



Security Council

Distr.: General
3 August 2022

Original: English

Letter dated 3 August 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2590 (2021), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 2590 (2021), the final report on the Panel's work.

The attached report was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali on 14 July 2022 and was considered by the Committee on 28 July 2022.

I would be grateful if the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Lipika **Majumdar Roy Choudhury**
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on Mali
established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)

(Signed) Albert **Barume**
Expert

(Signed) Aurélien **Llorca**
Expert

(Signed) Fatma **Saber**
Expert



Final report of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)

Executive summary

During the reporting period, the Panel of Experts on Mali observed that the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was stalled, with none of the implementing mechanisms functioning. The political situation remained tense. There was a perceptible lack of trust between the Government and the signatory armed groups. A high-level meeting on integration quotas had been delayed for over a year and five months, thereby deadlocking the entire disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

On the other hand, the landscape in terms of armed groups continued to be characterized by its fluidity, in the context of the attempt to operationalize the Cadre stratégique permanent (Permanent Strategic Framework) to unite most of the relevant compliant armed groups under one banner. After several meetings in Italy and Mali, it was not possible to finalize the project owing to disagreements with the Government of Mali over leadership, and between the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger and the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad on combating Islamic State offensives in the Ménaka Region. Those disagreements may represent, in the short term, an additional layer of obstacles to the implementation of the Agreement.

However, parties continued to build up their military strength unilaterally, including through the recruitment of youth, outside the Agreement framework, as if preparing for confrontation. In the Panel's assessment, the Agreement is threatened by a potential risk of confrontation between the parties for the first time since July 2017.

The stalled implementation of the Agreement, moreover, has created a security vacuum and an enabling environment for grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Actions taken by all sides, including armed terrorist groups, to position themselves and gain control of territory through the use of force have further aggravated the situation. These actions have resulted in an alarming rise in the number of civilian deaths; violence against civilians, including women and children; attacks against humanitarian actors, international forces and the Malian Armed Forces; and the internal displacement and movement of persons and families across borders.

Meanwhile, the implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban is mostly inadequate and ineffective. The travel ban is regularly violated, with four cases of non-compliance identified as having occurred during the current mandate. The asset freeze has not been implemented by the Government of Mali. Some countries have not been enforcing the measures because of the lack of a legal and institutional framework related to sanctions regimes. The situation highlights the need for greater outreach and sensitization at both the administrative and operational levels.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Background	4
A. Introduction	4
B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions	4
II. Overview of progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali	5
A. Political and regional context for the implementation of the Agreement	5
B. Update on armed groups, and links between them and non-signatory armed movements	10
III. Information relevant to the potential designation of individuals or entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)	15
A. Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017)	15
B. Involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against the entities referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017)	17
C. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, use and recruitment of children, and obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali	18
IV. Implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban	25
A. Violations of the measures	25
B. Identification of assets	26
C. Updates on designated individuals	27
D. Actions taken for the effective implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze	27
V. Recommendations	29
Annexes*	30

* Circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), covers the period from 6 August 2021, when the previous final report of the Panel of Experts on Mali ([S/2021/714](#)) was transmitted to the Council, to 30 June 2022.¹ It includes updates on ongoing investigations detailed in the previous final report. The Panel submitted its midterm report ([S/2022/232](#)) on 28 February 2022.

2. In its resolution [2590 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council mandated the appointment of the members of the Panel from 1 October 2021. As the appointment of the Panel was pending consideration by the Committee, the current members of the Panel were contractually appointed only on 17 January 2022. This represented a delay of three and half months after the end, on 30 September 2021, of the previous mandate, issued in resolution [2541 \(2020\)](#).

3. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel has maintained the highest achievable standard of proof, even though travel to Mali and other destinations was restricted owing to the delay in the start of the mandate and the circumstances described in paragraph 5 below.

4. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply.² The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality, and independence in its investigations.

B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions

5. The Panel visited Mali once, from 28 March to 8 April 2022, and also visited France, Italy, Mauritania and the Niger during the reporting period. It was not possible to conduct a second proposed visit to Mali in June 2022, as the visas provided to two Panel members were revoked without an official explanation from the Malian authorities. The Panel's travel to Mali remains crucial to its mandate and should be given priority by the Government of Mali.

6. The Panel is grateful for the excellent cooperation and support provided by the Governments of Mauritania and the Niger, especially during the visits to the two countries. A full list of Member States, organizations and individuals visited or consulted can be found in annex III.

7. Panel correspondence records can be found in annex IV. The Panel maintained contact with the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali, Member States and other interlocutors, including other Panels of Experts, through electronic platforms.

8. The Panel benefited from regular exchanges with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The Mission cooperated fully with the Panel and provided excellent support. The Panel would also like to express its appreciation to the other United Nations entities in Mali for their support for the Panel's mission.

¹ All hyperlinks were accessed on 27 June 2022, unless otherwise specified.

² Owing to the word limits on reports of monitoring mechanisms, the Panel has provided further details in the annexes. The abbreviations and acronyms used in the present report are set out in annex I. Further information on methodology and the opportunity to reply can be found in annex II.

II. Overview of progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

9. During the reporting period, the Panel observed that the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in Algiers in 2015, was stalled. In the Panel's assessment, the Agreement is threatened by a potential risk of confrontation between the parties, for the first time since July 2017 (see [S/2018/58](#), para. 21). The risk has arisen despite the parties continuing to reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of the Agreement.

A. Political and regional context for the implementation of the Agreement

Key implementing mechanisms and institutions at a standstill

10. The political situation remains tense, compounded by a lack of trust between the Government and the signatory armed groups. Parties continue to build up their military strength unilaterally, outside the framework of the Agreement. However, the Prime Minister of Mali, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, stated, at the forty-third session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l'Accord) (CSA) held in Bamako on 29 June 2021, that the implementation of the Agreement was an integral part of the priorities for the transition. The signatory armed groups also continued to reiterate their commitment to the Agreement.

11. The following factors are relevant for assessing the status of the implementation of the Agreement:

- (a) None of the implementing mechanisms of the Agreement has functioned over the last eight months. The last meeting of CSA was convened on 5 October 2021;
- (b) The Technical Commission on Security of MINUSMA has met only twice during the current mandate;
- (c) No regular meeting of the intra-Malian consultation framework has been held since October 2021. The framework has been repeatedly highlighted by both the Independent Observer and the Panel as being essential to the inclusive implementation of the Agreement (see [S/2019/636](#), para. 24);
- (d) None of the political and institutional reforms provided for in the Agreement has been finalized by the National Transitional Council, the transitional legislative body. In February 2022, draft legislation on territorial police was removed from the agenda of the Council. All other processes, including constitutional reforms, remain in the early stages.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process deadlocked

12. The high-level decision-making meeting on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration quotas had not been held at the time of writing. Initially planned for 9 February 2021, the meeting has now been delayed for over a year and five months (see [S/2021/714](#), paras. 9 and 10).³ Ever since, disagreements over the terms of

³ In its previous final report ([S/2021/714](#)), the Panel stated that, following the Government's announcement that it would integrate 26,000 members of armed groups into the army and other public services over a period of two years, a two-day workshop on the matter had been organized. On the first day of the workshop (8 February 2021), technical teams representing the Government and the signatory armed groups had reached a consensus on quotas for the reintegration of the first 13,000 members. The consensus was to be endorsed at a high-level decision-making meeting, which was to be held on 9 February 2021 but never took place.

reference for the meeting have frozen the whole disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The Government and the signatory armed groups accuse one another of being responsible for the delay.

13. On 8 April 2022, the Minister for National Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, Mr. Ismaël Wagué, informed the Panel that he had asked the signatory armed groups three weeks previously for comments on draft terms of reference for the aforementioned high-level meeting, but had received no response. The information was confirmed by reliable sources, including a representative of a signatory armed group, who indicated that the draft terms of reference had been shared at a meeting in Gao in March 2022. However, the representative alleged that the Ministry had subsequently withdrawn the document and that no new draft had since been sent to the signatory armed groups.

Military reinforcement by the Government and signatory armed groups outside the Agreement framework

14. The Panel further noted that the parties to the Agreement were busy reinforcing themselves militarily and making a public show of strength, as if preparing for confrontation. Several independent analysts and observers, and representatives of the parties, have shared with the Panel their fears of a possible military confrontation between the parties.

15. In recent months, the Government of Mali has received new weapon systems and military equipment that have been the focus of much media attention. It has also initiated a special military recruitment programme outside the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The special programme is a unilateral initiative by the Government, without the involvement of the signatory armed groups. The first phase of the programme was launched in August 2021. The second phase was launched in January 2022, through an official communiqué of the General Staff of the Malian army.

16. The special programme solely targets young Malians aged between 18 and 30 who are in possession of heavy weapons. The new recruits must also come from regions specifically listed in the communiqué, including Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka, but not Kidal (see annex V). The Panel received confirmation of eased recruitment conditions, which do not include any human rights vetting.

17. Information gathered by the Panel indicates that the Government plans to recruit 2,000 young people under the special programme. By May 2022, almost 1,300 had already been recruited. The new recruits are trained for a few months before being deployed. Government representatives told the Panel that the Malian army needed young, new members. The Panel also noted that the special programme was portrayed in the media as a call for youth to defend their country.

18. The signatory armed groups have also been remobilizing their forces, outside the framework of the Agreement. On 24 February 2022, the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) organized a public ceremony in Kidal town, celebrating, in front of local authorities and people, the entry of about 200 young recruits into its forces. The Panel wrote to CMA seeking further details of the process. CMA responded on 26 June 2022, denying any recruitment. It recognized, however, that it had trained new combatants to replace its aging members. CMA further recognized that it had trained thousands of new combatants. Its representatives told the Panel that it was preparing for all eventualities, considering the break in dialogue with the Government and persistent reports of attacks against civilian populations, allegedly carried out by government forces assisted by new partners. CMA also told the Panel that it feared the increase in hostile rhetoric against the Agreement among public opinion leaders and political actors, including some in Government positions.

19. On 24 May 2022, CMA launched a process of identification and counting of its combatants, as provided for in its charter. On 2 June 2022, the President of CMA, Bilal Ag Acherif, suspended the process, allegedly owing to disagreements among the numerous armed groups that constitute CMA (see annex VI).

20. Stakeholders in northern Mali, including signatory armed groups, expressed the fear of a possible military attack on the northern regions of the country by government forces supported by new partners.

Update on the government investigation into the killing of the former President of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad

21. The Panel continues to be concerned about the lack of progress in the Government’s investigation into the death of the former President of CMA and Secretary-General of the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatti (see S/2021/714, paras. 68 and 69).

22. Mr. Ould Sidatti was shot at his home in Bamako on 13 April 2021. On 29 June 2021, CSA, at its forty-third session, attended by Mr. Maïga, called upon the Government to conduct an investigation into the killing. Since then, the Government has communicated no information on the investigation, despite update requests, including by Mr. Ould Sidatti’s family. The lack of progress has contributed to the current mounting distrust between the Government and the signatory armed groups.

Regional context of the implementation of the Agreement

23. The Agreement serves a purpose beyond the borders of Mali, providing an indispensable security framework for neighbouring countries. Mali shares long borders with its neighbours: more than 2,200 km with Mauritania, more than 1,300 km with Algeria and over 800 km with the Niger. Neighbouring States engage on security issues with signatory armed groups regarding some border areas where the groups maintain a presence. The situation, in the Panel’s view, is due to a lack of progress in the implementation of the Agreement.

24. During the reporting period, the region continued to face a deteriorating security situation owing to the intensification of attacks by terrorist armed groups seeking to take advantage of the departure of international forces from Mali. The tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger⁴ is particularly affected, and there are growing terrorist activities in the coastal countries of West Africa.⁵ Concomitantly, the region is grappling with the self-isolation of the Government of Mali as well as the consequences of the stalled implementation of the Agreement.

25. In this regional context, neighbouring countries have intensified the monitoring of their borders with Mali. Additionally, they have multiplied efforts to keep the implementation of the Agreement on track.

⁴ In March 2022, hundreds of people were killed in the Malian areas of Tamalelt, Inchinanane and Anderamboukane by armed terrorist groups. Attacks by such groups have continued since then. See also <https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/suivi-de-la-situation-humanitaire-hsm-zone-des-trois-frontiers-niger-r-gion-de-l> and paras. 90–95 below.

⁵ Recently, the Government of Benin announced its decision to withdraw its troops from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 because of growing insecurity owing to terrorism on its own territory. On 8 and 10 February 2022, improvised explosive devices killed rangers in a national park in Benin. See also <https://lanouvelletribune.info/2022/05/le-benin-justifie-le-retrait-de-ses-soldats-du-mali/>.

Algeria

26. As head of the international mediation team, Algeria took the first initiative to try to resolve the current tensions between the Government and the signatory armed groups. The current lack of trust between the parties to the Agreement is the result of a declaration made by Mr. Wagué at the forty-fifth session of CSA, held on 5 October 2021. In that declaration, he called upon all international partners not to interact with the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP) (Permanent Strategic Framework) (see para. 48 below). In response, on 7 October 2021, the signatory armed groups, which are members of CSP, issued a communiqué in which they condemned Mr. Wagué's statement and suspended their participation in the intra-Malian consultation framework (see annex VII), which the Panel, in its previous reports, has highlighted as a key mechanism for the implementation of the Agreement (see [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), paras. 30–34).

27. In an attempt to defuse the tensions, on 13 October 2021, the President of the Transitional Government, Assimi Goita, held a meeting with the leaders of some of the armed groups that are members of the framework.⁶ Mr. Wagué also attended the meeting, during which Mr. Goita called upon Mr. Wagué and the signatory armed groups to continue their collaboration. Subsequently, on 22 October 2021, the leadership of CSP and Mr. Wagué were invited to Algiers⁷ (see para. 49 below). All those meetings, however, failed to rebuild trust between the parties to the Agreement.

Niger

28. The Government of the Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and was chairing the organization at the time of the first coup d'état in Mali, in August 2020. As such, the Niger had limited engagement with the Government of Mali during the reporting period. ECOWAS imposed political and economic sanctions on Mali following the two coups d'état. The Government of the Niger has instead developed new initiatives along its borders with Mali and continued to enhance its interactions with Malian signatory armed groups. Since taking office in April 2021, the President of the Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, has met Malian signatory armed groups several times, most recently in March and April 2022. During the meetings, discussions revolved around CSP and the challenges facing the implementation of the Agreement and efforts to combat the terrorist groups.

29. The Niger has also intensified military operations on its border with Mali, where it has also made "repentance offers" to certain sections of extremist armed groups composed mostly of Fulani from the Niger. The Government of the Niger also continues to crack down on drug trafficking, regarded as a major source of income for extremist armed groups operating on the country's border with Mali. The Government of the Niger is also working to reduce the mobility of these groups, and of similar groups on the country's border with Burkina Faso, by tightly controlling access to fuel, including fuel for motorcycles, seen as the preferred means of transport for members of the above-mentioned groups. Measures taken by the Government include the closure of fuel stations in certain parts of the Tillabéri Region, a

⁶ The leaders included Bilal Ag Acherif, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, Guichma Ag Hakeily, Mohamed Ould Awainat, Mohamed Attayoub Sidibé and Attaye Ag Mohamed. See the communiqué of the communications unit of the Political Guidance Committee of CSP, issued in Ménaka on 16 October 2022. Available at <https://cadre-strategique.com/2021/10/16/cadre-strategique-permanent/>.

⁷ The delegation representing the signatory armed groups that are members of CSP included Fahad Ag Almahmoud, Alghabas Ag Intalla, Moulaye Ahmed Ould Moulaye, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, Ibrahim Ould Handa and Bilal Ag Acherif.

crackdown on fuel trafficking from Nigeria, and a ban on the use of motorcycles in certain areas.⁸

Mauritania, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Mbera refugee camp

30. During the reporting period, Mauritania focused on diplomacy and on security around the Mbera refugee camp as responses to the current political and security situation in Mali.

31. Mauritania is not a member of ECOWAS, and as such the country remained one of the few open supply routes to and from Mali. However, relations have been strained between the two countries following incidents in January and March 2022, related to the killing of over 30 Mauritanian citizens on Malian territory, allegedly by the Malian security and defence forces (see paras. 98–100 below). Following a visit by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, to Mauritania on 11 and 12 March 2022, the two Governments established a joint commission to investigate the incident of March 2022.⁹ The Panel was informed that the joint commission had carried out its activities, including site visits and interviews of victims and witnesses. The Panel has not received the conclusions of the investigation. The Panel understands from discussions with the authorities in Mauritania that the Government of Mali is fully committed to holding all those responsible for these killings legally accountable.

32. As host country of the Executive Secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Government of Mauritania has actively engaged in diplomatic dialogue with Mali over the latter's decision to withdraw from the Group. On 15 May 2022, the Government of Mali, through a public communiqué signed by the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Mr. Abdoulaye Maïga, announced its withdrawal from the G5 Sahel (see annex VIII). On 16 May 2022, the Government of Mali notified the Executive Secretariat of the G5 Sahel of its decision through a note verbale. The Government of Mauritania sent its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Mauritians Abroad, Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug, to Bamako on 20 May 2022, to engage in dialogue on the matter with the Government of Mali. The diplomatic efforts of Mauritania did not produce the expected result. On 14 June 2022, the General Staff of the Malian army informed the Commander of the G5 Sahel Joint Force of the decision of Mali to withdraw its troops from the Joint Force by 30 June 2022 (see annex IX). The G5 Sahel has since announced its decision to transfer the headquarters of the Joint Force from Bamako to Niamey.

33. The Panel notes that the G5 Sahel was devised to address the situation in Mali and that the country's withdrawal will disrupt the territorial continuity of operations between the two sectors (east and west) of the Joint Force. The withdrawal will also weaken regional capabilities against terrorist groups.

34. Mauritania continues to effectively manage the Mbera refugee camp on its border with Mali. The escalation of violence and attacks against civilian populations in Mali in the first half of 2022 (see paras. 90–95 below) prompted waves of new arrivals of Malian refugees at the camp, which remains a safe haven in terms of regional security. In March and April 2022 alone, the camp registered over 6,500 new Malian refugees, most of whom came from the Timbuktu Region, with smaller numbers from Ségou and Mopti.

⁸ Meeting with confidential sources, held in Niamey in April 2022.

⁹ The request of the Government of Mauritania for a joint investigation into the January 2022 incident was not granted by the Government of Mali, which, however, undertook to carry out a unilateral investigation into the incident.

35. The Panel also noted that some new Malian refugees arriving at the camp had travelled over 1,000 km, some from as far away as Libya and Burkina Faso. The Panel has previously highlighted violence committed against Malian refugees in the Mentao camp in the north of Burkina Faso, as a result of which many were forced to leave the camp (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 7–10). Some of those refugees are now reaching the Mbera camp. Since 2019, when the Panel last visited Mauritania (see [S/2019/636](#), paras. 159–162), the population of the Mbera camp has risen from 58,341 to 78,114, an increase of about 25 percent in three years.

Economic Community of West African States and the implementation of the Agreement

36. The role of ECOWAS is institutionally embedded in the Agreement and the Community has been instrumental in the Agreement's implementation.¹⁰ The Panel, however, has noted an apparent shift in the Community's focus since the second Malian coup d'état in May 2022. The Community now appears to be focusing on the duration of the transition and overlooking the implementation of the Agreement. This relatively recent approach on the part of ECOWAS contrasts with its earlier positions on Malian political crises before the coup d'état of 18 August 2020. Up to that point, ECOWAS had insisted that the political and institutional reforms provided for in the Agreement be part of the agenda of the transition. Political transitions and the implementation of the Agreement were thus considered to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

37. The final communiqué of the fourth Extraordinary Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, held in a virtual format on 27 July 2020 to review political developments in Mali, contained an explicit call for the accelerated implementation of the Agreement. ECOWAS also welcomed the Transition Charter, adopted by the Government of Mali on 12 September 2020, which included the implementation of the Agreement as a priority of the transition (see annex X). The signatory armed groups therefore saw an opportunity in the first transition and subsequently joined the transitional Government.

38. The approach of ECOWAS to the implementation of the Agreement following the second coup d'état of May 2021 has undergone a paradigm shift. ECOWAS continues to focus on elections in Mali and has not mentioned the Agreement in any of its communiqués since the coup (see the recommendation in para. 148 (a)).

B. Update on armed groups, and links between them and non-signatory armed movements

39. During the reporting period, the Panel noted the increasing importance of CSP. It observed, in particular, that the debate over CSP overshadowed discourse on the implementation of the Agreement.

Inception of the Cadre stratégique permanent

40. CSP was formally created in Bamako on 6 April 2021 by the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger, represented by Fahad Ag Almahmoud, and CMA, represented by its then President, Bilal Ag Acherif (see the photographs of the meeting contained in annex XI). As mentioned in the statement published that day, the goal of CSP is to coordinate efforts to implement the Agreement, operationalize joint mechanisms to fight insecurity and protect the population, encourage social

¹⁰ See article 58 of the Agreement. The Economic Community of West African States is a member of the Agreement Monitoring Committee.

cohesion activities and enhance understanding of the common aspirations of communities (see the statement in annex XII).

41. An attempt to create a coalition of armed groups, in the form of the *directoire*, had been made in 2019 (see S/2018/581, para. 69, S/2019/137, annex 32, and S/2019/636, paras. 68–73 and 90, for further details). The Minister of Malians Abroad and African Integration, and former Ambassador of Mali to the Niger, Alhamdou Ag Ilyène, was involved in that attempt. He is considered by interlocutors to be one of the main figures behind the creation of CSP.

42. In January and February 2021, leaders of Malian armed groups met in Rome for preliminary discussions on the creation of CSP, at the invitation of an Italian non-governmental organization (NGO), Ara Pacis Initiatives for Peace,¹¹ which took charge of all the logistical and financial aspects of the meeting, including transport from Bamako, meeting organization and accommodation.¹² Mr. Ag Ilyène attended the meeting.

43. On 6 May 2021, the two components of CSP (CMA and the Plateforme) met again in Rome. According to representatives of armed groups who were present, Ara Pacis again coordinated the meeting, which concluded with the signature of a joint declaration entitled the Rome Declaration (see annex XIII). In the communiqué of the meeting, the participants expressed their gratitude to the Government of Italy and Ara Pacis for offering an optimal setting for their discussions.¹³ They also established “une coalition politique et sécuritaire” (political and security coalition) to achieve the objectives of CSP.

44. On the Ara Pacis website, the Rome Declaration is portrayed as an “historic peace agreement signed in Rome between the Tuareg communities of Northern Mali (Azawad)”, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Luigi di Maio (see the photographs of the ceremony in annex XIV).¹⁴

45. During a meeting with the Italian authorities,¹⁵ the Panel was informed that meetings held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on 6 May 2021 had involved Mr. Ag Ilyène only. The discussions had focused solely on migration, in particular the *Projet d'appui à la réduction des migrations irrégulières et à la stabilisation au Mali* (PARMIS) (project to support the reduction of irregular migration and stabilization in Mali). On the same day, a joint declaration on the control of migration flows was signed by the two ministers, Mr. di Maio and Mr. Ag Ilyène (see S/2021/714, paras. 93 and 94).

46. The project is currently being implemented jointly by the International Organization for Migration and the Government of Mali. The authorities in Gao have already identified land on which the migrant centre will shortly be built.¹⁶ Italian authorities confirmed that the project was still being implemented in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration.¹⁷

¹¹ See the Ara Pacis website for more information: <https://arapacisinitiative.org/who-we-are/>.

¹² Meetings with representatives of armed groups held in March, April and June 2021.

¹³ In the Declaration, the participants express their gratitude to the Government of Italy and Ara Pacis “pour leurs initiatives et leurs efforts déployés dans le cadre de la stabilisation au Sahel en général et au Mali en particulier et pour nous avoir offert un cadre optimal qui nous a permis de parvenir à la structuration du cadre stratégique permanent au grand bénéfice de la stabilisation”.

¹⁴ See the webpage on the Rome Declaration at <https://arapacisinitiative.org/news/historic-peace-agreement-signed-in-rome-between-the-tuareg-communities-of-northern-mali-azawad/>.

¹⁵ Meeting with the Italian authorities, Rome, 17 September 2021.

¹⁶ Meeting with Malian authorities in Gao, 1 April 2022.

¹⁷ Meeting with Italian authorities, Rome, 24 June 2022.

Failed operationalization of the Cadre stratégique permanent

47. Pursuant to the meeting held in Rome in May 2021, two follow-up meetings were held in Kidal in an attempt to establish the institutional structures of CSP:

(a) A meeting held on 3 and 4 July 2021 was attended by hundreds of participants from all the components of CSP, delegations from Mauritania and the Niger, and a delegation of five Malian ministers led by Mr. Wagué.¹⁸ At the meeting, no permanent bodies were established and disagreement with the Government was thereby revealed, particularly regarding the leadership of CSP. The functions of the provisional board therefore had to be extended (see the final statement in annex XV);

(b) A meeting held from 17 to 19 September 2021 was not attended by government authorities, although they had been invited. CSP succeeded in establishing its political steering committee (see annex XVI). In its final statement, CSP raised concerns about, inter alia, the potential deployment in northern Mali of the non-conventional military forces known as the Wagner Group instead of the reconstituted army, as well as territorial restructuring (see annex XVII).

48. The disagreement with the Government on the recognition of, and cooperation with, CSP appeared more openly during the forty-fifth session of CSA, held on 5 October 2021 (see paras. 25 and 26 and annex VII). Mr. Wagué, in his speech at the session, requested the international community to ignore CSP as an interlocutor. In its communiqué, CSP recalled that the Government had been associated with the initiative since the beginning, and that Mr. Wagué had praised its inception during his speech in Kidal on 4 July 2021.

49. At the meeting held in October 2021 with Mr. Goita, the disagreement between the Government of Mali and CSP continued to grow (see the CSP communiqué in annex XVIII). The Government of Algeria attempted to mediate to resolve the differences, with no success. To that end, on 22 October 2021, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria and former President of CSA, Ramtane Lamamra, welcomed a delegation of signatory armed groups, in addition to Mr. Wagué, in Algiers (see annexes XIX to XXI).¹⁹

50. The differences reached a peak during the Assises Nationales de la Refondation (ANR) (National Refoundation Congress), held in December 2021. Both CSP and the Plateforme issued public communications boycotting ANR, indicating that the Government had excluded de facto signatory parties to the Agreement from organizing it (see annexes XXII and XXIII). In an interview with Renouveau TV on 16 December 2021, the spokesperson of CSP and Secretary-General of the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad of the Dawsahak (MSA-D), Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, explained that the boycott was the consequence of Mr. Wagué's hostile statement against CSP at the forty-fifth session of CSA and refusal to associate it with the organization of ANR.²⁰

¹⁸ The five ministers were the Minister of National Reconciliation, Peace and Social Cohesion, Ismaël Wagué, the Minister of Malians Abroad and African Integration, Alhamdou Ag Ilyène, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Mahmoud Ould Mohamed, the Minister of Sport and Civic Instruction, Mossa Ag Attaher, and the Minister of Communication and the Digital Economy, Harouna Touré.

¹⁹ The related note of the Algerian Press Service (see annex XIX) and the joint final communiqué of the delegation of Mali, which comprised representatives of the Government of Mali and CSP, (see annex XX), contained references only to leaders of signatory armed groups and not to CSP, whereas the spokesperson of CSP published two social media posts on the meeting (see annex XXI).

²⁰ Extracts from the full interview are available at <http://news.abamako.com/h/263908.html> (accessed on 30 June 2022).

Failed attempt to revive the Cadre stratégique permanent

51. Another meeting of CSP was held in Kidal on 15 and 16 January 2022, on the occasion of the Congress of the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad of CMA, but with no results. A further meeting was convened in Rome in February 2022, with wider representation than at the meetings held in 2021. It was attended by a representative of the Gao faction of MAA-Plateforme, Hanoune Ould Ali, and by Mr. Wagué.

52. Ara Pacis was responsible for facilitating the meeting and its logistical arrangements, which included a private jet (Dassault Falcon 900) to transport participants from Bamako. On 2 February 2022, Mr. Wagué, Bilal Ag Acherif and Hanoune Ould Ali, as well as the President of Ara Pacis, Maria Nicoletta Gaida, signed the Accord de principe de Rome (see annex XXV), in which the issue of the leadership of CSP was addressed; however, the document was not made public by the parties.²¹

53. On 2 February 2022, the Ministry of Reconciliation stated in a social media post that, on that day, Mr. Wagué had travelled to Italy, the facilitating country for discussions between the Malian State and CSP (see annex XXVI). On 4 February 2022, the spokesperson of CSP, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, issued a communiqué in which he stated that CSP congratulated the Government of Italy and Ara Pacis for their efforts to facilitate the talks, which had resulted in an agreement entered into by all parties (see annex XXVII).

54. On 6 February 2022, Mr. Wagué declared on the State television channel ORTM1 that the Government considered that it should lead CSP and did not accept the concept of a rotating presidency, which would make the Malian State a party to an entity led by a former rebel group. He mentioned that he had been invited to Rome to support the operationalization of CSP, in particular by resolving the issue of leadership.²²

55. The Government of Italy maintains that it had no official involvement in the organization and funding of the large gathering of Malian armed groups in Rome on 2 February 2022.²³ It considers the mediation of Ara Pacis in Mali to be part of the activities of Italian civil society and has expressed concern at being connected to an initiative of which it had no knowledge.

56. Two meetings of CSP followed, one in Talataye, Gao, on 7 March 2022, and another in Anéfis, Kidal, on 8 and 9 March 2022. In Anéfis, CSP changed its name to Cadre stratégique permanent pour la réconciliation (CSPR) (Permanent Strategic Framework for Reconciliation).²⁴ During a subsequent meeting, held in Gao on 16 and 17 March 2022, the question of the leadership of CSP was discussed. Once again, the differences between the positions of the Government of Mali and the signatory armed groups on that question could not be reconciled (see annex XXVIII for the draft communiqué of the Minister for Reconciliation). As a result of the disagreement, the presidency of CSPR was passed by Bilal Ag Acherif to Fahad Ag Almahmoud and the name reverted to Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP) (see annex XXIX for the final statement).

²¹ No copy of the signed agreement was available for two months, until it was unofficially released on social media by the President of CSP, Fahad Ag Almahmoud.

²² Video posted on 7 February 2022 and available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KhCC93iB38; see also an article from the Anadolu Agency, published on 7 February 2022 and available at <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/bamako-le-cadre-strat%C3%A9gique-permanent-nest-pas-une-partie-de-laccord-dalger/2495711>.

²³ Meeting with Italian authorities, Rome, 24 June 2022.

²⁴ The significance of adding “pour la réconciliation” to the name was to formalize the integration of the Government into CSP.

The Cadre stratégique permanent and the confrontation with Islamic State affiliates in the Ménaka Region

57. On 1 March 2022, groups affiliated with Islamic State reportedly assassinated a military commander of the Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad (MSA) (Movement for the Salvation of Azawad), Oumar Ag Badagat, in Eghaghi, a location south of Tamalelt, a village in the Ménaka Region, close to the border between Mali and the Niger. The killing was the signal for the launch of a major offensive of groups affiliated with Islamic State in the Ménaka Region. It followed a fatwa reportedly issued by Youssouf Ould Chouaib, who belongs to a fraction of the Arab community in Ménaka²⁵ and emerged, with his brother, Abouwahad, as leaders of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara after the death of Abou Walid al-Sahraoui.²⁶

58. The offensive targeted the Tuareg population and Tuareg armed groups, namely MSA-D and the Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA), predominantly composed of Imghad. The major villages in Mali along the border with the Niger faced the brunt of the attack. They included Inchinanane, Tamalelt and Anderamboukane in the Ménaka Region, and Talataye and I-n-Délimane in the Gao Region. The Malian Armed Forces had a military presence in Anderamboukane and I-n-Délimane until 2019. Hundreds of civilians were killed by Islamic State, according to an organization representing the Dawsahak community (see annex XXX).

59. CSP has failed to stand united in the face of confrontations in Ménaka, owing to disagreements. CSP has claimed that it was involved in combat as an entity only once. All armed confrontations have been claimed by the MSA-GATIA coalition against Islamic State. CMA, which is a component of CSP, continues to consider that it is the role of the reconstituted national army to combat terrorism. The disagreements led to the cancellation of the last planned meeting of CSP, scheduled for 30 May 2022 in Amassin, Kidal; no new date has been set.

The Cadre stratégique permanent and the implementation of the Agreement

60. Although CSP refers constantly in its communications to the Agreement, its inception and attempted operationalization took place outside the framework, institutions and mechanisms of the Agreement.

61. CSA, in the communiqué of its forty-third session, published on 29 June 2021, only mentioned CSP as a topic of interest for some armed movements. In the communiqués of its two most recent sessions (the forty-fourth and forty-fifth), it did not mention CSP at all. The limited references to CSP in the communiqués contrast with the debate on the topic at the forty-fifth session (see para. 49 above).

62. Mr. Wagué also recalled, in his press conference on 7 February 2022, following his participation in the discussions in Rome,²⁷ that all discussions related to the Agreement were held in CSA and the intra-Malian framework, under his leadership.

63. During meetings with the Panel, several observers and parties to the Agreement said that they considered that the Agreement implementing mechanisms, in particular CSA meetings, were now dependent on resolving the issue of the presidency of CSP. The Government, however, no longer wishes to be associated with CSP.²⁸ Designed

²⁵ On Youssouf Ould Chouaib, see the previous final report of the Panel (S/2021/714), para. 34 and footnote 21.

²⁶ Al-Sahraoui's death was announced on 16 September 2021 by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. On 22 March 2022, Islamic State-affiliated media started to refer to groups affiliated with Islamic State in the Sahel as the "Sahel province of the Islamic State". Available at <https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-Threat-Statements/using-new-sahel-province-designation-is-claims-attack-on-malian-army-base-in-gao.html>.

²⁷ See video posted on 7 February 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KhCC93iB38.

²⁸ Meeting between the Panel and Mr. Wagué on 8 April 2022.

outside the framework of the Agreement, without the involvement of the international mediation team or the United Nations, CSP now constitutes an additional layer to the existing structures created in accordance with the Agreement.

III. Information relevant to the potential designation of individuals or entities who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)

A. Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017)

Proceeds from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali

Organized crime

64. As the Panel has previously reported, competition over smuggling routes engenders violence, and poses a risk to the peace, security and stability of Mali. The involvement of signatory armed groups adversely affects the implementation of the Agreement. In the present section, the actors and the activities are examined in the context of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017). The general patterns are detailed below. The identification of networks and key players was not possible, as the short duration of the Panel's mandate and the Panel's limited access to Mali did not permit detailed enquiries.

Trafficking of narcotic drugs

65. Trafficking trends in the Sahel region have continued unabated. The Panel attempted to ascertain patterns and networks connected to armed groups operating in northern Mali whose activities might adversely affect the implementation of the Agreement. The Panel wrote to several countries in the region requesting information, and four Member States responded. Mali did not provide details of seizures or of the involvement of the signatory armed groups, or their individual members, in such trafficking.

66. One Member State provided an outline of the networks' operations, which involved nocturnal movements, and the use of vehicles without the required papers and drivers without identification documents. The Member State could not, however, provide details of the active networks in Mali.

67. Since 2020, one Member State has seized a total of over 19 tons of hashish destined for Mali. The Panel has requested further details of the seizures, with a view to identifying networks and individuals, and to verifying the seizures against those previously reported by the Panel.

68. On 6 January 2022, the police of the Niger made a major seizure of 214 kg of cocaine, which had entered the country from Gao, Mali, and was being transported to Libya.²⁹

69. With regard to Mali, the Panel obtained partial information, from a credible source, to the effect that cannabis, cocaine, heroin, pharmaceutical products, psychotropic substances and methamphetamines had been seized. The Office Central des Stupéfiants (OCS) (Central Counter-Narcotics Office), an agency under the Ministry of Security, has been making efforts to combat drug trafficking and has

²⁹ BBC, "Niger police seize record 200 kg of cocaine from mayor's car", 5 January 2022.

referred to several major seizures. During the general meeting between the Panel and a number of Malian authorities, OCS referred to seizures of 18 tons of cannabis in 2021, without specifying the country of origin. OCS also mentioned that consumption of the drug in mining areas had increased. The Office had also seized 7 tons of tramadol. The information is insufficient for any analysis.

70. Regional offices of OCS have been set up in Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti and Ménaka. The Kidal and Taoudenni offices are not operational. The authorities provided no details of the networks and did not respond to requests for further meetings.

71. In Gao, there is reportedly less movement of cannabis. On 20 April 2022, the Anti-Drug Brigade in Gao seized 120 kg of cannabis. There is reportedly increased movement of tramadol (a pharmaceutical product). In March 2022, the police of the Niger seized a consignment of tramadol valued at approximately 540 million CFA francs on the frontier between Mali and the Niger, south of Ménaka. No further details of the seizures are available.

72. The alliances between drug traffickers and armed groups (or individual members thereof) are well-established and affect peace, security and stability in the region. In Kidal, for instance, organized crime revolves around trafficking in drugs and migrants. The criminal networks have ties to individual members of CMA. The Panel received information regarding the continued involvement of Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001) in drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, as previously reported (see [S/2021/151](#), paras. 43 and 44). He provides escorts for convoys in his area of operations in the southern part of the Kidal Region, which comprises Takellout and Tassikt. It will be recalled that he is the military chief of staff of the breakaway Plateforme coalition.

Artisanal gold

73. Artisanal mining in northern Mali continues to be a focus of interest for the Panel, given its potential impact on the peace, security and stability of Mali and its connection with the following other activities:

- (a) The influx of people from other countries to work in the mines, contributing to irregular migration and the smuggling of migrants;
- (b) Exploitation of minors and women;
- (c) Revenue generation for compliant and terrorist armed groups;
- (d) Avenue for the investment of proceeds from other illicit activities;
- (e) Revenue generation for equipment suppliers and gold merchants;
- (f) Gold smuggling;
- (g) Armed conflict for control of the gold mining sites.

Financial implications for armed groups

74. CMA representatives explained that they take coordinated action for security in the areas that CMA controls.³⁰

75. In Kidal, the administration by armed groups is more advanced, with CMA playing a major role in administering the region. The situation is evident in the control of the gold mining sites, not only for the provision of security but also for administration and taxation. CMA has a mining unit and a finance unit. The Panel has learned from a reliable source that miners and gold merchants who operate at the sites must pay the finance unit in order to work there. The control that CMA exercises has already been reported by the Panel (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), paras. 121 and 122, and annex XIII).

³⁰ Meeting with CMA representatives, held on 31 March 2022.

76. The governance of mining and processing sites in the Kidal Region, including security, has previously been reported by the Panel as being handled by both CMA and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) (QDe.159), particularly in the Tessalit area (ibid.). Some leaders of CMA-Plateforme have mining and treatment sites in Tessalit, Tin Zaouatène and Igouzar.

77. Gao is an important hub for gold trading. Since 2019, major economic operators involved in the purchase of gold have established themselves in Gao, where CMA has a well-planned security set-up. CMA prepares eligibility criteria for checkpoints. Its representatives have emphasized that no armed persons are present at the gold sites. Checkpoints on all the routes that lead to the gold sites in Gao are manned by both CMA and the Plateforme, with a central command unit in control.

78. The government authorities stated that the Panel does not provide enough details about the illicit gold mining in the north. The Panel requested further details from the Government regarding the location of the sites, estimates of gold production there, the measures taken to combat such informal gold mining and the estimated revenue lost as a result of that mining. No response was received.

Trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

79. The north of Mali is a transit area for migrants coming from different countries through networks operating in West and sub-Saharan Africa. When the migrants arrive in the north of Mali, they either seek to settle down or move on towards Europe. Migration in the north of Mali therefore has widespread consequences for peace, security and stability in the region.

80. The networks operating in the border areas in the north of Mali have the advantage of knowing the geography of the region. Their income from trafficking funds other illegal activities. One particular area in which the networks are active is between In Khalil and Tin Zaouatène in the Kidal Region. The networks are also a source of revenue for most armed groups, including terrorist groups in Mali, particularly JNIM. Several Malian nationals have been arrested in a neighbouring country for trafficking in persons. No evidence, however, is forthcoming to link them to criminal networks in Mali.

81. Gao is a hub for migrants, whether as seasonal labour related to the gold mines, or as a point of transit to other destinations. According to information received by the Panel, after several arrests were made about three years ago, the traffickers now remain in the shadows. The influx of migrants brings with it attendant issues such as the sexual exploitation of women.

82. The Panel was unable to proceed further with enquiries regarding specific individuals involved in trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling (see [S/2021/714](#), paras. 88 to 92), in view of its restricted access to Mali.

B. Involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against the entities referred to in subparagraph (d) of paragraph 8 of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#)

83. Attacks on international forces, including MINUSMA, and on the Malian Armed Forces have intensified in the reporting period. The Panel notes that the attacks are intended to intimidate the forces into withdrawing, creating a safe haven for the movements and activities of members of terrorist and criminal groups. Illicit trade routes and control over gold mines are additional reasons for the groups to limit the presence of international and national forces. Of more concern to the Panel is the significance of the seizure, through attacks, of vehicles and weaponry. The acquisition

of those items is one of the principal reasons for the recent increase in such incidents, as it strengthens the capabilities of the terrorist groups to carry out their plans.

84. From the start of 2022, MINUSMA forces were attacked over 60 times, sometimes with improvised explosive devices, sometimes indirectly and sometimes directly.³¹ From 1 January to 30 April 2022, seven peacekeepers were killed.³² According to testimony received, including from military forces in MINUSMA, the latter are systematically a target of terrorist armed groups, who also attack other international forces and the Malian Armed Forces. The Panel spoke with several members of the MINUSMA forces, who described incidents involving attacks by terrorist armed groups.

85. Malian Armed Forces camps, units and positions were heavily targeted during the reporting period, leading to high numbers of casualties and injuries. From July 2021 to mid-May 2022, Malian Armed Forces were subject to 95 direct attacks by light arms and 102 attacks involving improvised explosive devices or indirect fire. The attacks killed 205 and injured 345.³³ The Panel was not able to verify the number of those killed.³⁴

C. Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, use and recruitment of children, and obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali

86. During the reporting period, the Panel observed that the stalled implementation of the Agreement had created a security vacuum and an enabling environment for grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. A context in which little was expected to be achieved through the Agreement, coupled with a perceived lack of trust among the parties, fostered more belligerent attitudes on all sides. Moreover, actions taken by all sides, including Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, to position themselves, gain control of territory through the use of force and prepare for the withdrawal of some components of the international forces further aggravated the situation.

87. Those actions resulted in an alarming rise in the number of civilian deaths; violence against civilians; attacks against humanitarian actors, international forces and the Malian Armed Forces; and the internal displacement and movement of persons and families across borders.

Violence against civilians/targeting civilians

88. Violence against civilians was a hallmark of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law throughout the reporting period. MINUSMA reported that, in the period from July to December 2021, the number of civilians

³¹ Confidential United Nations report.

³² See https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/stats_by_year_mission_incident_type_5a_74_april_2022.pdf.

³³ See the report of the Secretary General on the situation in Mali (S/2022/446). By way of comparison, during the period from 1 July 2020 to 15 May 2021, 87 direct attacks and 75 attacks involving improvised explosive devices and indirect fire were recorded, leaving 119 dead and 227 injured.

³⁴ The Panel has written to the Malian authorities for details of the attacks on the Malian Armed Forces and the resulting casualties. It has not received a response. The Panel has also been informed that extremist armed groups are purportedly targeting individuals, community leaders and entities that appear to have any connection with the Malian authorities or are perceived to support the Malian Armed Forces.

killed, injured or kidnapped/disappeared was 886, of whom 318 were killed.³⁵ In the following three months alone, from 1 January to 31 March 2022, MINUSMA registered a similar number of victims to that of the preceding six months: 812 civilians, of whom 543 were killed.³⁶ More than half of the victims were men, and most of the violations took place in the central regions of Mali.³⁷

89. The Panel investigated two situations of violence against civilians, which were emblematic of the pattern of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law observed in Mali throughout the reporting period. The first situation concerned violations committed during recent tensions and armed hostilities between compliant armed groups and extremist groups in the Ménaka and Gao Regions from February to June 2022. The second situation was focused on incidents in several locations in the Ségou Region throughout March 2022.

Tensions in Ménaka and Gao

90. Since early March 2022, armed hostilities have broken out in the Ménaka Region between groups affiliated with Islamic State and the GATIA-MSA-D coalition. The hostilities have been aggravated by the security vacuum linked to the stalled implementation of the Agreement and the differences among the component armed groups of CSP (see paras. 57 to 59 above).

91. Attacks on GATIA-MSA-D positions by groups affiliated with Islamic State began on 8 March 2022 in the village of Tamalelt, in Anderamboukane *cercle*. They were followed by a series of attacks and direct confrontations between the compliant armed groups and groups affiliated with Islamic State on 12 March in the villages of Inchinanane and Anderamboukane. Confrontations also took place from 21 to 22 March in Inchinanane and Intakorè. The hostilities left an estimated 229 civilians dead.³⁸ Between 21 and 23 March, a number of villages in the commune of Talataye, in the Gao Region, were attacked by extremist elements, leading to the death of an estimated 100 civilians. Moreover, from February 2022, hostilities broke out near Tessit, where people in the villages of Keygourouten, Khadji, Bakal and Abagazgaz faced a campaign of intimidation. Many civilians fled for protection to other towns, especially those where the Malian Armed Forces are present, including Tessit and Gao.

92. The hostilities led to the large-scale displacement of civilians to other parts of the Ménaka Region, as well as to the Gao and Kidal Regions, while others fled across the border to the Niger. Attacks continue at the time of writing. Most recently, on 12 June 2022, groups affiliated with Islamic State carried out an attack on the village of Izingaz, in Tidermene *cercle*, and allegedly summarily executed 22 civilians.

³⁵ MINUSMA, “Note sur les tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l’homme et au droit humanitaire international au Mali, 1er juillet–31 décembre 2021”, March 2022; and “Note trimestrielle sur les tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l’homme au Mali, 1er janvier–31 mars 2022”, 30 May 2022.

³⁶ MINUSMA, “Note trimestrielle sur les tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l’homme au Mali, 1er janvier–31 mars 2022”, 30 May 2022.

³⁷ In the period from 1 July to 31 December 2021, JNIM and Islamic State were responsible for 570 human rights violations, community and self-defence groups were responsible for 223, signatory armed groups were responsible for 46, and the Forces de défense et de sécurité maliennes (FDSM) (Malian Defence and Security Forces) were responsible for 40. In the period from 1 January to 31 March 2022, JNIM and Islamic State were responsible for 410 violations of human rights, community and self-defence groups were responsible for 15, signatory armed groups were responsible for 12, and FDSM were responsible for 320. See footnotes 35 and 36.

³⁸ Confidential United Nations source. The Panel could not independently verify the number of deaths, since numbers of deaths are usually cited by one side of the conflict or the other. As a show of strength, and to avoid accusations of human rights abuses, both sides claim that dead civilians were in fact combatants, or that dead combatants were in fact civilians.

93. The Panel was told by witnesses that civilians were visited more than once by members of extremist groups, who burnt their crops and stole their cattle. Communities were given 24 hours to leave their homes or be killed. Those who did not leave were killed in the following days. People who returned to search for property or retrieve the bodies of dead family members suffered the same fate. Civilians were targeted by opposing parties on suspicion of being affiliated with one side or the other.

94. CMA indicated to the Panel that, following an attack by groups affiliated with Islamic State on a Malian Armed Forces camp in Tessit on 21 March 2022, the latter allegedly retaliated on 26 March 2022 by attacking a group of displaced persons in Ansongo. The Panel was informed that some of those injured in the attack, including a child, were treated in a hospital in the region.

95. Violence against civilians can be attributed to direct hostilities, especially in Ménaka, as described in paragraphs 90 and 91 above. Other incidents, however, are the result of intimidation of communities to compel them to affiliate themselves with a specific group. Intercommunal differences are an ongoing source of tension. Several individuals interviewed by the Panel expressed their fear of retaliation by one party or the other, on the basis of ethnic identity. In Ménaka, reprisal killings and intimidation occurred between the Dawsahak and Imghad communities, perceived as supportive of the GATIA-MSA-D coalition, and Fulani and Iboguilitane communities, seen as being allied with the groups affiliated with Islamic State. While incidents attributed to GATIA-MSA-D have also been reported, specifically in the Ménaka Region, the Panel has not been able to verify them.

96. Given the stalled implementation of the Agreement, the Panel fears that JNIM and groups affiliated with Islamic State will continue to expand their areas of influence, at the expense of the compliant armed groups. In this context, violence against civilians in the Regions of Ménaka and Gao may constitute a policy intended to force populations into displacement or submission, as well as to reinforce the financial capabilities of JNIM and the Islamic State affiliates.

Violence against civilians in the Ségou Region

97. Throughout the reporting period, the Panel received allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed by the Malian Armed Forces against civilians, especially in the central regions of Ségou and Mopti. Allegations included the targeting of civilians, summary executions, beatings, intimidation and pillage. Such violations persistently surfaced in the wake of Malian Armed Forces counter-terrorism operations or following an attack on their camps, units or positions (see para. 94 above).

98. Though the Panel could not undertake site visits, it received several testimonies related to operations carried out by the Malian Armed Forces in the central regions of Mali from the beginning of 2022. These accounts suggest a repeated pattern of conduct whereby local markets are targeted for such operations. Markets are surrounded to prevent anyone from leaving; those who run or try to escape are shot. One witness told the Panel that it is common knowledge that one should not run if the Malian Armed Forces appear on market day and that there is a chance of surviving if one keeps still. Cellular telephones and personal possessions are taken. Men who are present at the market are singled out, and questioned on the spot or detained. They are either released later or disappear, with accounts suggesting that ethnicity may play a role in determining who is set free following arrest.

99. On 5 and 6 March 2022, the Malian Armed Forces allegedly carried out a series of operations near the border with Mauritania.³⁹ According to testimony received by the Panel, six inhabited locations were targeted over the two days, including Robinet El Ataye (Nara *cercle*, Ségou Region). A group of “white-skinned soldiers” arrived in Robinet El Ataye at 8.30 a.m. on 5 March. Robinet El Ataye is the site of a well frequented by Mauritians who traditionally cross the border in search of pasture for cattle. Herders from nearby villages in the region also visit the well.

100. The soldiers proceeded to round up the men and older boys, tied their hands behind their backs and blindfolded them. The men and older boys were then gathered in the central area of the village. The women and children were told to go into their homes and not to watch. The soldiers then reportedly stripped the houses of all possessions, including bedding, cellular phones, jewellery, cooking utensils and clothing.

101. At 11 a.m., a group of Malian Armed Forces soldiers arrived in the village. They started beating the bound and blindfolded men with the heavy sticks used by the herders on their flocks. The women could not leave their homes, as there were soldiers blocking the doors. They could only hear the screams of the men as they were beaten. The Malian Armed Forces soldiers then released some of the younger men and carried off 33 or 34 men, comprising 29 Mauritians and 4 Malians (Tuareg). The “white-skinned soldiers” left at 2 p.m.

102. The women waited for the return of the men, but were notified by relatives a day later that the men’s bodies had been found 4 km away. The men had been shot and then burnt. An eyewitness who saw the bodies two days later claimed that they were covered in a dark substance that could not be identified. According to testimony, it appears that the executions were carried out at 1 p.m.

103. A similar pattern of pillage and beatings occurred at the five other locations. It was, however, only in Robinet El Ataye that civilians were killed. In two other locations visited by the Malian Armed Forces, a helicopter carrying “white-skinned soldiers” allegedly landed at the beginning of the operations. The Panel’s sources could not identify the name or rank of any of the perpetrators, or the camp from which they came.

104. Testimony received by the Panel reveals a sense of insecurity experienced by civilians living in the Ségou Region owing to intimidation by both extremist armed groups and the Malian Armed Forces. Many witnesses described visits to their villages by extremists searching for individuals whom they perceived to be affiliated with the Government. The extremists resorted to killing, pillaging, burning fields, stealing cattle, enforcing moral codes and attire, and extorting funds, with the aim of intimidating local people into submission. The extremists target the Malian Armed Forces camps in particular, which leads to a cycle of reprisals and further violations of human rights. The Government has announced that it is carrying out its own investigations into several incidents involving human rights violations (see the recommendation in para. 148 (b)).⁴⁰

³⁹ See para. 31 above for the regional implications of the incident. Mauritanian officials have so far provided restitution to the families of 17 individuals.

⁴⁰ See <https://www.maliweb.net/insecurite/le-gouvernement-du-mali-reagit-a-la-note-trimestrielle-de-la-minusma-ces-allegations-sont-faussees-et-sont-de-nature-a-discrediter-les-fama-respectueuses-des-droits-de-lhomme-2978430.html>. Attempts to carry out independent investigations, whether by MINUSMA or other organizations, were not permitted by the Government at several sites, especially in Moura, in the *cercle* of Djenné in the Mopti Region, where Malian Armed Forces allegedly killed a significant number of civilians over from 27 to 31 March 2022.

Displacement and population movement

105. Significant population movements took place during the reporting period, both internally and out of the country. By the end of May 2022, the number of internally displaced persons had reached 370,548. On a similar note, by April 2022, the number of Malians crossing the border to Mauritania (the Mbera camp) had reached 8,820, while the number crossing into the Niger had reached 14,225.⁴¹ These movements were motivated either by conflict or by economic or humanitarian reasons.

106. While the number of internally displaced persons does not differ greatly from the 2021 average, the Panel notes that forced displacement has resulted from the alleged incidents of violence against civilians described in paragraphs 90 to 103 above. It also observes that the movement of such persons in the tri-border area has been driven by acts designed to force populations to leave (see para. 96 above).

107. The tensions in the Ménaka Region from March 2022 led to large-scale displacement; internally displaced persons moved towards the town of Ménaka, and the towns of Gao and Ansongo in the Gao Region. The tensions have also led to the cross-border movement into the Niger of both Malians seeking refuge and Nigerien returnees. In the town of Ménaka, the number of internally displaced persons reached 54,000, in addition to 16,000 refugees from the Niger. On the border with Mauritania, the numbers of asylum-seekers increased in March and April 2022 (see para. 34 above).

108. Internally displaced persons, particularly women and children, are faced by several protection challenges (see para. 116 below). The Panel remains concerned about the security and humanitarian implications of the large numbers of displaced persons in the town of Ménaka.

Recruitment and use of children

109. From the beginning of 2022, 447 grave violations against children were committed, of which 294 were related to recruitment and use. As of March 2022, 1,731 schools were closed owing to insecurity, mostly in the central and northern regions.⁴² In April 2022, 65 per cent of schools were reportedly closed owing to threats by terrorist armed groups.⁴³ In the Ménaka Region, it is estimated that 60 per cent of internally displaced persons are children. In particular, there are 131 separated children and 8 unaccompanied children among the internally displaced persons.⁴⁴ In March and April 2022, the United Nations Children's Fund assisted 93 children associated with armed groups and forces (14 per cent of them were girls).⁴⁵

110. While the Panel was unable to independently verify the above figures, it notes that there is a growing risk for children in the context of increased belligerency in Mali. Given the number of children who are out of school, the rates of internal displacement, the large numbers of unaccompanied minors and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, it is the Panel's assessment that the recruitment and use of children will grow significantly in the months to come.

111. The Panel continued to receive information on the work of minors in the artisanal gold mines in the northern regions of Mali (see S/2021/714, paras. 139 to 147). An

⁴¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Operational update: Niger, April 2022".

⁴² United Nations Children's Fund, "Mali: humanitarian situation report No. 2", 30 April 2022.

⁴³ Cluster Education Mali, compte-rendu de la réunion mensuelle d'avril 2022. Available at <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/operations/mali/document/mali-compte-rendu-r%C3%A9union-mensuelle-du-cluster-education-avril-2022>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

estimated one third of those working in the mines are children.⁴⁶ The dangers they face persist, including exposure to hazardous chemicals, life-threatening activities such as entering into tight spaces to extract gold, becoming targets for recruitment, and being exposed to many forms of violence and abuse. The Panel has been informed that at least one child has been killed and several injured since the beginning of the year owing to the activities in the mines in the Gao Region.

112. The Panel was informed of the presence of a large number of unaccompanied foreign minors, a phenomenon that may be connected with the opportunity of working in the artisanal gold mines. Many of the children arrive from Burkina Faso, where it seems easier to cross the border and recent tensions have forced people to look for economic opportunities elsewhere.⁴⁷ The Panel was also informed that 14 unaccompanied foreign minors who had been involved in mining had been assisted by NGOs in Gao in 2021.

113. The Panel was informed by representatives of CMA, who exert some control over the Intehaka gold site (see paras. 72–80 above), that they recognized the scale of the human rights violations, including the use of children, and the deaths that were occurring at the sites. The representatives assured the Panel that they were drafting an action plan to limit the violations. The Panel is not aware of further developments in that regard.

Sexual and gender-based violence

114. Sexual and gender-based violence, especially conflict-related sexual violence, increased markedly throughout the reporting period. In 2021, the Gender-based Violence Information Management System of the United Nations Population Fund⁴⁸ recorded 9,450 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, compared with 6,605 cases in 2020. While the increase may be linked to increasing insecurity, forced displacement and the deteriorating humanitarian context, it may also be due to increased reporting by victims or access to humanitarian actors.

115. The System also registered 1,153 cases of conflict-related sexual violence in 2021, as compared with 1,020 cases in 2020.⁴⁹ Of the survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, 98 per cent are women and 51 percent are girls under the age of 18. The remaining 2 per cent are men, more than half of them under the age of 18. Among the regions in the centre and north of Mali, Mopti has the highest incidence, accounting for 28 per cent of the total number of cases, while Timbuktu accounts for 16 per cent and Gao and Ménaka account for 18 per cent. The main alleged perpetrators of the incidents were terrorist armed groups (71 per cent), compliant armed groups (26 per cent) and the Malian Armed Forces (2 per cent).

116. The Panel has received information regarding several incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. It has not been able to verify the events. The Panel has nonetheless noted that violence against women is used or threatened, in conjunction with other forms of intimidation by terrorist armed groups, in order to force communities into submission or displacement. That has been especially visible in the context of recent tensions in the Gao and Ménaka Regions (see paras. 90 to 95 above). Humanitarian actors and local interlocutors familiar with the situation in the two

⁴⁶ Confidential interview.

⁴⁷ In May 2022, 72 per cent of those crossing the borders of Mali were from Burkina Faso, and 4 per cent were unaccompanied minors (International Organization for Migration, June 2022).

⁴⁸ United Nations Population Fund, “Rapport annuel du Gender-based Violence Information Management System, janvier–décembre 2021”, Bamako. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/rapport-annuel-gbvims-janvier-d-cembre-2021>.

⁴⁹ MINUSMA, through its system of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, has documented 47 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, of which 24 involved girls and 4 involved men, in the Regions of Gao, Mopti, Ménaka, Ségou and Timbuktu.

regions have informed the Panel that communities have received threats of kidnapping of women, or of rape or forced marriage,⁵⁰ unless they leave their villages. Violations committed in tandem with those threats have been documented by humanitarian actors. They include cases of rape, kidnapping of girls and women, and the inflicting of physical harm. Many women have been left destitute, with their husbands killed, and their homes pillaged and burned. Pregnancies resulting from rape have been documented among internally displaced persons in both the Gao and Ménaka Regions.

117. The situation for internally displaced persons in the Gao and Ménaka Regions poses its own risks for women and girls. The humanitarian and security situation, in addition to the loss of the household breadwinner, has created a context in which women may resort to negative coping mechanisms and are exposed to further risks of violations. The Panel has been informed that 30 per cent of all displaced women in the town of Gao may have experienced sexual and gender-based violence, mostly during and after displacement. The Panel has also been informed that, among the population of internally displaced persons, women and girls are resorting to prostitution.⁵¹ Meanwhile, girls are not going to school and are therefore at greater risk of early or forced marriages.

Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali

118. The humanitarian situation in Mali remains of great concern. A total of 12 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022, a sharp increase from 5.9 million in 2021.⁵² The most affected sector is food security, with 1.9 million people, constituting 22 per cent of the country's total population, facing the threat of acute malnutrition in 2022 during the lean season, from June to August.⁵³ Armed conflict and security concerns have exacerbated the already severe humanitarian challenges faced by vulnerable populations.

119. During the reporting period, the Panel did not observe any acts that constituted direct obstruction of humanitarian assistance. Several interlocutors praised the cooperation of national and local authorities regarding humanitarian assistance. Lack of access or limited access to humanitarian assistance owing to security concerns and active hostilities, including in the Region of Ménaka,⁵⁴ were mentioned by all the humanitarian actors with which the Panel spoke. Such circumstances reduce the capacity of humanitarian actors and agencies to carry out the evaluations necessary to assess needs. The Panel was informed of recent instructions by the Malian authorities mandating 72 hours of advance notice before MINUSMA operations and force movements. The matter was raised in the context of a request from MINUSMA in March 2022, concerning a humanitarian mission.

⁵⁰ Humanitarian actors have observed the phenomenon of terrorist groups kidnapping or demanding girls in marriage as a form of payment in return for protection or as a tax instead of money and cattle.

⁵¹ The Panel has previously documented the abuse of migrant women, especially girls, through forced prostitution (see S/2021/714, paras. 90–92).

⁵² United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Mali humanitarian response plan, January–December 2022 (January 2022)", 22 February 2022. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-humanitarian-response-plan-january-december-2022-january-2022>.

⁵³ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Cadre harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations vulnérables au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest", 8 December 2021. Available at [mali_fiche_de_communication_novembre_2021_vf_revue08122021_final_0.pdf](https://mali.fiche_de_communication_novembre_2021_vf_revue08122021_final_0.pdf) (fscluster.org) (accessed in February 2022). Most of the areas facing crises are in the north and centre of Mali.

⁵⁴ Humanitarian agencies currently have very limited access outside Ménaka town.

120. The Panel notes that humanitarian and human rights actors are carrying out their tasks in a general atmosphere of fear and intimidation owing to the security situation. Interlocutors cited concerns over being targeted by extremist and criminal groups, especially since such targeting could also lead to attacks on the assisted populations. Sixty incidents of targeting of humanitarian actors and workers have been reported since the beginning of 2022, including killing, kidnapping, pillage and intimidation.⁵⁵ The Panel was informed of several incidents against humanitarian actors, including the kidnapping of NGO staff working in one of the northern regions of Mali. The staff were released after a few days (see the recommendation in para. 148 (c)).

IV. Implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban

121. Eight individuals have been designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, of whom three are subject to the travel ban and five are subject to both the asset freeze and the travel ban. The Panel interviewed the following three of the eight individuals:⁵⁶ Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003), Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) and Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008) (see annex XXXI).

A. Violations of the measures

122. In previous reports ([S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 47, [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 128, and [S/2021/151](#), paras. 10 and 12), the Panel has pointed out a number of violations of the travel ban.

123. The Panel has previously reported that it was told by the representative of Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) that Mahri had violated the travel ban in March 2020 (see [S/2020/785/Rev.1](#), para. 128). The violation has since been confirmed by the Mauritanian authorities. The following new information on other violations of the travel ban in preceding years has been received:

(a) Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007) travelled to Mauritania from 14 to 16 March and 16 to 30 October 2020. Cash payments were made for the tickets. Two different passports were used. One is being verified;

(b) Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008) travelled to Mauritania from 27 to 30 October 2020. A cash payment was made for the tickets. Passport details are being verified;

(c) Both individuals are also subject to the asset freeze.

124. The Panel has confirmed that the following two designated individuals have also violated the travel ban during the current mandate:

(a) Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003) was in Mauritania from 7 to 11 February 2022. He attended the second African Conference for Peace, held in Nouakchott. The event was convened by the Abu Dhabi Forum for Peace. His attendance was confirmed by the authorities of two Member States. The Panel requested the authorities of the United Arab Emirates to give details of the Conference and confirm the participation of the said individual. No response was received. In a meeting with the Panel in March 2022, Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune also

⁵⁵ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Indignation et condamnation des attaques contre les travailleurs humanitaires", 2 June 2022 (accessed on 30 June 2022). The figure of 60 incidents since the beginning of 2022 may be compared to the figure of 145 incidents reported for 2021.

⁵⁶ As previously reported by the Panel, Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daba (MLi.006) is deceased.

confirmed his attendance at the Conference and added that his expenses had been paid by the Forum. The Panel has received confirmation from another source that the ticket was paid for in the United Arab Emirates;

(b) The Panel has established the following violations of the travel ban by Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007):

(i) He travelled to Mauritania from 7 to 11 February 2022. The tickets were paid for in cash;

(ii) He travelled to the Niger in April 2022. The airline concerned confirmed his travel from Mali to Niamey via Lomé on 2 April 2022. One official source in the Niger also confirmed that Mahri had been present during the meetings between the delegations of the Malian armed groups and the authorities in the Niger. No official response has been received from the authorities of the Niger to the Panel's request for information;

(iii) He travelled to Saudi Arabia on an umrah visa, remaining there from 7 April to 9 May 2022. He travelled via Ethiopia. The authorities of Saudi Arabia informed the Panel that he was included in the travel ban list under a passport number recorded in the Security Council Consolidated List, but that he had entered the country under a different passport number.

125. The above information demonstrates that the travel ban is being regularly violated. The Panel notes that the efforts made by Member States are mostly inadequate and ineffective in implementing the travel ban.

126. The provisions for obtaining exemptions from the travel ban are clearly set out in the guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work. The Panel has previously highlighted the requirement that an exemption request be submitted for the Committee's approval sufficiently in advance of the proposed travel. That requirement was reiterated to the designated individuals with whom the Panel held meetings. A copy of the guidelines was handed to Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri, who expressed his intention to travel shortly to Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.

127. It is understood that, in April 2022, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri submitted an exemption request to the Committee. The request concerned travel for medical purposes to Türkiye and for religious purposes (umrah) to Saudi Arabia.

B. Identification of assets

128. In accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, must be frozen. Exemptions from and exceptions to the asset freeze are detailed in paragraphs 5 to 7 of the resolution, and the related procedures are elaborated in the Committee guidelines.⁵⁷

129. Some details of bank accounts of Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri were previously obtained and reported by the Panel (see [S/2021/714](#), paras. 112 to 114). He informed the Panel, in March 2022, that he had disposed of, and received compensation for, his shares in Tilemsi Holding in 2019. He had then bought three properties, two in Gao and one in Bamako, and had kept some of his compensation in the form of cash. In 2020, he had established another company, Groupe Sahélien, which, according to him,

⁵⁷ See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/2374_mali_committee_guidelines_en.pdf.

was not yet operational. He was currently occupied in trade activities and informed the Panel of his approximate monthly income. The Panel is unable to confirm the veracity of his statements, in the absence of any documentary proof.

130. Mohamed Ould Mataly informed the Panel that he owned two residential properties, one in Bamako and the other in Gao. He confirmed that he still functioned as a special adviser to the President of the National Transitional Council. Contrary to what he had previously told the Panel (see [S/2021/714](#), para. 114), he confirmed receipt of monthly remuneration from the Government of Mali in that capacity.

131. As previously reported (see [S/2019/137](#), para. 55), Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini (MLi.005) was reinstated as a public schoolteacher by the Government of Mali in September 2017. In that capacity, he receives a salary from the Government of Mali.

132. The Panel has previously reported on remuneration received by Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003) from the Government of Mali (see [S/2021/151](#), para. 14, and [S/2021/714](#), paras. 48, 115 and 116).

133. The Panel has previously taken up the issue of government payments to the sanctioned individuals with the Government of Mali, both during meetings with the authorities and in written communications (see [S/2021/151](#), para. 13). During the reporting period, the Panel requested information from the Government of Mali on what measures had been taken to obtain details of funds, other financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled by the five individuals subject to the asset freeze, and any consequential action to freeze those assets and resources. The Panel further requested the following:

- (a) Confirmation of ownership of immoveable property and shares in companies, as revealed by Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri and Mohamed Ould Mataly;
- (b) Measures taken by the Government to freeze any remuneration that it is paying to any of the individuals.

134. The Panel is awaiting a response to the above-mentioned requests for information. It notes that there has been no effective implementation of the asset freeze by the Government of Mali.

C. Updates on designated individuals

135. The Panel possesses additional identifying information for the following individuals:

- (a) MLi.007 Name: 1: MOHAMED 2: BEN 3: AHMED 4: MAHRI, passport No. AA0344148, date of issue: 21 March 2019 (date of expiration: 20 March 2024);
- (b) MLi.008 Name: 1: MOHAMED 2: OULD 3: MATALY 4: na, passport No. AA0260156, date of issue: 3 August 2018 (date of expiration: 2 August 2023). Address: Almoustarat, Gao, Mali.

D. Actions taken for the effective implementation of the travel ban and asset freeze

136. The effective implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban depends on the following factors:

- (a) Enabling legal provisions and administrative procedures in Member States;

(b) Suitable monitoring mechanisms in financial institutions and entities in the transport sector, such as airlines and shipping lines;

(c) Monitoring, sensitization and proper dissemination of information on sanctions measures by national authorities;

(d) Outreach by the Committee to Member States to ensure effective implementation.

137. With a view to assessing the efficacy of the implementation of the measures imposed in resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), the Panel addressed 12 requests to several Member States in the region. Only four responses were received. The essential elements are the following:

(a) One Member State verified and confirmed that none of the sanctioned individuals had travelled to its territory;

(b) One Member State has issued directives to financial institutions to freeze any assets in the name of the designated individuals. The institutions are monitoring for any attempts to circumvent the sanctions regime;

(c) One Member State indicated that the authorities had blocked the entry of the designated individuals into its territory.

138. The Panel has been informed that ECOWAS disseminates information to its member States on various United Nations sanctions regimes but has no institutional legal framework for application.

139. On the basis of the responses received from the four Member States who responded to the Panel's request for information on the implementation of the measures, the Panel notes that specific legal provisions and institutions have been established for the implementation of Security Council sanctions regimes related to terrorism.

140. Other Member States consulted by the Panel have national coordination systems or administrative procedures for the implementation of the sanctions regime overseen by the Committee, with no verifiable legal provisions for implementation or monitoring.

141. In Mali, a national commission for the freezing of funds and other financial resources related to terrorism was created in April 2015, but has yet to start functioning. On the basis of the Panel's discussions with authorities, there appears to be no specific legal framework to implement the Security Council sanctions regime established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#). In addition, the Panel was not informed of any administrative instructions in place for the purposes of such implementation, although it had made a specific request for such information. The matter has also been dealt with in an earlier report (see [S/2020/158/Rev.1](#), para. 44).

142. Member States are required to take the necessary measures for the implementation and enforcement of the travel ban and asset freeze, in accordance with various Security Council resolutions. In accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), they are further required to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures. The fact that designated individuals can still travel freely reflects the current level of implementation (see the recommendation in para. 148 (d)).

143. In 2021, the Panel reported on information provided by the Government of Mali on certain bank accounts of designated individuals (see [S/2021/714](#), paras. 112 and 113). There is no record of the accounts having been frozen. The Government of Mali has not yet responded to the Panel's request regarding the identification and freezing of assets of the designated individuals.

144. In the absence of domestic legislation on, and effective monitoring of, attempts to circumvent the asset freeze and travel ban, the effective implementation of those measures is not assured (see the recommendation in para. 148 (e)).

145. The Panel appreciates the Member States that responded to requests for information, especially on violations of the travel ban. Such responses enable the Panel to assess the effectiveness of the measures and assist the Committee in improving implementation and overcoming challenges in that regard. The Panel notes, in some cases, a lack of awareness of the implications of non-compliance with the travel ban and asset freeze measures, whether by government authorities, designated individuals or other parties, in relation to paragraphs 3 and 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017).

146. The Panel explained the exemption and delisting procedures to the designated individuals with whom it held meetings. It observed, however, that the individuals could not always grasp the procedures for applying or the necessity of doing so sufficiently in advance.

147. The lack of awareness described above exists despite the clear provisions in paragraphs 1 to 7 of resolution 2374 (2017) and the guidelines of the Committee on the conduct of its work. The situation reinforces the need for greater outreach, wider dissemination of information up to the operational level, outreach to the private sector and the identification of remedial measures (see the recommendation in para. 148 (f)).

V. Recommendations

148. The Panel recommends that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali:

(a) Encourage ECOWAS to continue paying attention to the implementation of the Agreement in its engagement on the situation in Mali (see para. 37);

(b) Encourage the Government of Mali to conduct impartial and independent investigations into violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and bring the perpetrators to justice (see para. 103);

(c) Encourage the Government of Mali to take measures to ensure the security of humanitarian actors in order to enable them to conduct their mission of providing humanitarian assistance (see para 119);

(d) Provide specific guidance to the Member States on the procedures for applying for exceptions to and exemptions from the travel ban and asset freeze, as well as the procedures to be followed should a violation of the travel ban come to light (see para. 141);

(e) Encourage those Member States that do not have appropriate domestic legislation to give effect to the Security Council sanctions regimes to introduce such legislation as soon as possible (see para. 143);

(f) Consider strengthening dialogue with interested Member States, in particular those in the region, in order to identify information gaps and report capacity-building requirements in the context of the implementation of the sanctions measures (see para. 146);

(g) Update the sanctions list with the additional identifying information (see para. 135).

Annexes

VI. Annexes

Contents	page
Annex 1	Abbreviations and Acronyms
Annex 2	Methodology and opportunity to reply
Annex 3	List of visits, organizations, individuals
Annex 4	Panel Correspondence records
Annex 5	Communique of the Etat-Major on special recruitment
Annex 6	Letter of Bilal
Annex 7	CSP communique of 7 October 2021
Annex 8	Communique announcing Mali's withdrawal from G5-Sahel.
Annex 9	Letter of the Etat-Major
Annex 10	Transition Charter
Annex 11	Photographs of founding meeting of the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP) in Bamako on 5-6 April 2021
Annex 12	Statement signed on 6 April 2021 on the creation of the Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP).
Annex 13	Rome Declaration
Annex 14	Photographs of signing ceremony of the Rome declaration on 6 May 2021
Annex 15	Final statement of CSP meeting in Kidal on 4 July 2021
Annex 16	List of members of the political steering committee of the CSP
Annex 17	Final statement of CSP meeting in Kidal on 19 September 2021
Annex 18	CSP communiqué on meeting with President of the Transition Government, Assimi Goïta on 13 October 2021
Annex 19	Press note dated 23 October 2021 of the Algerian press service
Annex 20	Joint communiqué of Mali delegation regarding meeting with Algerian authorities on 23 October 2021
Annex 21	Posts on social media by CSP spokesperson regarding CSP visit to Algeria
Annex 22	CSP statement concerning boycott of the National refoundation meeting
Annex 23	Information note of the Plateforme regarding the ANR
Annex 24	Photographs of the Rome Agreement.
Annex 25	Rome agreement-in-principle signed on 2 February 2022
Annex 26	Social media post on 2 February 2022 from the Reconciliation Ministry
Annex 27	CSP communiqué issued on 4 February 2022 on Rome meeting
Annex 28	Draft communiqué of the Reconciliation Minister on 17 March 2022
Annex 29	Final statement of the meeting of the CSP in Gao on 17 March 2022
Annex 30	Communiqué dated 15 April 2022 of the Daoussak community
Annex 31	Interviews with designated individuals.

Annex 1**Abbreviations and acronyms**

ANR	National Refoundation Congress (Assises Nationale de Refondation)
Agreement Committee	Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali
CMA	Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad
CNT	National Transitional Council (Conseil National de Transition)
CSA	Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de Suivi de l'Accord)
CSP	Permanent Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique Permanent)
CSP-R	Permanent Strategic Framework-Reconciliation
CSRV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
Council	United Nations Security Council
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
FAMa	Forces Armées Maliennes
GATIA	le Groupe d'Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés
G-5 Sahel	The Group of Five for the Sahel
HCUA	Le Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices.
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ISGS	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
JNIM	<i>Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin</i>
Km	Kilometres
MAA	Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MSA-D	Mouvement pour le Salut de l'Azawad-Daoussack
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ORTM	Office de Radiodiffusion- Télévision du Mali
OCS	Office Central des Stupéfiants
Panel	Panel of Experts on Mali
Plateforme	La Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger
PARMIS	Projet d'appuis à la réduction des migrations irrégulières et la stabilisation au Mali
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees


Annex 2 Methodology

1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.
2. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. Any mobile phone records from service providers were also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.
3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
4. The spelling of toponyms within Mali often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update. All major locations in Mali are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map at appendix A.
5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of three out of the four members including the Coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.
7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this

update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix B.

8. The Panel's methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is provided in appendix C.

Appendix A to Annex 2: UN Geographical Information System (GIS) of Mali



Appendix B to Annex 2: 'The opportunity to reply' methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity⁷⁶ in a Panel's report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the 'opportunity to reply'.

2. The Panel's methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:

(a) Providing an individual with an 'opportunity to reply' should be the norm;

(b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:

(i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;

(ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;

(iii) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;

(iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or

(v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

⁷⁶ Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both.

6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

Appendix C to Annex 2: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, S/2006/997, on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as requested by paragraph 12 of resolution 2511 (2020).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

a. All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

b. In carrying out its investigations on abductions and enforced disappearances and the Panel relied on the following sources of information: i. Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.

ii. Interviews with people with knowledge of the event such local authorities and community members.

iii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

iv. Documentation from local or international organization that provide contextual information and crime pattern analysis.

v. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

c. In carrying out its investigations on child exploitation and risks of use or recruitment in gold mining, the Panel is also particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel did not have access to the site in question, however, it relied on the following sources of information: i. Interviews with local authorities and others with first-hand knowledge of the situation on the site.

ii. Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.

iii. Interviews with other people with knowledge of the situation such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

iv. Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the situation on the site.

v. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

d. The investigation of sexual and gender-based violence presents its own specific challenges. These include the survivors' inability or unwillingness to report the incident due to social, cultural, or religious factors, and fear of retaliation; their lack of access to medical care of health providers; limited domestic investigations, and absence of a judicial response. The Panel is mindful that victims of sexual and gender-based violence may face the additional risks of discrimination, social stigma, exclusion from their family and community, or other forms of reprisals. In order to minimize their exposure and possible retraumatization, the Panel exercised caution in approaching survivors and witnesses, and collected contextual or corroborating data, such as statistical or pattern-related information, from relevant experts, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and other reliable sources. In carrying out its investigations on sexual and gender-based violence, the Panel relies on the following sources of information

i. The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.

ii. Given the abovementioned, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place. the Panel accepts testimonies as prima facie evidence of sexual violence.

iii. Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.

iv. Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.

v. Interviews with local authorities.

vi. Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

vii. Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

viii. Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.

3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except 1) with the specific permission of the victims and witnesses; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional documentation to support the Panel's findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 3: Member States, organizations and institutions consulted

1. This list excludes individuals and certain organisations or entities with whom the Panel met, in order to protect source(s) confidentiality.

Table 431

Member States, organizations and institutions consulted ^{a b c}

<i>Country/ Location</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Representative or International Organization</i>	<i>Institution / NGO</i>
Albania		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Algeria		Embassy to Mali (Bamako) ^c	
Belgium		World Custom Organisation	
France ^a	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries	Permanent Mission to the UN ^c Embassy to Mali (in Bamako)	NGO
Ghana		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Ireland ^b		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Italy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	NGOs
Mali	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others	Permanent Mission to the UN ^c MINUSMA	NGOs
Mauritania	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others	Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Mexico ^b		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Morocco		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	

<i>Country/ Location</i>	<i>Government</i>	<i>Representative or International Organization</i>	<i>Institution / NGO</i>
Niger	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries	Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
Nigeria		ECOWAS Permanent Observer to the UN ^c	
Russian Federation ^a		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c Embassy to Mali	
Senegal		UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa ^c	
Switzerland		UN OHCHR, UNHCR, IOM	NGOs
United Arab Emirates ^b		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
United Kingdom ^a		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c	
USA ^a		Permanent Mission to the UN ^c SRSG SVC ^{c d} SRSG CAAC ^{c e}	

^a Countries indicated ^{a*} are permanent members of the Security Council.

^b Countries indicated ^{b*} are elected members of the Security Council (2022).

^c Via VTC or other electronic platform.

^d Sexual Violence in Conflict.

^e Children and Armed Conflict.

Annex 4: Summary of Panel correspondences (2590 (2021) mandate)¹

Table 5.1

Correspondence with Member States 2590 (2021) Mandate)
(17 January to 30 June 2022) ^a

<i>Member State / country</i>	<i># letters sent by the Panel^b</i>	<i># replies from Member State</i>	<i># awaiting reply from Member State</i>
Algeria	3	2	1
Burkina Faso	2		2
Cote d'Ivoire	1	1	
Ghana	1	1	
Guinea Bissau	2		2
Guinea	2		2
Italy	1	1	
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	2	2	0
Mali	10	2	8
Mauritania	6	4	2*
Morocco	2	1	
Niger	4	1	3*
Nigeria	2		2
Senegal	2		2
Togo	2		2
UAE	3		3

Note.

* The Panel did not receive written responses. Some issues contained in the correspondences were however addressed by the authorities during the Panel's visits to the concerned countries. The unanswered letters include reminders to the original correspondences.

^a 17 January 2022 being the date the Panel was contracted pursuant to resolution 2590 (2021), and 30 June 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 30 June 2022 (PE.OC.56) are not included in the table.

¹ Excluding updates to the Committee, letters to the Chair or visa requests to Member States.

Table 5.2

Correspondences with other international organizations and United Nations Mechanisms (2590 (2021) mandate)
(17 January to 30 June 2022) ^a

Organization or entity	# letters sent by the Panel	# replies ^b	# awaiting reply
World Customs Organisation	1	1	
United Nations Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Mali	1	1	

Total

^a 17 January 2022 being the date the Panel was contracted pursuant to resolution 2590 (2021) and 30 June 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 30 June 2022 (PE.OC.56) are not included in the table.

Table 5.3

Correspondences with commercial companies (2590 (2021) mandate)
(17 January to 30 June 2022) ^a

Organization or entity	# letters sent by the Panel	# replies ^b	# awaiting reply
Asky Airlines	2	2	
Mauritanian Airlines	2	2	

^a 17 January 2022 being the date the Panel was contracted pursuant to resolution 2590 (2021), and 30 June 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 30 June 2022 (PE.OC.56) are not included in the table.

Annex 5: Communiqué of the General Staff of the Malian Army dated 7 January 2022 and referenced 000017 on special recruitment of youth between 18 and 30 years-old in central (Ségou, Sévaré, Kati, Kayes) and northern Mali (Gao, Timbuktu), in possession of military materiel

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE ET
DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL DES ARMEES

COMMISSION DE RECRUTEMENT SPECIAL

REPUBLICQUE DU MALI
Un Peuple- Un But- Une Foi

Bamako, le 07 janvier 2022

COMMUNIQUE 000017

Le Chef d'Etat-major général des Armées communique :

La campagne de recrutement spécial dans les forces armées au niveau des localités du centre et du nord du Mali va se poursuivre jusqu'au 28 février 2022.

Ce recrutement, qui s'inscrit dans le cadre normal, a pour objectif de reconstruire le tissu social et économique visant à :

- Réduire les sources de violence ;
- Maîtriser la prolifération des armes de guerre ;
- Faciliter le processus de pacification et de cohésion sociale.

Il concerne les jeunes hommes en possession de matériels de guerre et de nationalité malienne âgés de 18 à 30 ans, au 31 décembre 2021.

Les intéressés doivent se munir des dossiers suivants :

- ✓ Une demande manuscrite d'incorporation adressée au Chef d'Etat-major général des Armées ;
- ✓ Une copie d'acte de naissance ;
- ✓ Un certificat de nationalité ;
- ✓ Quatre photos d'identité en couleur.

Les heures d'enregistrement sont fixées de 8 heures à 16 heures 00 minutes, y compris les weekends sur les sites suivants retenus par les autorités :

Secteur de Ségou : Ségou, Diabaly, Diandiori, Macina, Ténenkou, Tominián, Saye, Timissa, Diatarabé.

Secteur de Sévaré : Sévaré, Bandiagara, Koro, Djenné, Douentza, Konna, Soutoulaye.

Secteur de Kati : Nara, Guiré.

Secteur de Gao : Gao, Ménaka, Ansongo.

Secteur de Tombouctou : Tombouctou.

Secteur de Kayes : Diéma.

Les autres spécificités et conditionnalités dudit recrutement sont disponibles au niveau des sites ci-dessus cités.


Le Chef d'Etat-major des Armées sait compter sur la bonne compréhension de l'opinion publique nationale.

Le Chef d'Etat-Major Général des Armées P/O
Le Chef d'Etat-Major Général Adjoint


Séraphin M. Kouamé WELE
Président du Comité National

DIRPA
COURTIER "Avis de
07/01/2022
N° 103
10H17

Annex 6: Information note dated 2 June 2022 and signed by CMA President, Bilal Ag Achérif, referenced 01/BE-CMA/2022 and addressed to the Defence Council of the CMA, the General Security directorate and the Army General staff, informing on suspension until further notice of the process of identification of combatants by CMA components



Annex 7: Communiqué of Political Committee of the CSP dated 7 October 2021 and referenced 7/COP-CSP, signed by the spokesperson of the CSP, reacting to declaration by Minister Wagué to the CSA on 5 October 2021, regretting that the Minister requested the international community not to receive the CSP anymore, claiming that the Minister welcomed its creation, and was associated since the inception of the CSP and declined to come to Rome in May 2021



CADRE STRATEGIQUE PERMANENT

Comité d'Orientation Politique –
Communiqué N°7/COP-CSP

Réaction aux propos Anti-CSP du Ministre Ismael WAGUE

- Dans les Médias
- Interview
- Non classé

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent a appris avec stupéfaction les propos tenus par le Ministre de la Réconciliation Nationale le Colonel Ismael Wague lors de la réunion du Comité de Suivi de l'Accord (CSA) le 5 octobre 2021.

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent regrette que le Ministre de la Réconciliation Nationale dans son intervention demande unilatéralement à la Communauté Internationale de ne plus recevoir le CSP.

Le CSP rappelle que conformément à sa déclaration de création datant du 6 Avril 2021 à Bamako, il a pour mission première de concrétiser la mise en synergie des efforts en faveur de la mise en œuvre diligente de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger.

A cet effet, le CSP a informé le Ministre de la Réconciliation Nationale de toutes ses activités et démarches entreprises depuis sa création.

Pour preuves, il a invité le Ministre à prendre part à la mission de Rome en Mai 2021 et pour des raisons qui lui sont propres il a décliné cette offre.

Le Colonel Ismael Wague a également pris part à la rencontre du CSP à Kidal aux côtés de trois (3) autres ministres, à cette occasion dans son allocution le Ministre de la Réconciliation Nationale a pour rappel salué l'initiative de la création du CSP et a informé que le Gouvernement ralliait ce cadre servant à faire avancer le processus de paix. Il a ensuite pris part aux concertations organisées par le CSP à Bamako le 12 Août 2021 à Bamako.

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent déplore les propos du Ministre de la Réconciliation Nationale qui vont en l'encontre du climat actuel de confiance qui existe entre les Mouvements Signataires et le Gouvernement et décide de suspendre sa participation au cadre de concertation interarmien dirigé par le Colonel Ismael Wague.

Le Ministre veut semer les germes de la division entre les Mouvements Signataires au moment où le CSP se bat pour les rassembler.

Le CSP appelle le Gouvernement du Mali à trouver un interlocuteur impartial pour apaiser toutes les inquiétudes le concernant.


Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent décide jusqu'à ce que cet interlocuteur soit désigné du côté du Gouvernement de continuer les discussions avec la Médiation Internationale dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger.

Fait à Bamako, le 07 octobre 2021

Le Porte-Parole

Moussa Ag Acharatoumane

Annex 8: Communiqué dated 15 May 2022 referenced 030 of the Government of Mali announcing its decision to leave the G5-Sahel, following correspondence from the transitional President Assimi Goïta dated 22 April 2022 to the President of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Deby Into, indicating that in absence of substantial progress on the transfer of the presidency of the G5 Sahel to Mali before 15 May 2022, that the government of Mali will suspend its participation to the mechanisms of G5-Sahel, including the Joint Force



Annex 9: Confidential General Staff Army note recalling all Malian army personnel from G5 Sahel mechanisms, including the Joint Force; the note is dated 14 June 2022 and refers to the official communiqué dated 15 May 2022 announcing Malian government intention to withdraw from G5 Sahel

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE
ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

ETAT-MAJOR GENERAL DES ARMEES

N° 0 0 4 9 0 /CEMGA/S-CEM/OPS/SP

REPUBLICQUE DU MALI
Un Peuple – Un But – Une Foi

Bamako, le 14 JUIN 2022

**Etat Major Général des Armées
Confidentiel**

Le Chef d'Etat-major Général des Armées

A

Monsieur, le Général de Division Commandant la Force
Conjointe du G5 Sahel

Objet : Fin d'engagement des personnels FAMA au sein de la FC G5 Sahel.

Pièces jointes : - Décision N°000370/CEMGA/S-CEM/OPS/DPE du 28 juin 2021 ;
- Décision N°000431/CEMGA/S-CEM/OPS du 13 juin 2022.

Mon Général,

Suivant un communiqué officiel en date du 15 mai 2022, le gouvernement du Mali annonçait le retrait du pays de toutes les instances du G5 Sahel y compris la Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel.


Par conséquent, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de la décision politique, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire part de la décision qui met fin à l'engagement des personnels maliens en service au sein des fuseaux Ouest et Centre pour compter le 30 juin 2022. Les dispositions sont en cours pour rapatrier les personnels concernés dans les délais requis.

S'agissant, des personnels en service au PCIAT de la FC du G5 Sahel, leur désengagement prend effet à compter du 30 juin 2022 avec une reprise de service dans leurs Armées et Services à compter du 1^{er} juillet 2022.

Tout en comptant sur votre coopération et votre bonne compréhension, veuillez recevoir mon Général, mes salutations fraternelles.

Ampliations :
- MDAC.....CR
- IGAS.....Info
- PCIAT.....Info
- Ts/CEM et Dr. Sces.....Info
- Archives et Chrono.....02

Le Chef d'Etat-major Général des Armées


Général de Division Oumar DIARRA
Ministre de l'Ordre National

Annex 10: Preamble of the Transition Charter adopted on 12 September 2020 and promulgated by Presidential decree referenced 2020-0072/PT-RM on 1st October 2020

2	JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU MALI
DECRET N°2020-0072/PT-RM DU 1^{ER} OCTOBRE 2020 PORTANT PROMULGATION DE LA CHARTE DE LA TRANSITION	Nous fondant sur la Constitution du 25 février 1992 et l'Acte fondamental n°001/CNSP du 24 août 2020 ;
LE PRESIDENT DE LA TRANSITION, CHEF DE L'ETAT,	Tenant compte de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger ;
Vu la Constitution,	Considérant le caractère patriotique des événements du 18 août 2020 ayant conduit à la démission libre et volontaire du Président de la République Monsieur Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA, précédée de la dissolution de l'Assemblée nationale et de la démission du Gouvernement ;
Vu les Conclusions des Concertations nationales tenues les 10, 11 et 12 septembre 2020,	Considérant l'amplification des conflits meurtriers dans les régions au centre comme au nord du Pays, avec des milliers de morts, des centaines de villages détruits, des milliers de déplacés et de réfugiés, ainsi que le sacrifice ultime de nos forces armées mal équipées et livrées à l'ennemi ;
DECRETE :	Considérant le lourd tribut payé par les filles et les fils du Mali victimes d'exactions et d'actes de répression ayant fait des martyrs parmi les manifestants pacifiques en Juillet 2020 ;
Article 1^{er} : Est promulguée, la Charte de la Transition adoptée le 12 septembre 2020 par les Forces vives de la Nation.	Conscient de l'impérieuse nécessité de situer l'action publique dans un cadre constitutionnel et légal, avec l'assentiment et la mobilisation du Peuple malien ainsi que l'accompagnement de la communauté internationale ;
Article 2 : Le présent décret auquel est annexée la Charte de la Transition, sera enregistré et publié au Journal officiel.	Considérant notre attachement aux valeurs et principes démocratiques inscrits dans la Charte africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance du 30 janvier 2007 de l'Union africaine et dans le Protocole A/SP/1/12/01 du 21 décembre 2001 de la CEDEAO sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance ;
Bamako, le 1^{er} octobre 2020	Considérant l'urgence et la nécessité de doter le Mali d'organes de transition afin de combler le vide constitutionnel et institutionnel dans la conduite des affaires publiques ;
Le Président de la Transition, Chef de l'Etat, Bah N'DAW	Conscient de la nécessité d'une trêve sociale pour permettre aux autorités de la transition de poser les bases de la refondation de l'Etat ;
ANNEXE AU DECRET N°2020-0072/PT-RM DU 1^{ER} OCTOBRE 2020 PORTANT PROMULGATION DE LA CHARTE DE LA TRANSITION	Adoptons la présente Charte de la Transition qui complète la Constitution du 25 février 1992 et dont le présent préambule est partie intégrante.
<u>LA CHARTE DE LA TRANSITION</u>	
<u>TITRE I : PREAMBULE</u>	
Nous, Forces Vives de la Nation représentées au sein du Comité national pour le Salut du Peuple (CNSP), du Mouvement du 5 Juin-Rassemblement des Forces patriotiques du Mali (M5-RFP), des Partis et Regroupements politiques, des Organisations de la Société civile et des Maliens établis à l'extérieur, des Mouvements signataires de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger et des Mouvements de l'inclusivité ;	
Mus par un élan de sursaut national pour la refondation de l'Etat, la préservation des principes républicains et le renouveau de la démocratie et de la citoyenneté ;	

Annex 11: Photographs of founding meeting and signature of the statement of the *Cadre Stratégique Permanent* (CSP) in Bamako on 5-6 April 2021; on the photograph below, Fahad Ag Almahmoud (left), representing the *Plateforme*, and Bilal Ag Achérif (right), representing the CMA, are signing the CSP statement (see also annex 12)



Annex 12: Statement signed on 6 April 2021 by Presidents of the CMA, Bilal Ag Chérif, and of the *Plateforme*, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, on the creation of the *Cadre Stratégique Permanent* (CSP), after two days of meetings in Bamako on 5 and 6 April 2021; the statement announces the appointment of a provisional board of eight members

Déclaration


- S'inscrivant dans la continuité et la consolidation des engagements CMA-Plateforme pris depuis Septembre 2017 en faveur de la paix et de la réconciliation ;
- Conscients de l'urgence de renforcer et de concrétiser les relations de coordination et d'actions collectives face aux défis et aux enjeux du moment ;
- Préoccupées par la détérioration de la situation sécuritaire et humanitaire marquée par des massacres, des exactions et des brimades à l'encontre de populations civiles ;
- Considérant le retard accusé dans la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger ;

La Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) et la **Plateforme** des Mouvements du 14 Juin 2014 d'Alger, après deux (2) jours de concertations tenues du 5 au 6 Avril 2021, ont abouti à une convergence de point de vue basée sur une communauté de destin.

Les parties conviennent de la création d'un **Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP)** qui a pour mission de :

- 1- Concrétiser la mise en synergie des efforts en faveur de la mise en œuvre diligente de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger ;
- 2- Operationaliser les mécanismes conjoints de lutte contre l'insécurité sous toutes ses formes afin de garantir la libre circulation des personnes et de leurs biens ;
- 3- Encourager et mener des initiatives en faveur de la cohésion sociale et du vivre ensemble entre les toutes communautés ;
- 4- Réaliser une meilleure cohérence dans la prise en charge des aspirations communes des populations.

Une commission provisoire de huit (8) membres est désignée pour animer le CSP en attendant la grande rencontre élargie prévue après le mois béni du Ramadan.



Les parties :

- appellent la Communauté Internationale, les Etats sahéliens et l'ensemble des acteurs du processus de Paix à prendre des décisions afin de mettre fin aux atteintes contre les populations civiles ;
- appellent l'ensemble des forces engagées au nom des Etats, des organisations régionales et internationales et des Mouvements signataires de l'Accord pour la Paix, à agir dans le strict respect du Droit International Humanitaire ;
- Invitent les Etats du Sahel, les Forces Internationales et la communauté internationale à adapter leurs actions au contexte particulier de la région en impliquant les acteurs non étatiques engagés dans le processus de paix ;
- appellent le Gouvernement de transition du Mali à soutenir le CSP dans ses actions en faveur de la sécurité, de la Paix, et de la réconciliation ;


La CMA et la Plateforme invitent les autres acteurs du processus de Paix au Mali à adhérer à cette dynamique salubre afin d'annihiler toutes les causes des souffrances des populations.

Bamako, le 06 Avril 2021


Ont signé :

Pour la CMA


Bilal Ag Achérif

Pour la Plateforme

Fahad Ag Almahmoud


Annex 13: The “Declaration of Rome” signed by the Presidents of the CMA and the Plateforme in Rome on 6 May 2021



Annex 14: Photographs of the signing ceremony of the Rome declaration on 6 May 2021, at Ara Pacis headquarters in Rome, with Fahad Ag Almahmoud (left) and Bilal Ag Achérif (right) at the table, and the Foreign Affairs Minister of Italy, Luigi di Maio, and the founding president of *Ara Pacis*, Maria Nicoletta Gaida, standing with the other members of the armed groups delegation



Annex 15: Final statement (unsigned) of the CSP meeting in Kidal on 4 July 2021, presided by CSP President of the provisional board Bilal Ag Achérif



permanent. En attendant la mise en place des nouveaux, le bureau provisoire du CSP continue de diriger et de coordonner les activités du CSP.

La rencontre décide de la tenue incessante d'une réunion pour le parachèvement de l'opérationnalisation du CSP.

3. Au titre de l'APR :

Les mouvements conviennent d'avoir une position commune sur toutes les questions relatives à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord issu du processus d'Alger, pour faciliter sa mise œuvre diligente et intégrale au bénéfice de l'ensemble des populations.

4. Au titre de la Cohésion Sociale

La rencontre encourage à perpétuer et à élargir les initiatives de rapprochement des mouvements et des communautés, notamment les différents engagements et ententes pris à Anefi.

Recommandations générales :

Sur la question des réfugiés et déplacés :

La rencontre remercie les pays d'accueil et les organisations humanitaires pour leurs efforts à leur endroit. Elle demande aussi au gouvernement du Mali, aux pays d'accueil et aux organisations humanitaires de fournir davantage d'efforts pour leur retour dans des conditions dignes ;

Des questions d'Aguelhoc, de Lerneb et de la zone des trois frontières :

La rencontre demande la diligence de l'enquête sur les exactions du 2 Avril 2021 à Aguelhoc, l'instauration d'un dialogue entre toutes les parties concernées en vue de trouver une solution permettant aux populations de vivre paisiblement et en toute sécurité chez elles.

Concernant Lerneb, elle demande aux acteurs une cessation immédiate de toutes les hostilités et un recours au dialogue pour le règlement pacifique et définitif de la question.

La rencontre demande aussi au CSP, à tous les Etats concernés et leurs partenaires de créer les conditions humanitaires et sécuritaires nécessaires pour un retour de la stabilité dans la zone des trois frontières et dans toutes les zones où les populations sont éprouvées.

Au titre du retour de la paix et de la stabilité :

La rencontre appelle le gouvernement, la communauté internationale et la médiation à soutenir et à accompagner les efforts et engagements pris dans le cadre du CSP ;

Au sujet des violations de droits de l'homme :

La rencontre condamne les massacres de masse, les assassinats ciblés, arrestations arbitraires et les enlèvements subis par les populations civiles de l'Azawad/Nord du Mali dont celui de Feu Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatt et exige que toute la lumière soit faite sur ce drame.

Au sujet de règlement de différends entre les populations de l'Azawad /Nord du Mali :
La rencontre soutient toute initiative pour le règlement définitif des différends locaux.

La rencontre

Annex 16: List (signed by Bilal Ag Achérif) of members of the political steering committee of the CSP, designated during the meeting of the CSP in Kidal on 19 September 2021

Cadre stratégique permanent « CSP »

Listes des membres du Comité d'orientation politique du CSP

- 1- **Président** : Bilal Ag Acharif
- 2- **Vice Président** : Fahad Ag Almahmoud
- 3- **Secrétaire permanent** : Moulaye Ahmed ould Moulaye
- 4- **Porte Parole** : Moussa Ag Acharatoumane
- 5- **Chargé de la sécurité** : Mohamed Ag Najim
- 6- **Chargé de la sécurité adjoint** : Mahamad Ag Bachir
- 7- **Chargé de la réconciliation** : Alghabas ag Intalla
- 8- **Chargé de la réconciliation Adjoint** : Alhaji Ag Gamou
- Membres** : Assalate Ag Habi, Takni Ag Itikine, Achafagui Ag bohoda, Dina Ould Daha, Ibrahim ould Handa, Abdine ould Mohamed, Mbarek Ag Akli, Albachar Ag Hamadou
- 9- **Chargé des relations extérieur** : Mohamed Ag Acherif
- 10- **Chargé des relations extérieur adjoint** : Guichima Ag hakeili
- 11- **Chargé des finances** : Mohamed ould Sidi Ahmad
- 12- **Chargé des finances Adjoint** : Mohamed Elmaouloud Ag Hamada
- 13- **Chargé du développement** : Mohamed Attaib Sidibe
- 14- **Chargé du développement adjoint** : Mahamad Rhissa Ag Ahmed Assaleh



Annex 17: Final statement of the CSP meeting held in Kidal on 17, 18 and 19 September 2021, signed by Bilal Ag Achérif on 19 September 2021, announcing the appointment of an Advisory board and creation of regional bureau, and the adoption by the political steering committee of recommendations

Déclaration finale de la Rencontre du CSP à Kidal

Conformément aux recommandations du Bureau Provisoire issues de l'Assemblée Constitutive du Cadre Stratégique Permanent tenue à Kidal les 03 et 04 juillet 2021 et à celles des concertations de Bamako relatives à la structuration efficiente du CSP, une rencontre s'est tenue à Kidal les 17, 18 et 19 Septembre 2021 sous l'égide du Président en exercice M. Bilal AG ACHÉRIF.

Le Bureau Provisoire restreint passant en revue un large éventail de la situation actuelle a cerné un champ d'action adéquat dans un contexte politique et sécuritaire globalement inquiétant.

Dans l'intermède, à l'actif du Bureau Provisoire, nombre d'actions dans le cadre de la poursuite de ses objectifs, a été mené dont notamment la consolidation du concept «Ménaka Sans Armes», des actions de lutte contre le banditisme dans le Haoussa de Gao et la poursuite d'autres actions pour l'atténuation des foyers de tensions à Adjel-Hoc et à Lerneb.

La rencontre a mis en place un Comité d'Orientation Politique qui est l'organe exécutif du CSP composé de 22 membres pour un mandat renouvelable de 6 (six) mois. Le siège est fixé à Kidal avec une Permanence à Bamako. La rencontre a aussi adopté les structures de pilotage ci-après :

- Un Conseil Consultatif,
- Des Bureaux régionaux.

Le Comité d'Orientation Politique s'est fixé des priorités déclinées dans une feuille de route consensuelle axée notamment sur la réconciliation, la consolidation de la sécurité et la continuité des engagements pris dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger.

Le Comité d'Orientation Politique rappelle que le CSP demeure ouvert à toutes les parties qui souhaitent œuvrer en synergie pour la réalisation des objectifs de paix, de stabilité, de cohésion et de réconciliation nationale.

RECOMMANDATIONS

Le Comité d'Orientation Politique du CSP recommande à toutes les parties d'éviter toutes prises de décisions susceptibles de remettre en cause les engagements souscrits :

- L'annonce d'un éventuel déploiement de **WAGNER** forces non conventionnelles au Mali demeure une préoccupation, en lieux et places de l'armée reconstituée tant attendue prévue par l'APR, dans la mesure où aucune armée d'un pays ami, frère ou allié ne pourrait se substituer à une armée nationale constituée de l'assemble des fils du pays.
- Le découpage territorial et administratif non concerté des terroirs en amont ou en contradiction avérée avec l'esprit de l'Accord issu du processus d'Alger doit être évité.

Par ailleurs le Comité d'Orientation Politique du CSP s'engage à tout mettre en œuvre pour atténuer les effets néfastes des trafics en tous genres et de l'immigration non contrôlée.

Le Comité d'Orientation Politique du CSP remercie le Président de la Transition, Son Excellence le Colonel Assimi GOITA pour ses louables efforts déployés en faveur de la paix, attend de lui une meilleure participation des Mouvements à l'exercice de la gestion des affaires publiques afin de parvenir à une stabilité plus optimale.

MITO LITE 66
AI QUAD CAMERA



Le Comité d'Orientation Politique du CSP renouvelle ses remerciements au Gouvernement Italien et à l'ONG ARA-PACIS Initiative For Peace pour leurs efforts en faveur de la paix et du développement au Mali.

Le Comité d'Orientation Politique du CSP remercie également la MINUSMA, le Chef de file de la Médiation Internationale, les pays d'accueil des populations réfugiées de l'Azawad/Nord Mali ainsi que tous les partenaires qui œuvrent inlassablement pour la stabilisation du Mali.

La Rencontre

Kidal le 19 septembre 2021



Annex 18: Communiqué of the political steering Committee of the CSP dated 16 October 2021 on its meeting with Interim President Assimi Goïta on 13 October 2021, noting that CSP representatives underlined that the statement of Minister Wagué at the last CSA was considered as displeasing and weakening the current atmosphere between parties

Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP)

Comité d'Orientation Politique

Cellule de Communication

Bulletin d'information

Convaincus du bien-fondé du CSP, ses leaders continuent de privilégier le dialogue et demeurent sûrs que de ce dialogue naîtra un apaisement des esprits pour le bonheur des populations dans leurs diversités.

C'est dans cette optique, qu'une délégation importante du CSP conduite par son Président Monsieur Bilal Ag Acherif et composée des Sieurs Fahad Ag Almahmoud, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, Guichma Ag Hakaïli, Mohamed Ould Aghweinate, Mohamed Attayoub Sidibé et Attaye Ag Mohamed a été reçu le 13 Octobre 2021 par le Président de la Transition, Chef de l'Etat Son Excellence le Colonel Assimi Goïta.

Avec le Président de la Transition des échanges fraternels et sincères ont abouti à une meilleure compréhension des objectifs du CSP qui ne sont autres que la Réconciliation, la Sécurité et la Paix. Il a été convenu de continuer les discussions pour aplanir toutes les inquiétudes.

Le CSP a souligné au Président de la Transition que la prise de position au dernier CSA du Ministre Wague était peu réjouissante et a été une sortie qui fragilise le climat actuel entre les acteurs du processus de Paix.

Au Niger, un pays frère et frontalier du Mali, le Cadre Stratégique Permanent a été reçu par le Président Son Excellence Monsieur Mohamed Bazoum qui a salué la dynamique de réconciliation inter mouvements et inter communautaires prônée par le CSP.

A Bamako, Soucieux du respect des règles politico-diplomatiques et toujours dans l'optique d'expliquer les objectifs du CSP, les leaders du CSP sont allés à la rencontre de certains partenaires impliqués dans le processus de paix pour que chacun s'imprègne de ce qui anime le CSP. Au nombre de ceux-ci plusieurs Ambassadeurs dont ceux de l'Algérie et de la Russie. Les Responsables du CSP ont également rencontré le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies et Chef de la MINUSMA.

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent invite les uns et les autres à s'approprier ses réalités profondes et sa démarche transparente et ouverte dans le but ultime d'accélérer la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger.

Le CSP a fait part aussi de son intention désormais à mener un combat politique à l'échelle nationale et internationale pour aider le pays à réussir la transition actuelle au bénéfice des populations de l'Azawad/Nord Mali en particulier et Malienne en général.

Dans les semaines à venir, le CSP va continuer les prises de contacts avec tous les acteurs nationaux et internationaux pour continuer à expliquer les objectifs du CSP et son engagement à soutenir la Refondation de l'Etat à travers la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali Issu du Processus d'Alger.

Ménaka, le 16 Octobre 2021

▲

Annex 19: Press note dated 23 October 2021 of the Algerian press service



 وكالة الأنباء الجزائرية

 — ALGERIE PRESSE SERVICE —

AI
Prévis

ALGÉRIE
ECONOMIE
MONDE
SPORT
SOCIÉTÉ
CULTURE
RÉGIONS
SANTÉ - SCIENCE - TECHNOLOGIE

Lamamra reçoit le ministre malien de la Réconciliation et les signataires de l'accord de paix

Publié Le : Samedi, 23 Octobre 2021 11:06 • Lu : 24 fois

 Imprimer • Envoyer • Partagez



ALGER- Le ministre des Affaires étrangères et de la Communauté nationale à l'étranger, M. Ramtane Lamamra a reçu vendredi à Alger, le ministre malien de la Réconciliation nationale et de la Cohésion sociale, le Colonel-major Ismail Wagué, ainsi que les premiers responsables des mouvements signataires de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger.

Ces consultations qui s'inscrivent dans le cadre des efforts de l'Algérie en sa double qualité de chef de file de la médiation internationale et Président du Comité de suivi de l'accord (CSA), visent principalement à permettre aux parties maliennes de donner un nouvel élan au processus de paix et de réconciliation au Mali, dans le prolongement des résultats encourageants de la 45ème session du CSA tenue le 6 octobre à Bamako.

Annex 20: Joint communiqué (unsigned) regarding meeting between Malian delegation composed of Minister Wagué and representatives of Malian armed groups with Algerian authorities on 23 October 2021

COMMUNIQUE

Dans le cadre de la recherche des meilleures voies à même de permettre une mise en œuvre rapide et équilibrée des dispositions de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger et à l'invitation des autorités algériennes, en leur qualité de président de Comité de suivi de l'Accord (CSA) et de Chef de file de la Médiation internationale, une délégation malienne, composée du Ministre malien de la Réconciliation nationale et de la Cohésion sociale, le Colonel-major Ismaël WAGUE, ainsi que les Chefs des mouvements signataires dudit Accord, ont séjourné à Alger du 22 au 24 octobre 2021.

A son arrivée à Alger, la délégation a été reçue en audience par le Ministre des affaires étrangères et de la communauté nationale à l'étranger, Monsieur Ramtane LAMAMRA, qui a renouvelé l'engagement des autorités algériennes, à leur tête le Président de la République, Monsieur Abdelmadjid TEBBOUNE, à ne ménager aucun effort pour soutenir les frères maliens dans leurs efforts inlassables pour aplanir toutes les difficultés et lever les obstacles entravant la mise en œuvre totale et consensuelle de l'Accord d'Alger.

Les parties signataires ont, pour leur part, réitéré leur attachement à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger, et au plein respect des décisions qui seront prises dans ce contexte.

Au terme de concertations fructueuses sur un ensemble de questions soulevées de part et d'autre au sujet de thématiques liées aux voies et moyens devant faciliter une mise en œuvre rapide des dispositions de l'Accord, les participants se sont engagés à poursuivre les discussions dès leur retour à Bamako ~~pour lever toutes les questions en suspens~~ afin de lever toutes les questions en suspens qui ont jusque-là retardé le processus de paix et réunir les meilleures conditions pour la tenue de la prochaine session du Comité de suivi.

Les participants n'ont pas manqué de saluer le rôle moteur joué par l'Algérie en sa double qualité de président du Comité de suivi de l'Accord et de Chef de file de la Médiation internationale pour réunir toutes les conditions nécessaires à même de permettre une mise en œuvre rapide et consensuelle des dispositions de l'Accord au bénéfice de l'ensemble des populations maliennes.

Alger le, 23 octobre 2021.

Annex 21: Posts on social media by CSP spokesperson regarding CSP visit to Algeria

Moussa AG Acharatoumane @Mossa_ag · Oct 23, 2021

#Alger : Fin des discussions sur le processus de paix , la question du **#CSP** ainsi que d'autres sujets en lien avec le processus de paix autour du chef de file de la médiation internationale.

Le CSP communiquera ultérieurement dans son bulletin d'information sur ces discussions.



5 16 47

Moussa AG Acharatoumane @Mossa_ag · Oct 22, 2021

#Alger: Une délégation du **#CSP** sur invitation des autorités Algériennes est arrivée cet après midi à Alger. Des discussions doivent avoir lieu sur le processus de paix. Le gouvernement est également présent à Alger pour le même exercice.



13 31 117

Annex 22: Statement of the spokesperson of the CSP dated 10 December 2021 informing the public opinion that signatory armed groups were excluded from the organisation of the National Refoundation Congress (ANR) and that all components of the CSP (CMA, Plateforme and CMI) will not endorse the conclusions of the ANR

**Déclaration du Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP)
relative à la tenue des Assises Nationales de la
Refondation (ANR)**

Les organisations membres du CSP en l'occurrence la CMA, la Plateforme et la CMI après plusieurs tentatives d'aboutir à un consensus politique avec les autorités de Transition autour du processus d'organisation d'Assises Nationales consacrées à la Refondation du Mali, informent l'opinion nationale et internationale que l'approche d'organisation mise en place de façon unilatérale par le Gouvernement a exclu les mouvements signataires.

L'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du Processus d'Alger, principale référence politico-juridique de nos liens avec les autorités centrales bien que placé au dernier plan des priorités réelles du Gouvernement actuel, devait en tant qu'un des projets pertinents de refondation du Mali servir d'acquis au profit du processus de réformes. C'est dans cet esprit et de bonne foi que nous avons concrétisé notre accompagnement à la Transition suite aux engagements annoncés par celle-ci en Août 2020.

Le CSP remarque également l'exclusion et la non prise en compte d'importants acteurs de la vie politique malienne malgré leur disponibilité à accompagner ces assises.

Au regard de ce qui précède le CSP déclare que les conclusions des assises nationales de la refondation sous leur forme actuelle ne sauraient nullement engager ses organisations membres.

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent présente ses condoléances au peuple Malien pour l'acte barbare perpétré par des bandits armés contre des populations civiles à Songho (Bandiagara) ayant occasionné la mort de plus d'une trentaine de personnes innocentes et à la MINUSMA pour le décès de 7 casques bleus sur l'axe Sévaré-Douentza.

Le CSP réitère sa disponibilité et son engagement pour la relance du processus de paix gage du retour définitif de la paix et de la cohésion sociale.

Ménaka, le 10 décembre 2021

Pour le CSP

Le Porte-parole

Moussa AG Acharatoumane

Annex 23 – Information note issued by the President of the *Plateforme*, Fahad Ag Almahmoud, recalling the stand taken by the *Plateforme*, as a component of the CSP, regarding the ANR in the context of rumours mentioning its participation to the ANR

Note de clarification sur les assises

La Plateforme des Mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger a appris avec stupéfaction les rumeurs, faisant état de sa participation aux assises nationales de la refondation.

La Plateforme membre du CSP s'est pourtant prononcée de manière très claire et à plusieurs occasions sur sa position par rapport à ces assises.

Devant cette grossière désinformation, la Plateforme:

1. Réaffirme sa non participation aux assises, position qu'elle partage avec tous les mouvements membres du CSP
2. Réaffirme son attachement indéfectible à un dialogue inclusif, franc et sincère sans exclusive;
3. Reste attaché à la mise en œuvre diligente de l'accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger, seule alternative, pour le retour d'une paix définitive.

Gao, le 26/12/2021


Pour la Plateforme

Le Président

Fahad Ag Almahmoud

Annex 24: Photographs taken at Ara Pacis headquarters in Rome, Italy, of the signature of the Rome agreement-in-principle on 2 February 2022



Annex 25: Rome agreement-in-principle signed on 2 February 2022

Une fois toutes les parties sont intégrées:

- Le Gouvernement entreprend les démarches nécessaires auprès des partenaires pour renforcer le CSP et soutenir ses financements.
- Le Gouvernement s'engage à accompagner, soutenir et financer le CSP et ses actions.

Signataires



Gouvernement du Mali


Représenté par le Ministre de la
Reconciliation

Le Colonel Major Ismaël Wagué

Ara Pacis Initiatives for Peace Onlus

Représentée par
sa Présidente


Maria Nicoletta Gaida



La Plateforme du 14 juin 2014 d'Alger

Représenté par son Président


Hanoune Ould Ali



Le CSP

Représenté par son Président

Bilal Ag Acherif



Annex 26 – Social media post on 2 February 2022 from the Reconciliation ministry on the Minister's visit to Rome, Italy, to participate to the CSP meeting



Annex 27 – Communiqué of the political steering committee of the CSP issued by its spokesperson in Bamako on 4 February 2022 on the CSP meeting in Rome and the signature of the agreement-in-principle signed on 2 February 2022

CADRE STRATEGIQUE PERMANENT

COMITE D'ORIENTATION POLITIQUE

Communiqué N°001-2022-COP-CSP

Sur invitation de l'ONG ARAPACIS, les leaders du Cadre Stratégique Permanent (CSP) ont séjourné en Italie du 30 janvier au 3 février 2022.

Une délégation du Gouvernement conduite par le Colonel Ismaël Wague Ministre de la Réconciliation, de la paix et de la cohésion nationale, chargé de l'Accord pour la paix et une autre de la deuxième tendance de la Plateforme ont également été invitées.

Le CSP, se voulant inclusif à l'ensemble des parties prenantes à l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale issu du Processus d'Alger y compris aux acteurs de la société civile, a pris part à cette réunion de Rome qui avait principalement pour but de s'entendre sur les modalités d'adhésion, de direction et de participation au dit cadre.

C'est ainsi qu'après trois jours d'intenses mais fructueuses discussions, un document intitulé « Accord de principe de Rome » a été signé entre les parties présentes.

Plusieurs points d'accord ont été énumérés dans le document parmi lesquels une large ouverture du CSP à d'autres composantes, l'adoption d'une devise pour le CSP, une présidence tournante entre les parties membres du CSP et l'accélération de la mise en œuvre de l'accord.

Le Gouvernement s'engage à accompagner et appuyer les actions du CSP allant dans le sens de la Paix et de la réconciliation nationale.

Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent remercie le Gouvernement Italien et l'ONG ARAPACIS INITIATIVE pour n'avoir ménager aucun effort afin de faciliter ces discussions qui ont abouti à cet accord accepté de tous.

Le CSP félicite le Ministre la Réconciliation, de la paix et de la cohésion nationale, chargé de l'Accord pour la paix et les différentes parties présentes à ces discussions pour ces échanges fraternels et conviviaux qui ont abouti aux résultats escomptés.

Enfin, Le Cadre Stratégique Permanent informe qu'il organisera dans le plus bref délai une réunion extraordinaire de son comité d'orientation politique pour examiner le contenu de cet accord de principe afin de le respecter conformément à l'engagement pris et s'atteler à sa mise en œuvre.

Le CSP en appel à l'accompagnement de toute la Communauté Internationale et particulièrement de la médiation internationale au Mali en vue de faire de cet accord de principe une opportunité pour booster la mise en œuvre de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d'Alger.

Bamako, le 04 Février 2022

Pour le CSP

Le Porte-parole

Moussa Ag Acharatoumane

Annex 28 – Draft communiqué (unsigned and not issued) of the Reconciliation Ministry regarding the meeting in Gao on 17 march 2022, obtained by the Panel from a confidential source

Communiqué Sur l'initiative des mouvements signataires de l'accord de principe de Rome, le Ministre de la Réconciliation a conduit une délégation du 15 au 17 Mars 2022 à Gao pour une rencontre portant sur les points suivants :

- 1) Discuter du CSP dans sa nouvelle version conforme l'esprit et à la lettre de l'accord de principe de Rome
- 2) Partager avec les acteurs sus mentionnés le TDR de la prochaine rencontre de niveau décisionnelle.
- 3) Transmettre le message de paix du président de la transition Aux termes des échanges, le gouvernement se réjouit de constater la volonté partagée de l'ensemble des acteurs à avancer dans le processus de paix.

De façon essentiel, la rencontre a été consacrée comme nouvelle appellation : le cadre stratégique permanent pour la réconciliation en abrégé CSPR. Elle entre également dans le principe de la présidence tournante du cadre.

Cependant, le gouvernement déplore que sur la question de la présidence par le gouvernement du cadre en premier ressort ayant fait l'objet d'un accord tacite à Rome fasse encore l'objet de désaccord. A ce sujet, le gouvernement accorde plus de temps aux acteurs pour parvenir à un consensus sur cette question afin de faciliter la poursuite des travaux.

Pour ce qui concerne la rencontre de niveau décisionnelle, les termes de référence ont été partagés avec tous les acteurs pour exploitation.

#Ministere_de_la_Réconciliation_de_la_Paix_Et_Cohesion_Nationale

Annex 29 – Final statement (unsigned) of the meeting of the CSP in Gao on 16 and 17 March 2022

DÉCLARATION FINALE DE LA RENCONTRE DU CADRE STRATÉGIQUE PERMANENT (CSP) TENUE A GAO DU 16 AU 17 MARS 2022

Dans un souci d'appropriation de l'Accord de Principe de Rome, le Cadre Stratégique Permanent-CSP a initié une série de rencontres:

- Du 6 au 7 mars 2022 à Talataye, le Comité d'Orientation Politique s'est approprié à l'interne l'Accord de Principe de Rome et l'a entériné avant de débattre des questions d'actualités notamment celles politique et sécuritaire.

Du 8 au 9 mars 2022 à Anefif, le CSP a rencontré des leaders de la plateforme signataire de l'Accord de Rome pour convenir de la transformation du CSP en CSPR.

Le 16 mars 2022 à Gao, s'est tenue une rencontre de toutes les parties à l'Accord de Principe de Rome (CSP, Gouvernement, Plateforme).

Au cours de cette réunion, les parties ont convenu de la nouvelle appellation CSPR, mais les divergences autour de sa présidence ont empêché la mise en place d'un organe consensuel.

Ainsi, tout en restant fidèle à ses engagements et tout en restant ouvert au dialogue, le CSP se voit dans l'obligation juridique de procéder à la passation de service entre son Président entrant et sortant avant le 19 mars 2022.

C'est ainsi que Monsieur Bilal AG ACHERIF, Président en Exercice de la CMA a passé le flambeau à Monsieur Fahad AG ALMAHMOUD Président de la Plateforme pour un mandat de six (6) mois, avec Monsieur Ibrahim OULD HANDA, Secrétaire Général du MAA-CMA, comme Vice-Président.

Les membres actuels du Comité d'Orientation Politique continuent la gestion des affaires courantes en attendant la formation d'un nouveau bureau.

Le CSP saisit cette occasion pour présenter ses condoléances les plus attristées aux populations de Tamalat, Inchinanane et Anderamboukar, récemment victimes d'exactions ignobles et leur assure de son soutien indéfectible.

Enfin, le CSP invite les parties à l'Accord de Principe de Rome à positiver son interprétation et invite également les parties à l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation au Mali, issu du processus d'Alger à diligenter sa mise en œuvre.

Gao, le 17 mars 2022

Le Président

Bilal Ag Acherif

Annex 30 – Communiqué dated 15 April 2022 issued by a Daoussak community organisation regarding massacres of civilians in Ménaka and Gao regions



Communauté Idaksahak

★ Favourites · 16 April · 🌐

Communiqué de la communauté Idaksahak sur les tragiques événements survenus à Gao et Ménaka.

Le mois de mars et le début du mois d'avril 2022 ont connu des événements tragiques dans les régions de Ménaka et Gao.

Ces événements caractérisés d'une part par des massacres de civils en masse (250 civils à Ménaka et plus de 100 à Talataye) et d'autre part, par un déplacement massif des populations en direction des villes de Ménaka, Gao et Ansongo, abandonnant derrière elles enfants, personnes âgées, bétails et autres biens.

La communauté Idaksahak comme les communautés voisines meurtries, par cette situation constate avec satisfaction l'appui substantiel en vivres du Gouvernement de la République du Mali et de ses partenaires en faveur des victimes. Elle remercie également la chaîne de solidarité intercommunautaire ayant permis la mobilisation de plusieurs tonnes de vivres en faveur des populations déplacées.

La communauté Idaksahak exprime sa satisfaction par rapport à ces gestes louables et en profite pour remercier les généreux donateurs ci-dessus cités.

Toutefois, la communauté Idaksahak exprime le souhait de voir les gouvernements des Républiques du Mali et du Niger traquer et traduire en justice les auteurs des massacres dans les régions de Ménaka et Gao.

La communauté s'indigne que ces massacres de civils n'occasionnent pas le même émoi que d'autres exactions similaires auprès de la communauté internationale.

Au nombre des responsables ayant dirigé les commandos auteurs desdits massacres nous pouvons retenir entre autres :

- 1- Youssef Ould Chogib (Malien)
- 2- ILLIASSOU DJIBO alias PETIT CHAFORI, alias OUSMANE, alias KHALID (Nigérien)
- 3- MOUSSA MOUMOUNI (Nigérien)
- 4- PERODJI DJOULDE (Nigérien)
- 5- SADJO DOUNA (Nigérien)
- 6- IKKOU CHEFFOU (Nigérien)
- 7- BAWA WODI (Nigérien)
- 8- Oussama Modallo (Nigérien)
- 9- Abdoulwahab Ould Chogib (Malien)

La communauté Idaksahak appelle toutes les communautés meurtries comme elle à ne pas tomber dans un cycle de représailles pouvant conduire à une guerre intercommunautaire. Nous devons dissocier nos communautés ayant des liens séculaires avec les auteurs de ces crimes abominables.

La communauté rappelle que ces crimes sont l'oeuvre d'une horde de malfrats sans foi ni loi qui tuent des érudits, brûlent des corans, pillent et volent le bétail des populations comme ce fut le cas dans le cercle d'Anderamboukane.

La communauté remercie encore une fois les autorités nigériennes qui ont permis de retrouver à Mangaizé (Niger) des centaines de bœufs des populations de Tamalat et Inchinanane volés par l'EIGS.

Par finir, la communauté Idaksahak rappelle l'exigence de la mise en place d'une commission d'enquête par le gouvernement du Mali afin que lumière soit faite sur la disparition de 15 membres de la communauté à Ansongo, arrêtés et maltraités au vu et au su de tous dans la cour du service de l'hydraulique par des éléments de l'unité légère de renseignements et d'intervention (ULRI3) commandée par le Capitaine Kaboro Sampana et l'adjudant-chef Amadou Diallo Matricule 36721.

La communauté présente ses condoléances à toutes les familles endeuillées et souhaite prompt rétablissement aux blessés.

La communauté Idaksahak demande aux Gouvernements du Mali et du Niger et aux organisations des droits de l'homme de tout mettre en oeuvre pour que lumière soit faite sur ces tragiques événements. Elle invite également le Gouvernement et les mouvements du CSP à protéger les populations.

Enfin, La communauté Idaksahak lance un appel au Gouvernement de la République du Mali, à ses partenaires et aux bonnes volontés pour venir en aide à ces populations indigentes.

Menaka, le 15 Avril 2022

Pour la communauté

La cellule de communication

Annex 31 - Summary of meetings between the Panel and designated individuals in March and April 2022

Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007)

On 30 March 2022, the Panel interviewed Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri in Bamako, Mali. He stated having asked for delisting several times but had no papers to show the Panel. He was again advised of the procedures for applying for exemption from the travel ban and assets freeze and for delisting. A copy of the Committee guidelines was also handed over.

He emphasised that he was merely a businessman, with no links to drug trafficking. He alleged that he was designated because he participated in a protest against the territorial division in Gao in November 2018. The Arabs surrounded the municipality to protest against this and then the authorities backed down. Three of the same family, including him, were sanctioned, as a consequence. He agreed that he would provide transport for goods a few years back, but did not know what the goods consisted of. He also admitted that these goods might have included cigarettes, but assured that this no longer took place. He continued to deny his involvement in drug trafficking.

He provided his residential address and a copy of his passport. The Panel asked about his occupation and any business he conducts, in particular his shareholding in Tilemsi Holding. He declared having left this company in 2019 and stated that he received 100 million FCFA in cash. The balance proceeds were used to buy residential properties – two in Gao and one in Bamako. At the start of 2020, he set up another company – Groupe Sahelien, which has not yet started functioning. Presently, he trades in products such as macaroni, couscous, dates etc. which he purchases from Algeria. He provided his estimated monthly income.

No documents were provided regarding sale of his shares in Tilemsi Holding, establishment of the new company and purchase of property. The addresses of the properties were not provided.

Mohamed Ould Mataly (MLi.008)

On 30 March 2022, the Panel interviewed Mohamed Ould Mataly in Bamako, Mali. He claimed that he was sanctioned for political reasons because he worked with MUJAO and MNLA. MUJAO had occupied Gao in 2012 and therefore he was compelled to work with them. He claimed that the French authorities were responsible for the sanctions against him and his son-in-law, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri (MLi.007).

He said that he should have been given an opportunity to be heard, prior to being sanctioned. This infringed his rights.

According to him, the Government of Mali has asked for his delisting.

Since March 2021, he is the Special Adviser to the government (Conseiller Special).

He receives a salary from the government.

He has his own house in Golf, Bamako and another house in Gao.

He travelled to Niger once after being sanctioned but would not give more details.

Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (MLi.003)

On 8 April 2022, the Panel interviewed Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune in Bamako, Mali. He is from the Timbuktu region and a member of the Comité de Suivi de l'Accord (CSA). He mentioned that there were attempts to set up the CSA, without him as a member but he finally got a seat. He was not included in the Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC) of Gao. He is working for national unity which is why he signed the peace agreement. He stated that he was very disappointed with his designation. Someone met him in Timbuktu

with a proposal to submit a delisting request. He refused to do so as he had never been consulted or heard about his potential designation. He did, however, apply for delisting at the end of 2018/beginning of 2019.

He confirmed that he travelled to Mauritania in February 2022 by Air Mauritania. The organisation hosting the conference paid. He refused to reply to questions about his assets but informed that he has a bank account where MINUSMA deposits payments. He also refused to provide his passport details.
