Letter dated 3 August 2023 from the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2649 (2022), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 2649 (2022), the final report on the Panel’s work.

The attached report was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali on 18 July 2023 and was considered by the Committee on 25 July 2023.

I would be grateful if the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Roberto Sollazzo  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)

(Signed) Salma Arka  
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Summary

During the reporting period, the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was at a substantial impasse, with crucial mechanisms remaining non-operational. Despite efforts to address the existing deadlock, suspicion among the signatory parties persisted, contributing to the ongoing stalemate. This situation has been compounded by repetitive overflying by Malian army fighter jets, over Kidal and other areas controlled by signatory armed groups, thereby increasing fears of attacks among communities. The Panel received consistent information that signatory armed groups are arming themselves to face perceived threats posed by the Malian Armed Forces, which could lead to more serious incidents that would deal a final blow to the Agreement.

Signatory armed groups are under increasing pressure from terrorist armed groups and are no longer able to guarantee security for their communities in several locations. Terrorist armed groups are actively taking advantage of the stalling of the implementation of the Agreement by entrenching their control over local communities. In search of protection against attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, QDe.163), some communities are relying on Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM, QDe.159) to provide security.

Transitional authorities and signatory armed groups faced disagreements regarding to what extent all provisions of the Agreement could be reproduced in the draft Constitution. For the Government of Mali, only key provisions of the Agreement should be reflected in the draft Constitution, with an understanding that the remaining issues would be addressed by legislative and regulatory measures.

Signatory armed groups, terrorist groups and transnational organized crime rings, some of which are headed by prominent figures with ties to local and national politics, compete to secure control over trade and trafficking routes transiting through the northern regions of Gao and Kidal. These dynamics engender violence and further jeopardize the peace, security and stability of Mali and hence the implementation of the Agreement.

Signatory parties continue to be implicated in human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, especially in the form of violence against civilians. These violations exist in the context of armed confrontations between the signatory parties, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, especially in the regions of Ménaka, Gao and Mopti.

Patterns of conflict-related sexual violence in Mopti and Ménaka, especially those involving the Malian Armed Forces and their foreign security partners, remain a concern. The Panel is concerned that the recurrence of such incidents could suggest that such acts are systematic, planned and serve to achieve security objectives for the foreign security partners.

As Islamic State in the Greater Sahara occupies the greater part of the Ménaka Region, the humanitarian situation in the region and in Ménaka town is deteriorating. Population movements have spilled over into Kidal as well as into the Niger, with a few continuing on to Burkina Faso. The use of improvised explosive devices is increasing, with dire consequences for civilians, including children. Humanitarian actors continue to be targeted, being subjected to kidnapping, robbery and threats.
Meanwhile, regionally, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its member States managed to stabilize regional dynamics that had been extremely volatile in recent months. Moreover, these regional actors are actively addressing the issue of ownership in regional initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of the Agreement. Concurrently, the Government of Mali is striving to create new regional frameworks that share its priorities and policies, in order to break its isolation and garner support.

The implementation of sanctions measures remains a mixed picture. Of particular interest is the complex network of companies that may be allowing sanctioned individual Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) to violate the asset freeze and to launder money.
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* Circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Background

A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2649 (2022), covers the period from 3 August 2022, when the previous final report of the Panel of Experts on Mali (S/2022/595) was transmitted to the Council, to 23 June 2023. It includes updates on ongoing investigations detailed in the previous final report. The Panel submitted its midterm report (S/2023/138) on 22 February 2023.

2. In its resolution 2649 (2022), the Security Council decided to renew until 31 August 2023 the measures set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of its resolution 2374 (2017). The sanctions regime established by the Council in resolution 2374 (2017) consists of a travel ban and an asset freeze that apply to individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali as being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali. In its resolution 2649 (2022), the Council requested the Secretary-General to re-establish the Panel of Experts and extended its mandate, as set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 of resolution 2374 (2017), until 30 September 2023.

3. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel has maintained the highest achievable standard of proof, even though travel to Mali was impossible owing to the refusal of the Malian authorities to authorize any visits by the Panel of Experts.

4. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply. The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations.

B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions

5. The Panel visited Belgium, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. The Panel also visited the European Union, at the headquarters of the European External Action Service in Brussels, and for the first time since its establishment, the Panel visited the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Abuja, as well as the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates. A full list of Member States and organizations visited or consulted by the Panel can be found in annex 3. The Panel also held regular exchanges with members of the Security Council and with other countries of relevance to its mandate. The Panel is grateful for the excellent cooperation and support provided by the Governments of the countries it visited.

6. The Panel is grateful for the outstanding support and cooperation provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Panel would also like to express its appreciation to MINUSMA for organizing regular virtual meetings with its leadership and relevant operational
sections, as well as with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA, El Ghassim Wane, in Abuja on 19 May 2023. The Panel would also like to express its appreciation to the other United Nations system entities for their support for the Panel’s mission.

7. Panel correspondence records can be found in annex 4 to the present report. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Panel has sent 89 official communications to Member States, institutions and organizations. Official communications sent to Member States were generally replied to, although with different degrees of cooperation. Letters sent to armed groups that are party to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (signatory armed groups) were answered. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) provided verbal answers to the Panel’s request for information. None of the official communications sent to Mali, including those requesting permission to gain access to the country, have received a response to date.

8. The Panel maintained regular contact with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali and its secretariat, Member States and other interlocutors, including other Panels of Experts of the Security Council and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team.

II. Overview of progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

A. Political and regional context of the implementation of the Agreement

9. During the reporting period, the implementation of the Agreement encountered a significant deadlock, as key mechanisms remained non-operational. Mistrust between signatory parties continued, despite steps taken by both sides in an attempt to overcome the existing impasse.\(^3\) The Panel observed the absence of progress on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the lack of convening of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l’Accord) and on the draft Constitution proposed by the transitional authorities. Tensions persisted between the signatory parties, with worrisome incidents during the reporting period (see paras. 33–38 below).

10. The Government of Mali adopted required legislative measures and acts, and included all of the principles outlined in the Agreement within the preamble of the new Constitution. The main signatory armed group, Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad, however, persistently opposed every step of the process, claiming that the Government’s actions were meant to serve as a diversion from its actual intentions. Apprehension on the part of Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad regarding the potential abandonment of the Agreement continues to fuel the group’s resistance, posing a major obstacle to its effective implementation.

11. In the light of the official communication it received from the Government of Mali on 21 June 2023 urgently calling for the withdrawal of MINUSMA, the Security Council decided to terminate the Mission mandate as of 30 June 2023, in accordance with the provisions outlined in resolution 2690 (2023). Signatory armed groups expressed concern regarding the potential dissolution of the Agreement in the absence of United Nations mediation, thereby exposing the northern regions to the risk of another uprising. The withdrawal of MINUSMA will further undermine an already

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\(^3\) See S/2023/138, para. 10.
fragile Agreement, especially considering that MINUSMA played a crucial role in facilitating dialogue between the parties, as well as in monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Agreement. The termination of international supervision over the conflict, as MINUSMA had the authority to investigate alleged violations, also raised significant apprehensions.

**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

12. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, as a core component of the second pillar of the Agreement, has been a key indicator of progress on its implementation. The fact that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process serves as an indicator specifically relates to the defence and security aspects of the Agreement (chapters 7 and 8).

13. The Panel reported that the last substantive progress on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was recorded in 2020, when 448 armed group elements were integrated (see S/2021/714, paras. 9–11 and S/2022/595, paras. 12–13). The ad hoc commission set up to make proposals on the management of modalities of senior civil and military personnel, including the chain of command, has still not met (see S/2023/138, para. 12).

14. The Government of Mali expressed disappointment that the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad had not yet shared its list of combatants for accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. On the other hand, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad emphasized the need to resolve outstanding issues related to senior level integration and the chain of command before progressing with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.\(^4\) The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad considers that the Government of Mali has not delivered on any key substantive provisions of the Agreement regarding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (see para. 61 below).

15. Meanwhile, the Government of Mali issued a decree creating the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration\(^5\) on 14 April 2023, pursuant to article 19 of the Agreement. It is worth noting that a Commission with the same name has been operational since 2015. According to information received by the Panel, the new entity was created specifically to incorporate the membership of the Coordination des mouvements de l’inclusivité (CMI)\(^6\) movements, along with the Government of Mali, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger.\(^7\) Indeed, according to its statute (see annex 5), the Commission will include eight representatives of CMI. The Commission will carry out the same tasks as the previous entity, under the authority of the Minister for National Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, who is in charge of the Agreement and is tasked with developing and implementing the national programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegrating of ex-combatants.\(^8\)

\(^4\) See S/2022/595, para. 12.
\(^5\) Decree No. 2023-0242/PT-RM of 14 April 2023 (see annex 5).
\(^6\) Coordination des mouvements de l’inclusivité (CMI) was founded on 11 November 2017 by dissident groups from Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014. These dissident groups demanded their inclusion in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. CMI is not a signatory party to the Agreement.
\(^7\) The composition of the Commission is as follows: 10 representatives of the Government, 7 representatives of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), 7 representatives from the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014, and 8 representatives from the Coordination des mouvements de l’inclusivité (CMI).
\(^8\) Full responsibilities and tasks of the Commission are set out in annex 5.
16. The Commission can only play an effective role in the implementation of the Agreement if all signatory parties, which share responsibility for the lack of progress in implementing the Agreement, engage in good faith in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

**Persistent lack of trust between the signatory parties jeopardizes the Agreement mechanisms**

17. During the reporting period, the international mediation focused its efforts on urging the signatory parties to resume dialogue, to the detriment of other tasks including the implementation of the Agreement’s provisions. While the focus on resuming dialogue was intended to foster an atmosphere of cooperation and reconciliation among the parties, it came at the expense of effectively addressing implementation challenges and ensuring compliance with the Agreement. It also led to the hardening of positions.

18. Following the suspension by Cadre stratégique permanent pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement (CSP-PSD) of its participation in all mechanisms provided for in the Agreement, a delegation of the Cadre stratégique permanent visited Algeria from 20 February to 3 March 2023 at the invitation of the Algerian authorities. The delegation was headed by the President of the Cadre stratégique permanent, Alghabass Ag Intalla.

19. The delegation met with the President of Algeria, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who assured them that the concerns of the armed groups regarding the terms of implementation of the Agreement would be duly acknowledged, and reaffirmed Algeria’s commitment to the implementation of the Agreement. No additional particulars pertaining to the topics discussed with the Algerian counterparts or the proposals submitted were made public.

20. Meanwhile, the Malian transitional authorities consider that the implementation of the Agreement has reached a significant roadblock. They are of the view that despite their efforts to implement the Agreement, the signatory armed groups continue to violate it, particularly the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad. The Government of Mali believes that the violations are occurring given the absence of a reaction from the international mediation team led by Algeria. In a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria dated 24 February 2023 (see annex 6), Malian authorities expressed their concern about alleged violations by the signatory armed groups. The letter highlighted the movement of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad forces observed in the Ménaka and Gao Regions in the fourth quarter of 2022 (see S/2023/138, para. 41) and accused Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and Cadre stratégique permanent, among other things, of establishing new military headquarters, reopening security posts, conducting patrols and illegally issuing authorizations for movement within gold mining sites. The letter also stated that the Government “(…) will automatically reject any accusation that would hold it responsible for the possible consequences of [the] violations” of the Agreement, presumably preparing public opinion and the international community for potential subsequent actions by the Government.

21. Meanwhile, the lack of trust has had consequences on the Agreement Monitoring Committee, which is the most important implementation mechanism but has not met since November 2022. Indeed, the Agreement Monitoring Committee has been lost in a mire of exchanges, accusations and requests by the parties to the Agreement. The request by Cadre stratégique permanent for a meeting on “neutral...

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10 The violations reported by the Government of Mali are listed in the letter.
“ground” was met with reservations by the Government of Mali, which emphasized the importance of conducting discussions and negotiations within the country’s sovereign territory. The lack of agreement concerning a venue for the meeting is an example of the deadlocks and uncompromising positions on all sides, which challenge the implementation of the Agreement.

22. In order to restore the momentum of the meetings of the Cadre stratégique permanent, concerted efforts must be made to address the prevailing challenges and obstacles that impede the effective implementation of the Agreement.

**Constitutional and legislative reform in the context of the implementation of the Agreement**

23. Malian authorities have taken steps (as explained in further detail below) to align with the provisions of article 3 of the Agreement\(^\text{11}\) by adopting the necessary legislative and regulatory measures necessary for its effective implementation. Despite these efforts, signatory armed groups – particularly the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad – remained sceptical about the will of the Malian authorities to execute these provisions, and the modalities for their execution, through tangible actions that would address the needs of their constituencies.\(^\text{12}\) They expressed specific concerns about the draft Constitution and the legislation described in paragraph 24 below.\(^\text{13}\)

**Legislative measures with a view to implementing the Agreement**

24. Act No. 2023-001 of 13 March amending Act No. 2022-019 of 24 June (the Elections Act), Act No. 2023-002 of 13 March amending Act No. 2012-006 establishing the fundamental principles of the administrative organization of the territory and Act No. 2023-003 of 13 March amending Act No. 2017-052 of 2 October 2017 setting out the conditions for the free administration of local constituencies were all adopted during the reporting period (see annex 7a–7c). These laws include the provisions set out below:

- (a) They entrust the regions and other territorial collectivities with a legal personality and financial autonomy. This aligns with the principle of decentralization outlined throughout the Agreement, which aims to empower local communities and enable them to have greater control over local matters;

- (b) They outline the principles of free administration of territorial constituencies by elected councils, whose presidents are elected by direct universal suffrage, and establish the roles and responsibilities of the executive bodies. These provisions align with article 6 of the Agreement;

- (c) Article 7 of the Agreement calls for devolving powers and resources to local authorities to promote inclusive governance and address the grievances underlying the conflict, as reflected in Law No. 2023-002 on the fundamental principles of the administrative organization of the territory. Any transfer of responsibilities from the State to territorial collectivities must be accompanied by the

\(^{11}\) Article 3 provides that: “The institutions of the State of Mali shall, in close consultation with the Parties and with the support of the Monitoring Committee provided for by the present Agreement, take the necessary action to ensure that any regulatory, legislative and constitutional measures required for the implementation of this Agreement are adopted.”

\(^{12}\) Confidential source.

\(^{13}\) The Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP) specifically expressed regret that the provisions of the Agreement were not incorporated verbatim into the text of the Constitution, thereby indicating a lack of willingness on the part of the transitional authorities to implement them exactly as outlined in the Agreement.
transfer of necessary resources and means to enable the effective exercise of those responsibilities;

(d) The new laws reflect the aim of article 8 of the Agreement to promote economic and social development in northern Mali and ensure that the benefits of development reach all segments of the population. The regions are tasked with conceiving, programming, implementing, monitoring and evaluating regional actions;

(e) Law 2023-003 on the conditions for the free administration of territorial collectivities introduces a mechanism for evaluating the performance of territorial collectivities and linking the allocation of additional resources to their performance. Performance contracts are established between the State representative and the territorial collectivities, aiming to enhance accountability, transparency and effectiveness in the implementation of development programmes. This provision aligns with the Agreement’s emphasis on good governance and accountability in the management of public resources;

(f) Article 47 of the Agreement was translated into Act No. 2022-041 of 15 November 2022 establishing the general rules relating to compensation for harm caused by serious human rights violations. Pursuant to that law, the Government created the Authority for the Management of Compensation for Victims of Crises, a transitional justice mechanism responsible for managing reparations for human rights violations in Mali since 1960. The Authority’s tasks include developing reparative measures, identifying victims, assessing damages, providing reparations, managing funds and proposing necessary measures.

25. Although the aforementioned laws potentially create a legal framework to support the implementation of the Agreement, certain key concerns of the signatory armed groups remain unresolved, including the absence of any real power being vested in the regional councils and their presidents. Of particular significance is the issue of how power is to be shared between the central Government and authorities in the regions. A priori control is preferred by the Government, which involves the Governor, representing the central Government, approving decisions made by regional decision-making bodies. Signatory armed groups, however, are keen on a simple a posteriori control, as outlined in the principle of subsidiarity stated in the Agreement. In this case, decisions taken by the regional bodies do not need to be approved by the Governor. The signatory armed groups consider the principle of subsidiarity essential and a prerequisite to considering the Agreement’s provisions on local governance as having been implemented.

Signatory armed groups opposition to constitutional reform

26. Some signatory and non-signatory armed groups participated in the drafting of the Constitution, while others chose to boycott the whole process in order to completely dissociate themselves from the transitional Malian authorities. The Plateforme and the Coordination des mouvements de l’inclusivité (non-signatory group) both participated in the drafting and official presentation ceremony of the draft Constitution to the President of the Transition, Assimi Goïta (see annex 8).

27. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad chose not to participate in the drafting of the Constitution, although the Government of Mali invited them to do so, and openly opposed the text. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad considered that the new Constitution does not provide for the necessary

14 Decree n°2023-016/PM-RM of 28 March 2023 establishing the Authority for the Management of Compensation for Victims of Crises.
decentralization tools to enable the regionalization of Mali, nor does it settle the question of the powers of the President of the Regional Council.\textsuperscript{16}

28. The transitional authorities and the signatory armed groups disagreed over to what extent all the provisions of the Agreement could be incorporated into the draft Constitution. For the Government, only key provisions of the Agreement should be added to the draft, with an understanding that the remaining provisions would be addressed by legislative and regulatory measures.\textsuperscript{17} On the other hand, the Cadre stratégique permanent issued a communiqué on 28 March 2023 addressing its grievances vis-à-vis the draft Constitution. It regretted that the draft “(...) does not show any specific evolution compared to the 25 February 1992 Constitution, regarding the essential provisions necessary for the implementation of legislative and regulatory measures related to the political and institutional commitments of the Agreement” (see annex 9a).

29. The Cadre stratégique permanent, during an extraordinary meeting held from 3 to 5 June in Kidal, thus recommended postponing the referendum\textsuperscript{18} to create the conditions that would lead to a sufficiently participatory text. On 6 June 2023, the international mediation met with the Cadre stratégique permanent, which insisted on receiving formal guarantees from the Government that the approval of the Constitution would not override the Agreement. These guarantees did not materialize, leading to the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad refusal that the referendum take place in Kidal (see annex 9c).

30. In Gao, electors were mobilized to participate in the constitutional referendum of 18 June 2023. Internally displaced persons were also encouraged to participate. A certain enthusiasm could be observed among these populations, who believe that the holding of the constitutional referendum was a harbinger of the 2024 elections.\textsuperscript{19}

**Constitutional referendum results**

31. According to the Independent Authority for Election Management, the new Constitution submitted by the transitional authorities was approved by Malians, with 97 per cent of the vote. The voter turnout, however, stands at 39.40 per cent. The voting process was hindered in numerous localities in the northern regions, either owing to the fear of jihadist attacks or to political disagreements (see para. 34 below).

32. With the approval of the new Constitution, several major changes are expected to be implemented in line with the Agreement. The changes include the introduction of a bicameral Parliament, which will enhance the territorial representation of northern Mali in national institutions. In addition, traditional authorities will be given greater recognition, particularly within the second chamber. The new Constitution also incorporates inclusive provisions regarding the recognition and promotion of national languages. The key question at hand is whether the implementation of the constitutional provisions that are tied to the Agreement can take place without the active involvement of the principal signatory armed groups.

\textsuperscript{16} Confidential source.
\textsuperscript{17} Confidential United Nations source.
\textsuperscript{18} Statement by the spokesperson of Cadre stratégique permanent, Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramdane, expressing the view that the signatory armed groups can only support the Constitutional referendum when the peace process is relaunched. See also the communiqué issued by Cadre stratégique permanent on 5 June 2023 (see annex 9b).
\textsuperscript{19} Local sources informed the Panel that there is a lot of hope around the elections and that the constitutional referendum represents the first step towards restoring peace.
Escalation of tensions between parties to the Agreement

33. Alongside the aforementioned persistent lack of trust and political impasse between the Government of Mali and signatory armed groups, the Panel observed that the tensions in the field had intensified.

Overflight over Kidal and other towns by Government of Mali fighter jets

34. On 5 April 2023, a Malian fighter jet flew, allegedly at low altitude, over Kidal, Ber, Anéfis and Amassin, all of which are areas under the control of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad. This escalation coincided with the approaching anniversary of the “unilateral declaration of independence of Azawad” on 6 April 2012, the celebration of which can be considered as a violation of article 1 (a) of the Agreement. The incident further exacerbated the tensions between the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups. The fighter jet reportedly took off from the Malian military base in Gao, and reportedly did not open fire. Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad elements in Kidal reacted instantly by shooting towards the jet (see annex 10a, video footage). The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad protested the overflight, branding it a ceasefire violation under the Agreement (see annex 10b).

35. The Panel had indicated in its previous reports (S/2022/595, para. 14) that signatory parties were acting as if preparing for a confrontation against one another. This trend has continued, as demonstrated in the incident of the overflight. The Panel further notes that the overflight happened in a context of successive events with military connotations that had heightened the tensions between the parties since January 2023:

(a) From 15 to 20 January, the army Chiefs of Staff of the Cadre stratégique permanent, on which the Panel has reported previously (see S/2022/595, paras. 40–46), met in Anéfis, Kidal, to discuss a single command structure for military operations in all areas under their control;

(b) On 8 February, the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) announced their merger into a single politico-military movement. On 10 February, a member of the bureau of the National Transition Council, Amadou Albert Maïga, published a video in which he refers to a potential military attack on Kidal by saying “…we have a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who had been able to tell the President of the Transition that the situation for the liberation of Kidal is on the table” (see annex 11, video footage);

(c) On 20 February, the army Chiefs of Staff of Cadre stratégique permanent met a second time in Anéfis and announced a major joint military operation, with 380 vehicles and 2,500 combatants, to protect the civilian population against attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara;

(d) Although the situation showed signs of improvement after the visit to Kidal on 13 May of the Minister for National Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, another similar incident of overflight by a Malian army fighter jet occurred on 18 June in Kidal, on the day of the constitutional referendum. In a context marked by the refusal of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad to allow the holding...
of the constitutional referendum in Kidal Region, the recurring of such an incident raises concerns regarding the fragile political context of the implementation of the Agreement.

36. In the Panel’s assessment, the overflights over Kidal and other areas controlled by the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad by Malian fighter jets is an act that further erodes the trust between parties to the Agreement. The Panel further considers these overflights as the second incident with military connotations between signatory armed groups and the Government in less than a year, after the incident at the Amasrakad-Gourma checkpoint on 28 September 2022, which was reported on by the Panel (see S/2023/138, para. 27).

37. Unlike the first incident in Amasrakad-Gourma, the overflight did not lead to an exchange of fire between the parties, but the situation could have degenerated quickly. The Panel was unable to verify the authenticity of images of weapons exhibited by the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad in Kidal, including those allegedly with anti-aircraft capabilities. Nevertheless, the Panel received consistent reports of intensive rearmament by the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and of its determination to acquire anti-aircraft weapon systems to defend itself in case of air attacks, including by the Malian Armed Forces. The representatives of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad told the Panel that arrangements have been made for it to be able to respond to such provocations in the future.

38. The developments in Kidal underscore the importance of addressing the underlying challenges that hinder the effective implementation of the Agreement. The incidents also highlighted the need to manage potential triggers that can heighten tensions in the region, thus preventing further deterioration of the security situation.

Regional context of the implementation of the Agreement and renewed regional solidarity

39. The regional dynamics surrounding Mali’s conflict remain complex. Neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger continue to face security challenges due to spillover consequences, especially terrorist threats.

Economic Community of West African States

40. The challenges faced by Mali are not limited to its borders but have wider implications for the entire region. In this context, the Panel witnessed a renewed regional solidarity being promoted by ECOWAS during recent months. The subregional organization has demonstrated leadership by facilitating diplomatic engagements, encouraging dialogue and urging its member States to normalize their relations with the Government of Mali. All these measures aim to support the transition and the holding of elections in accordance with the timetable presented by the Government of Mali in June 2022. This new dynamic is a promising development that strengthens the collective commitment to peace.

41. Although ECOWAS considers that some progress has been made in the implementation of the Agreement, it agrees that it is currently at a standstill. Accompanying Mali throughout the transition and the return to civilian rule and constitutional order remains a priority for ECOWAS. Disengagement from the Agreement, however, is not an option for the organization, as it would only create more difficulties. The transition could not possibly be brought to a successful end if the risk of resumption of armed confrontations between the signatory parties is high.  

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21 See annex 9.
22 Meetings with officials of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and United Nations sources.
Côte d’Ivoire

42. Ivorian authorities expressed concern about the population movements arriving from northern Mali, as the security situation has been deteriorating. As a mitigation measure, they intend to invest in the development of the border regions with Mali, including by creating opportunities for local communities, especially for young people, so as to prevent recruitment by terrorist groups.

43. Security issues are of utmost concern to Ivorian authorities, especially since the country suffered three terrorist attacks on its territory. Those incidents were linked to the situation in Mali in recent years, notably the shootings in Grand-Bassam in 2016. Besides terrorist threats, the border region has also been facing other security challenges, including the smuggling of persons and goods and the trafficking of drugs. For Côte d’Ivoire, cooperation with Mali in the border region is crucial for addressing shared challenges and promoting peace and security. Côte d’Ivoire considers that, in order to secure borders, the sharing of intelligence should be encouraged to ensure a similar level of information among actors and the conduct of joint operations, in particular within the framework of the Accra Initiative. The authorities nonetheless emphasized that cooperation would not fully resume until the return of civilian rule in Mali.

44. The prevailing priority for Côte d’Ivoire is to achieve political stability in the region, which begins with encouraging and supporting a successful transition in Mali. Côte d’Ivoire is willing to assist Mali throughout the transition process and recalls that there is constant communication between counterparts in both countries. In fact, the Joint Cooperation Commission (Commission mixte de cooperation) between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire met in Bamako from 22 to 24 March 2023, at a technical level, after several months of diplomatic crisis.

45. Ivorian authorities point out that they have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Mali. Côte d’Ivoire calls for the restoration of peace, security and stability in Mali through democratic means, within the framework of the Agreement.

Senegal

46. The bilateral relations between Senegal and Mali continue to evolve towards peaceful and regional rebalancing, taking into consideration that Senegal consistently maintained good relations with Mali. Senegal considers its approach regarding Mali as realistic, emphasizing the importance of a successful transition. Given the highly challenging security situation in the region, Senegalese authorities share the same priority as ECOWAS with respect to preventing the contagion effect and the proliferation of coup d’états, which undermine efforts to combat the spread of terrorism.

47. Senegal recognizes the need for sustained regional cooperation for the full implementation of the Agreement in order to address the complex challenges faced by Mali and the wider Sahel region.

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23 The Accra Initiative is a cooperative and collaborative security mechanism launched in 2017 in Ghana, between seven West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo as member States, and Mali and the Niger as observer members), as they face increasing threats and attacks from terrorist armed groups.
Mauritania

48. Border management is extremely important to Mauritanian authorities, who decided to establish a military exclusion zone along the Malian border. All civilian presence and activities are prohibited in these areas. This measure has proven effective in enhancing border control. The intensified military presence and surveillance deter illicit activities such as the smuggling, trafficking and unauthorized movements of people and goods. The increased security measures aim at maintaining territorial integrity, preventing cross-border threats and promoting stability in the region.

49. For Mauritanian authorities, the effectiveness of this approach would be further improved through enhanced cooperation, particularly in terms of intelligence-sharing, with Mali. Such collaboration would contribute to regional security efforts and reinforce stability in both countries. Within the framework of bilateral agreements with Mali, Mauritania has established a dedicated structure located in the port of Nouakchott. This structure functions as an extraterritorial enclave comprising warehouses where goods intended for official Malian operators are stored, before being transported to Mali. Notably, container shipments receive customs escorts. These measures allow for effective control of the flow of goods from the port of Nouakchott to Mali.

50. In view of the importance of addressing the issue of the illicit trafficking of migrants, Mauritania enacted Act No. 2020-017 concerning the prevention and suppression of trafficking in persons and the protection of victims, in 2020, which is specifically aimed at combating that phenomenon. The law includes stringent measures and sanctions that target individuals involved in the trafficking of migrants, with a particular focus on smugglers and facilitators.

51. Mauritania considers the protection of Malian refugees in the Mbera refugee camp, located close to Bassikounou commune, as a priority. The authorities have undertaken a census of the refugees, estimated to be around 108,000 individuals in 2023.

52. The joint commission established to verify the events in Robinet El Ataye has not yet concluded its investigations. It has conducted two on-site visits to gather information. The Mauritanian authorities recognize the commission’s significant efforts to determine the causes of the victims’ deaths. Both countries are now heading towards a bilateral approach to address this matter through judicial channels.

Burkina Faso

53. Burkina Faso faces a terrorist threat, which is particularly tangible in the northern and eastern regions but with clear spillovers in the west as well. The national authorities informed the Panel that the country’s ties with Mali were strengthened by the fact that both were facing the same threats and by the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on both countries. These ties resulted in the proposal of a federation with Mali and, initially, Guinea (see paras. 55–57 below). The national authorities

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24 Four wilayahs (regions) in Mauritania share borders with Mali: Hodh ech Chargui, Hodh el Gharbi, Assaba and Guidimaka. These regions serve as significant hubs for cross-border interactions, primarily involving the illicit trade of fuel, cigarettes, cannabis, medicines and stolen vehicles. These exchanges take place in open-air markets and predominantly involve populations from northern Mali. The Mauritanian authorities have observed that the redeployment of the Malian army along the borders has resulted in a significant decrease in vehicle trafficking.


26 At the time of writing, Burkina Faso hosted 36,000 registered Malian refugees.
moreover gave the Panel to understand that financial constraints prevented them from resorting to foreign private security companies to support their operations.

54. The national authorities welcomed the Panel’s visit as a reflection of the Government’s firm commitment to the international obligations of Burkina Faso as a State Member of the United Nations. In the same context, they referred to their continued contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations, despite the security challenges they face domestically. They furthermore highlighted their continued cooperation with ECOWAS to find suitable mechanisms to guarantee peace and stability in the region, and to that end, the authorities looked forward to liaising with the ECOWAS special envoy for Burkina Faso, the former President of the Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou. The country has also participated in two joint military operations, namely Operation Kapidougou with Mali, in April 2023, and Operation Taalali with the Niger, in 2022. The authorities of Burkina Faso expressed their need for both military equipment and training to overcome the current threats to its own security posed by the actions of terrorist groups and technical assistance to its financial intelligence unit to better comply with United Nations sanctions regimes, including the sanctions established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017).

Transitional authorities seek to create alternative regional cooperation frameworks

55. In 2023, the Panel has observed the efforts of the transitional authorities to launch and to join regional frameworks that share its priorities and policies, in order to break its isolation and garner support. At the initiative of Togo, an informal political platform called the “Alliance politique africaine” was launched in Lomé on 3 May 2023. Mali is actively participating in its work, as it was selected as a member of the High-Level Committee responsible for finalizing the founding documents of the Alliance.

56. The discussions of the Alliance revolved primarily around the region’s deteriorating security situation. Participants, at the ministerial level, expressed a growing willingness among African countries to assume responsibility for their own challenges, decrying external interference as the underlying cause of protracted conflicts.

57. On 9 February 2023 in Ouagadougou, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea announced their intention to create a confederation between the three countries. The initiative is aimed at creating and institutionalizing a permanent framework for political and security exchanges at the highest level. The Panel understands that no measures have yet been taken to implement this vision. For Burkina Faso, the initiative is a reflection of the three States’ intent to strengthen ties and consolidate security efforts, rather than the creation of a new structure or an intent to weaken existing regional frameworks.

Capacity-building for better participation of regional stakeholders in the implementation of the Agreement

58. Regional stakeholders have expressed to the Panel specific needs regarding capacity-building to effectively support the implementation of the Agreement in Mali, with a particular focus on combating terrorism. The need to improve the individual capacity of States in managing their borders remains a priority. Strengthening border management capabilities by implementing an effective migration policy and

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27 The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of delegation of Angola, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Namibia, Togo and the United Republic of Tanzania participated in the constitutive meeting of the Alliance.
governance systems is vital to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and illicit weapons and to tackle trafficking.

59. There is also a strong call for improvement in the existing frameworks on judicial and investigative cooperation to pursue acts of transnational organized crime, freeze assets, combat the financing of terrorism and share intelligence concerning the activities of terrorist groups. Countries in the region expressed the need to enhance operational cooperation and establish a framework for developing bilateral and multilateral operations with Mali.

B. Update on armed groups

Non-implementation of the Agreement weakens signatory armed groups and offers terrorist groups an opportunity to re-enact 2012 scenario

60. Signatory armed groups are entrusted with two key roles by the Agreement. They are security providers and advocate for the socioeconomic well-being of their communities and combatants. The prolonged stalling of implementation of the Agreement and the sustained terrorist attacks on communities have undermined the raison d’être of the signatory armed groups. These developments have also weakened the legitimacy of the signatory armed groups, offering terrorist groups an opportunity to re-enact the 2012 scenario. The impasse with respect to the Agreement is thus empowering Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin to vie for leadership in northern Mali.

61. The stalling of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in the context of the Agreement prevents signatory armed groups from offering their combatants incentives in the form of viable alternative sources of income and livelihood, including joining the Malian Public Services. Those combatants, as a result, have become more vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups. Many armed groups have seen their combatants switch sides to join terrorist armed groups or trafficking networks. Multiple local sources have confirmed the tendency of combatants to simultaneously belong to both signatory armed groups and terrorist armed groups, and to engage opportunistically in criminal activities.

62. Sustained violence and attacks against civilians committed mostly by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara against communities have made signatory armed groups appear to be weak and unreliable security providers for communities. Many of these communities and populations are forced to seek protection elsewhere. Several signatory armed groups, such as Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch), have lost many combatants in battles against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. There are also signatory armed groups that have simply forfeited their obligations by publicly declaring that they are no longer able to protect their communities (see S/2023/138, para. 45). Others, such as Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad, have abandoned certain positions to focus on key strategic geographical areas with their limited numbers of remaining loyal combatants.

63. Terrorist groups have seen the opportunity and they are attempting to capitalize on it as quickly as possible. In less than a year, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has almost doubled its areas of control in Mali. It now controls all the rural cercles of Ménaka (Anderamboukane, Inékar and Tidermene). In Gao Region, it controls large parts of Ansongo cercle, most notably Talataye, from where it is exerting pressure on Tilemsi and other parts of Gao. Information collected by the Panel indicates that
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has also revamped its supply routes from Nigeria through the Niger and Libya, as part of its current offensive.\(^{28}\)

64. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin appears to adopt a different strategy. It is primarily taking advantage of the weakening of signatory armed groups and is now positioning itself as the sole actor capable of protecting populations against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Multiple sources told the Panel that several communities in the north have declared allegiance to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in recent months. It appears now that the signatory armed groups depend on Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin for relevance and not the other way around. Indeed, some officers of signatory armed groups seem to believe that being portrayed with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin gives them credibility with respect to their communities. That development partly explains why almost all the leaders of signatory armed groups, at some point during the reporting period, agreed to meet with the leader of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, Iyad Ag Ghali (QDi.316).

65. Indeed, consistent information collected by the Panel indicates that the President of Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad, Algabas Ag Intallah, met the leader of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, the sanctioned individual Iyad Ag Ghali (QDi.316), in a secret locality. Several sources informed the Panel that the meeting was upon the request of Iyad Ag Ghali, who offered a formal collaboration between the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, to combat Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Reportedly, the leadership of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad declined the offer of formal collaboration. Representatives of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad told the Panel that to their knowledge there was no formal meeting between Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad leadership and Iyad Ag Ghali.

66. The Panel, however, received information that representatives of communities and local leaders in the areas controlled by Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad continue to provide support, including combatants, to Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in order to combat Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Plateforme leadership and other local leaders met with Iyad Ag Ghali in locations that the Panel was unable to identify, although the Panel was also told that many Plateforme combatants have joined Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin to combat Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Signatory armed groups appear reluctant to abandon the Agreement and openly join Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin to confront Islamic State in the Greater Sahara; that said, they are also not preventing their combatants from joining Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin operations.

67. The current situation provides Iyad Ag Ghali with an opportunity to fulfil his aspiration of becoming the indispensable leader of northern Mali. Since he is not part of the Agreement framework and is a listed individual on the sanctions list established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), Iyad Ag Ghali could not play this role. Communities in northern Mali are seeking to be represented by credible individuals who are recognized at the local, national and international levels. Iyad Ag Ghali also wants to appear as a unifying figure of northern Mali, which has motivated him to attempt to settle disputes between communities. His meeting with community leaders from Ménaka reportedly focused on the dispute between Daoussak and Fulani communities and other Tuareg groups.

68. The signatory armed group Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch) has been the most affected by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacks. It has lost large numbers of its combatants in Aмерamboukane et Inékar cercles. The Panel received reports of Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch)

\(^{28}\) Confidential sources.
seeking to overcome its historical differences with Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin as a way to combat threats from Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

69. Multiple sources informed the Panel that Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin was organizing the collection of money and other resources from almost all communities in the north of Mali and elsewhere. In order to gather support for resource mobilization and seek voluntary contributions, it has shifted its narrative from zakat to contributions to support the war effort against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and protect populations. According to the information received, contributions depend on each community’s capacity, size and economic weight. The Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin leader of the Timbuktu Region, Salem ould Breihmatt, also known as Abu Hamza al-Shanqiti or Hamza al-Mauritani, is the only one who has issued written calls for contributions (see annex 12). Elsewhere, the collection is done less transparently, but systematically. Local leaders are entrusted by terrorist groups with the responsibility to ensure that money is collected in their villages, and are deemed personally liable in case of failure. Some of the local leaders who were not ready to play this role were forced to flee their villages. The signatory movements say they do not take part in these activities, but they do not oppose them either.

70. The Government of Mali watches from a distance the confrontations between Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin. According to sources the Panel has met with, the Government appears to believe that, over time, the confrontation between Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in the north will benefit Malian authorities. Other sources told the Panel that the time is neither on the side of the Government nor on that of the signatory armed groups. The passage of time appears to favour the terrorist groups Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, whose military capacities and community penetration grow each day. Unless the implementation of the Agreement is revived, the 2012 scenario of terrorist groups occupying key cities in Mali could repeat itself.

In Ménaka Region, signatory parties prioritized private agendas over defending civilian populations against attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

71. The Panel noted that in Ménaka Region, both Government forces and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad appeared more interested in maintaining their zones of influence than in preventing attacks on civilians by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. This has contributed to this terrorist group’s almost total control of Ménaka Region.

72. The Malian Armed Forces have been deployed in Ménaka since June 2022. Located in the former French military base of Ménaka, the contingent is reputed to be well equipped, including with helicopters and several military armoured vehicles. The contingent is assisted by foreign security partner elements, presumed to be Wagner Group, whose number could not be verified by the Panel.

29 While presumed to be elements of the Wagner Group – taking into consideration its presence in Mali – the Panel has not received any evidence as to the identity, leadership or affiliation of the elements supporting the Malian Armed Forces in their operations. Russian officials confirmed to the Panel, during its visit to Moscow on 30 March 2023, the presence of Wagner Group elements in Mali as private contractors. These Russian officials also confirmed to the Panel the presence in Mali of Russian military instructors, based in Bamako airport, albeit in small numbers, who do not participate in operations. Elements of the foreign security partners are usually referred to in interviews with survivors of their operations as “The Whites/Les Blancs”.

S/2023/578
73. Operationally, the Panel noted that the Malian Armed Forces and their partners in Ménaka are generally confined to their camp and carried out mostly short-range patrols in the commune of Ménaka. Information collected by the Panel indicates that the Malian army contingent in Ménaka has also undertaken joint patrols with MINUSMA in Ménaka town.

74. To the Panel’s knowledge, the Malian Armed Forces have not protected civilians from attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara outside Ménaka town since June 2022. This is despite multiple calls for assistance by the Plateforme, which tried to ensure the protection of civilians when the Malian Armed Forces defaulted on their obligations (see annex 13). Since then, the region has continued to experience a surge in the number of attacks on civilians by terrorist armed groups. Even villages closer to the Malian Armed Forces contingent, within the commune of Ménaka, have been attacked (see paras. 113–116 below).

75. Signatory armed movements have constantly criticized Malian forces for not taking action to prevent attacks or promptly intervene when the terrorist groups in Ménaka Region attack villages. “Our people die defenceless and disenfranchised by the Government, as if they were not Malians”, one local leader mentioned to the Panel. On 12 May 2023 in Kidal, signatory armed groups reminded Minister Wagué of the Government’s duty to protect its population against attacks by terrorist groups.30

76. Meanwhile, the Panel notes that signatory movements were also unable to form a common front against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Despite the announcement made by Cadre stratégique permanent in January 2023, Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch) and Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA) were left to fight alone and suffered heavy losses (see annex 13).31

77. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad also showed little interest in using its strong military presence in Ménaka Region to protect civilians. It appeared more interested in revamping its old military base of Tinfadimata,32 keeping its footprint in the cercle of Tidermene and closely watching the Malian contingent deployed in Ménaka. According to information collected by the Panel, from October 2022 to January 2023, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad moved more than 1,900 combatants and 700 vehicles and weapons from Kidal to Gao and Ménaka, but then moved them all out of both Ménaka and Gao again. Indeed, as reported by the Panel,33 the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad operation Tartit deployed combatants and equipment to Ménaka and Gao until January 2023. Assuming the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad deployment constituted an additional security asset to the region, the Governor of Ménaka, Colonel Major Issa Tembiné, reportedly welcomed the presence of the group.34

30 Confidential source, May 2023.
31 Gathered in Anéfis/Kidal from 17 to 20 January 2023, the Chiefs of Staff of the different components of the Cadre stratégique permanent decided on a large-scale joint operation against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, bringing together more than 300 vehicles and 2,500 fighters, but that operation was not carried out, because of differences within the Cadre stratégique permanent.
32 Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad has always wanted to expand its influence in Ménaka, as previously reported on by the Panel (see S/2019/636, paras. 96–99).
33 See S/2023/138, para. 43.
34 Confidential sources, April and May 2023. It is reported that the Governor of Ménaka held a meeting at his office, including representatives of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), during which he explicitly welcomed the presence of Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad in the region as a needed security asset.
78. The Panel received confirmation that the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad forces remained cloistered in Tinfadimata base during attacks on civilians and, in small numbers, in the town of Ménaka. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad continued to argue that signatory armed groups have no mandate to fight terrorist groups and that anti-terrorism operations should be carried out within the framework of the Agreement. Representatives of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad confirmed to the Panel that the movement did not directly support the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés and Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch) in their confrontation against Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and that they have no more troops in Tinfadimata.

79. According to information gathered by the Panel, on 10 April 2023, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacked and occupied Tidermene, unchallenged. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad opted to move back its troops deployed in Tidermene to Kidal before the attack. The Malian Armed Forces did not intervene.

80. On 23 April 2023, more than 10 days after the attack, the Malian contingent based in Ménaka, accompanied by foreign security partner elements, conducted one of their first long-range patrols outside the town, to Tidermene. There they arrested 12 individuals on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group. On 27 April 2023, the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad issued a communiqué accusing the Government of provocation for arresting 10 of its elements (see annex 15). It claimed that those elements were on a duly authorized mission. The Panel received from the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad a copy of the alleged mission order of the 10 individuals, who allegedly were attending a family gathering after Ramadan (see annex 16a). However, the Panel was unable to verify the authenticity of the document, the affiliations of those arrested and the reason for their presence at the place of arrest.

81. Several sources and local leaders told the Panel that they wondered about the reason for the late arrival of the Malian Armed Forces on the scene and the presence of the elements of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad in an area under the control of a terrorist group. This is taking into consideration that Tidermene had been vacated of its civilian population, in order to facilitate military operations.

82. Signatory armed groups continued to seek avenues for unifying political and military forces. On 8 February 2023 at the “Mano Dayak” stadium in Kidal, representatives of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad, the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad announced a project to merge their three armed groups into one single political and military entity. The merger declaration (see annex 16b) also announced the creation of a commission mandated to make proposals for the name, flag and organizational structure of the new entity. The commission was placed under the leadership of Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga, a key leader of the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, who had subsequently integrated into the Malian Armed Forces, from which he formally resigned in 2021 (see annex 17).

83. The Panel notes that the merging project has not progressed as expected. The technical commission headed by Colonel Fagaga was expected to submit its report the following month, but it has yet to do so. The report of the Commission would...
have allowed the holding of a constitutive congress. Several sources informed the Panel of significant disagreements between the three movements. Some, notably the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, appear to fear their total disappearance and the subsequent supremacy of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad. The Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad is already quite weakened, mainly by the loss of combatants, who have reportedly joined other armed groups, including the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad.

84. According to information received by the Panel, the choice of a flag also causes disagreements. Reportedly, Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad would prefer its flag to represent the new entity, given its history in the Tuareg movement. It was also reported to the Panel that other stakeholders fear that the merger would serve as a way for Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’s leader’s, Iyad Ag Ghali, to cement his supremacy over northern Mali and supplant the signatory armed groups. The historical and clan ties between the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad and the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin leader appear to have scared other parties away from the project.

III. Information relevant to the potential designation of individuals or entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)

A. Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017)

Proceeds from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali

Organized crime

85. In the present section, the actors and the activities are examined in the context of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017). The general patterns are detailed below. The regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal sit at the crossroads of three transnational organized crime routes (see annex 18):

(a) Trafficking to and from the area comprising the ports of Dakar (Senegal), Conakry (Guinea) and Freetown (Sierra Leone) via Bamako;

(b) Trafficking to and from North Africa via the Tilemsi valley, Tessalit and Bordj Badji Mokhtar (Algeria) and via Niamey and Agadez (the Niger) to Libya (via Dirkou, the Niger) and Algeria (via Arlit, the Niger);

(c) Trafficking to and from coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea via Niamey and the area comprising the ports of Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Lagos (Nigeria).

86. Individuals associated with signatory armed groups, terrorist groups and transnational organized crime rings embedded in local power dynamics and interests are in competition to secure control over this trade and the trafficking routes. This situation engenders violence, further jeopardizing the peace, security and stability of Mali and, consequentially, the implementation of the Agreement.

87. The Panel focused its investigations on individuals and entities that fall under paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017), especially the signatory armed groups, taking into consideration that many of the shipments of narcotics, gold and fuel
products of which the Panel was informed originated from northern Mali, or passed through it.

**New trends and strategies in trafficking of narcotic drugs**

88. Mali remains a hotspot for drug trafficking in West Africa and between coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, in both directions. Many of the principal drug dealers are reported to be based in Bamako.\(^{36}\) During the current mandate, the Panel observed new trends of drug traffickers transporting drugs to and from Mali, including consignments originating from northern Mali that could be linked to individuals or ventures that act in violation of paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017).

89. The Panel observed an increasing use of parcel services to ship smaller quantities of drugs, normally hard and synthetic drugs with a high price-to-weight ratio, to countries outside West Africa. Multiple sources informed the Panel that this is part of the strategy put in place by transnational drug dealers, including those operating around Gao and Kidal, in order to limit the losses in case of detection. Smaller dealers have the phone numbers of bigger traffickers based in Mali, whom they contact – normally through encrypted applications such as WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram – to arrange consignments of small parcels of drugs. They then ship to the final destination countries through parcel services. Examples of this new trend from seizures made in Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania are detailed below. The case of the cocaine seized in the Niger, however, follows a more common path of trafficking of large quantities of cocaine by road from West Africa to North Africa and ultimately to Europe.

*Cocaine trafficking from Kidal to France through Côte d’Ivoire*

90. During the present mandate, the Panel was informed of cases of cocaine trafficking from Kidal that was destined for France, through shipping agencies in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The Panel observed a consignment of 21kg of cocaine seized by Ivorian authorities at a shipping agency in Abidjan, hidden in bags of “attieke” (milled and fermented cassava). This case reflects a novel trend, whereby drug trafficking trajectories are reversed, heading towards coastal countries before going north. The individuals arrested in conjunction with this case revealed that they had successfully sent two other similar consignments, using the same modalities.\(^{37}\) They also revealed that they had received the cocaine from Kidal.

91. The individuals arrested in conjunction with this case are Malians and dual French and Malian nationals. The Panel sent requests for information to Mali and France about these individuals. France replied that none of them was known to their judiciary. Mali did not reply. Moreover, the seized consignment contained an encrypted tracker (see annex 19). The Panel wrote to the manufacturer requesting details of the location points the tracker had registered, but had received no answer at the time of writing. Such information could clarify the regions and points of origin in

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\(^{36}\) Confidential reports and interviews. In a report to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mali identified Nigeria and Guinea as the first and second origin countries of cocaine entering Mali in 2021. The land route of cocaine from Guinea transits through Bamako. From Nigeria, cocaine transits either through Burkina Faso to enter Mali in Mopti Region or through the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of the Niger to enter Mali in Gao.

\(^{37}\) The Panel has also received information of a similar pattern discovered in Mauritania, when authorities seized 516 g of methamphetamine, known as “crystal meth”, in a parcel shipping agency in Nouakchott as part of a consignment destined for Australia. Investigations concluded that the drug had originated in Nigeria and arrived in Mauritania through dealers based in Mali and currently jailed in Mauritania.
northern Mali relevant to paragraph 8 (c) of the resolution. It would also reveal the precise trafficking routes inside Mali.

**Update on cocaine trafficking from Gao to Libya through the Niger**

92. In 2022, the Panel reported on 214 kg of cocaine trafficked from Gao to the Niger (S/2022/595, para. 68). The authorities in the Niger estimated the street value of the cocaine at 16,800,000 euro ($18,260,870).\(^{38}\) It was the largest recorded cocaine seizure in the Niger.

93. Investigations conducted by the Niger concluded that the cocaine originated in Gao and was destined for Libya, through the Niger, to ultimately arrive at destination markets in Europe. The cocaine was transported on the main roads between Gao and Niamey and Niamey and Agadez in 199 packages, sealed in eight bags carrying 25 packs each and hidden in a refrigerated container. In Agadez, the cocaine was reconditioned to be loaded in the car of the mayor of Fachi (Bilma Department, Agadez Region) and directed to Dirkou, with a military escort for the convoy. A citizen of the Niger transported the cocaine from Gao to Agadez and another citizen of the Niger oversaw its transportation from Agadez to Dirkou.

94. The Panel obtained names and phone numbers of individuals implicated in these trafficking activities and is investigating to determine whether they are linked to parties to the Agreement or sanctioned individuals.

**Trafficking of cocaine, cannabis and opioids between Mali and Senegal**

95. In October 2022, Senegalese customs in Kidira (Tambacounda Region) seized 300 kg of cocaine, worth an estimated 24 billion CFA francs ($39.97 million) concealed in a refrigerated truck bearing a Malian plate number, allegedly coming from Bamako. It was the biggest land seizure of cocaine ever made by Senegal.\(^{39}\)

96. The Panel has details on the route followed by that drug consignment and the individuals implicated and is investigating to determine whether they are subject to the provisions of resolution 2374 (2017).

**Artisanal gold in northern Mali**

97. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining takes place in every region in northern Mali and those activities are under the control of individuals associated with signatory armed groups, as well as terrorist groups. The sites provide significant revenue to signatory armed groups and terrorist groups, funding their activities and potentially providing a space of coexistence between these groups, with the various sites under the control of different groups, as described below:

- **(a)** Cadre stratégique permanent controls the gold sites of Intahaka and Tayekarene in Gao, although the latter was stormed multiple times by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara fighters between April and June 2023;

- **(b)** Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad controls Abeibara, Tin Zaouatène and Ti-n-Essako gold sites in Kidal;

- **(c)** Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés and Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (Chamanamas branch), control the site of Amasrakad in Tilemsi, Gao Region;

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\(^{38}\) On 23 June 2023, 1 United States dollar was equivalent to 600.50 CFA francs and 0.92 euro.

\(^{39}\) According to Senegalese and UNODC sources, it is quite common for cocaine to be seized en route from Senegal to Mali, coming from Latin American countries and most often with northern African or European countries as a final destination.
(d) The site of I-n-Tillit in Gao Region is jointly controlled by Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad, Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés and elements of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin;

(e) Islamic State in the Greater Sahara controls the site of Tassiga;

(f) Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin controls the sites of Abanko, Indarset, Igharghar, formerly under control of the Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (see S/2021/714, para. 89), and Talhandak, all in Tessalit;

(g) Control over the newly discovered site of Almaghmor, in Ber commune is not yet clearly attributed, but Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad elements are present there.

98. While signatory armed groups and terrorist groups are not directly involved in gold mining or the gold trade, they have established checkpoints to control the access to these sites. Gold buyers, diggers and/or miners, and traders, as well as civilians who are not involved in mining operations, are obliged to pay to pass through these checkpoints. At checkpoints around the Intahaka gold site controlled by Cadre stratégique permanent, for example, vehicles must pay 5 000 CFA francs ($8.33) to pass.

99. Signatory armed groups and terrorist groups do not have adequate experience to set up gold exploitation and trade. They thus resorted to the established know-how from neighbouring regions. Sources provided coherent information regarding the presence of “Sudanese”40 miners and traders in gold mining sites in northern Mali, called in by signatory armed groups to set up mining operations. Likewise, for the provision of security to gold mining operations, signatory armed groups resorted to the tombolomas41 model in place in gold mining sites in southern Mali.

100. The Panel identified the four following methods through which signatory armed groups and terrorist groups receive payments from gold sites:

(a) The first is compensation for the provision of security. This compensation usually takes the form of one bag of mineralized gravel42 for every 10 bags extracted;

(b) The second takes the form of payments that miners must pay to start digging at a site and that traders pay to be allowed to trade. The Panel has documented examples of such payments (S/2020/785/Rev.1, annex 14);

(c) Signatory armed groups and terrorist groups also receive payments when settling scores among gold miners or traders, with amounts varying depending on the complexity of the case being dealt with. As a general rule, all plaintiffs pay a sum, a sort of deposit, prior to being admitted to the trial. This varies between 5,000 and 25,000 CFA francs ($8.33 and $41.63) depending on the complexity of the case. After settlement, the party recognized as guilty is also obliged to pay the same amount as the initial deposit to the judges;

(d) The fourth form of payment are those made by gold traders as compensation for the security of operations. Unlike the same kind of payment made by miners, there is no fixed amount as a percentage of the gold traded that is paid by traders.

40 In artisanal and small-scale gold mining sites in francophone Sahelian countries, the term “Sudanese” does not refer to nationals of the Sudan. “Sudanese” are rather people living in the border areas of northern Chad, Libya, the Niger and the Sudan. The so-called “Sudanese” run artisanal and small-scale gold mining and trade in the north of the Niger, Chad and parts of the Sudan.

41 Tombolomas are groups of local people who provide security to artisanal and small-scale gold mining sites in the Regions of Kayes, Koulikoro and Sikasso. They are remunerated by taking a share on the bags of mineralized gravel.

42 The full steps of the calculations made are reported in annex 20.
101. No clear data exist with respect to the volume of production of artisanal and small-scale sites in northern Mali. Industry, traders and experts agree that sites in the southern regions of Kayes, Koulikoro and Sikasso account for about 70 per cent of the artisanal and small-scale gold production in Mali. Known artisanal and small-scale gold production in Mali varies between 35 and 40 tons per year. Based on these parameters, the Panel estimates that:

(a) Gold production for artisanal and small-scale sites in central and northern Mali may be 15 to 17 tons per year, with northern sites possibly accounting for 9 to 10 tons;

(b) Based on the above estimate, and the price of a gram of gold, currently sold at 33,000 to 35,000 CFA francs ($54.95 to $58.3n Mali, the market value of gold produced by sites in northern Mali varies possibly between $494 million and $594 million;

(c) The revenue for signatory armed groups and terrorist groups from providing security services to artisanal and small-scale gold mining sites, as explained in paragraph 100 (a) above, could thus range between $36 million and $41.5 million per year. Revenue generated from the points detailed in paragraph 100 (b) to (d) above depends on the verification of other events – such as the number of new miners arriving at a site, the number of disputes settled or the munificence of gold traders, and thus cannot be estimated.

102. These calculations can serve as starting points to estimate the revenue generated by signatory armed groups and terrorist armed groups from the control of the mining sites, based on the assumptions detailed above. It does not allow the estimation of which armed groups benefit from which share of the total, nor the non-gold related costs they incur to generate such revenues, such as logistics and salaries. More precise figures can only be obtained through access to the gold-producing areas.

Smuggling of petroleum products

103. The Panel documented three seizures, with a total amount of 84,480 litres of petrol and 16,840 litres of diesel in 2022 seized by Algerian customs officials along the borders with regions mostly controlled by signatory armed groups in northern Mali. These cases took place in Bordj Badji Mokhtar and Timeiaouine, close to Mali. According to sources, the trafficking of fuel contributes to financing the activities of Jamaa Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and continues to be a source of illicit revenues for elements linked to the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad. Fuel trafficking between Algeria and Mali is characterized by the following modus operandi:

(a) The use of hiding places and double tanks (in vehicles and trucks) to hold large quantities of fuel for smuggling;

(b) Frequent entries and exits to fill fuel tanks and empty them on the other side of the Malian border;

43 World Gold Council, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Environment Programme and others.
44 The full steps of the calculations made are reported in annex 20.
45 According to a 2022 report by UNODC, heavily subsidized fuel products in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, which keep fuel prices artificially low in these countries, are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. UNODC, “Fuel Trafficking in the Sahel: Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment – Sahel” (Vienna, 2022).
46 Trafficking of fuel between Algeria and Kidal was one of reasons for the listing of Mahamadou Ag Rhissa (ML.002), member of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad.
(c) Concealment and camouflage in trucks by other products, or even by animals (livestock);

(d) The use of high-powered vehicles to evade pursuit by anti-smuggling services (station wagons, etc.);

(e) Trucks carrying smuggled goods are usually accompanied by light vehicles or powerful motorcycles acting as scouts. If intercepted, the drivers abandon their trucks and flee on these motorcycles.

Other sources of revenue for signatory armed groups and terrorist groups

104. Kidnapping for ransom remains a source of revenue, especially for terrorist groups. Meanwhile, the Panel has been informed of cases involving elements involved in kidnapping that may be affiliated with signatory armed groups.\(^{47}\) During the reporting period, the Panel observed three cases of ransom being paid for the release of hostages taken by both signatory and terrorist armed groups.\(^{48}\) In addition, the Panel has been informed of 118 incidents of abduction in Timbuktu, Ménaka, Gao and Kidal, thus the number of cases of ransoms being paid are certainly higher.\(^{49}\)

105. Illegal taxation at checkpoints is another notable source of revenue for both signatory and terrorist armed groups. Both the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and Plateforme have established checkpoints on the main axes they control. Everyone passing through these checkpoints must pay, or face reprisals. In the reporting period, the Panel recorded four incidents of confrontation between armed groups over checkpoints in northern Mali, plus four other instances in which checkpoints have been used for identity verification.

106. Signatory armed groups also charge fees to escort truck drivers. In Ménaka, the Panel received reports of a signatory armed group levying 40,000 CFA francs ($66.6) per truck escorted along the first 7 km of the roads between Ménaka and Gao and Ménaka and the Niger.\(^{50}\)

107. Cattle rustling and illegal taxation on livestock remain major sources of financing for both signatory and terrorist armed groups (see S/2023/138, paras. 53 and 54; S/2022/595, paras. 104 and 116; S/2021/714, para. 149). For example, on 10 March 2023, Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés elements claimed to have recovered about 1,000 livestock stolen by presumed Islamic State in the Greater Sahara militants in the area of Adarên Tikilit in Gao Region.

B. Involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against the entities referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017)

108. Attacks against the Malian Armed Forces by both Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin continued throughout the reporting period, with a heavy impact on civilians. On 22 April 2023, the Malian Armed Forces camp in Sévaré airport, Mopti Region was attacked by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin-Front de libération du Macina, who claimed responsibility for the incident (see annex 21). A car bomb exploded near the camp, resulting in the death of 10 civilians and injuries to 61 individuals, including internally displaced persons from the Sarema site. Moreover,

\(^{47}\) Confidential sources.

\(^{48}\) Confidential sources.

\(^{49}\) Figures received from several confidential resources.

\(^{50}\) Confidential United Nations report. The name of the armed group has been omitted to protect the source.
the attackers fired on the nearby MINUSMA camp. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin-Front de libération du Macina also claimed responsibility for another attack that took place at a checkpoint in the Ségo Region on 18 May as well as another operation in Nara on 18 April, the latter an attack against a convoy of Malian officials, during which a member of the Transitional President’s cabinet was killed (see annex 22).

109. In a similar vein, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara continue to threaten and target individuals and communities seen as collaborating with the Malian Armed Forces, as well as their perceived adversaries.

110. MINUSMA itself remains a target for terrorist groups. On 9 June 2023, in Ber commune, Timbuktu Region, MINUSMA forces were subjected to two attacks. The first involved an improvised explosive device being launched at a logistical convoy, resulting in the death of two peacekeepers and several others being injured. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin claimed responsibility for that operation. In the second incident, a force patrol was shot at by unknown individuals. Meanwhile, MINUSMA forces continue to suffer from attacks with the use of improvised explosive devices, especially in Douentza commune, in Mopti. From January to May 2023, 5 of the 6 incidents using improvised explosive devices took place in Douentza.

C. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali

111. The lack of tangible progress in the implementation of the Agreement continues to foster a fertile context for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Signatory parties are implicated in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, especially in the form of violence against civilians. While the ceasefire prevented direct hostilities between signatory parties, armed confrontations occurred in the context of the signatory parties’ actions to combat terrorist groups (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin). Violence against civilians was also perpetrated during hostilities between Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Such confrontations were seen specifically in the Regions of Ménaka, Gao and Mopti.

112. The Panel remains particularly concerned with patterns of conflict-related sexual violence in Mopti and Ménaka, especially those involving the foreign security partners of the Malian Armed Forces. The persistence of such incidents leads the Panel to believe that such acts are systematic and planned and that they serve to achieve security objectives for the foreign security partners. Meanwhile, as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara occupies the greater part of Ménaka Region, the humanitarian situation in the region and town is deteriorating. Population movements have spilled into Kidal and to neighbouring countries, namely the Niger, with a few individuals continuing to Burkina Faso.

Violence against civilians and targeting of civilians

113. Violence against civilians persists as a concerning phenomenon in Mali, especially in the Regions of Ménaka, Gao and Mopti. All signatory parties in Mali resort to violence against civilians. Between June 2022 and March 2023, 1,414 incidents of violence against civilians allegedly took place, with 850 people killed.  

51 See footnote 33 above.
52 United Nations source. Information beyond March 2023 is not yet available.
114. Since April 2023, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara has succeeded in occupying Tidermene and I-n-Kadéouene communes, north-east of Métaka town, which were the last strongholds of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in the region. That event was followed by an influx of internally displaced persons towards Kidal. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara continued to consolidate its presence in the region by addressing populations through the distribution of leaflets and rounds of visits to mosques (see annex 23). On 10 June 2023, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara elements allegedly killed 10 civilians in Abalag cercle, Tidermene, all of whom were men and boys between the ages of 14 and 65 (see annex 24). In Timbuktu, the alliance of Malian Armed Forces and foreign security partners in Adiar commune, Gossi cercle, allegedly killed three civilians, included a handicapped person.

115. Displacement engendered by hostilities in Gao, Métaka and Mopti persisted. Terrorist armed groups continued their tactics aimed at forcing displacement through threats and violence. In December 2022, around 17,000 persons arrived in Gao city, mainly driven by hostilities in I-n-tillit commune. In February 2023, alleged Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin-Front de libération du Macina threatened the residents of Séguëndara village and Farabougou village in Niono, demanding that they leave or face the consequences. Another wave of displacement occurred in January 2023, following demands that civilians in the village of Inagam and in Inékar Ouest leave or die, resulting in their displacement to Métaka town.

116. The number of internally displaced persons in Kidal grew to almost 23,000 persons in April 2023, half of whom are women. The Panel has been informed that the increase in the number of internally displaced persons is prompting several humanitarian actors to expand their activities to Kidal, where they had not previously had operations.

**Gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence**

117. Violence against women and girls and conflict-related sexual violence remains prevalent in Mali, perpetrated by signatory parties, their affiliated partners, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. Such violence occurs in a context of fear of reprisals, scarce reporting of incidents and a vacuum of accountability mechanisms, leading to impunity.

118. In 2022, the alliance of Malian Armed Forces, foreign security partners and dozo militias is estimated to have been implicated in over 50 cases of violence against women. Self-defence militias, including Dan Nan Ambassagou, are increasingly involved in conflict-related sexual violence, especially against girls.

119. Indeed, the Panel has observed a recurring trend, since 2022, of conflict-related sexual violence being perpetrated in Mopti by the alliance of Malian Armed Forces, foreign security partners and dozo militias. These acts have been observed primarily in the Djenné cercle of Mopti Region and form a pattern that seems to be systematic and organized, as can be seen in the incidents described below.

120. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) revealed that in Moura, in March 2022, Malian Armed Forces accompanied

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53 Including rape, mass rape and abduction. Confidential interviews and United Nations sources.
54 Confidential interviews. According to the latest report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2023/402), in April 2023, 470 cases of sexual violence were reported, of which 51 were cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Signatory armed groups were allegedly responsible for 8 per cent of the total number of incidents.
55 The dozo hunters referred to in these paragraphs are most likely Dogons, as most dozos in the Region of Mopti are Dogons. Testimonies received moreover indicate that they used the Dogon language.
56 See the Panel’s midterm report (S/2023/138).
by foreign security partners were implicated in widespread acts of conflict-related sexual violence. In the report, it is indicated that 58 women and girls had allegedly been subjected to sexual violence, including rape. Other violations of international humanitarian law and human rights were reported, such as the killing of civilians.  

121. In its midterm report, the Panel had reported on a similar incident in Nia-Ouro, in September 2022. Since then, the Panel has received verified accounts of rape, threat of rape in front of family members, including young children, forced undressing of women, photographing women and girls naked and other disturbing practices that had taken place during the operation. The operation commenced early in the hours of 7 September, with the arrival of the Malian Armed Forces, the foreign security partners and dozo militias.

122. Most of the incidents mentioned above occurred when the foreign security partners searched the houses door-to-door, looking for male residents and money. Other incidents were reported on the following days, when the residents returned to recover their valuables.

123. The Panel has been informed of at least five alleged cases perpetrated by the foreign security partners and two by the dozo militias. The total number of women is estimated to be between 12 and 21, including two girls.

124. As is typical now of such operations, goods were pillaged, cattle stolen and houses were stripped of any valuable commodities. The Panel moreover understands that several men of the village had been forcibly detained or disappeared.

125. The Panel has received valid information that another incident involving the alliance between the Malian Armed Forces, foreign security partners and dozo militias took place in the first quarter of 2023. It allegedly occurred in the village of Djaba-Peulh, Fakala Commune, Djenné cercle in Mopti Region, which is the site of several cases of attempted rape that have been reported to the Panel.

126. The persistence of the perpetration of these acts may indicate that violence against women allegedly committed by the Malian Armed Forces and their foreign and local allies is systematic and organized. It potentially serves to achieve security objectives especially for the foreign security partners and dozo militias. This may be specifically relevant to the Djenné cercle, which has seen waves of violence connected to the presence of terrorist groups, most notably Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin.

127. The Panel believes that violence against women, and other forms of grave abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law are being used, specifically by the foreign security partners, to spread terror among populations. These practices potentially create a fear of reprisals, which acts as a deterrent for communities and armed groups who would otherwise seek to threaten the foreign security partners or harm them.

128. The Panel continues to be concerned about the alliance between the Malian Armed Forces with the dozo militias. With their superior knowledge of the terrain, the latter may be instrumentalizing the Malian Armed Forces and the foreign security partners to target their enemies.


59 Considerations of confidentiality do not allow further details regarding the nature of these practices to be revealed in the present report.

60 See the Panel’s report on the incident in Robinet El Ataye in March 2022 (S/2022/595, paras. 99–103).

61 Confidential Panel interviews. The Panel will continue its investigation in this regard.
129. Violence against women is also carried out by elements affiliated with signatory armed groups, and is perpetuated by an absence of a clear prohibition of sexual violence in their military doctrine or in other documents. The Panel has received information on an incident involving five women who were allegedly raped by Groupe d’autodéfense des Touareg Imghad et leurs alliés and Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (Daoussak branch) elements in June 2022. The incident allegedly took place when these elements stopped a truck and asked passengers to get out.

130. Conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by an alliance of actors in Mali, including parties to the Agreement, may constitute a violation of paragraph 8 (f) of resolution 2374 (2017), and threatens the achievement of peace, security and stability in Mali. Such acts may moreover be considered a violation of the principles and commitments of the Agreement, especially those related to reconciliation and justice.

Use of improvised explosive devices as a growing threat to civilians, humanitarian assistance and entities mentioned in para 8 (d)

131. Terrorist groups are increasingly using improvised explosive devices, with grave consequences on civilians. The number of civilian casualties caused by the use of improvised explosive devices has reportedly almost doubled since 2021 (25 per cent of all casualties caused by such devices) rising in 2022 to 43 per cent and in 2023, to 44 per cent. This alarming trend may be due to the increased pressure on terrorist groups caused by Government operations against them. Terrorist groups are increasingly placing improvised explosive devices on routes frequented by civilians. The prevalent use of improvised explosive devices is moreover closely linked to the exploitation of children, who are often employed to plant them.

132. Improvised explosive devices are used more frequently by terrorist groups in the centre of Mali, especially to target security forces, including the Malian Armed Forces and MINUSMA. In February 2023, 15 such incidents took place, with half of them having an impact on civilians. Moreover, improvised explosive devices constitute a significant obstacle to humanitarian assistance; as of the end of May 2023, 77 out of 193 access incidents reported were due to the use of improvised explosive devices.

62 Representatives of Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad informed the Panel that they did not see a need for written directives to combatants expressly prohibiting violence against women. According to the representatives, all combatants of Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad respected women, based on their traditions and values.

63 Confidential report.


66 Confidential interviews.

67 International NGO Safety Organization, February 2023, see https://sway.office.com/scNI8cYHumADl?ref=Link.

Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali

133. Ongoing hostilities in the Regions of Ménaka, Gao and Mopti continue to have repercussions on the humanitarian situation. The active presence of terrorist groups, especially Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, in all of the cercles of Ménaka has emptied villages and towns of their populations. Population movements are mostly converging in Ménaka town and its suburbs. Several humanitarian actors have related to the Panel that they have no access outside the immediate suburbs of Ménaka town itself, while others have claimed that they continue their activities through local partners.

134. The latest assessment has placed the number of internally displaced persons in Ménaka town at 38,000. Between April and May alone, an estimated 10,700 internally displaced persons arrived in Ménaka town, adding further pressure to an already critical situation. Women have been especially negatively affected, with humanitarian actors reporting 165 incidents of concern. A worrisome development is that Ménaka may be entering into phase 5, “catastrophe”, on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification scale. This would be the first time that Mali falls under this category and is mainly connected to the violence in the Ménaka Region.

135. Security concerns and the fear of hostilities remain the principal challenge the Panel has witnessed regarding access for humanitarian actors and the delivery of assistance. The increased use of improvised explosive devices, especially in the centre, is becoming a more significant challenge to humanitarian access. As of the end of May 2023, 193 access incidents had been reported, including 50 acts of violence against humanitarian actors. Humanitarian actors reported 41 incidents of the denial of access and seven cases of violence against humanitarian actors.

136. Humanitarians continue to be targeted and abducted by terrorist groups. The Panel has been informed of at least two incidents of violent acts or threats by populations towards humanitarian actors. On several occasions, unidentified armed groups demanded that humanitarian actors coordinate directly with them and/or pay them if they wanted access to certain areas. Transportation issues have also been flagged, with difficulties encountered in bringing goods across roads with known security concerns. This is further complicated by the reported closures of the Niger border at Anderamboukane, Ménaka Region.

137. In Gossi commune, Gourma-Rahrous cercle, Timbuktu Region, the Panel has been informed of an incident involving foreign security partner elements, acting individually, searching a guesthouse where humanitarian workers were present in May 2023. They allegedly interrogated humanitarian personnel at a guesthouse, asking them to verify their identity and to prove that their presence was legitimate.

138. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin-Front de libération du Macina remains active in sieging villages and imposing restrictions on movements. In June 2023 in
the Mopti Region, elements of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin-Front de libération du Macina allegedly imposed restrictions on the movements of the inhabitants of Diondiori village in the Ténenkou cercle. Front de libération du Macina warned inhabitants not to take the roads heading to the town of Diondiori, threatening to attack them with explosives if they did so.

139. With respect to the provisions of Security Council resolution 2664 (2022), the Panel did not receive any information that sanctions imposed on individuals pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) had had unintended humanitarian consequences.

IV. Implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze

140. Eight individuals have been designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, three of whom are subject to the travel ban and five of whom are subject to both the asset freeze and the travel ban. During the reporting period, the Panel interviewed Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007).

A. Travel ban

141. During the current mandate, the Panel did not find evidence of sanctioned persons violating the travel ban.

142. Regarding the violation of the travel ban by Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) in April 2022, reported by the Panel in S/2022/595, paragraph 124 (b) (ii), the Panel collected the following information:

(a) The outbound ticket from Bamako to Niamey via Lomé was purchased in cash at a travel agent in Burkina Faso on 1 April 2022, the day before the travel. Based on the time of the purchase and the date of Mr. Mahri’s travel, someone else must have bought the ticket on Mr. Mahri’s behalf. The cost for the ticket, in business class, was 1,248,000 CFA francs ($2,078);

(b) The airline informed the Panel that, after the Panel had contacted them in May 2022, they inserted the list of individuals sanctioned under the 2374 (2017) regime into their passenger processing departure control system; this system is equipped with the functionality to detect individuals put on the watch list and to prevent them from boarding. According to the information reported by the company and verified in parallel by the Panel, check-in agents do not have the authority to override the denial of boarding following an alert generated by the watch list. Check-in agents must refer that passenger to the station supervisor, who in turn will have to escalate to designated senior officers within the airline who have the final decision as to whether the passenger is allowed to board;

(c) If, however, the designated senior officers estimate that the alert was triggered by name similarity, but conclude that it is a different passenger, they usually grant authorization to board. As described in paragraph 144 below, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) appears simply as Mohamed Mahri on his identity card, and this does not figure in the aliases associated to record MLi.007 (see para. 151 below). It is thus possible that Mr. Mahri used this loophole, in addition to holding multiple passports not registered in the consolidated sanctions list, in order to violate the travel ban.

143. The travel ban violation detailed above shows how cooperation between the Panel, the airlines and the providers of passenger processing departure control systems is key to ensuring that travel bans are correctly enforced.

76 Confidential United Nations report.
B. Asset freeze

144. The Panel found that sanctioned individual Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) holds a bank account in Mali, registered with his national identity card, where he appears simply as Mohamed Mahri. The Panel notes that Mohamed Mahri does not appear among the aliases associated to record MLi.007, which prevented the bank from freezing this account.

145. In 2022, Mr. Mahri (MLi.007) informed the Panel that he had sold his shares in Tilemsi Holding SA (see S/2022/595, para. 129). The Panel obtained confidential documents in June 2023 certifying that the last modification in the statute of Tilemsi Holding occurred on 7 March 2018. The last certified registration of Tilemsi Holding bears the record “MA.BKO.2018.M.2566” (see annex 26). Under the terms of that modification, Mr. Mahri remains a shareholder of Tilemsi Holding SA. The Panel observed in another document that Mr. Mahri owns 25 per cent of the capital of Tilemsi Holding SA (annex 27a). Furthermore, Mr. Mahri still maintains a fixed phone number registered in his name with the address of Tilemsi Holding in Bamako (see annex 27b).

146. On 29 May 2020, Tilemsi signed a contract for 137,260,000 CFA francs ($230,951) with a client, who was unaware of the presence of a sanctioned individual among its shareholders. The contract was then extended several times, until 30 June 2022. The last paid invoice, in the amount of 31,882,700 CFA francs ($55,001) was paid to Tilemsi on 25 April 2023. In total, Tilemsi Holding SA received payments in the amount of 99,825,370 CFA francs ($172,210) over the course of the contract, distributed as follows:

- 27,452,000 CFA francs ($47,358) on 30 June 2021
- 40,490,670 CFA francs ($69,851) on 8 March 2022
- 31,882,700 CFA francs ($55,001) on 25 April 2023.

147. The Panel is aware of other contracts signed by Tilemsi during the period under review. Some banks known to have accounts of Tilemsi Holding on their books did not reply to the Panel’s requests for information.

148. Tilemsi Holding has several branches in other West African countries. The Panel has previously reported on Tilemsi Distribution, based in Gao, and its branch in the Niger (S/2020/785/Rev.1, para. 78, and S/2020/158/Rev.1, paras. 87–88). According to African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO) records, Tilemsi Distribution was the owner of three brands of tea that it marketed, namely “Thé vert de Chine Tilemsi”, “Super Tilemsi” and “Tanbankort”. “Super Tilemsi” and “Thé vert de Chine Tilemsi”, were cancelled from the list of brands registered with AIPO in 2017 and 2018, respectively, thus de facto making Tilemsi Distribution an empty box.

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77 The exchange rate applied by the client on this contract was of 579.67 CFA francs per United States dollar.
78 The African Intellectual Property Organization (AIPO) is the regional antenna of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In their bulletins, every brand and product are registered, with pictures and details of the colours used.
Furthermore, the Panel found that the well-established “Tilemsi Transport voyageurs”, which provides coach and transport services between Mali and eight west African countries is also part of Tilemsi Distribution\(^1\) (see annex 28).\(^2\)

149. Since July 2019,\(^3\) Tilemsi Holding accounts have registered transactions of 203,744,093 CFA francs ($339,290). The account balance was regularly brought close to zero, including through withdrawals of amounts that were equal to deposits that had been received on the same day. Such transactions occurred on 14 January, 1 February and 13 April 2022 and on 1 March and 17 May 2023 (information contained in confidential annex). According to Financial Action Task Force directives, this kind of activity is a sign of money-laundering. The Panel thus suspects that Tilemsi Holding could serve the primary purpose of money-laundering and sanctions evasion for its beneficial owners, including Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007).

150. The Panel also maintains that the complex network of companies linked to Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) under the names Tilemsi Holding, Tilemsi Distribution-TILDIS and Tilemsi Transport voyageurs generate cash flows for the aforementioned individual in violation of the asset freeze measures to which they are subject.

C. Updates on designated individuals

151. The Panel possesses additional identifying information for Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007):

(a) Holder of dual nationality (Algerian and Malian), holder of Algerian passport n°156448178, issued 16 August 2015;

(b) He holds a Malian identity card number 06698/15A issued in Bamako on 25 June 2018, on which he appears simply as Mohamed Mahri (see annex 29). In said document, his place of birth is Gao.

D. Actions taken for the effective implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze

152. The Panel sent requests to 55 Member States, regional institutions and private entities to inquire about the measures they took to implement the travel ban and asset freeze against people sanctioned under resolution 2374 (2017) and received 21 replies.

153. The Panel notes that most of the States in the region it interacted with only have specific legal provisions and institutions for the implementation of Security Council sanctions regimes related to terrorism, notably those established in accordance with

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81 On their website, Tilemsi Transport voyageurs claims that it serves Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin. See https://tilemsitransport.wordpress.com/tilemsi-transport/.
82 Tilemsi Transport has the same logo as the one registered by Tilemsi Distribution at AIPO. See also the LinkedIn page for Tilemsi Distribution, where the logo of Tilemsi Transport appears https://ml.linkedin.com/company/tildis?trk=public_profile_experience-item_profile-section-card_image-click.
83 Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) was included in the list established and maintained pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on 10 July 2019.
the provisions of resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001). The implementation of the asset freeze across these States for individuals sanctioned under resolution 2374 (2017) is still uneven across different States and it is often enforced by means of administrative decisions that are not immediately applicable.

154. On 20 December 2019, the Central Bank of West African States wrote to all the banks and designated financial institutions in Mali to transmit the list of persons sanctioned by the United States Office for Overseas Assets Control. On 7 April 2020 the National Financial Information Processing Unit of Mali requested all banks in Mali to provide a list of the assets of individuals subject to sanctions pursuant to United Nations resolutions against terrorism, from a list which included 6 of the 8 individuals sanctioned pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) (see annex 30).

155. Several States members of ECOWAS informed the Panel of having difficulties in accessing the list of people sanctioned under resolution 2374 (2017). That situation renders it impossible to even inform the designated financial and non-financial institutions about the targets of the sanctions, even in cases where implementing mechanisms are in place. Those States asked the Panel to send them the list of sanctioned individuals.

V. Recommendations

156. The Panel recommends that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali:

(a) Include the following additional identifying information in the record for MLi.007:

(i) Algerian passport n°156448178, issued 16 August 2015;

(ii) Malian identity card number 06698/15A, issued in Bamako on 25 June 2018;

(iii) Good quality a.k.a.: Mohamed Mahri;

(b) Liaise with ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union to ensure that the consolidated sanctions list is accessible in their member States and that it is properly disseminated to designated persons, businesses and professions;

(c) Call upon ECOWAS and its member States to harness the positive regional momentum in support of the implementation of the Agreement;

(d) Support ECOWAS and its member States in capacity-building aimed at enhanced implementation of targeted United Nations sanctions. In particular, the capacity-building should include efforts to foster the signature or ratification of pending bilateral and multilateral agreements in terms of judicial and investigative cooperation to pursue acts of transnational organized crime, freeze assets and combat the financing of terrorism.

84 Mali, for example, has in place Act no 008 of 17 March 2016 to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, article 100 of which stipulates that “the competent authority orders, by means of an administrative decision, the freezing of assets, funds and other financial resources of persons or entities responsible of financing of terrorism”. In the same article it is mentioned that a national list of persons, entities or organisms may be created pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) and subsequent resolutions. No mention is made of United Nations sanctions imposed outside the framework of terrorism.

85 The list submitted by the National Financial Information Processing Unit also includes individuals who are not subject to an asset freeze. Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008), who is subject to an asset freeze, does not appear on the list.
VI. Annexes

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## Annex 1: Abbreviation and acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Accord pour la paix et réconciliation au Mali)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGRV</td>
<td>Authority for the Management of Reparations for Victims of Crises</td>
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<tr>
<td>AML/CTF</td>
<td>Anti money laundering / Counter financing of terrorism</td>
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<td>ASM</td>
<td>Artisanal and small-scale mining</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCEAO</td>
<td>Central Bank of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTIF</td>
<td>Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief executive officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>Coordination des mouvements de l’inclusivité</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDDR</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>CNT</td>
<td>National Transition Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict-related sexual violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP-PSD</td>
<td>Cadre Stratégique Permanent – Paix, Sécurité et Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Dan Na Ambassagou</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATIA</td>
<td>Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et alliés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCUA</td>
<td>Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEDs</td>
<td>Improvised explosive devices</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International humanitarian law</td>
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<td>INSO</td>
<td>International NGO Safety Organisation</td>
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<td>ISGS</td>
<td>Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS, QDe.163)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNIM</td>
<td>Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (QDe.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>MLNA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
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<td>MSA-C</td>
<td>Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad – Chamanamas</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSA-D</td>
<td>Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad – Daoussak</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAPI</td>
<td>Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFAC</td>
<td>United States Office for Overseas Assets Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel</td>
<td>The UN Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plateforme</td>
<td>Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Foreign private security partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>Signatory Armed Groups to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR</td>
<td>Suspicious transaction report</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Terrorist Armed Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>WGC</td>
<td>World Gold Council</td>
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<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>XOF</td>
<td>CFA Franc</td>
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</table>
Annex 2: Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.

2. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. Any mobile phone records from service providers were also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.

3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitneses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

4. The spelling of toponyms within Mali often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update. All major locations in Mali are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map at appendix A.

5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of three out of the four members including the Coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.

6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel’s findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix B.

8. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is provided in appendix C.
Appendix A to Annex 2: UN Geographical Information System (GIS) of Mali
Appendix B to Annex 2: The “opportunity to reply methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity\(^{26}\) in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the “opportunity to reply”.

2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:

(a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;

(b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:

(i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;

(ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;

(iii) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;

(iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or

(v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

\(^{26}\) Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both.
Appendix C to Annex 2: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, S/2006/997, on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as requested by paragraph 12 of resolution 2511 (2020).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

   a. All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

   b. Due to the lack of access to Mali, the Panel has only related incidents which were verified by credible sources, including:

      i. Interviews with people with knowledge of the event such local authorities and community members.

      ii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

      iii. Documentation from local or international organisation that provide contextual information and crime pattern analysis.

      iv. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

   c. The investigation of sexual and gender-based violence presents its own specific challenges, especially in a context where the Panel did not have access to Mali. These include the survivors’ inability or unwillingness to report the incident due to social, cultural, or religious factors, and fear of retaliation; their lack of access to medical care of health providers; limited domestic investigations, and absence of a judicial response. The Panel is mindful that victims of sexual and gender-based violence may face the additional risks of discrimination, social stigma, exclusion from their family and community, or other forms of reprisals. In order to minimise their exposure and possible retraumatisation, the Panel exercised caution in approaching survivors and witnesses, and collected contextual or corroborating data, such as statistical or pattern-related information, from relevant experts, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and other reliable sources. In carrying out its investigations on sexual and gender-based violence, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

      i. The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview. The Panel for this report has in some cases relied on testimonies from survivors collected by credible international and local actors.

      ii. Medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place. the Panel accepts testimonies as prima facie evidence of sexual violence.

      iii. Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.

      iv. Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.
v. Interviews with local authorities.

vi. Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

vii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

viii. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except 1) with the specific permission of the victims and witnesses; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional documentation to supports the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.
Annex 3: List of visits, organization, individuals

1. This list excludes individuals and certain organizations or entities with whom the Panel met, in order to protect source(s) confidentiality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Location</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Representative or International Organization</th>
<th>NGO / CSO</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN; World Customs Organization; European Union External Action Service (EEAS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries; CENTIF; Specialized Police and Judiciary units; CONAREF</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries; Academie Internationale de lutte contre le terrorisme; CENTIF; Specialized Police and Judiciary units</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN; INTERPOL Regional Office; UNODC TOC hub</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries; Specialized Police and Judiciary units</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN; Representative of INTERPOL to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy *</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries; Direzione Investigativa Antimafia; Guardia di Finanza; Specialized Police and Judiciary units; Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Representation</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries; Specialized Police and Judiciary units; Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN; Chair of the 2374 Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign affairs and other Ministries; Financial Intelligence Unit; Specialized Police and Judiciary units</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Representative of ECOWAS to the UN; ECOWAS Commission; H.E. Goodluck Jonathan – Ecowas Special Envoy on Mali; MINUSMA SRSG; IOM NGOs</td>
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<td>UNHCR IOM NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* The Panel visited refugee camps and other institutions in Italy after the writing of this report
** The Panel visited Switzerland after the writing of this report
*** The Panel visited the United Arab Emirates after the writing of this report
**** The Panel visited the United Kingdom after the writing of this report
***** The Panel visited the United States of America after the writing of this report
Annex 4: Panel correspondance records

(a) Correspondence with Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State / Country</th>
<th># letters sent by the Panel</th>
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(b) Correspondence with International Organizations and United Nations mechanisms

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<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
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</table>

(c) Correspondence with private entities
The Panel wrote to the 12 commercial airlines servicing Mali airports to inquire about the measures they took to prevent people subject to travel ban from traveling. The Panel only received a reply from one airline.

The Panel contacted 17 banks and designated financial institutions operating in Mali to enquire about the measures they took to implement the asset freeze and received three responses. Only three banks responded, among which one reported holding an account for a sanctioned individual in their accounts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private entity</th>
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**SIGNATORY ARMED GROUPS**

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**OTHER ENTITIES**

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Annex 5 : Statute of the Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (CNDDR)

28 Avril 2023  JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

LOI N°2023-009 DU 17 AVRIL 2023 AUTorisant LA RATIFICATION DE L’ACCORD DE FRET SIGNE A LOME, LE 30 MARS 2023, ENTRE LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI ET LA BANQUE OUEST AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT (BOAD), POUR LE FINANCEMENT PARTIEL DU PROGRAMME D’APUREMENT DE LA DETTE DES FOURNISSEURS STRATEGIQUES DE LA SOCIETE ENERGIE DU MALI (EDM-SA)

Le Conseil national de Transition a délibéré et adopté en sa séance du 11 avril 2023,

Le Président de la Transition, Chef de l’Etat, prononce la loi dont la teneur suit :

Article unique : Est autorisée, la ratification de l’Accord de prêt d’un montant maximum en principal de 45 milliards (45 000 000 000) francs CFA, reparti en une tranche concessionnelle de 25 milliards (25 000 000 000) francs CFA et une tranche marchande de 20 milliards (20 000 000 000) francs CFA, signé à Lomé, le 30 mars 2023, entre le Gouvernement de la République du Mali et la Banque ouest africaine de Développement (BOAD), pour le financement partiel du Programme d’apurement de la dette des fournisseurs stratégiques de la Société Energie du Mali (EDM-SA).

Bamako, le 17 avril 2023

Le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l’Etat,
Colonel Assimi GOITA

DECRET

DECRET N°2023-0242/P/RM DU 14 AVRIL 2023 PORTANT CREATION, ORGANISATION ET MODALITES DE FONCTIONNEMENT DE LA COMMISSION NATIONALE DE DESARMEMENT-DEMobilisation-REinsertion AU MALI

LE PRESIDENT DE LA TRANSITION, CHEF DE L’ETAT,

Vu la Constitution ;

Vu la Charte de la Transition ;

Vu la Loi n°2022-301 du 25 février 2022 portant révision de la Charte de la Transition ;

Vu le Décret n°2021-0581/P/RM du 07 juin 2021 portant nomination du Premier ministre ;

Vu le Décret n°2022-0752/P/RM du 04 décembre 2022 portant nomination d’un ministre d’Etat ;

Vu le Décret n°2021-0580/P/RM du 11 juin 2021, modifié, portant nomination des membres du Gouvernement,

STATUANT EN CONSEIL DES MINISTRES,

DECRET :

CHAPITRE I : DE LA CREATION ET DE LA MISSION

Article 1er : Il est créé, sous l’autorité du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale, une Commission nationale de Désarmement-Demobilisation-Réinsertion, en abrégé CNDDR.

Article 2 : La CNDDR a pour mission d’élaborer et de mettre en œuvre le Programme national de Désarmement-Demobilisation-Réinsertion des Ex-combattants.

A cet titre, elle est chargée :

- de collecter les données de base et d’établir les indicateurs et les cibles ;
- de définir les critères d’éligibilité pour l’inclusion des individus dans les activités de Désarmement-Demobilisation-Réinsertion ;
- de développer des manuels opérationnels de mise en œuvre et d’orientation et de gérer de façon efficace et efficiente les projets ;
- de mettre en place les relais locaux ;
- de suivre et d’évaluer les activités du Programme national de Désarmement-Demobilisation-Réinsertion ;
- d’élaborer et de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de communication proactive et efficace.

Article 3 : La CNDDR travaille en étroite collaboration avec les structures chargées de la mise en œuvre de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du Processus d’Alger et toutes autres structures pouvant contribuer à la réalisation de sa mission.

CHAPITRE II : DE L’ORGANISATION

Article 4 : La CNDDR comprend :

- un (01) Président ;
- un (01) Coordinateur général ;
- trois (03) Coordonateurs adjoints ;
- trente-deux (32) membres ;
- une Cellule administrative ;
- une Cellule financière ;
- un personnel d’appui.

Les membres de la CNDDR sont répartis ainsi qu’il suit :

- dix (10) représentants du Gouvernement ;
- sept (07) représentants de la Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) ;
- sept (07) représentants de la Plateforme ;
- huit (08) représentants des Mouvements de l’Inclusivité ;


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Article 6 : La CNDDER est organisée en quatre (04) sous-commissions :
- la Sous-Commission Cantonement, Désarmement et Démobilitisation ;
- la Sous-Commission Réinsertion socio-économique ;
- la Sous-Commission Communication ;
- la Sous-Commission Suivi et Evaluation.

Chaque sous-commission est dirigée par un Chef nommé par décision du Président de la CNDDER.

Article 6 : Le Président de la CNDDER est chargé :
- de superviser le bon déroulement des activités de la Commission ;
- de rendre compte au Comité de suivi de l’Accord ainsi qu’aux partenaires du Programme national de Désarmement-Démobilisation-Réinsertion à travers des rapports réguliers ;
- d’assurer la bonne gestion des ressources engagées dans la mise en œuvre du Programme national de Désarmement-Démobilisation-Réinsertion ;
- d’approuver les plans de travail trimestriels et annuels et d’examiner les rapports et états financiers en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement de la Commission.

Article 7 : Le Coordinateur général est chargé :
- d’assurer la mise en œuvre technique du Programme national de Désarmement-Démobilisation et Réinsertion ;
- d’assurer la coordination des actions qui concourent à l’exécution du Programme national de Désarmement-Démobilisation et Réinsertion ;
- de coordonner les activités des sous-commissions, en collaboration avec la Commission nationale d’Intégration ;
- d’élaborer le programme et rapport annuel d’activités.

Il est assisté par trois (03) Coordinateurs adjoints qui le remplacent de plein droit en cas d’absence ou d’empêchement.

Article 8 : La Sous-Commission Cantonement, Désarmement et Démobilitisation est chargée d’organiser le cantonnement, le désarmement et la démobilitisation des ex-combattants.

Elle travaille avec les partenaires qui soutiennent ses activités, en particulier les Nations Unies.

Article 9 : La Sous-Commission Réinsertion et Réintégration socio-économique est chargée de mettre en œuvre les programmes de réinsertion. Elle travaille avec les partenaires qui soutiennent ses activités.

Article 10 : La Sous-Commission Communication est chargée de la communication interne et externe de la commission.

Article 11 : La Sous-Commission Suivi et Evaluation est chargée du suivi et de l’évaluation des activités de la CNDDER.

Elle rend compte périodiquement au Coordinateur général, en étroite collaboration avec le Comité de Suivi de l’Accord.

Article 12 : La Cellule administrative est dirigée par un Chef de Cellule et comporte en son sein un personnel d’appui.

Placé sous l’autorité du Président de la CNDDER, le Chef de Cellule assure le fonctionnement normal de l’Administration.

A ce titre, il est chargé :
- de planifier et d’organiser les réunions et en assurer le secrétariat ;
- d’organiser les audiences du Président et gérer son agenda ;
- de contrôler le courrier et d’élaborer les projets d’actes administratifs ;
- d’assurer la gestion des ressources humaines ;
- de Superviser et de contrôler les travaux du Secrétariat ;
- de veiller aux relations publiques de la CNDDER.

Article 13 : La Cellule financière veille à la bonne gestion des deniers publics conformément à la réglementation en vigueur.

Placée sous l’autorité du Président de la Commission, la Cellule financière est dirigée par un Agent comptable et comprend un Chargé des Finances et du personnel d’appui.

Article 14 : La CNDDER est représentée au niveau des Régions de Mopti, Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka et Timbouctou par des relais locaux.

L’organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement des relais locaux sont fixées par arrêté du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale.

Article 15 : Le Président de la CNDDER est nommé par décret pris en Conseil des Ministres, sur proposition du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale. Il est assisté d’un Coordinateur général qui le remplace en cas d’absence ou d’empêchement.

Le Coordinateur général est nommé par décret du Premier ministre sur proposition du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale.

Les membres sont nommés par décret du Premier ministre sur proposition du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale.
28 Avril 2023  JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

Le Chef de la Cellule administrative est nommé par arrêté du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale, sur proposition du Président de la CNDDR.

Le Chef de la Cellule financière est nommé par arrêté du ministre de l’économie et des Finances.

Les Coordonnateurs adjoints sont nommés par décision du Président de la CNDDR parmi ses membres. L’acte de nomination détermine la présence de ces Coordonnateurs adjoints.

Les Chefs de Relais locaux sont nommés par arrêté du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale sur proposition du Président de la CNDDR.

Le personnel d’appui est nommé par décision du Président de la CNDDR.

**Article 16** : Une décision du Président de la CNDDR répartit les membres entre les différentes sous-commissions.

**CHAPITRE III : DU FONCTIONNEMENT**

**Article 17** : La CNDDR se réunit sur convocation de son Président.

Le secrétariat est assuré par les membres désignés à cet effet.


**Article 18** : La CNDDR élabore son règlement intérieur.

**CHAPITRE IV : DES RESSOURCES**

**Article 19** : Les ressources de la CNDDR proviennent :
- du budget national ;
- des fonds mis à disposition par les partenaires techniques et financiers.

**CHAPITRE V : DES DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES ET FINALES**

**Article 20** : Un décret pris en Conseil des Ministres fixe les avantages accordés aux membres et au personnel d’Appui de la CNDDR.

Un arrêté du ministre chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et Réconciliation nationale fixe les détails de l’organisation de la CNDDR.

**Article 21** : Le présent décret abroge toutes les dispositions du Décret n°2015-894-P-RM du 31 décembre 2015, modifié, portant création, organisation et modalités de fonctionnement de la Commission nationale de Désarmement-Démobilisation-Réinsertion (CNDDR) au Mali.

**Article 22** : Le ministre de la Réconciliation, de la Paix et de la Cohésion nationale, Chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale, le ministre de la Défense et des anciens Combattants, le ministre de la Sécurité et de la Protection civile, le ministre de l’Economie et des Finances et le ministre du Travail, de la Fonction publique et du Dialogue social sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l’exécution du présent décret qui sera enregistré et publié au Journal officiel.

Bamako, le 14 avril 2023

Le Président de la Transition, 
Chef de l’Etat, 
Colonel Assimi GOITA

Le Premier ministre, 
Chorgel Kolalla MAIGA

Le ministre de la Réconciliation, de la Paix et de la Cohésion nationale, chargé de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation nationale, 
Colonel-major Imaïl WAGUE

Le ministre de la Défense et des anciens Combattants, 
Colonel Salou CAMARA

Le ministre de la Sécurité et de la Protection civile, 
Général de Brigade Dosou Ali MOHAMEDINE

Le ministre de l’Economie et des Finances, 
Alousséni SANOU
Annex 6 : Transitional authorities letter to the International Mediation

MINISTÈRE DE LA RECONCILIATION, DE LA PAIX ET DE LA COHÉSION NATIONALE, CHARGE DE L'ACCORD POUR LA PAIX ET LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE

REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

Un Peuple - Un But - Une Foi

CABINET

Bamako, le 24 FEV 2023

Le Ministre

Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la communauté nationale à l'Étranger République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire

Chef de file de la Médiation Internationale

N° 0010 /MRPCN-APR-CAB

Objet : Observations sur le rôle de la Médiation internationale et les cas de violations par certains mouvements, de l'Accord pour la paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger.

Excellence Monsieur le Ministre

Au nom du Gouvernement de la République du Mali, je tiens à adresser nos remerciements au Gouvernement de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire pour le rôle crucial que votre pays, frère, ami et voisin du Mali, joue dans la stabilisation du Mali et de la région du Sahel. Je vous re force également ma gratitude pour votre implication personnelle en faveur de la paix durable dans mon pays.

Comme vous le savez, sous l'impulsion de Son Excellence Le Colonel Assimi GOÏTA, Président de la Transition, Chef de l'État, le Gouvernement de la République du Mali est attaché au processus de paix engagé depuis la signature de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger.

A cet égard, le Gouvernement du Mali a déploqué de nombreux efforts pour la mise en œuvre de l'Accord, qui demeure le cadre de référence pour une paix et une stabilité durables au Mali. L'engagement du Mali à mettre en œuvre l'Accord, s'est traduit à travers l'implication des mouvements signataires de l'Accord, dans la désignation du Président de la Transition, la nomination de leurs responsables au
sein du Gouvernement et au sein du Conseil national de Transition, organe législatif de la Transition.

Ces responsables ont également été systématiquement consultés et associés à toutes les étapes majeures de la vie de la Nation, notamment les Concertations nationales, les Assises Nationales de la Refondation ; la rédaction du projet de nouvelle Constitution et sa finalisation en cours.

Ces mesures de confiance, qui renforcent caractère participatif et consensuel de la Transition, matérialisent la vision du Chef de l'État, résolument attaché à la paix. Concourant de cette vision, le dialogue permanent avec les acteurs des mouvements, considérés comme des malins à part entière et l'inscription de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord dans le Plan d'Action du Gouvernement (PAG).

**Son Excellence Monsieur Ramtane LAMAMRA,**
Ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Communauté nationale
à l'Étranger de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire
Chef de file de la Médiation internationale

- ALGER -

L'engagement du Gouvernement se manifeste en outre par l'allocation de ressources budgétaires spécifiquement dédiées au développement des régions du Nord du Mali, notamment à travers le financement, sur ressources propres, du Fonds de développement durable (FDD).

Malgré cet engagement, force est de constater que certains mouvements, précisément ceux de la CMA, n'ont cessé de violer l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger. Les cas les plus récents de ces violations sont :

2. La réouverture des postes de sécurité dans les Zones de Kidal, Gao, Ménaka et Tombouctou.
3. La délivrance illégale d'autorisations de déplacement sur les sites d'orpailleurs.
4. L'installation et la mise en place de dispositifs de sécurisation sur les sites d'orpailleurs illégaux de N'Tahaka (sud de Gao) et au Nord de Kidal.
5. Le refus de recevoir les médecins en charge de la lutte contre la Covid-19.
7. La conduite de patrouille TARTIT par des entités non reconnues (CSP-PSD) sans concertation, ni accord du Gouvernement (Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Tombouctou, Tagoudeni).
8. L'occupation et l'organisation de rencontres à Anéfis.
9. L'opérationnalisation d'un tribunal islamique à Kidal et qui a déjà délibéré sur le cas de deux éléments du BATFAR de Kidal.
10. La sécurisation de la ville de Kidal par le « CSMAK », et ce malgré la présence du BATFAR.

Ces cas flagrants de violation de l'Accord sont d'autant plus préoccupants qu'ils n'ont donné lieu à aucune condamnation de la Médiation internationale et leurs auteurs n'ont jamais été rappelés à l'ordre. Il me plaît de rappeler que la Médiation internationale, en tant que garantie politique de l'Accord et du respect de ses dispositions par les Parties, doit pleinement jouer son rôle pour sa mise en œuvre effective.

L'attitude de certains mouvements, suivie de l'absence de réaction de la médiation, jettent un discrédit sur cette dernière. Cette situation entrave les efforts inlassables de la Médiation internationale en vue de la paix et de la réconciliation au Mali, laissant ainsi se forger auprès des ennemis de la paix, un sentiment d'impunité.

Aussi, les structures chargées d'accompagner la mise en œuvre de l'Accord, notamment la MINUSMA, l'Observatoire indépendant et le Groupe d'experts international pour les sanctions concernant le Mali, n'ont jamais comblé les attentes. En effet, l'inaction du premier, le silence du deuxième sur les violations effectuées par certains mouvementsainsi que la propension du troisième à outrepasser son mandat posent la question de la pertinence de ces structures.

Fidèle à son double engagement de renforcer la sécurité sur l'ensemble du Territoire national et rétablir un ordre constitutionnel apaisé et sécurisé, le Chef de l'État n'a cessé d'équiper les forces armées et de sécuriser, dont les succès opérationnels sont éloquents. Il a également validé un chronogramme réaliste comportant des réformes politiques et l'organisation des élections.

Je voudrais souligner que le comportement de certains mouvements constitue une entrave à la paix, à la sécurité, et au développement. Ces cas de violation empêchent la création d'un climat de sérénité nécessaire pour le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel.

Dans le cadre de la Refondation du Mali, le respect de la souveraineté ; le respect des choix stratégiques et des choix de partenaires ; et la prise en compte des intérêts vitaux du Peuple malien, sont les principes qui servent de boussole. Par
consciemment, le Gouvernement mettra tout en œuvre pour atteindre ses objectifs, quel qu'en soient le prix et la forme, tout en respectant strictement les droits de l'homme, jusqu'à l'éradication du dernier terroriste ainsi que la sécurisation complète du Mali, afin que les populations puissent jouir des dividendes d'une paix tant attendue.

Aussi, je voudrais attirer votre attention sur le fait que le Gouvernement, tout en restant attaché à la mise en œuvre intelligente de l'accord, rejettera d'office toute accusation qui serait de nature à le tenir responsable des éventuelles conséquences de sa violation.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute et fraternelle considération.

[Signature]

 Colonel Major Ismaël WAGUE
Commandant de l'Ordre National
Annex 7a: Law No. 2023-001 of 13 March 2023, “Electoral Law”

Annex 7b: Law No. 2023-002 of 13 March 2023, “Fundamental principles of the administrative organization of the territory”

Annex 7c: Law No. 2023-003 of 13 March 2023, “Conditions for the free administration of territorial collectivities”

JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

24 octobre 2022 Arrêté Interministériel n°2022-489/ MUIDAT-MJDH-MAITD-MSFC-MEF-MDRI-S G déterminant les modalités d’application de certaines dispositions de la Loi devenant et suscitant…………………… p.139

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ACTES DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI

PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE

LOI N°2023-001 DU 13 MARS 2023 PORTANT MODIFICATION DE LA LOI N°2022-010 DU 24 JUIN 2022 PORTANT LOI ELECTORALE

Le Conseil national de Transition a délibéré et adopté en sa séance du 28 février 2023,

Le Président de la Transition, Chef de l’Etat prouva que, la loi dont la teneur est :

Article 1er : Les dispositions des articles 4, 24, 70, 71, 72, 73, 93, 97, 100, 101, 120 et 149 de la Loi n°2022-010 du 24 juin 2022 portant loi électorale sont modifiées ainsi qu’il suit :

- Article 4 (nouveau) : L’Autorité indépendante de Gestion des Élections a pour mission l’organisation et la gestion de toutes les opérations référendaires et électorales.

A cette fin, elle est chargée :

- de la conduite, de la gestion, de la mise à jour et de la conservation du fichier électoral ;
- de la réception et de la transmission des dossiers de candidatures relatifs aux élections des Députés à l’Assemblée nationale, des Conseillers nationaux et des Conseillers des Collectivités territoriales ;
- de la sécurité, de la fiabilité, de la confidentialité et de l’intégrité des données électorales ;
- des opérations de dépouillement des bulletins de vote, du recensement des votes, de la centralisation, de la proclamation, de la publication des résultats provisoires des scrutins par bureaux de vote et de la transmission des procès-verbaux ;
- de la gestion des observateurs nationaux et internationaux ;
- de la formation électorale et de la coordination des activités y afférentes ;
- de la publication et de la mise à disposition de son rapport annuel d’activités ;
- de l’acheminement des procès-verbaux des consultations référendaires, présidentielles et législatives, accompagnés des pièces qui doivent y être annexées à la Cour Constitutionnelle, en rapport avec les Représentants de l’Etat ;
- de la centralisation des résultats des consultations électorales communales, régionales, de Cercle et de District et de la conservation des procès-verbaux ;
- du suivi et de la supervision de la vérification des listes électorales à l’occasion des opérations référendaires et des élections dans les conditions prévues par la présente loi ;
- du suivi de la campagne électorale ;
- des opérations de délivrance des procuration de vote ;
- du suivi du dépouillement des opérations de vote ;
- de l’élaboration de son budget annuel de fonctionnement et du budget des consultations référendaires et électorales ;
- de la mise en place des calendriers des scrutins permanents avec l’Administration, les partis politiques et la société civile ;
- de la détermination des infractions aux autorités judiciaires compétentes.

L’AIGE participe à l’élaboration de la législation afférente aux élections.

Article 24 (nouveau) : Les Coordinations au niveau des Régions, du District, des Cercles, des Communes, Ambassades et Consulats sont mises en place tous (03) mois au plus avant le date du scrutin référendaire et électorale et leurs missions prennent fin un (01) mois après la proclamation des résultats définitifs.

Article 79 (nouveau) : La Commission administrative se réunit sur décision du représentant de l’Etat dans le Cercle qui est dans le District, après l’adoption de la rectification de toutes les erreurs décélées suite au traitement informatique des tableaux rectificatifs.

À cette occasion, il prendra en compte les modifications résultant des décisions de justice prononcées en appel.

En matière électorale, la nouvelle liste électorale est adressée par le Ministère chargé de l’Administration territoriale à l’AIGE en deux exemplaires en vue de la confection ou de la mise à jour du fichier électoral.

Le premier exemplaire est destiné au Secrétariat de la Commune, de l’Ambassade ou du Consulat où il est effectué au plus tard sept (07) jours avant la date du scrutin.

Le second exemplaire est adressé au sein de l’AIGE.

Toutefois, en cas de réorganisation territoriale ou administrative, l’Autorité Indépendante de Gestion des Élections (AIGE) est autorisée à procéder à la mise à jour du fichier électoral, conformément à la nouvelle carte électorale.
Article 71 (nouveau) : La carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée tient lieu de carte d'électeur. Sa délivrance est déterminée par les lois et règlements en vigueur.

La carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée est un unique document d'identification admis dans le bureau de vote.

La carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée est personnelle et inextensible. Sa falsification est interdite.

Article 72 : Les dispositions de cet article sont abrogées.

Article 92 (nouveau) : Les élections ont lieu au niveau de la Commune, de l'ambassade ou du consulat sur la base d'un bureau de vote pour cinquante (50) électeurs au moins et cinq cents (500) au plus.

Il est créé au moins un bureau de vote dans chaque village ou groupe de villages, site principal de fixation de faction, quartier et si possible dans les principales villes de juridictions de l'extérieur, sous réserve de contraintes et réalités spécifiques et des parions militaires en tant que de besoin.

Le nombre de bureaux de vote ainsi que le nombre d'électeurs par bureau de vote, l'emplacement et le ressort des bureaux de vote sont fixés, après consultation des partis politiques et la coordination de l'AIGE présents dans la circonscription électorale et le cas échéant, les autorités militaires par décision du Représentant de l'Etat dans le Circons, le District, de l'Ambassade ou du Consulat.

Cette décision intervient après la révision des listes électorales. Elle est transmise au Président de l'AIGE.

Le Coordonnateur de l'AIGE dans la Commune, dans l'Ambassade ou le Consulat fait procéder à son affichage aux emplacements retenus dans un délai de trois (03) jours précédant le scrutin. Tels que fixés, les bureaux de vote servent pour une élection devant se dérouler au cours de l'année suivant la décision qui les a déterminés.

Article 93 (nouveau) : Le bureau de vote comprend un président et quatre (04) assesseurs. Ils sont nommés, quinze (15) jours au moins avant la date du scrutin, par décision du Coordonnateur de l'AIGE dans la Commune, dans l'Ambassade ou le Consulat.

La décision doit obligatoirement comporter leur nom, leurs prénoms, leur profession et leur domicile.

Le président et les assesseurs doivent être en possession de leur carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée ou de la photocopie légalisée de celle-ci s'ils ont donné procuration de vote conformément à l'article 116 ci-dessous. Ils doivent figurer sur une liste électorale.

Ils doivent être de bonne moralité, reconnus pour leur intégrité et leur probité. Les présidents et assesseurs doivent savoir lire et écrire dans la langue d'expression officielle.

Le président du bureau de vote assure le remplacement des assesseurs absents le jour du vote parmi les électeurs inscrits dans le bureau de vote.

En cas d'empêchement du président, l'assesseur le plus âgé parmi les assesseurs assure la présidence du vote et complète le nombre d'assesseurs requis en choisissant parmi les électeurs du bureau de vote.

Article 97 (nouveau) : Le scrutin a lieu un dimanche. Toutefois, en cas de nécessité et hormis le cas de l'élection du Président de la République, le scrutin peut se tenir tout autre jour de la semaine.

En cas de nécessité et lorsque les conditions sont réunies, les membres des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité peuvent exercer leurs droits de vote par anticipation le dimanche précédent le scrutin général.

Dans ce cas, les dispositions des alinéas 2 et 3 de l'article 102 sont observées, en ce qui concerne l'utilisation des scellés sécurisés.

Les opérations de vote se déroulent conformément aux dispositions de la présente loi.

Le dépouillement des bulletins a lieu en même temps que celui du scrutin général et dans les mêmes conditions.

Article 100 (nouveau) : Nul ne peut être admis à voter s'il ne présente sa carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée.

A son entrée dans le bureau de vote, l'électeur présente sa carte nationale d'identité biométrique sécurisée à l'assesseur chargé de l'identification.

Les électeurs se présentent au bureau de vote le visage découvert.

L'utilisation du téléphone portable et de tout autre appareil électronique est interdite dans les bureaux de vote jusqu'à la fin du dépouillement et du scellé des enveloppes contenant les procès-verbaux.

Article 101 (nouveau) : L'électeur reçoit de l'assesseur un bulletin de vote.

Il se rend obligatoirement dans l'isoloir pour apposer son empreinte digitale dans la case réservée à la photo du candidat de son choix, au logo type ou à l'émblème de la liste.

Chaque bureau de vote est doté d'un ou de plusieurs isoîlons. L'isolor doit assurer le secret du vote pour chaque électeur.
Avant d’entrer dans l’isolement, l’électeur fait constater au président qu’il n’est porteur que d’un seul bulletin ; le président le constate sans toucher le bulletin unique que l’électeur introduit lui-même dans l’urne après l’avoir plié.

L’électeur signe et appose son empreinte digitale sur la liste d’émergence à l’emplacement prévu en face de son nom et de sa photo.

L’électeur trempe obligatoirement son doigt dans l’encre indélébile.

**Article 120 (nouveau) :** Le mandataire participe au scrutin dans les conditions privées aux articles 100 et 101 de la présente loi.

A son entrée dans le bureau de vote, sur présentation de sa carte nationale d’identité biométrique sécurisée, des procurations et des cartes nationales d’identité biométriques sécurisées de ses mandants, il lui est remis le même nombre de bulletins de vote. Le mandataire, après le vote signe et appose l’empreinte de son index gauche en face de son nom et de ceux de ses mandants en présence des membres du bureau de vote.

Les procurations sont estampillées.

**Article 149 (nouveau) :** Il est mis à la disposition de chaque électeur deux bulletins de vote sauf cas de recours au bulletin unique. En cas de bulletin unique, celui-ci est de deux couleurs différentes.

**Article 2 :** La présente loi sera enregistrée et publiée au Journal officiel.

Bamako, le 13 mars 2023

Le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l’État,
Colonel Assimi GOITA

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**LOI N°2023-002 DU 13 MARS 2023 PORTANT MODIFICATION DE LA LOI N°2012-006 DU 23 JANVIER 2012 PORTANT PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX DE L’ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DU TERRITOIRE**

Le Conseil national de Transition a délibéré et adopté en sa séance du 20 février 2023,

Le Président de la Transition, Chef de l’État prononce la loi dont la teneur suit :

**Article 1er :** Les dispositions des articles 3, 4, 5, 15, 16 et 17 de la Loi n°2012-006 du 23 janvier 2012 portant principes fondamentaux de l’organisation administrative du territoire sont modifiées ainsi qu’il suit :

**Article 3 (nouveau) :** Les Collectivités territoriales sont : la Commune, la Région et le District.

**Article 4 (nouveau) :** Les Circonscriptions administratives et les Collectivités territoriales sont créées, modifiées et supprimées par la loi.

Il est institué une codification numérique en vue de faciliter l’identification des Circonscriptions administratives et des Collectivités territoriales, dont les caractéristiques sont les suivantes :

- pour la Région : le numéro d’ordre ;
- pour le Cercle : le numéro d’ordre de la Région suivit du numéro chronologique du Cercle ;
- pour l’Arrondissement : le numéro d’ordre de la Région suivi du numéro chronologique du Cercle et de celui de l’Arrondissement ;
- pour la Commune : le numéro d’ordre de la Région, suivi du numéro chronologique du Cercle, de ceux de l’Arrondissement et de la Commune ;
- pour le village, la fraction et le quartier : le numéro d’ordre de la Région, suivi du numéro chronologique du Cercle, de ceux de l’Arrondissement, de la Commune, du village, de la fraction ou du quartier.

La codification des villages, fractions et quartiers est incluse dans les Arrondissements et des Communes.

Les codes des villages, fractions et quartiers de l’Arrondissement sont les mêmes que ceux de la Commune.

**Article 5 (nouveau) :** La Circonscription administrative porte le nom de son chef lieu.

A la tête de chaque Circonscription administrative est nommé un Représentant de l’État chargé de diriger l’action de l’État dans la Circonscription, de coordonner, d’orienter et de contrôler les activités des services déconcentrés sous son autorité.

A ce titre, il est garant de l’ordre public.

**Article 15 (nouveau) :** La Commune, la Région et le District sont des Collectivités territoriales dotées de la personnalité morale et de l’autonomie financière.

**Article 16 (nouveau) :** Les conditions de création et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Commune, de la Région et du District sont définies par la loi.

**Article 17 (nouveau) :** Les services déconcentrés de l’État peuvent concourir à la réalisation des missions des Collectivités territoriales à travers la mise à disposition de personnel ou le transfert désités services aux Collectivités territoriales conformément aux dispositions réglementaires en vigueur.
Article 2 : La présente loi abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires, notamment celles de la Loi n° 2012-006 du 23 janvier 2012 portant principes fondamentaux de l’organisation administrative du territoire.

Bamako, le 13 mars 2023
Le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l’Etat,
Colonel Assimi GOITA

Loi n°2023-003 du 13 mars 2023 portant modification de la loi n°2017-052 du 02 octobre 2017 déterminant les conditions de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales

Le Conseil national de Transition a délibéré et adopté en sa séance du 20 février 2023,

Le Président de la Transition, Chef de l’Etat prononce la loi dont la teneur suit :

Article 1er : Les dispositions des articles 1er, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 17, 18, 20, 23 et 29 de la loi n°2017-052 du 02 octobre 2017 déterminant les conditions de la libre administration des collectivités territoriales sont modifiées ainsi qu’il suit :

- Article 1er (nouveau) : Dans le respect de l’unité nationale et de l’intégrité du territoire, les collectivités territoriales de la République du Mali sont : la commune, la région et le district.
  La commune, la région et le district sont dotés de la personnalité morale et de l’autonomie financière.

- Article 3 (nouveau) : Les collectivités territoriales ont pour mission la conception, la programmation, la mise en œuvre et le suivi évaluation des actions de développement économique, social et culturel d’intérêt régional, communal ou de district en cohérence avec les orientations et les stratégies de développement définies par l’Etat.

- Article 4 (nouveau) : Chaque collectivité territoriale règle, par délibération, ses affaires propres.
  Tout transfert de compétences à une collectivité territoriale doit être accompagné du transfert consommant par l’Etat à celle-ci, des ressources et moyens nécessaires à l’exercice normal de ces compétences.

Toutefois, l’allocation des ressources additionnelles aux collectivités territoriales est conditionnée à une évaluation annuelle de performance des collectivités territoriales effectuée par les autorités de contrôle de légalité.

Des contrats de performance sont conclus entre le représentant de l’Etat et les collectivités territoriales de son ressort territorial.

Les copies des contrats de performance et les rapports d’évaluation annuelle sont transmis, par tout moyen, à la direction générale des collectivités territoriales.

Un décret pris en Conseil des Ministres détermine les modalités d’élaboration, de conclusion et de suivi des contrats de performance des collectivités territoriales.

La détermination des compétences de la commune, de la région et du district relève de la loi.

Article 5 (nouveau) : Les collectivités territoriales s’administrent librement par des conseils élus.
  Le conseil de la collectivité territoriale est doté d’un organe exécutif dont la composition et les modalités de désignation sont fixées par la loi.

Le maire est le chef de l’organe exécutif de la commune.

Le président du conseil régional est le chef de l’organe exécutif de la collectivité territoriale de région.

Le chef de l’organe exécutif prépare et exécute les délibérations du conseil de la collectivité territoriale, exercice ses pouvoirs propres et ceux qui lui sont délégués et dirige les services de la collectivité territoriale.

Article 9 (nouveau) : Pour accomplir ses missions, chaque collectivité territoriale dispose des services créés par elle-même et des services mis à sa disposition par le représentant de l’Etat dans la circonscription.

Une loi fixe les principes fondamentaux de la création, de l’organisation, de la gestion et du contrôle ainsi que la norme de classification des services des collectivités territoriales.

Un décret pris en Conseil des Ministres détermine les modalités de transfert des services déconcentrés de l’Etat aux collectivités territoriales relevant de leurs domaines de compétences.

Article 10 (nouveau) : Le personnel des collectivités territoriales comprend :
  - les fonctionnaires des collectivités territoriales ;
  - les fonctionnaires de l’Etat en position de détachement ou mis à disposition ;
  - les agents contractuels des collectivités territoriales.

Tout recrutement de personnel par une collectivité territoriale doit être prévu et autorisé par son budget.

Une loi détermine le statut des fonctionnaires des collectivités territoriales.
Article 17 (nouveau) : En cas de refus ou de négligence d’une Collectivité territoriale de réparer les dommages engendrant sa responsabilité, l’autorité chargée du contrôle de légalité de la Collectivité territoriale, dans un délai de deux (2) mois, procède à l’inscription d’office des frais de réparation au budget en cours d’exécution ou celui à venir de la même Collectivité.

Sous réserve des cas d’inertie ou de complicité avec les émeutiers en cas de troubles, lorsqu’une collectivité n’a pas eu momentanément ou de façon permanente la disponibilité de la police locale ou de la force armée, ou si elle a pris toutes les mesures en son pouvoir à l’effet de prévenir les troubles, elle peut exercer un recours contre l’État. L’État ou la Collectivité déclarée responsable peut exercer un recours contre les auteurs ou complices du désordre.

Les Collectivités territoriales sont responsables des dommages subis ou occasionnés par les membres de leurs organes exécutifs dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions.

Les membres des organes délibérants des Collectivités territoriales bénéficient de la même protection lorsqu’ils sont chargés de l’exécution d’un mandat spécial.

Article 18 (nouveau) : La police administrative a en charge l’application des mesures édictées par les organes compétents des Collectivités territoriales en matière d’ordre public, de tranquillité, de sécurité, d’hygiène et d’assainissement. Elle s’exerce conformément aux textes en vigueur et sous le contrôle de l’État.

Les attributions et les modalités d’organisation de la police administrative dans les Collectivités territoriales sont fixées par la loi.

Article 20 (nouveau) : Les Collectivités territoriales exercent leurs activités sous le contrôle de l’État et dans les conditions définies par la loi.

Les Représentants de l’État dans les Collectivités territoriales ont la charge des intérêts nationaux et du respect des lois.

Ils exercent le contrôle des Collectivités territoriales et leur apportent l’appui-conseil, conformément aux textes en vigueur.

Dans l’exercice du contrôle des Collectivités territoriales, les représentants de l’État requièrent, en tant que de besoin, l’avis des services compétents.

Article 23 (nouveau) : Le contrôle des actes des Collectivités territoriales consiste en la vérification de leur légalité et l’appréciation de leur cohérence avec les orientations et les stratégies de développement définies par l’État.

Il s’exerce à posteriori et dérogation expresse prévue par la loi.
Annex 8: Presentation of the draft Constitution
Annex 9a: CSP-PSD communique issued on 28 March 2023 about the Constitutional reform
Annex 9b: CSP-PSD communiqué issued on 05 June 2023 about Constitutional reform

Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD)

BUREAU EXECUTIF


Du 3 au 5 juin 2023 à Kidal, les Mouvements signataires de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d’Alger notamment la CMA et la Plateforme du 14 Juin 2014, regroupés au sein du CSP-PSD, ont en prélude à la visite de la Médiation Internationale à Kidal le Dimanche 4 Juin, tenu une réunion extraordinaire du Cadre autour de son Président Monsieur Alghabass Ag INTALLA, avec comme ordre du jour :

- Le processus de paix et les divergences autour du contenu du projet de nouvelle constitution
- Des questions sécuritaires et humanitaires

Les échanges autour des points inscrits à l’ordre du jour ont tenu compte des éléments d’interactions avec la délégation de la Médiation Internationale dont les efforts sont indéniables. Ainsi les conclusions de cette réunion extraordinaire sont entre autres:

Au titre de processus de paix

Le CSP-PSD rappelle que l’accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu de processus d’Alger demeure le seul outil d’une paix durable et d’une réconciliation nationale et déplore l’absence de volonté politique des autorités de transition pour transcender le blocage pour sa mise en œuvre;

Le CSP-PSD remercie la médiation internationale pour la démarche entamée pour décrisper la situation et lui réitère son soutien.

Au titre du projet de la constitution et l’échéance référendaire prévue le 18 juin fixée unilatéralement par les autorités de la transition

Le CSP-PSD réitère sa position de rejet du projet de constitution en l’état actuel conformément à sa déclaration du 28 mars 2023;

Un texte qui ne prend pas en charge les dispositions principales de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu de processus d’Alger, pire il constitue un obstacle pour une bonne gouvernance et qui est un recul démocratique;

Au regard de l’absence d’un consensus national sur le projet et de la difficulté de réussir une large participation de tous les fils du pays sur l’ensemble du territoire, le CSP-PSD recommande...
Au titre des questions sécuritaires humanitaires

Après des analyses approfondies de la difficile situation sécuritaire qui prévaut dans l’Azawad, Le CSP-PSD a défini des actions qu’il mettra en œuvre afin de pallier aux différents défis.

Face à un désastre sans précédent dans nos régions, des populations meurtries et déplacées en masse, le CSP-PSD alerte les états, les organisations humanitaires du monde entier sur la vulnérabilité et le drame que vivent des milliers de personnes du fait du terrorisme;

Le CSP-PSD s'engage à faciliter à tous les acteurs humanitaires l’accès aux terrains d’accueil des populations déplacées et réfugiées

Le CSP-PSD condamne avec fermeté les exactions contre les populations civiles, présente ses condoléances les plus attristées aux familles des victimes et souhaite prompt rétablissement aux blessés.
Annex 9c: AIGE communique on referendum in Kidal and Aguelhok

Compte Rendu de l’Election référendaire du 18 Juin 2023 dans la Région de Kidal:

- De la campagne électorale:

  Ouverte depuis le 02 juin 2023 et clôturée le 16 Juin 2023 à minuit les constats suivants se dégagent:

  - Aucune manifestation n’est organisée par l’un ou par l’autre des courants (Oui et Non).
  - Les médias de la place n’ont pas été sollicité.
  - Il n’y a pas eu d’affiches publicitaires dans la région (Même si les médias sociaux comme WhatsApp, Facebook et autres sont utilisés pour la communication des différents courants dans les autres régions du pays).

  Résumé: En somme une absence totale d’intérêt pour le vote dans la région de Kidal.

- Du déroulement du vote:

Les comptes-rendus et rapports qui nous sont parvenus des coordinations des communes et cercles de la région de Kidal font état de certaines contraintes d’ordre politiques et sécuritaires ayant entrainé la non ouverture des bureaux de vote dans l’ensemble de ces coordinations.

Le matériel électoral n’étant pas disponible, les agents électoraux n’étant pas désignés, aucune mobilisation des acteurs n’est constatée.
Des appuis et soutiens logistiques et financiers :

Depuis l'installation et la mise en place des coordinations de l'AIGE en début juin 2023, aucun appui n'a été perçu par les coordinations de l'AIGE de la région de Kidal.

CONCLUSION :

Il ressort en définitive que l'élection référendaire du 18 Juin 2023 n'a pas pu se tenir sur l'ensemble de la région de Kidal.

Kidal, le 19 Juin 2023
Le Coordinateur Régional

ISSOUF SYLLA

Améliorations :
- Gouverneur de Kidal : .......... 01
- Archives : ......................... 01/02
Autorité Indépendante des Gestion des Elections
AIGE
Coordination Communale de Tessalit

République du Mali
Un Peuple – Un But – Un Foi

Le Coordinateur Communal de l’AIGE de Tessalit

A

• Coordinateur Local de l’AIGE de Tessalit
• Coordinateur Régional de l’AIGE-KIDAL

OBJET : Compte-rendu de l’Election référendaire du 18 Juin 2023

Messieurs,

Dans le cadre de la tenue des élections référendaires, j’ai l’honneur de vous informer qu’aucun vote n’a été organisé à Tessalit.

Le matériel électoral est resté avec la MINUSMA de Tessalit.

L’AIGE n’a pas reçu le matériel électoral et la population a suivi le mot d’ordre du CSP-PSD qui avait boycotté la tenue du scrutin.

L’AIGE de Tessalit n’a reçu aucun soutien financier ni technique dans ce sens.

Franchise Collaboration.

Tessalit, le 19 Juin 2023

Le Coordinateur

Amélioration:

- Sous-préfet de Tessalit:...... 01
- Archives : ............01/02

Abdollah Ag BILAL
Objet: Election référendaire du 18 Juin 2023

Messieurs,

Dans le cadre de la tenue des élections référendaires, j’ai l’honneur de vous informer qu’aucun vote n’a été organisé à Adjelhoc.

Par ailleurs, nos constats sont les suivants :

- Une mascarade a été organisée par des personnes de mauvaise volonté pour organiser un semblant d’élection sans passer par la coordination de l’AIGE qui a été mise en place le 04 Juin 2023 et conformément à la décision N°2023-00232/AIGE-5G du 18 Mai 2023 portant nomination des membres de la coordination de l’AIGE d’AGUEL-HOC.
- Aucun matériel électoral n’a été reçu par l’AIGE d’Aguel-hoc ;
- Aucun bureau de vote n’a été ouvert ;
- Une manifestation populaire a été organisée pour dire non à la tenue du référendum ;
- Aucun soutien ni appui n’a été fait dans le sens des élections.

Adjelhoc, le 19 Juin 2023

Le Coordinateur

Amélioration :

- Sous-préfet d’Ageul-hoc : 01
- Archives : 01/02

Mohamedine Ag Aljimite
Annex 10a: Extracted frames from a video showing CMA elements firing at a Malian army fighter jet in Kidal
COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L’AZAWD -(CMA)-
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BUREAU EXÉCUTIF

CELLULE DE COMMUNICATION
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COMMUNIQUÉ N°02/2023/BE/CC/ CMA

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) informe l'opinion nationale et internationale que ce jour, 05 avril 2023 les avions de chasse des forces armées maliennes ont survolé à des altitudes délibérément provocatrices ses positions à Ber, Amassine, Anafis et Kidal en pleine période des tensions liées au blocage du processus de paix.

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad prend cette malheureuse aventure comme une violation patente du cessez-le-feu du 23 mai 2014 et une provocation grâve opérée sous les yeux de la communauté internationale garant des arrangements sécuritaires et de l’Accord pour la paix.

A cet effet la Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad décline toutes responsabilités et conséquences issues de tels agissements.

Kidal le 5 Avril 2023.

Pour la CMA :
Almou Ag Mohamed
Porte-parole
Annex 11: Extracted frames from a video of a CNT member on the situation in Kidal

Annex 11: Video published in February 2023 by Albert Amadou Maiga, Member of CNT, alluding to attack on Kidal

https://emea01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fm.facebook.com%2Faamaiga%2Fvideos%2Fhttpstmeamadoumaiga1489pourquoi-la-guerre-est-in%25C3%25A9vitable-%25C3%25A0-kidal-les-raison-dans%25E895366541615554%2F&data=05%7C01%7C7C%7C06f94817302845929ddf08d b7ac0c405%7C84df9e7fe9f640af435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C6382387405545 24748%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiL CJBTrl6lk1haWwiLCJXVCi6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=%2FPj4NaOcm89 Y%2F6oaDBdJW%2BjRRB8CevMpmYGcyQcalWk%3D&reserved=0
Annex 12: JNIM message asking communities to contribute
وسند شفاء من قبائل الأشياء
فإننا نطلب منكم المساعدة.
وعتأتون منذ 3 أيام.
عله خوزة 2.3 في 14
والعفو عنكم حذر.
علما المسلمين فقد عاد
في 6 أيام فساروا ولم يردو.
لذا سرعان وقت فتح بهما الله
3 حالات مهيبة.
ودعاء كل ممكن.
وسلام علىكم.
Annex 13: Communique by Plateforme to request help in Ménaka

Communiqué sur l’exécution de neuf (9) civils à Intiklatene (Inaghaber) par DAESH

La communauté Idaksahak informe l’opinion nationale et internationale qu’hier 26 février 2023, des terroristes affiliés à DAESH ont fait irruption dans la localité de Intiklatene (cercle d’Inekar, région Ménaka) tuant neuf (9) personnes civiles et enlevant une autre. Cette dernière a pu s’échapper des mains de ces criminels au niveau du village d’Emi-semis tard dans la nuit. De centaines d’animaux ont également été emportés.

La communauté Idaksahak attire une fois de plus l’attention des autorités de la transition, des mouvements signataires et de tous les partenaires du pays sur les massacres qui ont débuté depuis Mars 2022 et qui ont fait plusieurs centaines de morts civils et des milliers d’animaux emportés, détruisant ainsi toute l’économie de la région.

Elle appelle le Gouvernement, les mouvements signataires ainsi que tous les partenaires du Mali à trouver une solution urgente pour stopper les massacres et protéger les populations.

La communauté Idaksahak présente ses condoléances les plus attristées aux familles des victimes, prie pour le repos éternel des âmes des disparus.

Enfin, elle appelle les uns et les autres à s’éloigner des zones de combats et regagner les grandes villes.

Ménaka, le 27 février 2023

Pour la communauté

Cellule de communication.
Annex 14 : CSP-PSD Communiqué on its structures

Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement (CSP-PSD)

BUREAU EXECUTIF
COMMUNIQUÉ FINAL DE LA PREMIÈRE SESSION ORDINAIRE DU BUREAU EXÉCUTIF

Le Bureau Exécutif du Cadre Stratégique Permanent pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement s’est réuni les 25 et 26 décembre 2022 à Kidal.

Cette réunion présidée par M. Alghabass AG INTALLA Président en exercice du CSP-PSD a enregistré la présence des membres du BUREAU Exécutif élargi aux Secrétaires Généraux des Mouvements.

Après avoir épuisé l’ordre du jour, le bureau exécutif a convenu Ce qui suit:

Au titre de la restructuration :

Le bureau a procédé à la nomination de deux assistants pour soutenir le Vice-président en charge des relations extérieures, à la nomination d’un représentant des imams, et au remplacement du 3ème Vice-président Chargé des questions humanitaires, réfugiés et déplacés pour le CSP-PSD.

Plusieurs commissions ont été créées pour travailler sur les questions portant sur la question de Défense et Sécurité, l’Humanitaire, les réfugiés, les déplacés, le genre, la jeunesse, la communication, les finances et le secrétariat permanent.

Au titre des questions politiques il a été décidé ce qui suit:

*Respect de l’accord de principe de Rome convenu entre le Gouvernement Malien et les Mouvements;
*Harmoniser les points de vues sur l’avenir de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d’Alger;
*le CSP-PSD conformément à ses objectifs de sécurité, d’unité, de solidarité et d’entraide, s’engage à venir en aide à chacune de ses composantes en cas d’agression quelqu’en soit l’auteur;
*Le bureau exécutif a unanimement décidé que le CSP-PSD est l’organe suprême des Mouvements Signataires et les engage de façon consensuel sur les questions politiques et sécuritaires;
*Le bureau Exécutif a prévu d’organiser une rencontre avec les chefferies traditionnelles.

Au titre de la défense et Sécurité, il a été décidé :

*Une commission composée de tous les chefs d’états-majors des mouvements composants le CSP-PSD a été mise en place et placée sous l’autorité du vice-président chargé des questions de défense et sécurité;
*De définir une politique de sécurisation des populations et de leurs biens ;
*De mettre en place une coalition pour la sécurisation des personnes et de leurs biens avec comme priorité les zones d’urgences ;
*De la mobilisation de tous les acteurs présents sur le terrain.

Au titre des questions humanitaires, il a été décidé :

*De travailler à mobiliser au niveau national et international les partenaires techniques et
financiers pour venir en aide aux populations ;
*De travailler pour faciliter l'accès humanitaire aux populations dans le besoin ;
*De créer les conditions pour faciliter le retour des populations réfugiées et déplacées.

Le Bureau Exécutif du CSP-PSD demande l'accompagnement des populations de l'Azawad/Nord du Mali et des acteurs concernés pour la réussite de sa mission de paix, de sécurité et de développement.

Fait à kidal, le 27 décembre 2022

Le Porte-parole

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane
Annex 15 :  CMA communiqué on Tidermene arrests

COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L'AZAWD -(CMA)-

BUREAU EXÉCUTIF

CELLULE DE COMMUNICATION

COMMUNIQUÉ N°04 du 27/04/2023/BE/CC/ CMA

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) informe l’opinion nationale et internationale que dans la journée du 23 Avril 2023, une patrouille FAMa et leurs partenaires de Wagner a interpellé ses combattants munis de leur ordre de mission, portant leurs armes dûment enregistrées dans le secteur de CHIMAM, Région de MENEKA.

Il s’agit de :
1. Mohamed Ag Abdoulahi ;
2. Ben Laden Ag Issif;
3. Hamad lamine Ag Haya;
4. Ibrahim Ag kassata;
5. Aboubacrine Ag Akawel;
6. Mahamad Ag Ithinanan;
7. Moussa Ag Adenkache;
8. Mahamad Ag Amidi;
9. Eglass Ag Mahamad;
10. N’kozay Ag Willa.

La patrouille a également procédé à la séquestration des populations civiles, les dépossédant d'une importante somme d'argent.

Pour apaiser la situation, la CMA avait opté pour un règlement à l’amiable en donnant la chance à une initiative locale pour obtenir leur libération. Malgré cette démarche entamée depuis quelques jours, la CMA reste toujours sans nouvelle des dits combattants et pire, l'armée les qualifie de terroristes et se vante de l'exploit.

La CMA dément catégoriquement tout lien de ses combattants avec les terroristes et exige leur libération sans condition avec leurs armes et l'argent spolié aux paisibles populations par cette mission.

Enfin, en l'absence d'un dénouement heureux de cette affaire, la CMA prend à temoin la médiation internationale des eventuelles conséquences qui peuvent découler de tels agissements.

Kidal, le 27 Avril 2023

Pour la CMA:
Almou Ag Mohamed
Porte-parole.
Annex 16a : CMA ordre de mission for Tidermene
Annex 16b: Commission on CMA unification
Annex 17: Decree of the President concerning resignation of Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga

MINISTÈRE DIARRA
PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
SECRETariat GÉNÉRAL

DECRET N°2021 - 0818 / PT-RM DU 17 NOV. 2021

PORTANT ACCEPTATION DE DEMISSION D’UN OFFICIER SUPERIEUR
DES FORCES ARMÉES ET DE SÉCURITÉ

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA TRANSITION, CHEF DE L’ÉTAT,

Vu la Constitution ;
Vu la Charte de la Transition ;
Vu la Loi n°04-051 du 23 novembre 2004 portant organisation générale de la Défense nationale ;
Vu la Loi n°2018-053 du 11 juillet 2018 portant code des pensions des fonctionnaires, des militaires et des parlementaires ;
Vu l’Ordonnance n°2016-020/P-RM du 18 août 2016, modifiée, portant Statut général des militaires ;
Vu la Lettre n°00518/CEMGA/C/CEM/ADM/D-RH du 06 juin 2021 ;
Vu la Demande du 06 novembre 2020 formulée par l’intéressé ;

DÉCÈRTE :

Article 1er : La démission des Forces Armées et de Sécurité du Colonel Hassane AG FAGAGA de la Garde nationale du Mali pour convenance personnelle est acceptée.

L’intéressé est rayé du contrôle des effectifs des Forces Armées et de Sécurité.

Il sera versé dans la réserve des Forces Armées et de Sécurité.

Article 2 : Le présent décret sera enregistré et publié au Journal officiel.

Bamako, le 17 NOV. 2021

Le Président de la Transition,
Chef de l’État,

Colonel Assimi GOÏTA
Annex 18: Organized crime routes in West Africa and Mali

Route (a): Trafficking to and from the area comprising the ports of Dakar (Senegal), Conakry (Guinea) and Freetown (Sierra Leone) via Banako.

Route (b): Trafficking to and from North Africa via the Tlemessi valley, Tessalet and Beni Boujoujot (Algeria) and via Niamey and Agadez to Libya (via Dirkou) and Algeria (via Arlit).

Route (c): Trafficking to and from coastal countries in the Gulf of Guinea via Niamey and the area comprising the ports of Tema (Ghana), Loume (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Lagos (Nigeria).
Annex 19: GPS tracker found in cocaine consignment
Annex 20: Calculations on gold production and value

1. Production
   a. If known gold production in Kayes, Koulikouro and Sikasso is of 35 to 40 tons and represents 70% of the total gold production in Mali.
   b. The total is 35 / 0.7 = 50 to 40 / 0.7 = 57.14.
   c. The gold production of sites other than Kayes, Koulikouro and Sikasso is thus total – 70% = 50 – 35 to 57 – 40 = 15 to 17.14 tons.
   d. Sites in the northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Menaka and Kidal account for 60% of the amount calculated at step 1. c., while sites in the central regions of Mopti and Segou account for 40%.
   e. The gold production of sites in Gao, Timbuktu, Menaka and Kidal is thus 15 * 0.6 to 17.14 * 0.6 = 9 to 10.28 tons.
   f. A ton = 1 000 000 grams.

2. Selling price of gold
   a. A gram of gold is bought by trader at mining sites between 33 to 35 000 XOF (53 to 58 US$)\(^{86}\).
   b. 9 to 10.28 tons of gold sold at 53 000 000 to 58 000 000 US$ yield 9 * 53 000 000 = 477 000 000 to 10.24 * 58 = 596 240 000 US$.

3. Bags of mineralized ore produced and paid to armed groups
   a. Armed groups charge one bag of mineralized ore for every 10 bags extracted.
   b. A bag of mineralized gravel weights around 70 kg.
   c. On average, artisanal and small-scale mining sites in Mali yield 4 grams of gold per metric ton of mineralized ore. This is called the grade of gold in ore. So, \( \frac{1}{25} \) of a ton (250 kg) of mineralized ore are needed to extract on average a gram of gold. This represents \( \frac{250}{70} = 3.57 \) bags per gram.
   d. Gold produced by sites in Gao, Timbuktu, Menaka and Kidal equals to 9 000 000 to 10 240 000 grams * 3.57 bags = 32 130 000 to 36 556 800 bags.
   e. Armed groups thus receive 32 130 000 / 10 = 3 213 000 to 36 556 800 / 10 = 3 655 680 bags of mineralized ores as payment for providing security.
   f. These bags contain 3 213 000 / 3.57 = 900 000 to 3 655 680 / 3.57 = 1 024 000 grams of gold.

4. Value of the gold contained in mineralized gravel paid to armed groups
   a. The gold is worth 900 000 grams * 53 US$ = 47 700 000 US$ (worst-case scenario of lowest production at lowest price) to 1 024 000 grams * 58 US$ = 59 392 000 US$ (best-case scenario of highest production at highest price).
   b. A mid-case scenario would result in 900 000 grams * 58 US$ = **$52,200,000** US$ to 1 024 000 grams * 53 US$ = **$54,272,000** US$.

5. Processing cost of mineralized gravel

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\(^{86}\) On 23 June 2023, 1 United States dollar was equivalent to 600.50 CFA francs and 0.92 euro.
a. The cost to process a bag of mineralized ore at the mining sites is of 2-3 000 XOF (3.33 to 5 US$).

b. To process the bags needed to extract a gram of gold costs 3.57 bags $3.33 US$ = 11.88 US$ to 3.57 bags $5 US$ = 17.85 US$.


6. Estimate revenue = selling prices – processing cost

a. The revenue generated from payments for the provision of security to the gold mining sites is 47 700 000 US$ revenue – 18 278 400 US$ cost = 29 421 600 US$ in the worst-case scenario (lowest revenues with highest costs) to 59 392 000 US$ revenue – 10 699 290 US$ cost = 48 692 710 US$ in the best-case scenario (highest revenues with lowest cost).

b. A mid-point scenario, as calculated at step 4. b., would result in 52 200 000 US$ revenue – 10 699 290 US$ cost = 41 500 710 US$ to 54 272 000 US$ revenue – 18 278 400 US$ cost = 35 993 600 US$.
Annex 22:  JNIM claims responsibility for an attack on Malian Armed Forces in Nara 18 April 2023
Annex 23: Alleged ISGS leaflets distributed to populations in Menaka

Accessed online on: https://twitter.com/SimNasr/status/1645813091186221057

1- Almahmoud Ag Hamma
2- Wali Ag Hamma
3- Haba Ag Hamma
4- Mahamad Ag Idine
5- Mahamad Ag Mahine
6- Mahamad Ag Seydimohamad
7- Anar Ag Albahiri
8- Hadouwa Ag Ahbid
9- Tahamadat Ag Ahmad
10- Bouhoudou Ag Sory.
Annex 25: Excerpt from report of the SG on the situation in Mali, S/2023/402, para. 21

In April 2023, 470 cases of sexual violence were reported, out of which 51 were CRSV. Signatory armed groups were allegedly responsible for 8% of these incidents. «cas de violence sexuelle, dont 51 étaient liés à un conflit. Toutes les victimes étaient de sexe féminin, dont 11 filles âgées de 12 à 17 ans. Ces crimes avaient été perpétrés par des membres des groupes armés signataires (18%) et par des éléments armés non identifiés (82%). L’ONU a confirmé que des violations graves avaient été commises contre 154 enfants, dont 5 en avaient été victimes à deux reprises. Ces violations comprenaient des cas de recrutement et d’utilisation d’enfants (96), de meurtre ou d’atteintes à l’intégrité physique (32), de violences sexuelles (3), d’enlèvements (6), d’attaques contre des écoles et des hôpitaux (8) et de refus de l’accès à l’aide humanitaire (9)». 
Annex 26: Tilemsi Holding incorporation

MODIFICATIONS RELATIVES A LA PERSONNE MORALE

Son SIÈGE : Bamako, Quartier Baco – Djicoroni Golf, face musquée Wamry;
Mali. Tel : 66 33 30 33 / 76 33 30 33.
Sa FORME JURIDIQUE : Société Anonyme.
Son CAPITAL : Dix Millions de Francs CFA (10 000 000 FCFA).
Son DÉNOMINATION : « TILEMSI HOLDING -SA »
Son NOM COMMERCIAL : TILEMSI HOLDING -SA
Son ACTIVITÉ : La société a pour objet au Mali qu’à l’étranger et sous réserve, en cas de besoin, de
l’octention des autorisations nécessaires auprès des autorités compétentes :
- Recherche Exploitation et Prospection des Ressources Minières;
- Comptoir d’Achat et de Vente de Métaux Précieux;
- Traitement de Ressources Minières sous Toutes ses Formes;
- Importation des Machines d’Exploitation d’Équipements Minières;
- Vente et Location d’Équipements Minières;
- Importation Exportation, Distribution des Hydrocarbures et Produits Dérivés;
- Gestion et Exploitation des Points de Vente et de Stations d’Hydrocarbures et Produits
Dérivés;
- Transport;
- Commerce Import-export;
- Commerce Général;
- Génie Civil et Industriel;
- Bâtiments Travaux Publics et Particuliers (BTP);
- Électricité, Pompierie, Froid Climatisation;
- Prestation de Services et Divers;
- Nettoyage, Entretien, Hygiène, Assainissement;
- Aménagement Hydro-agricole;
- Construction des Forages et Grands Puits;
- Telecom et Nouvelles Technologies;
- Énergies Solaire et Éoliennes etc.

Et, généralement, toutes opérations commerciales, industrielles, financières, mobilières ou
immobilières se rattachant directement ou indirectement audit objet précité ou à tous objets similaires
et connexes et pouvant en faciliter la réalisation.

MODIFICATIONS RELATIVES AUX ASSOCIES

* Identité : Monsieur Abdoulaye OULDI MOHAMED, Maintenu.
  qualité : actionnaire et Président Directeur Général
* Identité : Monsieur Mohamed MAHRI, Maintenu.
  qualité : actionnaire.
Identité : Monsieur Abdoulaye AHMADOU, Nouveau.
Nouvelle qualité : actionnaire.
Date 21/02/2018 : Par la suite d’une cession d’actions.
MODIFICATIONS RELATIVES AUX DIRIGEANTS

Monsieur Abdoul Ould Mohamed, Rente Président Directeur Général

LE SOUSSIONNÉ : Maître Karamoko Camara, Notaire à Bamako
Demande à ce que la présente constitue : DEMANDE DE MODIFICATION AU RCCM

La conformité de la déclaration avec les pièces justificatives
Produites en application de l’acte Uniforme sur le Droit commercial
Général a été vérifiée par le Greffier en Chef sousigné qui a procédé à l’inscription le:

Sous le numéro: NA: B 1566

LE GREFFIER EN CHEF

Fait à Bamako
Le 21 Février 2018
Maître Karamoko Camara
Annex 27a  Tilemsi Holding shares owned by Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007)

3

Par exception, le premier exercice social prendra le temps écoulé depuis l'immatriculation de la société au Registre du Commerce, jusqu'au trente et un décembre mil neuf cent quatre vingt dix neuf.

ARTICLE 7 : APPORTS

Les actionnaires apportent à la Société en numéraire la Somme de : Dix Millions de Francs CFA (10 000 000F/CFA), ainsi :

Lors de la constitution, les actionnaires apportent à la société la somme de : Dix Millions de Francs CFA (10 000 000F/CFA) correspondant au capital de la société.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N° D'ordre</th>
<th>Nom du Souscripteur</th>
<th>Nombre d'actions souscrites</th>
<th>Pourcentage souscrit</th>
<th>Montant du Versement Effectué</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abidine OULD MOHAMED</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>70 %</td>
<td>7 000 000F/CFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohamed MAHRI</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>2 500 000F/CFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Abdoulaye AHMADOU</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>05 %</td>
<td>500 000F/CFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>10 000 000F/CFA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DÉCLARATION DE SOUSCRIPTION ET DE VERSEMENT :

Les comptant de la Société ont, par ces présentes déclarés :
Qu'il n'a été fait aucun appel au public pour la souscription du Capital de la Société Anonyme « TILEMSI HOLDING – SA », et que cette souscription n'a été précédée d'aucune publicité.

Que les bulletins de souscription ont tous été régulièrement établis, et signés par les souscripteurs, conformément à la loi et que chacun d'eux mentionne la raison sociale de la société, le montant du capital mis en souscription et le lieu du versement des fonds à prevoir de cette souscription.

Que les Millés (1000) actions de Dix Mille Francs CFA (10 000 F/CFA) chacune de la société « TILEMSI HOLDING – SA » susmentionnée, qui étaient à souscrire et à libérer en numéraires ont, toutes été souscrites et libérées pour leur montant intégral par Quatre (04) personnes.

Les sommes ainsi libérées par l'ensemble des actionnaires et représentant la totalité du capital a été déposé à la BCS – SA Hammak, en un compte ouvert au nom de la Société.

ARTICLE 9 : MODIFICATION DU CAPITAL

Le capital social peut être augmenté, réduit ou amorti dans les conditions prévues par la loi.

Le capital social peut être augmenté, soit par émission d'actions nouvelles, soit par majoration du montant nominal des actions existantes.
Annex 27b  Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) landline number
### Annex 28a: WIPO record of Tilemsi brands

#### SUPER TILEMSI
- **Mark:** SUPER TILEMSI
- **Filing #:** OA/3/2015/001104
- **Filing Date:** 2015.03.31
- **Publication #:** 083248
- **Publication Date:** 2016.03.11
- **Reg #:** 083248
- **Reg Date:** 2015.06.30
- **Ni Class:** 30
- **Vienna Classes:**
- **Applicant:** Société TILEMSI Distribution SARL

#### TANBANKORT
- **Mark:** TANBANKORT
- **Filing #:** OA/3/2015/001106
- **Filing Date:** 2015.03.31
- **Publication #:** 083250
- **Publication Date:** 2016.03.11
- **Reg #:** 083250
- **Reg Date:** 2015.06.30
- **Ni Class:** 30
- **Vienna Classes:**
- **Applicant:** Société TILEMSI Distribution SARL

#### THE VERT DE CHINE TILEMSI
- **Mark:** THE VERT DE CHINE TILEMSI
- **Filing #:** OA/3/2015/001105
- **Filing Date:** 2015.03.31
- **Publication #:** 083249
- **Publication Date:** 2016.03.11
- **Reg #:** 083249
- **Reg Date:** 2015.06.30
- **Ni Class:** 30
- **Vienna Classes:**
- **Applicant:** Société TILEMSI Distribution SARL
Annex 28b: Linkedin page of Tilemsi Distribution
Annex 29

Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) identity card
Annex 30

Letter issued from Mali CENTIF to Banks about individuals and entities sanctioned by the UN

Le Président de la Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations Financières
Bamako

Madame et Messieurs :

- La Directrice Générale de Eco Bank-Mali,
- Le Directeur Général de Orabank Mali,
- Le Directeur Général de Coris Bank Internationale-Mali,
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque de Développement Agricole du Mali (BDM),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque Internationale pour le Mali (BIM),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole du Mali (BNDA),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque Commerciale du Sahel (BCS),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque of Africa-Mali (BOA-Mali),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie au Mali (BICI-M),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque atlantique du Mali,
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque Malienne de Solidarité (BMS),
- Le Directeur Général de la Banque pour le Commerce et l’Industrie du Mali (BCI-Mali),
- Le Directeur Général de la banque Sahelo-saharienne pour l’Investissement et le Commerce-Mali (BSIC-Mali),
- Le Directeur Général de United Bank for Mali (UBA-Mali).

Object: Enquête patrimoniale sur certaines personnes physiques et morales désignées sur la liste des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, dans le cadre
de la lutte contre le financement du terrorisme.

**Madame et Messieurs,**

Dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, la République du Mali a ratifié plusieurs conventions, en vue de tarir les sources de financement des individus et des organisations terroristes.

En effet, l'article 100 de la Loi N° 008 du 17 mars 2016 dispose que « l’autorité compétente ordonne, par décision administrative, le gel de biens, fonds et autres ressources financières des personnes ou entités auteurs de financement du terrorisme. Une liste nationale de ces personnes, entités ou organismes peut, le cas échéant, être dressée conformément à la résolution 1373 et les résolutions subséquentes.

La décision visée à l’alinéa premier ci-dessus, définit les conditions ainsi que la durée applicable au gel desdits fonds.

En application de cette disposition pertinente de la Loi Uniforme ci-dessus visée, j’ai l’honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir faire vérifier votre base de données et nous renseigner sur les comptes bancaires et tout autre actif domiciliés dans votre établissement au nom des personnes physiques et morales dont la liste est annexée à la présente.

Sachant compter sur votre diligence habituelle, je vous prie d’agréer, Madame et Messieurs, l’assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Bamako, le 07 avril 2020

Marimpa SAMOURA
Chevalier de l’Ordre National
LISTE DES PERSONNES PHYSIQUES ET MORALES VISEES PAR LES SANCTIONS DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE DES NATIONS UNIES, DANS LE CADRE DE LA LUTTE CONTRE LE FINANCEMENT DU TERRORISME.

A - Personnes Physiques:

1°) AHMED AG ALBACHAR, Président de la commission humanitaire du Bureau régional d’administration et de gestion de Kidal, né le 31 déc. 1963 Tin-Essako, Région de Kidal, Pseudonyme fiable : Intahmadou Ag Albachar, Numéro national d’identification : 1 63 08 4 01 001 005E, Adresse : Quartier Aliou, Kidal.


9°) MOHAMED OULD MATALY, né vers 1958, Numéro de passeport : D9011156 Adresse : Golf Rue 708 Porte 345, Gao, Mali.


**B - Personnes Morales:**

1°) AL MOUKAOUNE BIDDAM:

*Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s):* a) Les Signataires par le Sang b) Ceux Qui Signent avec le Sang c) , Adresse: Mali .

2°) AL MOULATHAMOUN:

*Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s):* a) Les Enturbannés, Adresse: a) Mali b) Niger c) Algérie.

3°) AL MOURABITOUN:

*Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s):* a) Les Sentinelles, Adresse: Mali.

4°) ANSAR EDDINE:

*Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s):* Ansar Dine, Adresse: Mali.

5°) ISLAMIC STATE IN THE GREATER SAHARA (ISGS):

*Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s):* a) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) b) Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) c) Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Greater Sahara (ISIL-GS) d) Islamic State of the Greater Sahel e) ISIS in the Greater Sahel f) ISIS in the Greater Sahara g) ISIS in the Islamic Sahel.
6°) MOUVEMENT POUR L’UNIFICATION ET LE JIHAD EN AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST (MUJAO)

7°) MUHAMMAD JAMAL NETWORK (MJN)
Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s): a) Muhammad Jamal Group b) Jamal Network c) Abu Ahmed Group
d) Al-Qaida in Egypt (AQE) Adresse: opère en Égypte, en Libye et au Mali

8°) THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
Autre(s) nom(s) connu(s): a) AQIM b) Al Qaida au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) Précédemment
connu(e) sous le nom de: a) Le Groupe Salafiste pour La Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) b)
Salafist Group For Call and Combat Adresse: a) Algérie b) Mali c) Mauritanie d) Maroc e) Niger
f) Tunisie

Le Président

[Signature]