recent case involving armed actors from the ethnic Goula community is set out below, followed by a broader analysis of Misseriya proliferation in the prefecture.

C. Protracted hostage-taking situation in northern Vakaga Prefecture

70. On the morning of 11 November, two United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) staff and a representative of the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works left Tiringoulou in northern Vakaga on three motorcycle taxis and headed west towards Gordil. At around 10 a.m., a few kilometres west of Ndissa (22 km from Gordil), they were stopped by a group of armed elements, robbed and interrogated about their mission and destination, and then accused of being spies sent from Bangui to find out about the position of armed groups in the area.

71. The armed elements belonged to the Parti du rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine (PRNC), led by the chief of staff, Mohamed Ali, alias “B13”. With him were Abdrahaman Toukash, PRNC “military coordinator”, ex-FACA and, according to local media, the uncle of B13; Mahamat Nil, allegedly a Chadian national; and Abdel Motall, a civilian recruit and a local from Ndiffa. B13 was also the deputy of Tom Anour Adam, alias Ben Laden, who was located close to Gordil (see para. 61).

72. B13 was about to release the three men and send them back to Tiringoulou but he then allegedly made a call to the President of the PRNC, Nourd Gregaza, presumably based in France, to inform him of the situation. The call seemed to have been a turning point. B13 sent the drivers away, and the three were taken on foot into the bush. The drivers drove back to Tiringoulou and alerted the local authorities.

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49 Communication with International NGO country director, 16 December 2022.
50 According to UNOPS, the three had been on a joint mission to assess and select rural roads for rehabilitation in preparation for the launch of an emergency infrastructure project in the region (see UNOPS letter to the Ministry of Public Works in annex 24).
51 Gordil is an important area of control for armed groups from the Goula community. At the same time, it is close to Rounga-dominated FPRC areas of control further to the Chadian border. The two groups are currently realigning.
52 Confidential source, Bangui, 28 November 2022; sequence of events was confirmed by multiple sources in Bangui, 28–30 November.
73. Between 11 and 13 November, various United Nations staff were in telephone contact with B13, and on 13 November a team from the United Nations arrived in Tiringoulou to negotiate with the hostage-takers. By then, B13 had put forward two demands: (a) the release from prison in Bangui of RPRC “General” Azor Kalite and three others, all arrested by MINUSCA forces on 19 May 2020; and (b) a sum ranging from CFAF 10 million ($16,000) to CFAF 60 million ($97,000), meant to ensure food and the payment of security guards for the protection of the hostages.

74. The PRNC elements refused to meet with the negotiators in person. They kept moving with the hostages from location to location, but not for long distances, and were believed to be somewhere in the Ndîffa area. The negotiators in Tiringoulou were reported to be able to speak to the three hostages on the telephone, who assured them that they had been treated well.

75. On 16 November the PRNC issued a press release on PRNC “stationery” (see annex 26), signed by B13, supposedly in the village of Manou, located between Ndîffa and Gordil. In it, B13 declared having captured “three government spies” and having put forward two demands for their release. It called on local authorities in Vakaga, in particular the Mayor of Ouandjia commune, “whose authority we respect”, to engage in the negotiations.

76. Following threats by the hostage-takers to the team of negotiators on 3 December, MINUSCA airlifted them from their base at an NGO compound in Tiringoulou, to the MINUSCA field office in Birao.

77. On 16 December PRNC issued another press release (see annex 27), signed by B13, under the delegation of the PRNC president Nourd Gregaza. In the statement, PRNC declared that it was in ongoing negotiations with the international community via MINUSCA, and that it rejected any negotiations with former President of the transition, Michel Djotodia, an ethnic Goula from the same area as B13.

78. In the statement, PRNC further criticized the Minister for Justice, Arnauld Djoubaye Abazène, for putting undue pressure on his own “parents, brothers and sons of the Vakaga”. On 12 December, the Minister had, according to some members of the press, stated that the hostages would be released before 15 December.

79. On 18 December, a delegation of community leaders, including the Sultan-Mayor of Birao, arrived in Tiringoulou to negotiate with the hostage-takers. The following day, the delegation returned to Birao without the hostages. There were indications of a split between the hostage-takers on whether to release the hostages or not.

80. The prolonged hostage-taking situation was of grave concern to the population in the area. NGOs had reduced road travel and suspended all road travel between Birao and Tiringoulou. A kidnapping case meant that “Vakaga is closed for business”.

53 Azor Kalite, a former FACA element of the Goula ethnic community, was arrested by MINUSCA in Ndélé on 19 May 2020, together with eight of his men (see S/2020/662, paras. 31–33).
54 Confidential sources, Bangui, 28–30 November 2022.
55 Ibid.
56 Confidential source with first-hand knowledge of the incident, by telephone, 10 December 2022.
57 Michel Djotodia is a fluent Russian speaker after living for 10 years in the Soviet Union and seems to have returned to the Central African Republic permanently after having lived in Cotonou since his resignation on 10 Jan 2014.
58 See https://corbeaunews-centrafrique.org/centrafrique-quand-le-ministre-detat-arnaud-djoubaye-abazene-parle-de-sa-possible-arrestation/. Mr. Abazène had travelled to Birao with the Minister for Mines for an official visit and also participated in a postponed ceremony on 1 December on the occasion of Republic Day.
according to one international NGO country director whose life-saving humanitarian activities had been affected by the situation.59

D. **Proliferation of Misseriya militia north of Birao despite the tripartite force**

81. Under the command of 28-year-old leader Mohamed Adam, alias Abou-Kass/Aboulkasa, some 50 armed Misseriya elements operated numerous illegal taxation checkpoints, including at Dangore 50 km north-east of Birao on the Birao-Am Dafok axis, and north of Birao along the Birao-Tissifongoro axis, including at an uninhabited marshland area called Kyekye, 32 km north of Birao. Civil society representatives told the Panel that some 15 elements from Mohamed Adam’s group had been based in a building abandoned by the Gendarmerie and located at the market in Am Dafok town, which straddles the border between the Central African Republic and the Sudan.60 There, on the Sudanese side, the armed elements had allegedly operated an illegal taxation checkpoint, located opposite the base of the tripartite force.

82. A Sudanese official in Bangui told the Panel that the tripartite force established by the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan to maintain security in the tri-border area remained understaffed, as reported by the Panel in 2021 (see S/2021/87, para. 44).61 The official noted that, while the Sudanese contribution to the force stood at 450 elements, FACA elements numbered fewer than 100.62 He further expressed the view that the Sudan would support a strengthened bilateral force of the Central African Republic and the Sudan to patrol the border area. In 2018, Chadian soldiers participating in the Tripartite Force had been redeployed to participate in the border force of Chad and the Sudan,63 rendering cooperation difficult with Chad along the common border with the Central African Republic in the context of the Tripartite framework.64

83. People in Birao were fearful the town would come under the influence of Misseriya militia, which were now the dominant force on critical points along the main road axes leading to the Sudan. From the end of October and in November 2022, the looming threat of attack on Birao, ostensibly to release the Misseriya individual involved in the incident that had led to civilians being taken hostage in Am Dafok, had weighed hard on inhabitants there. Likewise, people of Sudanese origin bore the consequences because they were considered suspect.

84. For example, on the morning of Sunday, 13 November 2022, two Sudanese artisanal miners travelling on motorcycles from the mines near Gordil towards the Sudan on motorcycles got lost and found themselves on the outskirts of Birao. They met some women in the fields and asked where the FACA check points were, in order to avoid them. A short way further, they asked a young male cultivator the same. He indicated a path towards the Sudanese border. The young man then hurried back to Birao and alerted the Gendarmerie. The word spread in Birao, causing people to rush out of a church and out of the town in panic, thinking Birao was coming under attack.

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59 Meeting with international NGO manager, Bangui, 2 December 2022.
60 Meetings in Birao, 18–20 October 2022.
61 Meeting in Bangui, 24 October 2022.
62 The 2011 amended protocol establishing the Tripartite force envisages 1,500 elements, 500 per country.
64 Chad maintains a military presence in Tissi (Chad), but under national command or as part of the mixed force of Chad and the Sudan, rather than the tripartite force (See S/2021/87, para. 44).
E. Humanitarian situation and humanitarian access in Vakaga Prefecture

85. See annex 28.

VII. Recommendations

86. The Panel makes the following recommendations to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Consider designating those individuals who have been involved in acts that meet the sanctions criteria defined in paragraphs 20 to 22 of Security Council resolution 2399 (2018) and extended under Council resolution 2648 (2022), on the basis of statements of case prepared by the Panel;

(b) Request the Government of the Central African Republic to include all the information listed in paragraph 4 of Council resolution 2488 (2019) in their future notifications made pursuant to paragraph 1 (g) of resolution 2648 (2022);

(c) Encourage the Government of the Central African Republic to apply the technical guidelines for the verification of weapons and ammunition of May 2019 in cases of transfers to the Central African Republic notified under paragraph 1 (g) of resolution 2648 (2022).
Annex 1: Galaxie Nationale Communique of 18 September 2022 signed by its coordinator Didacien Kossimatchi

La Coordination de la Plateforme de la Galaxie Nationale Centrafricaine informe l'opinion Nationale et Internationale sur le comportement du sulfureux et nébuleux Ambassadeur de France en Centrafrique, le nommé Jean Marc GROSGURIN puisqu'il s'agit de lui, est bien le visage humain de cette diplomatie opaque et néo esclavagiste que la France entretient avec notre pays. La France par le truchement de ce dernier a donné une somme de 70 Millions de francs CFA aux Criminels du BDRC (Bloc des Démors de la République Centrafricaine) afin d'organiser un meeting prévu le Samedi 24 Septembre 2022 sur le Terrain de l'Ecole Préfectorale de Bimbo.

Sieur GROSGURIN use et abuse de ses pouvoirs en Centrafrique, se comportant tel un pharaon des temps modernes, ayant droit de vie ou de mort sur les Centrafricains considérés comme des vassaux d'une France en perte de vitesse sur l'échiquier international et qui se positionne comme le censeur des décisions pourtant souveraines des autres Etats membres de l'Union Européenne.

La Plateforme de la Galaxie Nationale Centrafricaine dénonce cette ingérence dans les affaires Centrafricaines et se réserve le droit de passer à la vitesse supérieure pour montrer à Monsieur GROSGURIN le mécontentement généralisé du Peuple Centrafricain dans la Globalité contre le comportement néocolonial de la France en République Centrafricaine.

Communiqué de Presse N°51/22 de la Plateforme de la Galaxie Nationale Centrafricaine.

« La Patrie ou la Mort Nous Vaincrons ! »
Comme disent les Latins : « CALUMNIAM PATIENS EST
SCRIPTOR SUPREMUM SIGNUM AD FINEM » autrement dit « LE
REVEIL DU PEUPLE SONNE LA FIN DE L’OPPRESSION ».

Fait à Bangui, le 18 Septembre 2022.

Le Coordonnateur de la Plateforme de
la Galaxie Nationale Centrafricaine.

Blaïse Didacien KOSSIMATCHI

Communiqué de Presse N°51/22 de la Plateforme de la Galaxie Nationale Centrafricaine.
« La Patrie ou la Mort Nous Vaincrons ! »
Annex 2: Incitements to violence by Didacien Kossimatchi

1. In its final report of the previous mandate, the Panel expressed the intention to further investigate incitement to violence by the Galaxy nationale platform led by Didacien Kossimatchi (see S/2021/569, para. 149). In addition to calling for acts of protest and sabotage against MINUSCA and France, the then cited 21 May 2021 memorandum had referred to corporal abuses, implying physical harm of staff.

2. During the present mandate, Kossimatchi’s encouragement of physical harm against individuals became more explicit and targeted. A communiqué of 24 May 2022 of threatens French troops based at M’poko airport with inhuman treatment (including corporal abuse, breaking vehicles and kidnapping) if leaving their base. The threat against French troops was repeated in a 31 May 2022 communiqué. The communiqué further calls on justice authorities to pursue political opposition members and for the dismissal of financial institutions’ staff. A 29 June communiqué then launches operation “base ball” to survey residences of certain politicians and get “putchists” out of the way. It implies the use of baseball bats as material, which, if insufficient, can be requested according to the communiqué.

3. In operation Barbarossa launched via a 31 July 2022 communiqué, the threat of violence then targets specific individuals. A corresponding instruction note recommends the use of machetes, baseball bats and knives to tie targeted individuals down and deliver them alive. Besides armed group leaders and opposition politicians, the targets of operation Barbarossa include Emile Bizon, the head of the Central African Bar Association, who is considered a spokesperson for France and the political opposition, Olivier Manguéréka, the legal representative of opposition politician Martin Ziguélé and journalist and writer Ben Wilson Ngassan. Further targets of corporal abuse include seven families considered enemies of the State, many living abroad.

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1 Available at https://m.facebook.com/people/Galaxie-Nationale-Beafrika/100070906621613/ (accessed on 15 August 2022)
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
Annex 3: 30 June 2022 A1 Jet fuel requisition letter signed by the CAR Minister of Energy Arthur Bertrand Piri
Annex 4: 22 September 2022 Government decision to suspend Galaxie Nationale Plateforme
Annex 5: 23 November 2022 issued list of individuals decorated by the President ahead of 1 December Republic Day celebrations, p. 1 and 2.

DECRET N°2022-402

PORTANT ELEVATION A TITRE NORMAL DANS L'ORDRE NATIONAL DE LA RECONNAISSANCE CENTRAFRICAINE

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
CHEF DE L'ETAT.

Vu la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 Mars 2016 ;
Vu le Décret n°16.0218 du 30 Mars 2016, portant promulgation de la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine ;
Vu Le Décret n°22.040 du 07 février 2022, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
Vu Le Décret n°21.146 du 20 Juin 2021, portant nomination ou confirmation des Membres du Gouvernement ;
Vu le Décret n° 62.133 du 21 Mai 1962, portant création de l'Ordre de la Médaille de la Reconnaissance Centrafricaine et ses modificatifs subséquents.
Vu le Décret n° 19.357 du 17 Décembre 2019, portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Présidence de la République ;

DECRETE

Art. 1er : Sont élevés à titre normal dans l'Ordre National de la Reconnaissance Centrafricaine, au titre de la promotion du 1er Décembre 2022.

A LA DIGNITE DE GRAND-OFFICIER

- MM ABDALLAH Abakar, Collecteur de Diamant et Or à Nola
- ASSANA Marcellin, Juriste Analyste à l'Agence Nationale d'Investigations Financières
- Mme AWOVAMO Solange Georgine, Gestionnaire au Service d'Odontologie à l'hôpital du camp Fidèle Obrou
- MM  BENGUE Urbain, Directeur des Ressources Humaines au Ministère de la Fonction Publique
- MM  BISSAHOLHO Rufin Modeste, Directeur des Examens et Concours Scolaires et Professionnels au Ministère de l’Education Nationale
- M  BISSEKON Victor, Préfet de la Ouaka
- MM  BISSIALO Bruno, Directeur d’Exploitation à la Représentation de l’AOG au Congo
- MM  BITAR Ibrahim, Directeur Général de CENTRA BOIS à Bangui
- MM  BIT-KEROGOKPI Venant Apollinaire, Inspecteur Adjoint des Douanes
- MM  DANICOUMANDI Sim Joaki, Commissaire Divisionnaire de Police
- MM  DAOU Abdel Kader Benoussi, Inspecteur du Trésor à Bangui
- MM  DIMANCHE Luc, Directeur Général du Fonds de Développement Forestier
- MM  FEIDANGAMOKOI Olivier, Attaché d’Administration aux Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
- MM  FEIZOUNAM-OUANFIO Samuel, Directeur Général de l’INRAP
- MM  FIBALA Rosaire, Commissaire de Police
- MM  GABA Patrick, Avocat au Barreau de Centrafrique
- MM  CANAWELE Hervé Sylvain, Commissaire Principal de Police
- MM  GBONGO Amédée Edgard, Contrôleur Général des Finances
- Mme  GRENGBO Julie Eliane, Secrétaire de Direction au Barc
- MM  GUERENDEMBO Godfroy, Chargé de Programme à l’Union Européenne
- MM  HOURONFIO Alexis Georges, Inspecteur des Finances à Bangui
- MM  KAMINDOMON DOMMSS Mobjyak Daudeska, Inspecteur du Trésor à Bangui
- MM  KAZANGBA NDIKINI Ghislain Patrick, Président Directeur de CMC à Nola
- MM  Mme  KETA – WAPOUTOU Igor, Inspecteur des Douanes à Bangui
- MM  KOISSI Jean de Dieu, Ingénieur en Télécommunication à Bangui
- Mme  KOSSIMATCHI Didacien Blaise, Enseignant à l’Université de Bangui
- Mme  KOUALET YADANZO Patricia Tatiana, Chef de Service du Protocole au Cadre de Concertation des Élections
- MM  KOUI Marcel, Magistrat, Président de la Chambre Sociale à la Cour d’Appel de Bangui
- MM  KOV Jean Louis Christophe, Inspecteur des Douanes à Bangui
- MM  KOVACPO Eric, Directeur Général Adjoint du Crédit Populaire
- Mme  LOUTOMO née MOZIA TE Alain Pulchérie, Directrice de la n°1 au Trésor Public
- MM  MADA Ernest, Ministre, Directeur de Cabinet à la Primature
- MM  MAHAMAT Moris, Coordonnateur de l’ATS
- MM  MAINA Gédéon, Deuxième Secrétaire Payeur à l’Ambassade de la RCA en Égypte
- Mme  MALEMBETI – VANGBANDA Huberte, Chef de Service du Secrétariat Particulier au HCC
- MM  MAMELEVEN Fred, Chef de Service des Dépenses et Opposition au Trésor Public
Annex 6: Photograph of Mahamat Salleh, obtained from a confidential source on 24 November 2022.
Annex 7: Further armed group dynamics in the centre of the Central African Republic

1. Three deadly clashes were reported in December 2022 in Ouaka prefecture. The first clash took place in Boyo, located 120 km northeast of Bambari on the Bambari-Ippy axis, on 10 December. The second occurred in Liotto, located 60 km from Grimari, on 11 December. In both cases CPC attacked FACA bases. The third attack took place on 12 December against a FACA position in Bokolobo, a former stronghold of Ali Darassa, located 60 km from Bambari on the Bambari-Alindao axis.

2. Earlier, on 19 November 2022 UPC had attacked the FACA in Kouango (Ouaka prefecture). UPC elements arrived from Zangba subprefecture (Bas-Kotto prefecture) along the DRC border, where they found refuge following pressure from MINUSCA and FACA, supported by bilateral forces, in the prefecture. The UPC forces were under the command of “general” Hamadou Boungous. Other UPC strongholds remain in the north of the prefecture in Mingala sub-prefecture, under the command of “generals” Garga and Kante, some of whose forces allegedly also joined in the Kouango attack.6

3. On 6 November 2022, at Tagbara village, on the Bambari-Ippy axis, alleged UPC elements stopped a transport truck coming from Bambari. Carrying about 40 passengers, the truck was surrounded by nearly 100 armed elements. While the passengers were being searched, the driver Hassane Hadi and two members of the crew were taken about 20 meters away from the vehicle. The assailants asked them for money. When they replied that they had no more money than what they had already given, the assailants shot and killed the driver.7 The truck and the goods in it were then set on fire.

4. According to security forces in Bambari the attack on the truck was ordered by certain coffee traders in Bambari, who had been disgruntled over the fact that the proprietor of coffee that the truck transported had purchased below the market price.8 The Panel continues to investigate this and other cases of armed group instrumentalization by economic actors.

6 Ibid.
7 Meeting with relatives of the driver in Bria, 29 November 2022; meeting with security forces in Bambari, 29 November 2022; confidential report 7 November 2022.
8 Meeting with security forces in Bambari, 29 November 2022.
Annex 8: Screenshots from video obtained from a confidential source showing UPC movement using donkeys in Ouaka prefecture sometime during the month of September 2022.
Annex 9: Screenshots from a video obtained from a confidential source showing a 3R arms cache in the vicinity of Sarki Farm, west of Koui (Ouham-Pende prefecture)
Annex 10: Arms flow map

- Axe 1: Libya (Alkufra) / Darfur (Oum Dafouk) / RCA (Birao);
- Axe 2: Niger/ Chad (Bangor, Doba) / RCA (Paoua);
- Axe 3: Nigeria/ Cameroon / RCA (Bouar);
- Axe 4: RDC (Monga)/ RCA (Bangassou, Bambari, Bakouma);
- Axe 5: South Sudan (Maridi, Naandi, Ri yubu) / RCA (Zemio).

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Annexe 11: Photographs of Bossangoa bombing incident, obtained from a confidential source on 29 November 2022.

Schrapnel

Parachute

Craters
Impact inside and outside the cotton factory
Annex 12: Kouï anti-vehicle mine incident

1. On 3 October 2022, MINUSCA peacekeepers from Bangladesh conducted a brief night patrol with three soft-skinned military vehicles from the temporary operational base in Kouï to a bridge on the Bouar road, approximately 4.5 kilometers from their base. When the vehicles reached the bridge at around 21:30, they made a U-turn. Because only two cars were able to turn at once before the bridge, the lead vehicle crossed the bridge to turn there. It is at that moment the explosive ordnance detonated and hit the vehicle, which then fell approximately 9 meters down in the riverbed. The explosion left three peacekeepers dead, and one seriously injured.

2. The analysis of post-blast residue shows that the main charge was a military-grade high explosive consisting of hexogen (RDX) and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) / trinitrotoluene (TNT). These explosive substances are primary ingredients in an anti-tank/vehicle mine, type PRB M3, which is very likely the type of landmine employed in all prior explosive assault occurrences in western CAR. Also, on 10 November 2021 the FACA discovered a PRB M3 mine on the Niem-Kouï axis.

3. The crater's measured dimensions (2.6 x 0.75 m) are consistent with an estimated explosive charge of 10 to 12 kilograms (see photographs below). One singe mine of type PRB M3 contains an explosive charge of approximately 6 kilograms. Hence, two stacked connected mines were most probably employed for maximum effect. The vehicle’s severe damage also points to a double charge. The mine was most probably triggered with a pressure plate.

4. Considering the double charge, the intended target was more likely to be a truck or an armoured vehicle, rather than a light soft-skinned vehicle. After sunset, neither MINUSCA nor other normal light traffic moves beyond the bridge. The only traffic moving beyond the bridge at that time would be a truck or armored vehicle belonging to either FACA or to Russian instructors based at Degaulle, in proximity of the MINUSCA TOB. Hence, it is a reasonable assertion that these forces were the target and not MINUSCA.

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10 Confidential report, 11 November 2022; meeting with confidential sources in Bangui, 25 November 2022.
11 Ibid.
Photographs showing hit vehicle and crater from confidential report, 11 November 2022
Annex 13: Discovery of Kombélé anti-personnel mines

1. The Panel obtained details of the two first ever reported anti-personnel mines in the country, discovered and destroyed by MINUSCA in Kombélé village, in Ouaka prefecture, on 4 April 2022 (See also S/2022/491, para. 22). Villagers reported the location of the mines during a risk education visit on 4 April 2022, but the mines had been likely buried in the ground during the offensive of the FACA with support of Russian instructors against the UPC in February 2021. Kombélé is located some 10 kilometers northeast of Bambari on the Ippi road, at the turnoff north to the gold mining area of Ndassima. The village is therefore of strategic interest to the UPC, which as recent as 2 November 2022 attacked its FACA position, stealing three weapons before fleeing.

2. The two anti-personnel mines were of the type OZM-72 with the cast iron eroded and showing no trace of markings. Without such details, it will be difficult for the Panel to send a tracing request to the producing country.

Photographs of OZM-72 mines at Kombélé from confidential report, no date.

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15 Interview with confidential sources in Bambari, 28-30 November 2022.
16 Confidential report, 5 November 2022.
17 Confidential report, no date.
Annex 14: Screenshots from videos showing CPC combatants handling UAV

1. The DJI MAVIC II UAV is not subject to international licensing rules and can be purchased online for about $1,000. It weighs less than 300 grams and is equipped with flight assistance and therefore does not require great skill to use. Capable of filming a predefined fixed point in stationary as well as in movement, and able to carry out preprogrammed circuits, the UAV has the capability of making patrols. It is used by many armed forces for the recognition of zones and the protection of temporary camps. When it is spotted above a camp, it is between 30 and 100 meters in altitude, which makes it almost impossible to shoot down even with a long gun.

2. However, this type of handheld drone remains fragile and requires one-day training to operate correctly. Supplied in a carrying case and with a battery life of 20-30 minutes of flight, it is necessary to have several batteries in advance and to have an efficient recharging capacity. The Panel considers that while armed groups may not have purchased the drone, with all necessary accessories, they could, within four months between the Nzako attack and the flyovers, have acquired these batteries as well as the necessary expertise to operate the UAV. The fact that no flyovers were reported afterwards may imply that the UAVs were already dysfunctional.

*Combatant unpacking DJI MAVIC II UAV from military bag, video obtained from confidential source.*
Combatants showing DJI MAVIC II Pro UAV, video obtained from a confidential source.
Annex 15: CAR national Technical Guidelines for the Verification of Weapons and Ammunition

PROCEDURES TECHNIQUES POUR LE CONTRÔLE ET LA VÉRIFICATION DES ARMES ET MUNITIONS À DESTINATION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE ENTRE LA FÉDÉRATION DE RUSSIE ET LE MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE CENTRAFRICAINE.

1 - La résolution 2127 (2013) du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, dans son article 54 (e) et les résolutions suivantes, la dernière étant la résolution 2454 (2019) et son article 1, qui décide de renouveler jusqu’au 31 janvier 2020 les mesures et provisions comme décrites dans les paragraphes 1 à 19 de la résolution 2399 (2018) fixent le cadre autorisant les livraisons d’armes, de munitions, d’équipements et de matériels militaires aux forces de Défense et de Sécurité de la République Centrafricaine tant que celle-ci sera sous embargo des armes et munitions et équipements connexes.

2 - Au regard de ces procédures, il est nécessaire de formaliser pour les armes, les munitions et les matériels connexes autorisés par le Comité des Sanctions à destination de la République Centrafricaine, un processus fixé en deux étapes suivantes (décrites dans les annexes):
   - Une vérification physique des qualités et quantités dès la livraison d’armes et de munitions sur le territoire (première étape),
   - Une vérification, après la livraison, des mécanismes de gestion et de contrôle au sein des forces de Défense et de Sécurité (seconde étape).

Cette procédure décrite dans les annexes renforcera la confiance de la communauté internationale dans les capacités d’accueil et de gestion de la République Centrafricaine des armes et munitions reçues.

Dans cet esprit, les procédures décrites dans les annexes ont pour objet de faire appliquer:
Les obligations fixées par les résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, pour le pays donateur, pour la République Centrafricaine, pour la MINUSCA et pour l’UNMAS;
D’autre part :
Les modalités de stockage en lien avec les normes internationales concernant les munitions (MOSAICS) et normes internationales concernant les armes (ISACS),
Les procédures techniques mises en place par l’autorité nationale lors des différentes arrivées sur le territoire national,
Le processus de contrôle interne et de suivi décrit au paragraphe 2 mis en place par la partie nationale fera référence aux bonnes pratiques de gestions de l’armement et des munitions.
5 - La mise en œuvre de la première étape décrite au paragraphe 2 se traduit au travers d’un groupe de vérification conjoint (GVC) dont les modalités de fonctionnement et les responsabilités sont décrites dans l’annexe 2 dirigé par le Directeur Général des services techniques dont la composition est la suivante :
- Des représentants du ministère de la Défense Nationale et de la Reconstruction de l’Armée,
- Des représentants de l’EMA
- Une représentation de la COMNAT ALPC
- Des représentants du pays donateur/exportateur
- Des représentants de l’EUTM
- Un représentant du groupe des experts en fonction de leur disponibilité,
- Un représentant de la RSS en tant que point focal de la MINUSCA pour l’embarquement des armes,
- Le Chef des Opérations l’UNMAS ou son représentant.
- Le représentant du groupe des experts en fonction de leur disponibilité.

5 - Au regard des articles 3 et 4 de l’annexe 2, ce GVC joue donc un rôle de consultation et d’expertise technique avant la livraison (garantie de faisabilité) des armes et ou munitions, de vérification physique, de leur arrivée sur le territoire centrafricain, de la conformité de celles-ci et de leur suivi tels que décrits dans les annexes.

7 - L’action de ce GVC est basée sur les MOSAICS et ISACS et prenant compte du contexte local et des moyens techniques disponibles.

8 - Sa Direction est assurée par le DGST et appuyée techniquement par le chef des opérations de l’UNMAS ou son représentant.
Afin de s’assurer de la bonne pratique en matière de gestion d’armes et de munitions, l’UNMAS soutiendra la partie nationale et aidera celle-ci à mettre en place des mécanismes de gestion sur l’ensemble du territoire national.
Avec accord préalable de l’autorité nationale, UNMAS effectuera en coopération avec la partie nationale des visites d’assurance qualité :
- sur toute l’étendue du territoire Centrafricain aux magasins, soutènes et locaux renfermant des armes, munitions, et matériel connexe initialement sous embargo afin de contrôler in visu le respect des bonnes pratiques (registres, ordres de mouvement et d’affectation, etc.) destinés à assurer le suivi de ces matériels par la partie nationale.
Cette démarche contribuera à faciliter la levée de l’embargo.

- Les convocations des membres du GVC sont assurées par le DGST.

- Pour chaque arrivée d’armes, des réajustements de procédures de contrôle et de vérifications décrites dans l’annexe 3 seront proposées et cela aussi longtemps que la République centrafricaine sera sous le régime d’embargo sur les armes. Le GVC devra être saisi au préalable à toute livraison d’armes et de munitions approuvée par le Comité des Sanctions.

2. - La convocation des membres du GVC doit avoir lieu :
- 12.1 en tout temps pour une étude de faisabilité, en amont d’une demande d’exemption au comité ;
- 12.2 – dans des délais raisonnables permettant d’assurer une bonne préparation des opérations de contrôle (cf. annexe 2).

3. - La République centrafricaine rentre en pleine et entière possession de la livraison des armes et/ou munitions après la vérification et suivant les conditionnalités fixées par le pays donneur. (cf.).

4. - Les États et entités politiques appuyant la reconstruction de l’État centrafricain peuvent demander l’autorisation de participer exceptionnellement comme observateur aux opérations de vérification et de contrôle. Une copie de cette demande est relayée par la présidence vers l’ensemble des membres.

5. - Un appui logistique et de sécurité du partenaire donneur lors de la livraison et pendant les périodes de stockage sera avec l’appui de la MINUSCA, si la partie nationale en fait la demande.

6. - L’autorité Nationale rend-compte par des rapports :
- dans la semaine qui suit la vérification. Il rend principalement compte de la conformité de la livraison au regard des documents émis par l’exportateur ;
- à 6 mois de la date de livraison sur les bonnes pratiques dans les domaines de gestion des armes et des munitions de la livraison conformément aux recommandations MOSAICS et ISACS.
17 - Les rapports sont rédigés par l’autorité Nationale et partagés :
- Aux entités représentées dans le groupe de vérification conjointe,
- Aux partenaires Internationaux engagés dans l’appui à la reconstruction de
  l’État Centrafricain ;
- Au comité des sanctions ;
- Au panel des experts indépendants.

18 - Les membres, les partenaires internationaux, le comité des sanctions et les
experts
Indépendants pourront dans des délais raisonnables interroger et obtenir des points
de clarification de la part de l’autorité nationale.
Annex 16: CAR Ministry of Defence response to incidents involving FACA forwarded for comments by the Panel.

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE ET DE LA RECONSTRUCTION DE L'ARMEE
DIRECTION DE CABINET
SECRETARIAT

N° 004/MDNRA/DIRCAB/SEC

Le Ministre

À

Monsieur le Coordonnateur du Groupe d'Experts des Nations Unies sur la République Centrafricaine
New York

Objet : Réponses aux allégations sur les Forces Armées centrafricaines et les Forces alliées.

Monsieur le Coordonnateur,

Pour faire suite à la correspondance référencée S/AC.55/PE/OC.24 du 15 décembre 2022, j'ai l'honneur de transmettre en annexe, les réponses aux dix points contenus dans ladite correspondance. Ces réponses font suite aux informations réelles dont dispose l'Etat-major des Armées et un recoupement diligenté par les services compétents.

Dans l'espoir que vous aurez foi à nos réponses, veuillez recevoir l'expression de notre distinguée considération.

Rameaux-Claude BIREAUX

REPUBLICQUE CENTRAFRIQUE
Unité – Dignité – Travail

Bangu le, 06 JAE 2023
**ANNEXE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAS SIGNALES</th>
<th>REPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empêchement par les FACA de la MINUSCA devant patrouiller et nettoyer les engins explosifs sur l’axe Dongbayeke - Nguia Bouar (Sous-préfecture de Baboua) le 11 Août 2021.</td>
<td>Selon les informations en notre possession, c’est la population locale qui a accusé le contingent Bangladeshi de la MINUSCA(BANBAT) d’être à l’origine des poses de mines voire des EEI. Elle a donc empêché ce contingent de circuler dans la zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En janvier 2022, exécution sommaire de deux suspects combattants de la CPC par les éléments FACA dans le village sans-souci à 42 Km de Bria sur l’axe Ouadda.</td>
<td>Le Commandement des FACA n’est pas informé de cette situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrestation d’une femme et son enfant début mai 2022 à Sapi Mine (Sous-préfecture de ABBA) après l’attaque des 3R le 29 Avril 2022.</td>
<td>Cette allégation manque de précision (circonstance de l’arrestation ; noms des personnes arrêtées ; sont-elles détenues ou libérées) à tel point qu’il est difficile d’en donner une réponse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprisailles des milices Anti-Balaka, parrainées par les FACA, sur 06 civils à Bokolobo après que la CPC ait attaqué leurs positions le 09 mai 2022.</td>
<td>Les FACA n’ont pas de supplétifs Anti-Balaka en zone d’opération. Dans le cadre du DDRR, certains Anti-Balaka éligibles et d’autres éléments de Groupes Armés démobilisés ont bénéficié du programme d’intégration dans les FACA après une formation militaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La garde présidentielle a enlevé la caméra de la MINUSCA, montée sur la tour de contrôle de l’aéroport Bangui M’poko.</td>
<td>La caméra de la MINUSCA au niveau de la Tour de contrôle de l’aéroport de Bangui M’poko a été enlevée pour des raisons d’État.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Confiscation de manière forcée d’une citerne de kérosène de la compagnie TOTAL le 30 juin 2022 à l’aéroport Bangui M’poko par la garde présidentielle.</td>
<td>Les juridictions n’ont pas enregistré de plainte émanant de TOTAL. Le Commandement de la Garde Présidentielle ne reconnaît pas cette situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Prise en otage par les FACA le 04 juillet 2022 du gestionnaire du site minier de Nawé et menace contre un artisan minier le 25 juillet dans la sous-préfecture d’ABBA.</td>
<td>La quasi-totalité des sites miniers sur le territoire sont occupés par les Groupes Armés, ceux-ci les exploitent en toute illégalité. Après l’avènement de la CPC, l’offensive des FACA et leurs alliés a permis de chasser tous ces exploitants illégaux voire capturer certains et mettre à la disposition de la police ou la gendarmerie. Si le gestionnaire du site minier de Nawé était arrêté, il serait peut-être un exploitant illégal. Il n’a jamais eu prise d’otage par les FACA puisqu’il n’y a pas eu revendication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Incendie par un élément FACA des maisons dans le camp des déplacés à Boubou causant la mort d’une femme et deux enfants. L’élément</td>
<td>Une faute est personnelle et n’engage que l’auteur, le Commandement ne peut tolérer de tels actes qui portent atteinte à l’honneur de l’Armée. L’élément FACA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Panels initial question was wrongly reformulated but correctly answered. The Panel reinserted its original question to avoid confusion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACA en question aurait été arrêté le 25 octobre 2022.</th>
<th>fautif a été arrêté et mis à la disposition de la justice pour une sanction conséquente.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Les FACA ont ouvert le feu sur des artisans miniers sur le site minier de Natale le 17 octobre 2022 dans la sous-préfecture de Sosso-Nakombo.</td>
<td>Cet événement est survenu suite à une altercation entre un élément des FACA du dispositif sécuritaire sur le site minier de Natale, l'artisan minier blessé a été conduit dans un centre médical et le soldat a été remis à la gendarmerie pour une procédure judiciaire.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 17: Photographs of ST-PAW offloading at Bambui M’Poko International airport on FACA trucks, from confidential airport data.

18 August 2022

19 November 2022
Annex 18: Antonov An-28 military registration certificates
Annex 19: Mi-17 helicopter observations

In Birao on 7 December 2022, obtained from confidential source on 9 December.

In Bangui on 1 December 2022, photograph taken by the Panel.
Annex 20: Pending Kimberley Process review visit

1. On 23 September 2022, the Minister of Mines invited the Panel to participate in a Kimberley Process review mission from 9 to 19 October 2022. The letter included the terms of reference adopted by the Working Group on Monitoring (WGM) on 16 August 2022, as well as an agenda of locations to be visited to assess the implementation of the revised operational framework under which CAR is allowed to export rough diamonds (see S/2022/527, para. 33\(^\text{18}\)) as well as other Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) minimum requirements.

2. In line with the terms of reference, these locations included compliant zones as well as zones that the CAR authorities have applied to be considered by the Kimberley Process Monitoring Team as compliant zones, namely the sub-prefectures of Abba, Baoro, Bouar, Gamboula and Sosso-Nakombo, all in western CAR. The agenda also included Bria in the east of the country that the Government has never proposed for lifting of the Kimberley Process suspension.

3. On 12 September, the Minister of Mines sent a letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the CAR and Head of MINUSCA, underlining the desire of Kimberley Process participants for MINUSCA to assure the security in compliant and priority zones. On 11 October, the Kimberley Process Chair also wrote to the Special Representative to explicitly seek advice regarding the security conditions, reiterating the request for security be provided by MINUSCA to the review team, together with the CAR authorities. On 4 November the Special Representative wrote to the Minister of Mines, providing a generic security assessment of non-compliant sub-prefectures as per 20 October 2022, with the caveat that the Mission does not conduct security evaluations specific to mine sites, and does not have data covering the entire national territory or theaters of operation of the FACA and its security partners.

4. The review mission was envisaged to take place sometime in 2022, according to the Kimberley Process communiqué, which was issued following the KP plenary meeting in Moscow from 8 to 12 November 2021. At the time of writing this report, the Kimberley Process focal point in the CAR could not yet provide any new dates for the mission in 2023.

\(^{18}\) The revised operational framework mentions five criteria for readmitting sub-prefectures: state presence; implementation of monitoring mechanisms; absence of the systematic presence of armed groups; freedom of movement; and no evidence of systematic fraud or smuggling of diamonds to or from the compliant zone to non-compliant zones.
Annex 21: Security incidents at mine sites in sub-prefectures proposed for lifting of the KP suspension on diamond exports

1. On 27 January 2022, approximately 18 armed 3R elements attacked Nawe mining site, Gamboula sub-prefecture. FACA allegedly abducted and extorted the chief of Nawe site on 4 July 2022 who, after his release, fled to Cameroon. In addition, on 25 July FACA soldiers arrested and extorted a civilian at the site, an act which FACA subsequently acknowledged was out of order. The location of Nawe, 30 km north of Gamboula along the Cameroonian border, is not known to be a diamond mining zone. It is most likely a gold mining site. Gamboula’s diamond sites are located some 20 km west from Nawe, along the Bombé River.

2. On 29 April 2022, five armed 3R combatants attacked the mine sites of Sapi, Abba sub-prefecture, and robbed money and cell phones from two miners. Following the incident in Sapi, FACA conducted an operation in the area in early May 2022, shooting suspected 3R combatants and arresting one woman and child accused of being associated with a 3R member. Sapi is in an area where there are both gold and diamond mining sites.

3. On 28 April 2022, approximately 14 armed 3R combatants entered the village of Libala, Gamboula sub-prefecture, shooting in the air and demanding money and minerals from the local population. Libala is located on the Bombé River where gold and to a lesser extent diamonds are produced.

4. On 26 June 2022, 3R combatants made an incursion at Nzeme mine site, also in Gamboula sub-prefecture, robbing the population of their belongings. The estimated four assailants fled to Libala forest where they appear to be hiding out. Nzeme mine site is near Nawe and therefore most likely concerns a gold mining site.

5. On 13 October, several dozen assailants armed with AK-47 rifles attacked the semi-industrial gold mining plant of the company Thien Pao at Ndiba in Abba sub-prefecture, south of Bouar (Nana Mambere prefecture). One FACA officer and two Central African civilians working at the plant were killed in the attack. Seven other company employees were wounded. Economic gain was likely the motivation for the attack. The assailants reportedly had inside knowledge of 42 million FCFA in the possession of the foreman and went straight for the cash. According to eyewitnesses of the incident, assailants spoke both Sango and Fulani. Anti-balaka leader Marcel Ndalé was identified in a village in the vicinity of the mine site the evening before the attack. In discussions with the Panel, a 3R representative claimed that the attack was carried out by Anti-Balaka, but the same representative recognized 3R involvement when speaking with a Panel source.

6. On 17 October 2022, FACA soldiers opened fire on the artisanal mining population of Natale diamond mining site in Sosso-Nakombo sub-prefecture, so to expel them from the site and continue exploitation with associated artisanal miners. Two civilians were injured, including a minor, while many artisanal miners reportedly having fled to seek refuge in Sosso Nakombo and Nola town.

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19 Responses of the Ministry of Defence in the Central African Republic to the incidents in Nguia Bouar, Sapi, Nawe and Natale are included in annex 16.
20 Confidential report, 27 June 2022.
21 Confidential statement of Case submitted to the Committee by the Panel on 3 September 2019.
22 Thien Pao has officially been conducting exploration activities around Abba since 2017.
23 Interviews with MINUSCA and FACA sources in Bouar, 17-19 October 2022.
24 Marcel Ndalé had been arrested in 2015 but escaped from Bangui’s Ngaragba prison (S/2015/936, para. 206)
25 Ibid.
26 Correspondence with 3R representative in Ndjame, 17 October 2022.
27 Correspondence with confidential source, 15 October 2022.
Annex 22: “Laissez Passer” for gold export by one Bangui based smelter obtained from a confidential source.
Annex 23: OCHA summary of humanitarian needs

1. The OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, published in November 2022, estimates that 3.4 million people will need humanitarian assistance and protection in the CAR. This is an increase of 10 per cent compared to 2022.\textsuperscript{28} By September 2022, humanitarian actors had managed to reach 1.5 million people with lifesaving assistance, representing 75\% of their target.\textsuperscript{29}

2. Donor funding for humanitarian assistance in CAR remains one of the highest in the region. As of 14 December 2022, 83\% of requested funding for 2022 had been received. However, security and logistical challenges to humanitarian actors remain high. Between January and October 2022, humanitarian actors reported 151 incidents affecting humanitarian access. Although statistics for November and December 2022 are pending, this indicates a slight decrease compared to 396 incidents recorded in 2021 and 424 in 2020.\textsuperscript{30}

3. The top three obstacles to humanitarian access were: i) ongoing hostilities or military operations, especially as a result of FACA and other security personnel in the east, Vakaga and Haute Kotto prefectures, and Ouham-Pendé prefecture in the northwest), ii) physical access constraints, including due to heavy rains in July and August, particularly affecting Bangui and Vakaga prefectures, and iii) violence against humanitarian personnel, property and infrastructure, representing 70\% or 96 of 151 incidents reported between January and October 2022). The death of one humanitarian worker and 18 wounded were reported by October 2022.


\textsuperscript{30} The decrease from 2020 to 2021 was largely attributed to restricted access and mobility for humanitarians in the central and western parts of the country due to armed confrontations and threats posed by explosive devices. See: OCHA https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-overview-incidents-affecting-28 (accessed on 14 December 2022).
Annex 24: Hostage-taking of civilians in Am Dafok by Arab Misseriya demanding the release of detainee in Birao

1. In the late afternoon on 14 October 2022, two young males returning from the Mandjan mines (paragraph 61 of the report) to their village Matala, 12 km east of Birao, fell victim to armed robbery by two unidentified men on a motorcycle, who then fled in the direction of Matala. The two men were able to alert their co-villagers in Matala, who set an ambush and confronted the robbers as they arrived near the village. An exchange of fire followed, and one of the robbers was shot and wounded.

2. When hearing about the incident the next morning, a joint team of Gendarmerie and UNPOL visited the Birao hospital to see whether the wounded man had been admitted during the night. He was not there.

3. In the night from 15 to 16 October, local armed youths in Matala tracked down and captured one of the suspected robbers. On 16 October they brought the captured suspect to the home of the Sultan-Mayor of Birao. At midday, a meeting was held there with representatives from the youth, administrative and traditional authorities, FACA, the Gendarmerie and MINUSCA.

4. The meeting concluded with the captured person being handed over to the Gendarmerie, including the weapons he had been captured with, namely two AK-47 rifles with two chargers, one offensive hand grenade, as well as a Sudanese Armed Forces uniform. He was found to have a gunshot wound on his calf and one on his hip. The captured person’s name is Mahamat Abdelker (or Abdelkader), and he is a Sudanese national. According to one local source, he is a captain in the Sudanese Armed Forces, but the Panel was unable to verify this.

5. In their exchanges with the Panel, local youth in Birao reported that the second robber had been shot and killed by the auto-defence forces in Matala on 16 October, leading to high tensions in Matala and Birao. In the days that followed, tensions rose further. Local authorities reported that Arab Misseriya fighters had assembled west of Birao airport and threatened to enter Birao to free their arrested companion by force.

6. Subsequently on 20 October, another group of armed Arab Misseriya elements based near the border town Am-Dafok, and joined by what local youth described as “Sudanese Armed Forces”, took 11 male civilians hostage (all belonging to the Sara ethnic group). The civilians were caught off guard and taken while fishing in the Sate River on the Central African side of Am-Dafok. The same day, a photograph was circulated on local WhatsApp groups in Birao, presumably taken and disseminated by the hostage takers. The Panel could not verify the authenticity of the photograph, which showed two men, allegedly part of the group taken hostage, seated on the grass with their hands tied behind their backs, and eight uniformed men standing upright in a tight circle around them, posing with their guns aimed at the hostages.

7. The armed Arab Misseriya communicated threats that they would continue to take more hostages and start executing those already captured if their companion at the Birao Gendarmerie was not released. They also demanded compensation payment (“diya”) on behalf of the family of their companion who had been killed on 16 October by armed youth near Matala.

8. On 21 October 2022, and for reasons unknown to the Panel, the hostage takers released two of the men held at Am Dafok. There may have been an intervention by the Sultan-Mayor of Birao, but the Panel could not confirm this. By the afternoon of 22 October, the nine remaining hostages were also released after what was described by a MINUSCA staff as a “muscled intervention” by the tripartite force. The conditions of their release have not been disclosed. While the tripartite force may have acted decisively to retrieve the nine hostages, the Misseriya still move unhindered and continue their criminal activities in the tri-border area.
9. Local sources reported that the release of the hostages came after a considerable sum of compensation money had been collected from community members and traders and paid to the family of the man killed on 16 October, indicating a sum of up to 20 million CFA Francs ($32,000).

10. On 15 November, the Mahamat Abdelker was transferred to Bangui on a MINUSCA flight and handed over to the Analysis and Investigation Section of the Gendarmerie in Bangui, for further investigations.

11. The Panel addressed a letter to the Government of Sudan to ask for any clarifications on the incident but has not received an answer to date
Annex 25: Letter from UNOPS to the Ministry of Public Works, obtained from a confidential source.

Réf. 274/UNOPS/CDMCO-RCA/2022

Bangui, le 14 Novembre 2022

A

Son Excellence M. Guismala HAMZA
Ministre d’Équipement et des Travaux Publics
Bangui, République Centrafricaine

Objet : Suspension temporaire des activités du projet suite à la prise d’otages du 11 novembre 2022 à Tingouloou dans le cadre du Projet d’Urgence de Rétablissement des Infrastructures et de la Connectivité en Centrafrique (PURIC)

Excellence Monsieur le Ministre,

Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du Projet d’Urgence de Rétablissement des infrastructures et de la Connectivité en Centrafrique (PURIC), signé entre le Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine et le Bureau des Nations Unies pour les Services d’Appui aux Projets (UNOPS), et en préparation du lancement des activités, une mission conjointe avec la cellule des Pistes Rurales de METP a été organisée du 08 au 15 Novembre 2022 à Tingouloou et ses environs.

L’objectif de cette mission a été la sélection des pistes rurales à réhabiliter à Vakaga et la prise de contact avec les autorités et partenaires locaux.

L’équipe conjointe est composée de :
- M. Augustin LILOMBI, Ingénieur Principal, UNOPS
- M. Anicet KARAM, Technicien Chef de Chantier, UNOPS
- M. Jean-Claude NGAHOUNOU, le Chef Cellule des Pistes Rurales, METP

Après les séances communautaires concluantes à Tingouloou le 08 Novembre 2022, l’équipe a effectué avec succès les consultations et discussions avec les communautés à Ouandja - Djalié du 09 au 10 Novembre 2022.
Le 11 Novembre 2022, alors que l'équipe se rendait à Gordil pour les consultations communautaires, elle a été victime d'un braquage, suivi d'enlèvement à N'diffa par des éléments armés.

Tous les efforts déployés jusqu'à présent par le Gouvernement Centrafricain et le Système des Nations Unies en RCA, pour leur libération ont été vains et l'équipe reste toujours en captivité.

Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, l'UNOPS est très concernée pour la sécurité, la santé et le bien-être de nos deux staffs et du Chef Cellule Pistes Rurales et sollicite l'appui du Gouvernement pour la libération sans délai de l'équipe.

Vu les circonstances, nous sommes au regret de vous annoncer qu'à compter de ce jour, l'UNOPS est obligé de suspendre temporairement toutes les activités de PURIC dans la région de Yakaga jusqu'à (i) la libération effective de l'équipe en otage et (ii) la normalisation des conditions de sécurité nécessaires à la mise en œuvre desdites activités.

Nous renouvelons nos remerciements à vous et au Gouvernement Centrafricain pour tous les efforts qui sont en cours pour la libération de l'équipe.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de nos considérations distinguées.

cc
- M. Guido RURANGWA, Country Manager, Banque Mondiale,
  Bangui, République Centrafricain
- M. Jean-Christophe MAURIN, Directeur de l'Agence, AFD,
  Bangui, République Centrafricaine
- M. Noël NGOYA, Coordinateur du PURIC, Unité de Gestion de Projet
  Bangui, République Centrafricaine
COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE
Relatif à la captivité de trois espions du Gouvernement le 11 novembre 2022.
Sous le fameux vieux prétexte habituel depuis 1960, le gouvernement a cru réussir à
nous feindre que des agents de renseignements étaient venus soi-disant contrôler et
expertiser les zones rurales. Et tout cela sous l’égide de la belle Organisation UNOPS
et pendant une période cruciale où un mouvement d’envergure politico-militaire est
établi dans la zone. Pas de chance, nous les avons capturés et nous avons des
preuves tangibles et un aveu sans contrainte de leur identité et de leur mission. Ce
sont des agents du gouvernement mandatés pour nuire même les staffs d’UNOPS
restent surpris. Nous avons montré ces preuves irréfutables aux autorités locales ainsi
nous demandons au gouvernement d’arrêter les manipulations. Nous avons émis deux
revendications et les négociations allaient très bien jusqu’à ce que le ministre de la
Justice s’ingère de la plus mauvaise manière. Nous tenons à lui rappeler qu’il n’est
pas le président de la République de la RCA et qu’il cesse de croire qu’il est
incontournable dans cette république. Il se croit supérieur mais il n’est personne de
plus que nous et l’argent lui monte à la tête.
Nous demandons aux populations Centrafricaines de ne plus se laisser endormir sur
ce prétexte fallacieux d’expertises qui ne sont même pas officielles ni pour construire
des routes dont nous avons tant besoin. Tellement que la route est chère pour nous,
le gouvernement incapable investit plutôt dans la communication à la place de la route.
Depuis l’indépendance vous allez faire combien de fois l’expertise ? Yakaye même le
stade de 20.000 places à Bangui est tellement pourri que notre pays est disqualifié
des compétitions, Ah ce n’est pas fait, toujours à notre époque c’est la route que vous
allez construire! La honte!
Nous demandons aux autorités locales de la Vakaga et plus particulièrement au maire
de la Commune de Ouandjia que nous respectons, son autorité dans ces affaires qui
est de s’impliquer davantage dans la négociation afin que notre revendication soit enfin
prise en compte. Mais si vous glissez dans la logique indiquée par le ministre de la
Justice demain le 17 novembre à 13h nous allons laisser partir ces espions et leur
famille les trouveront dans la concession du ministre de la Justice.

Fait à Manou le 16 novembre 2022
Le Chef d’État Major PRNC
Mohamed Aliass B13
PRNC
Parti pour le Rassemblement de la Nation Centrafricaine

Communiqué du PRNC

Aujourd’hui nous prenons à témoins le peuple Centrafricain et la communauté internationale des dérives de Monsieur DJOUBAYE ABAZENE. En effet, invité pour la fête du 1er décembre en dépit à Bira où les notables de la Vakaga, qui sont avant tout ses parents, ont subi toutes formes de pressions de Djoubaye devant les Wagner. Djoubaye respecte les Wagner bien plus que ses propres parents. Il a complètement ingeré le sort de ses parents, frères et fils de la Vakaga dont Azor et ses accompagnants illégalement emprisonnés depuis 2 ans et ose demander aux parents d’Azor d’établir une pression populaire pour assouvir son pouvoir même aux dépens de leurs vies ? Pourquoi en fait-il une affaire personnelle ? On se demande si le président Touadera a mandaté Djoubaye pour fuir ses propres responsabilités ? Il pensait certainement que Djoubaye contrôlerait la Vakaga c’est pourquoi il lui a remis de l’argent de l’Etat et regarder tous ce qu’il a fait avec :

1- Payé des mercenaires pour nous attaquer et faire rejeter la responsabilité des malheurs des espions retenus sur nous ;

2- Payé des marabouts pour nous envoyer et nous rendre ignorants afin de tomber dans son piège ;

3- Organisé une pression populaire dans le but de diviser la communauté pour mieux régner.

Pourtant dans la lettre ouverte adressée à Michel Djotodia nous avons été très clairs : que c’est terminé Michel et sadique sont des traîtres et il n’auront aucune chance de parler et manger en notre nom. Au peuple pour tenir que Djoubaye gaspille inutilement l’argent de l’Etat pour se venger il se comporte comme un criminel. Nous ne négocierons pas avec lui alors que c’est lui-même qui a créé le chaos, fait arrêter ses frères nuisibles pour lui et maintenant envoyé des espions !

Nous avons déjà entamé des médiation avec la communauté internationale à travers la Minusca on ne va plus revenir ducos. Et aucun mercenaire ne s’aventurera pour nous attaquer ils nous connaissent très bien c’est la mort assurée pour eux.

Nous demandons aux chers parents de la Vakaga de prendre patience de toutes les humiliations, harcèlements, violences et nous mettrons en lumière les viol subit par nos filles que Djoubaye a commanditées. Devant les mercenaires de Wagner il ne vous écoute pas et ne il ne veut pas entendre la voix de la raison. Le peuple Centrafricain n’est pas dupé bien au contraire nous savons ! Nous sommes proche de la vérité.

Le chef d’Etat Major PRNC

MOHAMED Ali alaas B13

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Annex 28: Humanitarian situation and humanitarian access in Vakaga prefecture

1. In late August 2022, heavy rains led to severe flooding and population displacement across northern Vakaga prefecture, especially around Birao. In the days leading to 24 August, torrential rains caused the collapse of a hydraulic dam just across the border in Um Dafuq, Sudan. This exacerbated flooding in low-lying villages along the Birao-Am-Dafok axis, including Matala.

2. Traders commuting between Birao and Am-Dafok or Nyala (South Darfur) must pass at least four flooded areas on the Birao-Am Dafok axis alone, where they need to pay to be ferried across with their goods. In addition to the illegal taxation checkpoints, the journey is very expensive with little profit.

3. Vakaga prefecture, one of the least populated prefectures with an estimated 83,000 inhabitants was, in terms of absolute numbers, the country’s most affected region, with 24,000 flood-affected people. In Bangui, the UN recorded 20,400 flood-affected victims.

4. Mobile teams from the International Medical Corps (IMC), one of the few NGOs with a permanent presence in Birao, struggled hard to reach flood-affected villagers east of Birao. IMC staff showed Panel members photographs of nurses wading waist-high in flood water, carefully steering floating carts pulled by horses, loaded with medicines, equipment and motorcycles, to reach people in need.

5. The three IDP sites in Birao provide protection, shelter and assistance to approximately 7,000 people displaced by armed conflict dating back to September 2019. They remain in the camps as their houses were destroyed by armed groups and they have no means to rebuild. According to humanitarian staff, humanitarian assistance is a strong incentive for IDPs to remain in the camps. The most recent displaced people arrived in April-May 2022 from Sam Ouandja (Haute Kotto prefecture). IMC runs a protection centre in the largest camp Yata. The Panel met with the nurses in charge who described the services provided, including psychosocial support and basic medical care for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence.

6. Humanitarian staff are concerned that the ongoing shift in alliances and movements of armed groups make it difficult to understand local dynamics and operate as they have done in the past. “We need a whole new and updated study of the armed groups in the east to be able to operate and safely reach populations in need”, explained one NGO manager.

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35 See [https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car/card/1FnuvE1InD](https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/car/card/1FnuvE1InD) (accessed on 22 December 2022).