



Security Council

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Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)

Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the European Union with the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 14 July 2015, and its endorsement by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), on 20 July 2015, demonstrated a unity of purpose among participants for achieving the shared objectives of non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. My belief that the Plan is the best available option for achieving these objectives remains unchanged.

2. It is therefore extremely concerning that, notwithstanding tireless and repeated efforts to resolve the remaining differences, the diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission have not yet resulted in the return of the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran to full and effective implementation of the Plan and the resolution. I am grateful for the efforts made by all participants in the Plan and by the United States since talks resumed in November 2021 and strongly urge them to recommit themselves to its restoration without further delay. The successful conclusion of these diplomatic engagements is essential for restoring the confidence of the international community in the ability of the Plan to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

3. It is therefore critical for the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to resolve the outstanding issues, recognizing that any gains that may be earned by restoring the Plan continue to diminish as delays persist. I repeat my call upon the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend the waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

4. I also repeat my call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan, to refrain from taking further steps away from its full implementation of the Plan and to reverse the steps that it has taken since July 2019, which it had pledged were reversible. Regrettably, since the previous report, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to reduce the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. On 22 November 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on the intention of the Islamic Republic of Iran to install new cascades of centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and to



produce uranium enriched up to 60 per cent at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.¹ Although IAEA has not been able to verify the total stockpile of enriched uranium in the Islamic Republic of Iran since February 2021, it has estimated that, as at 22 October 2022, the total stockpile was 3,673.7 kg (which exceeds the 202.8 kg limit), including 417.2 kg enriched to 20 per cent uranium-235 and 64.3 kg enriched to 60 per cent uranium-235.² It remains necessary for the Islamic Republic of Iran to carefully consider and address the other concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Issues not related to the Plan, however, should be addressed without prejudice to preserving the Plan and its accomplishments.

5. While the international community remains supportive of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the current diplomatic engagements remain at an impasse, making the ongoing bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran all the more necessary. I urge the relevant parties to pursue these initiatives, which may help to achieve regional stability, and to encourage the restoration of the Plan.

6. IAEA continues to play an indispensable role in the monitoring and verification of all nuclear-related activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In its most recent quarterly report dated 10 November 2022, the Agency noted that, since 23 February 2021, its “verification and monitoring activities have been seriously affected as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], including the Additional Protocol”. The Agency also noted that, as communicated to the Agency on 8 June 2022, “Iran’s decision to remove all of the Agency’s equipment previously installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] has also had detrimental implications for the Agency’s ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”.

7. The present report, my fourteenth on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), provides an assessment of the implementation of the resolution, including findings and recommendations, since the issuance of my previous report ([S/2022/490](#)) on 23 June 2022. Consistent with previous reports, the focus of the present report is on the provisions set forth in annex B to the resolution.

II. Key findings and recommendations

8. In October 2022, the Secretariat examined cruise missile parts seized by the United Kingdom in January and February 2022 in international waters south of the Islamic Republic of Iran and observed design characteristics and components consistent with those of cruise missiles previously examined and assessed to be of Iranian origin.

III. Implementation of nuclear-related provisions

9. Since 24 June 2022, no new proposals for participating in or permitting the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) have been submitted to and approved by the Security Council through the procurement channel. The Security Council has received eight new notifications pursuant to paragraph 2 for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of

¹ See the Agency’s report of 22 November 2022.

² See the Agency’s report of 10 November 2022.

Action that do not require approval but do require notification of the Council or both the Council and the Joint Commission.

10. I welcome once again the renewal of waivers by the United States in August 2022 regarding certain nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) that relate to the existing unit at the Bushehr nuclear power plant; assistance to expand the power plant beyond the existing reactor unit; the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium; the modification of infrastructure at the Fordow facility; and the modernization of the Arak reactor.

IV. Implementation of provisions related to paragraphs 3 and 4

A. Restrictions on paragraph 3-related activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran

11. In paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Islamic Republic of Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.

12. In identical letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, to the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and to me dated 24 June 2022 ([S/2022/514](#)), the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations brought to my attention a space launch vehicle flight conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran in March 2022. The Permanent Representative stated that space launch vehicles incorporate technologies that are virtually identical to, and interchangeable with, those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and that “[t]herefore launches of space launch vehicles ... are an activity that the Security Council has clearly called upon Iran not to undertake”. The views of the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation to the United Nations regarding the flight were reflected in my thirteenth report on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (see [S/2022/490](#), paras. 13–15).

13. On 23 November 2022, the President of the Security Council and I received letters from the Permanent Representatives of Israel ([S/2022/861](#)) and France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2022/878](#)) on activities undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran that those Member States deemed to be inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In the letters, the Permanent Representatives referred to the test flights of the Zoljanah and Ghaem-100 space launch vehicles in June and November 2022, respectively. They noted that the space launch vehicles incorporated technologies that were virtually identical to and interchangeable with those used in ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons and that the flight tests were activities that fell under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In their letter, the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom also referred to the unveiling of the Rezvan medium-range ballistic missile, with a claimed range of 1,400 km, by the Islamic Republic of Iran in September 2022. The Permanent Representatives classified the missile as a Missile Technology Control Regime category I system and concluded that, as such, the missile was inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons and therefore would fall under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

14. In letters dated 5 July and 28 and 29 November 2022 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2022/544](#), [S/2022/882](#) and [S/2022/890](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran “categorically” rejected “all

unfounded” and “unsubstantiated” allegations made by the Permanent Representatives of the United States, Israel, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In document [S/2022/882](#), the Permanent Representative reiterated that the definition of the Missile Technology Control Regime was not universally accepted and that paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) “does not concern nor does it apply to space launch vehicles”. He also restated that the Iranian missile and space programmes, including the launches of ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles, fell “outside of the purview or competence of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and its annexes”.

15. In letters dated 13 July and 29 November 2022 addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me ([S/2022/554](#) and [S/2022/889](#)), the Permanent Representative and the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations reiterated the position of their country regarding the interpretation of paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In document [S/2022/889](#), they restated that the category I criteria of the Missile Technology Control Regime “cannot be used to determine if specific ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”. In both letters, they stressed that the Russian Federation remained of the view that the Islamic Republic of Iran was “respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that [were] designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons”.

B. Restrictions on paragraph 4-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran

16. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), all States, provided that they have obtained the prior approval of the Security Council on a case-by-case basis, may participate in and permit the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in document [S/2015/546](#) and any items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Document [S/2015/546](#) includes ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicle systems (including target drones, reconnaissance drones and cruise missiles), all having a range equal to or greater than 300 km, and related items, materials, equipment, goods and technology.

17. Paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) also applies to the provision of various services or technical assistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran and its acquisition of an interest in any commercial activity in another State related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology described in its subparagraph (a).

18. During the reporting period, the Secretariat travelled to the United Kingdom, at the invitation of the British authorities, to examine items alleged to be of Iranian origin and being transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Secretariat examined a number of cruise missile parts (jet engines, electronic components and actuator systems) that had been seized by the British Royal Navy from two skiffs in January and February 2022 in international waters south of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Secretariat conducted first-hand and in-depth examinations of the parts and collected all other information available. The Secretariat observed many similarities³ between the parts seized by the United Kingdom (such as the jet engine, engine control unit, fuel feed system, steering system, inertial navigation system and electronic components) and parts found in the debris of the

³ The similarities observed among the parts included their design, configuration, dimensions, manufacturers and the format for part numbering.

cruise missiles used by the Houthis in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2019 and 2022, as well as the parts seized by the United States in November 2019.⁴ The Secretariat also observed new cruise missile parts, including an altimeter system and a new steering system. Those parts had a similar format for part numbering and inspection stickers as other previously examined parts, suggesting that they may be of the same origin. On three of the five jet engines examined, the Secretariat found manufacture date markings of August 2020 and June and November 2021. The Secretariat again identified the manufacturers of several subcomponents. One manufacturer informed the Secretariat that two pressure sensors had been exported in early 2020, and the Secretariat is still endeavouring to ascertain their complete supply chain.

19. In a letter addressed to me dated 17 October 2022 ([S/2022/771](#)), the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations alleged that several uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) had been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). In letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 21 October 2022, the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the United Nations ([S/2022/781](#)) and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations ([S/2022/782](#)) also alleged that UAVs had been transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with the resolution. In their letters, Ukraine, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the United States also asked that an inspection be conducted. In letters addressed to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 19 and 24 October 2022 ([S/2022/776](#) and [S/2022/794](#), respectively), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations categorically rejected “the unfounded allegation that Iran has supplied unmanned aerial vehicles for use in the conflict in Ukraine”. In addition, he expressed the view that paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) only restricted the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology “that the State determines could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” and that his country “has never produced or supplied, nor does it intend to produce or supply, items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems”. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations also sent a letter to the President of the Security Council and to me dated 21 October 2022 ([S/2022/783](#)) expressing “most serious concerns” with regard to the letter of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The Secretariat is examining the available information. Any findings will be reported to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

V. Implementation of the asset freeze provisions

20. In their letters, the Permanent Representatives of Ukraine ([S/2022/771](#)), France, Germany and the United Kingdom ([S/2022/781](#)) and the United States ([S/2022/782](#)) to the United Nations alleged that some of the UAVs transferred from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation had been manufactured by an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and that their transfer was therefore inconsistent with the asset freeze provisions of the resolution. The Secretariat is examining the available information. Any findings will be reported to the Security Council, as appropriate, in due course.

⁴ The Secretariat previously examined and reported on these systems and parts to the Security Council in [S/2019/934](#), para. 31, [S/2020/531](#), paras. 31–35, and [S/2022/490](#), para. 20.

VI. Secretariat support provided to the Security Council and its Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

21. The Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has continued to support the work of the Security Council, in close cooperation with the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Division has also continued to liaise with the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission on matters related to the procurement channel. In addition, the Division participated in events for outreach to Member States on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).
