Letter dated 2 November 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 3 of resolution 2675 (2023).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 18 September 2023 and was considered by the Committee on 1 November 2023.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Debi Prasad Dash
Coordinator

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Summary

During the reporting period, regional and international factors have reinforced the pacification efforts in Yemen. The agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia signed in March 2023 under the auspices of China, the Houthi-Saudi Arabia talks mediated by Oman, the prisoners exchange deal between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, and the growing engagement of China in Middle East affairs have generated positive momentum in the region.

The conflict in Yemen has been at a low level of intensity since December 2022, which some analysts described as an “informal truce”. However, provocative and confrontational content disseminated by media platforms affiliated with the Houthis and with the Government of Yemen increased during the reporting period, hampering the momentum of the talks. In particular, the Houthis issued numerous statements recently, threatening the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen that they would resume hostilities, should their demands not be met.

The Presidential Leadership Council has been experiencing a phase of significant internal conflicts. These structural challenges affected its ability to provide basic public services, and hence it was fiercely criticized by the Yemeni people. The cohesion of the Presidential Leadership Council would be at stake if these issues persisted, and military confrontations among the forces affiliated with its members might erupt.

The Houthis continue to refuse to engage in any direct talks with the Government of Yemen. They persist with their demands, such as the payment of salaries, including for military and security personnel, the increase of flights to and from Sana’a, and a major share from the oil revenue. They also displayed their military capabilities in several parades and exercises to exert more pressure on the Coalition and on the Government of Yemen.

Military operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on the front lines, with clashes, shelling and attacks with uncrewed aerial vehicles leading to civilian casualties and the destruction of property. A large percentage of conflicts is between armed groups not associated with the Houthis. Tribal conflict among tribes, and between tribes and armed groups, is reported in both government- and Houthi-controlled areas.

Until April 2023, most incidents attributed to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula had been directed against Southern Transitional Council-affiliated armed forces in Abyan. Subsequently, a large part of the attacks shifted to Shabwah.

Three maritime security incidents have been reported since December 2022, one involving a bulk carrier and two involving yachts. Tension is growing in the Red Sea, with the Houthis establishing a naval presence on Kamaran Island, off Hudaydah. At the same time, the Yemeni Coast Guard has bases on Red Sea islands close to Hudaydah, resulting in potential risks for ships and small craft transiting Yemeni territorial waters. On 11 August 2023, a major environmental disaster was averted when the transfer of 1.1 million barrels of oil from the FSO Safer to the Yemen (previously Nautica) was completed. Issues pertaining to the ownership of the oil, the ship Yemen, and the sale proceeds of the Safer remain.
With regard to the targeted arms embargo, the Panel notes large-scale violations involving military material, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, attack uncrewed aerial vehicles, waterborne improvised explosive devices and hundreds of 4x4 vehicles converted for carrying various weapon systems that were displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a in September 2022.

From November 2022 to June 2023, 254 uncrewed aerial vehicles, 100 engines for uncrewed aerial vehicles, nearly 5 tons of explosive precursor chemicals, 2 diver propulsion vehicles and various pieces of military equipment were intercepted by the Government of Yemen. Between December 2022 and January 2023, several thousand assault rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, and electro-optical surveillance system and medium-range ballistic missile components were seized in international waters.

All these seizures of material, corroborated by statements made by several Houthi officials, show that the Houthis are drastically reinforcing their land and naval military capabilities, including under water, as well as their arsenal of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles, in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

Parties to the conflict in Yemen continue to perpetrate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Panel documented many cases involving, inter alia, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance, torture and other forms of ill-treatment or punishment, including against migrants, recruitment and use of children, and sexual and gender-based violence. Most violations investigated by the Panel were attributed to the Houthis, who continue to recruit and use children, particularly in the context of the summer camps, at alarming proportions. The introduction of new changes in the school curricula, with content focused on hatred, violence and military indoctrination, is deeply disturbing.

The stricter enforcement of the mahram (male guardian) by the Houthis is hindering the access of women and girls to basic health-care services, including reproductive health. Freedom of expression is restricted in Yemen. Journalists, human rights activists and civil society activists are harassed and subjected to ill-treatment by multiple parties to the conflict. They are often detained for prolonged periods, including incommunicado detention, for denouncing cases of corruption, extortion or broader human rights abuses.

Landmines, commonly located in close proximity to civilian buildings such as houses, schools and mosques, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war continue to be major threats for the civilian population, especially children.

Online conflict-related gender-based violence, such as harassment and defamation against women activists, including those in the diaspora, particularly by the Houthis, was also reported. Lastly, some parties to the conflict continue to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The reports received on the diversion of humanitarian funding and relief items by the Houthis are particularly concerning.

On the economic front, a full-scale economic war has replaced the full-scale military war. The economic issues plaguing Yemen are now closely intertwined with the broader political and military situation. Yemen is divided into two distinct currency, trading and economic zones. The Houthis appear to have deployed a calibrated set of coercive economic measures relating to sea, land and air sectors to incapacitate the Government of Yemen and prevent it from functioning as a Government. Attacks on maritime assets, the ban on crude oil exports, the diversion of international trade from Aden to Hudaydah, the blockade of roads, the ban on key domestic trade such as cooking gas, and the latest freezing of funds of the national airline, Yemenia, are a few such indicators of the Houthis’ strategy. The continuing prohibition on certain series of banknotes issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,
the possible use of counterfeit currency notes and passports, and the ongoing regulatory clashes between the two central banks threaten the monetary and economic stability of Yemen.

Following the attacks on the Dabbah oil terminal, the Government of Yemen is losing about $1.2 billion in revenue per year. The shift in imports from Aden to Hudaydah resulted in a massive loss of revenue of YRs 637.36 billion for the Government of Yemen during the period from April 2022 to June 2023 and a consequential gain for the Houthis. The total loss of revenue from the ban on the purchase of cooking gas from the Government of Yemen is estimated at YRs 64 billion annually. With the new mechanism for collection of revenues at land customs points, implemented in March 2023, the Houthis have started treating government-controlled areas as a foreign territory for customs purposes, effectively dividing Yemen into two countries.

The continuing deterioration of the economic situation in the government-controlled areas, including high rates of inflation, depreciation of the Yemeni rial, which crossed the 1,400 mark in July 2023, and the poor public service delivery system, especially for electricity, resulted in civil unrest in several cities. Yemen has witnessed a resurgence of a political movement demanding self-determination for the south. Despite economic issues being a key theme in political and diplomatic dialogues over the past few months, failure to find common ground over them has stalled the peace talks.

However, given the involvement of regional and international actors, it is less likely that the Houthis will engage in another full-scale war, despite the threatening statements. Rather, they would continue their calculated escalatory policies and might increase attacks on several fronts to solve the issue of payment of salaries. Overall, however, they would commit to the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The adoption of a multiphase plan that takes into account the contextual variables is essential. At this stage, reaching a formal ceasefire should be the priority. Hence, it would be significant to agree on adopting incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures on less contentious issues to realize the goal.
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 2675 (2023), covers the period from 1 December 2022 to 31 August 2023 and includes information pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2624 (2022), as well as updated findings from some of the cases investigated in the framework of the Panel’s final report of 21 February 2023 (S/2023/130).

2. The Panel adopted the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). It placed emphasis on adherence to standards relating to transparency, objectivity and sources, documentary evidence, corroboration of independent verifiable sources, and providing the opportunity to reply. The Panel also maintained cooperation with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) and also worked closely with the Panel of Experts on Somalia established pursuant to resolution 2444 (2018).

3. The mandate of the Panel was extended on 15 February 2023 by the Security Council in its resolution 2675 (2023) until 15 December 2023. Of the five members of the Panel appointed by the Secretary-General (see S/2023/235 and S/2023/518), the contracts of the finance expert and the armed groups expert commenced on 29 March 2023, and the contract of the international humanitarian law expert, the arms expert and the regional affairs expert commenced on 3 April, 22 April and 24 July 2023, respectively.

4. In 2023, Panel members travelled to Djibouti, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Yemen (Aden, Dabbah and Mukalla). The Panel conducted physical and virtual inspections of material, including components of missiles and ammunitions seized by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and from the debris at the blast sites. The Panel held in-person meetings and engaged remotely with multiple interlocutors and also met with the President of the Presidential Leadership Council and the Prime Minister and other representatives of the Government of Yemen.

5. The Panel sent 74 official letters, of which 64 letters were addressed to 24 Member States and 10 to organizations, entities and companies, to which 35 replies were still pending as at 31 August 2023 (see annex 3).

II. Developments affecting peace, security and stability in Yemen

6. The conflict in Yemen has been at a low level of intensity since December 2022, which some analysts described as an “informal truce”. The proactive approach of the international community to finding a permanent solution to the conflict in Yemen has provided the space for diplomatic efforts at the regional and bilateral levels to take place. In addition, the prisoners exchange that took place in April 2023 represented an important element in the de-escalation process between some of the belligerent parties, especially given that prominent figures were among the released detainees (see para. 134). However, provocative and confrontational content disseminated by

1 The period covered in the final report of the Panel (S/2023/130) ended on 30 November 2022; hence, the present final report covers the period from 1 December 2022 to 31 August 2023. The last date for consideration of Member State responses to the Panel’s questions for the present report was 31 August 2023.

2 Additional information on the Panel’s methodology and the opportunity to reply is provided in annex 1.

3 All major locations in Yemen are spelled in accordance with the United Nations geographic information system map in annex 2.
Houthi- and government-affiliated media platforms continued to have a negative impact on the momentum of talks. Under pressure from internal instability and strikes, the Houthis issued numerous statements recently, threatening the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen that they would resume hostilities, should their demands not be met. Disagreements over controversial issues continued, and the talks with Saudi Arabia have stalled. All efforts should be made by the relevant stakeholders to prevent the situation from deteriorating and reverting to military confrontations.

7. The ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by parties to the conflict have resulted in an environment of normalized violence where impunity prevails. Civilians, including women and children, continue to bear the brunt of the protracted conflict and are subjected to all forms of violence and abuse. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of children, arbitrary detention and systematic torture are among the major threats to peace and security in Yemen. The Panel believes that, without a strong accountability and justice system in the country, the prospects of attaining sustainable peace are very limited.

Regional and international dynamics

8. Regional and international factors contributed to an extended truce-like situation in Yemen. For example, the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement under the auspices of China resulted in an agreement in March 2023. In addition, the initiation of direct talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Sana'a, under the auspices of Oman, paved the way for concrete talks, which may result in reaching a peace agreement. This new Saudi approach to reaching a negotiated settlement of the Yemeni conflict was perceived as a sign of goodwill and was praised by various regional actors. Some analysts interpreted the new strategy as a reflection of the Saudi determination to halt military confrontations to focus on its 2030 development strategy.

9. Meanwhile, the prisoners exchange between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America in August 2023 and the release of frozen Iranian assets undoubtedly created a positive regional environment. This important development, which followed an increase of the American military presence in the region, could be strengthened by other complementary measures. The increasing economic engagement of China in the Middle East has created a new bond between China, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would encourage China to play a role in stabilizing the Saudi-Iranian relationship.

Developments within the Government of Yemen

10. The Presidential Leadership Council has been facing many challenges and criticism. The divergent political views and aspirations of its members affected its unity and performance. The four committees that were formed following the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council, namely legal, economic, security and military, and reconciliation, could not achieve any tangible progress in the tasks assigned to them. Most importantly, the military committee was unable to unify different armed forces under one command.

11. Tensions increased between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Southern Transitional Council. The joining of two pro-government Presidential Leadership Council members to the Southern Transitional Council gave a numerical

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5 In December 2022, China signed 35 agreements with Saudi Arabia during the visit of its President, Xi Jinping, to Riyadh (see https://www.arabnews.com/node/2213196/amp).
6 See https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/20500.
advantage to the latter and enhanced its influence towards the establishment of an independent State in the south. In addition, the Southern Transitional Council appointed a prominent figure from Hadramawt, Saleh Alquaiti, as a special adviser in an attempt to obtain the support of the oil-rich governorate.7

12. This growing influence of the Southern Transitional Council was countered by the establishment in June 2023 of the Hadramawt National Council, which will act as a representative body of the governorate under the authority of the Presidential Leadership Council.8 Similarly, the establishment of the National Shield Forces in January 2023 under the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, was aimed at balancing the dominant role of the Southern Transitional Council in Aden Governorate. This could lead to more conflicts and potential military confrontations among members of the Presidential Leadership Council. For example, recently, media reported that the forces of Amaliqah Brigades, headed by a member of the Presidential Leadership Council, besieged the office of the Prime Minister in Aden.9 The Panel was not able to independently verify the veracity of this incident.

13. These factors led to fragmentations within the Presidential Leadership Council, which had a negative impact on its ability to perform its tasks, especially those related to improving the living standards of the Yemeni people and reforming the State’s institutions. Despite external financial support, the Government of Yemen is struggling to provide public services and to manage the economic crisis. In addition, the prolonged absence of government ministers and other senior officials from the country affected the credibility and performance of the Government of Yemen. This compelled the President of the Presidential Leadership Council to issue a circular ordering all ministers and governors to return to their workplaces in Yemen by 6 August 2023. The circular warned that failure to comply with this directive would result in legal measures against those officials (see annex 4).

14. The economic issues had never assumed as much political and military significance as they have since December 2022, dividing the country into two distinct and asymmetrical economic and political zones.

**Houthis’ position**

15. The Houthis continue to refuse to engage in any kind of dialogue with the Government of Yemen and preferred to hold direct talks with Saudi Arabia. As the Houthis are empowered by their military edge over the Government of Yemen, their demands for agreeing to any peace proposals have always been, primarily, based on economic considerations. These include the lifting of the restrictions imposed on the Hudaydah port, payment of salaries, including for military and security personnel, and obtaining a major share from the oil revenue. They also wish to engage Saudi Arabia in the negotiations as a party to the conflict and consequently ask Saudi Arabia to pay for, inter alia, the costs of reconstruction and compensations.

16. Under pressure from the strikes of employees in different sectors to demand payment of their salaries, Houthis leaders have been issuing threatening statements as a bargaining chip to enhance their leverage in the ongoing talks, especially regarding the issue of salaries. The Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) warned the Coalition in August 2023, “The current situation cannot continue as it is. The Saudis will not get away with leaving our people besieged and suffering, and our country destroyed.”10 In addition, the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, warned the Coalition, “We are ready, in order to provide salaries for all

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7 See https://channel16.dryadglobal.com/the-growing-battle-for-south-yemen.
8 See https://www.independentarabia.com/node/465951/.
9 See https://www.independentarabia.com/node/484726/.
10 See https://althawrah.ye/archives/822474.
employees of the Republic of Yemen, to engage in a military escalation to extract this salary.”

17. In order to secure more concessions, the Houthis have also been conducting several military parades and live-fire exercises to display their power. The Panel is particularly concerned by the volume and the nature of the military material displayed by the Houthis.

18. In late June 2023, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Defence, Major General Muhammad Nasser al-Atifi, addressed the fighters of the Fourth Military Region stationed in the Ta’izz axis, “We tell the enemies that any march, military parades, or manoeuvres are not for media consumption, but we are preparing the professional fighter capable of accomplishing any combat missions and in the most difficult situations”. He also said, “We are preparing to liberate Yemen against the aggression and whoever occupies Yemeni lands, whether the Emiratis or Saudis or those behind them, or those who fight with them, and we are not against the Yemenis at all.”

19. On the military front, operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on all front lines, with the escalation of clashes and shelling from time to time. Confrontations between armed groups and between armed groups and tribal factions are reported in both Houthi- and government-controlled areas. While attacks by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against the Houthis have ceased, the majority of their attacks are currently directed against Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces.

**Prospective outlook**

20. The Panel believes that resolving the intractable Yemeni conflict is a long-drawn-out process and that a comprehensive peaceful settlement may be unattainable in the near future. This could be attributed to many factors, among which are the military and economic disparity between the Houthis and the Government of Yemen. However, reaching agreements on a few less controversial issues should be encouraged and complemented by other confidence-building measures to sustain and expand the current détente.

21. Given the involvement of regional and international actors, it is less likely that the Houthis will engage in another full-scale war, despite threatening statements. Rather, they would continue their calculated escalatory policies and might increase attacks on several fronts to solve the issue of salaries. Overall, however, they would commit to the framework of the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. In this regard, some analysts question the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to influence Houthi decisions, as the Houthis enjoy relative economic independence and do not completely rely on Iranian aid.

22. The Panel believes that the Houthis will attempt to capitalize on the current situation and push different parties to recognize them as a legitimate entity. Some analysts believe that acknowledging the Houthis as a legitimate entity and granting them disproportionate concessions may isolate other Yemeni parties and put them in a vulnerable position. It is therefore crucial to include the political views and address the interests of all parties in any future agreement.

23. In the given circumstances, it may be in the best interest of all parties to agree on a formal ceasefire and resolve the pending issues, including those related to the payments of salaries, resumption of oil exports by the Government of Yemen, and resource allocations.

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12 See [https://www.masiratv.net/post/235300/](https://www.masiratv.net/post/235300/).
24. To that end, it is essential to avoid any deadlock in the current talks, which would mean reverting to military confrontations and more civilian casualties.

25. The Panel believes that it is important for the relevant stakeholders to adopt a multiphase plan that takes into account the contextual variables. At this stage, reaching a formal ceasefire should be the priority. Hence, it would be significant to agree on adopting incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures on less contentious issues to realize the goal.

III. Activities of armed groups that threaten peace, security and stability

26. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), as reaffirmed by the Security Council in its resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel continued to investigate individuals and entities associated with armed groups who may be engaging in or providing support to acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen.

27. During the reporting period, no cross-border attacks by the Houthis against any Member State or attacks on ports, oil terminals or tankers in government-controlled areas were documented. However, the impact of the attacks on oil facilities in 2022 continues to be felt (see para. 167). No Coalition air strikes have been reported since the onset of the truce on 2 April 2022.

A. Houthi-controlled area of Jawf Governorate

28. Tension exists between the Houthis and several tribes against the backdrop of attempts by the Houthis to subjugate the tribesmen by force and confiscate their property. At the end of January 2023, Bani Nawf tribesmen in Sayl, Hazm district, kidnapped a Houthi leader and his companions to exert pressure on the Houthis to release a tribesman detained by them a few months before. This resulted in the outbreak of armed clashes between Houthi forces and Bani Nawf tribesmen.

29. In July 2023, violent clashes led to the death of several Houthi members, including the commander of the Maraqiz front. The Houthis brought in large reinforcements and cut off roads to Sayl, which escalated the tension further. The Houthis demanded that 11 tribesmen be surrendered, but 10 of them fled to the government-controlled area and only 1 person turned himself in.13

B. Conflict on the front lines

30. Military operations between the Houthis and pro-government forces continued on the front lines, with clashes, artillery shelling and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks leading to civilian casualties and the destruction of property. The Houthis held military parades and live-fire exercises in Ibb, Dhamar, Bayda’, Jawf, Ma’rib and Sa’dah. These events are often accompanied by rhetoric on the readiness to resume military operations (see annex 5).

31. In July 2023, the Armed Forces of the Government of Yemen reported a military build-up of forces on the front lines, especially on the Ma’rib-Shabwah-Bayda’ area, including advanced weapon systems and special units. According to these sources,  

the Houthis have been clearing their own minefields, suggesting the preparation for an offensive.

Map 1
Armed conflict on the Ma’rib-Shabwah-Bayda’ front lines


Ma’rib

32. The conflict in Ma’rib is multidimensional and complex. Shelling, clashes and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks between the Houthis and pro-government forces concentrated on the west of Harib district, south of the city of Ma’rib, and in the vicinity of Umm Rish military camp in Jubah district (see figure I). Clashes were also reported among armed groups and government forces and tribes. In addition, Ma’rib is one of the most unexploded ordnance- and landmine-contaminated governorates, which results in high civilian casualties.
Figure 1
Satellite photo showing damage to buildings in Umm Rish military camp in Jubah

Source: Panel of Experts.

33. On 1 and 2 December 2022, violent clashes and artillery shelling were reported around the Balaq mountain range and the Akd front to the south of Ma’rib city (see figure II) between the government forces, backed by loyal tribes, and the Houthis.\(^\text{14}\) Reportedly, the Houthis took control of some positions on the front. Similar attacks were reported in March and April in the same areas; on 11 April 2023, clashes were also reported along the Kasara and Raghwan fronts west of Ma’rib city.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^{15}\) Panel’s analysis of incident data.
34. Armed clashes between the Houthis and the Amaliqah Brigades erupted in waves on the western fronts of Harib district between March and July 2023. In March, heavy fighting was reported around Jabal al-Yahmum, Jabal Jandalah and Jabal Buwarah, resulting in the Houthis capturing Jabal Buwarah, a strategic high ground overlooking Harib city. The Saba axis forces and the Amaliqah Brigades claimed to have regained control of these areas.

**Shabwah front**

35. An escalation of fighting was reported along the border areas between Bayda’ and Shabwah between Houthis forces and the Amaliqah Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces.

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16 See https://almawqeapost.net/news/84013.
17 See https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2023/20001; Panel’s analysis of incidents.
18 See https://www.khabaragency.net/news182111.html.
36. In late February 2023, the Shabwah Defence Forces reportedly foiled an attack launched by the Houthis on their positions in the Aqabat Umm Quwwah area in Merkhah al-Ulya district.\textsuperscript{19} Reports indicated that Houthi forces gained control of Jabal al-Khashibah as well as some areas west of Wadi Markhah in the district after clashes with the Amaliqah Brigades on 26 March 2023. Government reports indicated that the Shabwah Defence Forces repelled Houthi attacks in these positions after receiving reinforcements from Ataq.\textsuperscript{20}

37. Clashes between Houthi forces and the Amaliqah Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces were reported on the Makhdarah front in Ayn district on 25 February and 10 March 2023.\textsuperscript{21}

**Hudaydah**

38. Shelling and clashes continued in Hudaydah between the Houthis and the Joint Forces on the West Coast.\textsuperscript{22} In Tuhayta’ and Hays districts in Hudaydah Governorate, government forces accused the Houthis of shelling residential areas and farms, causing civilian casualties,\textsuperscript{23} and digging trenches and tunnels\textsuperscript{24} to the sea. Explosion of landmines and unexploded ordnance remains high in these two districts. Houthi media accused government forces of shelling and conducting uncrewed aerial vehicle strikes in Jabaliyah and Hays.\textsuperscript{25}

**Ta’izz**

39. In October 2022, Brigadier General Tariq Saleh and the Governor of Ta’izz, Nabil Shamsan, inaugurated the implementation of the Al-Kadaha-Al-Bireen Road project, named “breaking the siege” of Ta’izz, which connects the cities of Mukha and Ta’izz. Since then, five attacks have been recorded on this road. Three of the attacks took place on 25 March 2023: against the convoy of the Ta’izz Governor; against the convoy of the Minister of Defence of the Government of Yemen, Mohsen al-Da’eri; and an uncrewed aerial vehicle strike on a government checkpoint, resulting in the death of two soldiers. On 4 May 2023, the Houthi forces reportedly attacked the equipment of a company involved in the construction of the road.\textsuperscript{26} Lastly, on 7 May 2023, the former police chief of the Jabal Habashi district of Ta’izz, Colonel Tawfiq al-Waqar Jabari, was reportedly killed in a targeted uncrewed aerial vehicle attack (see annex 6). The Panel believes it likely that the aim of the Houthis is to prevent rapid military reinforcements and movement to the Kadaha front, as the road passes near the front lines and will also provide access to other front lines west of Ta’izz.

40. On 21 July 2023, the head of the Ta’izz office of the World Food Programme, Moayad Hameidi, was shot and killed\textsuperscript{27} by two masked men riding a motorbike in Turbah, Ta’izz city. Investigations by the relevant authorities are ongoing.

41. Two similar assassinations perpetrated by masked men on motorcycles were recorded in Ta’izz Governorate in July 2023.\textsuperscript{28} On 5 July, a leading member of the Islah party, Sheikh Ali Mohammed al-Haisi, was killed in the port city of Mocha while

\textsuperscript{19} See https://al-oman.net/m/details.php?id=195320.


\textsuperscript{21} See https://www.khabaragency.net/news183439.html.

\textsuperscript{22} See https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/march-2023.


\textsuperscript{24} See https://www.2dec.net/news/58378.html.

\textsuperscript{25} See https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/579162.

\textsuperscript{26} Government of Yemen sources.

\textsuperscript{27} See https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-statement-death-staff-member-yemen.

\textsuperscript{28} See https://twitter.com/AhmedAl_haj/status/1683228200669700099.
travelling in his vehicle. A Yemeni officer of the Special Security Forces, Salah al-Omrani, was killed on 10 July by armed motorcyclists near his house in Ta’izz city.

Abyan
42. Clashes and shelling between Houthis and Southern Resistance Forces were sporadically reported. Houthi forces tried to infiltrate locations in the Aqabat al-Tharrah front along the border of the southern Mukayras district of Bayda’ and the northern Lawdar district of Abyan. Clashes were also reported between the Houthis and Abyan axis forces on the Aqabat Halhal front.

Conflict between armed groups
43. A large number of protests and conflicts in the governorates are between armed groups not associated with the Houthis. Conflict often occurs when these armed groups are not from the local population to which they are deployed.

44. In January 2023, the establishment of the National Shield Forces was formalized by the Presidential Leadership Council (see para. 12). The National Shield Forces are intended to be the reserve force of the President of the Presidential Leadership Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Rashad al-Alimi. Since then, they established a base in Aden and Lahij and replaced the 141st Infantry Brigade at the Wadi’ah border crossing with Saudi Arabia in Hadramawt in May 2023. On 27 April 2023, Al-Alimi established the Joint Operations Authority under the Minister of Defence. The Authority is tasked with coordinating operations of various pro-government armed forces. Preventing factionalism among armed groups and to unite groups under a joint command remains a challenge.

45. Divergence of political interests between the Islah-affiliated First Military Region and the Hadrami Elite Forces, affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council in Hadramawt, led to community protests mobilized by opposing parties in Say’un, Tarim and Qatan between 7 December 2022 and 13 January 2023. On 7 July, a shooting incident occurred at the Southern Transitional Council anniversary rally for “Homeland Day” in Say’un, resulting in injuries to five people. Similar rallies were held in Mukalla, Qatan, Shihir, Tarim and Ghayil Ba Wazir.

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula
46. AQAP maintains a strong presence in Abyan and Shabwah Governorates. Their operation, “Arrows of the truth”, continued into the current reporting period and grew in intensity in the governorates. AQAP uses well-planned hit-and-run tactics against government forces and the Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces, operating in small groups, namely the Security Belt Forces, the Support and Backup Brigades

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30 See https://arabic.news.cn/20230711/499a51646d3f4e8b5bce865038dde81a/c.html.
32 Government of Yemen source.
37 See S/2023/95.
and the Shabwah Defence Forces. They make use of the mountainous areas, such as those around Wadi Amran, as cover. From December 2022 to April 2023, around 80 per cent of the incidents were reported in Abyan, followed by Shabwah and Ma’rib. However, since May 2023, a geographical shift in incidents has been observed, with half of the incidents currently in Shabwah. In Abyan, Mudiyah district faced most of the attacks launched by AQAP. These attacks are centred in Wadi Amran and nearby Baqirah, where government and Security Belt Forces counter-terrorism operations are also focused. Mahfad district and, to a lesser extent, Lawdar district also recorded incidents. On 10 May 2023, the Security Belt Forces launched a large-scale counter-terrorism operation in Mahfad district. 38 AQAP also maintains a presence in Hadramawt and Bayda’.

47. The Security Belt Forces were targeted in the majority of attacks by AQAP until the end of April 2023, but the Support and Backup Brigades and the Shabwah Defence Forces were also targeted. In May 2023, when a large percentage of attacks moved to Shabwah, the Shabwah Defence Forces became the main target. Focused intelligence led to uncrewed aerial vehicle and improvised explosive device attacks targeting commanders travelling in military vehicles.

48. On 16 May 2023, AQAP reportedly claimed an attack on the Shabwah Defence Forces with an uncrewed aerial vehicle using a 40-mm high-explosive grenade39 and provided photo documentation from the on-board camera. AQAP does not often use uncrewed aerial vehicles in attacks. The first such attack was reported in April 2022. 40 Since then, AQAP has launched at least six such attacks, all on the Shabwah Defence Forces at Musayn’ah in Sa’id district in Shabwah. Reports indicate that AQAP members were redeployed to this area in May 2023. 41 For example, on 24 May 2023, AQAP claimed to have injured the commander of the First Shabwah Defence Forces Brigade, Major Ahmed Mohsen al-Sulaimani. He was targeted, using an improvised explosive device, for a second time while on his way to the hospital in a military vehicle. AQAP regularly attacks wounded combatants, often while they are being transported in ambulances (see para. 115).42

39 The Panel was not able to identify the grenade owing to the quality of the pictures.
41 Yemen Data Project; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (YEM80475), see https://acleddata.com.
42 See https://ent.siteintelgroup.com.
49. On 18 February 2023, AQAP announced a successful prisoners exchange for two of its members held by the Houthis.43 The following day, the head of the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs, Abdulqader al-Murtada, confirmed the prisoners exchange with three Houthi prisoners on the Shabwah front line.44

50. On 3 June 2023, AQAP submitted a proof-of-life video for the Department of Safety and Security Field Coordination Officer in Aden, Akm Sufiul Anam, a Bangladeshi national, who was kidnapped on 11 February 2022 in Abyan with four national staff members.45 The hostages were released on 11 August 2023.46

43 See https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/.
44 See https://twitter.com/abdulqadermortd/status/1627357127625920512.
45 See https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/.
FSO Safer

51. On 9 March 2023, the United Nations Development Programme announced that it had entered into an agreement with Euronav\(^47\) to purchase a very large crude carrier for $55 million with the capacity to transfer crude oil from the FSO Safer. The VLCC Nautica was procured for the purpose.\(^48\)

52. The United Nations Development Programme contracted SMIT Salvage\(^49\) to safely remove the oil and prepare the FSO Safer for towing to a green salvage yard. The Panel was informed that the total budget for the emergency phase of the project was $121.2 million. The funding gap, for the salvage phase, stands at $21.8 million.\(^50\)

53. On 25 July 2023, both the offshore support vessel Ndeavor, chosen for the purpose of salvage, and the Nautica (renamed Yemen) were at the location of the Safer, 4.8 nautical miles north of Hudaydah, and the ship-to-ship transfer of crude oil began. On 11 August 2023, the transfer of the 1.1 million barrels of oil from the FSO Safer to the Yemen was completed.\(^51\)

54. While this averted a major environmental disaster, the issues pertaining to the ownership of the oil and of the Yemen, as well as of the sale proceeds of the Safer, remain unresolved.

IV. Maritime security

55. A total of three maritime security incidents involving vessels occurred off the coast of Yemen in territorial waters. In late August 2023, Mahdi al-Mashat threatened two companies that own the liquefied petroleum gas tankers Sanmar Regent and Epic Bolivar not to load gas at Aden port.\(^52\) The Panel’s investigations revealed that the sailing pattern of the two vessels are consistent with the threat. On 25 August, the Sanmar Regent turned away 18 nautical miles from Aden. On 29 August, the Epic Bolivar made a 180-degree turn 430 nautical miles from Aden sailing back to Duqm, Oman. According to the automatic identification system (AIS), the vessel’s destination was Aden.\(^53\) In 2022, the Houthis sent similar threatening messages prior to attacks on oil tankers (S/2023/130, para. 24).


\(^{49}\) See https://boskalis.com.

\(^{50}\) See https://stories.undp.org/all-hands-on-deck.

\(^{51}\) See https://twitter.com/beleefboskalis.

\(^{52}\) See Al-Mashat: We warn the Marines and British forces not to go too far in Yemen. Our hand is light on the trigger | Fields (almayadeen.net).

Map 2
Maritime security incidents

Source: Panel of Experts.

56. On 17 March 2023, the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier *Arietta* came under fire from armed men on a skiff, 38 nautical miles (70 km) south of the port of Hudaydah from a distance of 1 nautical mile. The on-board security team returned fire and the skiff turned away. The vessel was not using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor, as recommended, and was travelling to the east of the Hanish Islands, as the captain was not aware of the security arrangement. The Panel assessed that the incident is likely not linked to piracy or to the armed conflict in Yemen (see annex 7).

57. Tension in the Red Sea is currently high, with the Houthis establishing a naval presence on Kamaran Island, off Hudaydah. The Yemeni Coast Guard also has a base on the Zubayr Island group in the Red Sea, located approximately 44 nautical miles (82 km) west-south-west off Hudaydah. This situation places international shipping, especially small pleasure craft returning to the area after the suppression of Somali piracy, at risk. On 18 April, while under way to Djibouti, the crew of the motor yacht *30 Minutes* took shelter from severe weather at an anchorage off Saba Island, which is part of the Zubayr Island group. The crew were approached by a grey coast guard boat, which fired at them, hitting the boat once, after which *30 Minutes* fled the area. According to the crew, there were no radio warnings prior to the shooting. Arriving in Eritrea, the crew were detained for a week by national authorities, after a bullet hole in the hull of the yacht caught their attention. The crew established contact with the owner of the vessel after they reached Djibouti on 27 April 2023. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, it is a procedural requirement to make radio contact before firing on a vessel. The Panel is awaiting a detailed report from the Yemeni Coast Guard on the incident (see annex 8).

58. On 27 April 2023, the yacht *Kalizma* left the port of Salalah, Oman. The *Kalizma* sailed towards the transit corridor off the coast of Yemen, under way to Egypt. She had a crew of 10 Indian nationals on board and an armed security team consisting of 1 Greek and 2 Indian nationals. Her route brought her through the territorial waters

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55 Military-established corridor on which naval forces focus their presence and surveillance efforts.
56 Information received from Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa.
of Yemen about 6 nautical miles off the coast of Ra’s Fartak and Haswayn, Mahrah Governorate\(^57\) (see annex 9).

Map 3

**AIS track of the charter yacht Kalizma**


59. On the morning of 28 April 2023, two small boats from the Yemeni Coast Guard and a boat from the Yemeni Navy were on patrol in the area.\(^58\) The patrol boats attempted to make radio contact with the yacht through the VHF radio, but the yacht captain did not respond to repeated calls. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, the yacht was not flying a flag at the time while in the territorial waters and had armed guards on board. The Yemeni Coast Guard fired warning shots. Believing that they were under attack by pirates, the Kalizma’s crew issued a distress call, reporting that they were under attack by three skiffs, to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations,\(^59\) which subsequently issued an alert of an ongoing attack, reporting that shots had been fired.\(^60\)

60. According to the Yemeni Coast Guard, one naval officer was killed and two Coast Guard personnel injured as a result of the exchange of fire.\(^61\) One of the armed guards on the Kalizma was reportedly injured by a bullet. On its arrival in Djibouti, Yemeni authorities requested the local authorities to detain the vessel.

**Houthi naval exercise off Kamaran Island (see annex 10)**

61. On 13 April 2023, the Houthis held a naval exercise\(^62\) off Kamaran Island, north of Hudaydah.\(^63\) Multiple types of speedboats were displayed, which were equipped with various types of weapons, such as a 107-mm multiple-launch rocket system, as well as heavy and light machine guns (see para. 67).

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\(^57\) See [https://2dec.net/news60279.html#](https://2dec.net/news60279.html#).

\(^58\) Ibid.

\(^59\) See [https://www.ukmto.org/](https://www.ukmto.org/).


\(^61\) Government of Yemen sources.

\(^62\) See [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs). The account associated with this video was terminated in July 2023, and the video is no longer available.

\(^63\) See [https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1646671367608082432](https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1646671367608082432).
Figure IV
Houthi naval exercise: Kamaran Island

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs. The account associated with this video was terminated in July 2023, and the video is no longer available.

Map 4
Attack near the Balhaf liquefied natural gas terminal

Source: Panel of Experts, based on Government of Yemen sources.

62. On 5 August 2023, at 3 a.m., an explosion was heard at the Balhaf liquefied natural gas facility (see para. 167). The rocket landed approximately 2.5 km away from the Balhaf liquefied natural gas terminal, where a hole of about 2 m in diameter and debris of the rocket were detected. Electrical wires, a small mobile phone without a SIM card, several wooden launching pads and small pits in the sand were found at ____________________

64 Government of Yemen sources.
the launch site. It was estimated that the perpetrators had fired more than one rocket, some of which had not exploded.\(^{65}\)

63. AQAP reportedly claimed having targeted a military base in the vicinity of the Balhaf gas facility with several 122-mm rockets (Grad) on 5 August.\(^{66}\) AQAP has launched attacks on Balhaf, as well as its gas pipeline and nearby military bases, in the past, including on 6 April 2021.\(^{67}\)

V. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo

64. Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel focuses on a range of monitoring and investigative activities to identify violations of the targeted arms embargo involving the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of, individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). Pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 2624 (2022), the Panel focuses on the commercially available components which have been used by individuals or entities designated by the Committee to assemble uncrewed aerial vehicles, remote-controlled waterborne improvised explosive devices, and other weapon systems.

65. The Panel analysed the material displayed by the Houthis during military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a in September 2022. The Panel investigated four new cases of maritime smuggling of arms and ammunition, including one related to electro-optical surveillance system and medium-range ballistic missile components and the smuggling by land of uncrewed aerial vehicle engines and large quantities of detonators and explosive chemical precursors. The Panel also investigated two diver propulsion vehicles\(^{68}\) seized by the Government of Yemen in November 2022 and analysed debris of a missile launched in 2022 by the Houthis in Dabbah.

66. The Panel notes that the Government of Yemen made 10 seizures of material reportedly meant for the Houthis, in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

A. Maritime smuggling of small arms, related ammunition, electronic devices and ballistic missile components

1. Seizures by the United States

(a) Marwan-1 vessel

67. On 1 December 2022, the fishing trawler *Marwan-1*, carrying a significant amount of ammunition, was interdicted by the United States in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 1,080,000 rounds of 7.62x54 Rmm ammunition for light machine guns, 25,000 rounds of 12.7x99 mm for anti-materiel rifles,\(^{69}\) 6,960 fuzes for 122-mm rockets (Grad)\(^{70}\) and 870 boxes of PG-7 strip propellants\(^{71}\) were recovered. Except for the 12.7x99 mm rounds, which are still under investigation by the Panel, the markings and packaging of the seized material are consistent with those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on the documents found on board, which were

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) See https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/.


\(^{68}\) Also referred to as underwater scooters, used by scuba divers and military forces.

\(^{69}\) Ammunition compatible with the AM-50 anti-materiel rifle (S/2022/50, paras. 62 and 65, S/2021/79, para. 85).

\(^{70}\) Ammunition for multiple-launch rocket systems.

\(^{71}\) Ammunition for RPG-7.
provided to the Panel, the vessel originated from Bandar Abbas, Islamic Republic of Iran (see annexes 11–14).

(b) Stateless dhow

68. On 6 January 2023, a stateless dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons was interdicted by the United States in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 1,918 Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China and 198 AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Russian Federation were recovered (see annexes 15 and 27).

2. Seizure by France

69. On 15 January 2023, a stateless dhow carrying a significant quantity of weapons and ammunition was interdicted by France in the Gulf of Oman. A total of 2,999 Type 56-1 and 100 AKS20U rifles, 50 light machine guns and 201 associated barrels with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria, China, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Romania (see annexes 16–23 and 27), 23 Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missiles (S/2023/130, para. 56, S/2021/79, para. 84 and annex 13, S/2020/326, para. 52, and S/2018/594, paras. 115 and 116 and annex 42) with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 578,400 ammunition of calibre 7.62x54 Rmm, also with markings and packaging similar to those manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran, were interdicted (see annex 23).

3. Analysis of seized Type 56-1 and AKS20U rifles

70. The Panel notes that, since December 2017, 22,152 Type 56-1 assault rifles have been seized, mostly at sea (see annexes 24–26).

71. A total of 1,406 Type 56-1 assault rifles bearing serial numbers belonging to the same batch as those seized in early 2023 have been reported by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, as seized at sea on 20 December 2021 by the United States (S/2023/130, para. 42, and S/2022/754, para. 104).

72. The Panel notes that the serial numbers of the 298 AKS20U rifles seized are part of the same batch (see annex 28).

73. The Panel has not received responses from China and the Russian Federation regarding the chain of custody of the seized weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that it did not produce this material.

4. Seizure by the United Kingdom

74. On 25 February 2023, a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran and travelling at high speed in international waters was interdicted by the United Kingdom in the Gulf of Oman. According to the United Kingdom, the crew was of

72 The Panel notes that light machine guns with similar technical characteristics and markings have been recorded many times in seizures since 2018 (S/2022/50, para. 65 and annexes 19 and 20, figures 19.7, 20.6 and 20.7).

73 The Panel notes that anti-tank guided missiles with similar characteristics and markings have been recorded several times in seizures (S/2023/130, para. 56, S/2021/79, para. 84 and annex 13, figure 13.1, and S/2020/326, para. 52 and annex 20, figures 20.1 and 20.2).

74 Headstamps and lot numbers marked on the battle packs indicate that most of the 7.62x54 Rmm ammunition was produced in 2006.

75 Since December 2017, 30,830 small arms and light weapons have been seized, mostly at sea (see annex 27).
Iranian nationality. Seven Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missiles, including four with a thermobaric warhead (see annex 29), and components of an electro-optical surveillance system and of a medium-range ballistic missile (an inertial navigation system, 6 nose cones and 16 jet vanes) were recovered. All this material presents technical characteristics similar to that manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

75. The Panel has documented similar inertial navigation systems found in: (a) the debris of the Borkan-2H launched on 25 March and 11 April 2018 against Saudi Arabia; (b) the debris of the Borkan-3 launched on 17 January 2022 against the United Arab Emirates; and (c) the debris of one of the Iranian Qiam (S/2018/594, para. 90) launched on 8 January 2020 against a United States base located in Erbil, northern Iraq (see annexes 30–37). The last was claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

76. The technical characteristics of the components seized by the United Kingdom are similar to those of the Rezvan medium-range ballistic missile, which belongs to the Qiam series produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5. Seizures by the Government of Yemen

(a) Electric detonators and detonating cord

77. On 13 August 2020, 40,000 electric detonators and 100 reels of detonating cord were reportedly seized by the Amaliqah Brigades on the coast, close to Ra’s al-Arah, Lahij Governorate, where they were being offloaded from an unidentified boat. A sticker affixed on a crate shows the consignee as Wahah Trading Company, located in Djibouti (see annex 38). The Panel is investigating the case to identify the producer of these items and their final destination.

78. According to a Panel source, similar detonating cords manufactured in June 2020 were observed in the black market in Houthi-controlled areas in December 2021.

(b) Non-electric detonators

79. On 24 April 2021, a truck transporting 1.5 million non-electric detonators was reportedly intercepted by the Amaliqah Brigades in Ta’izz Governorate (see annex 39).

80. The marking visible on one of the crates indicates 27 February 2021 as the date of manufacture and Gulf Oil Corporation Limited, a company registered in India, as the producer. On a sticker affixed to the crate, Wahah Trading Company is mentioned as the consignee (see para. 77).

81. The Panel observed that, between 9 March and 25 October 2021, Wahah Trading Company received four other shipments for a total of 225 tons of chemical products

76 Also designated EOSS-I-103.
77 The components seized are sufficient for at least four medium-range ballistic missiles.
78 The characteristics of Borkan-2H are similar to those of Qiam-1, produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
79 The characteristics of Borkan-3 are similar to those of Qiam-2, produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
80 This attack was part of the military operation code named Operation Martyr Soleimani, conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (see https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/2988080/).
82 See https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2022/09/22/Iran-unveils-new-medium-range-ballistic-missile-during-parade-State-TV-.
83 Each reel is made of 250 m of detonating cord.
84 Wahah Trading Company does not have a website and has virtually no online presence.
85 Detonating cords exported by Gulf Oil Corporation Limited were documented by Conflict Armament Research in 2015 (see https://www.conflictarm.com/reports/weapons-of-the-islamic-state/).
86 The Panel is currently examining the elements provided by India in its response.
identified as potential components for the preparation of explosives and/or missile propellant. The Panel is investigating if this material has been transferred to the Houthis in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

82. Djibouti did not respond to the request of the Panel to provide information on Wahah Trading Company.

83. The Panel notes that non-electric detonators with similar characteristics are largely used by the Houthis in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices and landmines of various models. According to Panel sources, there are reportedly more than 2.5 million improvised explosive devices and anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines that have been planted by the Houthis, mainly on the front lines. The Panel was not able to independently verify these data. Nevertheless, considering an average of 5 kg of explosive chemical material required to manufacture one device planted by the Houthis, the Panel estimates that around 12,500 tons of such explosive chemical material would have been acquired by the Houthis in violation of the targeted arms embargo.

84. According to an analyst specializing in landmines, a large number of those planted by the Houthis since 2018 were manufactured locally by them.

(c) Explosive precursor chemicals

85. Based on the investigation report shared by the Security Belt Forces, nearly 5 tons of chemical products, namely aluminium powder, iron oxide powder, rice glue powder and phenolic resin, as well machine gun spare parts, drones, optics and machinery suspected to be used in the production of weapons, were seized by the Security Belt Forces in Aden on 17 and 22 February 2023 in the Burayqah district of Aden, after they were imported from a Chinese company through Aden’s container port. The material was being transported in two shipping containers and arrangements were made for the consignment to be collected in Aden by three drivers from north Yemen. According to the Security Belt Forces, the material was destined to the Houthis (see annexes 40 and 41).

86. The Panel noted that this shipment of aluminium powder was described as “flower gum” by the exporter, which raises the likelihood that this consignment was most probably imported for illicit purposes. Finely powdered aluminium can be used as a precursor for homemade explosives, and the Houthis are known to have utilized ammonium nitrate aluminium explosives and aluminium chlorates explosives in their improvised devices. In addition, aluminium powder can be mixed with ammonium perchlorate to produce a powerful rocket fuel. The Panel documented an attempt to smuggle ammonium perchlorate into Yemen, which was interdicted in the Gulf of Oman on 7 November 2022 (S/2023/130, para. 48). The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

(d) Two diver propulsion vehicles

87. In November 2022, two diver propulsion vehicles with markings consistent with those manufactured by Bonex GmbH, a company located in Germany, and those of model Constellation HP, were found in Ataq by the Coalition forces, shortly after a failed uncrewed aerial vehicle attack by the Houthis on the oil port of Qanah,

87 Some of the anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines were seized by the Houthis in 2014–2015 from the stockpiles of the Government of Yemen.
88 After the seizure of the materials and detention of the drivers, text messages from the owner of the importing company were found on a mobile phone belonging to one driver, asking if the aluminium powder was cleared by customs as “flower gum”, as described in the export invoice.
89 Presented by the producer as military material (see http://www.military-dpv.de).
Shabwah Governorate (S/2023/130, paras. 23 and 24 and annex 6) (see annex 42). Following the seizure, the material was reportedly destroyed at the request of the Government of Yemen.

88. According to a source, diver propulsion vehicles operated by the Houthis’ naval commando unit were reported in the region of Hudaydah.

89. The Panel notes that the documented diver propulsion vehicles are similar to those exhibited in early March 2023 during a military display held in the region of Arvand Kenar, Khuzestan Province, Islamic Republic of Iran (see annex 43).

90. Bonex did not respond to the Panel’s request, and German authorities requested that the Panel give more time to investigate this matter.

(e) One hundred uncrewed aerial vehicle engines

91. On 31 December 2022, a truck entering Yemen through the Shahn border crossing from Oman was intercepted by Yemeni customs. According to Yemeni authorities, the truck was in violation of the legal entry regulations and the driver failed to provide the required documents for the shipment. The driver managed to escape. The importer, who was questioned by Yemeni customs, claimed that the truck was carrying a shipment of clothes.

92. According to documents available to the Panel, the shipment contained 100 DLE 170 uncrewed aerial vehicle engines (S/2023/130, annex 5, figure 5.26, S/2021/79, annex 12, figure 12.3, S/2020/326, para. 62, and S/2019/83, para. 85 and annex 12) with similar characteristics to those manufactured in China (see annexes 44–47).90

93. The Panel observes that DLE 170 engines have been mounted on the Samad-3 attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (S/2023/130, annex 5, figure 5.26) operated by the Houthis. Considering the number of drone engines seized, it cannot be ruled out that the Houthis are reinforcing their uncrewed aerial vehicle attack capabilities.

(f) Various material (see annexes 48–50)

94. In August 2023, the Security Belt Forces informed the Panel that they recently seized a shipment of 30 pistols in Aden.

95. The Yemeni customs authorities informed the Panel that, on 12 March 2023, they seized 54 uncrewed aerial vehicles at the Shahn border crossing. On 22 March 2023, at the Shahn border post, 2,990 tactical belts were seized. Furthermore, on 21 May 2023, 5,175 pistol holsters, 1,232 pairs of tactical gloves and 498 night vision binoculars were seized at the same border crossing. They also informed the Panel that a shipment of 40 pistol boxes with the Glock GmbH factory logo of an unspecified model was seized on 23 June 2023 at the Shahn border crossing.

96. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel of the seizure in February 2023, in Aden Governorate, of 200 drones equipped with surveillance cameras, 4 anti-tank guided missile launching posts and 15 associated missiles, as well as 200 oxygen cylinders for scuba divers and naval communication equipment.

97. On 31 August 2023, the Houthi commander of the Coastal Defence Brigade allegedly stated that the Houthis had developed their naval capabilities during the truce.91

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90 The model of these engines is similar to one of the models of Samad uncrewed aerial vehicles used by the Houthis (S/2023/130, annex 5, figure 5.26, S/2021/79, annex 12, figure 12.3, S/2020/326, para. 64, and S/2019/83, para. 87).

91 See https://twitter.com/ZiadAlyama6259/status/1697312341426049229.
98. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis are the end user of this material. The response of the Government of Yemen to the Panel’s requests for information and inspection of the seized material remains pending.

B. Documented missile attacks and uncrewed aerial vehicle reconnaissance on government-controlled areas

**Quds-2 cruise missile launched on Dabbah oil terminal**

99. On 21 November 2022, the oil terminal of Dabbah, Hadramawt Governorate, was attacked by a cruise missile (S/2023/130, para. 37, figure III and annex 9). This attack was later claimed by the Houthis (see annexes 51–53).

100. The Panel inspected the debris on 25 June 2023. The technical characteristics and markings are consistent with the Quds cruise missile\(^{92}\) documented by the Panel after the following attacks: on 14 September 2019 (S/2020/326, para. 54 and annex 14); on 23 November 2020 on the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) petroleum distribution facilities in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (S/2022/50, annex 16); on 17 January 2022 on the Abu Dhabi international airport and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company fuel depot, United Arab Emirates (S/2023/130, para. 17 and annex 5, figures 5.11–5.19); and on 28 January 2022 on a skiff seized by the United Kingdom reportedly moving at a very high speed from the Iranian coastline in the direction of Oman.

C. Large-scale display of military material by the Houthis

101. The Panel notes that, on 1 and 22 September 2022, the Houthis conducted large-scale military parades in Hudaydah\(^{93}\) and Sana’a\(^{94}\) (S/2023/130, annex 10).

102. According to the Government of Yemen, there were about 25,000 uniformed participants in these parades. It also observed that some of the material on display included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, electro-optical surveillance systems and small arms and light weapons that were not in the possession of the Armed Forces of the Government of Yemen prior to 2015. Of the 63 items being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo,\(^{95}\) only 12 have been previously documented (see annexes 54–74).

103. The Panel is investigating the capacity of the Houthis to develop, test, produce or reassemble, and operate the sophisticated materials displayed during the parades.

D. Black market

104. The Panel notes that various models of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence system and anti-tank guided missiles, are reportedly offered for sale in the black market, especially in the Houthi-controlled cities of Sana’a and Sa’dah (S/2015/125, paras. 148 and 149).

105. In the material reportedly offered for sale, the Panel finds Type 56-1 and AKS20U rifles (see paras. 68–73) with serial numbers consistent with those seized at

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\(^{92}\) Three models of this cruise missile have been successively developed: Quds 1, 2 and 3.

\(^{93}\) See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIj0vbK1tQ.

\(^{94}\) See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BygROPygG4.

\(^{95}\) Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) reportedly stated during the 1 September 2022 parade: “Our blessed army is true to its homeland, and work is under way on further developing the army” (see https://english.almanar.com.lb/1680318).
sea (see annexes 75 and 76). The Panel believes that there are other transfers of weapons that have not been interdicted by any of the relevant authorities, which reached Houthi-controlled areas.

106. The Panel considers that the unregulated sales of small arms and light weapons contribute to their proliferation in the subregion, which can undermine peace, security and stability in Yemen and beyond. Moreover, the nature of specific material such as man-portable air defence systems could generate the interest of armed groups, including terrorist groups, and consequently it presents a threat to civil aviation security. The Panel’s investigation is ongoing.

**Pistols belonging to the same batch documented in Yemen and Somalia**

107. The Panel notes that CF98-9 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China are also offered for sale in Houthi-controlled areas.96 The Panel observes that pistols with the same batch number have been documented by the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Panel of Experts on Somalia. For example, the Panel of Experts on Somalia documented the pistols used by the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe.001) in an assassination attempt in August 2019 (S/2019/858, annex 2.6, figure 6), belonging to the same batch as and bearing a serial number separated by 18 digits from another pistol documented by the Panel of Experts on Yemen (see annex 77). Five other CF98-9 pistols with serial numbers consistent with those mentioned above were also documented by researchers in Somalia in 2021. The Panel of Experts on Yemen believes the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and Somalia, receiving weapons from a common source.

**Smuggling of G3 assault rifles retrofitted in Yemen into Sudan**

108. The Panel observes that, since June 2023, multiple sources have been reporting about the presence in the hands of the Rapid Support Forces97 of G3, which are being retrofitted in Houthi-controlled areas, since mid-April 2023 (see annex 78). These are reportedly being used in the ongoing armed conflict in the Sudan. The Panel believes the existence of a closely coordinated smuggling network that operates between Yemen and the Sudan.

**VI. Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law**

109. Pursuant to paragraphs 9, 17, 18 and 21 of Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), read together with paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015) and paragraph 6 of resolution 2511 (2020), the Panel continued to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Yemen, including obstructions to the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

110. Civilians, including children, continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict and are exposed to major threats such as the widespread presence of explosive remnants of war, particularly landmines, strikes against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and the unregulated proliferation of weapons. Most violations investigated by the Panel during the reporting period are attributed to the Houthis.

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96 In July 2023, the price of a CF98-9 pistol was around $1,600 in Sana’a, which is about four to five times the average cost of this weapon in the regular market.

97 Paramilitary force operating in the Sudan (see S/2023/325).
A. Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure

111. Parties to the conflict continued to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian objects in violation of international humanitarian law.

112. Incidents investigated by the Panel include attacks that caused damage to civilian infrastructure and had an adverse impact on the daily life of people living in Yemen and on their access to basic services.

113. Despite the decrease in violence in several locations on the front lines since the truce agreement in April 2022, the number of civilian casualties remained high, owing notably to an increase in the casualties caused by explosive remnants of war.

1. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects

114. The Panel investigated numerous attacks allegedly perpetrated by various parties to the conflict. According to data accessed by the Panel, from December 2022 to 31 August 2023, there were 1,436 civilian casualties, of whom 253 were children, and 341 attacks on civilian infrastructure, mainly residential buildings and vehicles. Sa’dah Governorate saw the highest number of recorded civilian casualties each reporting month, except for July 2023, when most casualties were documented in Ta’izz Governorate.

115. Among the various incidents, there appears to be an increasing trend in targeting ambulances, including military ambulances, primarily by AQAP.

Figure V
AQAP attack on an ambulance on 5 May 2023 in Abyan Governorate that reportedly resulted in the death of the driver

Source: https://adnlng.info/news/213825/.

2. Civilian casualties from landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance

116. Civilians in Yemen continue to be exposed to threats related to landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance, which have caused many civilian casualties, particularly children. July 2023 saw the highest number of recorded child casualties as a result of explosive remnants of war (23, of whom 9 died) since the beginning of the year.

117. Between 1 December 2022 and 31 August 2023, incidents involving explosive remnants of war, including landmines and unexploded ordnance, resulted in 417

98 With an impact on 1,116 units.
99 See https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/.
100 Ibid.
civilian casualties, including 140 deaths and 277 injuries. Hudaydah, Jawf, Ma’rib and Ta’izz Governorates were among the most affected. For example, on 25 July an unexploded ordnance in Wadi Abidah, in Ma’rib district, exploded, killing a man, his wife, his mother, and five children. Two more children were injured in the blast.\footnote{Ibid.}

118. The Panel received reports on various locations in which mines and improvised explosive devices were concealed in rural villages to target returning populations after the Houthis left those areas. Typically, the Houthis position anti-personnel mines in and around schools, mosques, houses, including under mattresses, wells, and other water sources.

3. **Attacks on vulnerable groups, including religious minorities and migrants**

119. The Panel investigated cases of indiscriminate attacks perpetrated against minority groups. For example, on 25 May 2023, in Sana’a, Houthi forces abducted 17 people belonging to the Baha’i community, including 5 women, who were holding a meeting to elect their national governing body.\footnote{See https://www.bic.org/news/armed-houthis-attack-peaceful-bahai-gathering-arresting-least-17-fresh-crackdown.} The raid was videorecorded by one of the participants connected via Zoom.\footnote{See https://twitter.com/BahaiBIC/status/1661762453577822210.} Eleven of them are still detained, including two women.\footnote{See https://twitter.com/AmnestyMENA/status/1697897155598422468.}

120. Migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Yemen, particularly women and children, face systematic violations of their rights. The Panel received credible reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including rape, especially against Ethiopian migrants, perpetrated by smuggling gangs allegedly connected to some parties to the conflict. According to data shared with the Panel by the International Organization for Migration and government sources, there are an estimated 200,000 migrants in Yemen, including asylum-seekers and refugees, mostly Ethiopian (89 per cent) and Somali (see annex 79).\footnote{See https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-quarterly-migration-overview-january-march-2023.}

**B. Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance**

121. All parties to the conflict have arbitrarily detained or forcibly disappeared men, women and children, primarily for their perceived association with opposing parties, for counter-terrorism purposes, or for ransom. Civilians subjected to detention and enforced disappearance include, but are not limited to, human rights and civil society activists, national and international staff working for local and international organizations, and journalists. In some instances, the missing or detained men are often the sole breadwinners in their families and are perceived by their communities as regular Yemeni citizens with no political or military affiliation.

122. Panel investigations revealed that, in some cases where disappeared men were believed to be dead, their wives remarried and their inheritance was distributed among the descendants, so when the men were released, they had nothing left. This made their dreadful situation deteriorate further, leading some of them to commit suicide.

123. The Panel has also received reports of Houthis and government prisons’ staff preventing detainees from obtaining the humanitarian relief items provided to them by the relevant aid agencies. Instead, prison staff reportedly kept the goods for themselves.
1. **Torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment**

124. The Panel investigated several cases of men, women and children detained or forcibly disappeared who have been and continue to be subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

125. Based on the evidence gathered by the Panel, including medical reports, Houthi-held prisoners are subjected to systematic psychological and physical torture, including the denial of medical intervention to cure the injuries caused by the torture inflicted, which for some prisoners resulted in permanent disabilities and death. The Panel documented cases of torture perpetrated by the Houthis in various official and unofficial detention facilities, including in the prison located in the central security camp in Sana’a, also known as Exchange House prison, and operated by the head of the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs, Abdulqader Al-Murtada (see annex 80).

126. Women are held by the Houthis for various conflict-related reasons, including for their perceived affiliation with opposing parties to the conflict, their political affiliation, their involvement in civil society organizations or human rights activism, or for so-called “indecent acts”. Among them, two known Yemeni models were arbitrarily detained in February 2021 and sentenced in November of the same year to five years in prison. Women held by the Houthis are subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including by the Zaynabiyat. Women in detention are also sexually assaulted, in some cases subjected to virginity tests, and are often prevented from gaining access to essential goods, including feminine hygiene products. In August 2023, the Houthis referred the human rights activist Fatima al-Arouli, detained since August 2022, to their specialized criminal court.

127. The rulings delivered by the Houthi specialized criminal court, or other Houthi courts, are perceived as fatwas, so they carry judicial as well as religious weight which can have major long-term implications in the life of the people convicted, particularly concerning their safety once they are released.

128. Based on the reports received by the Panel, the Houthis are also detaining children as young as 13 years old. Some of them are considered “ethical cases” and are accused of “indecent acts” for their alleged homosexual orientation. Other children detained are considered “political cases”, often for their or their families’ lack of compliance with Houthi ideology or regulations (see para. 142). These children share the same cells as adult prisoners. The Panel received credible reports that boys held in Al-Shahid Al-Ahmar police station in Sana’a are systematically subjected to rape.

129. The Panel received multiple reports of torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by the Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces. The journalist Ahmed Maher (S/2023/130, para. 108) is still detained in Bi’r Ahmad prison, reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment (see annex 81). The Panel also gathered credible evidence that Southern Transitional Council-affiliated forces are systematically torturing men in official and secret prisons, including in Waddah (وضاح) secret prison in Aden Governorate, which reportedly resulted in the death of men whose whereabouts were and still are unknown.

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106 Intisar al-Hammadi and Yousra al-Nashiri.


108 Female police wing of the Houthis.

109 See [https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1690798702862929920](https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1690798702862929920).
130. The Panel also received reports of torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by government-affiliated forces, including against women detained in the political security prison in Ma‘rib, mainly for their perceived association with the Houthis. Upon her release, Samira Marsh (see para. 134), who reportedly belongs to the Muhamasheen minority,\(^{110}\) denounced the torture to which she was reportedly subjected while held in detention for about five years. The National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights\(^{111}\) is investigating these allegations.

131. AQAP continues to abduct and forcibly disappear Yemenis and foreigners and to deprive them of their liberty. In August 2023, four national staff and one international staff of the Department of Safety and Security were released after 18 months in captivity by the group (see para. 50), reportedly in terrible conditions. The whereabouts of most AQAP detainees remain unknown.

2. **Release of detainees in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement**

132. During the reporting period, the third round of prisoners exchange took place in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement.\(^{112}\)

133. In March 2023, the Coalition and the Houthis agreed to release 887 prisoners during a three-day period.\(^{113}\) From 14 to 16 April 2023, the Coalition released 706 prisoners in exchange for 181 released by the Houthis. Among the prisoners released by the Houthis, there reportedly were 16 Saudi and three Sudanese soldiers, while the remainder were primarily civilians, who were treated as prisoners of war.

134. Only one woman, who was detained for her alleged association with the Houthis and her involvement in mobilizing other women to join the de facto authority, was among the released prisoners (see para. 130). Several high-profile detainees were released by the Houthis, including the brother of the former President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and the son of Tariq Saleh. The four journalists detained by the de facto authority since June 2015 and sentenced to death by Houthi-appointed Judge Mohamed Mufleh in the Houthi specialized criminal court in October 2020\(^{114}\) were also included in the exchange following extensive negotiations that lasted years.\(^{115}\)

C. **Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence**

135. The Panel documented cases of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by parties to the conflict in Yemen, including cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence against men, women and children, which remained severely underreported, owing mainly to the stigma associated with these violations. The Panel received reports of sexual violence against men and women in detention facilities, primarily as a means of torture and attributed mostly to the Houthis. Several cases of sexual violence perpetrated against young boys in detention facilities or police stations by the Houthis were also reported to the Panel (see paras. 128 and 145). Rape is also systematically perpetrated by trafficking gangs affiliated with some parties to the conflict against migrants, including asylum-seekers and refugees mainly from the Horn of Africa (see annex 79).

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\(^{111}\) See [https://www.nciye.org/en/?page_id=105](https://www.nciye.org/en/?page_id=105).


\(^{114}\) S/2021/79, annex 27.

136. The Panel gathered evidence on the challenges that women and girls are facing as a result of the conflict, including the establishment or enforcement of ad hoc regulations or measures imposed by some of the parties to the conflict.

137. The Panel received numerous reports of women prevented from travelling in Houthi-controlled areas, including to receive medical treatment abroad, in the absence of a mahram. In some situations, despite having the required alternative certifications signed by their mahram or relevant sheikh in accordance with current regulations, women and girls were still not allowed to travel. In some instances, in the absence of adult male guardians, women must travel with the closest male relatives, including very young boys. Women human rights activists, or those with a perceived affiliation to an opposing political party, are detained by the Houthis for long periods and often forced to pay a fine or sign documents pledging adherence to the newly imposed restrictions.

138. The humanitarian operations conducted by the United Nations and the non-governmental organizations in Yemen have been severely hampered by the Houthi-enforced mahram regulations. This resulted in a change in the terms of reference of female staff, who are now dedicated mainly to office work (see para. 148).

139. The mahram requirement is strictly enforced in Houthi-controlled areas, and particularly in the Governorates of Amran, Hajjah, Hudaydah and Sa’dah. Nevertheless, it has reportedly become an anecdotal requirement for travels in some particularly conservative areas under government control, specifically in Abyan and Lahij Governorates.

140. Another increasing trend is the gender segregation and other limitative measures imposed by the Houthis in public spaces, including in universities (see annex 82). The Sana’a University Faculty of Mass Communication was among the first targeted, through the circular issued by the Houthi-affiliated University Student Forum in July 2023, which announced that male and female students would attend classes during separate days of the week (see annex 83). The Panel believes that these directives, together with others targeting younger students, are part of a broader conflict-related campaign that is severely undermining women and girls in Yemen.

141. The Panel gathered numerous pieces of evidence of the use of public defamation, usually involving allegations of prostitution, against Yemeni women, including diaspora women. Women currently or previously engaged in politics, civil society organizations or human rights activism also receive personal threats, including death threats, and threats against their family members. This type of violence, which includes online harassment through social media, has a severe negative impact on these women, particularly given the conservative nature of Yemeni society (see annex 84). Most of these cases were attributed to the Houthis.

D. Violations of children’s rights

142. The Panel documented a broad spectrum of conflict-related violations of children’s rights perpetrated by parties to the conflict, which are particularly concerning, given the indelible impact of these violations on the future Yemeni generations. In particular, the changes in the education curriculum recently undertaken and the systematic campaign of indoctrination to ensure the population’s adherence to the Houthi ideology are fuelling an environment founded on hatred,

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117 See also S/2023/130, paras. 95–98, S/2022/50, paras. 42, 43 and 123 and annex 10, and S/2020/326, para. 120.
violence and discrimination, with a core military component, all of which are severely undermining peace, security and stability in Yemen (see annex 85).

Figure VI
Young girl holding a baby girl wearing a headband saying, “Who loves you is a believer, and who hates you is a hypocrite”, with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”, during a religious festivity in Hajjah Governorate

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235831/.

Recruitment and use of children

143. The Panel verified an increasing trend in children being subjected to military propaganda and training, particularly in the context of the summer camps, which in 2023 reportedly involved more than 1 million Yemeni children living in Houthi-controlled areas.118 While positive steps were allegedly taken by the Houthis upon the signature of an action plan with the United Nations in April 2022 to end and prevent this violation, the evidence gathered shows the opposite trend.119

144. The summer camps in Houthi-controlled areas took place between May and June 2023 in nine governorates120 under three modalities: (a) open summer camps, for boys and girls between 6 and 12 years old;121 (b) model summer camps, for boys and girls between 6 and 17 years old;122 and (c) closed (residential) summer camps, where boys between 13 and 17 years old spend between 30 and 45 days without returning home. Only teachers are allowed to gain access to the residential centres, where military training is reportedly taking place. The Panel documented that children as young as 10 years old are exposed to military training. The Houthis are also giving monetary incentives to promote a higher attendance rate in the summer camps, by waiving the registration fees for the next school year (see annex 86).

145. Children are often recruited through coercion and threats to their families. Credible reports received by the Panel indicate that families living in Houthi-controlled areas that refuse to send their children to join Houthi forces or that are openly not aligned with Houthi ideology are subjected to retribution. These include the removal of the family from the lists of beneficiaries entitled to humanitarian assistance, and the abduction and detention of the concerned children, who are subjected to various forms of ill-treatment, including sexual violence (see para. 135). In other cases, children are forcibly taken to the closed summer camps and subsequently sent to the front lines.

118 The Houthis claimed that more than 700,000 children attended the summer camps in 2022, while in 2023 they were aiming to enrol 1.5 million children (see https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3236884.htm?file_id=1).
119 Including Houthi-owned media platforms.
120 Sa’dah, Amran, Raymah, Hajjah, Ibb, Dali’, Ma’rib, Bayda’ and Jawf.
121 From first to seventh grade of primary school.
122 Primary and secondary school.
E. Obstruction of delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance

146. The humanitarian situation in Yemen is extremely dire as a result of more than eight years of protracted conflict. The humanitarian response continues to be severely underfunded, depriving thousands of people of vital humanitarian assistance.

147. There has been a notable increase in disinformation against humanitarian workers, which further hampered their operations. The ongoing spread of unfounded rumours on the effectiveness of vaccines, and various operational impediments, continued in Houthi-controlled areas. This had a negative impact on children’s timely access to vaccines for preventable diseases such as poliomyelitis, measles, tetanus and diphtheria.123

148. *Mahram*-related movement restrictions on female national staff have severely affected their ability to deliver the necessary services for women and girls, especially reproductive health services (see para. 137). These limitations are also affecting male humanitarian workers as a result of delays at checkpoints or other bureaucratic impediments.

149. The limited flights to and from Sana’a airport hindered people living in Houthi-controlled areas from receiving medical treatment abroad.

150. Funding shortages are having an adverse impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In particular, the recent decision of the World Food Programme to initially interrupt the malnutrition prevention activities as of August 2023, and the subsequent decision to further cut its funding,124 is of major concern as people in Yemen, especially children in severe acute malnutrition state, are fully relying on international humanitarian aid for their survival.

151. Interference in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and obstructions imposed by some parties to the conflict continue. The Panel received some reports of delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance caused by bureaucratic hurdles imposed by the Government of Yemen, as well as multiple reports on the collection of illegal fees125 from convoys transporting humanitarian items at checkpoints by the Houthis and other armed groups. Prolonged delays imposed by the Houthis in the delivery of humanitarian goods reportedly resulted in the delivery of expired food and medicines to the population.

152. The Panel received multiple reports of diversion of humanitarian funding and relief items being sold, including in detention facilities, by the Houthis, as well as the removal of beneficiaries from the lists of beneficiaries by the de facto authority due to opposing political affiliations or to their refusal to abide by imposed regulations.

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123 See https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-bulletin-7-june-2023-enar.
125 S/2023/130, para. 60.
VII. Economic and financial issues

A. Economic issues posing a potential threat to peace, security and stability

1. Overview

153. The economic issues plaguing Yemen are now so closely intertwined with the broader political and conflict situation that they can no longer be seen as being “economic” in nature alone; rather, they are issues posing a grave threat to the peace, security and stability of Yemen. The continuing conflict and the fragmented macro- and microeconomic policy responses by authorities have aggravated the already fragile economic situation. Despite economic issues being a key theme in political and diplomatic dialogues over the past few months, failure to find a common ground stalled the peace talks.

154. The continuing deterioration of the economic situation in the government-controlled areas, including high rates of inflation, depreciation of the Yemeni rial, and poor public service delivery, especially for electricity, has been exploited by political parties in the south. Economic issues have consequently assumed political dimensions, resulting in civil unrest in several cities. These issues also sharply divided the north and the south, leading to a resurgence of a political movement demanding equity, fair play and justice for individuals residing in government-controlled areas. The separatist and secessionist tendencies seem to be innate in these political outbursts, influenced by the learnings from the past and the desire to achieve self-determination for the south.

155. These contentious, unresolved economic concerns threaten not only the ongoing peace process but also the unity and integrity of Yemen.

2. Economic war

156. The Houthis appear to have deployed a calibrated set of coercive economic measures to incapacitate the Government of Yemen and prevent it from functioning as a Government. The Minister of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs of the Government of Yemen stated that the Houthis aimed to use “hunger as a weapon in their aggression”.

(a) Fragmentation of the banking and financial system

157. The takeover of the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a meant that the Houthis had access to massive deposits in the Central Bank and complete control over the banking sector. This triggered the establishment of a parallel central bank in Aden by the Government of Yemen. Over the years, in order for each to assert its authority over the other, the two adverse regulatory regimes have often issued contradictory directions with punitive implications for non-compliance (see annexes 87–89). This administrative bifurcation poses a major challenge to the economic stability of Yemen.

Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank – Aden

158. On 19 May 2021, the Houthis issued circular No. 70 (2021) directing exchange companies and institutions not to deal with the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank, operating in government-controlled areas (see annex 90). Subsequently, the Houthi-affiliated Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation issued circular No. 2084 warning...
international organizations and others not to deal with banks and exchange companies not authorized by the Central Bank of Yemen, Sana’a, including the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit bank, if they were to operate in Houthi-controlled areas without hurdles (ibid.).

159. The Panel received information from the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, and the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank that the latter had participated in the tender (request for proposal No. 100-14489) announced by the Social Fund for Development to provide emergency cash transfer services to low-income group families residing in government-controlled areas. However, the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank informed the Panel that, despite satisfying all the conditions of the request for proposal, it was declared ineligible and was prevented from participating in this humanitarian project on the grounds of its inclusion in the list of entities “sanctioned by the donor”. It contends that this denial of the tender was Houthi retribution against it for moving its head office to Aden in 2019 (see figure VII).
The Houthis challenged the monetary policy of the Government of Yemen by announcing the new series of currency notes issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, as counterfeit and prohibiting its circulation (S/2022/50, annex 26, paras. 10–12). This resulted in massive differences in exchange rates, uncontrollable inflation, and the weakening of the Yemeni rial in government-controlled areas (see figure VIII).
Figure VIII
Volatility of exchange rates and the impact of the ban on the Yemeni rial against the United States dollar


Prohibition of interest on banking and commercial transactions

161. In March 2023, the Houthis adopted a law on the prohibition of usurious transactions, which prohibited the payment of interest on deposits, treasury bills, government bonds and similar instruments or commercial transactions.

162. Yemen has been divided into two distinct currency, trading and economic zones (see annex 91).

(b) Control over international trade, customs and taxation

163. The Houthis exercised control over international trade and collected customs duties and other taxes at ports under their control. They resorted to double taxation, as customs duty was paid on the goods when imported through ports under the Government of Yemen. On 8 August 2023, the Houthis issued a circular on a “mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points”, assessing the customs duty rate at 50 per cent of the total customs value for all goods arriving at land customs points through land or sea crossings of “occupied areas” (see annex 92). The Houthis thus treat government-controlled areas as foreign territories for customs purposes and have effectively divided Yemen into two countries.

(c) Depriving the Government of Yemen of its revenue earnings

164. In addition, the Houthis have been denying the Government of Yemen of any opportunity to collect revenue.

Oil sector

165. This sector was the worst affected by the conflict (see annex 93). Before the conflict, oil revenues were estimated at $7.9 billion. In 2014, Yemen produced about 167,000 barrels per day, but between 2020 and 2022, production decreased to 50,000–60,000. 127

Attacks on Dabbah oil terminal

166. The non-renewal of the truce in October 2022 was followed by attacks on the Dabbah oil terminal. This resulted in the cessation of production and export of crude oil from the 14 Masilah, 10 East Shabwah, 51 East Hajar, 53 East Sir‘ and 9 Malik sectors.  

Every year, the Government of Yemen is losing about $1.2 billion in revenue. Total crude oil revenue in 2021 was $993 million, and in 2022 (up to November) $980 million. Considering the cost of repairs and replacement of equipment and facilities at the Dabbah oil terminal, the loss of the Government of Yemen would total about $2 billion. The Government of Yemen is thus deprived of its major source of foreign exchange, critical for importing essential food items and fuel for the generation of electricity. Moreover, this has undermined the ability of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, to intervene and arrest the decline of the Yemeni rial.

Attacks near Yemen liquefied natural gas project in Balhaf

167. The Yemen liquefied natural gas project in Balhaf was the country’s largest ever industrial investment, totalling about $4.5 billion, with the aim of exporting 6.7 million tons of liquefied natural gas annually for at least 20 years. However, owing to the conflict, in 2015 its operations were halted. The pipeline feeding the gas terminal was reportedly targeted several times by AQAP. On 5 August 2023, rockets were reportedly fired towards the military base near the Yemen liquefied natural gas site (see para. 62). According to the company, “as a consequence of the current security situation, Yemen LNG remains in force majeure and the plant remains in a preservation mode”.

International trade: diverting imports from Aden to Hudaydah

168. In April 2022, import of fuel and other fuel derivatives was allowed through Hudaydah port. From 7 February 2023, the Houthis secured permission to import all types of goods, excluding the prohibited cargo, through their ports. With the increase in imports through Hudaydah, the Houthis earned about $4 million from maritime services from January to July 2023. This is projected to rise to $7 million by December 2023.

169. The Panel received information that those importing goods through the port of Aden are being forced by the Houthis to sign an undertaking that they would import through the port of Hudaydah, failing which punitive action would be taken against them. The traders were warned that, from the date of the message, no goods that have been shipped through the port of Aden would be allowed to enter Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis recommend a specific international shipping company, Saba, by Mahir and Saddam al-Sharafi, to the traders, who would ship any container from anywhere in the world to Hudaydah at the same price as shipments to Aden (see annex 94).

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128 Government of Yemen sources.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, sources.
132 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_LNG.
133 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-emirates-idUSKBNAJ2UW.
135 Government of Yemen sources.
170. This shift in imports from Aden to Hudaydah resulted in a massive loss of revenue of YRs 637.36 billion for the Government of Yemen from April 2022 to June 2023,\textsuperscript{136} with a consequential gain for the Houthis.

Domestic trade between North and South: prohibition on purchase of cooking gas and other items from government-controlled areas

171. In March 2023, the Houthis stopped buying cooking gas from the Government of Yemen, which constituted about 60 per cent of cooking gas produced in Ma’rib. Trucks from government-controlled areas carrying cement, steel, wood and clinkers were not allowed to enter Houthi areas. The Houthis started importing all these items through Hudaydah and Ra’s Isa ports, thereby making them less dependent on the Government of Yemen for these supplies. In contrast to the import of 52,819.4 tons of liquefied petroleum gas in 2022, the import sharply rose to 234,649.7 tons up to July 2023, an increase of 444 per cent over 2022.\textsuperscript{137} The imports from April to July 2023 alone amounted to 216,072.6 tons, or 92 per cent of the total imports up to July 2023.\textsuperscript{138}

172. The quantity of production, which was about 60–70 trailers per day, has decreased to 25–40 trailers per day. Cooking gas sold to Houthi-controlled areas during the first quarter of 2023 amounted to 70,367.38 tons, which decreased to 38,380.65 tons in the second quarter, a reduction of 31,986.73 tons (45 per cent) and a revenue loss of YRs 7.8 billion. The total loss of revenue is estimated by the Government of Yemen at YRs 64 billion annually.\textsuperscript{139}

(d) Blockage of main roads

173. The conflict has taken a major toll on the main arterial roads and bridges, which have been extensively damaged. Restrictions and illegal collection of fees on the main inter-governorate roads by the Houthis and at the checkpoints by various armed groups in government-controlled areas have severely affected the movement of goods and persons, further restricting domestic trade. The siege of Ta’izz doubled the transportation costs of basic goods.\textsuperscript{140} The worst hit are the main highways connecting the major cities in the north and south, namely the N1 route (connecting Ta’izz, Ibb, Dhamar and Sana’a with Aden). The Houthis have blocked the 6 km-long road between Ta’izz and Hawban, a major economic centre, forcing people to detour 100 km. Not only does it take many days to transport goods from Aden to Ta’izz on the alternate 128 km-long Aden-Rahidah route, but the cost of transportation also nearly doubles, becoming highly prohibitive. Similarly, since the 160 km-long important commercial road connecting Sana’a with Ma’rib has been closed for security reasons, individuals travel an additional 400 km through Bayda’. Others also travel along treacherous desert routes through Ma’rib and Jawf.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{137} Based on United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism data.
\textsuperscript{138} Based on United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism data.
\textsuperscript{139} Government of Yemen sources.
\textsuperscript{140} See https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050923091537357/pdf/P17826203eb7ac0030b5540af4456d0dd7c.pdf.
Map 5

Blocked roads in Yemen

Source: Government of Yemen.

B. Financial resources of designated individuals and their networks

174. Individuals designated under the sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), those acting on their behalf or at their direction, and the entities owned or controlled by them continue to receive, own or control, directly or indirectly, funds, other financial assets, and economic resources. Flush with funds, the Houthis have become economically superior, there being a reversal in the economic power balance in the past few months in favour of the Houthis. The impact of the financial sanctions on these individuals has been limited.

Printing of currency notes, financial stamps and passports

175. The Panel received several allegations of printing and use of counterfeit currencies by the Houthis to meet its funding requirements. For example, on 28 August 2023, the Embassy of Yemen in Beijing received a request from a banknote paper company in China enquiring about one Yemeni national who reportedly approached them regarding printing of banknotes, financial stamps and passports. The Panel received copies of the relevant documents, including the passport of the concerned person and a letter dated 26 March 2023 from the Director General of the Department of Passport and Citizenship of the Ministry of the Interior of Yemen requesting that purchase of security paper and ink be facilitated. The Panel’s investigations revealed that the person did not represent the Government of Yemen and that his passport, shown to have been issued on 19 March 2023, had not been issued by the Government of Yemen.

176. The Panel does not rule out the possibility of the issuance of the aforesaid passport by the Houthi-appointed authority and the use of counterfeit currencies and passports in Yemen in the past.\(^{141}\) The Panel is investigating this matter.

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Figure IX

*English translation of the letter from the Ambassador of Yemen to China to Banknote Paper Co.*

Embassy of the Republic of Yemen Beijing  
No.: 116/08/20  

To: [Name]

The Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Beijing presents its compliments to your company and has the honor to inform that based on the information received during your call on the morning of 28th Aug 2023, our Embassy confirmed that [Name] holding the passport [Number], who is currently dealing business with your company, does not represent the legitimate government of the Republic of Yemen and cannot deal with such sensitive and important business.

The Embassy request your company does not engage in business cooperation with the above-mentioned personnel, and do not cooperate with any person who have not been confirmed and approved by our Embassy in the future, our Embassy would be much appreciated.

The Embassy of the Republic of Yemen in Beijing avails itself of this opportunity to renew to your esteemed company the assurances of its highest consideration.

Fax: 010-65327997  
Tel: 010-65322315

Embassy of the Republic of Yemen to China  
Beijing,  
28 August, 2023

*Source: Confidential.*

**Taxes and fees**

177. The Houthis continue to collect illegal fees, zakat and *khums* (one-fifth) tax, indulge in black market operations, and resort to double taxation, extortion and confiscation of funds in the bank accounts and other assets of individuals and entities opposed to them to sustain their war efforts (S/2023/130, paras. 72–86 and annexes 22–26).

178. On 9 July 2023, while celebrating the Shia holiday *Eid al-Ghadir* in Sa’dah, as part of the activities during the day, women collected money to be sent to the combatants on the front lines.

Figure X

*Women in Sa’dah collecting money during a religious festivity*

*Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/*.
Income from the fuel sector

179. The Houthis have been generating significant revenue from the fuel sector. With the increase in imports of fuel through the Hudaydah port, the Houthis have now been receiving significant customs revenue from this sector.

Freezing of accounts of Yemenia (Yemen Airways) and others

180. The Panel received information that, on 8 March 2023, the Houthis froze funds in the three bank accounts of Yemenia in Sana’a, amounting to $80 million. With the additional funds that got credited to the airline’s bank accounts in Sana’a and the release of some funds, an amount of $78 million stood frozen as at 5 August 2023. The airline is also prohibited from using spare parts lying in its Sana’a maintenance hangar. The main objective was to compel Yemenia to increase the number of weekly flights between Sana’a and Amman from three to six and to fly hajj pilgrims to Jeddah. Yemenia operated 6 flights to Amman in July, 5 outbound flights to Jeddah in June and 12 inbound flights from Jeddah and Medina to Sana’a in July 2023. However, since funds were not released by the Houthis, Yemenia reduced the number of Amman flights to three per week. The Government of Yemen has ownership rights to 51 per cent of the airline,\(^{142}\) which could be another reason for the Houthis to target its civil aviation sector. The freezing of funds has affected the daily operations of the airline and delayed the purchase of new aircraft. This also has an impact on any plans for increasing air service from Sana’a to more destinations abroad, including for humanitarian purposes.

Figure XI
Letter dated 5 August 2023 from Yemenia

\(^{142}\) See https://yemenia.com/about.
181. The Houthis have also reportedly confiscated the assets of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sana’a. The Panel is currently investigating these matters.

Smuggling and trafficking of drugs, cultural objects and other items

182. The Panel received information about increasing incidents of smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs in Yemen and seizures of consignments by authorities in Yemen and interceptions of dhows carrying consignments of narcotics drugs by international naval forces. Between 2016 and 2021, the land area for growing khat (*Catha edulis*), a mild stimulant widely consumed across Yemen, increased by over 40 per cent.\(^{143}\) The Panel is currently investigating the reported involvement of the Houthis in increasing khat production and in the trafficking and smuggling of drugs to generate funds for its military activities.

183. The conflict in Yemen has left a great deal of the country’s heritage infrastructure in ruins. The Panel is currently investigating the scope of the destruction of heritage sites and the smuggling of antiques and antiquities.

C. Economic issues in government-controlled areas

Electricity crisis in Aden

184. From May to August 2023, electricity outages in Aden reportedly continued for over 15 hours per day owing to shortages of fuel for power plants. The Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, informed the Panel that the Saudi oil grant of $170 million was used between November 2022 and March 2023 and that thereafter the Government of

\(^{143}\) See https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099050923091537357/pdf/P17826203eb7ac0030b5540af4456d0dd7c.pdf.
Yemen pays for the fuel. Protests and civil unrest were reported in many areas under government control against deteriorating public services, with the Government of Yemen being accused of inability to address these issues (see annex 95).  

185. In June 2023, to draw the attention of the Government of Yemen to these problems, the Governor of Aden announced that customs and tax revenues collected from the port of Aden and the Aden Free Zone would not be deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. On 12 June, the employees of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, were prevented from moving money from the ports to the vaults of the Central Bank. However, the matter was resolved, and on 19 June 2023, money was deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden.

D. Inspection of cargo

186. The vessels going to the Houthi-controlled ports were subject to inspection by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism in Djibouti in accordance with resolution 2216 (2015) and by the Coalition, a joint exercise of the evaluation and humanitarian operations cell and the Government of Yemen, in the Coalition holding area. Since February 2023, all types of restrictions on the import of goods, except prohibited goods, through the Red Sea ports, including inspections by the Coalition in the Coalition holding area, have been suspended.

187. The inspection system of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, however, continues as before, although it has to handle more vessels now, especially container vessels. In contrast to cargo being imported in 265 containers in August 2020, the number of containers at the end of July 2023 reached 3,511, with an increase in the weight of cargo from 5,939 tons to 109,829 tons, registering a record growth of 1,325 per cent and 1,849 per cent in the number of containers and weight of cargo, respectively.

Growth in container cargo imported through Houthi-controlled ports, 2020–2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of containers discharged</th>
<th>Total weight of cargo discharged (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>5,939.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2020</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>12,234.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2020</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>12,936.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2021</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>16,304.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2021</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>7,599.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2021</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>12,566.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2023</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>28,752.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2023</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>4,379.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2023</td>
<td>2,074</td>
<td>50,994.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2023</td>
<td>3,511</td>
<td>109,829.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,932</td>
<td>261,535.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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144 Central Bank of Yemen, Aden.
188. As regards inspection by the Coalition, in March 2023, in order to accelerate the movement of cargo and to support the peace process and the talks, the evaluation and humanitarian operations cell had allowed vessels from Jizan and Jeddah ports in Saudi Arabia to go directly to Hudaydah port. The Panel learned that this has been withdrawn and that the Coalition and government officials carry out inspections in Djibouti alongside the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism and also subject some containers to screening.

189. The effectiveness of the inspection system in ensuring compliance with resolution 2216 (2015) assumes importance, given the significant increase in the number of vessels and types of cargo. The United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism is reportedly facing severe funding and human resource constraints. As a result, the Mechanism could not share critical information with the Panel for its investigations and analysis. A robust, risk-based and automated cargo profiling-cum-inspection system helps in facilitating clearance of bona fide humanitarian and commercial cargo and targeting smuggling of prohibited goods.

E. Monitoring of asset freeze and travel ban measures

190. The Panel continues to monitor the implementation by Member States of the asset freeze and travel ban measures imposed in paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), respectively, in relation to the designated individuals.

VIII. Recommendations

191. The Panel recommends that the Security Council:

   (a) Encourage parties to the conflict and other relevant stakeholders, including international mediators, to include in the peace process measures that would:

      (i) Help to stabilize the current informal truce and prevent any reversion to military confrontation, with the aim of paving the way to a formal ceasefire;

      (ii) Formulate and implement incremental and reciprocal confidence-building measures, such as the release of children recruited and used by parties to the conflict and the release of conflict-related detainees, to be able to address complex issues such as payment of salaries, lifting of the siege on Ta’izz, and allowing the Government of Yemen to export oil;

      (iii) Ensure the participation of the Government of Yemen and all other Yemeni stakeholders;
(iv) Develop a common vision for the unity of Yemen encompassing an appropriate political and administrative set-up;

(v) Include transitional justice elements for the protection of children, and preserve freedom of expression;

(b) Condemn in the strongest terms all attacks targeted against civilians and civilian infrastructure, which are prohibited under international humanitarian law, and reaffirm the need for the parties to the conflict to comply with their obligations under international law;

(c) Consider establishing a monitoring unit within the relevant United Nations entity to closely monitor violations of the targeted arms embargo and to reinforce the capacity of the Government of Yemen to counter the illicit flow of arms, ammunition and related material;

(d) Call upon the Government of Yemen and the Coalition to establish a joint mechanism for collecting debris of weapons, including uncrewed aerial vehicles used by the Houthis or AQAP in their attacks, and the material seized and ensuring proper documentation, forensic analysis and storage while maintaining the chain of custody;

(e) Call upon the parties to the conflict to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines and remove existing landmines from civilian areas under their control and encourage Member States to enhance their support for humanitarian demining efforts in Yemen, including through the provision of specialists, equipment and adequate funding, with appropriate safeguards to prevent any misuse;

(f) Call upon Member States to support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Maritime Crime Programme to enhance the capacity of the Yemeni Coast Guard to interdict smuggling of weapons, drugs and other contraband items, rescue and recovery of migrants and others, as well as search and rescue of vessels in distress, including Yemeni fishing vessels;

(g) Call upon relevant United Nations entities and regional government authorities to strengthen the existing coordination mechanisms to monitor and address the issues associated with the smuggling and trafficking of human beings from the Horn of Africa to Yemen by entities connected with parties to the conflict;

(h) Call upon all parties to the conflict to immediately end torture and other forms of ill-treatment and inhuman or degrading punishment against prisoners and end the arbitrary detention of civilians for their perceived affiliation with opposing parties to the conflict, ensuring due process and a fair trial;

(i) Call upon all parties to ensure freedom of expression and freedom of the media, not subjecting journalists, human rights activists and civil society activists to arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment;

(j) Call upon all parties to the conflict to immediately end the unlawful practice of enforced disappearance and inform relevant family members of the abductees’ whereabouts and reasons for detention;

(k) Encourage the Government of Yemen to become party to the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance;

(l) Call upon all parties to the conflict to prioritize the release of children, women, elderly and critically ill detainees in the context of the exchange of prisoners conducted in the framework of the Stockholm Agreement;

(m) Call upon the Houthis to comply with its obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, particularly the Convention on

(i) Immediately ending the recruitment and use of children below 18 years old, including the ongoing military indoctrination in the summer camps;

(ii) Stopping the revision of Yemeni national education material, which violates the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the content of the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and to work in partnership with the relevant United Nations entities to ensure that school textbooks fully reflect the principles of non-discrimination and promote peace, tolerance, equality and respect for other civilizations;

(n) Call upon all parties to fulfil their obligation to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for all people in need and, in this context, call upon the Houthis to lift the mahram requirement for female aid workers to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance, including basic health care and reproductive health services to women and girls, and not to prevent necessary movements of those seeking medical assistance abroad and of those who are the breadwinners in their families;

(o) Call upon the donor community to put in place a robust mechanism to ensure that the people in need receive the humanitarian assistance to which they are entitled, and prevent any diversion of humanitarian funding, as well as food and core relief items;

(p) Encourage Member States to enhance their support to the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights of Yemen and call upon parties to the conflict to collaborate with the Commission;

(q) Establish an independent international accountability mechanism for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Yemen and provide redress and support to the victims and their families, including families of those who have been killed as a result of such violations;

(r) Consider encouraging parties to the conflict and international mediators to urgently set up an economic committee comprising representatives from all the stakeholders to prepare a framework for solving the contentious economic issues within a specified time frame;

(s) Call upon the Houthis to refrain from, arbitrarily and with the use of force, confiscating lands, buildings and other properties of individuals and entities, without following due process of law, and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who undertake such acts;

(t) Call upon the Houthis to take measures to channel the revenue of the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’s Isa to the Central Bank of Yemen as a contribution to the payment of salaries in the Governorate of Hudaydah and throughout Yemen, in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement.

192. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider:

(a) Encouraging Member States to increase the allocation of humanitarian funding for Yemen;

(b) Issuing a press release condemning the torture and ill-treatment against prisoners held by parties to the conflict and calling upon them to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
(c) Inviting the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights to brief the Committee on its operations and on the findings of its investigations;

(d) Strengthening the existing cargo profiling and inspection system with a robust, risk-based and automated system that would help in facilitating clearance of bona fide humanitarian and commercial cargo and targeting smuggling of prohibited goods.
Annexes to the Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)
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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.

2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.

4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.

5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel’s findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.
Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.

2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
   (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
   (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
       (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
       (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
       (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
       (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
       (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

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145 Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.
Appendix B  Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, (S/2006/997), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

(a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

(b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

   (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;

   (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

   (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;

   (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:

      a) In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and

      b) The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.

   (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;

   (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;

   (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;

   (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;
(ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

(i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;

(iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;

(v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;

(vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;

(vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;

(viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;

(ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings;

(xi) Detainees do not always have access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture;

(xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement, human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

(i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;

(ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

(iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;

(iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;

(v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.
(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

(i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;

(ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;

(iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

(g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel’s sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.

(h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.
Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map
Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 31 August 2023)

Table 3.1
Correspondence with Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</th>
<th>Number of letters where the deadline is after 31 August 2023</th>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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Table 3.2
Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<table>
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<th>Entity</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters by entity</th>
<th>Number of letters where the deadline is after 31 August 2023</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sana’a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
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### Table 3.3
**Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities**

<table>
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<th>Commercial Company/Government Entity</th>
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<th>Number of unanswered letters by commercial company</th>
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<td><strong>2</strong></td>
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Annex 4  Letter dated 1 August 2023 from the President of PLC to the Prime Minister

Source: Confidential
Appendix A

English translation of Letter dated 1 August 2023 from the President of PLC to the Prime Minister

Republic of Yemen
Office of the Presidency of the Republic

1 August 2023

Subject: Circular

With regard to the aforementioned subject, minister, governors, deputy ministers, under-secretaries and the heads of executive agencies are hereby notified that they must abide by the following:

1. Starting on 6 August 2023, they must be present in their places of work in the capital and in the governorates. Whosoever violates this instruction will be subject to legal measures. Those who have been tasked with official duties on the basis of a written authorization from a competent authority are exempt from this instruction.

2. All authorizations to expend sums from the State budget or the budgets of agencies are revoked. Expenditure authority is restricted to those who are legally authorized, ministers or their deputies, governors or their deputies, heads of agency or their deputies and representatives of the Ministry of Finance within the agencies.

3. In exceptional and justified cases, such authorization may be granted, with the approval of the Prime Minister, for a period not exceeding two weeks to the directors of the facility who are not consultants.

4. Decisions previously taken by the Presidential Leadership Council with regard to high-level appointments that were made by other than the legally mandated authority must be implemented faithfully.

5. The Central Bank must be informed regarding the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4. No requests for expenditure that are contrary thereto must be accepted.

6. The results must be reported to us one week from today’s date. The Civil Service Ministry and the Central Audit and Accounting Organization must monitor implementation of the present circular.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Yahya Muhammad al-Sha‘bi
Director, Office of the Presidency of the Republic

cc: Members of the Presidential Leadership Council

His Excellency Maeen Abdulmalek Saeed
Prime Minister
Annex 5: Houthi Parades and Exercises

Background

1. The Houthis held five military parades and four military exercises in Ibb, Dhamar, Al-Bayda’, Jawf, Ma’rib and Sa’dah.

Map 5

Houthi Parades and Military Exercises

Source: Panel

2. On 12 March 2023 the General Police Training Centre in Dhamar had a graduation parade for new trainees which reportedly included a thousand police personnel.146

146 https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/591332
3. On 8 May 2023, the Houthis’ 4th Military Region, held a live-fire exercise in Al-Bayda in an area of 100 square km. According to sources, the aim of the exercise was to raise combat readiness.\(^\text{147}\)

4. In June 2023, thousands of soldiers from the 4th Military Region moved on foot from Dhamar to Ibb Governorate.\(^\text{148}\)

5. On 22 June 2023, about 7,000 Houthi combatants from the 4th Military Region reportedly took part in a parade held in Ibb.\(^\text{149}\)

\(^{147}\) https://www.masirah.tv/post/232714.


6. On 10 July, the 3rd Military Region held a live-fire exercise in the Serwah district of Ma’rib province. An Mi-17 helicopter was also displayed at the exercise. Several senior Houthi military leaders attended the event.150

7. On 6 August, the Houthis held a graduation parade for the Republican Guard and Special Forces in the central military region in Ma’rib Governorate using live-fire. During the event, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Defence, Major-General Muhammad Nasser Al-Atifi, stated that the graduation of these forces represents a strong tributary to strengthening the military capabilities of Yemen, keeping pace with the requirements of the current situation, mostly dedicated to preparation and constant readiness to face all challenges. He indicated that the Houthi leadership and its forces are in the stage of de-escalation, and are ready for peace, while at the same time keeping the military option open. He stated that the Houthis are capable of imposing new rules of engagement with their enemy.151


Figure 5.4

Houthi parachuters during the Houthi graduation ceremony

Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1688292932955013121

8. On the same day, Mahdi al-Mashat, the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, announced that Gen. Ahmed Al-Hamzi (YEi.012), the commander of the Houthi Air Force and Air Defence Forces died from a previously sustained wound. According to a source, many died and were injured during a missile misfire incident at the parade in Ma’rib that day and that the commander’s death was connected to the incident.

\[152 \text{ https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1688163442417336320; } \text{https://www.arabnews.com/node/2350571/middle-east; } \text{https://www.sabanew.net/story/ar/100099.} \]
Annex 6: Attacks on Al-Kadaha Road, Ta’izz

Map 6

Attack on the convoy of Governor Nabil Shamsan on 25 March 2023

Source: Panel

1. On Sunday, 25 March 2023, at 7:20am the convoy of Ta’izz Governor Nabil Shamsan departed from the city of Al-Mukha. They were planning to join the convoy of the Minister of Defence in the Al-Kadaha area. They were travelling in an armoured Land Cruiser with distinctive plates via the Al-Mukha-Al-Kadaha road to Ta’izz city. When the convoy reached the Uqmah area in the Mawza’, district, the Governor’s car was attacked by either a missile or explosive-laden UAV which caused serious damage to the vehicle. The GoY claimed that it was a missile attack, and that the missile was launched from a location under the control of the Houthis in Jabal Al-Urf very close to the area they were travelling (map 6). After disembarking from the car, the Governor was ambushed and fired-on with mortar and machine gun fire. The Governor was evacuated via footpaths and wadis to an area out of gunfire range. He was taken to the December 2 Hospital in Al-Mukha for medical examination. This was one of three attacks recorded on the day.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{153} GoY source.
Figure 6.1.

**Damage to the car due to the attack of Ta'izz Governor Nabil Shamsan**

![Image of damaged car](image)

*Source: GoY*

2. On the same day, the convoy of the GoY Minister of Defence, Mohsen Al-Da’eri and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz’s was attacked on the Al-Mukha-Al-Waziyah road. The Minister of Defence continued his travel to Mayoun Island in the Bab-el-Mandab strait, located 70km south of Al-Mukha, for a field visit. No casualties were reported during the first two incidents.\(^{154}\)

3. The third incident on the same day was a UAV strike targeting a GoY military checkpoint on the same road, killing two soldiers.

4. On 4 May, the Houthis targeted the construction and asphalting equipment of the company involved in tarring the road with UAVs, damaging bulldozer and crawler excavator, and injuring three workers on the project.

\(^{154}\) GoY source (Minister of Defence Mohsen al-Da’eri).
Figure 6.2.

Attack against construction workers and equipment that took place on the road between Al-Kadaha and Ta’izz on 5 May 2023

Source: GoY

5. On 7 May, the vehicle in which Colonel Tawfiq Al-Waqar Jabari, former police chief of the Jabal Habashi district of Ta’izz, was targeted in a UAV attack on the Al-Kadaha-Ta’izz road between the areas of Al-Barh and Al-Kadaha. The Colonel was killed and two of his escorts were injured.155

155 https://republicanyemen.net/archives/33334
Annex 7: Maritime Security Incident involving the Bulk Carrier, Arietta

Background

1. On 17 March 2023, the Liberian-flagged Bulk Carrier, Arietta (IMO 9446403\textsuperscript{156}), came under fire from armed men in a skiff, 38 nautical miles (70 kilometres) south of the port of Hudaydah. The attackers did not approach but fired at the vessel from a distance of one nautical mile (nm). The onboard security team returned fire and the skiff turned away. The vessel was not using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC), as recommended, and was travelling to the east of the Hanish Islands as the captain was not aware of the security arrangement. The Panel assessed that the incident likely is not linked to piracy nor the armed conflict in Yemen.

Chart 7

AIS\textsuperscript{157} track of the Bulk Carrier, Arietta

\textsuperscript{156} The International Maritime Organization (IMO) ship identification number scheme was introduced in 1987 through the adoption of resolution A.600(15), as a measure aimed at enhancing maritime safety, and pollution prevention and to facilitate the prevention of maritime fraud. It aimed at assigning a permanent number to each ship for identification purposes.

\textsuperscript{157} Automatic identification systems (AIS) transponders are designed to be capable of providing position, identification, and other information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.

Figure 7

Damage to the Bulk Carrier, Arietta

Source: Confidential
Annex 8: Maritime Security Incident involving the Motor yacht 30 Minutes

Background

1. On 17 April 2023, the crew of motor yacht, 30 minutes (MMSI 262064900\(^{158}\)) underway to Djibouti left Jizan commercial port in KSA.\(^{159}\) They had a crew of three Russian and one Egyptian nationals. On 21 April 2023, the Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (JMRCC) received calls from the Russian Search and Rescue Centre and the agent of the Russian owner, that the owner lost contact with the yacht on 19 April 2023.\(^{160}\)

2. According to the crew, they left Jizan port and spent the night off a small island in KSA territorial waters. On 18 April, at around 4:00-5:00pm, while underway to Djibouti, the crew took shelter from heavy weather at an anchorage off Saba Island, a volcanic island in the Red Sea and part of the Zubair Island group in Yemeni territorial waters. The island is located approximately 44 nm (82km) WSW off Hudaydah. While they were there, they were approached by a grey coast guard type boat approximately 10m long with a weapon mounted on the front. They were shot at and hit once by a 12.7mm round. They were not sure if the shots came from the coast guard vessel or the land. They fled the area. According to them there were no radio warning prior to the shooting.\(^{161}\)

3. When the yacht reached Eritrean waters on 19 April, the crew and the yacht were detained by Eritrean authorities in Assab, after a bullet hole in the hull of the yacht caught the

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158 Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSIs) are nine-digit numbers used to uniquely identify a ship or a coast radio station.

159 Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (JMRCC), KSA.

160 KSA source.

161 Interview and correspondence with crew of yacht, 30 minutes.
authority’s attention. According to the crew, they were told by the Eritrean authorities that the Russian embassy would be contacted to verify their identities, and that the authorities would investigate whether the bullet hole was caused by an attack and identify those responsible. They were treated well by Eritrean authorities and were allowed to leave after a week.

4. The crew reached Djibouti on 27 April. According to the JMRCC, they received confirmation from both the owner and the Head of the Consular Section of the Russian Federation in KSA on 27 April that the yacht had arrived in Djibouti and that the crew was safe. In addition, the Jeddah Maritime Information Sharing Centre (JMISC) received a message from the Djibouti Navy via the MERCURY Maritime Security Community Information Exchange Platform informing them that the yacht had arrived in Djibouti on 27 April.162

Figure 8.

**Damage to the yacht 30 minutes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yacht 30 minutes in Djibouti Port</th>
<th>Damage by 12.7mm round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Yacht 30 minutes in Djibouti Port" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Damage by 12.7mm round" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Inside damage" /></td>
<td><img src="image4.png" alt="12.7mm round found" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Red Sea Up-down yachting service.

5. The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) has a station at the Zubair Islands. It is the procedure of YCG to first make radio contact before firing. The Panel is awaiting a detailed report from the YCG on the incident.

162 KSA source.
Annex 9: Maritime Security Incident involving the Yacht, *Kalizma*

**Background**

1. On 27 April 2023, the 117-year-old, 165-foot yacht *Kalizma* (IMO 2869864) left the port of Salalah, Oman where the yacht spent five hours. The *Kalizma* sailed towards the transit corridor off the coast of Yemen in the Gulf of Aden, underway to Egypt. She had a crew of ten Indian nationals onboard and an armed security team consisting of one Greek and two Indian nationals. Her route brought her through the territorial waters of Yemen about six nm off the coast of Ras Fartak and Hasween, Al Mahra Governorate, Yemen. On the morning of 28 April 2023, two small boats from the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) and a boat from the Yemeni Navy were on patrol in the area. The YCG established radio communication instructing the vessel to stop and fired warning shots at the yacht when they did not comply. Believing that they were under attack by pirates, the *Kalizma*’s crew issued a distress call, reporting that they were under attack by three skiffs each with three to four people onboard, to the United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations (UKMTO), which is responsible to provide maritime security information in the region. UKMTO issued an alert about an ongoing attack reporting that shots had been fired.

2. According to the YCG, one naval officer was killed and two coast guard personnel were injured as a result of the exchange of fire. One of the armed guards on the *Kalizma* was reportedly injured by a bullet. The *Kalizma* reached Djibouti, and the Yemeni authorities requested the local authorities to detain the vessel.

Figure 9.1.

**The 117-year-old, 165-foot yacht *Kalizma* in Djibouti Port**

*Source: Red Sea Up-down yachting service.*

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163 [https://2dec.net/news60279.html](https://2dec.net/news60279.html).

Automatic identification systems (AIS) transponders are designed to be capable of providing position, identification, and other information about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically.

Figure 9.2.

**Damage to the Kalizma**

*Source:* Red Sea Up-down yachting service
Annex 10: Houthi naval exercise off Kamaran Island, Hudaydah

Background

1. On 13 April 2023, the Houthis held a naval exercise\(^{166}\) off Kamaran Island north of Hudaydah.\(^{167}\) Multiple types of speed boats were displayed, which were equipped with various types of weapons such as 107mm Multiple Launchers Rocket System (MLRS) as well as heavy and light machine guns. Naval forces present in this event were equipped with assault rifles that have not been documented by the Panel before. The same assault rifles were observed by the Panel during the military parade that took place on 22 September 2022 in Sana’a.

Figure 10

Houthi Speed Boats and Forces, Kamaran Island

Source: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs]^{168}

\(^{166}\) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bxAOV5kQZTs].

\(^{167}\) [https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1646671367608082432].

\(^{168}\) YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated. Images available at [https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1646671367608082432].
Annex 11: 7.62x54Rmm ammunition with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the Marwan-1 vessel

Quantity: 1,080,000 rounds

Figure 11.1.
Sample of headstamps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7.62x54_06_1</th>
<th>7.62x54_06_55</th>
<th>Double stamping(^{169})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.62x54_06_72</td>
<td>7.62x54_06_78</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 different headstamps illustrating a production in 2006: “06_1”, “06_54”, “06_55”, “06_56”, “06_72”, “06_73”, “06_74”, “06_75”, “06_76”, “06_77”, “06_78”, “06_82”, “06_87”, “06_88”, and “06_89”.

Source: US

Figure 11.2.
Battlepack each containing 200 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm ammunition with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (here from lot “06_54” (2006)).

Source: US

\(^{169}\) Such double stamping indicate a malfunction during the production.
Annex 12: 12.7x99mm ammunition seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the Marwan-I vessel

Quantity: 25,000 rounds

Figure 12.1.
Lateral view of five rounds in their plastic package


Source: US

Figure 12.2.
Close-up of the markings present on the cartridges

Markings: (upper line) “12.7x99” “SNIPER” (lower line) “28_2017”

Source: US

Figure 12.3.
Box for five rounds

Markings observed: (upper line) (5 PCS) “12.7x99mm” “APH-W Sniper” (lower line) Lot “00” Date “2017” (2017 as the year of production)

Source: US
Annex 13: M122-K fuze with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-I* vessel

Quantity: 6,960 fuzes

Figure 13.1.  
**Proximity fuze “M122-K”, Lot No: “01”, Date: “2010”**

![Proximity fuze “M122-K”, Lot No: “01”, Date: “2010”](image)

Four different lot numbers documented: “01-2010”, “02_2010”, “04_2010” and “05_2010”.

*Source: US*

Figure 13.2.  
**Logistic container containing the fuze**

![Logistic container containing the fuze](image)

*Source: US*
Figure 13.3.
Description of the M122-K proximity fuze published by Mindex, an entity reportedly affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of Iran

Source: https://mindexcenter.ir/sites/default/files/2021-01/chapter%206-11%2898%29%29_357.pdf
Annex 14: Strip propellant for PG7 seized by the US on 1 December 2022 from the *Marwan-I* vessel

Quantity: 870 boxes

Figure 14.1. 
Carton box, Lot No: “01/2018” (year of production 2018)

*Source:* US
Annex 15: Stateless dhow interdicted by the US on 6 January 2023

Figure 15.1.
Display of the seized material


Figure 15.2.
Seized Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 (quantity: 1,918)

Source: US

Figure 15.3.
Seized AKS20U compact assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia (quantity: 198)

Source: US
Annex 16: Stateless dhow interdicted by France on 15 January 2023

Figure 16.1.
Close-up of the factory markings on one of the seized Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 (quantity: 2,999)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 16.2.
Seized AKS20U compact assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia (quantity: 100)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Table: Seized T-80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran.

Figure 17.1.

Serial number: “15KN200059”

Figures 17.2. (left) and 17.3. (right)

Serial number: “0059” (last for digits of the complete serial number)

Figures 17.4. (left) and 17.5. (right)

Transport handle of a T-80 machinegun presenting the marking of the Iranian Defence Industry Organisation, Military branch (DIOMIL) arsenal

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Similar marking observed on G3 assault rifle (Figure 17.6.) and TD9 “Tondar” submachine gun (Figures 17.7. and 17.8.) manufactured in Iran

![Figure 17.6.](Source: Conflict Armament Research (CAR))

![Figure 17.7.](Source: CAR)

![Figure 17.8.](Source: Armament Research Service (ARES))

Similar “dot marking”\(^{170}\) observed on Hoshdar sniper rifle (Figure 17.9.) and AM-50 AMR (Figure 17.10.) with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

![Figure 17.9.](Source: https://i.postimg.cc/1X4M12JV/ka9.png\(^{171}\))

![Figure 17.10.](Source: S/2022/50, figure 19.10.)

Serial numbers of the documented T80 LGM

Material seized by the US on 6 May 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2400404 2400405 2500121 2500122 2500123 2500124 2500134 2500135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2400162 2500181 2500182 2500183 2500184 2500185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500265 2500266 2500271 2500272 2500278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500299 2500300 2500319 2500323 2500335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500406 2500407 2500409 2500425 2500426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500657 2500658 2500667 2500683 2500684</td>
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<td>2500690 2500691 2500692 2500701 2500703</td>
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<tr>
<td>2600041 2600042 2600043 2600044 2600059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600076 2600149 2600150 2600153 2600154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600196 2600199 2600200 2600205 2600206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600290 2600303 2600304 2600744 2600745</td>
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<tr>
<td>2600785 2600836 2600865 2600870 2600886</td>
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<tr>
<td>2600908 2600910 2600911 2600914 2600915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600921 2600922 2600923 2601067 2601078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2601114 2601123 2601124 2601125 2601128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2601156 2601179 2601182 2601186 2601210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2601264 2601275 2601279 2601282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{170}\) The number of dots on each digit of the serial numbers documented is the same, which indicates the same factory process.

Annex 18: Seized M80 LMG with markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26

Figure 18.1.

Figures 18.2. (left) and 18.3. (right)

Serial numbers of the documented M80 LMG

Material seized by the US on 6 May 2023 is displayed in purple
Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue
Material documented in Somalia by CAR in January 2022 is displayed in grey
Material seized by the US on 10 February 2021 is displayed in green
Material seized by the KSA on 24 June 2020 is displayed in yellow
Material reportedly for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

172 The table illustrates that M80 LMGs which have been seized or have been observed multiple times between June 2020 and May 2023 belong to same batches.
Seized M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State factory 26 documented in Somalia

Figure 18.4.

![State Factory 26 marking
Serial number “17-CN_03564”
Documented in January 2022 in the black market in Somalia]

Source: CAR

Figure 18.5. (left) and 18.6. (right)

![State Factory 26 marking
Serial number “17-CN_07055” (left) and “17-CN_24547 (right)
Documented in January 2023 in the black market in Somalia]

Source: CAR

The serial numbers “17-CN_03564” and “17-CN_07055” are consistent with the serial numbers of the material seized by France on 15 January 2023 (para. 69 and annex 18).

173 This serial number is consistent with those from M80 LMG seized on 6 January 2023 (annex 18).
Annex 19: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria

Figures 19.1. (up) and 19.2. (down)

Serial number “ИМ_27_036”

Figure 19.3.

Serial number “BA_25_293”

Figure 19.4.

Serial number “BE_24_244”

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue
Material reportedly for sale in the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

Serial numbers of the seized PKM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AE 25 201</th>
<th>ВА 27 293</th>
<th>ВД 27 336</th>
<th>БЕ 24 244</th>
<th>КО 26 520</th>
<th>КТ 27 274</th>
<th>NH 25 421</th>
<th>ИМ 27 036</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ВА 26 472</td>
<td>ВД 27 310</td>
<td>ВА 50 450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 20: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Romania

Figure 20.1.

![Seized PKM LMG](image1)

Figure 20.2.

![Seized PKM LMG](image2)

Serial number “U-1426”, year of production 1987

*Source:* Panel of Experts on Yemen

Material seized by France on 15 January 2023 is displayed in blue
Material reportedly for sale in the black market in Houthi-controlled area is displayed in red

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U-1426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-2752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-3192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 21: Seized PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Hungary

Figure 21.1.

Figure 21.2.

Figure 21.3.

Source: US
Annex 22: Seized Dehlavieh ATGMs with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (quantity: 23)

All the missiles documented belongs to the “lot 149” with markings indicating a production in 2021.

Figure 22.1.

Figure 22.2. Serial N° 04

Figure 22.3. Serial N° 05

Figure 22.4. Serial N° 11

Figure 22.5. Serial N° 13

Figure 22.6. Serial N° 16

Figure 22.7. Serial N° 19

Figure 22.8. Serial N° 22

Figure 22.9. Serial N° 25

Figure 22.10. Serial N° 33

Figure 22.11. Serial N° 40

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Annex 23: Seized battlepack each containing 200 rounds of 7.62x54Rmm with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran (quantity: 578,400 rounds)

Figure 23.1.

Battlepack Lot No. 14/2002 (year of production 2002)

Figures 23.2. (left) and XX.3. (right)

Battlepack Lot No. 17/2006 (year of production 2006)
Headstamp: 7.62x54_06_17

Figures 23.4. (left) and 23.5. (right)

Battlepack Lot No. 43/2006 (year of production 2006)
Headstamp: 7.62x54_06_43

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Annex 24: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with the same batch.

Serial numbers of batch 16-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

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**Legend**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61000005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61000263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61000459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61001559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61002169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61002625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61002962</td>
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<td>61005767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61005863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61006015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 25: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with a same batch.

Serial numbers of batch 17-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.


Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 8 August 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62000076, 62000104, 62000111, 62000168, 62000217, 62000229, 62000259, 62000267, 62000281, 62000328, 62000424, 62000427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62000430, 62000431, 62000490, 62000492, 62000493, 62000554, 62000555, 62000568, 62000569, 62000574, 62000606, 62000717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62000772, 62000773, 62000872, 62000920, 62000965, 62000971, 62001002, 62001195, 62001209, 62001213, 62001226, 62001258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62001282, 62001490, 62001493, 62001519, 62001538, 62001539, 62001542, 62001595, 62001635, 62001660, 62001761, 62001841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 reportedly presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled area in 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62001875, 62001917, 62001923, 62001960, 62001978, 62002002, 62002037, 62002055, 62002090, 62002101, 62002122, 62002139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia between 2019 and 2021 by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62000076, 62000104, 62000111, 62000168, 62000217, 62000229, 62000259, 62000267, 62000281, 62000328, 62000424, 62000427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 documented in Somalia in 2018 by CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62000076, 62000104, 62000111, 62000168, 62000217, 62000229, 62000259, 62000267, 62000281, 62000328, 62000424, 62000427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 26: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26 seized since August 2018 are consistent with a same batch.

Serial numbers of serial 18-CN

These Type 56-1 show the serial numbers in sequential order, which suggests that the rifles were procured from a national stockpile, rather than from different non-state sources.

Source: S/2019/83, figure 16.7

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial numbers of Type 56-1 seized on sea by the US on 28 August 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63000005</td>
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<td>63000140</td>
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<tr>
<td>63000362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63000441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63000568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63000771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63001998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63002087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63002182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63002290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63002455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63002592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63046054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63046287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63046690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63047164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63047442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63047638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63047874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63048338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63069739</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 27: Seized SALW

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 11 February 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, para. 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 17 April 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, para. 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>Seized in Aden, Yemen on 10 December 2018</td>
<td>S/2020/326, para. 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,521</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 28 August 2018</td>
<td>S/2019/83, paras. 95-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 25 June 2018</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20,746 Total

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China reported by the Panel of experts on Somalia. These Type 56-1 assault rifles are bearing serial numbers consistent with a same batch as those documented in this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 20 December 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/754, para. 104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1,998 Total

Assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, tables 2-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1,998 Total

Assault rifles of non-specified model and origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 28 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,989&lt;sup&gt;174&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2 and annex 35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3,489 Total

AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia bearing serial numbers consistent with the same batch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

298 Total

<sup>174</sup> Including Type 56, SA-93 and AIM assault rifles.
AKSU compact assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type 85 sniper rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China by the State Factory 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hoshdar sniper rifle with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AM-50 AMR with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Seized on sea on 10 February 2021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Seizure on the KSA on 24 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Seizure on the KSA on 17 April 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Seized on 17 April 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, para. 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>Seized on 24 June 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>484</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Bulgaria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Total

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Total

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Total

PKM LMG of non-specified model and origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 17 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

483 Total

Type 73 LMG with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Democratic People’s of Korea (DPRK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 20 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Total

HMG of non-specified model and origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Seized on sea on 10 February 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 17 April 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 28 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

163 Total
**RPG-7 with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, annex 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Seized in Aden, Yemen on 10 December 2018</td>
<td>S/2020/326, para. 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Seized on sea by Australia on 27 February 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, tables 2-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

632 Total

**RPG-7 of non-specified origin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Seizure on sea by the US on 28 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/193, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

200 Total

**RPG-29 (or a copy of it) of non-specified origin**\(^{175}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 24 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, table 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 Total

**Dehlavieh missile with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in the Iran**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023</td>
<td>Para. 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the UK on 23 February 2023</td>
<td>Para. 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Seized on land by GoY on 10 March 2022</td>
<td>S/2023/130, para. 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the KSA on 20 June 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, annex 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>Seized on sea on the 09 February 2020</td>
<td>S/2021/79, para. 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 25 November 2019</td>
<td>S/2020/326, para. 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Seized on sea by France on 6 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2018/594, paras. 115-116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Seized on sea on 20 March 2016</td>
<td>S/2017/91, table 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seized on land on 29 November 2015</td>
<td>S/2017/91, table 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

253 Total

**Toophan missile with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Iran**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Seized on sea by Australia on 25 September 2015</td>
<td>S/2018/192, para. 82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56 Total

---

\(^{175}\) The Panel could not identify the origin of these RPG-29. However, the Panel notes that RPG-29 rocket launchers are produced in Iran as *Ghadir*. [https://www.ifmat.org/10/08/iranian-small-arms-manufacturing-is-bigger-than-you-think/](https://www.ifmat.org/10/08/iranian-small-arms-manufacturing-is-bigger-than-you-think/)
9M111 and 9M113 missiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Seizure</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Seized on sea by the US on 6 May 2021</td>
<td>S/2022/50, para. 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of the material seized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Type of material</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27,972</td>
<td>Assault rifles and compact assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>Sniper and AMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>LMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>HMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>841</td>
<td>RPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>378</td>
<td>ATGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,830</td>
<td>Grand total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
S/2023/833

Annex 28: Table illustrating that the serial numbers of the AKS20U compact assault rifles with
technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in Russia seized in January
2023 are consistent with a same batch
Legend
Material seized on sea by the US on 6 January 2023
Material seized on sea by France on 15 January 2023

21 300027
21 300092
21 300184
21 300236
21 300276
21 300332
21 300391
21 300440
21 300518
21 300579
21 300609
21 300638
21 300682
21 300707
21 300761
21 300787
21 300814
21 300844
21 300890
21 300924
21 300950
21 300974
21 301005
21 301066
21 301087
21 301114
21 301143
21 301170
21 301227
21 301284

23-17854

21 300033
21 300094
21 300187
21 300237
21 300278
21 300336
21 300393
21 300450
21 300523
21 300582
21 300610
21 300640
21 300687
21 300708
21 300762
21 300791
21 300816
21 300845
21 300897
21 300926
21 300952
21 300975
21 301016
21 301067
21 301088
21 301119
21 301146
21 301172
21 301236
21 301294

21 300062
21 300110
21 300188
21 300251
21 300282
21 300338
21 300398
21 300452
21 300546
21 300585
21 300611
21 300643
21 300688
21 300709
21 300763
21 300797
21 300820
21 300846
21 300898
21 300931
21 300954
21 300977
21 301019
21 301068
21 301090
21 301123
21 301149
21 301173
21 301248
21 301316

21 300067
21 300111
21 300193
21 300254
21 300291
21 300340
21 300402
21 300467
21 300547
21 300589
21 300618
21 300651
21 300690
21 300713
21 300764
21 300801
21 300822
21 300847
21 300891
21 300933
21 300956
21 300978
21 301020
21 301069
21 301093
21 301127
21 301151
21 301174
21 301250
21 302353

21 300072
21 300118
21 300196
21 300255
21 300299
21 300346
21 300405
21 300473
21 300551
21 300596
21 300623
21 300661
21 300691
21 300723
21 300766
21 300803
21 300826
21 300853
21 300895
21 300936
21 300957
21 300981
21 301024
21 301070
21 301098
21 301128
21 301152
21 301176
21 301251

21 300076
21 300124
21 300205
21 300256
21 300303
21 300347
21 300409
21 300484
21 300552
21 300598
21 300626
21 300667
21 300695
21 300728
21 300771
21 300805
21 300830
21 300863
21 300896
21 300937
21 300960
21 300982
21 301027
21 301075
21 301105
21 301129
21 301154
21 301177
21 301254

21 300079
21 300162
21 300213
21 300260
21 300305
21 300359
21 300420
21 300507
21 300562
21 300599
21 300629
21 300662
21 300698
21 300739
21 300773
21 300806
21 300831
21 300864
21 300905
21 300938
21 300961
21 300984
21 301028
21 301078
21 301107
21 301133
21 301160
21 301179
21 301261

21 300082
21 300173
21 300214
21 300266
21 300317
21 300386
21 300424
21 300513
21 300567
21 300601
21 300632
21 300671
21 300699
21 300744
21 300776
21 300807
21 300836
21 300870
21 300914
21 300939
21 300969
21 300985
21 301053
21 301080
21 301108
21 301135
21 301162
21 301181
21 301262

21 300085
21 300176
21 300223
21 300268
21 300319
21 300387
21 300431
21 300515
21 300572
21 300603
21 300633
21 300675
21 300700
21 300748
21 300780
21 300810
21 300839
21 300873
21 300918
21 300941
21 300970
21 300991
21 301062
21 301085
21 301110
21 301136
21 301166
21 301218
21 301265

21 300090
21 300179
21 300232
21 300269
21 300330
21 300390
21 300437
21 300516
21 300578
21 300607
21 300636
21 300679
21 300706
21 300753
21 300786
21 300812
21 300843
21 300885
21 300921
21 300947
21 300972
21 300992
21 301064
21 301086
21 301111
21 301141
21 301168
21 301221
21 301271

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Annex 29: Smuggling vessel interdicted by the UK on 25 February 2023

Figure 29.1.
Display of the material taken after the seizure

1. Dehlavieh ATGMs (quantity: 7)\(^{176}\)
2. Electronic component (main body) of an EOSS
3. Nose tips for ballistic missiles
4. Jet vanes for ballistic missiles
5. Components of a military satellite antenna


Figure 29.2.
Close-up of the electronic component (main body) of an EOSS with similar characteristics of the EOSS-I-103 produced by Iran. This material presents similar characteristics to the EOSS Sadiq presented on 22 September 2022 during the parade held by the Houthis in Sana’a (Figure 63.1.)

\(^{176}\) The red strip on the four Dehlavieh missiles on the left indicates that they are a thermobaric variant. Thermobaric munitions are those munitions that, by design, produce more heat and overpressure than conventional explosives by exploding a vapor in the blast zone. They predominantly affects the pulmonary, cardiovascular, auditory, gastrointestinal, and central nervous systems. https://jmvh.org/article/munitions-thermobaric-munitions-and-their-medical-effects/
Figure 29.3. Description of the EOSS-I-103 published by Mindex, an entity reportedly affiliated with the Ministry of Defence of Iran

The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

**SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS**

- Day imaging (TV camera with 110x zooming and variable focal length from 10 to 1100 mm)
- Night imaging (Cooled IR camera with lenses from 240 mm to 1020 mm focal length)
- As optional
- Passive (Radiation less if LRF is not used)
- Determining Target azimuth and elevation on time (Feedback of absolute encoder with 0.003° accuracy)
- Enhanced image quality (SUPERVERVIEW, RQUILIZE and DDE image processing algorithms)
- Stabilization (Removing image fluttering to 25% of image dimensions)
- Moving targets recognition and tracking

Source: https://mindexcenter.ir/sites/default/files/2021-01/chapter%206-11%2896%29_355.pdf

Figure 29.4. EOSS-I-103 mounted on a tripod. The main body is underlined in red.

Source: https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1631292646957150213/photo/1
Annex 30: Comparison between Inertial Navigation System (INS) seized by the UK and those from Borkan-2H and Borkan-3 which have been launched against KSA in 2018 and UAE in 2022 and those from Qiam series manufactured by Iran.

Figure 30.1. Schematic drawing of the Borkan ballistic missile

Source: Confidential

Figures 30.2. (left), 30.3. (centre), 30.4. (right) INS seized by the UK

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 30.5. (left) and 30.6. (right) INS of the Borkan-2H vs. the housing of the Borkan-3

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Annex 31: Comparison between INS seized by the UK and those from Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran

The INS of the Borkan-2H, Borkan-3 and Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran are presenting some differences in markings, but the composition, shape and dimensions are all similar.

Figure 31.1. (left)
INS seized by the UK

Figure 31.2. (right)
INS of a Qiam-2 manufactured by Iran and displayed during an exhibition held in 2019 in Tehran

Figure 31.3. (left)
INS of a Borkan-2H ballistic missile operated by the Houthis seized by the UK

Figure 31.4. (right)
INS of a Qiam-2 manufactured in Iran and displayed during an exhibition held in Tehran

Source of Figure 31.1.: UK
Source of Figures 31.2. and 31.4.: https://vladimirkrym.livejournal.com/4967815.html
Source of Figure 31.3.: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Figure 31.5. (left)
INS seized by the UK

Figure 31.6. (right)
Qiam-2 INS debris from Iranian attack on US base in Iraq in January 2020

Source of Figure 31.5.: UK
Source of Figure 31.6.: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Annex 32: Comparison between Initial Measurement Unit (IMU) seized by the UK and those from Borkan-2H and Borkan-3 ballistic missile and which have been launched against KSA in 2018 and UAE in 2022

Figure 32.1.
PCB of the IMU seized by the UK and close-up of the DC-DC converter\textsuperscript{177}

Serial number on the DC-DC converter: “ZUW25_2415” and “ZUS25_2405”

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 32.2. (left) and 32.3. (right)
PCB of the IMU of the Borkan-2H vs. the PCB of the IMU of the Borkan-3 and close-up of their respective DC-DC converters

Serial number on the DC-DC converters: “ZUS25_2405” and “ZUW25_2415”

Source: Confidential

\textsuperscript{177} Similar converters are presented in S/2019/83, annex 13.
Annex 33: Analysis of the navigation antenna seized by the UK

Figures 33.1. (left), 33.2. (right up), 33.3. (right down)
Q.A stickers with marking “6000 Q.A” observed on the navigation antenna seized by the UK

Observed marking: … 6000 Q.A

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 33.4. (left) and 33.5. (right)
Similar Q.A stickers with marking “6000 Q.A” observed on a debris of a Borkan-2H launched against the KSA in 2018

Source: Confidential

Figure 33.6
Different type of Q.A sticker with marking “QA 6000” observed on a debris of a Qiam-2 launched by Iran against a US base in Erbil, Iraq, on 8 January 2020 (para. 75).

- Clearly the same [type of] quality control sticker;
- Note the absence of a dot (.)” after the letter A of “Q.A” (such markings are often seen on technical components of weapons systems manufactured in Iran);
- “6000” very likely stands for “Department 6000” also known as Shahid Varamini Industries\textsuperscript{178}, of the Iranian Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG), is the entity responsible for the liquid-propellant ballistic missile programme (S/2018/594, table A.36.1, serial 2) is responsible for the guidance & control systems.

Annex 34: Comparison between the nose tip seized by the UK and those from a Rezvan MRBM manufactured in Iran

Figure 34.1.
Nose tips of a Rezvan ballistic missile seized by the UK

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 34.2.
Nose tip of a Rezvan ballistic missile manufactured in Iran

Source: https://www.iranintl.com/en/202209226922
Annex 35: Comparison between the jet vanes seized by the UK and those from a Qiam serie MRBM manufactured in Iran

Figure 35.1.
Jet vanes of Rezvan ballistic missile seized by the UK

Source: UK

Figures 35.2. (up) and 35.3. (down)
Jet vanes of Qiam ballistic missile manufactured in Iran

Source:

Source: https://twitter.com/FieldMarshalPSO/status/1091390204370399233/photo/1
Annex 36: Marking patterns

Similarity in the marking patterns made with the following sequence: “three letters / dot / one letter / three digits” as observed on the Borkan-2H nose tips with the marking patterns on Borkan-2H and Borkan-3-used by the Houthis and Qiam MRBM series manufactured in Iran.

Figure 36.1.
Borkan-2H nose tips seized by the UK

[Image of Borkan-2H nose tips]

Marking pattern on the Borkan-2H nose tips: “CGU.Z035”, “QVU.Z014” and “VHU.Z003”

Figures 36.2. (left) and 36.3. (right)
Marking pattern on borkan-2H debris (INS) from Houthi attack on Riyadh, KSA on 2018

[Image of Borkan-2H debris with marking “ZHU.D193”]

“ZHU.D193”

Figure 36.4.
Marking pattern on burkan-3 debris (pressure switch) from Houthi attack on Riyadh, KSA on 10 September 2020

[Image of Burkan-3 debris with marking “RIU.D142”]

“RIU.D142”

Figure 36.5.
Marking pattern on burkan-3 debris (pressure switch) from Houthi attack on Dammam, KSA on 7 March 2021

[Image of Burkan-3 debris with marking “PDU.L070”]

“PDU.L070”

Source of figures 36.1.-36.5.: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Figures 36.6. and 36.7.  
**Marking pattern on jet vanes of a Qiam MRBM displayed in Iran**

![Image of jet vanes with marking pattern]

“QWU.D241”

*Source:* [Twitter](https://twitter.com/FieldMarshalPSO/status/1091390204370399233)

Figures 36.8. (left), 36.9. (center) and 36.10. (down).  
**Marking pattern on Qiam-2 debris from Iranian attack on US base in Iraq in January 2020**

![Image of Qiam-2 debris]

“TEU.D012”

“SZU.D121”

“SZU.D056”

*Source pictures 36.8.-36.10.: US*
Annex 37: First public display of a Rezvan MRBM (Iran, September 2022, at the annual parade of the armed forces)

Figure 37.1.
First public display of a Rezvan MRBM

Source: https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/iran-solidifies-missile-support-houthis
Annex 38: Seized electric detonators of the same origin

Figures 38.1 (up). 38.2. (close-up)
Material seized on 13 August 2020 in Lahij Governorate

Source: Confidential

Similar DCord manufactured in June 2020 have been observed in the black market in December 2021

Source: Confidential
Annex 39: Seized non-electric detonators of the same origin

Figure 39.1.
Wooden crates reporting the name of the producer and consignee containing non-electric detonators seized on 24 April 2021 by the Coalition (quantity: 1.5 million)

CONSIGNEE:
WAHAH TRADING COMPANY
14 RUE DE ATHERNS
REPUBLIC DE DJIBOUTI

(similar address to the one presented on figure 38.2)

Source: Confidential

Figure 39.2.
Close-up of the seized non-electric detonators packed in a carton

Source: Confidential
Annex 40: Seizure of explosive precursors chemical by GoY

Figure 40.1.
Page 1 of the SBF statement

Source: GoY
الثانية: لجهاز الحماية الأمنية المخصصة عند عدن تبين في محاام جمع الأسماك الأولي الأخرى دون تغيير جمرك:

من خلال عملية التعبير البسيط النقل الحاولة إلى العاصمة عدن تبين في محاام جمع الأسماك الأولي الأخرى دون تغيير جمرك:

1. رقم الدخول: 10467
2. رقم المخلف: (C31658)
3. رقم الباخرة: (NGJ1112072)
4. رقم الباخرة: (CHINA)
5. رقم الباخرة: (KOTA NASRAT)
6. رقم الباخرة: (SUFENHE)
7. رقم الباخرة: (HONG KONG)
8. رقم الباخرة: (FLOWER GUM)
9. رقم الباخرة: (CHINA)
10. رقم الباخرة: (KOTA NASRAT)
11. رقم الباخرة: (SUFENHE)
12. رقم الباخرة: (HONG KONG)

تبين وجود بعض من الباخرات على حساب مركب (C31658) والباخرة (NGJ1112072) في محاام جمع الأسماك الأولي الأخرى دون تغيير جمرك:

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7. رقم الباخرة: (HONG KONG)
8. رقم الباخرة: (FLOWER GUM)
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10. رقم الباخرة: (KOTA NASRAT)
11. رقم الباخرة: (SUFENHE)
12. رقم الباخرة: (HONG KONG)
ثالثًا: والفاء التعاون مع عدو (الطغية من الداخل):
تتم عملية ضبط المواد في مرحلة الحفاظ على وظيفة التشريفي، ما قبل عملية التنقل إلى وجهتها الأخيرة في المخازن المتعلقة
تمكين الاستمرارية للنقل في حضرة المسئولين، خصوصاً على مستوى الحركة الحديثة إلى مناطق سيطرة المواقع، مثلاً على مستوى المركبات، يعد الأساليب على عملية وأجر التنقل (وي نفس الوجهة، ونفس الفرع من إجاد السيدات الطيران
والراويين، وهو غير ملائم للرسول الشريف، رحمه الله المستعينين).
وذلك أعمال مكوبة لجسرية النطاق والتعاون مع عدو محارب بداخل مواد متدرجة كانت تسير في إعداد الجنازة نحو
القاسف تجاهه، وتحقيق طليعة وضرة لولا تدخل أسباب ومعاناة أخرى (باهل لإعداد الأجهزة فيها) حالت دون تحقيق إسلامها إلى مناطق سيطرة ملتويات أخرى، وجماعات الإرهابية التي تستهدف المحافظات الجنوبية المحررة بكل وسائلها وإداراتها.
رابعاً: الأفعال المنوية لكل من المعتززين على ذمة القضية:
1- ثبوت النشأ:
• بثت قبل النقل والتخزين والحزمة لمواد متدرجة محررة،
• بثت الأفعال المنوية لجسرية التهريب الجمركي (غير المرتبطين) على شحن وتشكيل وإدخال مواد خام
• مفتوحة بالإضافة إلى تنظيم عملية وطائرات مواد وقطع غير ملائم إلى البلد عبر منطق منطقية الحرة /عند خاتم
• سيطرة غير محاذية.
• وذلك بحق كل من:
المتهم / محمد حسن الهديري،
والملتم / عثمان محمد سعيد الله،
بمشاعر وصفاتهم وتمثيلهم للوسائل والعلاقات التي تم استخدامها في الجريمة.
2- ثبوت النشأ:
• بثت قبل النقل والتخزين والحزمة لمواد متدرجة محررة،
• بثت حالة الشروع بعملية فتح مواد متدرجة محرزة إلى منطق سيطرة الحرة.
• عمد بثت أفراد القس وتنظيم وتشكيل ونقل مواد متدرجة محرزة،
• وذلك بحق كل من / محمد عبد الله.
خامساً: تفاصيل المسؤولية الفردية:
تقوم المسؤولية الجرمانية في الجرائم الجمركية على توسيع دائرة المسؤولين، تمتد المسؤولية إلى كل شخص اتصل بإحالة
المخازن، تشمل مسؤولية على (كان شخص طبيعي أو اعتباري) أو (ول false حارة刺) أو وقف، في أي عمل أو أعمال
الكرات أو التعامل في ارتكابها أو أعمال المخازن في ضبطها، وذلك في تشمل:
1. المعايير ونظام الشروط والامتثال ونظام الوقاية في الجرائم التي يركبها مساعدوهم في
2. المحاربين الآخرين من مسؤولين بحضورهم في عمليات المخازن ووصول التهريب، التي يركبونها مستخدموه
3. الأفراد الإداري (الشركة الشابة والمسوية ووساط النقل الخارجي ووساط النقل الداخل) ووساط
الخليج.)

...
س/2023/833

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Figure 40.4.
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<th>عباس عبد السلام، أحمد</th>
<th>عباس عبد السلام الجبلي</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 40.5.**
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Appendix A

Unofficial translation of relevant elements of the document referred to in annex 40

Security Belt Forces
The capital, Aden
Department of Legal Affairs

The second to the warehouses of the Al-Ostora office for transportation by a means of transporting a Hilux type car, and on the same date, a seizure force was sent to the Al-Othmani warehouses after (Othman) confessed to storing and possessing a shipment of other raw materials, and 120 bags of the material were seized. On 28/2/2023, the accused, Muhammad Hussein Ahmed Haidar, was arrested next to Al-Othmani’s stores, after a process of monitoring and tracking his return from China, and after proving his participation in the process of shipping and entering the seized goods.

Second: the customs entry incident

Through the process of tracking the source, the entry of the shipment to the capital, Aden, it was shown in the preliminary inference collection records that it had entered through the customs port Free Zone / Aden on 11/20/2022 AD with in the load of container No. 173 according to the following entry data:

- Customs declaration number: C31658
- Manifest No.: NR16720221026 Country of Origin: CHINA
- Bill of lading number: 21027200 NGJH
- Shipping port: CHIWAN
- The carrier company: KOTA NASRAT
- Source sender: SUIFENHE
- Labeling the container load according to the customs declaration: empty bottles. Designation of the entry of the explosive substance according to the bill of lading: under the name (FLOWER GUM), literal translation: flower glue, common nomenclature: ceramic glue.

Circumstances accompanying the entry of the shipment into the customs of the Aden Free Zone:

It was found that there was a prior communication (from one of the partners due to a dispute, according to the confessions, about the entry of two containers to the customs of the free zone / Aden with No. 173 and No. 935 in the name of the importer Yasser Abdel Salam for Trade, carrying spare parts for weapons and turning machines for weapons, drones and night vision material.

Seizure action taken in the customs base:

According to the inspection minutes No. 8/0559 and No. 0562/10 conducted by the customs police at the customs base:
1. The container load was subjected to inspection, and a shipment of drones, binoculars, weapon spare parts and machines suspected of being used to lathe weapons was seized.
2. Financial fines were imposed for the crime of entry and confiscation of the reported prohibited shipments, and the exit of container No. 935 with the rest of its cargo on 16/12/2022 AD, including 120 bags of raw materials that were seized in Al-Othmani’s warehouses, and the exit of container No. 173 with the rest of its cargo on 1/1/2023 AD, including 40 barrels of raw materials which was seized.
3. Not taking any seizure and legal measures against the persons directly involved in the crime.

Through the aforementioned data and facts, we are facing evidence of material acts constituting a crime of non-tax customs evasion, or rather (security smuggling), which is represented in the introduction of military materials and explosive materials in violation of the provisions of restriction, prevention and restriction, with the aim of delivering them to areas under the control of a belligerent enemy, and in light of a situation witnessing wars and armed conflicts, security instabilities, and parties to the conflict targeting security, stability, and tranquility in the liberated governorates, with the availability of the element of knowledge and the intent to introduce explosive materials.
The following actions are prohibited:

Knowledge before and during the shipping process.
Knowledge before and during the clearance process
Knowledge during the process of inspection, inspection and release of the shipment from the borders of the customs authorities.

**Third: The incident of cooperation with the enemy (the purpose of entry):**

The process of seizing the materials took place at the stage of possession and the storage process before the transfer process to its final destination, in the warehouses of the Al-Ostora Office for Transport in the possession of the accused Ahmed Al-Imad, the mediator of transporting the shipment to the Houthi-controlled areas / Sana’a for a person named Abdul-Malik Al-Osaimi, after agreeing on the transportation process and fees, (which is the same destination and the same purpose as entering the airline shipment sights and machine gun parts, with different recipients).

These are material acts constituting the crime of complicity and cooperation with a belligerent enemy by introducing explosive materials in which the will of the perpetrators was moving towards the completion of its result and the realization of its danger and damage had it not been for the intervention of other reasons and barriers that have nothing to do with the will of the perpetrators that prevented its delivery to the areas of control of the Houthi militia, and terrorist groups that target the southern governorates. Liberated by all means and tools.

**Fourth: the actions attributed to each of the detainees in the case:**

**Evidence of the following:**

Evidence of the act of transporting, storing and possessing prohibited explosive materials. Evidence of material acts constituting the crime of customs evasion (non-tax) represented by shipping, clearance and entry of explosive raw materials in addition to military binoculars, drones and weapon spare parts to the country through the Aden Free Zone port, contrary to the provisions of prohibition and prohibition. Evidence of the acts constituting the crime of attempting to bring in prohibited materials with military uses for the purpose of delivering them to areas controlled by the enemy.

This is against:
The accused / Muhammad Hussein Al-Haidari and the accused / Othman Muhammad Saeed Abdullah with their persons, characteristics, and their representation of the means and means that were used in the crime.

2. **Evidence of the following:**

The act of storing and being in possession of prohibited explosive materials
Proof of the initiation of the process of transporting prohibited explosive materials to Houthi-controlled areas. Failure to prove the element of intent and knowledge of the possession, storage and transportation of prohibited explosive materials.
This is against the accused / Ahmed Abdullah Ali Al-Emad.

**Fifth: The scope of criminal responsibility:**

Criminal responsibility in customs crimes is based on expanding the circle of officials, so the responsibility extends to every person who came into contact with the smuggled materials physically and extended his authority over them (whether he was a natural or legal person), even for a short period, or participated in any of the activities of the warehouse in which they were seized. . authorized by them. storage).

Complicity or facilitation in its commission or acts of prevention in seizing it, and therefore it includes:
1. Owners, purchase, shipping and import brokers, transport brokers, and the possessor under any capacity, and the owner, manager, or tenant
2. Customs brokers, as they are fully responsible for violations and smuggling crimes committed by their employees.
3. Legal persons (the trucking and importing company, the means of external transport, the means of internal transport, and the means of storing.
4. the employees of the customs authorities are governed by two cases:
The first: direct penal responsibility with proven knowledge.
The second: tort liability by proving negligence, negligence, and refraining from performing one's duty, in light of the presence of a shipment that falls within the scope of suspicion in terms of the existence of a prior notification and in terms of its destination to the Houthi-controlled areas, and in terms of the existence of a difference (that an ordinary employee can notice by simply examining the theoretical characteristics of an explosive material characteristics and the properties of the glue that entered the material under its name.

**Sixth: Available evidence and evidence:**

1. Physical evidence: represented in the seized materials, seizure records and documentation of the seizure process.
2. Data and information of customs papers, bills of lading and invoices for the shipping price of the material.
3. Acknowledgments and confessions in the minutes of interrogation of the accused.
4. The physical evidence extracted and documented (attached within the file, which confirms the following in its content):
   - Confirmation of the agreement process in China regarding the shipping process, which proves the availability of knowledge that they are prohibited raw materials. Mining containers with drone cargo, weapon spare parts, and aluminum powder, knowing that they are prohibited materials. The process of agreeing to ship materials at a price of (1,400) dollars per CBM, while the usual price and acquaintance with it is (500) dollars) only for licensed goods.
   - Evidence of the availability of knowledge during the inspection process at the customs that the released materials are prohibited explosive materials.
   - Evidence of the entry of three types of prohibited materials estimated at about 3 tons, of which the forty barrels are included in one bill of lading sent to the mediator for the purchase of materials in China and sent to the owner of the goods Abdul Malik Al-Osaimi, indicating the total weight of the materials (5,645) CBM, including the forty barrels, and clarifying In which the total shipping price is (7,916 dollars) from calculating the shipping price (1,400) dollars per CP. M) and a difference of more than (900) dollars) from the declared goods (in addition to confirming this equation with the confessions of the interrogation records).
   - Conversations, letters, agreements and acknowledgments between the sender and the clearing agent refer to the process of customs clearance in a boycott manner in the amount of 5,000 dollars for each container without opening or inspection, and the process of sharing the customs fine with the customs authority obtaining a 40%, committee members 20%, state treasury 40%.
   - Confirmation of getting used to the crimes of entering containers rigged with prohibited goods, and there was nothing left but to enter the tanks, according to what was stated in audio clips and correspondence in text and letters).
   - Letters and confessions using notes in the name of propaganda and advertising shops and notes in the name of the military establishment (including Brigades of Sa’leek of Taiz, and the Department of Military Armament / Taiz for the release of prohibited shipments.
   - Conversations between the accused warning of the need to change the data of the containers that were coming during the inspection of the container 173 and Al-Hayyah 935.
   - Confessions of the change process that took place in the data of the containers that were coming and changed them in the name of the importer, Muhammad Fadl Al-Dubai, and the name of the customs broker, Yasser Al-Dubai, which arrived on 23/2/2023 AD, and cleared, loaded, and unloaded its cargo in New Al-Haidary stores in Al-Mamdara.
   - Pictures of the seized material during the shipping and loading process in China, and during the transportation process from customs to warehouses
   - Evidence of the purpose of bringing in explosive and prohibited materials, which is to deliver them to Houthi-controlled areas.
   - Evidence reporting a lack of testing capabilities increases the possibility of the substance's hazardous uses for military purposes as the declared raw materials can be checked with simple and available capabilities.
   - Image of reports on Iran's secret projects and its use of aluminum powder in the missile industry.
2 Names of merchants, owners of goods, importers, brokers, workers... etc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Ship</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiz business</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An intermediary to purchase seized items from China.</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The owner of the shipment of explosive materials.</td>
<td>Sanaa', Haraz</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The owner of the shipment of reserved and the recipient of the shipment of</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saana'a, the mediator of the purchase of the shipment of military busses and for</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>weapons, the owner of the shipment of weapons, an area dealer in the area and the brother of Sultan and</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>owner</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The future of goods in Aden</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant Mohammad Al-Hajiri</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother of Mohammad Al-Hajiri and responsible stores in Minsira.</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The agreement to transfer the shipment of machinery to it</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Al-Hajiri stores to which the materials were transported</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper Al-Hajiri.</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new recipient of the upcoming container shipment whose data has been changed, which</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was in the name of Saeed Abdul Saeed</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The new discharge of the container shipment whose data has been changed, which</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer was responsible for clearing</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
<td>Sanaa'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Date: 26/6/2023 AD

Dear Thursday

Security Belt Forces, the capital, Aden,
Department of Legal Affairs

---

2 Names of legal persons, shops, and means of storage and transportation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marashe Alkhail behind Wazan Hotel</td>
<td>Brummel department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 cartons in each carton 250.</td>
<td>2 inside cartons from the temporary office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 cartons in each carton 250.</td>
<td>(\text{value: } 40 \times 250 = 10000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Container with a metal cover which follows the order of the charger.</td>
<td>Durrat, Alana Street, Al-Jubba Building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Attachment No. 1: 4 of 24 sheets containing the final inspection of the drugs and the date of the receipt of the container inspection report at the customs.
2. Attachment No. 2: 14 sheets containing the storage identification and the shipping, and the logistics of the container inspection report at the customs.
3. Attachment No. 3: 20 sheets containing the results of the inspection of the container inspection report at the customs, the Al-Hamriyah Bank of Aden.
4. Attachment No. 4: 24 sheets, including the results of the logistics of the storage and the final inspection of the container inspection report at the customs.
5. Attachment No. 5: 30 sheets containing the results of the logistics of the storage and the final inspection of the container inspection report at the customs.
6. Attachment No. 6: 1 sheet containing the results of the logistics of the storage and the final inspection of the container inspection report at the customs.

A. The writer is a member of the United Financial Affairs Department and has been assigned to check the contents of this package.

B. The writer is a member of the United Financial Affairs Department and has been assigned to check the contents of this package.

C. The writer is a member of the United Financial Affairs Department and has been assigned to check the contents of this package.

D. The writer is a member of the United Financial Affairs Department and has been assigned to check the contents of this package.

---

And the Turk

7 of 29
Annex 41: Documents related to the seizure of explosive precursors chemical

Figure 41.1.
Export invoice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marks &amp; No./ Shipping mark</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>PRICES IN US $</th>
<th>TOTAL AMOUNT IN US $ CIF ADEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS AIR THROW</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>345.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>72.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>55.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>42.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CNTS DOOR PADLOCKS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CNTS ACSESSSE HARDWARE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>465.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>CNTS CAR SPARE PARTS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>CNTS CLOTH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>CNTS CLOTH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>CNTS HAIR ROLL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>CNTS EMPTY BOTTLE GLASS</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>1120.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>CNTS COVERING MACHIN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>CNTS MATERIEL TAIWANA</td>
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<td>CNTS</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>CNTS ATTACH BOTTLE GLASS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>CNTS FLOWER GUM</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>600.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>CNTS PLAST HALZON</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>36.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>CNTS CAMARE SHOW</td>
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<td>CNTS</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>24.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>CNTS HUNGING COTTONS</td>
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<td>7.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>CNTS DRILL RISH JALKE</td>
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<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CNTS DRILL RISH JALKE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>108.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>CNTS CAR SPARE PARTS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>36.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>CNTS MONEY COUNTER</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>380.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>CNTS MONEY COUNTER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>CNTS BICYCLE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>120.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>CNTS HARD WORK ITEMS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>CNTS CONIFRETION FUMP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>CNTS FAIR HAVEN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>CNTS SPARE PART HAVEN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>CNTS CAR SPARE PARTS</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>1548.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>CNTS FISHING ITEMS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>195.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>CNTS IN CAR SPARE PARTS</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>7000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>CNTS CLOTH</td>
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<td>CNTS</td>
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<td>168.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>CNTS CLOTH</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CNTS</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>95.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Confidential
Figure 41.2.
Picture of aluminium powder in drums

Source: Confidential

Figure 41.3.
Picture of iron oxide powder in bags

Source: Confidential
Figure 41.4.
*Photo of one of the bags of rice glue powder*

![Photo of a bag of rice glue powder]

*Source: Confidential*

Figure 41.5.
*Picture of one of the bags of phenolic resin*

![Picture of a bag of phenolic resin]

*Source: Confidential*
Figure 41.6.
Photo of a Houthi explosive charge, likely using phenolic resin to form the fragmentation plate

*Source:* Confidential
Annex 42: Seizure by the Coalition forces of two DPVs with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured by Bonex GmbH, a company registered in Germany

Figure 42.1.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP model

Source: Confidential

Figure 42.2.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP model

Source: https://shop.tezhongzhuangbei.com/gycop_date_63563_514684.html
Annex 43: DPV with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured by Bonex GmbH displayed in Iran in early March 2023

Figure 43.1.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP displayed in Iran

Source: http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html

Figure 43.2.
DPV Bonex of Constellation HP displayed in Iran

Source: http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html

Figures 43.3. (left) and 43.4. (right)
DPV Bonex Constellation HP displayed in Iran

Source: http://www.hisutton.com/Iran-IRGC-Bonex-DPV.html
Annex 44: Seizure by the Yemeni customs on 31 December 2022 at Shahn border crossing of DLE-170 UAV engines with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China

Figure 44.1.
Four of the seized UAV engines

Source: Yemeni customs

Figure 44.2.
Serial number on one of the engines: “TG00637”

Source: Yemeni customs

Figure 44.3.
Serial number on one of the engines: “TG00591”

Source: https://twitter.com/South24E/status/1617160080423620611
Figure 44.4.
One of the crates seized by GoY containing four DLE-170 UAV engines

Source: Yemeni customs
Annex 45: Samad-3 UAV equipped with an engine with similar characteristics to the DLE-170 presented by the Houthis during an exhibition held in Sana’a in March 2021

Figure 45.1.
Some of the Samad-3 UAVs

Figure 45.2.
Close-up picture of the DLE-170 engine of a Samad-3 UAV

Source: https://twitter.com/amirheydari1373/status/1370322989397463040/photo/1
Annex 46: DLE-170 UAV engines documented in the debris of Samad-3 UAVs

Figure 46.1.
Samad-3 that was shot-down in August 2019 by the GoY, the DLE-170 engine is visible


Figure 46.2.
Debris of a Samad-3 found in the KSA, the DLE-170 engine is visible

Source: https://twitter.com/awes_spad/status/1579403997928394753/photo/1
Annex 47: DLE-170 UAV engine of the Samad-3 shot down in February 2022 in Al-Dafrah, UAE

Figure 47.1.
DLE-170 UAV engine

Annex 48: Material seized by the Yemeni customs

Figure 48.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اسم الجمرك</th>
<th>جمرك المنطقة الحرة</th>
<th>تاريخ الضبط</th>
<th>نوع الضبط</th>
<th>ملاحظات</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12/3/2023</td>
<td>54 طائرة دون طيار</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22/3/2023</td>
<td>2990 حزام عسكري</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21/5/2023</td>
<td>5175 سكين صادق</td>
<td>1232 قنبلات عسكرية</td>
<td>498 نظائر عسكرية قديمة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Email: customs.yemen@gmail.com  Fax: +96772395579  P.O Box(6166) Aden. Yemen
Figure 48.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>شحن</th>
<th>اسم الامارة - اليمن</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/4/2023</td>
<td>الغطاء البليز</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80 جهاز إتصال لاسلكي</td>
<td>خلال الأطعمة</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رقم الجمرك</th>
<th>تاريخ الضبط</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23/4/2023</td>
<td>80 جهاز إتصال لاسلكي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>اسم الجمرك</th>
<th>تاريخ الضبط</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>الشحن</td>
<td>خلال الأطعمة</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/4/2023</td>
<td>80 جهاز إتصال لاسلكي</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoY
Appendix A
Translation of the document referred to in annex 48.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Duty Free Area Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>12/3/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>54 drones (UAVs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Duty Free Area Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>22/3/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>2,990 Military belts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Duty Free Area Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>21/5/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>5,175 Pistol Holster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,232 Military Gloves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>498 Military Night Vision Telescope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Translation of the document referred to in annex 48.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Shipping Customs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>23/4/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>50 Motorola Wireless handheld transceiver devices 20 Wireless handheld Transceiver devices (Brand: Mobile Radio) 10 Wireless handheld transceiver devices for crews (Brand: Mobile Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates- Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Shipping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>23/4/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>80 wireless handheld transceiver devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Route</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates- Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customs Name</th>
<th>Shipping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of Seizure</td>
<td>23/6/2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Seizure</td>
<td>40 Glock pistol cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 49: Tactical belt

Figures 49.1. (left) and 49.2. (right)
Houthi forces wearing a tactical belt during a parade held in Ma’rib in August 2023

Source: https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3256299.htm

Comparison between the material observed during the parade conducted by the Houthis in Ma’rib Governorate early August 2023 and the material seized by the GoY on 22 March 2023.

Figure 3
Close-up of a tactical belt observed during a parade held by the Houthis in Ma’rib in August 2023

Source: https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3256299.htm

Figure 4
Tactical belts seized by GoY on 22 March 2023

Source: GoY
Annex 50: Reinforcement of the Houthi naval capabilities

Figure 50.1. Tweet dated 31 August 2023 on a statement allegedly made by the Houthi Commander of the Coastal Defense Brigade

*The Yemeni Navy worked during the armistice and de-escalation to build and develop its capabilities in an unprecedented manner and prepared surprises for the enemy.*

Source: https://twitter.com/ZiadAlyama6259/status/1697312341426049229
Annex 51: Analysis of the debris of the cruise missile launched by the Houthis against Al-Dhabba oil terminal

Figures 51.1. (up) and 51.2. (down)
Point of impact of the cruise missile on the Single Point Mooring (SPM) buoy

Source: Confidential
Figure 51.3.
**Schematic drawing of the Quds-2 cruise missile**

![Schematic drawing of the Quds-2 cruise missile](image)

*Source: Confidential*

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<td><em>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</em></td>
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<td><em>Source: Panel of experts on Yemen</em></td>
<td><em>Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJfJu">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJfJu</a></em></td>
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179 Pictures shown in figures 51.5. and 51.7. have been extracted from videos released by Houthi media. The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos are no longer available.
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<td>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
<td>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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Part of one of the three actuator systems (housing of servo motor) with serial number starting with “211”

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (housing of servo motor highlighted)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.24. Marking of one of the three actuator systems

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.25. Marking on actuator system seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.26.  

Figure 51.27.  
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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**Figure 51.28.** Part of the actuator systems #3 (housing of servo motor) with “test ok / Act 3” sticker

**Source:** Panel of Experts on Yemen

**Figure 51.29.** “test ok / Act 1” found on actuator system seized by the UK in 2022

**Source:** Panel of Experts on Yemen

**Figure 51.30.** Electronic cable of actuator system #2

**Source:** Panel of Experts on Yemen

**Figure 51.31.** Electronic cable of actuator system #3 of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA

**Source:** Panel of Experts on Yemen

**Figures 51.32.** (up) and 51.33. (down) **Battery box front plate**

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<td>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td>Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td><strong>Electronic circuit board (ECB) of battery box</strong></td>
<td><strong>Battery box seized by the UK in 2022</strong></td>
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<td><img src="image1.jpg" alt="ECB Image" /></td>
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*Source:* Panel of Experts on Yemen

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*Source:* Panel of Experts on Yemen

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*Source:* Panel of Experts on Yemen
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Interface box front plate

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.47.
Interface box front plate found among the debris of a cruise missile used in a Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi airport, UAE, in January 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.48.
Broken jet engine suspension bracket

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.49.
Jet engine suspension bracket of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Figure 51.50. Jet engine component

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.51. Jet engine part of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA. Serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.52. (up) and 51.53. (down) AMISCO solenoid coil (part of jet engine ignition system)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.54. (up) and 51.55. (down) AMISCO solenoid coils seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figures 51.56. (up) and 51.57. (down) NCR fuel/oil hose

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.58. NCR fuel/oil hose of a cruise missile used in the Houthi attack in September 2019 on ARAMCO installations in the KSA

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.59. Jet engine component with serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.60. Jet engine component with serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits)

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.61. Serial number in the format “100XXXXX” (100 followed by five digits) on a jet engine seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
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<td><strong>Actuator system seized by the UK in 2022 (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker</strong></td>
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<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Image" /></td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Image" /></td>
<td><img src="image4.png" alt="Image" /></td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
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<td><strong>Part of one of the three actuator systems (side view) with “QC Pass” sticker.</strong> The Panel observes that there is an unusual space between the two “s” in the word “pass”</td>
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*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*  
*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*

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*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*  
*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*

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*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*  
*Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen*
Figure 51.74.  
Close-up of a battery box part  
“E.L… / INSP…/A…” sticker

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.75.  
“E.L.C.P / INSPECTED / ACC” sticker on electronic box seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.76.  
Close-up of battery box part  
“GH… 0359” sticker

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen

Figure 51.77.  
“INSPECTED / ACC / GH02/3A0742” sticker on electronic box seized by the UK in 2022

Source: Panel of Experts on Yemen
Annex 52: Statement by the Houthi Armed Forces’ spokesman and Director of the Moral Guidance Department of the Armed Forces that the previous attacks on Aramco bulk plant located in Jeddah, KSA \(^{181}\) and Jizan port, KSA \(^{182}\), have been conducted with Quds-2 cruise missiles.

Source: https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1505637253653139466

\(^{181}\) S/2022/50, annex 16. On Figure 16.3., the debris of a Quds-2 cruise missile are documented by the Panel in the aftermath of the attacks conducted on the Aramco bulk plant.

\(^{182}\) The Panel documented that the attack on Jizan port was conducted by an UAV and not, as claimed by the Houthi Armed Forces’ spokesman by a Quds-2 cruise missile (S/2022/50, annex 14).
Annex 53: Quds-2 cruise missile

The Panel observes that in April 2022 a mock of a Quds-2 cruise missile was displayed in Tehran, Iran. The Panel notes that this mock was bearing a similar identification number to the one visible on the Quds-2 cruise missile displayed by the Houthis during in March 2021 in Sana’a.

Figure 53.1. Mock of a Quds-2 cruise missile displayed in April 2022 in Tehran

“Tehran, Apr. 29 (MNA) – Some missiles of the Resistance axis were exhibited on the sidelines of the Quds Day march in Tehran.

The 'Qassim' missile of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movements, the 'Fateh-110' missile of the Lebanese Resistance movement Hezbollah and the 'Quds-2' missile are among the missiles which were displayed on Friday on the sidelines of the International Quds Day rallies in Tehran.

Earlier in the day, Iran's latest ballistic missiles "Kheiber-Shekan" and "Emad-3" were also unveiled during the Quds Day march. 'Kheiber-Shekan' is the world's longest-range tactical ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 km. 'Emad-3' long-range missile is a new generation of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles of Iran.

The International Quds Day is an annual event held on the last Friday of the Holy month of Ramadan that was initiated by the late founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran Imam Khomeini in 1979 to express support for the Palestinians and oppose Zionism and Israeli occupation.

Millions of Iranians from various provinces across the country took part in nationwide rallies to show their solidarity with the Palestinians and condemn Israel’s occupation and atrocities.”

Figure 53.2.
Quds-2 cruise missile displayed by the Houthis in March 2021 in Sana’a

Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1370009321879314438/photo/1

Figure 53.3. (left) and 53.4. (right)
Comparison of the identification numbers of the Quds-2 cruise missile displayed in Sana’a in March 2021 and the mock displayed in Tehran in April 2022

Source of figure 53.3.: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1370009321879314438/photo/1

Annex 54: Military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

1. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket launchers, and UAV

1. Eight models of ballistic missiles, six models of long-range guided rockets, three models of cruise missiles, and 13 models of UAV (surveillance and/or attack) which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo (annexes 56-57 and 59-61).

2. Air defence

2. Four models of air defence systems which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo (annex 62).

3. Surveillance and communication material

3. Two models of EOSS and high frequency communication equipment which were displayed by the Houthis during the parades are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo. The main body of one of the EOSS, designated as “Sadiq” by the Houthis shows a similar shape as one of the materials seized by the UK, referred to in para. 74 (annex 63).

4. Mobility

4. The Panel observes that during the military parade held in Sana’a on 22 September 2022, the Houthis displayed hundreds of Toyota Land Cruiser pickups, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo. Most of these vehicles that appear to be new have been transformed into ‘technicals’, equipped with a wide range of armaments such as Heavy Machineguns (HMG), anti-aircraft canons, Man-Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS), ATGMs, recoilless guns and MLRS (annex 65).

5. The Panel believes that such a large number of light 4x4 vehicles gives the Houthis the capacity to conduct large movements of troops in a short time and over great distances while providing them with significant firepower.

5. Maritime capability

6. During the parades, the Houthis also displayed the following materials which are being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo: a) Four models of AShM (annex 71); b) Seven models of armed speed boats and/or remote controlled WBIEDs (annexes 72-73); c) Two models of large volume influence naval mines, one model of naval limpet mine, one model of naval shape charge and three models of naval contact mines (annex 74).

6. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

7. The Panel observes that during the military parade held in Sana’a on 22 September 2022, the Houthis displayed new assault rifles, sniper rifles and Anti-Material Rifles (AMR) (annexes 66-68). This material is being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

8. The Panel observes that similar new assault rifles have been displayed by the Houthis during their naval show of force held on April 2023 in Kamaran Island, north of Hudaydah (para. 61). The Panel notes that these assault rifles, similar to the AK-103, are allegedly manufactured locally by the Houthis (annex 67). In addition, the Panel documented that the Houthis reportedly manufactured locally clones of AK-104 compact assault rifle (annex 68). This material is also being investigated by the Panel for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

183 The Panel observes that some UAVs initially dedicated to conduct surveillance have been transformed by the Houthis to drop bomblets or mortar bombs (annex 60).

184 Weapons mounted on civilian vehicles such as 4x4, pickups, trucks, and similar.

185 Two variants of these clones have been identified by the Panel. The markings indicate the year of production as 2022 and 2023.
Annex 55: Status of the material displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Figure 56.1. and S/2018/594, para. 89 and figure 35.1</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Ballistic missile Qaher-M2</td>
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<td>Figure 61.1. and S/2020/326, figure 5</td>
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<td>Figure 61.2. and S/2020/326, footnote 47 of the para. 57</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 61.3.</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>AShM Khalij Fars “Aasif”</td>
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<td>Surface to air missile Saqr-1 “358”</td>
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<td>Figure 62.1. and S/2023/130, para. S/2023/130, para. 51; S/2022/50, para. 61;</td>
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<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface to air missile Thaqib-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>S/2021/79, para. 73 and annex 13; and S/2020/326, para. 52 and annex 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface to air missile Mi-raj</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 62.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPADS similar to Misagh-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 62.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance UAV Mersad-1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance UAV Mersad-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Rased</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Figure 59.3. and S/2019/83, para. 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Wa’aed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Figure 59.4. and S/2023/130, para. 57; S/2022/50, para. 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Shihab</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Raqib</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Rujum</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Qasef-2K</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Samad-2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Figure 59.8. and S/2019/83, para. 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Samad-3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Khatif-1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV Khatif-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 59.11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed boat Aasef-1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 72.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed boat Aasef-3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 72.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed boat Malah</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 72.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBIED Tawfan-3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 73.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBIED Tawfan-2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Figure 73.2. and S/2019/83, paras 92-94 and figure X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBIED Tawfan-1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 73.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBIED Toufan-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 73.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval mine Masjur-1 AMD-1-500</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval mine Masjur-2 DM-1-2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval mine MTA Thakib</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval mine MKA Karrar-1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval mine HAD Aseef-4</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval mine MGA Auwaifs</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval mine Moujahid</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 74.6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFP Model 1</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 70.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFP Model 2</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 70.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFP Model 3</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 70.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EFP Model 4</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 70.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directional mine</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 69.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AP bounding mine</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 69.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EOSS Sadiq</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 63.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EOSS Haydar</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 63.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Frequency (HF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) radio manpack</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 63.3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light armoured vehicle Hani</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 64.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armoured Land Cruiser pickup</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 64.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed into ‘technical’</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Figure 64.3. and annex 65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 56: Ballistic missiles displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 56 to 59 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi’s media.

1. Hudaydah parade
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKlTQ

2. Sana’a parade
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGIfJgU
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVkxjBNPTg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ballistic missile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borkhan-2</td>
<td>Figure 56.1.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borkhan-3</td>
<td>Figure 56.2.</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falaq</td>
<td>Figure 56.3.</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatem</td>
<td>Figure 56.4.</td>
<td>- 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

186 The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ballistic missile</th>
<th>Fateh-11</th>
<th>Figure 56.5.</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile</td>
<td>Al-Bahr</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markings observed:</td>
<td>22, 24, 25, 27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile</td>
<td>Qaher-M2</td>
<td>Figure 56.7.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic missile</td>
<td>Moheet</td>
<td>Figure 56.8.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

187 Markings on the missiles.
Annex 57: Guided rockets displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guided rocket Badr-1P</td>
<td>Figure 57.1.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markings observed:</td>
<td></td>
<td>1004, 1005, 1007, 1008, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1014, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1025, 1026, 1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided rocket Badr-1</td>
<td>Figure 57.2.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markings observed:</td>
<td></td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided rocket Badr-2</td>
<td>Figure 57.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markings observed:</td>
<td></td>
<td>1160, 1162, 1164, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided rocket</td>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Markings observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badr-3</td>
<td>57.4.</td>
<td>54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasim-1</td>
<td>57.5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeer</td>
<td>57.6.</td>
<td>501, 503, 508, 509, 510, 515, 516, 517, 518, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 529, 530, 537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 58: Rocket launchers displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unguided rocket Zilzal-2</strong></td>
<td>Figure 58.1.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MLRS 122mm, six tubes</strong></td>
<td>Figure 58.2.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MLRS 107mm, eight tubes</strong></td>
<td>Figure 58.3.</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 59: UAVs displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is for investigating potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surveillance UAV</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersad-1</td>
<td>Figure 59.1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surveillance UAV</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersad-2</td>
<td>Figure 59.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack UAV</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rased</td>
<td>Figure 59.3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack UAV</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa’aed</td>
<td>Figure 59.4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV</td>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shihab</td>
<td>59.5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raqib</td>
<td>59.6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasef-2K</td>
<td>59.7.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samad-2</td>
<td>59.8.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samad-3</td>
<td>59.9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khatif-1</td>
<td>59.10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack UAV</td>
<td>Figure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khatif-2</td>
<td>59.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rujum</td>
<td>59.12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 60: Surveillance UAV transformed by the Houthis to drop bomblets or mortar bombs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures 60.1. (left) and 60.2. (right)</th>
<th>Bomblets carried under a DJI Mavic-3 UAV allegedly shot down by pro-PLC forces on 14 November 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1598413034912743425/photo/3" alt="Figure 60.1" /></td>
<td><img src="https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1598413034912743425/photo/3" alt="Figure 60.2" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1598413034912743425/photo/3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures 60.3. (left) and 60.4. (right)</th>
<th>Bomblets carried under Rujum UAV displayed during the military parade held in Sana’a in September 2022. The bomblets appear to be of a similar model that the one displayed in figure 60.2.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU" alt="Figure 60.3" /></td>
<td><img src="https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/161112652760494899https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/16112652760494899" alt="Figure 60.4" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source (for the figure 60.3.):** https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU

**Source (for the figure 60.4.):**
https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/161112652760494899https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/16112652760494899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figures 60.5. (left) and 60.6. (right)</th>
<th>120mm mortar bomb carried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

188 The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos are no longer available.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235942" alt="Image" /> <img src="https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1673390105615015944/photo/2" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Source (for the figure 60.5.): <a href="https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235942">https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235942</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1673390105615015944/photo/2">https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz__/status/1673390105615015944/photo/2</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under a Rujum UAV operated by the Houthis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU" alt="Image" /></td>
<td>Source: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures 60.7. (left) and 60.8. (right)</td>
<td>60mm mortar bomb carried under Rased UAV displayed during the military parade held in Sana’a in September 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 61: Cruise missiles displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 61 to 66 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi’s media.\(^\text{189}\)

1. Hudaydah parade  
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ

2. Sana’a parade  
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU  
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4  
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVkxjBNPTg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise missile Quds-1</strong></td>
<td>Figure 61.1.</td>
<td>Hudaydah parade: -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Markings observed</strong>: MC-79074, MC-79075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise missile Quds-2</strong></td>
<td>Figure 61.2.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Markings observed</strong>: MC-790777, MC-790778, MC-790779, MC-790781(^\text{190})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cruise missile Quds-3</strong></td>
<td>Figure 61.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Markings observed</strong>: MC-2014053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{189}\) The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.

\(^{190}\) See S/2023/130, figure 5.13, showing the debris of a Quds-2 cruise missile indicates the marking “MC-790721”, which is consistent with the markings observed on the parade held in Sana’a on 22 September 2022.
Annex 62: Air defence systems displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
<th>Hudaydah parade</th>
<th>Sana’a parade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surface to air missile Saqr-1 “358”</td>
<td>Figure 62.1.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface to air missile Thaqib-2</td>
<td>Figure 62.2.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface to air missile Mi-raj</td>
<td>Figure 62.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPADS similar to Misagh-2</td>
<td>Figure 62.4.</td>
<td>Several</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 63: EOSS and HF/VHF radio manpacks displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EOSS Sadiq</strong>&lt;sup&gt;191&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Figure 63.1.</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EOSS Haydar</strong></td>
<td>Figure 63.2.</td>
<td>- 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HF/VHF radio manpack</strong></td>
<td>Figure 63.3. (left) 63.4. (right)</td>
<td>Observed Observed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>191</sup> This EOSS presents similar characteristics to the EOSS-I-103 produced in Iran (annex 29, figure 29.3.).
Annex 64: Light armoured vehicles and ‘technicals’ displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Hudaydah parade</th>
<th>Sana’a parade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light armoured vehicle Hani</td>
<td>Figure 64.1.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Land Cruiser pickup</td>
<td>Figure 64.2.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed into a ‘technical’</td>
<td>Figure 64.3.</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
<td>Several</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 65: Variants of the Toyota Land Cruiser pickup transformed as ‘technicals’ displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

According to Toyota Motor Company, the vehicles shown appear to be Land Cruiser Single Cab Pick-up with left hand drive. This model is sold worldwide and was first manufactured in 1999 and it is still in production. Toyota informed the Panel that some of the vehicles displayed in the parades are for sale in the Middle East region given the front hood ornament, with primary destinations Saudi Arabia, Oman, and UAE.

Figure 65.1.
Mounted with DShK 12.7x108mm HMG

Figure 65.2.
Mounted with KPVT 14.5x114mm HMG

Figure 65.3.
Mounted with ZPU-2, 14.5x114mm twin-barrel HMG

Figure 65.4.
Mounted with ZU-23, 23mm twin-barrel air defence canon
Figure 65.5. Mounted with 37mm anti-aircraft canon similar to Type 55 or a variant of it

Figure 65.6. Mounted with 37mm twin-barrel anti-aircraft canon Type 65 or a variant of it

Figure 65.7. Mounted with 82mm recoilless gun similar to B10 or a variant of it

Figure 65.8. Mounted with 76mm recoilless gun similar to SPG-9 or a variant of it
Figure 65.9.
Mounted with 75mm recoilless gun similar to M20 or a variant of it

Figure 65.10.
Mounted with 106mm recoilless gun similar to M40 or a variant of it

Figure 65.11.
Mounted with ‘Dehlavieh’ ATGMs

Figure 65.12.
Mounted with ATGMs launching post similar to 9K111

Figure 65.13.
Mounted with ATGMs launching post similar to 9P151
Figure 65.14.  
**Mounted with 82mm mortar**

![Mounted with 82mm mortar](image)

Figure 65.15.  
**Mounted with 120mm mortar**

![Mounted with 120mm mortar](image)

Figure 65.16.  
**Mounted with 107mm MLRS with eight tubes**

![Mounted with 107mm MLRS with eight tubes](image)

Figure 65.17.  
** Mounted with 122mm MLRS with six tubes**

![Mounted with 122mm MLRS with six tubes](image)

Figure 65.18.  
**Mounted with Zilzal-2 or Zilzal-3 rocket launcher**

![Mounted with Zilzal-2 or Zilzal-3 rocket launcher](image)
Annex 66: SALW displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allegedly locally manufactured AK-103 assault rifle</td>
<td>Figure 66.1.</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshdar sniper rifle</td>
<td>Figure 66.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified heavy caliber anti-material rifle</td>
<td>Figure 66.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 67: AK-103 reportedly manufactured locally by the Houthis

Figure 67.1.
AK-103 variant 1 with markings indicating the year of production as 2022

Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1613868055326593024/photo/1

Figure 67.2.
AK-103 variant 2 and related comment

Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1634279349535887392/photo/4

Figures 67.3. (left) and 67.4. (right)
Markings indicating a production in 2023

Serial number: “2023 YMN 000075” Made by six digits
Serial number: “2023 YMN 02113282” Made by eight digits

Source figure 67.3.: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1636029291098980352/photo/3
Source figure 67.4.: https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1697728634142728396/photo/2

192 https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1664393695037145090/photo/1
Figures 67.5. (up), 67.6. (centre), 67.7. (down)

Display of an AK103 in 2021 in Houthi-controlled area

The Panel notes that the rifle is presented to Mohammad Ali Al-Houthi, former President of the Houthi Revolutionary Council, also the cousin of Abdul-Malik Badreddin al-Houthi (YEi.004)

Source: https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1472892080473083908
Annex 68: AK-104 manufactured in Houthi-controlled area

Figure 68.1.  
AK-104 variant 1.  
The Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” is visible on the box.

Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1651706775756840962

Figure 68.2.  
Markings indicating a production in 2022.

Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1651706775756840962
Figure 68.3. (up), 68.4. (centre) and 68.5. (down)
**AK-104 variant 2**

*Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1654164726887088154*

Figure 68.6.
**Markings indicating the production year as 2023**

*Source: https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1649519474557571073/photo/1*
Figure 68.7.  
Sale of AK-103 in Sana’a

Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1656569056013570048/photo/1

Figure 68.8.  
Sale of AK-103 in Sana’a

Source: https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1678426651732897799/photo/1

Figure 68.9.  
Sale of AK-104 in Sa’dah

Source: https://twitter.com/TbyNasr/status/1678473056774135814/photo/1
Annex 69: Landmines displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 69 and 70 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi media.

1. Hudaydah parade
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ

2. Sana’a parade
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJfJgU
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Byg0ROPygG4
   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-pVkjxBNPTg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hudaydah parade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP directional mine</td>
<td>Figure 69.1.</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP fragmentation bounding mine</td>
<td>Figure 69.2.</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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193 The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.
Annex 70: EFP displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Hudaydah on 1 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFP (Model 1)</td>
<td>Figure 70.1.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP (Model 2)</td>
<td>Figure 70.2.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP (Model 3)</td>
<td>Figure 70.3.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP (Model 4)</td>
<td>Figure 70.4.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 71: AShMs displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and in Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

Pictures shown in the annexes 71 to 74 have been extracted from videos released by Houthi’s media.\(^\text{194}\)

1. Hudaydah parade  
   [link]

2. Sana’a parade  
   [link]
   [link]
   [link]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
<th>Hudaydah parade</th>
<th>Sana’a parade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AShM Al-Mandab-1</td>
<td>Figure 71.1.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AShM Al-Mandab-2</td>
<td>Figure 71.2.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AShM Falaq-1</td>
<td>Figure 71.3.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AShM Khalij Fars “Aasif”</td>
<td>Figure 71.4.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{194}\) The account associated with these videos was terminated in July 2023 and the videos no longer available.
Annex 72: Armed speed boats displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana’a on 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Aasef-1</td>
<td>Figure 72.1.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Aasef-3</td>
<td>Figure 72.2.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Malah</td>
<td>Figure 72.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Hudaydah parade</th>
<th>Sana’a parade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Aasef-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Aasef-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed speed boat Malah</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 73: Remotely-controlled Water-borne IEDs (WBIEDs) displayed by the Houthis during the military parade held in Sana’a on 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hudaydah parade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotely-controlled WBIED</td>
<td>Figure 73.1.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawfan-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotely-controlled WBIED</td>
<td>Figure 73.2.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawfan-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotely-controlled WBIED</td>
<td>Figure 73.3.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawfan-1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remotely-controlled WBIED</td>
<td>Figure 73.4.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toufan-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 74: Naval mines displayed by the Houthis during the military parades held in Hudaydah and Sana’a on 1 and 22 September 2022, which the Panel is investigating for potential violations of the targeted arms embargo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Picture</th>
<th>Number observed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence naval mine Masjur-1 AMD-1-500</strong></td>
<td>Figure 74.1.</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence naval mine Masjur-2 DM-1-2</strong></td>
<td>Figure 74.2.</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limpet naval mine MTA Thakib</strong>&lt;sup&gt;195&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Figure 74.3.</td>
<td>- 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shape charge naval mine HAD Aseef-4</strong></td>
<td>Figure 74.4.</td>
<td>16 -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact naval mine MGA Auwais</th>
<th>Figure 74.5.</th>
<th>18</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact naval mine Moujahid</td>
<td>Figure 74.6.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact naval mine MKA Karrar-1</td>
<td>Figure 74.7.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 75: Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics consistent with those manufactured in China reportedly documented for sale in the black market in Sana’a, Yemen

Figure 75.1.

![Picture posted on 11 May 2023](https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat/status/1656683743573147648/photo/1)

Source: [https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat/status/1656683743573147648/photo/1](https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat/status/1656683743573147648/photo/1)

Figure 75.2.

![Serial number: 62042402 Picture posted on 8 April 2023](https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1644478722496512003/photo/2)

Source: [https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1644478722496512003/photo/2](https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1644478722496512003/photo/2)
Annex 76: AKS20U compact assault rifles with technical characteristics similar to those manufactured in Russia reportedly documented for sale in the black market in Sana’a

Figure 76.1.
AKS20U (markings on the rifle are written in Cyrillic)

Pictures posted on Twitter on 5 June 2023

Source: https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1665803168654000128/photo/1

Figures 76.2. (left) and 76.3. (right)
AKS20U posted on the Twitter account of a Yemeni weapons’ shop owner

Pictures posted on 3 May 2023

Source: https://twitter.com/YemenTactical/status/1653609290790326278
Annex 77: CF-98-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings similar to those manufactured in China

Sample 1

Figure 77.1.: Contact details of the shop owner in Sana’a

Figures 77.2. and 77.3.: Left view of the pistol and close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers

Serial number: “15-CN 006313”
Pictures posted on 16 August 2021

Source: https://www.facebook.com/103455701997637/photos/pb.100070385013748.-2207520000./129080262768514/?type=3

Sample 2

Figure 77.4.: Location in Sana’a and contact details of the shop owner

Figures 77.5. (left), 77.6. (center) and 77.7. (right: close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers)

Serial number: “15-CN 009885”
Pictures posted on 3 February 2023

196 The CF-98-9 model is the commercial variant of the Chinese military QSZ-92 pistol developed in 1994.
Sample 3

Figure 77.8.: Location in Sana’a and contact details of the shop owner

Figures 77.9. (left) and 77.10. (close-up of the factory marking and serial numbers)

Serial number: “15-CN 029430”
Pictures posted on 3 May 2023

Source: https://twitter.com/DhiaaArms/status/1653770115689660416

Sample 4

Figures 77.11. (left), 77.12. (right) and 77.13 (down): CF-98-9 pistol documented in the black market in Sana’a

The serial numbers of this pistol are consistent with other documented in the black market in Sana’a.\textsuperscript{197}

Source: Confidential

\textsuperscript{197} To protect the source, the serial numbers of this pistol are hidden.
CF-98-9 serial numbers

Material documented by the Panel as displayed for sale in Sana’a is shown in blue
Material documented by the Panel of Experts on Somalia as used by Al-Shabaab in an assassination attempt is shown in green
Material documented in Somalia in 2021 by “Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GTOIC)” is shown in red

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 001694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 001954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 003259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 006313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 006331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 007633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 008461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 008772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 008795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 009785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 010840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 017542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 019582</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-CN 021000</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-CN 023827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 025554</td>
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<td>15-CN 026530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 027724</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-CN 028735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 028754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 028834</td>
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<td>15-CN 028943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 029336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 030078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 030930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-CN 033211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extract from the Panel of Expert on Somalia report S/2019/858

Figure 77.14. (left) and 77.15. (right)

Serial number: “15-CN 006321”

CF-98-9 reportedly in the hands of Islamic State (IS) fighters, Somalia

Source: https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1175325454657626114/photo/1

Figure 77.16.

Source: https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1616817037443010560/photo/3

Figure 77.17.

Source: https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1460306965654081539/photo/4

Figure 77.18.
Annex 78: Smuggling of G3 retrofitted in Yemen into the Sudan

Figures 78.1. (up) and 78.2. (down)
Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana’a

![Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana’a](image)

Markings indicating the local retrofitting

Figure 78.3.
Location in Sana’a and contact details of the shop owner

Source: [https://twitter.com/KhaldhydrT17459/status/1685799313983582208](https://twitter.com/KhaldhydrT17459/status/1685799313983582208)

Figures 78.4. (left) and 78.5. (right)
Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana’a

![Locally retrofitted G3 displayed for sale in Sana’a](image)

Figure 78.6.
Location in Sana’a and contact details of the shop owner

Source: [https://twitter.com/ZynAlsaydy/status/1687482395325259776/photo/1](https://twitter.com/ZynAlsaydy/status/1687482395325259776/photo/1)
G3 retrofitted in Yemen displayed in Sudan as in the hands of RSF

Figure 78.7.
Source: https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1674053735222321152

Figure 78.8.
Source: https://twitter.com/Moh_Gamea/status/1666817457607303170

Figure 78.9.
Source: https://twitter.com/FaisalElsheikh/status/1674314259256188928

Figure 78.10.
Source: https://www.militantwire.com/p/arsenal-of-the-rapid-support-forces
Annex 79: Brief overview of the situation of migrants in Yemen

1. The Panel has been investigating the situation of migrants in Yemen. Based on the data received by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and GoY sources, it is estimated that there are nearly 200,000 migrants in Yemen, including asylum seekers and refugees, mostly Ethiopian (89%) and Somali. More than 77,000 of them arrived as of January 2023, marking a significant increase from the previous year, which counted a total of 73,233 arrivals.

2. The vast majority of migrants in Yemen are subjected to severe ill treatment and live in extremely dire conditions. Of the 200,000, IOM estimates that some 40,000 want to be repatriated, while about 160,000 are on the move trying to reach other Gulf countries. The summer months of June, July, and August 2023 witnessed a major spike in arrivals. Most of the migrants reaching the Yemeni shores are not aware that there is an ongoing armed conflict.

3. Once in Yemen, migrants are dependent on trafficking networks who deprive them of their liberty if they are unable to pay additional fees. They are subjected to torture and other forms of ill treatment, including sexual violence, and are forced to request money from their families. Some of them become pregnant as a result of rape, which creates a major stigma, including when they are able to return to their country of origin. Those who are able to pay, are set free and can continue their journeys upwards. Reportedly, migrants are asked to pay fees at checkpoints, which are managed by various parties to the conflict, including the STC, GoY, and the Houthis. Also, the practice reported in the communication by the group of UN independent experts to the Houthis of October 2022 is still ongoing.

4. The Panel also received reports of targeted killing of migrants attempting to cross the border with the KSA, including the presence of mass graves on the Yemeni side of the border. Migrants who manage to reach Sa’dah Governorate and those who are unable to pay the requested fees to cross the KSA border, are allegedly forced to be the first ones attempting to cross, so that they would be shot first by the Saudi Border Guards. Children are reportedly most likely to be those put forward.

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199 IOM implements the Voluntary Humanitarian Return Programme, through which about 6,000 repatriations took place at the time of writing this report from Marib, Aden, and Sana’a since the beginning of 2023. For more information, see https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/soaring-number-migrants-distress-yemen-demands-greater-relief-efforts-0.

200 “The Yemen Immigration, Passport and Nationality Authority (IPNA), which reports to the Ansar Allah movement, collaborates with traffickers to systematically direct migrants through the governorates of Al Jawf and Sa’dah. Traffickers and these authorities reportedly coordinate to extort fees of around 250 Saudi Riyal (SAR) from each migrant under the pretext of facilitating their passage to KSA. This purportedly constitutes an extremely lucrative scheme, earning the IPNA in Sa’dah and the trafficking networks an estimated $50,000 per week.” https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27562.

Figures 79.1 (left) and 79.2. (right)

Smuggling boat transporting migrants from the Horn of Africa approaching the Yemeni shores on 3 August 2023 through Bab al-Mandab Strait

Source: Confidential
Annex 80: The Central Security Camp in Sana’a and the so-called Exchange House prison

1. The Central Security Camp in Sana’a includes several buildings, such as the so-called Exchange House prison, operated by the Houthi National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs under the leadership with Abdulqader Al-Murtada. The prison hosts the detainees, mostly civilians, some of whom are supposed to be included in prisoner exchange deals between the Houthi and other parties to the conflict. Some detainees have been living in this prison for years. These include political prisoners, journalists, prisoners of war from the battle of Jabara Valley of 2019, men detained on criminal charges, mentally ill detainees, and drug addicts, among others.

2. Prisoners are systematically subjected to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by the prison’s staff. Based on the multiple reports received by the Panel, various members of the prison’s management were and still are torturing the prisoners, including Abdulqader Al-Murtada.

3. Some of the types of torture inflicted to the prisoners include: 1) Pointing guns at the head and pretending to shoot; 2) Making them stand for long hours and stand while spreading their legs and hitting between the thighs, including on the genitals; 3) Hitting their heads on the wall; 4) Removing chairs so that they fall on the ground and subsequently stepping on them, and dragging them; 5) Beating with metal, wooden, and electric sticks; 6) Administering electric shocks; and 7) Hanging in outdoor areas to intimidate other detainees. Prisoners are mostly denied the required medical treatment, including for injuries caused by the torture, and in some cases of emergency, the prison staff prevented medical personnel to perform surgeries, explicitly requesting the provision of antibiotics as an alternative to surgical procedures. As a result, some prisoners have permanent disabilities, and some have reportedly died.

4. The Panel also gathered evidence of extortion. Prisoners and their families are forced to pay high amounts of money to be able to make brief phone calls or to be able to meet. Often, the phone calls are allowed for the sole purpose of requesting families to transfer additional money, which will be administered by the prison’s management on behalf of each prisoner. The prisoners who can pay more, are usually given a better treatment and better cells, while those who cannot pay, are subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

5. The prisoners must pay for the medicines they need while detained. For example, a box of paracetamol is reportedly sold at a price that is five times the regular local price. Based on multiple reports received by the Panel, some of the medicines purchased by the prisoners were contained in boxes with a “not for sale” label, or that were known to be medical products donated by humanitarian agencies and sold to the prisoners. Allegedly, some of the prison guards were providing these details and other information about internal affairs of the prison to the prisoners, mostly in exchange of money or qat purchased by the prisoners through their available funds controlled and managed by the prison’s management.

6. Periodically, some of the prisoners are held in incommunicado detention for months. Detainees are also held in solitary confinement, in cells with no mattress, no blankets, sometimes in abandoned bathrooms converted into cells for long periods of time. Some of the cells are called “squeezers”, as their size is reportedly 1 meter by 0.5 meters with no access to water and ventilation. Some of the prisoners have reportedly been held in the “squeezers” for months. During the day, through loudspeakers, detainees are forced to listen to lessons from Shia’ clerics and Al-Masirah channel broadcasting, among others, lectures by Abdulmalik Al-Houthi (YEi.004), aimed to “re-educate” prisoners, a vast majority of whom are reportedly Sunni.

7. According to multiple sources, there are some 3,000 detainees currently held in the Central Security Camp. Some of these prisoners were minors at the time when they were initially
detained, some became mentally ill as a result of the severe torture inflicted, and some died under mysterious circumstances.

Figure 80.1.
**Central Security Camp area in Sana’a where the so-called Exchange House prison is located**

Source: Confidential

Figure 80.2.
**Close-up of the prison building and surrounding buildings**

Source: Confidential
Annex 81: The impact of the protracted conflict on the freedom of expression, including of the media, in Yemen

1. The protracted conflict has negatively impacted freedom of expression, including the media, in the country. Propaganda and disinformation deepened ideological and socio-political divisions across Yemen, which served to delegitimize the work of journalists fostering a climate of self-censorship. In addition, the increasingly strict enforcement, since early 2022 of mahram (male guardian) imposed by the Houthis in areas under their control on women’s travel, has further challenged the work of female journalists.202

2. Civil society and human rights activists, journalists, and other people active on social media are primarily accused of spreading false and malicious misinformation, espionage, including for foreign entities, and disruption of public security.

3. In Yemen, there are nearly no independent media outlets, and public information is generally highly manipulated by parties to the conflict and their supporters to promulgate disinformation and misinformation that would result in increasing political leverage. Often, this results in the abduction, detention, or enforced disappearance of people engaged in the media, or online platforms.

4. During the reporting period, the Panel has investigated several cases of men and women who have been and that are currently detained or forcibly disappeared for having expressed their views online or on paper.

5. The multiple evidence gathered indicates that the Houthis use popular or relatively known figures to support their own propaganda, forcing them to sign (often blindfolded) declarations of guilt that include the spreading of false information or espionage. Another regular practice by the de facto authority, is to force the detainees, in exchange of freedom, to record videos in which they admit their responsibilities on the alleged charges. In some cases, after the video is recorded, the detainee is freed, while in other cases, the video is widely broadcasted, but the person remains in detention often for the purpose of either negotiating their release through other means. Of particular concern, the Houthis, through their specialized criminal court, have issued death sentences against the four journalists Abdelkhaliq Amran, Tawfiq Al-Mansouri, Harith Hamid, and Akram Al-Walidi.

6. The STC is also detaining, forcibly disappearing, or threatening journalists and activists who publicly criticize them and are also forced to sign or deliver confessions. Based on reports received by the Panel, the STC-affiliated forces have also abducted and forcibly disappeared many men and women who have been publicly vocal, through online videos and social media posts against their operations. Panel sources indicate that many of the abductees are held in secret detention facilities. One of the emblematic cases is the one of the journalist Ahmad Maher,203 particularly in relation to his right to a fair trial in the Specialized Criminal Court of Aden. Reportedly, since his arrest and detention by the STC-affiliated forces on 6 August 2022 until the end of February 2023 he was prevented from being brought before the court for 13 times, allegedly due to logistical impediments, partly attributed to the GoY.

7. The Panel also received reports of threats by the GoY against people who criticize its actions, including via social media and other public fora. Arrest warrants have been issued against some journalists who accused the judiciary in Ma’rib of corruption.204

203 S/2023/130, para. 108.
Annex 82: Directive issued on 17 July 2023 by the Rector of Ibb University addressed to the affiliated Deans of colleges and centers for ensuring compliance of regulation on the appearance and uniform of male and female students

Figure 82.1.

Directive issued by Ibb University Rector

Source: Confidential
Appendix A

Translation of the directive issued by Ibb University Rector

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Ibb University
President of the University
Office of the President of the University
Outgoing Communications Section
No.: 413 Attachments:
Date: 28 Dhu al-Hijjah A.H. 1444
Corresponding to: 16 July 2023

To: The Vice-President for Student Affairs
The Deans of Colleges and Centres

Sirs,

Subject: Standards of appearance and dress for university students

In respect of the above-mentioned subject, and having regard to the teachings of our true religion, as well as the imperative to uphold our Yemeni moral and social values and our university’s values, and considering that students’ appearance is something that matters to us and a reflection of their development, students in all the colleges and centres of the university must adhere to the following:

• Students must carry and clearly display their university card when they attend lectures, engage in practical studies, are in the library or engage in any activity at the university during the academic day.

• Students must maintain personal hygiene and wear clean clothes that cover the body, are not transparent or revealing, are not of extremely bright, eye-catching colours, and are not indecent. The following is strictly forbidden:

I. Males

• Male students may not enter the campus and the campuses of colleges located away from the main campus carrying a weapon of any kind. Whosoever violates this directive will be referred for investigation.

• They must not cut or style their hair in an unsuitable fashion and use light-coloured hair dyes.

• They must cut long and unclean nails.

• They must not sport tattoos, colours and piercings.

• They must not wear metal rings, earrings and chains on the neck, hands or clothing.

• They must not wear t-shirts or any inappropriate shirt that reveals the chest, or large parts of it, and the forearms.

• They must not wear tight, body-hugging trousers, trousers that sit below the waist and trousers that touch the ground.

• They must not wear any clothing that bears political, regional or sectarian slogans.
• They must not wear shoes, sportswear, shorts, tanks tops and extremely loose clothing.

II. Females
• Females must not wear tight, body-hugging or tight-waisted clothing and dresses.
• They must not wear clothing that bears decorations or political, regional, sectarian or inappropriate slogans.
• They must not sport manicures, colours or any dyes on the body and hands, as such are considered to be unclean.
• They must not have long nails and fingernail extension, which demonstrate lack of personal hygiene.
• They must not wear high heels and open shoes, which make the legs vulnerable to being pricked by contaminated needles.
• They must not wear an excessive number of accessories on their hands and legs, other than the usual accessories.
• They must not have nose piercings or use teeth decorations and coloured lenses.
• They must not use excessively bright cosmetics on the face, eyes and lips, as well as false eyelashes.

These directives shall be implemented, and implementation must be monitored on a daily basis in order to ensure compliance.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Nasr Muhammad al-Hajili
President of the University
Annex 83: Houthis’ gender segregation policy: the case of the Faculty of Mass Communication of Sana’a University

1. On 17 July 2023, the Houthi-affiliated Student Forum, which reportedly replaced the Students Union of Sana’a University, published a new circular to the students of the faculty of Mass Communication.

2. According to the circular, the academic year would start on 22 July 2023 and that three days per week would be allocated for male students, namely Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, while female students would attend on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday.

3. This prompted immediate reactions by students and professors who did not support this decision. Reportedly, Dr Samia Al-Aghbary, head of the journalism department of the Faculty of Mass Communication, was removed from her function because of her disagreement on this decision and was subsequently replaced with the Houthi-appointed Dr. Ali Hussein Hassan Al-Ammar.205

Figure 83.1.
Circular of the Houthi-affiliated Sana’a University Student Forum published on 17 July 2023

Source: Confidential

205 https://twitter.com/HindAleryani/status/1686345279866359808/photo/1.
4. The Houthi public media outlets reacted to the criticisms received on this decision. They published some articles presenting the findings of research reportedly conducted by renowned international universities such as Harvard University, alleging the devastating effects of gender mixing. Among the reported findings of the Harvard university research, a quarter of the number of female students are raped in western universities because of the policy of gender mixing.\textsuperscript{206} The Panel wrote to Harvard University to verify the veracity of the above-mentioned research and findings and is awaiting a response.

5. Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, Chairman of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, publicly informed that “this decision was done in accordance with the wishes of the students, because they carry modesty, pride, and high Islamic values”.\textsuperscript{207} He also noted that fathers can choose if they want their daughters to study with male students, and if so, they can submit the request to the university. Multiple sources indicated that Al-Houthi is well aware that Yemeni fathers would not dare to submit such a request.

\textsuperscript{206} https://althawrah.ye/archives/818419.
\textsuperscript{207} https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1682753439170805760.
Annex 84: Defamation as a gender-based violence tool against Yemeni women, including diaspora women

1. The use of public defamation against Yemeni women, particularly those previously or currently involved in politics, as well as human rights activists was widely documented by the Panel during the reporting period through multiple unrelated sources and interviews with survivors.

2. In the specific context of Yemen, accusing women of being prostitutes, or performing the so-called “indecent acts”, can ruin their reputation for life creating a major stigma. This also has severe societal implications, which in some cases results in the same outcome that survivors of rape face, namely, to be disowned by their family members.

3. At the beginning of June 2023, Noura Al-Jarwi, the Director of the Coalition of Women for Peace in Yemen currently living in the UK, was subjected to public defamation through the publication of a video documentary produced by the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah TV channel, in which she is featured together with other women. The documentary aims to demonstrate that they are part, or have been forced to be part, of a “prostitution network used by the KSA in their propaganda war”. Specifically, Al-Jarwi is described as a leading figure in procuring prostitutes that would work for the Coalition, primarily to seduce their opponents. In the documentary, she is accused of recruiting other girls held in Houthi prisons to be engaged in prostitution. Al-Jarwi is a former Houthi prisoner, who was previously the undersecretary of the Houthi Minister of Youth and Sports. She is now targeted reportedly due to her active involvement in advocating the release of all women detained by the Houthis, who are mostly accused of “indecent acts” and treason. According to the information shared with the Panel, she is subjected to threats on social media, including from people reportedly affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

4. The same documentary is also featuring Samira Al-Houri,\(^{208}\) who used to be detained by the Houthis and reportedly a victim of sexual violence while in detention. She was released in 2019 and later moved to Riyadh, KSA. In April 2022, she was arrested and detained by the Saudi authorities. Upon its request, the Panel received official information that Al-Houri is currently detained on charges related to her possible affiliation with an [unspecified] terrorist group.

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Annex 85: Houthi revision of textbooks in primary and secondary schools, including summer camps

1. The Houthis recently introduced changes in the textbooks, starting with primary education levels, in areas under their control. These changes are reflecting their ideology and political views, influenced by Shia’ religious beliefs.

2. In November 2022, the Houthi-appointed Minister of Education Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi presided over the first national conference “to develop education curricula and diversification of education paths”. In his interview to Al-Masirah channel, Al-Houthi informs that the textbooks that have been used within the Yemeni education system contain multiple mistakes and inaccuracies, hence the need for an in-depth revision. The ongoing revision of the textbooks is reportedly undertaken in partnership with Yemeni and foreign specialists. According to Al-Houthi, “What is required is not an amendment, what is required is a replacement, a complete renewal [of the textbooks]”.

3. On 5 April 2023, the Head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat, used his official twitter account to urgently “call on the Arab and Islamic countries to consolidate the state of enmity and discontent with the enemies of the nation, the Zionists and the Americans in their media and in the school curricula”. The same message was posted again on 20 April 2023 and 27 June 2023.

4. During his speech at the opening of the school year in Sana’a on 22 July 2023, Al-Mashat, informed that “the Prime Minister [Abdel Aziz bin Habtour], together with the Minister of Education [Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi], in the middle of last week, announced that the teacher's incentive will be ready, and that half of the printing of the textbook will be ready, God willing […]”.

5. The teacher’s incentives referred to by Al-Mashat are the YR 30,000 that were already announced in August 2021 to be disbursed on a monthly basis to teachers starting in September of the same year. The Panel was unable to independently verify whether these incentives have been paid since 2021. Nevertheless, the lack of payment of teachers’ salaries since 2015 remains a major concern, which has been triggering reactions by teachers in Houthi-controlled areas, including strikes, which resulted in the replacement of teachers and other education staff with Houthi-appointed education personnel.

6. The Panel accessed some of the revised textbooks and considers the new content to be of great concern. The impact in the short- and long-term of such propaganda, disinformation and misinformation can severely damage the future generations in Yemen and have major negative effects in the whole Middle East region and beyond.

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209 The Houthi-appointed Minister of Education Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi speaks about the ongoing work on the revisions of the Yemeni school curricula https://www.masirahtv.net/post/223870 (min. 23:18).
210 https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1643685779628244993.
211 https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1649122766124089363.
212 https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/167374486886167574.
213 https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1682828499105509377.
215 The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) was ratified by the Republic of Yemen in 1991. Article 29 of the Convention states that “States Parties agree that the Education of the child shall be directed to: […] (c) The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different from his or her own; (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; […]”
7. The following are some samples from the textbooks used in Houthi-controlled areas during the summer camps held in May and June 2023, and in the school year that started in July 2023. The samples chosen are not meant to be exhaustive, but indicative of the type of changes that have been introduced by the Houthi Ministry of Education under the leadership of Yahia Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi.

Figure 85.1.

Cover pages of textbook of first level curriculum used during the summer camps held in May and June 2023. On the back cover, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” and the message “Boycott American and Israeli goods”.

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235101.

Figure 85.2.

Cover pages of textbook of second level curriculum used during the summer camps held in May and June 2023. On the cover page is an image of the shrine of Hussein Bader Al-Din Al-Houthi. On the back cover, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” and the message “Boycott American and Israeli goods”.

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235101.
Figure 85.3.

Cover of Arabic language textbook for second grade students

Source: GoY

Appendix B

Unofficial translation of the text in the cloud on the cover page of the Arabic language textbook for second grade students

“I will seek jihad, enlightened by my book.
To make my country proud, achieving a big victory.”
Poem “the future” included in the Arabic language textbook for second grade students

Source: GoY

Appendix C

Unofficial translation of the poem “the future” and exercise included in the Arabic language textbook for second grade students

“1. I am a young child, I will seek a lot of knowledge
2. Who can tell what I will be when I become older?
3. Maybe I will be a doctor, or a good farmer?
4. Maybe I will be a novelist, or a famous journalist?
5. I will seek jihad, enlightened by my book.
6. To make my country proud, achieving a big victory.

Answer the following questions:
1. Why do you study?
2. With what will you be enlightened?
3. What would you like to be in the future?”
Figure 85.5.
Cover page of the textbook of Arabic language for third grade students. The picture shows a child donating to the Fund for the frontlines.

*Source: GoY*
Figure 85.6.

Poem in a textbook for third grade students

Source: GoY

Appendix D

Unofficial translation of the poem included in the textbook for third grade students

“*We are Yemenis*

1. We are Yemenis, our high dunes did not surrender to any occupier
2. We defeated all tyrants, we forced our enemies
3. As Yemenis, we had not been inferior, and our foreheads were not humiliated
4. It is enough honour for us what the prophet said about us
5. It is enough honour for us that we brought victory to God and religion.”
Figure 85.7.

“The Yemen of Heroism” in the textbook for fifth grade students

Source: Confidential

Appendix E

Translation of the poem “The Yemen of Heroism”

1. The Yemen of heroism and youth * Will remain the graveyard of the invaders
2. With its great men * Who gave their pure souls
3. Who were first in jihad * In the footsteps of the lifeboats
4. From them we learned courage * And pride and sacrifice
5. They are the followers of God who * Brought guidance and the clear proof
6. The ones who truly believe that * By God, victory is coming

By the poet Dayfallah Ahmad Salman [edited]
Figure 85.8.

Cover page of Arabic language textbook for sixth grade students

Source: Confidential
Figure 85.9.

A poem included in the Arabic language textbook for sixth grade students, unit 12:
Our martyrs are the greatest among us

Source: Confidential

Appendix F

Translation of “The story of Tawmar”*

Praise be to God, may He protect us from conquerors
Hani did his duty the way it should be done
He plunged headlong alone
Hani’s comrades were surrounded by the enemy
An onslaught that could only be overcome
And another act of heroism in a war chariot
With no armour other than faith
The sea of fate was churning, but the youth
Three trips did Hani make
Remember his footprints

They who are faithful to Thee can never be conquered
When others on the ground fell short
Showing no hesitation in the face of danger
They were facing destruction from all sides
By sounding the clarion call for counterattack
With no protection or camouflage
A faith that was unbreakable
Sliced through the waves like a ship
Ammar, Miqdad and Ashtar
And let them be your guide

*These verses are part of a long poem by Mu’adh al-Junayd
Figure 85.10.

“The martyr Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi” in the textbook for sixth grade students

Source: Confidential

Appendix G

Translation of “The martyr Abdulaziz Al-Rantisi”

“Who is this brave mujahid who sowed terror in the hearts of the Zionist enemies and did not let them feel comfortable and secure?

Dr. Abdulaziz bin Abdulmajid al-Rantisi was a Palestinian physician and politician and one of the founders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). He led the movement before his martyrdom. He was a scholar, poet and writer of political articles.”
After Adil’s family had eaten lunch, they sat and watched television. Breaking news flashed. This news report was not like other news. The family continued to watch the report with enthusiasm. Everyone became cheerful and proclaimed God’s glory, rejoicing in the news.

- Ayah: What is this news that will be broadcast shortly?
- Ayman: It’s the news that our drones have reached deep into enemy territory and dealt a severe blow to the coalition of brutal aggressors arrayed against our country.
- Ayah: What is meant by drone?
- Father: They are locally made aircraft that are highly autonomous because they use computer programs that allow them to collect information and monitor targets. They can process data and accurately identify and distinguish targets. They are equipped with mapping systems and accurate cameras. They carry out their tasks without the need to be in direct contact with them when flying under the control of satellite systems. Were it not for the grace God, who bestowed upon us this advanced Yemeni-made weapon, the invaders would have been able to achieve their suspect aims.
- Ayman: Are these drones effective in the face of the aggressors’ enormous arsenal?
- Father: With God’s help, there are many drone systems, such as Samad-3, Qasif, Rasid and others [...].
Figure 85.12.

Cover page of textbook on national education for eighth grade students. The man in the image is Hassan Abdullah Al-Malsi, one of the Houthi leaders killed in 2016.

Source: GoY
Figure 85.13.

Cover page of the Arabic language textbook for ninth grade students. The message on the flag reports: “those who love life, will live humiliated (servile)”. The implied meaning is that people should be ready to sacrifice their life for a cause.

Source: Confidential

Figure 85.14.

Girls displaying a book on the “Political and cultural dimensions of the modern State” during an event for women to celebrate a Shi’a religious festivity in Hajja Governorate in July 2023.

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235831.
Annex 86: Summer camps 2023 and graduation ceremonies

1. The summer camps organized by the Houthis under the theme “Science and Jihad” and that took place between May and June 2023 reportedly saw a much higher attendance than previous years, with more than one million children reportedly enrolled. This increase is mostly attributed to the financial help that families were receiving and the threats and negative repercussions that families would be subjected to should their children not attend, including the removal from the list of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance.

2. Based on the evidence gathered by the Panel, children attending summer camps have been exposed to:

✓ Military training and/or military indoctrination,
✓ Educational activities based on textbooks that include the glorification of child combatants, discriminatory content, and a distorted narrative and interpretation of national history,
✓ Incitement to hatred and violence, including against Yemenis who do not support the Houthi ideology and the so-called disbelievers and traitors,
✓ Daily recitation (often multiple times per day) of the Houthi slogan calling for the death of the US and Israel, and curse to the Jews,
✓ On-site visits to cemeteries of Houthi martyrs, including child martyrs, portraying the heroic image of children who died while fighting along the Houthis.

Figure 86.1.

Copy of the announcement on a poster in the premises of a school in Sa’dah Governorate. On the upper left side, the logo “Science and Jihad”

Source: Confidential

216 The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but it aims to give an overview of the type of activities that took place in summer camps in Houthi-controlled areas in May and June 2023.
Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the announcement in the premises of a school in the Governorate of Sa’dah

“Good news – the Office of Education announces to students and parents in all directorates of the Governorate that any male/female graduate of summer schools for this year 1444 AH [2023 AD] will be exempted from registration fees in public and private schools at the beginning of the next school year in support and encouragement from the Office to them.”

Figure 86.2.

Brigadier General Yahya Saree, spokesperson for the Houthi forces, inspects the summer camp class in Al-Nahda School in Sana’a in May 2023. He was briefed on the progress of the educational process and summer programmes for the students

Source: https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1658074100173099010/photo/1.

Figure 86.3.

Children attending a summer camp in Amran Governorate in May 2023

Source: Confidential
Figure 86.4.

Children in a classroom attending a summer camp in Amran Governorate in May 2023. On the back cover of the textbooks, the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”

Source: Confidential

Figure 86.5.

Children in a classroom attending a summer camp in Ibb Governorate in May 2023 reciting the Houthi slogan “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”.

Source: Confidential
Figure 86.6.

**Summer camp classrooms in Ma’rib Governorate in May 2023**

*Source: Confidential*

Figure 86.7.

**Summer camp daytrip held in June 2023. From the video posted on Al-Masirah channel titled “An entertaining and cultural trip for students of summer centers in Al-Jawf to Sa’dah”. Students visited various sites, including cemeteries of Houthis.**

*Source: https://www.masirah.tv/*
Figure 86.8.
Children reciting in front of a mock Quds-2 cruise missile during the summer camp closing ceremony in Nahda school, Al-Thawra district, Sana’a Governorate in June 2023

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235067/.

Figure 86.9.
Group of children holding a banner with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam” during one of the summer camp activities in Hudaydah in May 2023

Figure 86.10.

Tweet from the director of the Office of the Spokesperson of the Houthi forces, sharing the video of a child, son of a Houthi martyr, delivering a speech in support of the Houthis during the graduation ceremony of a summer camp in the district of Nehm, in Sana’a Governorate in June 2023. In his speech, the child committed to following his father’s path by fighting with the Houthis.

Source: https://twitter.com/ameanhayan/status/1672322270646116356.

Figure 86.11.

Girls reciting the Houthi slogan at a graduation ceremony in Sana’a Governorate on 24 June 2023.

Source: https://www.masirah.tv/post/235089/
Figure 86.12.
A young girl receiving her summer camp graduation diploma in Sana’a Governorate in June 2023 next to the banner with the Houthi logo “God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235089/.

Figure 86.13.
Art exhibition of the students’ handicrafts and sculptures at the closure of a summer camp in Sana’a Governorate in June 2023

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/235089/.
Figure 86.14.

Art exhibition at the closure of a summer camp in Bani Al-Harith district in Sana’a in June 2023. In addition to the Houthi logo, this image shows the logo of the summer school campaign “Science and Jihad”.


Figure 86.15.

Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana’a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi Al-Mashat. On the first row, a young child is seen carrying a fake weapon.

Source: https://twitter.com/i/status/1670889126214660096.
Figure 86.16.
The head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat attends the summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana’a on 19 June 2023

Source: https://www.facebook.com/YemenPresidency2/posts/pfbid02qFgsCRiSsDNkVfmHEWDu2KuCpDFTzxpmcDAQkYMhkxm51NC2D2sjWTWnDrSkCl.

Figure 86.17.
Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana’a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat. On the walls in the background, photos of Houthi martyrs who died in the conflict, including men and children

Source: https://twitter.com/husseinazeh/status/1672343027380019200/photo/2.
Figure 86.18.
Summer camp graduation ceremony held in Sana’a on 19 June 2023, which was attended by the head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat. On the walls in the background, photos of Houthi martyrs who died in the conflict, including men and children.

Source: https://www.facebook.com/YemenPresidency2/posts/pfbid02qFgsCRisDNkVfmHEWDu2KuCpDPTxzPmcDAVKtMYmhkxm51NC2D2SjWTWnDdSrCl.

Figure 86.19.
Summer camp conclusion celebrations held in Ma’rib Governorate on 17 June 2023. Children as seen marching and dancing on the American and Israeli flags.

Source: https://www.masirahtv.net/post/234715/
Annex 87: Battle for supremacy between CBY, Sana’a and CBY, Aden: Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

Houthis, acting through CBY, Sana’a, and the GoY, acting through the CBY, Aden, continue to adopt measures that further divide the financial institutions. The administrative bifurcation is compounding institutional challenges and adversely impacting the economic stability of Yemen.

a) Freezing of accounts of 12 entities by CBY, Aden

As a result of the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation by the GoY (S/2023/130 para. 11 and annex 4), based on Decision No. 17 dated 1 December 2022 of the Public Prosecutor, the CBY, Aden, on 6 December 2022, froze accounts and banned dealings with 12 entities and companies, located in Houthi-controlled areas (figure 87.1). It also listed these 12 entities in the blacklist for their alleged involvement in money laundering and terrorist financing.

Figure 87.1.

Copy of Circular dated 6 December 2022 issued by CBY, Aden

Source: CBY, Aden
Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 6 December 2022 issued by CBY, Aden

Central bank of Yemen
Head Office, Aden
Ref. 932/CBY/
Date. 6/12/2022

Subject: Freezing accounts and prohibiting dealing with individuals and entities

With reference to the above subject and to Public Prosecution Resolution No. (17) of 2022 AD dated 1/12/2022 AD regarding the inclusion of individuals and entities in the terrorist list, and based on Article No. (17) - Paragraph (b) of Law No. (1) of 2010 AD and its amendments regarding combating Money laundering and terrorist financing, you must freeze all accounts and prohibit commercial and financial transactions with individuals and entities specified in the aforementioned decision and include them in your blacklists, these are:

1. Sam Oil Company for Trade and Oil Services (Saddam bin Ahmed bin Mohammed al-Faqih and Zaid bin Ali bin Yahya al-Sharafi).
5. Abkar Oil Services Company (Abdullah bin Abkar Abdul Bari).
6. Al Faqih International Company for Trade, Import and Oil Services Ltd. (Saddam bin Ahmed bin Mohammed).
7. Oil Company (Zaid bin Ali bin Yahya Al Sharafi).
10. Al 'Awadi Trading Group Company (Zaid Zaid Al-'Awadi and his partners).
12. Atlantic Oil for importing oil derivatives (Ahmed Mohammed Salih Al-Baydani)

b) Countermeasures by the Houthis: Circulars issued by CBY, Sana'a

i. Five Circulars of 25 December 2022

CBY, Sana'a issued five circulars on 25 December 2022 directing the banks, traders of basic commodities, and traders dealing with wood and steel not to deal with “entities carrying out banking business without licenses from CBY- Sana’a” (figure 87.2-87.5)\(^\text{217}\). The circulars mentioned the following banks as those which were not licensed by CBY Sana’a:

- Branches of National Bank of Yemen operating in the GoY-controlled areas
- Branches of Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank (CAC) in Aden
- Al-Qutaibi Islamic Microfinance Bank

\(^{217}\) As informed by CBY, Aden to the Panel.
• Aden Microfinance Bank

The exchange companies located in the Houthi areas did not provide any data related to their activities in the areas controlled by the Houthis since the issuance of the circular that prohibits the submission of data to CBY, Aden. This has made it difficult for this central bank to exercise effective regulatory control over the exchange companies, some of which are alleged to have been involved in activities that violate the sanctions regime.

CBY, Aden had introduced a transparent system of online auction to sell foreign currencies in the market. This measure helped, to some extent, in stabilising the foreign exchange rates in GoY-controlled areas. In order to upset this auction system, CBY, Sana’a restricted the banks, operating in the areas under its control, from participating in this online auction system. The Panel was informed by CBY, Aden that, as a result of these directions by CBY, Sana’a, the weekly foreign exchange transactions that amounted to USD 30 million, have come down to a range of about USD 10-15 million per week. Only a few entities are now participating in the auctions, in contrast to about 90 entities that used to participate prior to this directive from CBY, Sana’a. The circulars stipulated the following conditions, which, in effect, weakened the operation of the online auctions:

• Traders are allowed to participate in the foreign exchange auctions held by CBY, Aden only to the extent of the amount equal to their total sales in the areas under GoY’s control.

• They are not allowed to participate to cover their sales in the areas under the control of the Houthis.

• Participation in auctions must only be through the branches.\(^ {218}\)

Despite opposition from the exchange companies, CBY, Sana’a issued Decision No. 4 of 2023, requiring these companies to deposit 25 per cent of their capital with it as guarantee (figure 87.6). This measure severely affected the liquidity as well as the operational capability of the exchange companies.\(^ {219}\)

The effect of all these measures by CBY, Sana’a was felt in GoY-areas as the foreign exchange rates have started moving up again. Such adversarial economic policy decisions would further fragment the economic and banking system and may derail the ongoing peace process in Yemen.

\(^ {218}\) Branches operating in areas under the control of CBY, Aden.

\(^ {219}\) Information shared by the CBY, Aden with the Panel.
Figure 87.2.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting dealing with four notified banks

Source: CBY, Aden
Figure 87.3.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting traders in wood and steel not to deal with four notified banks

Source: CBY, Aden
Figure 87.4.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana’a to traders in wood and steel regarding foreign exchange auctions by CBY, Aden

Source: CBY, Aden
Figure 87.5.

Copy of Circular issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting traders in basic commodities not to deal with four notified banks

Source: CBY, Aden
Figure 87.6.

**Copy of Decision No. 4 issued by CBY, Sana’a**

![Copy of Decision No. 4 issued by CBY, Sana’a](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type of Account</th>
<th>Limit of Deposits (Million Rials)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fixed Deposits</td>
<td>1,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Savings Accounts</td>
<td>500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Current Accounts</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Foreign Exchange</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CBY, Aden
Appendix B: Unofficial translation of Decision No. 4 issued by CBY, Sana’a

CBY Governor Decision No. 4 of 1444 AH regarding the Capital of Exchange Companies / Institutions and the Cash Guarantees

It has been decided:

Article (1): The minimum amount of the paid-up capital for licensing exchange business shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Exchange companies operating local money transfer networks</td>
<td>1,250,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Exchange companies</td>
<td>500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Exchange institutions in areas where financial services are available</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Exchange institutions in areas where financial services are not available (operating in locations at least 1 km away from any bank branch, company, or licensed exchange institution)</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Article (2): Each exchange company and institution should deposit a cash guarantee in YER in CBY equivalent to 25% of the paid-up capital indicated in article (1) of this decision as a guarantee of compliance with laws and regulatory instructions.

Article (3): Licensed exchange institutions are granted a period of eight months, starting from the date of issuance of this decision, to raise the paid-up capital to the minimum amount indicated in Article (1) of this decision.

Article (4): Licensed exchange companies and institution are given a period of 8 months, starting from the date of issuance of this decision, to deposit the cash guarantee as indicated in Article (1) of this decision.

CBY Sana’a
30/04/2023
Governor
Annex 88: Prohibition order by CBY, Sana’a on banks and exchange companies against registration with or linking to financial remittance networks and systems of CBY, Aden

On 26 January 2023, CBY, Aden issued a circular directing all exchange companies and establishments to complete the registration process with CBY, Aden and establish a link with the consolidated funds network via the link: www.unmoneye.com:8000. The entities were directed to sign the contract and register their agents with the MONEX financial transfer system by 31 January 2023. Failure to do so would result in the imposition of fines by CBY, Aden (figure 88.1).

Reacting to this move, CBY, Sana’a issued the retaliatory circular no. 5 dated 29 January 2023, prohibiting exchange companies to register with or connect to any financial remittance networks or systems with any other central bank in Yemen without obtaining permission from CBY, Sana’a (figure 88.2).
Circular dated 26 January 2023 issued by CBY, Aden

Copy of the Circular dated 26 January 2023 issued by CBY, Aden

Source: CBY, Aden
Appendix A: Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 26 January 2023 by the CBY, Aden

Translated from Arabic

Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office - Aden

Banking Supervision Sector
Department of oversight of non-banking financial institutions

Date: 26 January 2023
No.: 

Circular addressed to all exchange companies/establishments operating in the Republic

To: Exchange companies and establishments

Sirs,

Re: Registration and link with the consolidated funds network

In reference to the above subject: All exchange companies and establishments must complete the registration process and establish a link with the consolidated funds network in a timely fashion via the link: www.unmoneye.com: 8000. The required forms must be filled out so that a company can complete the rest of the procedures for signing contracts and registering agents with the MONEX financial transfer system by 31 January 2023. Please note that fines will be imposed on those who miss that deadline.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Mansur Abdulkarim Rajih
Director, the Banking Supervision Sector

cc:
The Deputy Governor
Figure 88.2.

Copy of the Circular No. 5 dated 29 January 2023 issued by CBY, Sana’a

Source: CBY, Aden
Appendix A: Unofficial Translation of the Circular No 5 dated 29 January 2023

Translated from Arabic

Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office
Sana’a

Banking Supervision Sector
Office of the Director

Date: 7 Rajab A.H. 1444
Corresponding to: 29 January 2023
No.: qaf-ra’ 110

Circular No. 5 (2023) concerning registration with or linking to financial remittance networks and systems

To: Exchange companies and establishments

Sirs,

It is strictly prohibited to register with or connect to any financial remittance networks or systems in the Republic of Yemen without obtaining prior approval from the Banking Supervision Sector of the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Sami Ali al-Siyaghi
Director, Banking Supervision Sector

cc:

• The Deputy Governor
Annex 89: Freezing of bank accounts, Dual currency system and Exchange rate of YR

Freezing of bank accounts
The Panel has received information that CBY, Sana’a regularly sends directives to banks, with headquarters in Sana’a, to freeze and confiscate funds in the accounts of individuals and entities opposed to the Houthis. However, for fear of reprisals by the Houthis, these bank officials are reluctant to reveal the details to the Panel.

Dual currency system
The Houthis through CBY, Sana’a continue to prohibit the use of currency notes printed by CBY, Aden, declaring them as counterfeit. This has resulted in a peculiar situation in which domestic trade between the Houthi-controlled areas and the GoY-controlled areas are carried out using Saudi Riyal (SR), US Dollar and Yemeni Riyal (YR) (of the non-prohibited series)²²⁰ carrying high premia. This has hampered the free flow of goods within Yemen and has led to uncontrolled inflation in GoY-controlled areas.

Exchange rate of YR
With the increase in imports through the Hudaydah port, the difference in the exchange rate of YR between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas added a new dimension to the economic impoverishment of the GoY. The exchange rate in GoY-controlled areas has been very volatile over the years. For example, at the end of 2019, one USD was equivalent to YR 591, while at the end of 2021, it reached YR 1,700 (Table 89.1. An analysis of the exchange rates in the past eight months indicates an alarming upward trend. While in December 2022, one USD was equivalent to around YR 1,100, during the period from January to May 2023, it remained in the range of YR 1,200. However, in June 2023, the rate crossed YR 1,300, and in July it crossed 1400 raising an alarm in the political circles in the GoY areas. The exchange rate in the GoY-controlled areas, most of the time, remains almost double than in the Houthi-controlled areas. The exchange rate between the YR and the USD has been relatively stable in Houthi areas but volatile and depreciated in GoY areas, the latter linked to reduced government foreign exchange earnings from oil. The high exchange rates strain the GoY’s ability to import essential goods at reasonable prices, thereby pushing the problem of food insecurity to deeply concerning levels.

The following are the monthly averages of exchange rates in Aden and Sana'a from January 2021 to July 2023.

Table 89.1
Comparison of monthly averages of exchange rates (YR/USD) in Sana’a and Aden from January 2021 to July 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Average Exchange Rate in Sana’a</th>
<th>Average Exchange Rate in Aden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1137.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1154.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1134.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1146.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1151.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1172.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1239.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1243.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1246.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1209.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,279.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,354.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1,414.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBY, Aden

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221 Although CBY, Aden did not provide average exchange rate prevailing in Sana’a from July to July 2023, information received by the Panel from other sources indicated that the average exchange rate during this period mostly remained around 550.
Difference in the exchange rates for calculation of customs duty

Another facet of the problem is the wide variance in the exchange rates determined for the purpose of calculation of customs duties on imports. While the customs duty is calculated in Houthi-controlled ports by adopting the exchange rate of YR 250 per one USD, the rate in the GoY-controlled ports for non-essential goods was increased in January 2023 from YR 500 per one USD to YR 750 per one USD. As a result, the importers pay more customs duty for their imports through Aden and other GoY-controlled ports. With the relaxation of restrictions on imports through the Hudaydah port, the business community now prefers to import their goods through this port, as they have to pay less customs duty on imports and the bulk of their imported goods can be sold in Houthi areas, where about 80 per cent of the Yemeni citizens reside. This shift in the imports of goods from Aden to Hudaydah, on account of differential customs exchange rates, has further dented the revenue of the GoY. Since the market rates of exchange in GoY-areas are in the range of YR 1,200-1,400 per one USD, the GoY, as it is, loses revenue even after fixing the customs exchange rate at YR 750 per one USD. If the GoY reduces the customs exchange rate below YR 750, it will lose revenue, and if the GoY does not reduce the customs exchange rate, imports will shift from Aden to Hudaydah, which will result in loss of revenue. Therefore, this exchange rate war between the two areas of Yemen is affecting the economic stability of Yemen.
Annex 90: Documents relating to CAC Bank case

Figure 90.1.
Copy of Circular 70 (2021) dated 19 May 2021 issued by CBY, Sana'a prohibiting dealing with CAC Bank

Source: Confidential
Appendix A: Unofficial translation of the Circular dated 19 May 2021 issued by CBY, Sana’a prohibiting dealing with CAC Bank

Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office
Sana’a

Banking Supervision Sector
General Department of Foreign Exchange and Exchange Companies Affairs

No. 191
Date 19 May 2021

Circular No 70 (2021) for the year 2021 AD
Addressed to exchange companies and institutions

Linking or dealing with “CAC Hawala” service or any financial transfer service under the name of “CAC Bank” that is not operated from the main centre of CAC Bank (Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank – Sana’a) is prohibited.

Signed and Seal

Circular No. 2084

CBY, Aden informed the Panel that the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Co-operation, Sana’a issued circular no. 2084. In order to maintain the continuation of the implementation of monetary programmes, projects, and activities without any obstacles, the international organizations, and others, were directed not to deal with banks and exchange companies that are not authorised by CBY, Sana’a. This directive is implemented from 1 January 2023 (figure 90.2).
Figure 90.2.

Copy of the Circular No. 2084 issued by the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, Sana’a

Source: CBY, Aden
Appendix B: Unofficial translation of the Circular No. 2084 issued by the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, Sana’a

Presidency of Republic
Supreme Council
For management and coordination of Humanitarian Affairs & International Cooperation
General Secretariat

To/ Representatives of international organizations, agencies, programs and funds

Circular regarding banks that are not authorized by the CBY to deal with organizations

Based on the memorandum no. 170 / m-m dated 11/23/2022 issued by CBY – Sana’a, which includes banks and exchange companies that are not authorized to deal with agencies, funds, international / UN organizations, civil society organizations, in addition to entities that are not authorized to conduct business in general. Those banks and exchange companies are as follows:

1- National Bank of Yemen
2- Tadhamon Bank
3- Al-Qutaili Islamic Bank for Microfinance – (not licensed to operate in banking business)
4- Cooperative and Agriculture Credit Bank – Aden branch
5- Al-Kuralim Islamic Bank
6- Aden Bank for Microfinance - (not licensed to operate in banking business)
7- Arab Bank
8- Saba Islamic Bank

As for exchange companies, all of them are not authorized to contract with organizations directly for the purposes of distributing humanitarian cash assistance. Exchange companies can contribute to the implementation of these works through subcontracts with banks that are authorized to deal with the organizations.

Therefore, starting from 1/1/2023, we hope that everyone will work and adhere to what was mentioned above, and not deal with unauthorized banks, as well as companies that do not have contracts with the authorized banks in dealing with agencies, funds, international / UN organizations, and civil society organizations, in order to maintain the continuation of the implementation of monetary programs, projects and activities without any obstacles.

Secretary General
Figure 90.3.

Letter rejecting CAC’s proposal

Source: Confidential
CAC’s reply to Social Fund for Development

**Source:** Confidential
Annex 91: Law banning all types of interest

1. Despite serious opposition from the banking and trade circles, in March 2023 the Houthis adopted “The Prohibition of Usurious Transactions Act”, a new law banning all types of interest on banking and commercial transactions such as deposits, loans, Letters of Credit, and Letters of Guarantee. The new law also repeals the savings deposits provisions of the Post and Postal Savings Act without suggesting alternative savings schemes or returns from such deposits that were offered by the Post Office as a non-banking institution.

2. For enforcing the provisions of this law, the following officials have been granted the status of judicial police officers pursuant to a decision of the Public Prosecutor: a) designated employees of CBY, Sana’a; b) designated employees of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry and Trade; c) the Minister of Finance; and d) the Minister of Industry and Trade. Under this new law, whosoever violates the provisions of articles 3, 4 and 7 shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than six months and not more than four years and fined not less than YR 100,000 and not more than YR 3 million.

3. According to various stakeholders, this new law will sharply divide the banking and commercial activities in the two areas of Yemen, and the new regime, when fully implemented, will completely ruin the economy of Yemen. The banking community of Yemen strongly feels that since the new law applies to all loans and facilities that were granted before the date on which it enters into effect, this is contrary to article 104 of the Yemeni Constitution, which provides that laws cannot be applied retroactively without the approval of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. These bankers are of the opinion that the law will give rise to disputes in relation to many banking and commercial transactions, and many judicial disputes will arise between commercial banks and depositors concerning the way in which deposits are put to use. Further, there will be confrontations between the State and the government, on the one hand, and the local and foreign banks, on the other, that have invested their funds in treasury bills issued by CBY, Sana’a.

4. As per information received by the Panel, Yemen, like many other countries, finances its deficit by overdrawing up to 92 per cent of the amount from its central bank, or by raising funds through the issuance of treasury bills, or other such instruments. Since this will be prohibited under the new law, the bankers feel that it will no longer be possible to finance the ongoing general budget deficit, which amounted to approximately YR 905 billion in 2015. It is also argued that external sources of financing, such as foreign loans and deposits (without interest), will dry up, as will some categories of grants and foreign aid. The authorities would not be able to pay up the internal public debt, which as of June 2022 stood at YR 3.449 billion, and the outstanding external public debt, which amounted to USD 6.6 billion. As per the letter sent by the Yemeni bankers to the Houthis, which was seen by the Panel, the following are some of the adverse outcomes of the new law:

i. Bank financing, including loans and current facilities available from commercial banks in the form of loans and facilities, will cease. For example, it is estimated that such financing amounted to YR 466 billion in 2018, whereas it had reached YR 539 billion in 2013. Banks will thus suddenly lose their largest source of revenue, namely interest, which comprises up to 81 per cent of the revenue of certain Yemeni banks.

ii. Traditional commercial banks, which currently provide the bulk of bank financing and cover business transactions, will lose their role. Current deposits amounting to YR 3,750.7 billion, of which YR 2,271.4 billion are frozen deposits from 2016 and earlier, pose a challenge to the commercial and Islamic banks as they are unable to allow clients to

223 Reference to ‘Central Bank’ in this letter, refers to the CBY, Sana’a.
withdraw their deposits. The following table summarizes the current balance positions of the funds deposited with Yemeni banks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deposit/Account in YR</th>
<th>Balance (June 2022)</th>
<th>Frozen (2016 and earlier)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current (on demand)</td>
<td>889 billion</td>
<td>408.3 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term deposits</td>
<td>874.3 billion</td>
<td>732.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings deposits</td>
<td>292.6 billion</td>
<td>215.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits in foreign currencies</td>
<td>1632.1 billion</td>
<td>845.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earmarked deposits</td>
<td>62.8 billion</td>
<td>48.9 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iii. Microfinance activities which are used for supporting small businesses will stop.

iv. It will be difficult to continue processing transactions with correspondent banks abroad.

v. Since the returns from the foreign investment holdings of Yemeni banks (in the form of term deposits or investments in debt instruments) will be prohibited, commercial banks will be forced to convert those holding into current deposits without returns and deprive themselves of the returns generated by those holdings. The foreign investment holdings of traditional commercial banks of Yemen amounted to approximately YR 343 billion in June 2022.

vi. Opportunities for foreign direct investment in projects will disappear.

vii. Prohibiting payment of interest will have major repercussions in case of debts. The State, banks and the business sector have neither repaid their debts for years, nor paid the interest on those debts. The aforesaid representation of the bankers mentions the following debts:

viii. The current debt owed to the Central Bank [Sana’a] by the government amounted to YR 5,561 billion as of June 2022.

ix. Debt owed to the Central Bank [Sana’a] by public institutions amounted to YR 309 billion as of May 2022.

x. Debt in the form of treasury bills and bonds owed to commercial banks by the government amounted to YR 1,787 billion as of May 2022.

xi. Debt in the form of bank deposits owed to commercial banks by the Central Bank [Sana’a] amounted to YR 688 billion in 2021.

xii. Debt owed to depositors by commercial banks amounts to YR 3,750 billion, including frozen deposits of approximately YR 2,271 billion prior to 2016.

xiii. Debt in the form of existing loans owed by customers to commercial banks amounted to approximately YR 284 billion in 2022.

xiv. The external debt of the State amounted to USD 6.6 billion in 2022.

xv. In addition, there are debts owed by public institutions and the non-banking sector to the government, including the debts of the pension funds and the postal fund.
5. According to CBY, Aden, since the Houthis have not been paying salaries to the civil servants for several years, a large number of them relied on the interest revenue received from their deposits in the banks and post office as a source of their livelihood. CBY, Aden argues that prohibiting citizens’ access to this revenue will exacerbate the humanitarian situation and increase poverty levels in Yemen. The Panel was further informed that CBY, Sana’a never paid any interest on the treasury bills and now has converted these bills to current account deposits, as a result of which they will not be paying any interest on these deposits. (Figure 91.1)
## Figure 91.1.

**Treasury Bills and other deposits by the banks with CBY, Sana'a**

### Comparative balance statement of Treasury bills, reserves and deposit balances as of 30/4/2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bank Name</th>
<th>BHD</th>
<th>TND</th>
<th>USD</th>
<th>Eur to BHD conversion (30/4/2023)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>YER to BHD conversion</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>YER to BHD conversion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79,030,500 BHD</td>
<td>79,030,500</td>
<td>544,463,128</td>
<td>740,493,679</td>
<td>30,929,621</td>
<td>349,102,954</td>
<td>438,032,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,840,000 BHD</td>
<td>8,840,000</td>
<td>13,150,366</td>
<td>21,990,366</td>
<td>15,220,990</td>
<td>19,022,770</td>
<td>38,213,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>19,640,000 BHD</td>
<td>19,640,000</td>
<td>24,940,000</td>
<td>74,460,000</td>
<td>52,460,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,400,000 BHD</td>
<td>4,400,000</td>
<td>6,540,000</td>
<td>10,940,000</td>
<td>9,940,000</td>
<td>10,940,000</td>
<td>21,880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank of the People of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,000,000 BHD</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
<td>19,300,000</td>
<td>16,300,000</td>
<td>19,300,000</td>
<td>38,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Bank</td>
<td>20,660,000 BHD</td>
<td>20,660,000</td>
<td>27,260,000</td>
<td>47,920,000</td>
<td>31,120,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,200,000 BHD</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>13,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,000,000 BHD</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
<td>19,300,000</td>
<td>16,300,000</td>
<td>19,300,000</td>
<td>38,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and Agricultural Bank of Yemen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,200,000 BHD</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>13,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Sun Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,200,000 BHD</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>13,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Discount Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,200,000 BHD</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>13,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Second Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,200,000 BHD</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>4,700,000</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>6,900,000</td>
<td>13,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Commercial Bank</td>
<td>10,000,000 BHD</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>13,000,000</td>
<td>23,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen National Bank</td>
<td>19,640,000 BHD</td>
<td>19,640,000</td>
<td>26,090,000</td>
<td>45,730,000</td>
<td>31,030,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHD to TND conversion (30/4/2023)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,300,000</td>
<td>15,220,990</td>
<td>26,520,990</td>
<td>30,929,621</td>
<td>438,032,580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHD to USD conversion (30/4/2023)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,940,000</td>
<td>35,460,000</td>
<td>59,400,000</td>
<td>78,860,000</td>
<td>138,260,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHD to Eur conversion (30/4/2023)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>74,460,000</td>
<td>106,980,000</td>
<td>181,440,000</td>
<td>230,460,000</td>
<td>460,900,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95,680,000,000</td>
<td>95,680,000,000</td>
<td>130,320,000,000</td>
<td>126,000,000,000</td>
<td>130,320,000,000</td>
<td>262,640,000,000</td>
<td>262,640,000,000</td>
<td>262,640,000,000</td>
<td>262,640,000,000</td>
<td>262,640,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CBY, Aden

Figure 92.1.

Houthi Circular Ref. 656-110-MF dated 8 Aug 2023 regarding Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points.

Source: Confidential
Appendix A


Translated from Arabic

Ref.: 656-110-MF

Yemen Republic

Ministry of Finance

Muharram A.H. 1445
(6 August A.D. 2023)

Subject: Mechanism for collecting government revenues at land customs points

Sir,

I write in the light of the incentive mechanism that has been put in place at the port of Hudaydah for the import of goods, the purpose of which is to alleviate the burden on consumers and protect traders from the arbitrary measures that were being enacted in occupied areas.

We are mindful of the need to implement public policy and encourage and sustain imports through the port of Hudaydah, prevent the goods from spoiling, and keep to land crossings except when necessary and in accordance with the policies determined by the Supreme Economic Committee.

Accordingly, from 21 Muharram A.H. 1445 (8 August 2023), taxes and other revenue on all goods imported through land borders and at the port of Hudaydah shall be assessed at a cash rate of 100 per cent of the total customs value. The customs rate shall remain at 50 per cent of the total customs value for all goods arriving at land customs points through land or sea crossings of occupied areas.

For appropriate action.

Accept, Sirs, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Rashid Abd al-Aziz al-Luhum
Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for economic affairs
Ministry of Finance

Head, Customs Authority

C.c.:

H.E. the President of Supreme Political Council
H.E. the Prime Minister
The members of the Supreme Economic Committee
Head, Tax Authority

2315714.001.DPR.docx1/1
Annex 93: Oil Sector

1. The oil sector was the worst hit by the conflict.

Ras Isa port

2. Because of the ongoing conflict, export of oil from Ras Isa port has stopped since March 2015. This port used to receive oil from several productive sectors in Ma’rib and Shabwa namely sector-18 Safer, sector S1 Dames, sector S2 Al-Uqla, sector-5 Jannah, and sector-9 Malik that is located on the west of Al-Masila and connected through the oil pipeline from SAFER to Ras-Isa’s export terminal on the Red Sea.\(^{224}\) This pipeline suffered repeated sabotage attacks in the past.\(^ {225}\) This has no doubt affected the economy of the country.

Attacks on Al-Dhabha oil terminal

3. After a few years of remaining in-operational due to the conflict, GoY had commenced production and export of crude oil in late 2017 from Sector 14, Al-Masila in Hadramawt Governorate with quantities not exceeding 20 percent of that of 2014. However, the non-renewal of the truce in October 2022, was followed by attacks on the port of Al-Dhabba in Hadramawt Governorate. This resulted in the cessation of production and export of crude oil from the sectors namely14 Al-Masila, 10 East Shabwa, 51 East Al-Hajar, 53 East Sir, and 9 Malik\(^ {226}\). The total crude oil revenue for the year 2021 amounted to USD 993 million, and up to November 2022, it amounted to USD 980 million. The GoY informed the Panel that it is losing revenue of about USD 1.2 billion per year.\(^ {227}\) But taking into account the cost of repairs and replacement of equipment and facilities at the Al-Dhabba oil terminal, the GoY loss would amount to about USD 2 billion. The GoY is also deprived of its major source of foreign exchange, which is critical for importing essential food items and fuel for generation of electricity for the people. This has also undermined the ability of CBY, Aden to intervene to support the declining YR.\(^ {228}\)

Attacks on Yemen LNG project in Balhaf

4. In order to take advantage of its gas reserves in Ma’rib, especially from sector (18) Marib, Al-Jawf, the Yemen LNG project was launched in 2005 in Balhaf in Shabwah Governorate, on the coasts of the Gulf of Aden, 200 km south-west of Mukalla and around 400 km east of Aden. This was Yemen’s largest-ever industrial investment of about USD 4.5 billion. The new Yemen LNG terminal, opened in Nov 2009, comprises a single LNG berth, two 140,000m³ storage tanks and associated re-liquefaction plant. The gas is piped via a 320 km pipeline from Ma’rib gas fields. The plan was to export 6.7 million MTs of LNG per annum for at least the next 20 years, considered a game changer for the economy of Yemen. However, due to the conflict, the Yemen LNG stopped gas production, liquefaction, and export in April 2015.\(^ {229}\) The pipeline feeding the gas terminal has reportedly been targeted several times by AQAP.\(^ {230}\)

5. The Panel has received information that, on 5 August 2023, some rockets were reportedly fired towards the military base near the Yemen LNG site. Although no damage has been reported to the Balhaf gas terminal, such incidents compel the company to continue to close down its facility, thereby adversely impacting any chance for the revival of Yemen’s economy. As per the company, “As a consequence of the current security situation, Yemen LNG remains in force majeure and the plant remains in a preservation mode.”\(^ {231}\)

\(^ {224}\) GoY - Ministry of Oil.
\(^ {226}\) GoY - Ministry of Oil.
\(^ {227}\) GoY - Ministry of Finance.
\(^ {228}\) CBY, Aden.
\(^ {229}\) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen_LNG.
\(^ {230}\) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa-emirates-idUSKBN1AJ2UW.
Table 93.1
Government Revenue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount of Government Revenue (in million YRs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>928.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1,455.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2,774.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (January to June)</td>
<td>877.49 (a proportionate loss of 509.62 million YR compared to 2022)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoY

Table 93.2
Import of fuel and fuel derivatives through ports under GoY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Number of Vessels</th>
<th>Gasoline (in tonnes)</th>
<th>Diesel (in tonnes)</th>
<th>Kerosene (in tonnes)</th>
<th>Mazout (in tonnes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2022 (January to December)</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>443,292</td>
<td>622,740</td>
<td>13,874</td>
<td>40,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (January to July)</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>164,697.4</td>
<td>123,780.6</td>
<td>10,434,668</td>
<td>17,055.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionate Difference</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>(-) 14.6</td>
<td>(-) 93,889.6</td>
<td>(-) 239,484.4</td>
<td>(+) 2341.50</td>
<td>(-) 6523.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022 (January to December)</td>
<td>Mukalla</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63,197.47</td>
<td>169,224.6</td>
<td>5,359.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (January to July)</td>
<td>Mukalla</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86,544,755</td>
<td>7,419,313</td>
<td>9,029.471</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionate Difference</td>
<td>Mukalla</td>
<td>(-) 6.75</td>
<td>(+) 49,679.56</td>
<td>(-) 91,295,037</td>
<td>(-) 22,232.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022 (January to December)</td>
<td>Nishtun</td>
<td></td>
<td>41,978.59</td>
<td>142,316.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023 (January to July)</td>
<td>Nishtun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8,194.117</td>
<td>7,648.939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionate Difference</td>
<td>Nishtun</td>
<td>(-) 5.3</td>
<td>(-) 16,293.39</td>
<td>(+) 75,368.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table prepared by Panel based on data from GoY.

6. The exchange rates in Ma’rib and the cost of essential items have started showing upward trend compared to Aden, thereby, economically, further dividing the GoY areas.
Annex 94: Message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

Figure 94.1.

Copy of the message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

Source: Confidential
Appendix A

Translation of the message from Houthis to the importers to shift imports to Hudaydah

Message addressed to traders concerning shipping to the port of Hudaydah, and efforts to resolve the situation of goods held at inspection points

A meeting took place today between the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Muhammad al-Mutahhar, senior Government officials, and managers of all the incorporated maritime companies with a presence in Yemen.

The outcomes were as follows.

1. All the maritime companies are fully prepared to accept any shipments to the port of Hudaydah of any goods except weapons. The port of Hudaydah is fully open in accordance with the political agreement among the Yemeni State, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations. That agreement remains unannounced, so that the Saudi enemy can save face.

2. All traders who have freight detained at customs crossings or have shipments at sea should redirect their shipments to the port of Hudaydah, using the form provided. A copy of the policy should be attached and transmitted to the Sana’a office of the maritime company office through which the shipment was arranged. The company should then confirm that the shipment has been redirected.

3. A copy of the redirection document should be sent to the clearance agent and to the operations number of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which will be transmitted to you. Freight will be released for those traders who have sent the redirection document.

4. Freight that is on the road between the main crossings and the inspection points will be inspected, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry will be notified so that the freight is not hindered on arrival.

5. From this date onward, no goods whatsoever that have been shipped through the port of Aden will be allowed to enter.

6. Anyone who has goods stored in the south or in an area outside the control of the Political Council and wants to bring those goods into Sana’a has two options. The first is that the goods can be inspected, and a copy sent to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The second is that the goods can stay where they are until the port of Hudaydah is opened up and the problem is resolved.

7. Any trader who has a shipment anywhere in the world and wants to ship it to Yemen should get in touch with the maritime companies here in Yemen. The goods will be shipped to Hudaydah directly. For information, the international shipping company Saba, by Mehr and Saddam al-Sharaa, is prepared to ship any container from anywhere in the world at the same price as shipments to Aden. The same is true of other companies.

8. Requests to redirect shipments should be submitted as soon as possible to ensure prompt coordination with shipping companies. An agreement has been reached with shipping companies that Thursday and, most likely, Friday will be workdays.

9. We are grateful to the officials who worked with us to solve the problem. They made considerable efforts, and their role was decisive. In particular, we are grateful to Minister Muhammad Sharaa al-Mutahhar and to Mr. Khalid.
Figure 94.2.
Copy of the Importer’s Declaration

Source: Confidential
Appendix B
Translation of the Importer’s Declaration

New - redirection of container ships to the port of Hudaydah

Circular

Using the form below, all traders should send the present letter to the navigation lines with which they have containers so that those navigation lines can contact the Saba company to redirect the containers to the port of Hudaydah. [The company] has two ships ready to ship the containers to the port of Hudaydah.

To … navigation company

Subject: Changing the port of discharge from Aden to Hudaydah

Sirs,

We would be grateful if you could redirect the containers from the port of Aden to the port of Hudaydah. We undertake to settle the fee for redirecting the containers, along with the difference in shipping fees in accordance with shipping contracts No. (...).

Trader name:

Seal:

C.c.: Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Industry
Customs Authority, Ministry of Finance
Security and Intelligence Agency
Figure 94.3.

Copy of the Undertaking by the Importers to shift imports from Aden to Hudaydah port

Source: Confidential
Appendix C
Translation of Undertaking by the Importers to shift imports from Aden to Hudaydah port

Translated from Arabic

Pledge

Our brother the honourable Director-General of the Sana’a customs and control office

Sir

We, the importer……………………, commercial name………………………,

owner’s name……………………, tax number……………………………..,

Commercial Registry number…………………….., Date / /2 AD, phone number ……………………

Do hereby undertake the following:

1. Not to assess a new customs exchange rate of 750 Yemeni riyals at ports of entry;

2. Not to raise the sales price for consumers;

3. To transfer imports via Hudaydah port and Sana’a International Airport.

With this pledge we hereby assume full responsibility. The Customs Authority reserves the right to take whatever measures we might deem appropriate in the future.

Many thanks.

Company Director

Seal
Annex 95: News reports about public demonstrations against decline in the value of YR and power outage in GoY areas

Figure 95.1.
Massive popular protests in Aden, Hadramawt and Abyan against the collapse of the currency and the electricity crisis

Source: https://alkhabaralyemeni.net/2023/07/12/228263/.

Figure 95.2.
Demonstrations renewed in Aden, condemning the collapse of the electricity service and the national currency, 13 July 2023

Figure 95.3.

Protests in Lahj and Hadramawt against the deterioration of electricity – 13 July 2023

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUAwIt7CSW0.
List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADNOC</td>
<td>Abu Dhabi National Oil Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification Signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMR</td>
<td>Anti-Material Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARAMCO</td>
<td>Arabian American Oil Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARES</td>
<td>Armament Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AShM</td>
<td>Anti-Ship Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Guided Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Anti-Tank (Mine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel (Mine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>Cooperative and Agriculture Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Conflict Armament Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBY</td>
<td>Central Bank of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>Coalition Holding Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCord</td>
<td>Detonating Cord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIOMIL</td>
<td>Defense Industry Organization, Military branch (Islamic Republic of Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPV</td>
<td>Diver Propulsion Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHOC</td>
<td>Evaluation and Humanitarian Operations Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFP</td>
<td>Explosively Formed Penetrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnant of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E OSS</td>
<td>Electro-Optical Surveillance Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Floating Storage and Offloading Vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>High Explosive (Grenade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEF</td>
<td>Hadrami Elite Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF/VHF</td>
<td>High Frequency/Very High Frequency (radio transmitter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMG</td>
<td>Heavy Machinegun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Initial Measurement Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INS</td>
<td>Inertial Navigation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC</td>
<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC-QF</td>
<td>Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMISC</td>
<td>Jeddah Maritime Information Sharing Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMRCC</td>
<td>Jeddah Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCs</td>
<td>Letters of Credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>Light Machinegun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPG</td>
<td>Liquefied Petroleum Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man-Portable Air Defence System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple Launcher Rocket System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMSI</td>
<td>Maritime Mobile Service Identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium Range Ballistic Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTC</td>
<td>Maritime Security Transit Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Metric Tonnes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIAVHR</td>
<td>National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nm</td>
<td>Nautical Mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Shield Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPAC</td>
<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSV</td>
<td>Offshore Support Vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>Printed Circuit Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>Presidential Leadership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoES</td>
<td>Panel of Experts on Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PoEY</td>
<td>Panel of Experts on Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC</td>
<td>Quality Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request For Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket-propelled Grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Rapid Support Forces (Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Sudanese Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBF</td>
<td>Security Belt Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Shabwah Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESGY</td>
<td>Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Saudi Riyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Southern Transitional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBGL</td>
<td>Under Barrel Grenade Launcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKMTO</td>
<td>United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Safety and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMHA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNVIM</td>
<td>United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VLCC</td>
<td>Very Large Crude Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBIED</td>
<td>Water-borne improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSW</td>
<td>West-South-West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCG</td>
<td>Yemeni Coast Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YR</td>
<td>Yemeni Riyal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>