Letter dated 25 January 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 2564 (2021).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 23 December 2021 and was considered by the Committee on 21 January 2022.

We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Dakshinie Ruwanthika Gunaratne
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Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)

Summary

During the reporting period, the parties to the conflict continued to fight to consolidate their control over territories and populations. In September and October 2021, in quick succession, the Houthi forces captured several districts surrounding Ma’rib city, and in Baydah and Shabwah. In November, the withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the West Coast resulted in the Houthis gaining control over significant areas in Hudaydah Governorate.

There were measures taken to undermine the Stockholm and the Riyadh Agreements during the reporting period. Neither the Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen nor the Joint Forces informed the Redeployment Coordination Committee or the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), established under the Stockholm Agreement, of their intent to withdraw from areas in Hudaydah. The Houthis also hindered UNMHA from carrying out its mandate. The Southern Transitional Council undertook unilateral appointments of military and security personnel, and the Government of Yemen appointed civil servants, undermining the Riyadh Agreement. There has been limited progress on the implementation of the military and political provisions of the Agreement.

The Government of Yemen failed to provide adequate military support to tribal fighters in Ma’rib, resulting in the Houthis gaining control over strategic areas surrounding the city. Both the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen have been struggling to secure the resources necessary to ensure the provision of basic services, alleviate the current economic crisis and pay regular salaries, resulting in mass public demonstrations in areas under their control. In the second half of 2021, military infighting between forces affiliated to the Council and several serious security incidents raised questions about the Council’s ability to maintain order in areas under its control.

In contrast, in areas controlled by the Houthis, the security situation remained relatively stable and there were no serious challenges to their political authority. The Houthis continued their systematic campaign to ensure the population’s adherence to their ideology and to secure popular support for their cause and the conflict; this included the organization of summer camps and cultural courses for both adults and children. The Houthi policy of sexual violence and repression against politically active and professional women continued, including after the designation by the Security Council of Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006) in February 2021.

On the military front, the Houthis continued their aerial and maritime attacks on Saudi Arabia. Targets close to the border remained most at risk and were usually attacked with a combination of uncrewed aerial vehicles and short-range artillery rockets. The Houthis also continued to strike deep inside Saudi Arabia using longer-range uncrewed aerial vehicles, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles. In the Red Sea, waterborne improvised explosive devices were used to attack commercial vessels at anchorage at ports in Saudi Arabia, in some cases more than 1,000 km away from Yemeni shores. The purpose of these attacks was primarily political, i.e. the Houthis want to push Riyadh towards accepting a political settlement beneficial to them. This contrasts sharply with the use of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles within Yemen, the aim of which is often to attain maximum lethality.
Most types of uncrewed aerial vehicles, waterborne improvised explosive devices and short-range rockets are assembled in Houthi-controlled areas using locally available materials, as well as commercial components, such as engines and electronics, which are sourced from abroad using a complex network of intermediaries in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

In February and May 2021, the United States of America Navy seized two cargoes of weapons from dhows in the Arabian Sea. These included significant quantities of small arms and light weapons; container-launched, wire-guided anti-tank missiles; and associated equipment such as optical sights. An inspection of the seized weapons by the Panel revealed that they had markings and technical characteristics consistent with arms documented by the Panel in previous seizures, indicating a common pattern of supplies involving dhows in the Arabian Sea.

The conflict has devastated the economy of Yemen. Due to the country’s high dependence on the import of basic commodities and foodstuffs, the rapidly depreciating value of the Yemeni rial, in areas which are not under Houthi control, has led to severe inflationary pressures on retail prices. This has made food items increasingly inaccessible for large parts of the population. With parallel systems of power in the country, there has been a systematic fragmentation of the economic system and institutions. This, in turn, has led to a further deterioration of the economy and the living conditions of the population. This state of impoverishment has created a situation that is exploited by some to further their political objectives, at times leading to civil unrest across Yemen, thereby posing a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of the country.

Houthis adopt various methods to enrich themselves and sustain their activities, notably through the use or threat of violence and coercive regulatory practices. These include the collection of illegal fees and levies from high revenue-generating economic sectors, such as oil and telecommunications, and the confiscation of the assets and funds of individuals and entities. The downstream impact of the fragmented political, regulatory and financial institutions has created a coercive and challenging environment for the economy. Unless the macroeconomic situation is seriously addressed, political solutions to the conflict will only become more complex, making the vision of peace for the region even more distant.

The ongoing Houthi offensive against Ma’rib has had dire consequences for the civilian population, especially internally displaced persons. During the reporting period, there were several attacks against internally displaced person camps, which exposed an already vulnerable population to fear, injury and death while forcing additional displacements. There were also numerous shellings of Ma’rib and Ta’izz cities, which are densely populated areas, with lethal consequences for civilians.

The indiscriminate use of landmines by the Houthis, in particular on the west coast, presents a constant threat to the civilian population, with tragic impacts on lives, security and health, and with long-term consequences if not addressed.

Impunity is the norm rather than the exception when it comes to violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Violations such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment are endemic and committed by all parties. Migrants continue to be particularly vulnerable to abuses and violations of international human rights law. In Houthi-controlled areas, detention and the judicial system are being instrumentalized to quell any opposition or perceived dissent, especially by journalists, women and religious minorities. In areas that are not controlled by the Houthis, the judicial system remains weak, dysfunctional and mostly ignored by the security forces. Coalition airstrikes also continue to result in civilian casualties.
There is almost no support available for victims of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Often, those who have been arbitrarily detained for years, having lost their houses and jobs, are left with nothing when released. This is particularly the case for women who, in addition to trauma, have to face the social stigma associated with their detention. In addition, after years of arbitrary arrests and detentions and enforced disappearances, a large number of Yemenis have gone missing. Their families are left in the lurch, with little support from any of the parties to ascertain the fate of their relatives.
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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 2564 (2021), covers the period from 6 December 2020 to 5 December 2021 and includes updated findings from the investigations that were presented in the Panel’s final report of 25 January 2021 (S/2021/79).


3. In its previous final report, the Panel reported on the implementation of the Saudi deposit mechanism. In view of additional information received by the Panel since the publication its previous report, the Panel has undertaken a complete review of section IX.B, annex 28 and text related thereto in table 1, and the recommendation contained in paragraph 161 of that report. The findings of the present report update and replace the findings of the aforementioned parts of the previous report.

4. During the reporting period, the Panel travelled to Egypt, Germany, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as to Aden and locations on the west coast of Yemen. The Panel conducted inspections of seized weapons and of debris from missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles and waterborne improvised explosive devices in the countries of the region.

5. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continued to have an impact on the Panel’s ability to travel and investigate cases. The Panel notes that some individuals and entities share sensitive information in person only. Restrictions related to the pandemic have forced the Panel to draft remotely, which has had an adverse impact on the process. The Panel’s regional expert resigned on 31 July 2021; this position had not been filled at the time of writing.

6. The Panel met with senior members of the Government of Yemen, including the Vice-President and Prime Minister, as well as leaders of the Southern Transitional Council, including its President. The Panel’s visit to the west coast provided an opportunity to meet with local authorities, senior representatives of the National Resistance Forces, the Amaliqah Brigades and Tihamah leadership. The Panel also met with senior officials of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

7. The Panel sent 147 official letters, of which 94 letters were to 21 Member States and 53 letters were to 36 organizations, entities and companies, to which 68 replies were still pending as of 17 December 2021 (see annex 3).

II. Developments affecting peace, security and stability

8. The conflict in Yemen cannot be understood without an analysis of its role within the region, both regarding the threats posed by the military actions of the Houthi forces to the security of Saudi Arabia and the wider region, and regional political developments affecting the search for a peaceful solution.

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1 Additional information on the Panel’s methodology and the opportunity to reply is provided in annex 1.

2 Major locations in Yemen are spelled in accordance with the spellings used in the United Nations Geographic Information System map in annex 2.
9. For Saudi Arabia, with a long and difficult border to control, strong social and economic ties, and the strategic importance of the Bab al-Mandab strait, the conflict in Yemen is as much about containing an external threat as it is about restoring the authority of the legitimate Government in the interest of bilateral relations. The Government of Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi requires the continuous military, financial and political backing of Riyadh. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is increasingly looking for an exit from the war, inter alia, because the war is expensive and unpopular with domestic audiences.

10. The role of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, unlike that of Saudi Arabia, is harder to understand. The United Arab Emirates does not share a border with Yemen and there are fewer economic and social ties between the two countries. Having spearheaded anti-Houthi military operations on the west coast until the signing of the Stockholm Agreement in 2018, the United Arab Emirates officially withdrew most of its military forces in 2019, while remaining part of the Coalition and also conducting counter-terrorism operations. Nevertheless, it retains an outsized political role in Yemen, mostly through providing political, financial and military support to the Joint Forces on the West Coast, as well as political support to the Southern Transitional Council.

11. The situation is less clear with regard to external support for the Houthis. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been a political ally of the movement since at least 2015 and maintains an “ambassador” in Sana’a. It is one of few States Members of the United Nations that recognize the Houthis as the legitimate government of Yemen.

12. The other country in the region that maintains formal channels of communication with the Houthis is Oman, which shares a border with Yemen. Strong social and economic links exist between the two populations. The Sultanate maintains a neutral position vis-à-vis the conflict and hosts high-level Houthi negotiators. Overland commercial traffic remains lively. While the border crossings are under the control of the Government of Yemen, there is evidence that components for Houthi weapon systems (see paras. 69 and 70), as well as other military equipment (see para. 67), continue to be supplied overland to the Houthi forces by individuals and entities based in Oman.

13. Within Yemen, the political, security, military, economic and humanitarian situation further deteriorated during the reporting period. The unity Government, which includes representatives from the Southern Transitional Council and the Hadi Government, was sworn in on 26 December 2020. This Government, formed after months of negotiations, was the most significant achievement of the Riyadh Agreement. However, the unity Government has not been able to meet all its objectives, i.e. the withdrawal of military forces from Aden affiliated to the Southern Transitional Council, jointly confronting the Houthis, stabilizing the currency and increasing government revenues.\(^3\) For example, the Government of Yemen and the Council disagree on whether the Council has removed all military units from Aden (see annex 6); the Houthis made significant territorial gains; and the exchange rate of the Yemeni rial against the United States dollar, which was 720 on the date of the announcement, has steadily deteriorated, crossing 1,700 in early December 2021.

14. During the reporting period, measures were taken by both signatories which undermined the Riyadh Agreement (see paras. 15 and 34).\(^4\) The Prime Minister and some senior government functionaries were compelled to leave Aden, barely three months after the formation of the unity Government, after protestors stormed

\(^3\) See www.arabnews.com/node/1783251/middle-east.

\(^4\) Panel discussions with the negotiating teams of both the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen in Riyadh in June and October 2021.
Masheeq Palace, where the Prime Minister was residing.\(^5\) After that incident, in mid-2021 negotiation teams from Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council were formed in an attempt to revive the Riyadh Agreement, and to enable the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to return to Aden. In the absence of the Prime Minister and after the return to Aden of the President of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidarous Zubaidi, in May 2021,\(^6\) the Council took additional measures to establish its control over various institutions. In June 2021, the Council informed the Panel that it had taken control of Mayyun/Perim island, with the help of the Coalition.\(^7\) Following protracted negotiations by Saudi Arabia, the Prime Minister returned to Aden on 28 September 2021.

15. The political relationship between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government remains tense, with the Government accusing the Council of escalating already palpable tensions with its belligerent rhetoric. The Council accuses the Government of carrying out a “war of services” by denying populations under the Council’s control access to public services.\(^8\) In June 2021, Saudi Arabia stated that the political and media escalation and the subsequent political and military appointment decisions by the Council were inconsistent with what had been agreed upon between the two parties.\(^9\) It is unusual for Saudi Arabia to publicly single out any party for criticism.

16. The Panel notes that both the Stockholm and the Riyadh Agreements were negotiated under time constraints during crisis situations, namely, the advances by the Joint Forces on Hudaydah city in 2018 and the open fighting between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen in 2019. Both Agreements contain broad wording that leaves room for significant differences in interpretation by the conflict parties. As such, the Agreements per se are merely starting points for further negotiations on their implementation, which has stalled. Withdrawals in Hudaydah by the Joint Forces in November 2021 undermined the already weakened Hudaydah Agreement. Although the Riyadh Agreement was partially successful in achieving local ceasefires in Abyan in 2021, other objectives remain incomplete in terms of implementation.

### III. Activities of armed groups that threaten the peace, security and stability of Yemen

17. Throughout the reporting period, Houthi and Government of Yemen forces backed by the Coalition continued to fight for the control of Ma’rib city. In September and October, in quick succession, the Houthis captured several districts in Baydah, Shabwah and Ma’rib Governorates, with the aim of encircling the city (see map 1 and annex 4). As the fall of the city became a real prospect, anti-Houthi forces began repositioning themselves and forming new strategic alliances (see para. 31 and annexes 4 and 5). In October and November, there were unprecedented redeployments and withdrawals by both the Coalition and the Joint Forces (see paras. 18–20).

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\(^5\) Although the Government of Yemen accused the Southern Transitional Council of orchestrating those protests, the Council’s involvement was less visible than in August 2019, when the vice-president of the Council, Hani Ali Salem Binbrek, publicly called for the storming of the presidential palace (see S/2020/326, para. 29).


\(^7\) Meeting with the Council negotiating team in June 2021 in Riyadh. Mayyun, also known as Perim, is a very small island in the Bab al-Mandab strait.

\(^8\) Discussions with the Council delegation in Riyadh in 2021.

\(^9\) See https://twitter.com/SPAregions/status/1410734209367363592?s=19.
A. Withdrawals by the Joint Forces on the West Coast from Hudaydah in November 2021

18. Around 10 or 11 November 2021, brigades of the Joint Forces began withdrawing from their positions on the north-western strip of the Hudaydah coastline. According to the Coalition and the Joint Forces, this was a pre-planned national military strategy, aimed at reinforcing the Shabwah and Ma’rib fronts. On 12 and 13 November, Houthi forces took control of the vacated areas (see map 2). Around 14 November, the Coalition launched airstrikes to prevent further Houthi advances, reportedly its first engagement in the area since the signing of the Stockholm Agreement.

19. The withdrawals had adverse consequences on the humanitarian situation of civilians. Civilian and military authorities were informed of the withdrawals 24 hours before they occurred, which did not give them sufficient time to evacuate vulnerable people from the areas. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel of 54 alleged violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Houthi forces after they gained control over vacated areas; most occurred on 12 November 2021. By

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10 For the statements, see annex 5.
11 Confidential sources.
12 The Houthis, having been taken by surprise, reportedly did not initially have sufficient troops to occupy those areas.
14 Reportedly, it was difficult to regroup the concerned units. Some Joint Forces fighters were killed.
15 The Panel also received information from multiple sources but has not yet been able to investigate.
14 November, the United Nations reported the displacement of over 800 families because of the withdrawals. The Peaceful Tihamah Movement and the Tihamah Resistance condemned the withdrawals (see annex 5). At least one brigade refused to withdraw from its location until the families of its members were safely evacuated. The Panel finds that the Joint Forces and the Coalition should have taken adequate measures to ensure the safety of civilians and wounded fighters, notably by ensuring that civilians at risk from Houthi reprisals would be evacuated in a timely manner.

20. The Joint Forces indicated that these withdrawals were according to the redeployment plan of the Stockholm Agreement (see annex 5). However, the withdrawals were not coordinated with the Government of Yemen or the Redeployment Coordination Committee, which, according to the Agreement, is to supervise redeployments. UNMHA, responsible for the facilitation of the Agreement’s implementation, was also not informed, nor was the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, who visited Mukha on 10 November.

21. The Stockholm Agreement, mediated by the previous Special Envoy, is unpopular among the Joint Forces. The National Resistance Forces, for example, view it as having impeded their victory in Hudaydah. Both they and the Tihamah Resistance begrudge the signing of the Agreement without their participation. This frustration is further fuelled by the inability of the United Nations to reach an agreement in Ma’rib, which could operate to stop Houthi advances, in a similar way to how the Stockholm Agreement stopped further advances of the Joint Forces into Hudaydah in 2018–2019.

22. The Hudaydah Agreement has failed to achieve some important objectives: there have been multiple ceasefire violations; redeployments from the ports are contested; and the Houthis have unilaterally used revenue from the Central Bank of Yemen in Hudaydah, despite undertakings in place. The Houthis further prevented UNMHA from fully carrying out its mandate, including by controlling its observers’ movements. Additionally, the Houthis instrumentalized the Agreement by using it to protect high-value military targets (see para. 49 and annex 36). The delegation of the Government of Yemen to the Redeployment Coordination Committee stopped its participation in the joint Committee mechanism in March 2020 after the Houthis allegedly killed a Government of Yemen-affiliated Committee liaison officer.

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17 A representative of the Joint Forces informed the Panel that the Houthis were planning to launch military operations against Al-Faza in Hudaydah after capturing Ma’rib city. Taking over this narrow strip of land controlled by the Joint Forces would allow the Houthis to effectively cut off supplies to 13 brigades stationed north of Al-Faza.

18 A representative of the Joint Forces stated that neither the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) nor the Government of Yemen had been informed due to fear that both entities were compromised, i.e. they did not want the Houthis to know about the withdrawal.


20 See https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1459262407759609860.


22 Panel discussions with the Joint Forces, the Government of Yemen and individuals from Ma’rib. See https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/بيان-صادر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-الساحل-.html.


24 The Government of Yemen-affiliated Redeployment Coordination Committee team requested from UNMHA that there be an investigation of the killing and requested UNMHA to transfer its offices to a neutral area because they were currently in a Houthi-controlled area. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that it continued to meet with the UNMHA unilaterally; the most recent such meeting was on 7 June 2021 (see S/2021/79, para. 12).
23. Following the withdrawals on the west coast, the Joint Forces recaptured some areas in Hudaydah and West Ta’izz Governorates from the Houthis (see annex 4). The Coalition also supported some of these operations through air strikes.\textsuperscript{25}

24. There were also movements by some Amaliqah Brigades to Aden and Abyan, reportedly with the intent to reinforce Shabwah (see annexes 4 and 5). The Joint Forces have not deployed into Ma’rib.\textsuperscript{26}

Map 2  
Changes in areas of control as of 1 December 2021

\textit{Source:} Government of Yemen.  
\textit{Note:} The areas in deep red are those which the Houthis are said to have captured following the events of November 2021.


\textsuperscript{26} Representatives of the Joint Forces. Members of the 3rd Amaliqah Brigade are fighting in Ma’rib, but they are fighting in their individual capacity, according to the Government of Yemen (see para. 38).
25. The Government of Yemen does not appear to have a national-level military strategy to fight the Houthis. The front lines on the west coast and in southern Yemen are largely left to the Joint Forces and the Southern Transitional Council to defend against the Houthis. It is the Coalition, and not the Government of Yemen, that coordinates military operations between the different anti-Houthi factions. For example, in 2021, both the Council and the Joint Forces informed the Panel that it was the United Arab Emirates or the Coalition that coordinated joint military operations with the Government of Yemen (see annex 5) and that they did not receive instructions from the Government of Yemen or the Ministry of Defence.

26. It is unclear to what extent the Government has autonomy from the Coalition in military decision-making. Among Coalition members, there are also competing priorities, which clearly affects the military and political landscape in Yemen (see S/2021/79, para. 28). The Coalition, some officials in the Government of Yemen and some tribal leaders have expressed their concern that corruption in the Ministry of Defence, or the Yemeni Islah Party’s influence over the military and high-ranking officials, has an impact on support for, and the performance of, the national army and affiliated tribal forces.

B. Armed groups on the west coast

27. Since 2019, the Joint Forces have largely held defensive positions against the Houthis. During the reporting period, it positioned itself as a relevant actor beyond the west coast, offering to fight in Ma’rib and to send brigades to Shabwah (see annex 5). In November 2021, it conducted offensive operations in Hudaydah and West Ta’izz. While forces affiliated to the Southern Transitional Council experienced a level of disintegration during the reporting period (see para. 35), clashes within the Joint Forces were few and of a shorter duration, and had limited impact on civilians. As the Coalition’s frustration with Government of Yemen and the Council became more evident during the reporting period, in particular because of their inability to implement the Riyadh Agreement, the Joint Forces emerged as a more reliable partner to the Coalition, as demonstrated by the Coalition-coordinated Joint Forces withdrawal of November 2021. The Government of Yemen and the Joint Forces also have a mutually beneficial relationship, in which the Joint Forces defend the west coast from the Houthis and derive some legitimacy by being aligned to the Government of Yemen.

28. In late 2020, all armed groups on the west coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance Forces and Abu Zara Al-Mahrami of the Amaliqah Brigades. In March 2021, Saleh created the political

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27 The United Arab Emirates stated in October 2021 that it did not have operational control over Southern Transitional Council or Joint Forces leaders and that the activities of those forces were directly linked to their leaders.

28 Panel discussions in Aden and on the west coast, in August 2021, with military leaders. See also an interview with the Director of the Office of the President at https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136.

29 Meeting in Riyadh in October 2021. The Yemeni Islah Party denied exercising any control over the Government of Yemen and the military.

30 Ta’izz military officials and the Joint Forces. See https://2dec.net/news47596.html and https://twitter.com/SDwaid/status/1461714995516002314.

31 The most notable clashes being those between the 3rd Amaliqah Brigade and Abu Zara Al-Mahrami over the latter’s decision to change the Brigade’s leader (see para. 38).

32 The November 2021 withdrawals were the most significant military movements for which the Coalition took responsibility, without informing the Government of Yemen. With regard to the Southern Transitional Council, see para. 15.

33 As opposed to 2019, when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See www.ereenews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139 and annex 5, appendix 4.
bureau of the National Resistance Forces (see annex 5). Saleh’s influence over the local authorities was visible during the Panel’s visit to Khawkhah and Mukha in August 2021. Saleh provides local authorities with financial incentives, humanitarian and development assistance, and guarantees of their security. This is possible through the support of the United Arab Emirates for Saleh, which allowed him to step in for the absent central Government. Saleh’s activities in this regard have further eroded the authority of the Government of Yemen on the west coast.

29. Some Tihamah leaders consider the National Resistance Forces and the Amaliqah Brigades as outsiders to their region. They resent the incorporation of Tihamah armed forces under these two entities, which, according to them, was undertaken by Saleh and the United Arab Emirates to weaken the Tihamah military leadership. The withdrawal in November 2021 further escalated tensions because the Houthis have now gained control over more Tihamah land, and in the process committed atrocities against the Tihamah population (see annex 5). Some Tihamah military and political leaders, in meetings with the Panel throughout the reporting period, stated that they did not exclude the use of force as an option if they continued to be marginalized from local political and military decision-making, citing the example of the Southern Transitional Council’s use of force in Aden.

30. During the Panel’s visit to the west coast in August 2021, local authorities stated that the main factors that undermined their authority and prevented them from undertaking developmental activities were the illegal collection of revenues by the Joint Forces (see figure 1) and the continued occupation of public buildings by the Amaliqah Brigades. In Mukha, the revenues collected by the Joint Forces were not deposited in the Central Bank of Yemen. Al-Mahrami of the Amaliqah Brigades and Ahmed Al-Kawkabani, former Commander of the 1st Tihamah Brigade, informed the Panel that they were occupying some public buildings to secure them or to provide temporary bases for their troops until they received alternative locations from the Coalition. Individuals on the west coast further alleged that the inability of the Joint Forces to halt the smuggling of small weapons, fertilizer and fuel into Houthis-controlled areas through the west coast had further eroded the authority of local institutions, to the frustration of local people and fighters.

34 The influence was not always positively described, e.g. by those who feared reprisals if they carried out activities that were not approved by Saleh.
35 Meeting with Mukha authorities on the west coast. See also https://2dec.net/news47897.html.
36 Confidential discussions with local authorities. See also https://2dec.net/last47928.html and https://2dec.net/last47939.html regarding the delivery by the United Arab Emirates of 80,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses through the National Resistance Forces. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that it provided development and humanitarian assistance on the west coast.
37 Meetings with military and political leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2021. See also www.mei.edu/publications/century-old-grievances-continue-fester-yemens-tihama-region.
38 Ibid.; see also https://almahriah.net/local/5952.
39 Meetings prior to November 2021.
40 Confidential sources. The Amaliqah Brigades informed the Panel that the revenue collection was based on an agreement with authorities and that it was used for development.
C. Relationship between the Joint Forces on the West Coast and the Southern Transitional Council

31. The Southern Transitional Council and the National Resistance Forces informed the Panel in August 2021 that they did not engage in significant military cooperation. Nevertheless, with the possibility of the fall of Ma’rib to the Houthis, in October 2021 the two parties alluded to their readiness to form a united front against the Houthis (see annexes 1 and 5).

32. Some Amaliqah Brigades units, by contrast, fought alongside the Southern Transitional Council against the Government of Yemen in 2019. In 2021, the Amaliqah Brigades used Council-controlled facilities and maintained a military camp in Aden (see para. 38). Within the Coalition, the United Arab Emirates continues to retain significant influence over Saleh, Al-Mahrami and Zubaidi. This influence has, so far, prevented serious clashes between the different forces.

D. Armed groups affiliated to the Southern Transitional Council

33. During the Panel’s visit in August 2021, it was evident that the Government of Yemen had no effective military or security presence in Aden. The Southern Transitional Council and its affiliated forces controlled the Governorate. Notably, Panel meetings with local authorities were held in the presence of Council officials. The Council stated that it maintained a functioning Governorate, despite the absence of senior government functionaries and limited financial support.

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41 For example, in September 2021, the Panel visited a camp for wounded National Resistance Forces fighters in Aden, who said they felt unsafe among members of the Council, because most of the wounded were from the North.

42 See https://2dec.net/news46965.html and https://stcaden.com/news/15986#.YXrXgYHNXw0.twitter.

43 In discussions with the Panel, Al-Mahrami stated that his forces aimed to remain neutral and did not wish to get involved in clashes between the Government of Yemen and the Council.

44 The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that it “has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process” and that it “is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions.”
34. The Council stated that, in 2021, all its military and security forces had been integrated into the Government forces;\(^{45}\) the Government of Yemen denies this.\(^{46}\) Zubaidi relies on the continued existence of Council armed forces to fulfil his political ambition of creating an independent south.\(^{47}\) This will likely prevent the complete integration of these forces as foreseen by the Riyadh Agreement. The Council stated that the Government of Yemen had violated the Agreement in 2021 through unilateral appointments of public servants.\(^{48}\) The Government of Yemen responded that the requirement for consultations with the Council, according to the Agreement, was limited to the appointment of governors and security directors of specified governorates. As such, while the Agreement may have prevented military escalations between the Government of Yemen and the Council,\(^{49}\) it is not a sustainable solution to the southern political crisis.

35. The Council’s authority has significantly eroded since it took control of Aden in 2019. The military infighting and serious security incidents that occurred during the reporting period have raised questions about the Council’s ability to provide security in areas under its control. For example, since June 2021 there have been three significant explosions of improvised explosive devices, as well as clashes between Council fighters that resulted in civilian casualties.\(^{50}\) The Council continued to struggle to secure the resources necessary to ensure the provision of basic services, alleviate the economic crisis and ensure that regular salaries were paid to its fighters. Support from the United Arab Emirates to Council-controlled areas appears to have visibly decreased since 2019, while Saudi Arabia continues to largely channel its financial support through the Government of Yemen.

E. **Developments in Houthi-controlled areas**

1. **Military developments**

36. During the reporting period, the Houthis continued to rule in their territories without any significant political or military opposition, while making significant military gains. The Houthis gained full control of Baydah and advanced into areas in Hudaydah, Ma’rib and Shabwah (see annex 4). The security situation in Houthi-controlled areas was stable compared with that in other areas of Yemen (see para. 35). The Houthis profited from, and at times contributed to, the instability in areas not

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\(^{45}\) See annex 6.

\(^{46}\) However, both claim control over the Shbwani and Hadhrami Elite Forces. Discussions with the Government of Yemen and the Council in August and November 2021.

\(^{47}\) For example, in March 2021 Zubaidi stated that: “The fall in Ma’rib … might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the Southern Transitional Council are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control.” See [www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists).

\(^{48}\) He also continues to advocate for a separate South (see [www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcoCwFrwr58)).


\(^{50}\) It has, so far, prevented major confrontations in Abyan, Aden and Shabwah. There were localized clashes, for example, in Shabwah between the Southern Transitional Council-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen after the United Arab Emirates left the Alam camp in October 2021.

under their control (see paras. 37–40). The Houthis continued to strategically undermine their opponents.

37. During the reporting period, the Panel documented four incidents of missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks on the west coast and in the south, where the attacks targeted important political initiatives or contributed to chaos among anti-Houthi forces. On 30 December 2020, Aden International Airport was attacked by missiles, just as the newly formed unity Government landed (see annex 7). The formation of this Government was the most important achievement of the Riyadh Agreement and, had the plane not been delayed, it is likely that there would have been more casualties among Government representatives, undermining months of negotiations. The timing of the attack was also symbolic, in that the return of the Government provided hope for the people after witnessing two years of fighting between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen. On 11 September 2021, Mukha port was attacked with five uncrewed aerial vehicles and two missiles. At the time, a governmental committee was visiting to oversee the port being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation. This conversion would be an important milestone in normalizing relationships between the Joint Forces and the Government, while opening an additional port for civilian imports on the west coast (see annex 8). On 10 November, missiles hit some military bases in Mukha, on the day that the Special Envoy for Yemen was due to undertake his first mission to the west coast (see map 3 and annex 8).

Map 3
Mukha port attack

38. On 29 August, the Anad camp in Lahij was attacked by missiles and an uncrewed aerial vehicle. This reportedly resulted in around 90 casualties among the 3rd Amaliqah Brigade. The Brigade, which is usually located on the west coast, was in Anad to undertake a training session, following disagreements with Abu Zara

51 The Southern Transitional Council stated that when Houthis “anonymously” carry out attacks, they allow for speculation as to who may be responsible, and create further distrust among anti-Houthi forces.
52 Additional Houthi attacks that resulted in civilian casualties in Ta’izz and Ma’rib are documented at paras. 114–117 and annex 35.
53 For sources, see annex 5.
Al-Mahrami, leader of the Amaliqah Brigades. This attack, which targeted the Third Brigade, created suspicions of collusion between Al-Mahrami and the Houthis, which Al-Mahrami denies. Following the attack, some Third Brigade members dispersed, as they said that they no longer trusted Al-Mahrami.

39. Except for the attack on 10 November, responsibility for the attacks documented in paragraphs 37 and 38 have not been claimed by the Houthis (see annexes 7 and 8). It is unlikely that other armed groups in Yemen have the relevant capacity or motivation for these attacks. It is significant that, in all four attacks, missiles were reportedly launched from Houthi-controlled Ta’izz. In at least two of the attacks, the Panel was informed that early warnings had been provided by the Government of Yemen-affiliated Ta’izz military axis to the Coalition. In the 29 August attack, surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles were sighted over the area prior to the attack; an attack was therefore expected.

40. The Panel was also informed that, over the course of 2021, surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles were observed over key institutions, such as Aden International Airport and Mukha port. Anti-Houthi forces in Yemen have no means of preventing unmanned aerial vehicles or missiles from entering their airspace. The Southern Transitional Council and the Joint Forces, which control the sites of the aforesaid four attacks, stated that, after the United Arab Emirates forces left their areas, they no longer had effective air defence systems, complaints which the Panel also heard in Ma’rib in October 2020. A Coalition member informed the Panel that it was unable to send its air defence systems to Yemen as that would be in breach of its end-user agreements. Had these systems been in place, there likely would have been fewer civilian casualties and less damage to infrastructure (see paras. 114–117).

2. Political and cultural developments

41. The Houthis continue their systematic campaign to ensure the population’s adherence to their ideology and to secure local support for the conflict. In doing so, they specifically target vulnerable groups. For example, the Panel has documented a further nine cases in which Houthis detained, tortured, maimed, sexually violated or repressed politically or professionally active women who opposed Houthi views. In these and other cases, Houthis continued the use of claims of “prostitution” as a pretext to: (a) reduce community support for and acceptance of former detainees, (b) prevent their further active participation in their communities and (c) ensure they do not threaten the Houthi regime (see annex 9). To this end, the Houthis make and keep sexually compromising video recordings, which they continue to use as leverage against any opposition from these women. These measures also have a deterrent effect on other female leaders. Increased repression of women expressing political views affects their capacity to take part in decision-making processes related to the...
resolution of conflict and, as such, comprises a threat to the peace, security and stability of Yemen (see S/2020/326, para. 21 and annex 5). There were limited measures available to provide psychosocial, economic or protection-related support to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, which has resulted in some returning to their families in Houthi-controlled areas (see annex 9).

42. Summer camps and cultural courses targeting children and adults are part of the Houthis’ strategy to gain support for their ideology, encourage people to join the fighting and motivate troops (see annex 10). While some adults join these cultural courses because they agree with the ideology, others participate in order not to lose employment benefits or humanitarian assistance, or out of fear of reprisals for non-participation. For example, two women who refused to participate in these courses were arrested and raped (see annex 10).

43. The Panel investigated some summer camps in schools and a mosque used by the Houthis to disseminate their ideology among children, to encourage them to fight, to provide basic military training or to recruit them to fight (see figures II and III). In these summer camps, hate speech and violence against specific groups are encouraged. The children are instructed to shout the Houthi slogan “death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, victory to Islam”. In one camp, children as young as 7 years of age were taught to clean weapons and evade rockets (see annexes 10 and 11). The Panel also documented a case in which sexual violence was committed against a child who underwent military training. The Panel received information on 10 cases in which children were taken to fight on the pretext that they would be enrolled in cultural courses or in which they were taken from such courses to the battlefield. It also documented nine cases in which humanitarian assistance was provided or denied to families solely on the basis whether their children participated in fighting or to teachers on the basis of whether they taught the Houthi curriculum. These findings are detailed in annex 10.

Figure II
Study materials used in summer camps (left) and students in a summer camp using the books (right)

Source: Al-Masirah (left) and confidential (right) (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opFl1zkY88).

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60 See also Security Council resolution 2467 (2019).
61 Regarding support for victims of gender-based violence, see resolution 2467 (2019), especially paras. 14, 16 (a) and 16 (d).
Figure III
Children and guests at a summer school graduation ceremony, August 2019

Source: Al-Masirah (see www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opFl1zkY88).
Note: Guests included the prime minister, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor; Mohammed Ali al Houthi; and the minister of health, Taha Mutawkkel.

44. Major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi (see figure V), as the minister of defence, has a responsibility to ensure that children are not recruited into the Houthi military. Yahyah al Houthi (see figure IV), as the minister of education, also has a responsibility to ensure that schools and summer camps are not used to promote violence, hatred and radicalization, or to recruit children. Further information on these individuals is available in annexes 10 and 11.

Figure IV
Yahyah al Houthi visiting a summer camp

Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opFl1zkY88.
IV. Maritime security

45. Since December 2020, the Panel has documented five attacks on commercial vessels, as well as several suspicious approaches and one sighting of armed persons onboard small boats in the waters around Yemen (see map 4). Compared with the previous reporting period, where three commercial vessels were attacked in the Gulf of Aden, the focus shifted back to the Red Sea, where four attacks occurred.

In at least two cases, the reported suspicious approaches turned out to be hailing by the Yemeni Coast Guard, which was not conducted in line with international procedures.
46. The situation in the Red Sea was characterized by an increase in the number of attacks involving waterborne improvised explosive devices. Successful attacks involving such devices were not directed at moving vessels, but rather towards ships moored at maritime oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, some of which were more than 1,000 km from Yemen. In some cases, a new, larger type of device was deployed, which is powered by two outboard engines and therefore has a significantly higher fuel consumption rate than the previous generation of “blowfish” devices with one engine. Given the distance cited earlier, it appears almost certain that those devices were launched from a “mothership”, which would have towed the devices for most of the journey.

47. The first attack occurred on 14 December 2020, when three waterborne improvised explosive devices were used to attack Jeddah port. Two such devices were targeted at a naval base, damaging a Saudi warship, while another hit the Singapore-flagged tanker *BW Rhine* (IMO: 9341940) at the Saudi Aramco marine terminal (see figure VI). The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull at the waterline. It also caused a fire which burned for about an hour. While no injuries were reported, there was significant material and subsequent economic damage (see annex 12).

Figure VI
**Fire on the BW Rhine**

![Image of BW Rhine fire](source: Confidential)

48. A similar attack involving two waterborne improvised explosive devices took place on 27 April 2021 close to the Yasref terminal in Yanbu’, where the Singapore-flagged tanker *Torm Hermia* (IMO: 9797993) was moored (see figure VII). The vessel’s crew confirmed that the Saudi Arabian navy intercepted a device approximately 1.4 nautical miles (nm) from the ship. Saudi Arabia confirmed the attack. A second device was detected, approximately 30 nautical miles south of Yanbu’ port (see annex 13). The Panel believes that the distance between the Yemeni coast and Yanbu’ is too long for waterborne improvised explosive devices to operate autonomously, so it is likely that a “mothership” was involved.
49. The frequency of launches of such devices directly from Houthi-controlled areas increased significantly over the reporting period. The Panel was informed by multiple sources that the devices were assembled and launched from Hudaydah and Salif ports. The Coalition is usually able to intercept such devices, and tends to respond with aerial attacks on assembly locations in Houthi-controlled areas, which prompted UNMHA in July 2021 to call for restraint from both sides as “[threats to] operations at vital points of aid entry” constitute “a breach to the Hudaydah Agreement”. The Panel is investigating whether areas covered by the Agreement are used to launch these devices and has requested additional information from the Coalition and UNMHA. As of 31 October 2021, 92 such devices had been launched by the Houthis since the beginning of the conflict, according to the Coalition.

50. The Panel also documented uncrewed aerial vehicle attacks on commercial vessels. On 30 July 2021, the Bahamas-flagged tanker Alberta (IMO: 9486922) sustained damage at Jizan port (see annex 14). The uncrewed aerial vehicle exploded over the vessel’s bow. Pieces of fiberglass debris recovered from the deck show technical features consistent with Qasef-type medium-distance uncrewed aerial vehicles, frequently used by the Houthis to attack targets in the south of Saudi Arabia. No injuries were reported, and the damage was relatively minor. However, this incident shows that moored vessels remain vulnerable, especially at ports near Yemen.

51. Another uncrewed aerial vehicle attack occurred in the Gulf of Oman, targeting the Liberia-flagged tanker Mercer Street (IMO: 9539585). The vessel was first attacked during the morning of 29 July 2021, when the master reported two “drone attacks” 30 minutes apart, which missed the vessel. The vessel was subsequently attacked during the evening of the same day, when a third uncrewed aerial vehicle struck the bridge roof, resulting in significant damage, as well as two casualties, including the master of the ship (see annex 15).

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63 See https://twitter.com/UN_Hudaydah/status/1412009048862568450.
52. Initial reports suggested that the attack could have originated in Yemen.\textsuperscript{64} Therefore, the Panel reviewed publicly available information, and received confidential information from several Member States on this incident. The uncrewed aerial vehicles used seem to be advanced versions of the delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicle previously documented by the Panel (see S/2020/326, para. 57 and annex 15). Considering the distance of over 1,700 km between Houthi-controlled areas and the location of the attack, a successful attack on a ship moving at cruising speed likely requires a system of aerial or maritime relays. This makes it very likely that another actor was responsible for the attack, as the Panel is not aware of access to such systems by the Houthis. Nevertheless, the attack shows how quickly uncrewed aerial vehicle technology, which appears to be also available to the Houthis (see para. 60) is evolving, raising the possibility of similar strikes in waters surrounding Yemen.

53. The second attack in international waters in proximity to Yemen involved the Islamic Republic of Iran-flagged general cargo ship \textit{Saviz} (IMO: 9167253), which experienced an explosion on 6 April 2021 while anchored in the southern Red Sea, approximately 115 nautical miles north-west of the Yemeni coast. According to the Tasnim News Agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the vessel was damaged by limpet mines, which had been attached to the hull by divers.\textsuperscript{65} The \textit{Saviz} had maintained the same position since at least 2017, leading to allegations that the vessel’s role was to support military operations in the region.\textsuperscript{66} The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that the ship had been assigned to combat maritime piracy, and that the attack was unrelated to the Yemeni conflict.

54. The Panel continues to receive reports about sea mines planted in the southern Red Sea by the Houthis, near different islands east of the three ports under their control, and about drifting sea mines near the border with Saudi Arabia. According to the Coalition, between the start of the conflict and 31 October 2021, 205 sea mines were detected and destroyed. The Panel is investigating allegations that mines are stored in and deployed from specific locations in Hudaydah, Salif and Ra’a’s Isa, which would constitute a breach of the Stockholm Agreement.

V. Arms and implementation of the targeted arms embargo

55. Pursuant to paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015), the Panel continues to focus on a range of monitoring and investigative activities to identify whether there have been any violations of the targeted arms embargo involving the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of, individual and entities listed by the Committee and the Security Council. In the assessment of the Panel, all military and paramilitary forces loyal to the Sana’a-based authorities fall under this definition.

56. During the reporting period, the Houthis continued their aerial attacks on Saudi Arabia (see map 5). Targets close to the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia were most at risk and were usually attacked by a combination of medium-range Qasef-2K uncrewed aerial vehicles and Badr-type artillery rockets. The Houthis also continued to strike deep inside Saudi Arabia, using long-range Samad-type uncrewed aerial vehicles, Quds-type cruise missiles and Zulfiqar ballistic missiles.

\textsuperscript{64} See https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2021/08/10/Senior-Pentagon-official-says-Iran-backed-Mercer-Street-attack-came-from-Yemen.
57. Attacks in the border areas took place several times a week. Longer-range operations were less frequent and often occurred in waves, i.e. Houthi forces launched several uncrewed aerial vehicles and missiles at multiple targets as part of the same operation. Locally manufactured uncrewed aerial vehicles and Badr rockets accounted for most of the attacks. The frequency of the attacks shows that the Houthis are easily able to source components for these weapons from abroad.

58. The Panel is aware of a single attack using a cruise missile and of three confirmed longer-range ballistic missile attacks during the reporting period. Those numbers are consistent with previous years, showing that the Houthis continue to struggle with sourcing sophisticated missile systems from abroad. According to the Coalition, between the start of the conflict and 31 October 2021, a total of 781 uncrewed aerial vehicles and 409 ballistic missiles were launched at targets in Saudi Arabia.

59. Houthi targets during the reporting period included civilian infrastructure, e.g. the Saudi Aramco bulk plant in Jeddah (see annex 16) and Abha International Airport (see annex 17). The purpose of these attacks is primarily political: the Houthis want to push Riyadh towards accepting a political settlement beneficial to them. This contrasts sharply with the use of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles in Yemen itself, where the aim is maximum lethality, as evidenced by the attack on Aden International Airport on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), aided by the absence of effective Government of Yemen air defences.
A. New Houthi weapon systems

60. On 11 March 2021, the Houthis presented new weapon systems to the media (see annex 18). The exhibition included a new uncrewed aerial vehicle called Samad-4, which carries two rockets and allegedly has a range of 2,000 km, as well as a short-range hexacopter called Rujum. The latter appears to be a Chinese YD6-1000S converted to drop six small mortar grenades. Additionally, they showed a delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicle called Waed, which seems to be an advanced version of the model documented in 2019 (see figure VIII). It appears to have a larger wingspan and likely has a longer range. Visually, the shape of the vertical stabilizers is the most obvious design difference. In September 2020, images showing what appeared to be a damaged Waed on the Alam front, Ma’rib, was posted on social media. The Waed appears capable of carrying advanced sensor systems, allowing remote control over distances of several hundred kilometres with the assistance of a data relay system, significantly increasing the threat to moving targets (see para. 52 and annex 15).

Figure VIII
Waed uncrewed aerial vehicle at the exhibition (left) and possible Waed debris near Ma’rib (right)

61. The Ma’rib battlefront also saw the first reported deployment of a “358” surface-to-air missile, which was allegedly used in July 2021 to intercept a surveillance uncrewed aerial vehicle (see figure IX). Its comparatively low speed means that it does not pose a significant threat to warplanes, but it may be effective against slower aircraft.

Sources: Almasirah.net (left) and https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168 (right).

69 See https://twitter.com/almasdaronline/status/1308769942007943168.
70 Other longer-range Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle systems use pre-set Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to find their targets, as radio control is restricted by the line of sight. This means that the course of those vehicles, once launched, cannot be adjusted.
72 See https://almasdaronline.com/articles/239284.
B. Seizures

62. On 10 February 2021 at 1701 hours, the USS *Winston Churchill* observed attempts to trans-ship cargo between two dhows approximately 70 nautical miles east of the coast of Somalia (see figure X and map 6). The first vessel, a Shu’ai dhow, was interdicted at 1105 hours on 11 February 2021, but the cargo hold was found to be empty and the dhow was released five hours later. The second vessel, a larger Jelbut dhow, was interdicted at approximately 1400 hours. It carried 3,752 type 56-1 assault rifles, 198 PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, components for 82 DShK heavy machine guns, 50 AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifles (along with 50 RG-004A1 optical scopes) and 90 rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) launchers (see annex 19).
63. The Panel has obtained evidence that the dhows were crewed by Yemeni nationals (see annex 21). According to a Member State, the crew of the Jelbut dhow stated that it had been told to sail to the port of Jask in the Islamic Republic of Iran in January 2021 to pick up the cargo, a claim which appears to be supported by coordinates from a navigational device recovered onboard (see annex 19, figure 19.20). However, the Panel cannot independently verify this information and was unable to inspect the cargo, as it had reportedly been disposed of. Based on available images, the assault rifles and some of the general-purpose machine guns have technical characteristics and markings consistent with weapons manufactured in China, while the anti-material rifles (and associated sights) and the RPG launchers are likely of Iranian origin. The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the Panel that it rejects any linkage to the dhow in question and the seized arms. The Panel also notes that the green plastic wrapping is similar to that used in previous interdictions (see figure XI and table 1; S/2021/79, annex 14, figure 14.6; and S/2019/83, annex 16, para. 7), indicating a common source.

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73 The Panel received only the information shown in the map in annex 19, figure 19.20; however, it notes that more detailed information on the track of the vessel is provided in the report by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime entitled “An Iranian fingerprint? Tracing type 56-1 assault rifles in Somalia”, available from https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/iran-firearms-somalia.
64. The second seizure of weapons occurred at approximately 1700 hours on 6 May 2021 when the USS Monterrey interdicted a Shu’ai dhow in the Arabian Sea, about 114 nautical miles south of the coast of Pakistan (see map 6). The Panel obtained evidence that this dhow’s master was also onboard the Shu’ai dhow seized on 11 February 2021 (see annex 21). Some weapons were again wrapped in green plastic, which has previously been documented by the Panel in other interdictions (see table 1; S/2021/79, annex 14, figure 14.6; and S/2019/83, annex 16, para. 7). The Panel obtained coordinates, from a navigational device allegedly found onboard the dhow, indicating that the ship had been at a location close to the port of Jask on 4 May 2021 (see annex 20, figure 20.44). The Panel cannot independently verify this information and notes that coordinates on a Global Positioning System (GPS) device do not constitute per se conclusive evidence that the vessel was at that location.

74 The Panel notes that a navigational device found on the dhow Bahri-2, which was seized with a cargo of weapons on 24 June 2020, also contained coordinates for Jask port (see S/2021/79, annex 15, figure 15.20).
65. In August 2021, the Panel inspected the cargo, comprising 2,556 type 56-1 assault rifles, 192 PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, 100 type 85 sniper rifles, 52 AM-50 Sayyad anti-material rifles, 35 AKS-74U assault rifles and 194 RPG-7 launchers (see annex 20). The type 56-1 assault rifles and the sniper rifles, and 19 of the PKM-pattern machine guns, have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those made in China. Most were manufactured by Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26) between 2016 and 2017. Of the remaining machine guns, 164 have technical characteristics and markings consistent with manufacture in the Islamic Republic of Iran, while six were produced in Bulgaria and in three cases the origin remains unclear. The AKS-74U assault rifles have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those manufactured at the Tula arms plant in what is now the Russian Federation during the late 1980s. The AM-50 anti-material rifles and the RPG-7 launchers have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Panel also documented several Ghadir rifle scopes, which have characteristics consistent with those made in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as POSP telescopic sights manufactured in Belarus. The Islamic Republic of Iran has informed the Panel that the machine guns and rifle scopes are not Iranian products and that, in its view, the “mere appearance or similarity in markings or technical characteristics between [such] equipment and the products of Iranian companies should not lead to conclusions regarding their origin”. In addition to the small arms and light weapons, the dhow also carried 50 wire-guided, container-launched anti-tank missiles, which have technical characteristics consistent with different versions of 9M111 and 9M113 missiles manufactured between 1978 and
1999 in what is now the Russian Federation. The missiles were packaged in plastic tubes, as observed in previous maritime seizures by the Panel (see figure XII and table 1, as well as S/2020/326, annex 20, figure 20.1), indicating a common source.

Figure XII
Anti-tank guided missiles in their packaging

66. The Panel has not received responses regarding the chain of custody of the seized weapons. The Russian Federation stated that its military entities did not supply weapons to Yemen, while Bulgaria informed the Panel that no records regarding the machine guns were available and a response from China is pending. The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the weapons had not been sold, exported or transferred to Yemen. Regarding the POSP sights, Belarus informed the Panel that they had been exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran between June 2016 and April 2018 and that that country had provided an end-user certificate stating that they would be used exclusively for the needs of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that the sights were in use by its military units and had not been re-exported, transferred or sold. With some notable exceptions,77 the mix of the weapons indicates a common pattern of supply (see table 1), likely from government stocks, involving dhows in the Arabian Sea, which transport weapons to Yemen and

75 In previous years, China informed the Panel that seized type 56-1 assault rifles had not been exported to Yemen. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the weapons were exported to a third country.

76 This is the fifth time since 2018 that optical sights from Belarus exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran were seized (see table 1).

77 These exceptions include the AKS-74U assault and the type 85 sniper rifles.
Somalia (see S/2021/79, paras. 72–76). The Panel continues to investigate, in cooperation with the Panel of Experts on Somalia.

67. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized on 22 June 2021 at the Shahn border crossing between Oman and Yemen (see figure XIII and annex 22). The sights are manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese-Iranian joint venture, and have appeared previously in seizures commingled with weapons (see S/2021/79, para. 88 and annex 14). The Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Panel that the seized sights had not been manufactured in that country. This incident shows that small quantities of military equipment also continue to enter Yemen overland.80

Figure XIII
RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the Shahn border crossing

Table 1
Seized small arms and light weapons, anti-tank guided missiles and sights documented by the Panel since 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Seizure</th>
<th>Type 56-1 assault rifle</th>
<th>RPG-7 anti-materiel rifle</th>
<th>PKM machine guns</th>
<th>DshK machine guns</th>
<th>Optical sights from Belarus</th>
<th>Ghadir rifle scopes</th>
<th>Rayan Roshd Afzar sights</th>
<th>Anti-tank guided missiles (different types)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gulf of Aden, 28 Jun 2018</td>
<td>X&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Aden, 10 Dec 2018</td>
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80 The last known seizure of this nature at the Shahn border crossing took place on 20 March 2019 and involved small arms and light weapons ammunition and mortar grenade fuses.
### C. Chain-of-custody investigations

68. The Houthis continue to source critical components for their weapon systems from companies in Europe and Asia, using a complex network of intermediaries to obscure the chain of custody (see map 7). The four cases described below illustrate this pattern, in line with the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 2511 (2020). Member States have repeatedly informed the Panel that those components are neither weapons nor dual-use items under national legislation. However, the Panel finds that, as these components have military applications, export control and customs authorities need to be particularly vigilant to prevent violations of the targeted arms embargo.

#### Map 7
**Houthi supply networks**

![Houthi supply networks map](image-url)

**Sources:** Panel and Member States.

- ‡ Items had similar packaging.
- ‡ Items were not inspected by the Panel.
- ‡ Shahn is a major border crossing point between Oman and Yemen (see map 6).
69. The Panel investigated the chain of custody of a 30.600G OEM pressure transmitter manufactured by BD Sensors in Germany, which was part of the Quds-type cruise missile used in the attack on Jeddah on 23 November 2020 (see annex 16). Similar pressure transmitters were documented by the Panel as parts of previous missiles and were traced to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey (see S/2021/79, paras. 79–80). This transmitter was purchased by a company in Oman, which imported it via China in July 2020, four months before the attack. The Omani company imported it on behalf of an individual claiming to represent a company in Yemen (see annex 23). The Panel so far has not been able to establish whether the transmitters were indeed exported from Oman to Yemen (which would imply that the Quds cruise missile was manufactured by the Houthis) or to another country, after which it ended up in Yemen. This is the second time in recent years that components for Houthi weapon systems were traced from suppliers in China to commercial companies in Oman (see S/2021/79, para. 77).81

70. The Panel also investigated the chain of custody of six E75BEHD outboard engines manufactured by Yamaha in Japan, which it documented among the debris of three waterborne improvised explosive devices used in the 14 December 2020 attack on Jeddah port (see annex 12). The Panel was able to establish that the engines were exported to Dawood Trading, Yamaha’s general dealer in Yemen, on 9 March 2020, via another commercial company in Oman. The Panel contacted Dawood Trading requesting information about the chain of custody of the engines; a response is pending.

71. The Panel investigated the chain of custody of a 3W-110i B2 2-cylinder rotary engine manufactured by 3W-Modellmotoren in Germany, which it inspected in October 2020 among the debris of a Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle in Ma’rib (see figure XIV). The Panel obtained evidence (see annex 24) showing that the engine had been ordered by an individual in China, via the Taobao.com e-commerce platform on 25 January 2018. Responding to this order, a company in Germany had ordered the engine from the manufacturer via another intermediary, a model aircraft retailer in Germany, and reportedly exported it to China in March 2018. The Panel has contacted China requesting information about the identity of the buyer and the engine’s chain of custody; a response is pending.

81 A response from the Omani authorities regarding the chain of custody of the cargo of uncrewed aerial vehicle components after their arrival in Salalah on 2 December 2018 remains pending.
The Panel further investigated the chain of custody of Titan gas turbine engines manufactured by AMT Netherlands, which it documented in 2020 as part of the “358” surface-to-air missiles (see S/2021/79, para. 81 and annex 13). They were exported to Hong Kong, China, on 10 March 2017 and 6 June 2019. According to end-user certificates obtained by the Panel, the engines were procured by an aircraft company, which, according to China, ceased activities in 2014 and therefore could not have imported the engines. The Panel has discovered that the end-user certificates were submitted by a company based in Hong Kong, China, HSJ Electronic (HK), which was the consignee for the engine with the serial number #7023, while the other three engines were delivered to another company based in Hong Kong, China, Vista Automation & Communication. According to publicly available records, both HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication were owned by the same individual (see annex 25). A response from China about the chain of custody of the engines is pending.

VI. **Financial and economic issues**

A. **Economic issues**

1. **Overview**

73. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen which pose a threat to its peace, security and stability. For over seven years now, Yemen has been embroiled in conflict which has devastated its economy. In areas that are not controlled by the Houthis, the Yemeni rial has been depreciating rapidly against the United States dollar, increasing food prices and pushing more people into extreme poverty.\(^{82}\) Since

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about 90 per cent of the country’s basic commodities are imported, inflationary pressures, triggered primarily by higher import prices, remained strong. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, average food-price inflation exceeded 30 per cent in 2020.\textsuperscript{83} Real gross domestic product contracted by approximately 8.5 per cent in 2020 and the World Bank anticipates that overall inflation continued accelerating rapidly in 2021, to an estimated 45 per cent, compared with 35 per cent in 2020.\textsuperscript{84}

2. Economic issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security and stability

74. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation and resentment among the population in areas not controlled by the Houthis, offering a fertile breeding ground for further social unrest and conflict. The patience of ordinary individuals is wearing thin, evidenced by increasing instances of public protests, demonstrations and unrest in these areas,\textsuperscript{85} with people taking to the streets to protest against spiralling exchange rates, increasing food prices, non-payment of salaries, electricity shortages and widespread poverty. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation.

75. The Economic Committee of the Southern Transitional Council, under Aidarous Zubaidi, held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the Central Bank of Yemen or other Government of Yemen entities, to discuss measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation.\textsuperscript{86} Such actions by the Council are viewed by critics as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank and the Government of Yemen over banking and exchange companies, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the Council.\textsuperscript{87}

76. The fragile nature of the political system and economy of Yemen continues to be threatened, endangering the country’s peace, security and stability. The conscious and systematic fragmentation of the economic system and institutions of Yemen by the Government of Yemen and the Houthis alike has resulted in the emergence of separate central banks, customs and revenue authorities, financial intelligence units and telecommunications authorities, as well as separate economic, trade, banking, tariff and tax laws and policies in the two regions (see annex 26).

77. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situation, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy, adding to the country’s instability.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{83} Central Bank of Yemen, \textit{Quarterly Bulletin: Economic and Monetary Developments}, No. 4 (September 2021). The annual inflation rate in 2020 was estimated at around 25 per cent, up from an estimated average rate of 10 per cent in 2019.

\textsuperscript{84} See \url{www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview#1}.

\textsuperscript{85} According to data from Intelyse, as of 27 September 2021, 54 demonstrations had been recorded that month in Aden, Shabwah, Abyan, Socotra, Lahij and Hadhramaut. See \url{https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-key-message-update-protests-intensify-south-due-further-sharp-depreciation}.

\textsuperscript{86} See \url{www.aden-tm.net/NDetails.aspx?contid=179225}. During the Panel’s meeting with the Economic Committee of the Southern Transitional Council, the Committee stated that those meetings had been held to improve the situation.

\textsuperscript{87} During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the Committee clarified that, since the Government of Yemen and the Central Bank of Yemen had not done their job properly, leading to the collapse of the Yemeni rial and an increase in the prices of basic commodities, they had had to intervene.

B. **Control of financial resources by designated individuals and their networks**

78. The Panel investigated funds, other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by individuals designated under the sanctions regime imposed under Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, in violation of resolution 2140 (2014). The following methods are allegedly being employed by them to fund their activities:

(a) Confiscation of assets and funds of individuals and entities;
(b) Receipt of funding from sources across the borders;
(c) Engagement in black-market commerce and imposition of illegal fees on the import of fuel and other business activities;
(d) Counterfeiting, smuggling and trafficking of narcotics, drugs and psychotropic substances, currency notes, antiques and antiquities;
(e) Collection of non-tax revenue and zakat;
(f) Collection of customs duties and taxes.

79. A detailed examination of some of these sources of financing is discussed below.

1. **Confiscation of funds of Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi and others**

80. The president of the al Amana specialized criminal court in Sana’a issued a memorandum on 27 June 2021 to Tadhamon Bank informing it that the frozen funds in three specified bank accounts, maintained with the Bank in the name of Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, had been confiscated by the court upon Hadi’s conviction on charges, inter alia, of “compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen”. 89

81. Tadhamon Bank was further directed by this court to transfer these funds to specific accounts at the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a, managed under the supervision of the public prosecutor. The Bank informed the Panel that it considered such a transfer to be in violation of resolution 2140 (2014). As such, it had informed the governor of the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a and the head of the specialized criminal prosecution that it would not be in a position to transfer the funds. The Panel received information that these funds had not been transferred by Tadhamon Bank to the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a as of 17 November 2021. The freezing and confiscation of these accounts is considered by the Panel to be a potential violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. 90

82. The Panel’s investigations have further revealed that funds and assets of certain entities maintained with a bank have also been ordered by the courts to be transferred to the designated accounts in the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a, but the bank concerned did not transfer any of those funds and assets. The Panel continues to investigate the matter (see annex 27).

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89 The Panel believes that, considering the political nature of this case, the al Amana specialized criminal court in Sana’a was acting under the control or direction of Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004).

90 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17; Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2004, art. 31 (available from https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/551368?ln=en); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4 (2) (g); and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law database, rules 50 and 52.
2. **Confiscation of funds of Tadhamon Bank**

83. The central bank of Yemen in Sana’a issued a circular on 28 June 2021 – the same day on which Tadhamon Bank expressed to the Central Bank its inability to transfer the confiscated funds of Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi – directing all establishments and exchange companies operating within Houthi-controlled areas to freeze all funds and balances of Tadhamon Bank deposited with them and to transfer the same immediately to the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a (see annex 28). Tadhamon Bank reported that it did not maintain any accounts with any exchange company or establishment. The Panel finds that such reprisals by the central bank of Yemen in Sana’a in ordering the confiscation of funds and balances of banks operating within areas under its control have an adverse impact on the smooth functioning of the banking sector and on the economy and stability of Yemen.

3. **Revenue from the telecommunications sector**

84. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry in Yemen continues to experience significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. Companies operating in areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, the levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licences are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies.91 The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over the major telecommunications companies, namely MTN, Sabafon, TeleYemen and Y Telecom (see annex 29). TeleYemen in Sana’a denied any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management had been appointed prior to the current conflict. However, the Government of Yemen claims that it transferred the head office of TeleYemen to Aden and kept the company under its control. TeleYemen in Sana’a stated that the transfer had never been officially communicated and that therefore it did not recognize the transfer under company law. Eighty per cent of the shareholders of Sabafon decided to shift the company’s head office to Aden in 2020. Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer, a close associate of Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004), has been instrumental in taking control of the management of Sabafon.92

85. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national top-level domain, “.ye”, and whether they are using a “bandwidth management system” purchased by TeleYemen in Sana’a. Control over the domain and the illegal use of telecommunications tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out Internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents and block domains in all parts of the country. It is alleged that the Houthis use this equipment to monitor data, messages, texts and voice and video traffic involving their opponents. TeleYemen in Sana’a has clarified to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require [Internet service providers] to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.93

86. The Panel is investigating a case of seizure, by Yemeni customs authorities in Al Mahara, of telecommunications equipment imported by a Sana’a-based

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91 The Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of $13.2 million were collected by the ministry of telecommunications from the telecommunication companies in Sana’a and that, taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and Sabafon by the Houthis was about $22 million per annum.

92 Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel and from confidential sources. On 29 July 2019, Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer (brother of Saleh Mesfer Saleh Al-Shaer (YEi.007)) was appointed managing director of Sabafon in Sana’a (see S/2020/326, annex 26).

93 Letter from TeleYemen in Sana’a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.
telecommunications company, without obtaining a licence or approval from the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen.

87. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that it had seized many consignments of telecommunications equipment and that there were dozens of such shipments that reached the Houthis through smuggling networks. The Panel continues to investigate. Access to telecommunication services is essential for the civilian population, and any measures taken in respect of this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population (see annex 29).

4. **Black market in and illegal fees imposed on the import of fuel**

88. Prior to June 2020, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel for Yemen (48 per cent); since then, there has been a significant change in the pattern of such imports. In April and May 2021, the share of fuel imports arriving in Hudaydah port decreased to 8 per cent\(^\text{94}\) (see annex 31). According to the Government of Yemen,\(^\text{95}\) the fuel supplied to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route during April and May 2021 was about 10,000 tons per day, which represented about 65 per cent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to a supply of 6,000 tons between January and March 2021,\(^\text{96}\) demonstrating an upward trend. According to various sources, the Houthis create an artificial scarcity of fuel in order to force the traders to sell it in the black market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis collected official revenues on fuel imports (i.e. customs and other taxes through Hudaydah port) in excess of YRIs 70 billion.\(^\text{97}\)

89. The Panel received information that, although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in areas not controlled by the Houthis, the Houthis illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations.\(^\text{98}\) The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, with the end consumers paying the price: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports through ports under its control; the Southern Transitional Council also allegedly collects fees of about YRIs 12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers through Aden port;\(^\text{99}\) and the importers and traders seize this opportunity to become enriched (see annex 31). The Panel was informed that the increase in fuel prices had been having a negative impact on the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

5. **Counterfeiting of notes**

90. In paragraphs 142 to 144 and annex 53 of its report dated 26 January 2018 (S/2018/594) and paragraph 125 of its report dated 25 January 2019 (S/2019/83), the Panel mentioned a case involving the seizure of a truck carrying promissory notes of YRIs 5,000 denomination, worth YRIs 35 billion ($140 million), printed outside Yemen,\(^\text{94}\) See the press release of the Government of Yemen available at [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

\(^\text{95}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{96}\) See [https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875](https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875).

\(^\text{97}\) See [www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405](http://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405).

\(^\text{98}\) For example, an importer stated that the Houthis had been collecting YRIs 37 per litre since February 2021.

\(^\text{99}\) The Panel was informed by an importer that it had previously been paying YRIs 7 per litre as per the demand of the Southern Transitional Council but, since April 2021, that payment had increased to YRIs 12 per litre, which was deposited in one designated account with an exchange company in Aden. (For safety considerations, the details are not being shared in the present report.) During the meeting of the Panel with the Council’s Economic Committee on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the Committee, however, clarified that this amount represented local taxes.
in the Government-controlled area of Jawf on 25 May 2017. This case was cited by the Panel to illustrate how the Houthis had tried to solve the problem of cash shortages by printing and bringing promissory notes into Yemen to be used as legal tender.

91. The Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, Germany, in March 2018, convicted Reza Heidari, an Iranian national residing in Germany, imposing a prison sentence of seven years. In 2021, the Panel received further information and evidence about this case, along with a copy of the appeal judgement of 15 May 2020, which confirmed a custodial sentence of five years for his involvement in the case. The matter continues to be investigated by the Panel.

C. **Saudi deposit**

92. In its previous final report, the Panel reported on the implementation of the Saudi deposit mechanism. Information received after that report’s publication shed new light on the data presented therein. The Panel therefore updated that report to reflect that section IX.B, annex 28 and text related thereto in table 1, and the recommendation contained in paragraph 161 of the said report were to be disregarded, pending a final assessment. Accordingly, a review was undertaken by the Panel, which is provided in full in annex 32.

93. During its review, the Panel interacted with all relevant stakeholders and considered updated information received from them, including information on transactions undertaken after the submission of the Panel’s previous final report. The review by the Panel has revealed that the importers who availed themselves of the benefits of the Saudi deposit have received significant benefits, totalling $370.27 million, by way of the difference between the market rates and the letter of credit coverage rates adopted by the Central Bank of Yemen in the implementation of the Saudi deposit mechanism. The Panel’s review demonstrated the shortcomings in the implementation of the mechanism that potentially could have enabled importers to retain benefits advanced to them without passing them on to consumers.

94. Based on information and evidence made available to it, as detailed in annex 32, the Panel’s final review has not revealed incontrovertible evidence to substantiate allegations of corruption, money-laundering or elite capture.

D. **Monitoring of travel ban and asset freeze measures**

95. Sultan Saleh Aida Zabin (YEi.006), director of the criminal investigation division in Sana’a, was designated by the Security Council on 25 February 2021 through its adoption of resolution 2564 (2021). According to a media report, on 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Zabin’s death from a terminal illness. The Panel has not yet received any evidence confirming his death.

VII. **Acts that violate international humanitarian law and international human rights law**

96. Violations and abuses of international humanitarian law and international human rights law are systematic in Yemen and committed by all parties with overwhelming impunity. The judicial system is weak and, in the few cases of arbitrary arrest and/or detention for which it issues orders or decisions, such rulings are largely

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100 See [www.ypagency.net/354210](http://www.ypagency.net/354210).
disregarded by authorities and security forces.\(^{101}\) The judiciary is therefore unable to carry out its preventive and protective functions against human rights abuses.\(^{102}\)

97. The arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists and human rights defenders, and threats against them, continued to be widespread over the course of the reporting period, affecting their ability to document and report on violations (see annex 34).\(^{103}\)

98. Not only is there little recourse for victims, but there is also virtually no assistance available; those who have been arbitrarily detained and/or tortured and/or have seen their assets looted are often left with nothing. Most cannot return to their homes due to constant threats. The same goes for families whose main breadwinner is missing or detained. In both cases, women are particularly vulnerable (see para. 41).

99. The continuation of the conflict is delaying the establishment of justice and redress mechanisms. Ensuring the protection of those documenting violations, and preserving their archives, is crucial.

A. Acts and incidents attributed to the Coalition

1. Coalition airstrikes

100. The Panel investigated six airstrikes conducted by the Coalition in 2021: (a) on 16 January in Mahliyah, Ma'rib; (b) on 28 February in Hawak, Hudaydah; (c) on 7 March in Thawrah, Sana’a; (d) on 10 May, in Rada’, Baydah; (e) on 21 March in Salif, Hudaydah; and (f) on 18 September in Markhah al-Ulya, Shabwah. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 12 civilians, including two children and one woman, and injuries to 13 people, including three children and three women. The Panel concluded its investigations in the cases involving the airstrikes of 16 January and 28 February (see annex 33).

101. In 2020 and 2021, Saudi Arabia provided details to the Panel about the payment of compensation to victims of 10 incidents,\(^{104}\) including the Hajjah hospital attack on 15 August 2016, investigated by the Panel.\(^{105}\)

2. Detentions by the United Arab Emirates

102. The Panel investigated cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance and torture involving United Arab Emirates personnel in Yemen. The Panel received evidence of three people having been detained at the following sites controlled by United Arab Emirates forces between 2018 and 2021: Balhaf, Shabwah; Rayyan airport, Mukalla; Dubbah oil port and Ash Shihr, Hadramawt; and Mukha port, Ta’izz (see annex 34). In a letter to the Panel, the United Arab Emirates denied allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law involving its nationals in the context of detention.

103. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that allegations of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law relating to

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\(^{101}\) The Panel documented three cases in which orders to release a detainee were ignored by the authorities. (On attacks against members of the judiciary, see S/2021/79, paras. 130–131.) During the current reporting period, the Panel investigated three additional cases.

\(^{102}\) See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8; and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2.

\(^{103}\) See also S/2021/79, sect. XI.E.

\(^{104}\) The Panel has not yet been able to verify this.

detention had been referred to the Joint Incident Assessment Team. The Team confirmed that, while it had investigated a detention-related case involving six fishing boats and some 90 fishermen in March 2018, counter-terrorism activities were not part of its mandate.

104. Additionally, the United Arab Emirates stated that it had cooperated with the Director of Aden Security, Major General Shallal Ali Shaye, from December 2015 to July 2020 in the context of Coalition counter-terrorism operations, based on a decision by the Government of Yemen issued at the end of 2015. During the aforementioned period, the Panel documented several cases of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law attributed to him or his forces.

B. Detention by the Government of Yemen

105. The Panel investigated 18 cases of arbitrary arrest and detention by Government forces in Hadramawt, Ma'rib, Shabwah and Ta'izz; one case concerned a woman (see annex 34). In Ta'izz, two cases involved the 170th Brigade, including one case in which a civilian died in detention, and one involved the 22nd Mika Brigade. In Shabwah, most arbitrary arrests and detentions appeared to be politically motivated, as five out of seven cases documented concerned Southern Transitional Council members or supporters, including a minor.

C. Detentions in areas controlled by the Southern Transitional Council

106. During the reporting period, the Panel investigated 16 cases of arbitrary arrest and detention by armed groups affiliated to the Southern Transitional Council in Aden, Lahij and Socotra, including those of two journalists (see annex 34).

107. Three of the cases relate to allegations of detention by the counter-terrorism unit in an unofficial prison within a Council compound in Aden.

108. Of particular concern are two cases of people shot dead at checkpoints controlled by the 9th Brigade, in Tawr al-Bahah area, Lahij.

109. In Aden, 14 people accused of participating in attacks against mosques and clerics are currently being prosecuted. The Panel received evidence that at least 10 of them were tortured during their detention and forced to sign confessions; evidence to that effect was disregarded by the presiding judge.

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106 The Panel investigated several cases of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law by United Arab Emirates officials in Yemen in respect of detention. See S/2021/79, para. 127; S/2020/326, paras. 100–101; S/2019/83, para. 142; S/2018/594, paras. 166–172; and S/2018/193, paras. 132–134. In December 2018, in a letter to the Panel, the United Arab Emirates denied any involvement in such violations in Yemen. It also informed the Panel that all arrest operations and subsequent procedures were, at that time, undertaken by the Government of Yemen. In July 2021, the United Arab Emirates informed the Panel that the content of that letter was still relevant.

107 Major-General Shaye was away from Aden from March to December 2020. The United Arab Emirates stated that it had not dealt with him since he left his position as the Director of Aden Security.


109 The Panel received evidence that he had been shot and that his body showed marks of violence.

110 12°46'32.1" N, 44°59'18.9" E.
110. The Panel also received evidence that three men missing in Aden since 2016 were at one point detained in Mansoura prison, before being handed over to counter-terrorism forces by prison authorities.\footnote{The Panel accessed correspondence between the Mansoura prison director and the Director of Aden Security from November 2020 and January 2021. The date of the transfer was not specified.}

111. In February 2021, members of the judiciary started a strike in southern Yemen to protest allegations of corruption within the judicial council. In August, the Panel was informed that several detainees had not been released because of the strike and that the judiciary had agreed to resume work twice a week. However, this will not be sufficient to clear the backlog of cases. Consequently, many detainees will continue to see their detention prolonged or their trials delayed.

112. In Socotra, the three cases documented involved civilians who had expressed views critical of the Southern Transitional Council. They were arrested for short periods of time and none were formally accused (see annex 34).

D. Detention by the Joint Forces on the West Coast

113. The Panel investigated six cases of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Hays, Khawkhah and Mukha. Four cases involved National Resistance Forces and two cases involved the 1st and 7th Amaliqah Brigades (see annex 34). One case involved a minor who was detained for nearly two years. In none of these cases, involving detention ranging from 4 to 23 months, were the victims presented before a judicial or other impartial body. The National Resistance Forces informed the Panel that tribunals in Hays were not functioning due to hostilities.

E. Incidents attributed to the Houthis

1. Use of explosive ordnance against civilians

(a) Shellings

114. The Panel investigated eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance by Houthis in populated areas in Ma’rib and Ta’izz, which allegedly killed 33 people, including eight children, and injured 51 others, including 11 children (see annex 36).\footnote{In some cases, the Panel was unable to ascertain the exact number of victims despite having received information from multiple sources.}

115. Since early 2021, intense fighting surrounding Ma’rib has had serious consequences for civilians. Several attacks, using explosive devices such as artillery shells, hit camps for internally displaced persons, resulting in deaths and injuries to civilians, as well as the destruction of civilian objects. It also led to the displacement of numerous people who had already been displaced several times, increasing their needs and vulnerability. Between 8 and 17 February, the Zawr camp was attacked at least twice, with Houthis raiding the camp and planting landmines; between 19 and 21 February, the Sawabin and Haylan camps were attacked at least twice; and between 16 March and 4 April, the Milh camp was attacked five times, the Tawasul camp twice, the Khair camp twice, the Dhat al-Ra’ camp once and the Suwaydah camp once.\footnote{The Panel received reports from the Ma’rib authorities and the Government of Yemen, conducted interviews and received videos, pictures and reports from local sources with direct access to the camps. The Panel took note of the letter dated 26 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2021/405).}

116. These cases demonstrate a continuous disregard by Houthis for the principles of distinction and the protection of civilians. The Panel notes that, in at least one incident
in Ma’rib, an uncrewed aerial vehicle was used (see figure XV). According to the Panel’s analysis, Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles are highly accurate.

117. Systematic attacks against populated areas in Ta’izz and Ma’rib, at a distance from the active front lines, can be considered as acts aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law (see annex 36).114

Figure XV
Debris of uncrewed aerial vehicle used in the Ma’rib attack

Source: Confidential.

(b) Landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance

118. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has documented its devastating impact on civilians (see S/2021/79, paras. 140–142; S/2020/326, paras. 115–117; and S/2018/193, annexes 43 and 44).

119. During the reporting period, the Panel gathered significant evidence on this issue, especially during its visit to the west coast in August, one of the most affected regions. The Panel’s findings are reflected in annex 35.

2. Detention

120. The Panel investigated 17 cases concerning 50 victims of violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law in respect of

114 See Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, art. 13 (2); and ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law database, rule 2.
detention, including sexual violence and torture by Houthi authorities.\textsuperscript{115} Six journalists and 11 women are among the victims (see annex 34).\textsuperscript{116}

121. Since 2019, the Panel has investigated the cases of 10 people,\textsuperscript{117} including one minor, arrested in relation to the killing of Saleh al-Samad, president of the Houthis’ supreme political council, in April 2018. They were arrested between September and October 2018 and detained at a secret location. Their families were left without news of their whereabouts until they appeared on television on 17 April 2019, when their trial started, presided over by judge Amin Ali Ahmed Zabara.\textsuperscript{118} The Panel received evidence that they had been tortured and forced to sign confessions. Although this was mentioned during court hearings, no measures were taken. One of them died in detention on 7 August 2019, allegedly from torture. The Panel also received evidence of numerous violations of the detainees’ judicial guarantees; not only were their confessions obtained under torture and used as evidence against them, but the trial also began without them having access to a lawyer. Their lawyers had to make several requests to access the evidence. On several occasions, the accused were unable to meet their lawyers before court sessions. Lawyers were given very short notice of court hearings, leaving them with little time to prepare. On 24 August 2020, the detainees were all sentenced to death, which on appeal was confirmed.\textsuperscript{119} All nine were publicly executed. Their families were notified one day before the execution. As many of those families live in Hudaydah, they were unable to travel in time to Sana’a.

122. The Panel continues to investigate the case of four journalists sentenced to death and still detained in Sana’a.\textsuperscript{120} According to information received, during the reporting period there were discussions about including them in a prisoner exchange, but these did not yield results.

3. Recruitment of children

123. The Panel received a list of 1,406 children recruited by the Houthis who died on the battlefield in 2020. The Panel also received a list of 562 children recruited by the Houthis who died on the battlefield between January and May 2021.\textsuperscript{121} They were aged between 10 and 17 years old. A significant number of them were killed in Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, Hudaydah, Ibb, Sa’dah and Sana’a (see annex 10).

4. Persecution and discrimination on religious grounds

124. The Panel documented the systematic persecution of Jews in Houthi-controlled areas. Most of Jewish population left Yemen after several years of persecution, which started under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh but intensified under the Houthis. The Panel knows of seven Jewish individuals still in Yemen, including one who remains detained despite an order to release him issued in July 2019. The Panel also documented two cases of Christians detained by the Houthis based on their religion (see annex 34).

\textsuperscript{115} See, among others, Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3; Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, arts. 4–6; and ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law database, rules 90, 93, 98, 100, 123 and 125.

\textsuperscript{116} See S/2020/326, paras. 22 and 118; and S/2021/79, para. 137.

\textsuperscript{117} Evidence includes interviews, reports and court documents from at least six different sources, including relatives of the victims.

\textsuperscript{118} See www.almanar.com.lb/5135682.

\textsuperscript{119} According to information received by the Panel, the Appeal judges were judges Abdul Hafeez Abdul Razzaq Al Mahbashi, Hammoud Ahmed Al-Qulaisi and Muhammad Lotf Al-Zubayri.

\textsuperscript{120} See S/2021/79, para. 147.

\textsuperscript{121} These lists were compiled by a confidential source and the Government of Yemen, using Houthi public media announcements. The Panel also received a report which contains the names of 640 children. The Panel stands ready to share these lists with the Committee.
125. Judicial procedures against several Baha’is remain active even though many of them were expelled from Yemen; one of the objectives is to complete the seizure of their assets and properties. In a speech given in March 2021, Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YE1.004) accused the “Americans of seeking to establish Baha’i, Ahmadiyya and atheism in Yemen in order to undermine Islam”, demonstrating support for this policy of systematic persecution.

5. Attacks against civilians

126. The Panel investigated attacks by Houthis against civilians in several villages in the Hima region, Ta’izz, in January 2021. According to information, reports and testimony received, the attacks resulted in 13 people killed, including one child, 47 people injured, including seven children and seven women, 257 arrested, including 14 children, and approximately 150 families displaced. At least three schools were raided and used by Houthis for military purposes and detention. The Hima area was attacked before, in December 2017 and April 2019.

127. Towards the end of September 2021, Houthis surrounded Abdiyah district, Ma’rib, and blocked road access. For a few weeks, civilians were facing food and medicine shortages. The Panel received information about 59 men arrested by Houthis during this period, as well as testimony about the destruction of a communication antenna, which made obtaining information about the situation very difficult.

F. Acts attributed to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula

128. On 14 June 2021, five Government of Yemen investigators were kidnapped by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Kura, Shabwah, near the border with Baydah, an area under the group’s control. The group released a video of the detainees and asked the Government of Yemen to exchange them for members of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. The detainees were released on 5 July 2021.

G. Land disputes

129. Disputes over land and property are a long-standing problem in Yemen. However, years of conflict have weakened conflict-resolution systems, especially the judiciary and the security apparatus, and increased the power of armed groups and gangs involved in the disputes. The price of land has also increased in the past few years. As a consequence, violence over land disputes has increased, with civilians becoming more vulnerable as their land and houses are being taken by armed groups.

130. The Panel investigated one case to illustrate this issue. On 10 August 2021, in Bi’r Bashah, Ta’izz, a dispute occurred over land belonging to the Al-Haq family and occupied by a group led by Majid Al-Araj, affiliated to the Government of Yemen 145th Brigade. The dispute resulted in the killing of Majid Al-Araj, one of his men and four men of the Al-Haq family, and injury to another person. Subsequently, a

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125 The Panel received information from local sources and non-governmental organizations that included pictures, reports and videos.
126 This was mainly due to blockage of commercial items. According to information received by the Panel, food distribution to approximately 15,000 people by the World Food Programme took place at the beginning of September and at the end of October as initially planned.
127 According to news reports, 52 people were released on 4 November. See https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3162733.htm and https://twitter.com/abdulqadermortd/status/1456239360844632068.
group affiliated to Al-Araj raided the Al-Harq family’s houses, with women and children present. Three members of the Al-Harq family were arrested: two minors and one young man, the latter of whom died in detention. The Ta‘izz military informed the Panel that it had intervened to secure the area, and that two suspects resisting arrest had been killed and nine others detained.

H. Migrants

131. On 7 March 2021, an incident occurred at the Immigration, Passport Naturalization Authority detention facility in Sana’a which resulted in the death of approximately 45 migrants and injury to 202 others.128

132. According to information received, following an argument between guards and migrants, who were on a hunger strike over detention conditions, security forces intervened and threw tear gas canisters into a hangar in which the migrants had locked themselves. As a result, a fire started in the overcrowded and poorly ventilated structure, which had only one door.129 According to Houthi authorities, there were 862 migrants at the facility on that day and 358 were in the hangar when the incident occurred.130 According to information received, Houthi authorities confiscated victims’ cell phones, including at hospitals, in an attempt to prevent communication about the incident.

133. The Houthis publicly blamed the International Organization for Migration for the incident, saying that the organization had failed to repatriate the migrants, leading to overcrowding.131 Also, according to information received, the statement issued following the incident by a group of migrants indicating that the fire was due to a fight between migrants132 was released following pressure by Houthi authorities on migrant leaders.

134. Local media reported that Houthi authorities had begun an investigation, leading to 11 people being arrested.133 The Panel received evidence that four people had been detained following the incident. Approximately four months later, they were released after investigations concluded that the fire was an accident and that they had not committed any crime.134

135. Between July and September 2021, the Houthis conducted a “security campaign” in Jawf, arresting over 700 migrants, some of whom were forcibly expelled from Houthi-controlled areas while others were detained.

VIII. Obstruction of the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance

136. Since the end of 2020, some progress has been reported concerning humanitarian access and the possibility for humanitarian organizations to undertake programme assessments in Houthi-controlled areas. After a long period of blockage

128 The Panel received information from multiple sources that approximately 28 people died from their injuries after being transported to hospitals. According to the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights of Yemen, the number of victims was 400 (see www.nciye.org/reports/NineReport/NINE-en.pdf).

129 The Panel received information from international humanitarian organizations, local non-governmental organizations and individuals.


132 The Panel received a copy of the statement.

133 See www.ansarollah.com/archives/421005.

134 Copies of the documents are with the Panel.
by the Sana’a-based authorities, the implementation of a biometric project by the World Food Programme to secure humanitarian assistance is still ongoing. A regular humanitarian air service to Ma’rib has also been established.  

137. However, numerous obstacles to the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance across Houthi-controlled areas remain: delays in the approval of sub-agreements, requests to share details of beneficiary lists, pressure to influence the choice of implementing partners or programme design, restrictions on access and denial of movement, including the arbitrary imposition of a mahram chaperone for female personnel,  

136 and harassment of humanitarian personnel. Local authorities often try to impose their own requirements by blocking trucks at checkpoints or threatening humanitarian actors. The Panel also documented cases in which families were threatened with removal from the beneficiaries list if they refused to allow their children to join Houthi forces (see annex 10).

138. The Panel received evidence of abuse, harassment and continuous obstruction by the Houthis of a specific humanitarian organization to force the organization to change its policy. The abuse included physical violence, arbitrary arrests and detention, denial of visa or entry, expulsion of senior staff, restrictions on movement of personnel and supplies, and interference with activities and choice of service providers (see annex 37).

139. In addition to the two United Nations employees arrested in November 2021, the Panel documented the arrest and detention of three other humanitarian actors by Houthi authorities.

140. The media campaign against the United Nations is still ongoing. This not only is detrimental to humanitarian activities but also creates additional security risks (see S/2021/79, para. 48 and annexes 7 and 8).

141. In southern Yemen, the weakness of governmental authorities allows local actors to impose their own requirements. The security risks for humanitarian organizations are also increasing: the Panel documented five incidents of humanitarian personnel or cargo being blocked at checkpoints and three incidents in which vehicles of humanitarian organizations were hijacked by unknown actors in Abyan and Ta’izz.

142. In April 2020 in southern Yemen, some activities of a humanitarian organization were suspended for several months over a disagreement on incentives for some governmental staff.

IX. Recommendations

143. The Panel recommends that the Security Council, in its upcoming resolution:

(a) Call on the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen to refrain from taking actions undermining the Riyadh Agreement and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who participate in these acts;

(b) Call on the Houthis, the Government of Yemen, the Joint Forces and the Coalition to refrain from taking actions undermining the Stockholm Agreement and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who participate in these acts;

135 See S/2021/79, sect. III.
136 This rule prevents females from traveling without being accompanied by a male member of their family. It limits the possibility of female employees of humanitarian organizations performing their duties and exposes them to arrest and detention, if not complied with.
137 See https://apnews.com/article/science-middle-east-saudi-arabia-united-nations-yemen-f138d377483ac1e1d106b131e9676286.
(c) Call on parties to the conflict to refrain from using educational, religious and public institutions to incite hatred or violence against any group or nationality and express its intention to impose sanctions on those who are responsible for these acts;

(d) Call on parties to the conflict to refrain from using schools, summer camps and mosques to recruit children and express its intention to impose sanctions on those responsible for these acts;

(e) Call on Member States to increase efforts to combat the smuggling of weapons and components via land and sea routes, to ensure implementation of the targeted arms embargo;

(f) Call on Member States to increase due diligence measures concerning the export of commercially available components documented by the Panel within weapon systems used for the benefit of listed individuals (see S/2021/79, annexes 19 and 20) and report to the Committee thereon;

(g) Call on parties to the conflict to take measures to prevent the further fragmentation of the economy of Yemen, including banking and financial institutions, and express its intention to impose sanctions on those responsible for these acts;

(h) Call on parties to the conflict to ensure accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed by their forces and to provide immediate redress and support to victims;

(i) Call on Member States, parties to the conflict and other relevant stakeholders to consider establishing transitional justice mechanisms for Yemen;

(j) Recall resolution 2474 (2019) and call on the parties to the conflict to take all appropriate measures to actively search for persons reported missing, to put in place appropriate channels to enable communication with the families of such persons and to consider putting in place mechanisms to provide those families with support;

(k) Call on the Houthi forces to take measures to stop the indiscriminate use of landmines, record their placement and remove existing landmines from civilian areas under their control.

144. The Panel recommends that the Security Council include in the agenda of the monthly meeting on Yemen a focused discussion on:

(a) The challenges faced by female detainees in Yemen, as presented in annex 9, and include these women in future transitional justice initiatives and consider including in this discussion the Government of Yemen and other relevant Yemeni stakeholders;

(b) The use of educational, religious and public institutions to disseminate hate speech, encourage violence and recruit children, and consider including in this discussion the Government of Yemen and other relevant Yemeni stakeholders.

145. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider:

(a) Discussing with Member States the possibility of establishing a dedicated fund for survivors of sexual violence, which includes survivors from Yemen, as stipulated in paragraph 17 of resolution 2467 (2019);

(b) Engaging with the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies to include commercial parts used in Houthi missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles and waterborne improvised explosive devices in their list of dual-use goods and technologies;

(c) Encouraging parties to the conflict and other relevant stakeholders, including international mediators, to include measures to prevent further
fragmentation of the economy of Yemen, including banking and financial institutions, in the peace process;

(d) Encouraging Member States to support the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Violations of Human Rights of Yemen, especially with respect to the safeguarding of its archives, including through the creation of an offshore digital backup, and calling on parties to the conflict to collaborate with the Commission;

(e) Engaging with parties to the conflict and international mediators to include accountability, justice and redress measures in the peace process;

(f) Encouraging Member States to increase support for demining activities, including through training sessions for demining personnel in Yemen.
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Annex 1 Methodology

1. The Panel used satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also used commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.

2. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.

4. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of four out of the five members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.

5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel’s findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.
Appendix A  ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity\(^1\) in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.

2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
   (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm.
   (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
       (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation.
       (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources.
       (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members.
       (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field.
       (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

\(^1\) Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.
Appendix B  Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopted the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations met the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it has paid particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, S/2006/997, on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).

2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:

   (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

   (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
       (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims.
       (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.
       (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavor to obtains copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations.
       (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
           a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
           b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
       (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident.
       (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and
international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

(vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced.

(viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area.

(ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident.

(x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:

(i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview.

(ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody.

(iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.

(iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates.

(v) Documentation issued by prison authorities.

(vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible.

(vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim.

(viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates.

(ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.

(xx) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(xxi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from
detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture.

(xxii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

(i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview.

(ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident.

(iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained.

(iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident.

(v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk pose by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:

(i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident.

(ii) Interviews with people and organization providing assistance to these children.

(i) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

(f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

(f) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian
home, or in violations associated with children.

(g) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 2564 (2021) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.

3. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel will deposit such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.

4. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to supports the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.
Annex 2  UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) map
Annex 3  Summary of Panel correspondence

Table 3.1  
Correspondence with Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters by Member State</th>
<th>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>One was a partial response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Engagement ongoing in respect of response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>One was a partial response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (21)</strong></td>
<td><strong>94</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2  
Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters by entity</th>
<th>Number of letters where the deadline is after 17 December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a based ministry of foreign affairs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sana’a based central bank of yemen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Transitional Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Resistance Forces Guards of the Republic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3
Correspondence with international and regional organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters by entity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4
Correspondence with commercial companies/government entities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commercial company</th>
<th>Number of letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th>Number of unanswered letters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aurum Ship Management FZC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Mantab Logistics Company (SFZ) LLC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Talib Shipping Company LLC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCD &amp; ME GmbH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawood Group of Companies, Sana’a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayel Saeed Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Walther GmbH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank Yemen (Aden)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Smart Digital Interface Company LLC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonca Paz. Mak. San. Tic. A.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTN Group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHI Marine LLC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabafon, Aden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabafon, Sana’a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamos Steam Ship Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaid &amp; Sons for Exchange Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadhamon Bank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tele Yemen, Sana’a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tele Yemen, Aden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORM A/S</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walbro LLC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zodiac Maritime Ltd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Yah Satellite Communications Company P.T.S.C (Yahsat)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y Telecom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Net</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (25)</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4 Battle for Ma’rib and Shabwah in 2021

1. The hostilities which escalated in the first half of 2020 have continued throughout 2021.² The Houthis made significant territorial gains, including in areas in the Governorates of Al Baydah, Shabwah, Ma’rib, and Al Hudaydah. While the Government of Yemen, the Coalition air forces, and the West Coast Joint Forces (WCJF) have engaged in both offensive and defensive operations³ (see map 4.1 and table 4.1), the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has mostly been defensive in its battles against the Houthis.

Map 4.1
Houthi military gains in September-October 2021 around Ma’rib City

² In 2019, the Panel reported that the frontlines remained relatively stable (paragraph 11, S/2020/326).
³ For example, this includes areas in Maqbanah, Hays and Al Ain and Hess Junction, Ta’izz. Information from military sources.
⁴ The encirclement started around 23 September 2021, after the Houthis successfully cut the last supply line, when it took over Harib in Ma’rib. The encirclement lasted until approximately mid-October 2021 and had significant negative consequences for the civilians affected and for the overall conflict. Some individuals fighting in the Jebel Murad area stated that this had an impact also on the fighting in Jabal Murad, as the tribal fighters wanted to prevent a similar encirclement in their areas.

Source: Panel

2. Despite support from the Coalition and some local tribes, the Government of Yemen has not been able to maintain all its front lines against the Houthis (Table 4.1). Like in 2020, the Houthis largely focused on increasing hostilities on the Ma’rib frontlines, despite significant human casualties, in 2021. They have been conducting a war of attrition by continuously sending reinforcements to the multiple battle fronts; targeting civilian and military infrastructure with short-range missiles and UAVs; as well as targeting government-allied tribes, for example, in the encirclement in Al Abdiya.⁴
3. With the unexpected fall of Al Juba, bordering Ma’rib city, and Jebel Murad in late October 2021, there was some significant repositioning of the conflict parties. At the time of writing, Ma’rib city is one of the last strongholds of the Government after the STC took control of Aden in 2019.\(^5\) In Al Hudaydah and in Ta’izz, the West Coast Forces and Government Forces are concerned that should Ma’rib fall, they would be the next target.\(^6\) For the STC, if Shabwah falls, their potential source of financial revenue from petroleum resources and their ambitions of self-governance would be adversely affected. Additionally, the Houthis would have better access to Southern areas of Yemen through Shabwah. The Houthis would also be in a stronger negotiating position. Thus, for all members of the anti-Houthi forces, the possible fall of Ma’rib and Shabwah presents an existential threat.

4. Therefore, in response to this threat, the Coalition and the WCJF began significant political and military repositioning from September to November 2021, focusing primarily on curbing Houthi advances into their territories, as shown in Table 4.1 for Yemeni forces and Table 4.2 for Coalition forces. The Coalition confirmed that their movements were necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.\(^7\) The Government informed the Panel that they were not given advanced notice of the movements of the WCJF.

Table 4.1
Main areas of battles between the Government of Yemen, WCJF, and the Houthis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Bayda</td>
<td>23 September 2021</td>
<td>The Houthis announce that they took full control of Al Bayda.(^8)</td>
<td>The Houthis justified the takeover as a move to combat AQAP.(^9) The capture of Al Bayda enabled the Houthis to intensify its efforts on the Ma’rib frontlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma’rib</td>
<td>September 2021 – 15 November 2021</td>
<td>Houthis have reportedly taken control of eight of the 14 districts of Ma’rib Governorate, with four districts under their partial control.(^10) Both sides are sending reinforcements for fighting around Jebel Al Balaq, which borders the heavily populated and government-controlled city of Ma’rib. The fall of areas in Harib,(^11) Jebel Murad(^12) and Al Juba(^13) were significant defeats for the Government in this period.</td>
<td>The defeats in Ma’rib are attributed to tribal divisions within the Murad tribe, inadequate provision of weapons to tribal allies, and the need to avoid a catastrophic situation such as Al Abdiya.(^14) Through the movements in Al Hudaydah and Ta’izz (see below), some anti-Houthi forces are attempting to consolidate their positions to reinforce and fight Houthis in Ma’rib and Shabwah. Tareq Saleh and the Government of Yemen on the one hand; and the STC and Tareq Saleh on the other hand, seem willing to temporarily set aside their differences, and to consolidate their efforts to fight the Houthis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


\(^6\) Discussions with representatives of the WCJF and Ta’izz military forces.

\(^7\) https://twitter.com/EKH_brk/status/1458503049421500425?t=xT2K1FbGEmpkTzmPTZmPBpc60A&s=08; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-troops-redeploying-yemen-not-withdrawing-2021-11-10/.

\(^8\) According to some sources, 8 of the 14 districts in Ma’rib are under Houthi control and 4 partially (Serwah, Madghel, Raghwan, and Al-Joubah). Marib city and Alwadi are under the control of the Government of Yemen and affiliated forces. Information updated as at 15 November 2021.

\(^9\) Around 22 September 2021. The attack reportedly came from Shabwah’s Al Ain district.

\(^10\) Around 26 October 2021.

\(^11\) Around 25 October 2021, the capital of the district fell to the Houthis, but as of 15 November 2021 the fighting is still ongoing.

\(^12\) Discussions with Murad and other civilian, military and tribal figures in Ma’rib.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shabwah</td>
<td>September 2021 – November 2021</td>
<td>In September, the Houthis took control of areas in Bayhan, Ain and Usaylan in Shabwah.</td>
<td>The battle for these areas in Shabwah was won by the Houthis, with minimal resistance from the Government of Yemen. This had led to the fear that should Houthis decide to advance to Shabwah’s oil rich areas, they would be able to do so with relative ease. There were attempts by some units of the Giants brigades to reinforce Shabwah through Abyan. A united front of anti-Houthi forces in Shabwah is adversely affected by: 1) The current political infighting in Shabwah; 2) the unpopularity of the pro-Islah Governor with the STC, UAE, and consequently some West Coast armed groups; and 3) the fact that for the STC, control of Shabwah remains an important element in the fulfilment of their aspirations. These movements appear to be linked to the military setbas in Ma’rib. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that the STC may be using the circumstances to push the Government for more political concessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hudaydah</td>
<td>September 2021 – November 2021</td>
<td>In September 2021, there was an exchange of control of territories between the Giants brigades and the National Resistance. Around these areas there appeared to be a tension between the Houthis and the STC in Al Hudaydah and Al Bahah.</td>
<td>Statements made by the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (PBNR) on 28 October 2021 (see <a href="https://dce.net/news46965.html">https://dce.net/news46965.html</a>); and STC statement stating that they will fight alongside the National Resistance forces to fight the Houthis (see <a href="https://sitcadex.com/news/159866_YXrNgYHNQxw0.twitter">https://sitcadex.com/news/159866_YXrNgYHNQxw0.twitter</a>). In the PBNR, which Saleh chaired, it was stated “the political bureau renewed its call for all political components and national forces to unite in the defense arenas of the republic, for the parties to open a new page in their relations with each other, and for all to direct their weapons and political and media discourse against houthi militias.” The spokesperson of STC said “we welcome any efforts in the STC to unite to confront houthi militias along the frontlines in the south and Yemen, and we express our readiness to partner with the national resistance and support it... and keep its threat away from our country and the region, while affirming our commitment to our southern national objectives.” PBNR informed the Panel that Saleh also offered to fight with GoY in Ma’rib, this was confirmed by GoY to the Panel. Additionally, see interview with Saleh at <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185">https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185</a> and the Director of the Office of President Hadi confirming the offer made by Saleh at <a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136">https://sanaacenter.org/publications/news/14136</a>. For example, STC’s President has stated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations with the Houthis should Ma’rib fall: In an interview published in March 2021, he stated that “The fall in Marib would have serious consequences, not just at humanitarian level but it might accelerate the process towards internationally convened talks between the North and the South. It could lead to a situation where the STC are largely in control of the South and the Houthis control most of the North. In that case, it would make sense to have direct talks between the parties that are in control.” (<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/01/biden-can-help-end-yemen-civil-war-by-backing-referendum-say-separatists</a>). On 9 November 2021, the STC also threatened withdrawal from the Riyadh Agreement, unless their demands were met from the Government side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reportsedly. the 14th and 4th Brigades were deployed to Abyan. Confidential military sources and officials of the Government of Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In November 2021, Sheikh Awad Mohammed bin al-Wazir al-Awlaki held meetings in Shabwah calling, amongst others, for the dismissal of the Governor Mohammed Saleh Bin Adio. The former, reportedly a well-respected GPC member, appears to be challenging the authority of the Governor, reportedly an Islah party member. He returned to Shabwah in November 2021, after reportedly living 6 years in the UAE (<a href="https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894/Shabwa">https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/15894/Shabwa</a>). His return comes in the backdrop of the escalating tensions between the Governor and GPC, Governor and the STC and some tribes, as well as the Governor and the UAE (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). The Governor in 2021, continued his calls on the UAE personnel to vacate Belhaf (see paragraph 59, S/2021/79). In October 2021, after a discussion involving Saudi Arabia, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE left Ataq airport and Al Alam camp, but UAE personnel are reportedly still present in Belhaf (table 4.2). According to local sources, there were reported clashes in Al Alam after the departure of the Coalition forces, between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and the Government of Yemen forces affiliated to the Governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Panel discussions with military sources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 November 2021, the WCIJ reportedly moved 13 brigades from 14 locations along the coastal line. Around 12 November 2021, the Houthis occupied these areas and opened the Sana’a-Al Hudaydah road. “the military redeployment and repositioning of its military forces” is in line with its military strategy to support the Yemeni government in its national battle on all fronts. Yet, the Yemeni Government stated that they did not have advance notice of this withdrawal.

On 19 November 2021, the WCJF confirmed having captured the Al Adin-Hess junction, which connects Ibb with the Al Hudaydah supply route for the Houthis, as well as other locations in Western Ta’izz. This was an important victory for the WCJF who had suffered significant reputational damage for the 11 November 2021 withdrawal. Unlike in Shawbah, in Ta’izz, the WCJF and the Ta’izz Military Axis, as well as the political leadership have at times set aside their differences to meet and discuss joint strategies.

Sources: Panel based on various sources.

4. The Coalition also undertook redeployments during this period at Table 4.2, which according to them were also necessitated by operational and tactical assessments.

Table 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 November 2021</td>
<td>Al Bureika Base in Aden</td>
<td>Significant troop reductions reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 2021</td>
<td>Ataq Airport in Shabwah</td>
<td>Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2021</td>
<td>Al Alam Camp in Shabwah</td>
<td>Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces. Clashes between the STC-affiliated Shabwani Elite Forces and pro-Government forces followed, which resulted in the latter taking control of the camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October and November 2021</td>
<td>Several small military camps in Mahra</td>
<td>Redeployment and consolidation of Coalition forces at Al Ghaydah airport.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

20 The Panel notes that different dates between 10 – 12 November are referred to as dates when the withdrawal began, by different interlocutors.
21 Source: representatives of the WCJF.
25 See paragraph 20 of the main report.
27 The last meeting was in October 2021, according to military sources.
28 Discussions with Government of Yemen and military sources, local authorities, and civil society from Al Baydah, Ma’rib, Shawbwa, al Hudaydah, and Ta’izz.
30 Government of Yemen sources.
31 Confidential sources.
32 Confidential sources.
33 Government of Yemen sources.
16 November 2021  |  Khalidiyah Camp in Hadramawt  |  Complete withdrawal of Coalition forces reported.\(^{34}\)

**Source:** Panel, based on various sources.\(^{35}\)

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\(^{34}\) [https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827.](https://almasdaronline.com/articles/240827.)

\(^{35}\) The Panel has requested KSA for more information on its withdrawals, a response is pending.
Annex 5  Developments on the West Coast

I.  Developments relating to Tareq Saleh

1. In 2021, Tareq Saleh was one of the most powerful Yemeni military leaders on the non-Houthi controlled West Coast, and his brother, Ammar Saleh, the most powerful security and intelligence figure in the same area. On 25 March 2021, Tareq Saleh announced the establishment of a “Political Bureau of the National Resistance” (PBNR). This is the political wing of the existing military entity under Saleh, which is also known as the Guards of the Republic. According to information received by the Panel from individuals close to Tareq Saleh, he resented the fact that he was effectively excluded from the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Agreement. This situation may have been a contributing factor in the formation of the PBNR.

2. Tareq Saleh’s ascension into political and military power have been largely facilitated by:
   a. The lack of authority exercised by the central Government on the West Coast, which has failed to integrate all the various armed groups on the West Coast into the National Army, except for some Giant Brigades (paragraph 6).
   b. The inability of the Government of Yemen to provide adequate health care to the wounded fighters, or to pay regular salaries to local West Coast civil service, security, and military officials, letting them to seek this support elsewhere.
   c. Direct humanitarian and reconstruction support by the UAE that comes through the National Resistance for communities on the West Coast, rather than to the central Government, (paragraph 4 and 10).
   d. The reliance of local authorities and civilians on ‘humanitarian assistance’ provided by the National Resistance humanitarian unit, which further increases the dependence of local authorities on Tareq Saleh to provide for populations in their localities (figure 5.1).
   e. Access to wide-reaching intelligence networks of Ammar Saleh, which allows Tareq Saleh to counter security threats in the area. This has created a space in which it has become difficult for individuals to criticize Tareq Saleh or the National Resistance openly.

3. Tareq Saleh is also providing financial incentives to local authorities, as well as security support. The Panel noted that the same Government leaders that spoke out against Tareq Saleh

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36 In this annex, in order to prevent reprisals against individuals, the Panel will not indicate the sources of information, where such may have a potentially negative impact on those sources. Sources for this section include members of the Government of Yemen and its armed and security forces, the Yemeni Coast Guard on the West Coast, Political Bureau of the National Resistance, Tihama Resistance, Tihama political leaders, Tihama Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, Tihama National Council, and other Tihama and West Coast human rights activists, National Resistance Forces, Giant Brigades, civil society, and local authorities in Ta’izz and Hudaydah Governorates.

37 Ammar Saleh used to be the Deputy of the National Security Bureau under Ali Abdullah Saleh effectively from 2002 to 2012.

38 https://t.co/BK0o6B9Kij” / Twitter.

39 Tareq Saleh was excluded from various peace initiatives, including the Stockholm Agreement and the Riyadh Agreement, and the formation of the Unity Government in December 2020. In an interview, Saleh said, “(t)he political office was created as a result of the ongoing political situation in Yemen and the developments that have occurred. We, on the West Coast, need a political entity that represents us in any upcoming negotiations, for it to be another voice that represents the Yemeni people outside of any religious political parties.” See https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185.

40 The Panel cannot confirm if assistance provided by the National Resistance is intended or distributed in an impartial, indiscriminate, or neutral manner and without pre-conditions.

41 Multiple confidential sources who received threats.

42 As incentives, unlike salary payments, are not regular and depends on maintaining favor with the paying authority, some individuals informed the Panel that they could not act independently to carry out their functions, when these actions were inconsistent with what was required by the WCJF.
in 2019 and 2020, adopted a more submissive attitude in 2021, as they adjusted to the realities on the ground.

Figure 5.1
National Resistance’s humanitarian unit providing support on the West Coast

Source: https://2dec.net/news47950.html (right) (showing mobile clinics on the West Coast, note the ambulance has the name of the national resistance); https://2dec.net/news47897.html (left) (showing a convoy of humanitarian assistance, including reportedly 3000 food baskets to the newly liberated areas in Hays. It also contains a video of the Governor of Hudaydah thanking the National Resistance for the food baskets.)

4. The Government of Yemen informed the Panel that neither the salaries paid to Tareq Saleh’s fighters, nor the financial incentives that he distributes, came from the Government. According to some fighters, their salaries or incentive payments are made by the UAE, through Tareq Saleh, mostly in Saudi Riyals. The UAE stated that it provides “a substantial amount of financial support through the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen to the Government of Yemen to pay the salaries of West Coast forces.” The Government of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been requested to confirm the UAE’s statement; the Panel has not yet received a response.

5. In 2021, the relationship between the Government of Yemen and Tareq Saleh remained complex, but cordial. The Government cannot maintain the new frontlines with the Houthis in the Hudaydah Governorate and in West Ta’izz without the WCJF. At the same time, it cannot provide salaries or other support to maintain the loyalty of those forces to the Government. According to some, the establishment of the Political Bureau by Tareq Saleh is part of a plan to further consolidate his political position in the West Coast and in Yemen (see paragraph 7). Indeed, since its establishment, Saleh has engaged in high-level meetings with foreign interlocutors, articulating his vision for Yemen.

6. The establishment of the PBNR and Tareq Saleh’s engagement with the international community has created significant unease and tensions, especially amongst some communities.

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43 Multiple sources from the Government of Yemen.
44 Discussions in April, June, August and September 2021 with the Giant Brigades, leaders from Tihama, and Government of Yemen security and military forces. Some of these individuals were receiving incentives that they said came from the UAE. The STC negotiating team in Riyadh informed the Panel that while they were being supported by the Coalition, Tareq Saleh was supported bilaterally by the UAE.
45 Communication to the Panel in November 2021.
46 The Panel requested the Government of Yemen to provide a clarification on the nature of its current relationship with Tareq Saleh, the Panel is awaiting a response.
47 Discussions with Government of Yemen officials, Tihama community leaders, and some leaders in the Tihama National Council.
in Tihama. They have expressed concerns that Tareq Saleh, an outsider to, and a guest of, the Tihama region is positioning himself as the de facto ruler of the region. Barely two weeks after the formation of the PBNR, there were clashes reported between the National Resistance forces and some local communities, with three reported deaths. The withdrawal in November 2021, have further escalated tensions between Saleh and some Tihama political leaders (paragraph 29 of the main report and appendix 3).

7. The establishment of the PBNR has also created some tensions within the General People’s Congress (GPC) because Saleh’s primary support base comes from the GPC. This move has further weakened the already fragmented GPC. For example, representatives of the Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh (YEi 005)-led GPC faction informed the Panel that it did not support the formation of the Political Bureau, even if they continue to work together on some matters with Saleh. While Saleh states publicly that the PBNR is not an alternative for the GPC, and that the PBNR represents the Joint Forces on the West Coast, it is likely that his ambitions are not limited to the West Coast. Saleh’s PBNR representatives indicated to the Panel that the Political Bureau’s ambitions and reach were national, and not merely regional.

II. Development relating to the Giant Brigades

8. The Giant Brigades have acted as a “neutral force” in maintaining peace between different anti-Houthi forces. Within the Giants, there are units that are aligned with the Government of Yemen, while some others are more aligned with the United Arab Emirates. The Giants have successfully maintained a ceasefire in Abyan, following clashes between the Southern Transitional Council and the Government of Yemen (see S/2021/79, paragraph 40). In the June 2021 negotiations around the Riyadh Agreement, the possibility of deploying units of the Giants Brigade as a neutral force to protect the Yemeni Prime Minister and other Government officials in Aden was discussed.

9. The Giants Brigade, in a communication with the Panel, informed that its present leader, Abu Zara al Mahrami, was appointed by President Hadi. Around June 2020, al Mahrami returned to Aden from the UAE and then travelled onwards to the West Coast. He was reappointed as the commander of the different Giant brigades, as well as some Tihama brigades. In 2021, there have been frictions and clashes between some components of the Giant Brigade. For example, tensions arose when Al Mahrami ordered to change the leaders of

48 Discussions with representatives of the Tihama community including civil society, the Tihama National Council and the Tihama resistance forces.
49 These clashes reportedly began after Tareq Saleh forces forcefully entered the house of a local prominent General People’s Congress (GPC) leader in Mukha Zaid al Kharj. Tareq Saleh forces justified this to the Panel as a security operation. Others say the clashes was linked to the PBNR’s formation.
50 Conversations between the Panel and the GPC, June 2021.
51 Conversations between the Panel and the PBNR, June and August 2021. In an interview Saleh said, “The GPC is the umbrella that we are all under, but unfortunately, it was fragmented between those inside Yemen and those outside. This major political party was not given the opportunity to play its role in the Yemeni political arena, whether in foreign representation or internally. Inside Yemen, it is under pressure by the Houthis and the GPC in Sana’a has become very marginalized in its political role. Outside of the country, it is divided into a number of different factions. We hope the GPC can play a very important role. We’re obviously never going to be an alternative to the GPC and the role it has played. But the political office of the National Resistance represents the Joint Forces here on the West Coast, and it also represents the political arm of all of these forces here in the Yemeni political arena.”
52 The Panel understands that a unit under the leadership of the Giants, is in Abyan, maintaining a buffer zone and facilitating movement and communication between the two forces belonging to the Government of Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council. Discussions with individuals from the Giant Brigades, the 1st Presidential Protection Brigade, based in Abyan, and the Coalition. According to the 1st Presidential Brigade, the unit is under Hamdi Shukri.
53 Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.
54 Panel discussions with both STC and Government negotiating teams.
55 December 2021.
56 This includes the 1st Tihama and the 1st Zaraniq brigade. Zaraniq is a tribe in Tihama.
the 1st and 11th Tihama Brigades and the 3rd Giants Brigade. (see also appendix 3). In two cases, there were affiliations between these units and the Government of Yemen. The 3rd Giants Brigade was also the 4th Infantry Brigade under the Government of Yemen. In May 2021, the 1st Tihama Brigade Commander was also named as the Commander of the 8th Presidential Brigade. Subsequently, he was ordered by Al Mahrami to step down and was replaced by another senior commander of the 1st Tihama Brigade. In the case of the 3rd Brigade, it saw two leadership changes and clashes in 2021 when Al Mahrami attempted to change, the second leader, Abu Ayesha, and replace him with a third individual, who was not a member of the 3rd Giants Brigade. The Giants Brigade in its communication with the Panel in December 2021, justified the changes of Abu Ayesha because of, amongst others, his links to Islah party. The Panel received allegations against all the leaders mentioned in this paragraph relating to financial mismanagement of military resources.

III. Developments relating to Tihama Fighters

10. In late 2020, all armed groups on the West Coast were reorganized under the dual leadership of Tareq Saleh of the National Resistance and Abu Zara Al Mahrami of the Giant Brigades. Some Tihama leaders viewed this as an attempt by the UAE and Tareq Saleh to reduce the Tihama influence on the West Coast, for example, by dividing their military forces under the command of two leaders who are not originally from the Tihama and preventing them, the Tihama people, from making autonomous military decisions (see also paragraphs 50 – 52 and annex 5 of S/2021/79). In discussions with the Panel, Tihama military and political leaders complained of persistent marginalization by different Yemeni leaders and the Government of Yemen, and lack of basic services for the local population. Both the Tihama and WCJF representatives acknowledged that because most of the Tihama fighters were only receiving their salaries through the Giants Brigade and National Resistance leaderships, they are compelled to fight with WCJF to ensure their and their families’ survival.

11. The Tihama political leadership appeared to be divided; sometimes the Panel received conflicting political messages from them. The leadership includes those within the Tihama National Council, the Tihami Peaceful Movement/Hiraq, and Tihama leaders who are also members of the GPC. Some informed the Panel that if the ‘occupation’ of their lands continued by Tareq Saleh, they would have no choice but to use force to assert autonomy like the STC. Other Tihami leaders, some of whom were loyal to Saleh, expressed the need for a peaceful political solution based on equitable access to the resources on the West Coast. The Peaceful Tihama Movement, a political wing in the West Coast, and the Tihama Resistance, condemned the withdrawals of the WCJF in November 2021, particularly in view of the subsequent atrocities committed by the Houthis over the Tihama population (appendix 3).

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57 The appointment letter is with the Panel. Source: Government of Yemen.
58 In discussions with the Panel, it was mentioned that the Giant Force leadership only removed him from his position as the Commander of the Tihama, but that his appointment by President Hadi remains unchanged.
59 The first change was of Abdul Rahman al Lahji. The Giant Brigade informed the Panel in a communication in December 2021 that he was also appointed as the leader of the 4th Infantry Brigade by the Government. The second leader was Abu Ayesha.
60 According to information received by the Panel from the 3rd Giants Brigade and other sources, Abu Zara al Mahrami, sought to replace the Brigade leadership with a Yemeni individual who had returned from fighting in Libya.
61 For example, the 4th Tihama Brigade joined Tareq Saleh in 2020 due to largely non-payment of salaries by the Government of Yemen.
62 As opposed to 2019 when different force commanders were on an equal footing. See https://www.erneusnews.com/news/arab-world/yemen/1883139 where a spokesperson for the West Coast said "this council includes members of all joint forces and has no president, deputy, secretary and the like, all under the leadership and supervision of the Arab alliance, and the council includes a selection of forces participating in the west coast front"and see appendix 4.
IV. UAE and the Coalition’s role in the West Coast

10. The current role of the UAE on the West Coast remains opaque. The UAE has acknowledged to provides support to the WCJF and to the West Coast on humanitarian and development matters (figure 5.2 and 5.3). However, the UAE has not been clear on the nature of its current military support to the WCJF; in July 2021, the UAE denied that it had provided any military support to Tareq Saleh or his forces. In October 2021, in contrast, the UAE stated that it had provided such support in 2019. In July 2021, the UAE stated that it had no troops permanently present on the West Coast, even if it is not at the same scale before mid-2019. The UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE does not exercise any direct or indirect authority over the leaders or their security and military operations” in the WCJF, and that “Tareq Saleh and Abu Zara (al Mahrami) are part of the joint forces, whose tasks include confronting the Houthis and managing operations in the west coast. The Coalition’s joint command deals with any problems they face”. The Panel notes that in an interview with Saleh, he said that “the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance.” (appendix 4).

63 UAE informed the Panel that “(t)he UAE has provided a substantial amount of humanitarian support to the West Coast prior to June 2019 (building schools, hospitals, reconstruction, including of Mocha port); and it continues to provide support to maintain the infrastructure that it has rehabilitated.” UAE communication to the Panel, November 2021.

64 The UAE in its communication with the Panel in November 2021, informed the Panel that prior to 2019 “(t)he UAE as a part of the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen worked with these forces (West Coast armed groups and STC) to ensure that they are trained and equipped as a part of the capacity building measures that was undertaken by the Coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen. The UAE’s support was in the interest of ensuring that these forces were able to prevent and respond to Houthi and AQAP security threats, including after the departure of the UAE. This support was given with knowledge of the Government of Yemen.” The Panel received videos showing military vehicles coming into the Mocha port; the National Resistance in August 2021 stated that they arrived prior to the UAE’s redeployment around mid-2019, as the UAE wanted to provide new military equipment and vehicles to the armed groups in the West Coast prior to their movement.

65 Discussions between the Panel and the UAE, July 2021.

66 Individuals from the armed groups on the West Coast.

67 Communication from the UAE, October 2021.

68 https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/14185. The extracts are as follows:

Saleh: Even before the withdrawal of the Emirati forces, they formed the Joint Command and a joint operations room between the National Resistance and the Giants Brigades... So the UAE formed the Joint Operations Command, and there are representatives from the Giants Brigades, from the National Resistance and from the Tihama Resistance. Decisions are made all through consensus and consultations, through meetings between the leadership and representatives of all these parties.”

“Sana’a Center: ...What is the current state of your relationship with the UAE?
Saleh: It is a partnership. We and the UAE have put in place principles for this coalition, for this alliance, this is our cause and our interest. The UAE are part of this coalition and we need support to fight against the Houthis. We welcome their support on the condition that we are partners to liberate Yemen and to restore the state. These are our main objectives, to restore the state and ensure the return of state institutions and the legitimate government. This is the agreement that we had for our partnership with the UAE and they have adhered to this. There are no other interests or agendas outside of the liberation of Yemen from the coup.”
11. The Panel finds that, within the Coalition, the UAE continues to retain significant influence over the West Coast forces. In at least two documented incidents, the UAE has, according to individuals present at the meetings, been involved in trying to contain tensions and infighting amongst WCJF and between WCJF and Tai’zz military. The Tihama leaders allege that the UAE, as well as Tareq Saleh, was instrumental in the reorganization of the West Coast armed groups in late 2020, that resulted in all Tihama forces falling under the dual leadership of Abu Zara al Mahrami and Tareq Saleh (appendices 3 and 4).

69 Confirmed by a representative of the National Resistance.
70 The UAE informed the Panel that “...the UAE has good relations with the above-mentioned parties, but its influence on those parties is limited and focused on advancing the peace process. In light of its relationships, the UAE is working on reducing any armed escalations resulting from conflicting opinions, since the escalation took place before the Riyadh Agreement, in order to advance the peace process.”
12. For most part of 2021, the KSA appeared to keep its focus on Ma’rib, while the Government continued to allow the UAE, through the Coalition’s Joint Forces Command established by the Coalition, to take the lead on the West Coast.\footnote{Representatives of the Government informed the Panel that the UAE continues to have control or influence over the West Coast forces, even after their redeployment in mid-2019.} In November 2021, the Coalition clarified its own role in the withdrawals in Hudaydah and stated that “The joint forces in the West Coast carried out the redeployment and the reposition of its military forces under commands of the Joint Forces Command of the Coalition” (appendix 1). It is the first time, that the Panel is aware of, that the Coalition acknowledged its role in a significant military operation in Yemen, without the prior knowledge of the Government.\footnote{The Panel has provided Saudi Arabia an opportunity to clarify if it informed the Government in advance of this movement, a response is pending.} The WCJF in its statement did not refer to the role of the Coalition (appendix 2), however, its representatives bilaterally acknowledged the leadership of the Coalition in this operation, to the exclusion of the Government.
Appendix 1 Media article on the statement by the Coalition Spokesperson on the redeployments of Coalition forces and withdrawals of the WCJF

Appendix 2  Media Report on the statement by the WCJF

Source: https://alamalika.net/site/2021/11/12/بيان-صدر-عن-القوات-المشتركة-في-المشتركة-19594-74/
Unofficial translation (confirmed as accurate by a representative of the WCJF):

The Joint Forces at the West Coast are monitoring the developments of the successive events following their implementation of the decision to evacuate the areas governed (according to Stockholm agreement). The reason is that those areas are governed by an international agreement that keeps them demilitarized and safe for civilians under the pretext of their protection and security.

To begin with, we, in the joint forces, affirm with firm and strong confidence in victory - God willing - that the redeployment decision is part of the national battle that we have begun and made priceless and precious efforts to address the threats targeting the security of our homeland and the Yemeni citizen in particular, and Arab national security in general.

The Joint Forces command confirms that it made this decision in the light of the redeployment plan outlined in the Stockholm agreement, which the Government is keen to implement, despite violations committed by Houthi militias from the next day after the agreement was signed, as Houthi militias continue to violate that agreement till this day.

The Joint Forces did not give the green light to liberate Hudaydah city, and by doing so a strategic goal for Yemen and Arab national security was deprived from being achieved. If Hudaydah city is liberated, the end of Houthi militias would have been accelerated.

We see it as our religious and patriotic duty that motivates us to defend other fronts of other importance, which the enemy may exploit when there are insufficient defenses as well as when there is an absence of an international agreement efficiently deterring the Houthi militias from their progress like what happened with our forces in (Hudaydah).

The Joint Forces decided that decision in the context of following the recent events and developments at the fronts of the whole country. Those developments of events impose on every free person - to his ability - to provide support and aid by various means to the fronts of defense of Yemen and Yemenis in the face of the tools/hands of (Iran); which is wreaking havoc in (Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf), and which brought down three districts from and through Shabwa governorate, reaching the outskirts of (Ma’rib) city.

The Joint Forces had noted the mistake of remaining besieged in defensive barricades and being prohibited by an international decision from fighting, while the various fronts require support in all forms; an example of such support is to open other fronts that would stop the Houthi militias, and by that assure to the Yemeni and Arab citizens; who are living with us our national battles, that the Yemenis will spare no effort in rearranging their rows and their battles to fight (as one row like a solid structure); In every front and direction.

Accordingly, The Joint Forces has begun implementing its plan, which defines defensive lines, secures the battle of the coast and keeps (Tihama) ready for any developments of events that may occur at the fronts of fighting against the Houthis.

Unfortunately, this plan was met with media misinformation and was misleading; that aims to target and strike the solid confidence of The Joint Forces’ members as usual; In the same way and tools that were used to weaken the role and effectiveness of the legitimate government in the national battle.

The heroes of The Joint Forces in all military units and formations are committed to their battle in every inch in the face of the Houthi tumor. Our fronts will remain solid, subjecting Iran's militias to humiliating defeats. We call on everyone to feel the duty, rearrange the rows, charge their well, and adhere to aimed goals until God decide on the matter and God’s victory is nearby.
Appendix 3  Statement of Tihama

بيسهم الله الرحمن الرحيم

بتاريخ: 9 / 4 / 1443 هـ
المواقع: 11 / 6 / 2022 م

بيان الحراك التهامي السلمي والمقاومة التهامية رقم (4) للسنة 2022م

 بشأن ان家喻ق القوات المشتركة من طرف واحد في منطقة سيطرتها على الساحل التهامي:

قد واجب الحراك التهامي والمقاومة التهامية في يوم الخميس الموافق 11 نوفمبر 2021م بإنهاء مفاوضات للقوات المشتركة من مناطق سيطرتها في كل من مديرية الحوك ومديرية الحناي ومديرية الدربة ومديرية التحباي والحلف الساحلي بما يعادل 90 كيلومتراً يدعو إلى تنفيذ اتفاق استكشاف من طرف واحد لتنظيم مليشيات الحورى العمرانية والإرهابية لمحاولة السيطرة على مناطق المباح.

ورغم أن أبناء تهمة لم يكونوا ممها في اتفاق استكشافه، إلا أن تنفيذ الاتفاق تحت أي دعوى كان يعترض أن يكون الانسحاب من الطريقين في مناطق محددة، بما في ذلك إخلاء مليشيات الحورى لموارض الحديثة والصليف ورأس عيسى.

ومهما كانت التدابير السياسية أو العسكرية لهذا الانسحاب، فإن عدم وضع اعتبارات للتنازل على الجهة الإنسانية للإنسحاب؛ لا يمكن أن يكون البداية في المناطق التي أقيمت فيها القواعد وأعدت مليشيات الحورى إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة تراقفت مع ذكرى الأهل من عودة الإخراج الحورى وملاحقاته وكسفاته وفعالية النزوح الحركي بما يضر بإنسان.

إذاً في الحراك والمقاومة التهامية ندين ما حدث من الأحداث؛ أي كانت دراية ومرضاته، نتيجة عدم أخذنا التدابير الإنسانية في تهذيب دعواته، وأعدت مليشيات الحورى إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة تراقفت مع ذكرى الأهل من عودة الإخراج الحورى وملاحقاته وكسفاته، وفعالية النزوح الحركي بما يضر بإنسان.

كما حمل المجتمع الدولي بمختلف الأمم المتحدة ومجموعها الأممي كل المسؤولية الإنسانية عن التدابير الإدارية القاسية التي حملت وتحمل نتيجة غض النظر عن هذا الانسحاب من إهمال كلامنا إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة، ودعا وطلبوا وتحملوا المسؤولية الكاملة إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة، ودعا وطلبوا وتحملوا المسؤولية الكاملة إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة، ودعا وطلبوا وتحملوا المسؤولية الكاملة إجتياحاً مؤثرًا الفظاعة.

لا يخفى على كل متابع متعرض له أبناء هذا المنطقة الجغرافية الهامة في كيفية الدعوات، فإنها تدريجياً تدفزوا في سبيل مجموعهم، فهم في إرادة البناء في آية مسئولية، حيث تبنت مسؤوليات الأمان عليهم كعون، وعلي كذلك أبناء من أبناء من العدوى في إنهاء عمجية نووية.
والآن وبعد كل مؤامرات التقويض لهذه الدولة التهابية الأكثر حرفا على تحرير أرضها المبينة في الساحل التهابي ترى من بحثهم مجددا معتقدا أنهم سيواجهون مصيرهم وأنهم أصبحوا في حالة وعن وذا وهم.

إذا في الحراك التهابي والمقاومة التهابية تطالب الحكومة السيرة بإعلان سقوط إتفاق استوكهولم نتيجة الممارسات الحوثية التي رافقت الإسماع عبر الممر من طرف واحد وإصدار موقف سياسي واضح يعبث إتفاق استوكهولم كان لم يكن بعد هذه الانكماشات الكبيرة التي دعت المليشيا التهابية للتحرك الأرعن، كما ندعو كافة أبناء تهامة وأحورهم الأحرار من روع الدين بالثبات والإصطفاف وتقول لهم: أنتم من مستمرين وحترمتم تلك المناطق، وبإمكانيات استوديناها وحرب ميليشيا الإرهاب التهابية، واتخاذتم لم أبشروا فلن المد أتكم قريبًا جدًا فرضوا صفوفكم ووجها كاملكم وأجمعوا رأيك وكونوا على قلب رجل واحد واتركوا الخلافات جانبا واجبوا هنافك تحرير تهامة فاعليوتا وأصدقوا وإن التصرح خلفكم بمصيره الله.

وكم ما خلقكم النصر قدما صحاكم حديثا وأبدا لأنكم على الحق ودائمون عن أرضكم وديكم окружаكم وعلى أديكم تكست خرافات هذه المليشيات وسنتبه الأبد.

ولا مكان للمتساقتين الخونة في أرض تهامة الأبية.

الرحمة والمغفرة للسادة والذين عالجوا العرفى.

وعانته تهامة حرة الأبية.

مصادر عن الحراك التهابي السلمي بتاريخ 11/11/2021

Source: Confidential, Tihama political leadership
Unofficial translation of the Statement of Tihama

In The Name of Allah the Merciful
Tahamah Region
Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak
2021 A
Tahami Resistance

The Statement of Peacefull Tahami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance No. (4) of the Year 2021

In regard to the unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at the Tihami coast:

Tihami Movement/Hirak and Tahami Resistance were surprised on the Thursday of 11th of November 2021 by the sudden unilateral withdrawal of the joint forces from their areas of control at Al-Hawk district, Al-Hali district, Al-duraihemi district, Al-Tuhaita district and the costal line, and that was from about 90 kilometres under the pretext of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, for the racist terrorist Houthi militia to advance to try to control the withdrawal areas.

The sons of Tihama were not a party in the Stockholm Agreement; However, the implementation of the agreement required that the withdrawal should be by both parties in limited areas, this included the Houthi militia’s evacuation of the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Whatever the political or military reasons for this withdrawal, the failure to consider its consequences on the humanitarian situation of the people of Tihama in the areas from which the forces were evacuated and the Houthi militia re-invaded; is considered to be a setback, resulting in the people’s fear of the return of the Houthi invasion and its pursuits and assassinations, and the chaos that accompanied the mass displacement from what are supposed to be liberated and safe areas from the violence of the militias.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance condemn the withdrawal that took place; whatever its reasons and necessities, because it did not take the Tihama’s humanitarian repercussions into consideration. Given that the justifications and political and military motives for this withdrawal are vague and unjustified, we demand the Arab coalition to take a firm stand towards what happened and to open an investigation on what happened and is happening to the sons of Tihama, changing the situation to ensure the restoration of control over the areas from which the withdrawal occurred and to reassure the people of Tihama of their safety and that the integrity of their lands are protected and their dignity is preserved.

We also hold the international community, led by the United Nations and its UN envoy, responsible for the catastrophic humanitarian repercussions that have occurred and are occurring as a result of turning a blind eye to this reckless violation of the terrorist Houthi group and those behind it.

We hold them fully responsible towards the families and displaced citizens of Tihama and call them to carry out their duty to ensure the opening of all humanitarian safe passages for our people inside; as
well as the responsibility of ensuring the cessation of Houthi violations against them (Tihama people) and the (cessation of) Houthi retaliatory crimes. This includes any coercive attempts to militarize them (Tihama people) and militarization of civilian life, as well as putting an end to human trafficking crimes.

It is no secret to the followers of the event; the attempts to exclude and marginalize the people of this important geographical area of Yemen and the region from decision-making, even after all the sacrifices they made in order to obtain their right to a just partnership in their land, the series of plots against them as an authentic national element continued, starting with the fragmentation and dispersal of the Tihama forces such as the (Tihama) Elite, the Third Brigade and the Eleventh Brigade, targeting the leadership of the Tihama Resistance First Brigade, and targeting the rest of the brigades, which were and are considered qualitative additions to Tihama and Yemen in general.

And now, after all the conspiracies to break up this Tihami force that is most eager to liberate its Yemeni land in the Tihami coast, we see those who fail them again, believing that they (Tihama people) will face their fate and that they are in a state of weakness.

We in the Tihami movement/Hirak and the Tihami resistance demand the legitimate government to announce the fall of the Stockholm Agreement as a result of the Houthi practices (Houthi advances) that accompanied the unjustified unilateral withdrawal; Issue a clear political position that considers the Stockholm Agreement as if it were nothing after this major setback, which prompted the Houthi militia to persist in recklessness. We also call on all the sons of Tihama and their free brothers from across Yemen to stand firm and line up, and we say to them: You are the ones who have resisted and liberated these areas, and you can recover them and defeat the Houthi terrorist militia. We also tell them rejoice, then rejoice, then rejoice, for aid and support will come to you very soon; Strengthen your vows, unite your words, unify your opinions, be on the heart of one man, leave differences aside, and make your goal the liberation of Tihama; So, persevere and be patient, and victory is your ally, by the will of God.

And just as victory swept you in the past, it will ally you recently and forever, because you are defending the right and defending your land, your religion and your faith, and on your hands, the myth of these militias has been broken and will end forever.

There is no place for traitorous climbers in the land of proud Tihama
Mercy and forgiveness to the martyrs and a speedy recovery to the wounded.
Long live proud Tihama freely.
Issued by the Peaceful Tihami movement/Hirak
On 11/14/2021AD
Appendix 4  West Coast Joint Operations Room Command in 2019

Table 9.1:
Leaders of the Joint forces of the West Coast (established in June 2019 and information as of December 2019). Note: In 2021, the Panel understands that all of these brigades or leaders came under the National Resistance or the Giant Brigade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Ra'ed al Habhy</td>
<td>Amalika Forces</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Brigade, Amalika Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Hamdy Shukry</td>
<td>Amaliaka Forces</td>
<td>Commander, 2nd Brigade, Amalika Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
<td>Abdalrahman al Lahj</td>
<td>Amalika Forces</td>
<td>Commander of the 3rd Brigade. From Lahj.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Brigadier General| Tareq Saleh                 | Guards of the Republic/National Resistance | Commander of the Guards of the Republic. |}
| Brigadier General| Ahmed al Kawkabany          | Tihama Forces           | Commander of the 1st Tihama Brigade.                      |
| Brigadier General| Sadq Duwid                  | Guards of the Republic/National Resistance | Spokesperson for the Guards of the Republic |}
| Brigadier General| Suleyman Mansour al Zaranwq | Tihama Forces           | Commander, Zaraniq Brigades                               |
| Brigadier General| Ali al Kuniny               | Amalika Forces          | Commander, 7th Brigade                                    |
| Brigadier General| Bassam al Mehdar            | 3rd Infantry Brigade    | Commander, Facilities/Logistics Brigade.                  |

*Source:* Various sources in 2019
Annex 6 STC statements on military and security appointments

Figure 6.1
Appointment of three leaders of the Security Belt Forces

Source: https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/140848703297504774?s=08.
President Al-Zubaidi issues decision appointing leadership for Security Belt Forces and to work within Ministry of Interior

The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 14 of 2021 regarding the appointment of a leadership for the Security Belt Forces and their work within the Ministry of Interior.

The decision included the following articles:


Article (3): Appointing Brigadier General Obaid Muthanna Qassem La'ram – Operations Staff officer of the Security Belt Forces.

Article (4): The Security Belt Forces to carry out security and police tasks and work within the framework of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (5): The work of the Security Belt Forces is regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Interior.

Article (6): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.
Figure 6.2
Appointment of three leaders of the Support and Attribution Forces

Source: https://twitter.com/STCSouthArabia/status/140848564603695109?s=08
The President of the Southern Transitional Council, Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces, President Aidarous Qassem Al-Zubaidi, issued Resolution No. 13 for the year 2021, regarding the appointment of a command for the Backup and Support brigades and their inclusion within the southern ground forces. The decision included the following articles:

Article (1): Appointing Major General Saleh Ahmed Mohammad Al-Sayed as commander of the the Backup and Support brigades.


Article (4): The headquarters and brigades of Backup and Support shall be transferred outside Aden governorate and shall be included within the land brigades of the Southern Armed Forces.

Article (5): Backup and Support brigades are subject to the command of the land forces, which are subject to the Ministry of Defense.

Article (6): The work and tasks of the Backup and Support brigades shall be regulated in accordance with the regulations and laws of the Ministry of Defense.

Article (7): This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance, and the concerned parties shall be notified.

Note: The STC informed the Panel in December 2021 that there are no more military forces in Aden, and that they “fulfilled the Riyadh Agreement in this aspect from one side.” These military forces left to different fronts immediately after the issuance of the decree. The Government of Yemen denies that any movement of these forces outside of Aden.
Annex 7 Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020

1. The Panel investigated the attack at Aden International Airport, which took place at approximately 13:25 hours on 30 December 2020 shortly after a plane carrying the Ministers of the newly formed ‘unity’ government had arrived from Riyadh. The attack claimed the lives of 20 civilians, including Deputy Minister Yasmin al-Awadhi of the Ministry of Public Works and Urban Development and three staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Over 100 people were hospitalized as a result of injuries sustained during the incident. The Panel investigated whether the attack constituted a threat to peace and security in Yemen, as well as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).

2. Following an invitation by the Government of Yemen, the Panel visited Aden from 3 to 6 February 2021, where it had access to the impact locations at Aden International Airport as well as to the debris of the missiles used in the attack. The Panel also held meetings with representatives of the Government of Yemen and the National Commission for Inquiry, which were both conducting their own investigations into the incident. In Aden, the Panel interviewed victims and witnesses of the airport attack. It has also conducted remote interviews with a number of other individuals, including people who claim to have witnessed the launch of two missiles at the time of the attack from Tai’zzz Airport. The Panel has also communicated on the attack with Houthis, journalists, independent analysts as well as international and local organisations.

3. The Panel had access to information provided by several Member States regarding the attack, including high-resolution satellite imagery of Tai’zzz Airport from 30 December 2020. The Panel has requested permission to reproduce the imagery for this report, but so far the Member State which provided the imagery has not granted the Panel permission to do so.

I. Description of the incident

4. On 30 December 2020, a Yemen Airways (Yemenia) Airbus A320-200 operating as flight IY535 left King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh at 10:10 hours, carrying Yemeni Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed, members of his cabinet, other officials, as well as the Saudi Ambassador to Yemen. The new ‘unity’ cabinet had been sworn in just four days earlier after long negotiations between the Hadi government and representatives of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The cabinet’s return to Aden was seen as a crucial step in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement. The arrival of the plane was awaited by a crowd of people, who had gained access to the airport’s apron. It was also broadcast live on Yemeni television (see figure 7.1 below). Despite the high-profile nature of the event, security around the airport on 30 December 2020 seems to have been relatively light, even though the Government has informed the Panel that it had received some intelligence information in the early morning hours of 30 December about a possible attack.
The Panel was informed that the plane arrived at Aden International Airport at approximately 1317 hours, about 90 minutes later than originally expected. Just minutes before its arrival, the airport authorities decided to change the incoming airliner’s parking position from line 1 (the closest position to the terminal) to line 2, which is approximately 50 metres further away from the terminal. It is also clear from the presence of a red carpet visible in some of the video footage that the plane was originally supposed to park closer to the terminal. According to airport officials interviewed by the Panel, the decision to change the parking position was taken to increase the distance between the waiting crowds and the plane. Following the plane’s arrival, there was an additional delay as Major-General Shallal Ali Shaya, former Director-General of Security in Aden, disembarked first to greet his supporters on the apron. Only after Shallal Ali Shaya had boarded a vehicle to leave the airport, the rest of the passengers, including the members of the cabinet, began to leave the plane.

According to the time stamp on the closed-circuit television (CCTV) tapes of the airport, the first explosion occurred at 13:24:35 hours, when the VIP lounge in the terminal building was hit by a missile (see figure 7.2), which penetrated the concrete wall and caused a crater with a diameter of approximately two meters. Based on the damage to the terminal wall (see figure 7.3), the Panel assesses that the first missile was launched from a northerly direction. According to witnesses interviewed by the Panel, the Government had been planning to hold a press conference at this location after the arrival of the Prime Minister and the other cabinet members from Riyadh. It is likely that only the delay described in the previous paragraph prevented members of the Government from being harmed by this missile, which instead killed and injured a number of passengers, all civilians, waiting in the departure hall for the departure of Yemen Airways flight no. IY612 to Cairo.

Source: https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344431245481160704
Figure 7.2
CCTV footage showing the impact of the first missile

Source: Government of Yemen
The second explosion occurred seconds later at 13:25:09 local time (based on the time stamp of the airport’s CCTV footage), when a missile hit the airport apron (see figure 7.4), causing a crater with a diameter of approximately 75 centimetres with a depth of about 32 centimetres. The orientation of the crater shows that this missile impacted from approximately 315° from the North, i.e. from a northwesterly direction (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1). Given the dimensions of the crater, which are significantly smaller than in the case of the other two missiles, it is possible that the second missile carried a smaller quantity of explosives. Nevertheless, the missile impacted directly on lane 1 (see figure 7.5), where the Yemenia Airbus was supposed to park after its arrival from Riyadh. Had the plane’s landing position not been changed at the last moment, it seems very likely that the plane would have suffered a direct hit, causing even greater loss of life and destruction.
Figure 7.4
CCTV footage showing the impact of the second missile on the apron

Source: Government of Yemen
At 13:25:33 local time, a third missile hit at a low earth wall close to the terminal building, approximately 15 metres away from the impact point of the first missile. The impact created a crater with a diameter of approximately 3 metres and a depth of 1.3 metres. Unfortunately, at the time of the Panel’s visit to Aden International Airport, about four weeks after the attack, the crater had already partially been re-filled with earth, which made precise measurements impossible. However, the orientation of the crater, as well as the imagery from the CCTV cameras clearly shows that this missile came from a northerly direction.
Figure 7.6
CCTV footage showing the impact of the third missile on the low earth wall

Source: Government of Yemen
9. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel reported shots being fired. Gunfire can also be heard on some of the videos taken by journalists during the incident. Despite speculation that there was a simultaneous ground attack, the Panel has been informed by the authorities that those shots were fired by members of the Yemeni and Saudi security forces in the confusion following the explosions. With regard to the human toll of the attack, the Panel has received information from three different sources – the Government of Yemen, National Commission of Inquiry and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Aden – stating that a total of 20 people,\(^\text{74}\) including three staff members of the ICRC perished as a result of the attack,\(^\text{75}\) and that between 104 and 114 people were injured.\(^\text{76}\) The difference in figures is due to the fact that the Government only listed people who were hospitalized, while OHCHR also included those injured but not hospitalized as a result of the attack. Among the injured were four children, nine women, ten journalists and 12 members of the military.\(^\text{77}\)

10. The Panel has noted media reports that about four hours after the attack the Maasheeq palace, which is the seat of the government in Aden, was attacked by “an explosive-laden drone”, which was allegedly intercepted.\(^\text{78}\) The Panel requested more information about this incident, and stands ready to conduct an inspection of the debris of the uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).

\(^\text{74}\) This number includes three people who died from their injuries in hospital.


\(^\text{76}\) The list with the names of the casualties received by the Panel from the Government of Yemen is reproduced in annex 4.

\(^\text{77}\) According to information provided by OHCHR this number includes five foreign soldiers.

11. Immediately after the attack, the Government of Yemen attributed responsibility to the Houthis.\textsuperscript{79} The Panel has taken note of statements by senior Houthi officials, including by the deputy foreign minister Hussein al-Ezzi\textsuperscript{80} as well as by the ministry of human rights in Sana’a, who condemned the attack and stated that “the Saudi aggression coalition planned and directly supported terrorist groups to target Aden airport and civilians”.\textsuperscript{81} The Panel has not been able to find any evidence supporting the claim against Saudi Arabia. The Panel also notes that Abdulwahab al-Mahbashi, a member of the political office of the Houthis, when asked about the Aden airport attack, neither denied nor confirmed Houthi involvement in the incident, but rather stated in general that the Houthis have a right of self-defense.\textsuperscript{82} In line with its methodology, the Panel has written to the leadership of the Houthi movement with detailed questions regarding the attack; a response is still pending.

II. Possible launch sites of the attack on the Airport

12. The Panel is investigating different locations from which the missiles could have been launched on 30 December 2020. It has interviewed a number of witnesses, who claimed to have observed the launches, and has analyzed images and videos posted on social media in the aftermath of the attack. It has also reviewed satellite images obtained from different sources, including confidential images provided by a Member State. The Panel has also obtained the angle and direction of the impact craters and has cross-referenced this information with the CCTV footage, both of which imply that the missiles were launched from a northerly (in the case of the first and third missile) and a north-westerly (in the case of the second missile) direction. This suggests different launch sites.

13. Shortly after the attack, a number of videos were posted on social media which appear to show the launch of two solid-propellant\textsuperscript{83} missiles in the vicinity of Tai’zz Airport. The four geo-located four videos (figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, using the angles and shadows of the sun, that they were taken shortly after 1300 hours.\textsuperscript{84} The Panel also had access to a confidential, high-resolution satellite image provided by a Member State, which was taken on 30 December 2020 over Tai’zz Airport (13°41’08.88’’ N, 044°08’21.12’’ E). The satellite image appears to show two Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs) positioned at a distance of several hundred metres apart towards the West of the airport’s main runway. The TELs were oriented South-East, in the direction of Aden. According to the same Member State, the TELs were no longer visible on 31 December 2020. The Panel has requested a copy of the satellite image; a response is pending. The Panel has attempted to obtain high-resolution satellite images from other providers showing the same location at the same time but without success.

\textsuperscript{79} \url{https://twitter.com/ERYANIM/status/1344246809116475392?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1344246809116475392%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5EEt1&_ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55484436}.
\textsuperscript{80} \url{https://english.almasirah.net/post/16883/Deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Condems-Targeting-Civilians-in-Aden-Airport/}
\textsuperscript{81} \url{https://english.almasirah.net/post/16918/Ministry-of-Human-Rights-Saudi-Aggression-Coalition-Plans%2C-Directly-Supported-Terrorist-to-Target-Aden-Airport%2C%20}
\textsuperscript{82} \url{https://twitter.com/South24_net/status/1349077026691538945?s=20}.
\textsuperscript{83} The smoke trails of the two missiles in the videos show a distinctive white smoke, which is characteristic of so-called “composite solid-propellant”, a combination of Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), ammonium perchlorate, aluminum particles and other additives.
\textsuperscript{84} \url{https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2021/02/09/rockets-over-yemen-inside-the-houthis-botched-attack-on-aden-airport/}. Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodolody used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.
Figure 7.8
Footage from different social media sources (“Video #2”, left) showing two missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020

Source: https://twitter.com/Alsakaniali/status/1344283130824372224 (left), Government of Yemen (right)
Figure 7.9
Approximate locations of the two TELs at Tai’zz Airport on 30 December 2020 based on confidential information provided by a Member State

14. It appears clear from the videos posted on social media on 30 December 2020 that one of the missiles launched from Tai’zz Airport malfunctioned and crashed shortly after take-off. A number of witnesses interviewed by the Panel stated that it crashed near the Al-Hashdi soap factory in the Al-Jund valley south of the airport. The distance from Tai’zz Airport to Aden Airport is approximately 135 kilometers, which would imply the use of a short-range ballistic missile system. Images posted on social media, which were allegedly taken at the location shortly after the launch, are showing the remnants of the guidance and control section of a missile with control-surfaces which are characteristic for a guided weapon (see figure 7.10). The witnesses also stated that the area was cordoned off by Houthi fighters immediately after the crash and that local citizens were forced to delete any images taken on their
phones. Yemeni media also mentioned a number of arrests made by the Houthi forces of local people, who had taken videos and images of the launch.  

Figure 7.10
Images posted on social media showing the remnants of a guided missile, which allegedly crashed near the Al-Hashdi factory on 30 December 2020


15. In addition to the videos and images posted from Tai’zz, a number of videos were also posted on social media by users in Dhamar City on 30 December 2020, which appear to show the launch of two additional missiles. Three videos, which were geo-located (see figure 7.21 in appendix 1) show, with slightly lower confidence than in the case of Tai’zz, that these were also taken shortly after 1300 hours. The launch most likely occurred from a military police training center in the Al-Qarn area (14°30’41.4” N, 044°25’00.84” E) in the south of Dhamar City. The Panel has been informed that the Government is in touch with a number of witnesses from Dhamar City, who have confirmed the launches. Unlike in

86 Although the information was initially published on the internet by a third party, the Panel has been able to verify the methodology used for the geo-location and the timings of the videos.
the case of Tai’zz, the Panel has not been able to interview those witnesses. The Panel has tried to obtain satellite images of the likely launch location from a number of providers, but it seems that no high-resolution imagery was taken on 30 December 2020. The Panel notes that the distance from the police training center in Dhamar City to Aden airport is approximately 200 kilometres.

Figure 7.11
Footage from social media (“Video 6”) allegedly showing the launch of two missiles from the police training center in Dhamar City

Source: https://www.facebook.com/100003789151283/videos/2091492734320345/

III. Analysis of the weapon system used in the attack

16. The Panel inspected the debris of the three missiles that were used in the attack on Aden airport. It is not clear who had access to the debris or whether pieces are missing, as it seems that entry to the airport was not tightly controlled in the immediate aftermath of the attack. It is also not clear which pieces belong to which of the three missiles as most of the debris was not labelled or packed in a way that would allow for clear attribution. The Panel is aware that pieces of debris are held by both the Government and by the National Commission of Inquiry.

17. The Panel has analyzed the CCTV footage from Aden airport, which for all the explosions clearly shows a missile-shaped form immediately before impact. Comparing the size of the shape with other objects in the frame whose size is known allows for a rough estimate of the missile’s length, which is assessed to be between five and 5.5 meters (see figure 7.12 below). In addition, the impact angle points towards a ballistic missile, while the high degree of precision visible in some of the impacts (see for example figure 7.5 above) leads to the conclusion that guided missiles (as opposed to a less precise weapon, such as a rocket or a mortar grenade) were used in the attack. The available evidence points strongly towards the use of solid fuel, short-distance, surface-to-surface, ballistic missiles.
18. The Houthi forces have been using short-range ballistic weapons for several years, both within Yemen and against border towns such as Jizan or Najran in Saudi Arabia. The most common weapon system in this category is the Badr-1, which the Houthis unveiled for the first time in February 2017 and which the Panel has documented several times since mid-2018. In its basic version, the Badr-1 is a solid-fuel, unguided, artillery rocket with a diameter of 300 millimetres, which is commonly launched from one of the twin launch containers mounted on a 6x6 TEL. The Panel believes that the Badr-1 artillery rocket is manufactured locally in Yemen without the need to source components from abroad. On 28 October 2018, the Houthis unveiled a guided version, dubbed the Badr-1P and stated a range of 150 kilometers and an accuracy of three meters, which unlike the basic version, appears to be launched from a rail. The Badr-1P features distinctive control-surface (pivoting fins) mounted in the front of the missile, immediately behind its warhead, and seems to have a length of approximately six meters. While it is possible that the Badr-1P is also domestically manufactured, it is very likely that at least some components of the weapon (such as the servo actuators and the guidance unit) are imported into Yemen.
19. The Panel has analyzed the debris of the three missiles collected at Aden airport by both the Government and the National Commission for Inquiry. It also had access to the pieces of debris that were sent to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel notes that the debris has characteristics which are consistent with the debris of a solid-fuel missile with a diameter of approximately 300 millimetres\textsuperscript{88} (see figure 7.14). The Panel also notes that the three missiles carried fragmentation warheads, featuring small metal cubes (see figure 7.15), a type of fragmentation which the Panel has previously observed as part of missiles and UAVs used by the Houthi forces\textsuperscript{89} The Panel has not seen any remnants of the guidance and control sections, which would allow for a better identification of the missile, and the only identifiable marking documented on the debris (“18F4”, see figure 7.16 below) has not been observed by the Panel previously. Appendix 2 contains additional images of the debris inspected by the Panel in Aden.

Figure 7.14

Debris from the missiles used in the attack on Aden airport

\textit{Source: Panel}

\textsuperscript{88} Precise measurements were impossible as the debris was severely bent out of shape as a result of the impact.

\textsuperscript{89} See paragraph 7 in annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report (S/2020/326).
Figure 7.15
**Metal cubes which were part of the fragmentation warhead of the missile**

*Source: Panel*

Figure 7.16
**Markings ("18F4") documented on the debris of one of the missiles**

*Source: Government of Yemen*

20. The Panel notes that the debris inspected in Aden has similar characteristics to debris which the Panel inspected in October 2020 during a visit to Ma’rib, in particular with regard to the diameter (approximately 300 millimeters) of the missile and the small metal cubes, which form part of the fragmentation warhead (see figure 7.17 below). The Government of Yemen commissioned a comparative laboratory analysis of the debris from Aden and Ma’rib, which concluded that the metallurgical content is very similar (see appendix 3). While this is far from conclusive, it does strengthen the probability that the missiles used in Aden and in Ma’rib were of the same type.
21. The Panel concluded with regard to the weapons used in the Ma’rib attacks, which are consistently referred to as “ballistic missiles” by both the Houthi forces and the Government of Yemen, that the debris was likely from an unguided artillery rocket (see page 8, S/2021/79). This assessment was based on (a) the relatively short distance between the frontlines and the impact points, (b) the absence of any debris from the guidance and control sections and (c) the comparatively low precision of the targeting. In contrast, the attacks in Aden were clearly conducted using a short-range guided ballistic missile. It is possible that the weapon system used in Ma’rib was the basic version of the Badr-1, while the weapon system in Aden was a guided version of the Badr-1 missile family. However, the Panel notes that the images of the guidance and control section of the missile which allegedly crashed south of Tai’zz Airport (see figure 17.10 above), do not correspond to the images of the Badr-1P, which were shown in the Houthi-affiliated media (see figure 7.13 above), in particular with regard to the size and form of the control surfaces. While the distance between the airports of Tai’zz and Aden of approximately 135 kilometers would be within the range of 150 kilometers claimed by the Houthi-affiliated media for the Badr-1P, this is not the case for the distance of circa 200 kilometres between Dhamar City and Aden. It is therefore possible that, either (a) the missiles launched from Tai’zz and Dhamar were of different types, or (b) that the range of the Badr-1P missile has been extended, for example through the reduction of the payload (i.e. the amount of explosives carried). The inspection of the debris recovered from the airport in Aden does not give any indication that the type of missile was different, while the diameter and the fragmentation warhead, as well as the laboratory analysis of the metal strongly points towards an extended-range version of the Badr-1 missile family.

IV. Analysis of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations

22. Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. Military personnel, including members of the Coalition also use the facility. However, according to information received by the Panel from multiple sources, at the time of the attack no military operations were being carried out from the airport, nor were there any military aircraft at the locations where the three missiles impacted. As discussed above, the missile attack was targeting high-ranking members of the Government of Yemen upon their return...
from Riyadh. Government officials, including cabinet members, are civilians under IHL.\textsuperscript{92} Although military personnel were present at the airport at the time of the incident, this was also the case for large numbers of civilians, including passengers waiting for their departure, airport personnel and journalists. This is also reflected in the number of casualties – no member of the military was among the 20 people killed in the attack and only 12 members of the military were among the more than 100 people who were hospitalized as a result of injuries. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the missiles carried fragmentation warheads containing small metal cubes, which are intended to cause more injuries.

23. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between combatants and civilians.\textsuperscript{93} Aden International Airport is a civilian airport. At the time of the attack, it was not, by purpose or use, making an effective contribution to military action and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, did not offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, it was not considered as a military objective at the time of the attack.\textsuperscript{94} In addition, there was a large number of civilians present, including senior officials of the Government of Yemen, who were clearly targeted as discussed in previous sections. Based on the information and evidence received, the Panel therefore concludes that the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians\textsuperscript{95} was not respected by the attackers, nor were the principles of proportionality or of precautions.\textsuperscript{96}

V. Conclusion

24. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the plane carrying senior government officials, including the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, was the target of the attack on 30 December 2020 and that this attack was carried out in violation of the applicable norms of IHL.\textsuperscript{97} The Panel finds that the attack was carried out using a solid-fuel, guided, short-range ballistic missile with a fragmentation warhead, most probably an enhanced-range version of the Badr-1 family, which has been in frequent use by the Houthi forces against both targets in Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Panel has not yet seen any evidence suggesting that other conflict parties in Yemen have used guided missiles of this kind. While the Panel continues to investigate, the Panel concludes with very high confidence that at least two missiles were launched from Tai’zz Airport towards Aden on 30 December 2020, and that it is likely that two additional missiles were launched from the police training center in Dhamar City. The Panel has been able to confirm that both locations were under the control of the Houthi forces at the time of the launches.

\textsuperscript{92} The Minister of Defence, who has military status, was not present at the airport.
\textsuperscript{93} See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL. The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rule).
\textsuperscript{94} See CIHL rule 8.
\textsuperscript{95} See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 APII, and CIHL rule 1.
\textsuperscript{96} See CIHL rules 14 and 15.
\textsuperscript{97} As per its methodology the Panel stands ready to revise its findings if contrary evidence is made available to the Panel.
Appendix 1  Maps

This annex contains a number of maps, which were prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT on behalf of OHCHR and the National Commission for Inquiry, and they are reproduced here with their permission. The Panel has verified the impact locations and the approximate angle of the incoming missiles during a visit to Aden Airport in February 2021. The geo-locations of the social media videos in Tai’zz and Dhamar City are based on open-source information.

Figure 7.17
List of geo-locations of social media videos in Tai’zz and Dhamar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #</th>
<th>Geo-Location</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Video #1</td>
<td>13°41’19.6080” N 044°09’40.68” E</td>
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<tr>
<td>Video #2</td>
<td>13°39’14.1480” N 044°08’12.5520” E</td>
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<td>Video #3</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.18
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the first missile.
Figure 7.19
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the second missile
Figure 7.20
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the location of the impact of the third missile
Figure 7.21
Satellite image of Aden Airport showing the direction of the incoming second missile
Figure 7.22
Possible launch locations of the missiles on 30 December 2020

Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT
Appendix 2  Additional images of the missile debris inspected by the Panel in Aden

Figure 7.23
Missile debris

Figure 7.24
Missile debris

Figure 7.25
Missile debris
Figure 7.26
Screws from the missile

Figure 7.27
Remnants of solid fuel

Source: Panel
Appendix 3  
Results of the metallurgical analysis undertaken on behalf of the National Commission of Inquiry comparing two pieces of missile debris from Aden and Ma’rib

Source: Government of Yemen
Ministry of Electricity and Energy
General Electricity Corporation
Haswah Thermal Power Station (Aden)

Date: 25 January 2021

To: Chair of the National Commission to Investigate Alleged Human Rights Violations (Aden)

Subject: Technical report on uniformity of fragments from the missiles that struck Aden International Airport

Sir,

We send you our sincere greetings and wish you success as you carry out your humanitarian and noble work of investigating human rights violations. With regard to the above-mentioned subject, we should like to inform you that we have conducted non-destructive metallurgical testing of the fragments that we received from the missiles that were fired on 30 December 2020 at Ma’rib Governorate and Aden International Airport in the interim capital of Aden. The following tests were carried out:

**Tomographical analysis of the elements**

Using tomographical analysis, it was determined that the metallic composition of the two missile shards is quantitatively and qualitatively identical.

**Hardness of the metal comprising the shards**

It was determined that the hardness of the metal fragments from both rockets is within the allowable range (-3, +15) on the Brinell hardness scale (HB).

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<tr>
<th>Information/data</th>
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<th>Missile fired at Aden International Airport</th>
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<td>Manganese (Mn)</td>
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<td>~ 0.25%</td>
<td>~ 0.7-0.9%</td>
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<td>~ 0.7-0.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardness (HB)</td>
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<td>(HB)₂</td>
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<td>175</td>
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Based on the test results, we confirm that the missiles are of the same type and origin.

(Signed)

Metallurgical Engineer
Appendix 4  List of the casualties of the attack on 30 December 2020

Figure 7.27
List of the people killed during the attack

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<th>رقم</th>
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<td>إدارة الطوارى</td>
<td>مدير إدارة الطوارى</td>
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<td>دائرة الأغاثة</td>
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Source: Government of Yemen
Figure 7.28
List of the people who were hospitalized for injuries sustained during the attack

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كتش تفصيلي عن الجرحى بسبب انفجارات مطار عدن الدولي
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**المراجع:**
مكتب وكيل محافظة عدن الشهيد والجريج

**Source:** Government of Yemen
Annex 8  Mukha Port Attack, 11 September 2021

I. Introduction

1. The Panel is investigating the attack at Mukha Port in Al Mukha, Ta‘izz Governorate, which began at approximately 0945 hours and lasted until 11.15 hours on 11 September 2021, shortly after a representative of a Government of Yemen committee arrived at the port for meetings. The attack, during which two missiles and six UAVs were deployed, resulted in one injury to a port worker. There was damage to an office container used as conference room, to a warehouse and to the base of a control tower. At the time of the attack, the port was reportedly being converted for civilian use after years of exclusive military occupation. The committee was meant to oversee this development, which would be an important milestone in normalising relationships between the WCJF and the Government, as well as in opening an additional port for civilian imports on the West Coast. Therefore, the Panel initiated investigations into this attack as a threat to peace, security, or stability of Yemen and a potential violation of international humanitarian law.

II. Methodology

2. The Panel received information, including images, videos, and other documentary evidence from the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance. The Panel conducted interviews with representatives of the port authority, National Resistance, the visiting committee, Government of Yemen, local authorities, and other witnesses. The Panel has given the Houthis the opportunity to comment on the Panel’s findings regarding the incident, a response is pending. The Panel has not had an opportunity to inspect the debris directly of the weapons systems used in the attack but has requested to do so during a future visit to the West Coast.

III. Description of the incident

3. On 11 September 2021, the committee was scheduled to attend several meetings at the Mukha Port. In August 2021, the Panel was informed that the conversion of Mukha Port to civilian use had begun with the establishment of a customs post and the appointment of a civilian port management team. According to port officials, at least two civilian vessels had already docked at the port. The committee, appointed by the Yemeni Minister of Transport (figure 8.1), was planning to conduct a general visit of the port to assess the repairs. Therefore, this visit was viewed by all stakeholders as an important step towards future civilian oversight.

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98 According to the port authorities, the port had been under military occupation since at least 2017.
100 This meeting was, initially, scheduled for 7/8 September 2021, but was postponed to 11 September 2021, according to a port official.
101 Source: Customs official. The document of the decision is with the Panel. The aim of this post was to allow the Government of Yemen to collect the revenue. According to a custom official, this revenue will be deposited with the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden after the establishment of the port. In a discussion with the Panel in May 2021, one of the concerns expressed by an official of the Government of Yemen was that the Mukha port was under the control of the National Resistance, and that the Government was unable to collect the revenue.
102 Sources: Ministry of Transport official, National Resistance Forces, and port official.
103 The Panel is unable to independently verify. On 30 July 2021, the port was opened to receive commercial ships, according to this official.
4. The Panel was informed that on 11 September 2021, at approximately 0930 hours, five senior officials of the committee arrived at the port.\textsuperscript{105} Their first meeting commenced at approximately 0930 hours in the office of the General Manager (map 8.1).\textsuperscript{106} There were at least 13 persons in this meeting room.\textsuperscript{107} The representatives of the committee and some port officials were still at this meeting when the first missile hit near the office container used as a conference room in a different part of the port at 0945 hours, and therefore, were unharmed. The second missile hit a warehouse one minute later.

\textsuperscript{105} According to the National Resistance, these individuals were the Deputy Under Secretary for Port Affairs, Ministry of Transport; the Director of Marine Environmental Protection, Maritime Affairs Authority; the Project Manager, Gulf of Aden Ports Corporation; the, Director, Department of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport; The Director of Information of the Ministry of Transport and his team and Port of Al Mukha’ officials.

\textsuperscript{106} Two individuals present at the meeting.

\textsuperscript{107} Information from the port officials and visiting delegation. The Panel was informed by a port official that the Head of Port Security was at the meeting, and that the Head of the Coast Guards of Mukha, who was supposed to attend the meeting, did not attend.
4. Had the meeting been in the conference room, which was attacked, as is considered the norm for a high-profile visit, there would have been casualties (see figure 8.2). The Government of Yemen and the National Resistance in their identical letters to the Panel stated that “(t)he committee was scheduled to hold a meeting in the port’s conference room, which was struck by one of the ballistic missiles. However, none of the Committee members were injured because the committee was late in starting its visit.” This information was disputed by two individuals who participated in the meeting and stated that the conference room was not meant to be the venue, but as the committee was planning to visit the whole port, they could still have been harmed by the attack.

5. The attack lasted for approximately 90 minutes, with two missiles and three UAVs impacting on different targets and an additional three UAVs being shot down (see table 8.1 and map 8.2). The duration and scope of the attack indicates that the perpetrators also intended to damage the port facilities (see table 8.2). The incident resulted in an injury to a port worker from shrapnel.

Source: Panel, based on various sources.

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108 The Panel met both political and military leaders in the conference room in late August 2021.
Table 8.1

Details of the attack on 11 September 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Type of projectile</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Coordinates of targeted location</th>
<th>Description of the location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target 1</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>09.45</td>
<td>43° 13' 58.116&quot;</td>
<td>13° 18' 33.8472&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 2</td>
<td>Missile</td>
<td>09.46</td>
<td>43° 14' 16.368&quot;</td>
<td>13° 18' 34.1496&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 3</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>43° 13' 53.904&quot;</td>
<td>13° 18' 36.936&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 4</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>43° 14' 18.492&quot;</td>
<td>13° 18' 39.2112&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 5</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>43° 14' 0.276&quot;</td>
<td>13° 18' 20.3256&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 6</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>Intercepted; exploded in mid-air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 7</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>Intercepted; exploded in mid-air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 8</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>Intercepted; exploded in mid-air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Panel, based on information provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

Map 8.2

Locations of the five impact points

110 This is a unit that is affiliated with the National Resistance that carries out relief and humanitarian work on the West Coast.
Source: Panel, based on coordinates provided by the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance.

1. The first missile hit near a conference room and completely destroyed it (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 8.2
Damage to the area (Target #1)

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.3
Damage to the conference room

Source: Confidential
Figure 8.4

Images of the missile (Target #1)

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

1. According to the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance, at 0946 hours, the second missile struck a hangar that was being used as a warehouse by the “West Coast Humanitarian Unit”. They informed the Panel that images taken by the surveillance camera demonstrated that the angle of descent was from the East.
Figure 8.5
Damage to the hangar used as a warehouse (Target #2)

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

Figure 8.6
Image of the second missile prior to impact (Target #2)

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance
8. The National Resistance stated that the following humanitarian items were destroyed in the second missile attack (see table 8.2).

Table 8.2
**Items destroyed by the second missile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Food basket</td>
<td>2,142 baskets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Shelter tents</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Tarpaulins</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Oxygen cylinders</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 First-aid kits</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Children’s clothing</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Hunting equipment</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Canvas roll</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* National Resistance

9. An UAV impacted at the base of the port control tower. According to information received by the Panel, port workers reported that at least two of the UAVs approached at a low altitude from an easterly direction.

Figure 8.6
**Impact point of the UAV (Target #3)**

*Sources:* Government of Yemen and the National Resistance
Figure 8.7
Impact point of another UAV and damage caused (Target #4)

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance
Figure 8.8
**Impact point of the third UAV (Target #5)**

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

9. According to information received by the Panel, the following damage to the port occurred (see table X.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Buildings</td>
<td>4 buildings (19 rooms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Offices</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Warehouses</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Control tower</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Vehicles</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Port protection boats</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Miscellaneous furniture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Electrical equipment and tools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Water tanks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Other damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

IV. Advance Warning

10. There were no advance warnings that the port would be a target. There were no reported sightings of surveillance UAVs on the day of the attack,\(^{111}\) although surveillance UAVs were observed over the port about three days prior to the attack.\(^{112}\) The Ta’izz Military Axis informed the Panel that they warned

\(^{111}\) Panel interviews with two witnesses.

\(^{112}\) The Panel was informed that these drones are still being observed over Al Mukha port as of November 2021.
the relevant authorities of preparations for a large-scale Houthi attack a few days before 11 September 2021 (see paragraph 11).\textsuperscript{113}

IV. Attribution of responsibility

11. The National Resistance informed the Panel that, “the ballistic missiles and drones that the Houthi militias used to attack the port of Mukha were launched from areas controlled by those militias in Ta’izziyah District, Ta’izz Governorate.”\textsuperscript{114} The Ta’izz Military Axis informed the Panel that, on 5 September 2021, they provided information to their hierarchy of a possible large-scale attack by the Houthis, as there was information indicating that the Houthis were transporting missiles from Ta’izz airport to the Al Hawban area.

12. The Houthis have not, to the knowledge of the Panel, claimed responsibility for the attacks on Mukha Port, although both the Government of Yemen and the National Resistance have attributed the attack to the Houthis.\textsuperscript{115}

Map 8.3
Launch directions of the missiles

\textbf{Source:} Panel, Google Earth, based on information provided by Ta’izz Military Axis

13. The Panel has obtained low-quality images of the debris of the UAVs reportedly used in the attack (see figure 8.8). The images show engine parts as well as a piece of fuselage, apparently made from fiberglass. The debris shown in these images is consistent with components of UAVs manufactured and used by the Houthis. The National Resistance stated that, in their assessment, the UAVs used were SAMAD-3 models, however, the Panel is unable to independently verify this based on the limited

\textsuperscript{113} The Panel was provided evidence to support these statements.
\textsuperscript{114} Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively.
\textsuperscript{115} Letters to the Panel from the Government of Yemen and National Resistance dated 9 October and 28 October 2021, respectively.
information available at this stage. The Panel has not received any other information regarding the type of missile used in the attacks.

Figure 8.9:  
Debris of the missiles/drones

Sources: Government of Yemen and the National Resistance

VI. Analysis of IHL violations

13. Measures had been taken in 2021 to convert Mukha Port back into a civilian port. At the time of the attack, the conversion had not yet been completed and military personnel remained at the facility. The attack took place when a high-level committee visited the port. The visit was originally supposed to take place on 7 or 8 September and had been postponed to 09.30 am on 11 September 2021.116

14. The Panel finds it likely that the missile and UAV attack targeted the members of the committee and senior port officials, which would be a violation of IHL.117 The visiting members of the committee and the port officials are civilians under IHL. Military personnel were likely present at the port at the time of the incident. Under IHL, parties to a conflict must always distinguish between

116 Source: Port authority official.
117 See article 13 (1) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions which prohibits direct targeting of civilians.
combatants and civilians. If the target had been military forces present in the port, the attack could have been carried out at another time.

15. Under IHL, Mukha Port, at the time of the attack, was likely a dual-use object. This does not affect the question whether the committee was the intended target of the attack or not. Therefore, it is unlikely that the perpetrators respected the principles of distinction or proportionality and precautions.

VII. Conclusions

16. Based on the analysis of the available evidence, the Panel concludes that the visiting committee was the likely target of the attack. Additionally, the Panel finds that another objective of the attack could have been to hamper the civilian conversion of the port. Like in the case of the Aden International Airport attack on 30 December 2020 (see annex 7), which targeted the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it is possible that the perpetrators intended to disrupt initiatives aimed at normalizing the situation on the ground. The Panel also notes that on 10 November 2021, three missiles were launched towards two small military camps in Mukha, which coincided with the first visit of the new Special Envoy of the Secretary General to Yemen to the city. This attack, which unlike the one on Mukha Port was claimed by the Houthis, might have been an attempt to disrupt his visit. The Panel is not aware of evidence suggesting any other party to the conflict in Yemen, other than the Houthis, has used UAVs of the kind used in the Mukha port attack.

118 See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 AP II, and Customary International Humanitarian Law rule 1 (hereafter CIHL. The CIHL rules as well as their interpretation and related practice can be consulted online at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul).

119 See CIHL rules 14 and 15.

120 The name of the Giants camp that was hit was reportedly and the National Resistance’s camp was an administrative base camp. Two missiles impacted inside the camps, and one impacted outside, according to sources on the West Coast. The Panel cannot independently verify the number of missiles used. See below footnote.

121 Information provided by the Ta’izz Military Axis to the Panel confirms that these missiles were launched possibly from Houthi controlled areas in Ta’izz. The Houthis stated that on that day “two ballistic missiles (that they launched) struck an enemy training camp in the west of Taiz province”. See en.ypagency.net/243466/.
Annex 9 Impact of Houthi activities on former female detainees

1. The Panel continues to monitor the activities of different armed groups that impact adversely on women, children, and minorities in a manner that threatens the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. The Panel in 2021 documented the targeting of present and former female detainees, politically active women as well as female professionals opposing the Houthis. According to the women interviewed, the Houthis, through their actions, have created an environment that undermines women’s capacity to effectively participate in community and leadership activities. This annex is based on interviews with 14 former detainees and their families. 127

I. Continued repression of former female detainees

2. Former female detainees and/or their families informed the Panel that they continue to suffer marginalization by their communities and political leaders after their release. For most women, their detention severely affected their ability to continue their work in political or community-based activities. It also impacted their family life and the education of their children. In addition to those interviewed in 2019 and 2020, in 2021, the Panel interviewed former female detainees who had been raped during their imprisonment; the family of a woman who had become paralyzed during her incarceration and was unable to speak after close to a year of enforced disappearance; women who had been tortured and/or mutilated in detention; and women who had been subjected to enforced disappearance. 123

3. Former detainees are particularly vulnerable in Sana’a and in other Houthi-controlled areas. According to former female detainees interviewed by the Panel, they are called “prison graduates” by the population and are often excluded from community activities because of the stigma associated with prostitution and sexual violence. Two former detainees informed the Panel that they witnessed another female detainee being killed by her relatives on the day of her release at the prison gate. The witnesses presumed this was because the detainee had brought shame to her family through her incarceration. The Panel also received information that the family of a well-known female detainee is facing daily insults, while being stigmatized because of her ongoing detention.

4. There are no effective measures in place to protect or support women fleeing Houthi-controlled areas over prolonged periods of time, despite the provisions of resolution 2467 (2019). 124 As a result, some of the women who have been interviewed by the Panel since 2019 had to return to their homes in Houthi-controlled areas. The Panel has not been able to re-establish communication with them since their return due to significant safety concerns. Women interviewed by the Panel continue to show signs of trauma because of their ordeals while incarcerated. Some women, who are now living outside of Houthi-controlled areas, have no means to cover their daily expenses and their children’s education has stopped. The Panel was informed that some would like to bring their perpetrators to justice, but that no financial or legal means are available. 125

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122 This included nine former female detainees and/or their families whose cases were not previously reported by the Panel, as well as five more former female detainees whose cases were reported in S/2020/326 and S/2021/79.
123 Most women suffered multiple forms of violence.
124 Paragraph 16 (a) and (d) of resolution 2467 (2019) asks “to ensure that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict in the respective countries receive the care required by their specific needs and without any discrimination” The resolution further encourages Member States and other actors to give due consideration to the establishment of a survivors’ fund and to support civil society organizations working on this issue. See also paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 of resolution 2467(2019).
5. Women were also separated from their husbands and/or families for reasons related to detention. One woman informed the Panel that her family sold most of their belongings to bribe Houthi officials for her release. When she left the prison, the family refused to communicate with her because Houthi officials had informed them that she engaged in prostitution, a claim she denies. In another case, the family decided that the woman would leave her home in a Houthi-controlled area for her safety, while her husband continued his work inside the Houthi-controlled area. Women who have been separated from their families continue to be at high risk for continued sexual violence and further traumatization (see paragraph 6). One woman, who left Houthi-controlled areas for Government-controlled areas after her ordeal, stated that the military in Government-controlled areas kept harassing her because she had arrived from Sana’a.

6. The Panel has received information that compromising videos and images of female detainees were taken by the Houthis. The women were threatened with the release of these videos and images. This potentially exposes former detainees to further violence and trauma. Three women stated how the Houthis made sexually compromising videos of them; and/or forced them to confess on video to sleeping with identified military commanders belonging to anti-Houthi forces. In another incident, the Houthis submitted similar coerced and sexually compromising videos as evidence against the detainee before the prosecution. The Panel was also informed of an identified prison director who downloaded unveiled photos of female detainees from their phones, while he was interrogating them, and threatened to release them unless the detainees complied with his orders.

7. Many of the women interviewed by the Panel since 2019 were active members of the General People’s Congress (GPC). It is unclear if these female detainees were included in the Government’s list of detainees for prisoner exchanges. The Panel was also informed of threats against former detainees in a third country and was told of physical harm done to another former detainee, likely committed by Houthi supporters present in that country. Even amongst survivors, there are fears that some former detainees may be working for the Houthis as informers.

II. Outcome of the designation of Sultan Zabin (YEi.006) and update on sexual violence in Houthi-controlled detention centers

8. On 25 February 2021, through the adoption of resolution 2251 (2021), the Security Council designated Sultan Saleh Aida Aida Zabin (YEi.006), including for instigating a policy of violence and sexual abuse against politically active women. On 26 February 2021, Zabin denounced his designation

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125 These women could identify their perpetrators either by their names or as belonging to the Houthi apparatus.
126 The woman was arrested, and presumably also detained, in Sana’a.
127 Three women informed the Panel that their immediate relatives were victims of “road-accidents” and they suspect the Houthis caused the accidents to install fear in the former detainees. The Panel was unable to verify independently the causes of the deaths. The ones who died were a sister and an adult female child of two women, and one case of paralysis of a minor child because of such “road-accidents”.
128 The detainee tried to have access to these after her release and was denied.
129 The Panel stands ready to share this information orally with the members of the Security Council but will not provide such information in the report to protect the women and to ensure that host countries continue to accept these women.
130 The Panel cannot independently verify this information as it did not meet the victim. This information was provided by two former detainees who knew the victim personally.
stating that it was the result of lobbying by “organized crime and terrorist organizations”.131 He continued as the director of the criminal investigation division in Sana’a until his alleged death on 5 April 2021.132 Houthi officials continued to publicly deny his involvement in the sexual violence of women and held an elaborate funeral for Zabin. However, several sources stated that the Panel’s report (S/2020/326), resulted in tribal pressure on the Houthis to release some women.

Figure 9.1

Extract of Facebook post by Sultan Zabin (26 February 2021)

Source: https://m.facebook.com/sultan.zabinye/.

9. After the designation of Zabin, the Panel documented other cases involving repeated rape and sexual violence in Houthi-controlled territory. Unlike in previous years, when women were raped to “purify” them, or as a punishment, or to coerce confessions (annex 5, S/2020/326), in 2021, the Panel documented a case where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at secret detention centres because she was told that she was “being prepared for her future role as a sex worker” for important clients. According to the Houthis, her job was to obtain information from them. Additionally, the Panel also received further information that for at least one detainee, working as a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis was made a condition for their release.133

10. The Panel is investigating the involvement of an identified female in the trafficking of vulnerable women as sex workers after their release from Houthi prisons. Women whose families refuse to accept them after their detention are particularly vulnerable to such abuse. The female security wing of the Houthis (Zainabiyath) continues to repress and control women in prisons, professional workplaces, and in public places. In 2021, the Panel documented four more cases of sexual violence where the female security wing was directly involved in arrests, detention and/or violence, including in one case, where they tortured a woman. This new information complements the violations documented previously by the Panel in S/2020/326. The Panel is unaware of any measures taken by the Houthis to prevent sexual and other forms of violence against women in detention.

131 See https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1051903415320657&id=517842145393456&m_ent
stream_source=timeline&anchor_composer=false.
132 http://www.ypagency.net/354210. On 5 April 2021, the ministry of interior announced Sultan Zabin’s death from a terminal illness. The Panel continues to investigate if Zabin has indeed died, and the circumstances of his death as new information has emerged that merits consideration. The Panel will further investigate.
133 In 2019, the Panel documented a similar case where a woman was released, according to her, because she accepted to prostitute herself to help Houthis get information from their enemies or to compromise their enemies. She informed the Panel that she was prepared to say anything to stop the regular rape and sexual violence she had to endure in secret detention centers.
11. According to information received and media reports Brigadier Ahsan Al-Hijazi is likely the successor of Sultan Zabin as the director of the criminal investigation division. The Panel is unaware of any information, at this stage, that links him as a successor to Zabin in the above-mentioned policy.

12. In 2019, the Panel reported that Abdul Hakim al-Khaiwani, former deputy minister of interior, publicly stressed the strong relationship between the ministry of the interior, the prosecution and legal authorities in carrying out arrests and detentions in respect of countering “prostitution” networks (paragraph 22, S/2020/326). In 2021, a victim informed the Panel that al-Khaiwani was involved in her torture while in detention. Al-Khaiwani currently serves as the director of security and intelligence bureau of the Houthis.

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Annex 10  Houthi cultural courses and summer camps as a threat to peace and security in Yemen

I. Overview

1. The Panel finds that the conflict in Yemen continues, partly, because of the Houthis’ ability to continue the recruitment of new fighters, despite heavy casualties on the battlefronts (see annex 4). Their ability to exercise political and security control over their territories and populations, in violation of resolution 2216 (2015), relies to a significant extent on their ability to monitor and suppress dissent (see annex 9). The Panel is therefore investigating the impact of summer camps as well as religious and cultural courses in perpetuating the conflict and in radicalizing civilians, including children.

2. During the reporting period, these camps and courses were used to: (a) solidify Abdulmalik al Houthi’s (YEi.004) authority and to consolidate his group’s control over civilians; (135) (b) limit individual freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion; (136) (c) recruit fighters, including children; (137) (d) promote violence, hatred and radicalization; (138) and (e) obtain popular support for the continuation of the conflict. (140) The Panel is also investigating incidents of reprisals against civilians who refused to participate in these courses (paragraphs 23 to 25), (141) including through the denial of humanitarian assistance (paragraph 20 and 21). (142)

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135 The Panel considers attempts by Houthi authorities to solidify their control over Houthi-controlled areas to be a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), including paragraphs 1 (b) and (d).

136 This would include situations where individuals are forced to attend these religious courses or chant slogans when those conflict with their belief systems. This includes freedoms relating to political expression and religion. See Articles 10, 18 (1), (2) and (4) and 19 (1), (2) and (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force for Yemen on 9 May 1984. No derogations have been made by the Government of Yemen.

137 This would include situations where those courses operate to directly or indirectly recruit adults and children for conflict-related activities. In respect to recruitment of adults by the Houthis, the Panel finds it likely that these activities constitute a violation of paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015), as the nature of the conflict is such that the recruited Houthis are primarily fighting the Government of Yemen; and therefore, the act of recruitment is primarily aimed at undermining the Government’s control over its territory. The recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed groups is prohibited under international law and anyone engaging in recruitment also falls within the designation criteria under paragraph 6 of resolution 2511(2020). See article 4 (1) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, article 4 (3) (c) APII, CIHL rules 137 and 137.

138 This would include situations where adults and children are forces to chant slogans that promote violence against nationalities or religious minorities and where textbooks for these courses, and lectures, demonize groups based on nationality, race or religion. Hate speech is defined by the Panel according to the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech (2019) “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor.” See www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/advising-and-mobilizing/Action_plan_on_hate_speech_EN.pdf. See also Article 20 (1) on the ban on war propaganda and 20 (2) of the ICCPR that prohibits “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”. See also General Comment 17 of the ICCPR Committee, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11, Article 20 (Nineteenth session, 1983), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HR/C/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 12 (1994).

139 This would include those situations where individuals condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further the ideological or political goals espoused in these lectures. The Panel notes that there is no universally accepted definition for radicalization. The notion of ‘radicalization’ is generally used to convey the idea of “a process through which an individual adopts an increasingly extremist set of beliefs and aspirations. This may include, but is not defined by, the willingness to condone, support, facilitate or use violence to further political, ideological, religious or other goals.” See A/HRC/33/29, para. 19.

140 The Panel finds that these activities constitute threats to the peace, security and stability of Yemen and fall under paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), while also violating paragraph 1 of resolution 2216 (2015).

141 See paragraphs 17 and 18 of resolution 2140 (2014).

142 See paragraph 19 of resolution 2216 (2015).
3. It should be noted that religious and cultural courses organized by the Houthis have been a part of Yemeni society since at least the 1990s. Some of these courses, which aimed to provide religious education to children during their vacations, were called summer schools, summer centres or summer camps (summer camps). The Panel does not claim that every religious or cultural course in Yemen, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, falls within the Panel’s mandate. This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.

4. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted bilateral in-person or remote interviews with thirty medical professionals, including those that rehabilitate former child combatants, teachers, participants in the courses, civil society activists, and former detainees who had been forced to undergo various religious and cultural courses, sometimes, as a condition of release. This investigation is limited to those camps and courses which fall under the criteria set out in the previous paragraph. The Panel also notes that the content and format of these courses vary between governorates, target groups, the local organizers, and other factors. Therefore, this annex is not meant to provide a generic description of all courses and summer camps held in Houthi-controlled areas. A detailed presentation of the Houthi perspective on these courses was shown in an al Masira documentary.

5. The Panel also received over 15 investigative and other reports on these cultural and religious courses. The Government of Yemen provided a list of locations where children have been receiving military training. In this report, the Panel only reflects information that it was able to verify independently through testimonies and documentary evidence. Where sources have consented, the Panel has deposited these reports with the Secretariat for viewing by Member States.

II. Types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”

6. The Panel investigates the role of “summer camps” for children and religious and cultural training courses for adults and children (hereinafter “cultural courses”) to radicalize participants and to recruit new fighters. The Panel’s investigations demonstrate that there are several types of “summer camps” and “cultural courses”; and, for ease of reference, the Panel classifies them as follows:
a. Duration and format of the courses: half-day-courses; short courses from a few days to a few weeks; residential versus day courses; the Panel is also aware of open-ended courses.\textsuperscript{149}

b. Contents of the courses: some combine basic military training with “religious” or “cultural” lessons, others focus exclusively on the latter.\textsuperscript{150} The Panel notes that some purely military training courses are also called “summer camps”.

c. Target groups of the courses: children, university students, professionals, the general population, as well as specific courses for detainees. For adults, the Panel was not informed of the use of military training in “cultural courses”\textsuperscript{151}

7. The summer camps and cultural courses are systematically organized and reach large parts of the population. In August 2019, the Houthi-affiliated media stated that there were 3,500 “summer camps” that trained 284,000 students. The cultural courses and summer camps are often implemented at the local level; for example, the supervisors\textsuperscript{152} in a hospital or school may host these courses for their staff or students. Supervisors at the local level appear to take responsibility for the courses organized for the general population in Houthi-controlled areas.\textsuperscript{153}

III. Summer Camps and Cultural Courses for Children

A. The use of summer camps and cultural courses to recruit children as fighters or for supervisory functions

8. The Panel is investigating the cases of four children, aged between 7 and 14 years, who have received military training in summer camps or have been taken to military camps under the pretext of attending cultural courses.\textsuperscript{154} In paragraph 120 of S/2020/326, the Panel also reported on a 13-year-old child who was lured by the Houthis to a military training camp. They had told him he was going to participate in a three-day educational camp. He was kept for three months and received training on how to use small arms. He was sent to the front after the completion of the course (see annex 33 of S/2020/326 for details).

9. In the cases of the four children above, the two younger children were taught how to clean weapons and trained on how to evade “rockets” in what was supposed to be a “summer camp”.\textsuperscript{155} One child

\textsuperscript{149} Those children interviewed by the Panel stayed from 3 – 9 months in these camps. Based on their testimonies, some children stay for longer until they are ready to be taken to the battlefield. For adults, the longest period that the Panel was informed of, was a week, except for the courses for detainees which lasted months. It should also be noted that for adults, the Panel has not documented cultural or religious courses that also provided military training. The Panel was however informed of possible “cultural” lectures in adult military camps, to radicalize fighters, so that their loyalty could be secured even in the most dangerous frontlines.

\textsuperscript{150} The Panel was also informed of two types of camps: those that are open to all students, and they are taught “cultural” content, where some children are chosen from those and are provided opportunities for leadership and for acting as potential recruiters of adults in their families and other children. Then there were other camps that are for the selected few that are trained to go into battle.

\textsuperscript{151} One reason for this maybe the lack of stigma and the lack of social resistance to adults joining in the fighting, as opposed to children, where the parents may object. For example, taking children from their homes in the pretext of participating in summer camps have occurred in four documented cases. The Panel also documented such a case in 2019, see paragraph 120 of S/2020/326.

\textsuperscript{152} In Houthi-controlled territories, alongside “formal state authorities” there are individuals who are appointed by the Houthi leadership to oversee or supervise the functions of those authorities or institutions. These individuals have significant powers, and they act by and on behalf of the Houthi leadership to implement central decisions at the local level. The highest-level supervisor at a governorate-level is the governorate supervisor, who would supervise the governor, and all activities in that governorate through a network of supervisors.

\textsuperscript{153} Based on Panel discussions with participants of courses, their families and civil society activists researching the issue.

\textsuperscript{154} Discussions with children and relatives.

\textsuperscript{155} Discussions with Yemeni children in 2021, in the Gulf region.
displayed to the Panel healing scars around his elbow, which he said occurred because of crawling on
the ground as a part of his training. A 14-year-old child was directly taken to a military camp, where he
was taught to dig tunnels and plant mines, together with other children.156

10. The Panel was informed that the recruitment of children is facilitated by cultural lessons given in
public camps. For example, the Panel interviewed the parents of a 14-year-old child, who was taken to
a Houthi military camp. In this case, the Panel was informed that the child refused to return to the
family, which attributes this to the lessons in school which “brainwashed” the child by teaching him
that God would want him to follow the Houthis instructions, over those of his parents (see also
paragraphs 8, 9 and 18 for cases of nine other children who were taken from cultural courses to military
trainings).

11. The Panel was also informed children who possess leadership qualities are selected to deliver
ideological speeches, recruit fighters from among their peers, and/or to take over leadership roles in the
Houthi movement. For example, a relative informed the Panel of a child, who, after taking lessons,
condemned his parents as “non-believers” and became a local supervisor.157 Testimonies of children
and families who received military training through summer camps are also available in the public
domain.158

B. Hate speech in summer camps

12. In the “summer camps”, alongside religious lessons, the children were taught patriotic songs
glorifying Houthi leaders, and received lectures in which, amongst others, they were told that they were
fighting to liberate Palestine.159

13. The children and parents interviewed by the Panel stated that violence against Americans and Jews
was encouraged. Children were expected to regularly shout the Houthi slogan “Death to America, Death
to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” (figure 10.1). The Panel has seen images of these slogans
in mosques, schools, distributed as stickers to children, and attached to missiles (annex 11).

156 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Tareq Saleh forces informed the Panel that they continue to capture children
from the battlefield who were recruited to lay mines on respectively, the Saudi-Yemeni borders and the battle
frontlines. In 2016, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the Panel access to some of these children. A human
rights activist from al Hudaydah reported multiple cases of injuries to children from the explosion of mines,
which the children themselves were attempting to lay. The Panel has not been independently able to verify the
causes for these injuries.

157 The Panel spoke to a relative. The Panel was unable to verify the information independently as the child and
parents were in Houthi-controlled areas, which the Panel did not have access to.

158 See “Scout activities… a new way for Houthis to recruit Yemeni youth” at
https://alkhalecionline.net/ and “Compulsory sectarian lesson what is the truth about
al-houthi collecting the children of summer centers to al saleh mosque?” At
See also
all/the-yemen-review-ar/15338, https://www.dw.com/ar/اليمن-ومستقبل-لحاضر-وتفخيخ-
لطفوله-انتهاك-الأطفال-تجنيد/158120089.

159 Information from in-person interviews with Yemeni children, in the Gulf region, 2021.
14. The Panel has had access to images from textbooks used in the summer camps. The Panel notes that the texts call for Jihad against both Israel, the United States of America and their supporters, and calls it a duty to stop the United States of America from executing its “evil plans” (figure 1).

15. The Panel received documents on changes made to school curricula as well as to the textbooks used in “summer camps”. These changes are said to distort history in favour of the Houthi leadership’s right to govern in Yemen and to distort historical Islamic accounts with the aim to promote fighting...

164 Panel discussions with Government of Yemen and civil society activists in 2020 and 2021.

165 The documents received by the panel supporting these allegations are deposited with the Secretariat for viewing by member states of the Committee.

166 See old editions archived at https://archive.org/search.php?query=creator%3A"مؤسسة"+الإمام+الهادي+الثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقافية"+الهادي+ثقيفة
A. Use of schools and mosques to recruit children and incite hatred

17. The Panel notes the use of presumably safe spaces to recruit children as fighters and to spread hatred.\(^\text{169}\) In Bayhan, Shabwah, barely a week after the Houthis took control,\(^\text{170}\) there were reports of Houthi religious leaders coming from Ibb, Saada and other areas. Photographs show these imams distributing stickers with the Houthi slogan to children. The Panel also notes videos allegedly showing children from a school in Bayhan shouting the Houthi slogan.\(^\text{171}\) The Shabwani educational authorities informed the Panel that they took immediate steps, on 29 September 2021, to close all schools in the Al Ain, Bayhan and Usaylan areas to prevent the children from becoming radicalized (see Figure 10.2). The schools reportedly re-opened after the educational authorities obtained a guarantee from the Houthis that they would not interfere with the education of the children (see annex 11).

\(^{169}\) The Panel in this context means spaces that provide children with protected environments in which they participate in organized activities to play, socialize, learn, and express themselves. See https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/2923.pdf for a definition of a child-friendly safe space.

\(^{170}\) According to local sources, Houthis took control of Bayhan around 22 September 2021.

\(^{171}\) Authenticity of video confirmed by two local sources.
Figure 10.4
Document issued by educational authorities closing schools, citing “ideological and security” concerns for the children, 29 September 2021

Source: Confidential

18. The Panel also documented the use of the al Saleh Mosque in Sana’a for a summer camp, where children as young as seven years were provided with basic military training (see figure 10.4 and annex 11). The Panel was informed that participants of this camp included homeless children who had come to the mosque seeking shelter. The Panel also notes that summer camps, like mosques, are meant to be safe spaces where children can engage in religious activities consistent with their belief systems. Yet in five cases that it documented, children were taken from cultural courses held in schools to military training, and in another five cases, parents were informed that the children were in cultural courses when they were in fact in military training.

172 This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.
D. Physical harm and sexual violence against children at camps

19. The Panel received information on sexual violence committed by an instructor against a child who underwent military training.\(^{174}\) The child’s phone was taken away from him, and the parents were told that the child was taken to a cultural course. Therefore, it took some time before the parents could find the child, and for the child to communicate to the parent what had happened to him. Children who are separated from their parents for prolonged periods of time, and whose means of communication were removed, have a higher likelihood of have been exposed to violence, as they become particularly vulnerable once they are separated from their parents. The Panel also finds that sexual violence is likely underreported in Yemen due to the social stigma associated with the crime. The Panel continues to investigate. In another case, some children who tried to escape from their “summer camp” were reportedly caught and beaten up.\(^{175}\)

E. Denial of humanitarian assistance

20. The Panel has received information from multiple sources on nine cases in which Houthi supervisors have threatened families that they would be denied humanitarian assistance, if their children would not participate in summer camps or military courses.\(^{176}\) These incidents occurred between 2018

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\(^{174}\) The Panel will refrain from providing further information to protect the identity of the child but stands ready to provide the Security Council verbally with further information on the circumstances of the violence.

\(^{175}\) This information was provided by other children who have stayed at the camp.

\(^{176}\) In five cases, where the Panel has not had access the families because of safety concerns for the families, it spoke to the researchers that documented these cases, who collected further information from the families on behalf of the Panel. The Panel has the names of the beneficiaries, the names of Houthi individuals who denied assistance, the dates of incidents and locations. The Panel stands ready to provide further situational information, without disclosing any identifiable information, as appropriate.
– 2020. According to a Yemeni non-governmental organization, in two cases, families were in fact deprived of humanitarian assistance. In another case documented by this organization, the Houthi supervisor offered a 15-year-old child to be registered to receive humanitarian aid in exchange for joining the Houthis on the frontlines. The child accepted and enrolled in a cultural and military training course for two months, after which he went to fight for the Houthis. He died in battle. Additionally, the Panel received information that a teacher was denied access to humanitarian assistance from a non-governmental organization because he refused to teach the “Houthi curriculum” in his class, and to send his send his children to fight. The teacher had previously been receiving this assistance for 5 years. The Panel interviewed another teacher in 2019, who stated that food baskets given by organizations were only distributed to teachers following the Houthi ideology. The Panel also received information on two children being sent cultural courses for 6 months, in exchange for humanitarian assistance provided by the local supervisor. After the children returned from the cultural course, assistance was only resumed after the parent agreed to send the children to military training. The assistance was provided by the supervisor directly to the families, allegedly these were UN assistance. In another case involving multiple children, the supervisor promised that the children will be acting as his security detail, and they would only attend cultural courses in a school in Sana’a. The children were taken with the promise that the family would receive humanitarian assistance from the supervisor. Three months later, the children were taken for military training. When the parents asked the supervisor to return the children, the latter stated that he would continue to provide assistance, as well as the salaries to the parents. The supervisor informed the parents that on child was killed in the battle in Ma’rib. The parents, after their children returned or was killed in battle, approached the supervisor for continued humanitarian assistance, at which point he informed them that the priority for assistance would be for those families whose members are fighting. Some of the aid given by the supervisor had the UN logo. In all of these cases, the cultural courses or summer camps were held in schools and it is from these schools that the children were then taken to the military fronts.

21. The Panel was informed that humanitarian assistance is denied through the removal of families’ names from the list of beneficiaries. Local supervisors appear to have control over these lists. The Panel has received information that at least two families took this threat seriously enough for them to send their children to the frontlines. The Panel finds that local Houthi supervisors are exploiting the prevailing poverty to recruit children as fighters. The Panel notes that in a 2021 study done by a local

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177 These were daily classes and the children would return home every day from the „summer camp“.
178 The family received several packages of assistance directly from those affiliated with the supervisor.
179 The children were gradually taken. Initially they would return home every day, but then they would return after a week, and then after 2 weeks until finally they were enrolled in a residential military training.
180 The UN informed the Panel that such a practice of providing humanitarian assistance in exchange for fighting was unlikely as the UN would be informed if their food was diverted in this manner. The researchers informed the Panel that it was more unlikely that the families living under the control of the supervisor, would inform the UN, that their local supervisor was diverting food from the UN.
181 The Panel notes open-source reporting on this issue: “… interviews for this paper, two families said the local Houthi supervisor forced them to send their children to the battlefields in exchange for humanitarian aid and a small salary. The salaries their children receive and the humanitarian aid they get, although very limited, is the main source of income they have.” See www.hudson.org/research/16848-yemen-s-clash-of-two-revolutions. See also https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739 “Houthis take advantage of “citizens” need for aid to recruit them to fight”. See also https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739 which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children’s refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks."(unofficial translation).
182 Confidential source.
183 Confidential source who interviewed the families.
184 See study done by a local organization on the reasons for children to drop-out of school. According to them 4.7% of those interviewed dropped out because they were recruited by a party to a conflict but 48.3% dropped out for economic reasons. https://mwatana.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/War-Of-Ignorance-1.pdf.
Yemeni organization over 57% of children across Yemen who dropped out of school stated that they would re-join when their economic situation improved.\textsuperscript{185} For children and families who are poor, humanitarian assistance given by organizations is vital to their economic survival. Thus, the Panel finds that the ability to access humanitarian assistance is a powerful incentive for parents and children to join fighting. The Panel continues to investigate.

IV. Cultural trainings targeting the general population

22. The Panel finds that the cultural courses provided in Houthi-controlled areas have also been perpetuating the conflict. They enable the Houthis to counter localized resistance to recruitment, to control popular dissent, and to maintain support for the Houthi leadership and its ideology. In some cases, individuals were forced to attend the courses as a demonstration of their loyalty to the Houthi cause.\textsuperscript{186}

23. For example, one woman stated that she took multiple courses, even though they were contrary to her religious beliefs. She feared reprisals from the Houthis if she refused to participate.\textsuperscript{187} In the cases investigated by the Panel, Houthi-appointed supervisors or managers in schools and hospitals monitor the participation of the employees in these activities. There are reports that non-participation has resulted in job losses.\textsuperscript{188} In prisons, some men and women are provided ideological courses as a condition of release (see annex 9 and paragraph 26 below).

24. The Panel documented the arrest and detention of, and sexual violence committed against two women who had refused to participate in the cultural courses. One refused to participate because the course materials were contrary to her political beliefs, and the other because she saw these courses as promoting hatred. Both women did not want to shout the Houthi slogan. One of these women, while being sexually abused, was told that what was being taught in the courses was the “real Islam”. It was made clear to her that the violence used against her was because of her refusal to participate in the courses.\textsuperscript{189} This woman believed that she was targeted because she was well-respected within her community, and because the Houthis wanted her to use her influence to recruit new fighters.\textsuperscript{190}

25. The Panel was informed that medical professionals who attend these courses were expected to encourage patients to send their male relatives to fight in the conflict. Several individuals informed the Panel that they suspect that some of their co-workers may have become informers for the Houthis after they had taken a cultural course.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} The panel also notes that in some cases individuals are free to choose whether to participate or not. Interviews conducted with individuals in Houthi-controlled areas, 2021.
\textsuperscript{187} Interview in \textbackslash Yemen, 2021.
\textsuperscript{188} Confidential sources in some schools and hospitals, as well as civil society activists.
\textsuperscript{189} 1 In-person interview with the Panel in 2021.
\textsuperscript{190} Interview, 2021.
A. Cultural trainings targeting vulnerable populations

i. Targeting detainees

26. The Panel finds that cultural courses are also being used in a systematic manner in secret detention centres. These “rehabilitation” courses impose the Houthi vision of Islam, incite hatred against various groups, and disseminate lectures from the Houthi leadership. The Panel was informed of some organized courses using videos and different lecturers. One male detainee informed the Panel that the attendance of a six-month religious course, teaching Islam from the beginning, was a condition for his release. He, therefore, accepted to participate in the training and was indeed released after completion.191 A female detainee said she begged to join the courses because she hoped that it would facilitate her release.192 Another detainee said he was forced to take the courses and to shout the slogan despite him not being a Muslim. This individual also said he did so to demonstrate his loyalty in order to be released.193

ii. Targeting children of female detainees

26. The Panel received information on four children between seven and 15-years old, who were forcibly taken away by the Houthis from their caretakers, after their mothers were detained. In two cases, their relatives were informed that the children were taken to a cultural course until their mothers are released. In fact, they were taken to a summer camp and provided with basic military training.194 In the case of a third child, he was reportedly taken from a female detainee. She was subsequently informed by the Houthis, while still in detention, that the child had died on the Ma’rib front.195 The Panel notes a report in 2021 of another child dying under similar circumstances.196

27. In another case, a mother informed the Panel that her interrogators told her that if she did not cooperate with them, her eight-year-old son would be taken by the Houthis to fight.197 In view of the circumstances of the five children referenced here, the Panel has initiated investigations to establish whether the Houthis have a policy targeting the children of female detainees for military recruitment.

iii. Targeting ethnic minorities

28. The Panel received information from Ta’izz and elsewhere on the possible targeting of children from ethic minority groups for recruitment in summer camps, which it is in the process of verifying.198

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191 In-person interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.
192 Interview with Panel in 2021 in Yemen.
193 In-person interview with Panel in 2021.
194 The Panel conducted in-person interviews with the children and a caregiver.
195 The mother refused to be interviewed by the Panel as she was in Sana’a.
196 See https://gulfstateanalytics.com/houthi-crimes-against-women/. It states “Then Doaa, arrested along her one-year-old daughter, spent two years in jail. Her husband obtained a divorce in her absence. Doaa says her older son was recruited by Houthis and deployed to the front lines where he died. She was not informed until her released”
197 In-person interview with Panel in 2021.
198 Information from the Ta’izz military axis and civil society. The Panel received also information on specific supervisors involved in organizing these courses. For open-source reporting on minority children see https://alsahwa-yemen.net/p-33739 which states that “the sources indicated that Houthi supervisors deprived many families in marginalized communities of domestic gas and humanitarian assistance as a result of their children's refusal to attend courses, lectures and programs of sectarian militias and to join their ranks.”
V. Responsibility of Member States and international organizations

29. The Panel notes that some Member States and international organizations, including United Nations entities, have provided support to the ministry of education in Sana’a. The Panel finds that these entities are likely aware of the use of Houthi slogans in schools and in textbooks used in summer camps, which incite hatred against various groups and entice students to join the Houthi military.\(^{199}\) Organizations supporting schools in Houthi-controlled areas have a responsibility to ensure that schools are safe spaces. Children should be able to study without being forced to shout political slogans or being asked to contribute to hate speech against various groups and nationalities or without being at risk of being recruited into the Houthi military. At minimum, those supporting the ministry of education should engage in a dialogue with the Minister or relevant authorities on the allegations above, as well as allegations concerning changes into school curriculum, and underscore that changes to curriculum and conduct in school should be in line with Yemen’s international human rights obligations. It should also enhance existing monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds and material provided to support the education of children are not diverted or misused to promote Houthi ideology, Houthi cause, or the conflict.

VI. Individuals responsible for these policies

30. The top Houthi leadership is responsible for the use of some summer camps for ideological training, and, in some cases, basic military training.\(^{200}\) The leadership is also responsible for organizing cultural courses, and any curriculum changes in schools that may entice children to fight. High numbers of children are recruited and killed in fighting, a fact which is also acknowledged in official Houthi media (figure 10.5).\(^{201}\) In his annual report on children and armed conflict, the UN Secretary-General noted that the Houthis had recruited 134 boys and 29 girls in 2020 (S/2021/437). In the same report, the continuing rise in the number of grave violations, including the recruitment of children, particularly by the Houthis, and persistent high numbers of children killed and maimed, and increase in denials of humanitarian access were highlighted.\(^{202}\)

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\(^{199}\) For publicly available information on summer camps see “With the aim of transferring them to the fronts...the Houthis sort students in their summer centers” at https://www.alyqyn.com/print~33181; “summer camps...’fuel’ for Houthi battles in Yemen” at https://al-ain.com/article/children-camps-summer-houthis-yemen, “Houthis chart a path of no return for Yemen’s generations” at https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/yemen/2019/08/05/اليمن-لأجيال-لاعودة-طرق-لاعمدة-لاجيال-اليمن/.

\(^{200}\) See for example the participation of top leaders at the graduation ceremony of the al Saleh mosque (annex 11).

\(^{201}\) The Panel has received over a hundred of extracts of similar photos of child martyrs, with their ages, but it cannot independently verify if all are children.

Figure 10.6

Images of a child “martyr” in the Houthi media

Source: Government of Yemen

31. The Panel is not aware of any measures taken by the Sana’a-based minister of education, Yahyah Bader al-Din al-Houthi, to stop children being recruited, or to investigate allegations on schools and summer camps being used for child recruitment. The Panel also finds that the Sana’a-based minister of defense, major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi,\(^{204}\) has not taken any effective measures to prevent the recruitment of children into the Houthi military. The Panel notes that Abdulmalik al-Houthi (YEi.004) has stated that he fully supports the summer camps and will continue to fund them.\(^{76}\) The Panel has initiated investigations into the roles of Abdullah Al-Razhi, director-general of educational coordination and summer activities at the ministry of youth and sport; and Muhammad Hussein Majd Al-Din Al-Muaydi, minister of youth and sports, in sustaining this policy.\(^{205}\)

Figure 10.7

Yahayah Badreddin al-Houthi

Source: Al Masirah

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\(^{203}\) According to Government of Yemen, this 13-year-old child was killed in January 2020. Source: Government of Yemen. The Panel has received similar images and videos of children allegedly killed on the battlefield from multiple sources.

\(^{204}\) وزیر الدفاع اللواء محمد ناصر العاطفي

\(^{205}\) وزیر الشباب والرياضة محمد حسين مجد الدين المويدي
Figure 10.8

**major general Mohammad Nasser Al-Atifi** (second from right)


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Figure 10.9

**Guests at a graduation ceremony for summer camp in al Saleh mosque**

*Source:* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opFl1zkY88](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2opFl1zkY88) (in the lower image, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, prime minister, Mohammed Ali al Houthi and Taha Al Mutawkkel, minister of health, are shown to attend a graduation ceremony at al Saleh Mosque)

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32. Regarding the cultural courses, it is likely that the governorate-level supervisors exercise oversight while local supervisors implement the policy that had been formulated at the central level. The Panel continues to receive information that the ultimate control over the local supervisors lies with Abdulmalik al Houthi (YEi.004) and Mohammed Ali al Houthi.206

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206 Confidential sources in Yemen, including in Houthi-controlled areas.
Annex 11  The use of Al Saleh Mosque as a summer school and for military purposes

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.
Annex 12  Attack on Jeddah port on 14 December 2020

1. In the early morning hours of 14 December 2020, the port of Jeddah was attacked by at least three water-borne improvised explosives (WBIED) causing significant damage to two vessels, a merchant tanker and a Saudi warship, as well as to the port infrastructure. In June 2021, the Panel visited the sites of the attacks and interviewed representatives of the Royal Saudi Navy and Saudi Aramco, which operates parts of the port, and which had chartered the merchant tanker. The Panel has also been in contact with the operator of the tanker involved in the incident.

Figure 12.1
Satellite images showing approximate impact locations of the WBIEDs

Source: Google Earth, Panel

2. The first and the second WBIED employed targeted King Faisal Naval Base, a facility which hosts the Headquarters of the Western Fleet of the Royal Saudi Navy, and functions as the home port for its vessels. At 0007 hours, the first WBIED hit the Western end of Pier #8 located towards the Southern end of the base. The subsequent explosion caused significant damage to the concrete structure. The damage, as well as some of the repair work, was still visible when the Panel visited the impact location in June 2021. At 0015 hours, a second WBIED impacted the hull of the BORAIDA (902) on the starboard side. The vessel, a naval replenishment tanker based at Jeddah, was moored at that time to the North of Pier #8. The Panel has requested more information (including detailed images) on the damage caused to the warship from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a response to which is pending at the time of
writing. However, during the Panel’s visit to the naval base, the repairs to the vessel’s hulls were visible and an image obtained from other sources (see below) clearly shows damage above the waterline shortly after the attack.

Figure 12.2
The BORAIDA shortly after the attack at King Faisal Naval Base

Source: Confidential

3. At 0044 hours, the third WBIED impacted the port side of the hull of the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker BW RHINE (IMO: 9341940), which was moored at Main Berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco’s Marine Terminal, a facility several kilometres away from King Faisal Naval Base in a North-Western direction. The vessel was operating a scheduled charter on behalf of Saudi Aramco and was offloading refined petroleum products. According to Saudi Aramco, at the time of the attack, the tanker had already been in port for about 20 hours and about 20 percent of the cargo was still onboard the vessel. The impact and subsequent explosion penetrated the hull of the ship at two locations at the waterline. The holes measured approximately 30 centimetres x 30 centimetres. The impact also caused a fire with flames reported to be 20 meters high which burned for about one hour. While the crew of the BW RHINE reported to the shipping line that they had heard two explosions from King Faisal Naval Base as well as subsequent gun fire, which caused the master to stop the offloading of the cargo, they did not receive a warning that an attack on Saudi Aramco’s Marine Terminal was imminent.
Figure 12.3  
**Damage to the hull of the BW RHINE**

![Image of damage to the hull of the BW RHINE]

*Source: Confidential*

4. No injuries were reported from the attacks on either the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal nor the ones on the King Faisal Naval Base and while the damage to the vessels and the piers required extensive repairs, the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal was able to resume operations shortly after the attack. However, as noted in annex 16, the supply of petroleum products to the Western region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends heavily on Saudi Aramco’s terminal and storage infrastructure in Jeddah. If the attack had done more damage to the tanker or the terminal infrastructure, the repercussions on the economy and civilian infrastructures for this part of the Kingdom would have been significant. In addition, a successful attack on a fully loaded oil tanker could have resulted in an oil spill, which would have serious environmental and economic repercussions for communities which depend on the Red Sea for their livelihoods, as well as a potentially negative impact on global trade and commerce.
5. During its visit, the Panel was able to inspect the debris of the three WBIEDs which were used in the attacks on 14 December 2020. The Panel notes that the design of the boats is different from previous models deployed by the Houthi forces in the Red Sea.\footnote{The Houthis have previously used converted ten-meter patrol boats manufactured by the UAE (2017), as well as the smaller, 5.8 metre long, purpose-build ‘Blowfish’ model (since 2018), which is powered only by a single outboard engine. The design used in the attack on Jeddah port is more similar to the converted skiffs used in the attack on the Saudi-flagged tanker GLADIOLUS (IMO: 9169548) in the Gulf of Aden on 3 March 2020 (see paragraph 63 and annex 22 of the Panel’s Final Report, S/2021/79).} Measuring between 6 and 8 meters from bow to stern and powered by two, 75-horsepower Yamaha outboard engines, these WBIEDs are basically skiffs converted for autonomous military deployment. Regrettably, the Panel has not been able to inspect the guidance and control systems of the WBIEDs, but it will likely, in the Panel’s assessment, as in the case of previous generations, rely on pre-set GPS coordinates to guide it to its target. The Panel has also not been able to inspect any remnants of the warheads used in the WBIEDs, but images of debris recovered from the inside of the BW RHINE, as well as the “significant internal blast damage” reported by the crew, could imply that they were carrying a shaped charge similar to the ones used in some Houthi UAVs (see annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report, S/2020/326) as well as in the WBIED attack on the Saudi-flagged merchant tanker ARSAN (IMO: 9421415) in the Southern Red Sea on 24 July 2018 (see annex 15 of the Panel’s Final Report, S/2019/83).
Figure 12.5
Metal debris recovered from inside the BW RHINE, likely part of the shaped charge

Source: Confidential

6. If the attack was conducted in the context of the conflict in Yemen, IHL would apply.\textsuperscript{208} In this case, the attack against the King Faisal Naval Base would be permitted under IHL as this military base is a military objective by its nature.\textsuperscript{209} However, the attack against the Singaporean-flagged merchant tanker in the Saudi Aramco Marine Terminal, a civilian tanker, is contrary to the IHL principle of distinction.\textsuperscript{210} The Panel estimates that the targeting accuracy of the WBIEDs used in this attack is fairly high, with a margin of error of less than five metres. In addition, the distance between Main Berth #1, where the BW RHINE was moored, and King Faisal Naval Base is approximately 2,000 meters. It is therefore likely that the civilian tanker was the intended objective of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.

\textsuperscript{208} For instance, if Houthi forces were responsible, the attack would be part of the conflict between the Houthis and the KSA. However, if the attack was conducted by another group, such as a terrorist group, with no link with the conflict in Yemen, IHL would not be applicable. In this case, the Panel concluded that the attack was conducted with near certainty by the Houthis, and therefore is linked with the conflict.

\textsuperscript{209} CIHL rule 8.

\textsuperscript{210} CIHL rule 1.
Annex 13  Attack on Yanbu port on 27 April 2021

At 0615 hours on 27 April 2021, a patrol vessel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia identified a target approaching the port of Yanbu, on the west coast of Saudi Arabia, from the open sea at a distance of six nautical miles (approximately 11 kilometres) and heading towards the Saudi Aramco refinery at high speed (more than 30 knots, approximately 55 kilometres/hour). The patrol vessel intercepted the target, which turned out to be a water borne improvised explosive device (WBIED) and disabled it at 0630 hours, approximately two nautical miles (3.7 kilometres) away from the refinery. At 0815 hours, the disabled craft had been moved by the waves to a location close to the Yanbu desalination plant where it was destroyed by another military patrol. The Panel has interviewed the crew of a merchant tanker, the TORM HERMIA (IMO: 9797993), which was moored at berth 71 of Yanbu port, and which had first reported the incident. Three crew members said that they observed the incident stating that the explosion took place at 08.05 hours approximately 1.4 nautical miles (2.6 kilometres) away from the tanker to the South-East between buoy 6R and 3R (see figure 13.3). The Panel has learned that following the incident, the Saudi military conducted a survey of the area and discovered the wreckage of a second WBIED in the Shu'ban al-Sab’ah area, approximately 30 nautical miles (55 kilometres) South of Yanbu port.

Figure 13.1  
WBIED approaching Yanbu port as observed by the Saudi patrol vessel

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Figure 13.2
Destruction of the WBIED by the Saudi military

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Figure 13.3
ECDIS screenshot from the TORM HERMIA showing the approximate location of the explosion

Source: Confidential
Figure 13.4
Map showing the locations of the intercept and destruction of the first WBIED, as well as the location where the wreck of the second WBIED was found

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Annex 14  Attack on Jizan port on 30 July 2021

At 1712 hours on 30 July 2021, the crew of the Bahamas-flagged crude oil tanker ALBERTA (IMO: 9486922) noticed a UAV approaching at high speed from the starboard side. The vessel was moored at berth #1 of the Saudi Aramco Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal, loading crude oil. The UAV exploded over the vessel’s bow in the vicinity of the forecastle at an unknown height in a matter consistent with a loitering munition. The ALBERTA only sustained minor damage, including several holes in the floor of the main deck, possibly as a result of fragmentation,211 as well as damage to a hydraulic line and a mooring winch. Neither a fire nor injuries among the crew members were reported. The crew was able to document a number of pieces of debris on the deck of the ALBERTA, which were later collected by the Saudi military. While the Panel has not been able to inspect the debris, the images show clearly that the weapon system used was a UAV, most likely a medium-range, QASEF-type, which has been documented multiple times by the Panel in cross-border attacks by the Houthis on locations in the South of Saudi Arabia. Whereas the explosives carried by those UAVs likely would be unable to seriously damage the vessel itself, it can cost the lives of crew members as evidenced by the attack on the MERCER STREET a day earlier (see annex 15). The distance from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen to the Jizan Bulk Plant Terminal is approximately 80 kilometres, which put the port within reach of medium-range UAVs.

Figure 14.1
Possible fragmentation damage on the main deck of the ALBERTA

Source: Confidential

211 Houthi UAVs often carry fragmentation warheads, which explode into a mass of small, fast-moving metal fragments (“fragmentation”) that are lethal against individuals.
Figure 14.2
Possible fragmentation damage in the roof of the main cavity

*Source:* Confidential

Figure 14.3
Debris of the wing of the UAV made from fiberglass

*Source:* Confidential
Figure 14.4  
**Debris of the engine of the UAV**

Source: Confidential

Figure 14.5  
**Small parts, possibly pieces of fragmentation from the UAV**

Source: Confidential
Annex 15  Attack on MERCER STREET on 29 July 2021

1. The oil products tanker MERCER STREET (IMO: 9539585) was attacked three times over the span of several hours on 29 July 2021, while steaming empty in international waters in the Gulf of Oman en route from Tanzania to the United Arab Emirates. The first attack occurred at 1045 hours when the crew reported that a UAV had missed the vessel, crashing approximately one nautical mile off the aft starboard. The bridge watch heard a loud buzzing noise followed by an explosion in the ocean, causing the water to erupt 15-20 metres in the air and black smoke rising at the point of impact. The second attack happened approximately 45 minutes later, at about 1130 hours. The bridge watch again reported a buzzing noise and stated that the UAV approached from the aft port quarter of the ship at an altitude of 20-25 metres. Prior to reaching the MERCER STREET, the UAV suddenly pitched nose up before rotating back down and proceeded in a 170 degrees downward descent towards the ship. According to the crew, the UAV was “light desert green” in colour. The second UAV narrowly missed the MERCER STREET and crashed into the ocean about one metre off the stern. The crew observed black smoke from an explosion on impact and recovered some pieces of UAV debris from the deck of the MERCER STREET. Following the second attack, the ship increased its speed from 11 knots (20 kilometres per hour) to 16 knots (30 kilometres per hour) but maintained its course.

2. The third attack happened at 2030 hours and this time the UAV hit the MERCER STREET’s aft superstructure from above, impacting the pilot’s cabin located on the aft bridge deck. The impact killed the ship’s master, a Romanian citizen, as well as a British security officer, making this the first fatal attack on a commercial vessel in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in many years. The attack also destroyed the vessel’s communication equipment and created a breach in the roof of the pilot’s cabin. It also damaged the bridge deck, as well as the C and B decks. In the aftermath of the attack, the crew mustered inside the citadel and informed the company, which in turn alerted the U.S. Navy. U.S. forces were then dispatched to assist the vessel, to conduct a preliminary survey of the damage, and to accompany the MERCER STREET to a safe harbour.

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212 Some reports state that the attacks took place on 29 and other that it occurred on 30 July 2021, the reason for that apparent discrepancy is that international naval forces are using Zulu time, the military version of coordinated universal time (UTC). In this report the Panel is using local, i.e., Gulf Standard Time, which is UTC+4.
Figure 15.1
Aerial view of the aft castle showing the location of the impact

Source:

Figure 15.2
Impact location of the UAV on the aft superstructure

Source:
Figure 15.3
*Internal view of the impact location from the Pilot’s cabin*


Figure 15.4
*Damage to exterior bulkhead below the impact point*

*Source:* Confidential
Figure 15.5
**Vertical stabilizer of the UAV**

*Source:*

Figure 15.6
**Debris of a servo actuator from the UAV**

*Source: *Confidential
Figure 15.7
Fiberglass debris from the UAV recovered from the bridge wing

Source: Confidential

Figure 15.8
Sketch by a crew member of the UAV used in the second attack

Source: Confidential
Annex 16  Attack on the Saudi Aramco Bulk Plant in Jeddah North

17. At 0342 hours in the early morning of 23 November 2020, the Saudi Aramco petroleum products distribution facility in Jeddah North was attacked by a cruise missile, which hit the top of storage tank #103 coming from a South-Westerly direction. One of 13 similar structures at the site used to store petroleum products such as diesel oil, gasoline and jet fuel. The tank has a capacity of 500,000 barrels and was filled with diesel at the time of the attack. The attack caused an explosion and a subsequent fire in the attack, the burn marks of which were still clearly visibly during the Panel’s visit to the facility in June 2021 and it took the company’s response team and the fire brigade about 40 minutes to extinguish the fire. Subsequent investigations showed that the impact of the missile had created a hole of 3.93 meters x 2.56 meters in the external roof of the storage tank and had completely destroyed the floating internal roof, a six-millimeter-thick structure made of carbon steel on top of the product. Company representatives interviewed by the Panel confirmed that there had been no advance warning of an attack.

Figure 16.1
Satellite Images showing the approximate impact point of the missile

Source: Google Earth, Panel

18. Shortly after the attack, a spokesman for the Houthi forces, brigadier general Yahya Sarie, announced in the Houthi-affiliated media that “the Yemeni missile forces targeted an Aramco
distribution station in Jeddah with a winged missile, Quds 2, which is announced for the first time. On the same day, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2020/1135), the Permanent Representative of KSA also attributed responsibility for the “terrorist attack” on the bulk plant to the Houthis militia. The Panel also notes that the modus operandi of the attack, despite more limited in scale, is broadly like the previous attacks on the oil infrastructure in KSA, including the high-profile attack on 14 September 2019 on the Aramco facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais (S/2020/326).

Figure 16.2
Damage to the external roof of storage tank #103

Source: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

19. While operations at the Bulk Plant resumed within hours of the attack, storage tank #103 was out of service for about four months for repairs, which according to the company cost it approximately USD 1.5 million. Even though there were 15 employees of Saudi Aramco at the site when the attack happened, no injuries occurred. However, had the missile hit another storage tank containing a more flammable fuel than diesel oil (such as kerosene), it is possible that the tank’s firefighting system would not have been able to contain the blaze and that other tanks in the facility would have also been affected. The Panel believes that the missile system used by the Houthis in this attack (see paragraph 5 below) is sufficiently precise that storage tank #103 was deliberately targeted, but it not clear whether the attackers were aware what kind of fuel was stored there at the time of the attack.

20. According to information received by the Panel during its visit to the facility, the North Jeddah Bulk Plant has a total storage capacity of 5.2 billion barrels and plays a critical role in distributing up to 120,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per day to customers in the Jeddah, Mecca and al-Baha regions, which accounts for 25 to 30 percent of the Kingdom’s supplies. In addition to more than 1,000 petrol stations, the facility also supplies public utilities such as the King Abdulaziz International
Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the vital Saline Water Conversion Corporation, which is responsible for the provision of most potable water in the Jeddah region. While the facility also supplies the Saudi military with petroleum products, it is mostly supplying civilian customers. If the plant had been out of service of a significant period, the impact on the Kingdom’s economy as well as on the welfare of the residents of the Western region would likely have been significant.

Figure 16.3
Debris of the cruise missile used in the attack

Source: Panel

21. The Panel has been able to inspect the debris of the missile used in the attack and was informed that some parts were found inside of storage tank #103 during the repair works. The debris is consistent with the land attack cruise missile, which has been previously documented by the Panel as having been used in several attacks on targets in KSA in 2019 (annex 16 of S/2020/326) and whose parts were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden in November 2019 (paragraph 79 and annex 19 of S/2021/79). The damage to storage tank #103 of is also consistent with a missile of this type. The distance between the facility and Houthi-controlled territory is about 700 kilometres, which would put it close to maximum range estimated by the Panel for this weapon system. Whereas the Houthi forces have claimed that the missile used in the attack was a “Quds-2” cruise missile, during its inspection the Panel has not been able to identify significant design differences to the “Quds-1” model which was used in 2019. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of some of the commercial components used in the manufacturing of the missile (annex 23) to establish whether the missile was manufactured in Yemen, as claimed by the Houthis, or supplied by an external party.

22. The Aramco Bulk Plant can be considered as a dual-use object under IHL as it provides supplies both to the Saudi military and civilians. However, according to information received by the Panel, most petroleum products distributed by the facility are for civilian use. For instance, the Panel was informed by a company representative that approximately one percent of the aviation fuel distributed by the Bulk Plant are supplied to the Royal Saudi Air Force in Jeddah. As for other petroleum products distributed to the military, the Panel was unable to obtain specific data. Storage tank #103, which was the specific objective of the attack (see paragraph 3 above) was not providing an effective contribution to the Kingdom’s military action in Yemen and the Panel fails to see how its
destruction offered the Houthis forces a definite military advantage. Therefore, the Panel considers that the tank was, at the time of the attack, a civilian object\textsuperscript{214}. In addition, the Panel notes the importance of the Aramco Bulk Plant facility in providing supplies to critical civilian infrastructures such as the King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah, the Saudi Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected in this attack.\textsuperscript{215}

\textsuperscript{214} See CIHL rules 8 and 9.
\textsuperscript{215} See CIHL rule 1.
Annex 17  Attacks on Abha International Airport

1. Abha International Airport (IATA: AHB) is a civilian airport in the ‘Asir Province in the South of KSA, approximately 95 kilometers from the Yemeni border. This proximity to Houthi-controlled areas is also one of the reasons why the airport has been attacked more often than any other civilian facility in the KSA, even though the airports in Jizan and Najran\(^{216}\) have also been attacked multiple times. In June 2021, the Panel visited Abha International Airport, as well as the nearby town of Khamish Mushait, which hosts an important Royal Saudi Air Force Base and met with airport staff and military officials to discuss the threats to civilian aviation. The Panel was also able to view CCTV footage of some of the attacks. In 2019, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Abha International Airport handled 4.5 million passengers, making it the fifth largest airport in the Kingdom in terms of passenger numbers\(^{217}\). According to airport staff interviewed by the Panel, the airport is the main hub for the Southwestern region, offering a mix of domestic and international flights. Due to its colder climate, Abha is also an important destination for domestic tourism, in particular during the summer months and during Ramadan.

**Figure 17.1**
Attacks on Abha International Airport as of 31 August 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Attack</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 April 2018</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>6 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 2018</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>2 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 2018</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 September 2018</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2019</td>
<td>Cruise Missile</td>
<td>26 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>20 injured, 2 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>10 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>5 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 2019</td>
<td>Cruise Missile</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August 2019</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 2020</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February 2021</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February 2021</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 May 2021</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 2021</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 2021</td>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>8 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>77 injured, 2 deaths</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Confidential*

2. The Panel received information showing that there were 18 successful attacks on the airport between the start of the aerial attacks in 2018 and 31 August 2021, causing a total of 77 injuries and 2 deaths. The airport authorities told the Panel that until 31 June 2021 (the day of the Panel’s visit), the airport received a total of 491 threats, which are defined as warnings from the Saudi military about incoming UAVs and missiles. They also noted that all warnings trigger an interruption of airport

\(^{216}\) According to the airport authorities in Abha, Najran Domestic Airport (IATA: EAM), which in 2014 handled 600,000 passengers, was closed completely between May 2015 and May 2019 as a result of the threats from Houthi-controlled Yemen.

operations and an evacuation of passengers and staff from the apron into the terminal building.\textsuperscript{218} According to the management of the AHB, not all successful attacks are preceded by a warning\textsuperscript{219} and even when warnings are received, this is typically just a few minutes before the impact. This clearly shows that the Houthi forces have become more adept at evading detection by the Saudi air defenses, when using UAVs and cruise missiles. The late notice is also likely due to the close proximity of Abha to Yemen and the mountainous terrain, both of which limit the opportunities to detect and intercept an aerial threat. The following paragraphs describe some of the more “successful” attacks in greater detail.

Figure 17.2
Satellite image showing the approximate impact locations of the attacks discussed below

Source: Google Earth, Panel

3. While the majority of attacks on the airport have been conducted with short-range Qasef-type UAVs which do not carry enough explosives to penetrate the concrete roof of the terminal building, it also experienced two cruise missile attacks in 2019. The attack on 12 June 2019 took place at 0225 hours in the morning when a Quds-1 land attack cruise missile penetrated the roof of the baggage hall.

\textsuperscript{218} Airport staff informed the Panel that prior to June 2019 passengers were evacuated from the apron and the terminal to the landside areas of the facility as those were considered to be safe from attacks. Following the attack on the outdoor McDonalds restaurant located on the landside, which claimed the lives of two civilians and injured 21 others (see paragraph 4), the airport changed its security protocol and now evacuates into the terminal building, which provides some protection against UAV attacks.

\textsuperscript{219} Out of the 16 successful attacks, prior warning was only received in ten cases.
in the arrival terminal. The subsequent explosion, which was captured by CCTV cameras, injured 26 passengers and airport staff. This was the first documented case of a Quds-1 cruise missile ever being deployed by the Houthi forces. The airport authorities informed the Panel that they received no prior warning from the Saudi military about the incoming missile. The second cruise missile attack took place on 28 August 2019, but no significant damage was reported. The Panel has inspected the debris of both cruise missiles in 2019 (see annex 16 of S/2020/326), as well as parts of a missile of the same type, which were seized by the U.S. Navy from a dhow in the Gulf of Aden (see paragraph 79 and annex 19 of S/2021/79).

**Figure 17.3**
CCTV footage showing the moments immediately before and after the missile attack on 12 June 2019

![Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhpROPyg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjsuhpROPyg)

4. The most lethal attack on Abha International Airport took place at 2120 hours on 23 June 2019 when a UAV exploded on the landside of the terminal building, immediately killing one civilian, who was at that time eating at an outdoor table of the McDonalds restaurant, and injuring 22 other people, one of whom died later from his injuries. Houthi UAVs (as well as some missiles) often carry a fragmentation warhead, i.e. small fragmentation, typically metal cubes, are scattered over a wide area following the detonation of the explosive filler. The UAVs are programmed to fly to pre-set GPS coordinates and then explode in mid-air, typically at a height of some 20 metres, or more rarely impact directly in a building or other structure, exploding on contact. This type of weapons with large blast effect and multiple fragmentations used in an area where there are civilians does not allow for discrimination between civilians and fighters. Contrary to IHL prescription, it also does not minimize damages to civilians and civilian objects.²²⁰

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²²⁰ CIHL rules 1 and 15.
Figure 17.4
Damage from fragmentation from a UAV attack visible on the apron of the airport

Source: Panel

5. At 1242 hours in the afternoon on 10 February 2021 Abha International Airport was attacked by a Qasef-type UAV, which hit a parked Airbus A320-214 with the registration code HZ-FAB operated by FLYADEAL (IATA: F3), a Jeddah-based low-cost airline. The explosion penetrated the fuselage of the aircraft on the left side and triggered a fire, which was put out by the airport fire brigade. In this specific case, the airport authorities received a warning from the Saudi military about 20 minutes before the attack which allowed them to complete the deplaning of the 119 passengers from the plane and to evacuate them to the terminal building. Even though the plane only suffered limited damage, it was out of service for four months. As far as the Panel is aware, this is the first incident in which a civilian aircraft in KSA was damaged by a Houthi UAV attack. The Panel has been informed by the airport authorities that the warhead of the UAV in this case did not contain fragmentation, which could imply that in this case the plane rather than the passengers was targeted. Under IHL, only military objectives can be the object of attack. According to information received by the Panel, the plane was not used by military and there was no military personnel or civilians having lost their protection under IHL on board or near the airplane. The Panel therefore concludes that the airplane was a civilian object protected under IHL against direct attacks and that the passengers and people nearby the airplane were also protected under IHL.\textsuperscript{221}

\textsuperscript{221} See CIHL rules 1, 5-8.
4. In addition to the human casualties, there has been significant economic damage, both directly in terms of necessary repairs and protective measures such as the construction of a blast barrier between the apron and the terminal building, as well as indirect costs due to higher insurance premiums, reduced slots at the airport and a stop to night-time operations. Airport management estimates that the losses from the attacks amount to Saudi Riyal 40 million (approximately USD 10.65 million). Unlike in the case of attacks on other targets, the Houthi forces have repeatedly claimed responsibility for the strikes on Abha International Airport, stating that the facility is used for military operations by the Coalition. During the meeting with the Panel, the airport management categorically denied that the facility was used for military operations. While the Panel is unable to independently verify this claim, it notes that the Saudi Air Force regularly operates from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait, about 13 kilometres East of Abha International Airport.

5. Abha International Airport is a civilian airport and is used by civilians. The Panel found that the attacks mentioned above were conducted in contravention to the principle of distinction. In the case where the airport would be used for military operations by the Coalition, only attack against military objects or equipment and military personnel would be permitted by IHL. In addition, because the airport is used by civilians any attack should be conducted with constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects and all feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

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222 With reference to the attack on 10 February 2021, the spokesman of the Houthi forces Yahya Sarie was quoted as saying: “The UAV air force targeted the airfield of warplanes at Abha International Airport – which is used for military purposes to target Yemeni people – with four drones”, see https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-abha-airport-attack.

223 CIHL rule 1.

224 CIHL rule 15.
Annex 18: New Houthi weapons displayed to the media

Figure 18.1
SAMMAD-4 UAV at the exhibition (side view)

There are some indications that the UAV shown in the exhibition is a mockup, which is not airworthy.
Figure 18.3
Unguided projectile carried by the SAMMAD-4 UAV

Figure 18.4
RUJUM Hexcopter at the exhibition

Unlike the other new attack UAVs shown in the exhibition, the RUJUM was deployed in several attacks by the Houthis on different frontlines. At least two RUJUM hexcopters were shot down by GoY-affiliated forces, but despite several requests, so far, the Panel has been unable to inspect their debris, preventing further technical analysis.
Figure 18.5
KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (side view)

Figure 18.6
KHATIF UAV at the exhibition (top view)
Figure 18.7
MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition (top view)

Figure 18.8
Detail of the MERSAD Reconnaissance UAV at the exhibition

*Source for figures 18.1 – 18.8: Almasirah.net*
Annex 19: Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 10 February 2021

Figure 19.1
*Shu’ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021


Figure 19.2
*Shu’ai*-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021

Figure 19.3
Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021


Figure 19.4
Jelbut-type dhow interdicted on 10 February 2021

Figure 19.5
Type 56-1 assault rifles wrapped in plastic

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.6
Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm assault rifle and detail of the markings showing that the weapon was manufactured in 2017 by Factory 26 in China

7.62mm Type 56-1
(Symbol) 17-CN 62068328

Source: Confidential
Figure 19.7
PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.8
Detail of the marking on one of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, likely indicating that it was manufactured in China

(Triangle) CF / M80 / 401702

Source: Confidential
Figure 19.9
AM-50 ‘Sayyad’, 12.7x99mm calibre Anti-Material Rifle

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.10
Details of markings on the Anti-Material Rifle

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.11
Ghadir-4 optical weapons scope

Source: Confidential
Figure 19.12
Components of 12.7x108mm calibre ‘DSchK’ heavy machine guns

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.13
Marking on the receiver of one the heavy machine guns

180058

Source: Confidential
The Panel notes that the description of the Um-Almadain 1 does not match the images of the Jelbut-type dhow. Therefore, it is likely that this boat license is for another vessel.

The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.
Figure 19.16
Farsi-language warehouse receipt for ARIZONA brand cigarettes found on the Jelbut-type dhow

Source: Confidential

Figure 19.20
Mapping of coordinates allegedly retrieved from GPS devices onboard of the Jelbut-type dhow

Source: Confidential

229 The Panel inspected many similar receipts for cigarettes in Farsi, which were found on the dhow Bahri-2, seized with a cargo of weapons off the coast of Somalia on 24 June 2020. See figure 15.18 in annex 15, S/2021/79.
Figure 19.21
Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karama 1 found on the Shu’ai-type dhow (front side)

![Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karama 1 found on the Shu’ai-type dhow (front side)](image)

*Source: Confidential*

Figure 19.22
Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karama 1 found on the Shu’ai-type dhow (rear side)

![Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karama 1 found on the Shu’ai-type dhow (rear side)](image)

*Source: Confidential*

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230 The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.
Annex 20  Seizure of weapons from a dhow on 6 May 2021

Figure 20.1
*Shu’ai*-type dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021


Figure 20.2
Small arms and light weapons wrapped in green plastic onboard the dhow

Figure 20.3
**ATGMs and wrapped SALW in the cargo hold of the dhow**


Figure 20.4
**Type 56-1, 7.62x39mm calibre assault rifle seized from the dhow**

*Source:* Panel
Figure 20.5
Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)

7.62mm Type 56-1
(Symbol – Factory 26) 17-CN / 62130678

Source: Panel

Figure 20.6
M80, PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns

Source: Panel
Figure 20.7
Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured in China in 2017\textsuperscript{231} at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)

![Image](Symbol – Factory 26)
M80 / 17-CN 02415

Source: Panel

Figure 20.8
Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle\textsuperscript{232}

![Image](Type 85, 7.62x54mm calibre sniper rifle)

Source: Panel

\textsuperscript{231} The Panel notes that the Chinese PKM-pattern machine guns, unlike the Type 56-1 assault rifles, showed significantly more wear and tear. It is possible that they were assembled using repurposed parts of older PKM-pattern machine guns. In 2020, the Panel noted that PKM-pattern machine guns seized by the Royal Saudi Navy from dhows sometimes combined parts with Cyrillic markings with parts bearing Chinese markings, which would support this theory.

\textsuperscript{232} This is a Chinese copy of the Dragunov SVD-63 sniper rifle, which is manufactured in Russia. The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that this type of rifle has been seized in the Arabian Sea.
Figure 20.9
Markings documented by the Panel indicating that it was manufactured China in 2017 at Jianshe Arsenal (State Factory 26)

(Symbol - Factory 26)
7.62mm Type 85
17-CN
3309924

Source: Panel

Figure 20.10
PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns manufactured in Bulgaria\(^{233}\)

Source: Panel

\(^{233}\) The Panel notes that this is the first time in recent years that Bulgarian-manufactured weapons were seized from a dhow in the Arabian Sea.
Figure 20.11
Detail of markings documented by the Panel

Source: Panel

Figure 20.12
PKM-pattern, 7.62x54mm calibre general-purpose machine guns, likely manufactured in Iran

Source: Panel

234 These weapons appear to be copies of the Chinese, M80 version of the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns. The Panel notes that, unlike the Bulgarian, Chinese and Russian PKM-pattern machine guns, these weapons do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production.
Figure 20.13
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun

Figure 20.14
Detail of marking on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun

Source: Panel

The Panel notes that the dot peen marking used on the machine guns has also been observed on the AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ anti-material rifle (see figure 20.21). Dot Peen marking is not known to be used on Chinese or Russian manufactured weapons.
Figure 20.15
Detail of stamp on PKM-pattern general purpose machine gun

Source: Panel

Figure 20.16
Similar stamp documented on the rifle selector lever of Iranian G3A1 assault rifle

Source: https://irp.fas.org/world/iran/smallarms.pdf

The Panel notes that not all the PKM-pattern general-purpose machine guns, which the Panel assesses to be of Iranian-origin were bearing this stamp. The Panel believes that the machine guns were assembled using repurposed parts from older weapons, some of which had original government markings.
The Panel notes that the RPG-7 launchers do not have clear markings showing the country and year of production. The Panel notes that all RPG-7 launchers inspected since 2019 have identical physical characteristics, including the green plastic heat shield, which is different from other versions of the RPG-7 launchers, as well as similar markings, highlighted in yellow (see figure 20.18).
The Panel notes that the anti-material rifles seized from the dhow have no clear markings showing the country and year of production, however it also notes that all anti-material rifles inspected since 2018 have identical physical characteristics and markings. The AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ is an unlicensed copy of the HS.50 anti-material rifle manufactured in Austria. The main technical differences include a different grip and barrel design.

\[238\]
The Panel notes that the dot peen marking on the AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ is similar to the marking on some of the PKM-pattern machine guns which were seized from the same dhow (see figure 20.13 and 20.14). The Panel has observed similar markings on other AM-50 ‘Sayyad’ rifles inspected since 2018.
Figure 20.23
Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope and its metal box, likely made in Iran

Source: Panel

Figure 20.24
Detail of marking on Ghadir-4 rifle 12x50 optical weapon scope

RG-004 A1
1700560

Source: Panel
Figure 20.25
Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media

Source: https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/

Figure 20.26
Ghadir-4 rifle scope visible on the poster (not mounted on the rifle) in the Iranian media

Source: https://www.khabarazma.com/4206519/
Figure 20.27
5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union

Source: Panel

Figure 20.28
5.45x39mm calibre AKS-74U assault rifle manufactured in the Soviet Union

Source: Panel
Figure 20.29
Detail of markings indicating manufacture at the Tula Arms Plant in 1988

(Symbol – Tula Arms Plant) 88 / 985076

Source: Panel

Figure 20.30
9M133 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia and transport container (in the background)

Source: Panel
Figure 20.31
Detail of markings documented by the Panel

9M113 / 07-85-536 / 2580 / 36-86-22

Source: Panel

Figure 20.32
9M111M Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia

Source: Panel
Figure 20.33
Detail of markings documented by the Panel

9M111M / 10-83-MK / 100486 / 42-85-53

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.34
9M111-2 Anti-tank guided missile manufactured in Russia

*Source:* Panel

Figure 20.35
Detail of markings documented by the Panel

9M111-2 / 03-79-MK / 47-80-53

*Source:* Panel
Figure 20.36
POSP 12x50M Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus

Source: Panel

Figure 20.37
Detail of serial number indicating manufacture in 2017

Source: Panel
Document found with the sights indicating that quality control took place in May 2017

Source: Panel

POSP 8x42 Telescopic Sight manufactured in Belarus

Source: Panel
Figure 20.40
Detail of serial number

596-1-1242

Source: Panel

Figure 20.41
Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karma 1 found on the dhow240 (front side)241

Source: Confidential

240 The Panel notes that this appears to be the same license, which was previously documented on the smaller dhow seized on 10 February 2021 (see figure 19.21), raising the possibility that this is the same vessel. The Panel also notes that at least one dhow crew member was present on both occasions (see annex 21).

241 The Panel has obtained the full name and unredacted picture of the owner of the vessel.
Figure 20.42
Yemeni Boat License for Ramazu Al-Karama 1 found on the dhow (rear side)

![Yemeni Boat License](image)

Source: Confidential

Figure 20.43
Image from the Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device showing waypoint at Jask

![Garmin ECHOMAP Plus](image)

Source: Confidential
Figure 20.44

Coordinates and dates reportedly retrieved from Garmin ECHOMAP Plus device

GPS Device from 6 May 2021 Interdicted Flagless Dhow: Garmin echoMAP Plus 5AZ028107 Point Data

Source: Confidential
Annex 21: Images and ID documents of the crew members of the dhows

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.
Annex 22  Seizure of thermal weapon sights at the Shahn border crossing on 22 June 2021

1. The Panel is investigating the chain of custody of seven RU90/120G thermal weapon sights, which were seized at 2000 hours on 22 June 2021 by Yemeni customs officers at the Shahn crossing on the border with Oman. The Panel has been informed that the sights were transported in the driver’s cabin of a Mercedes truck with Omani license plates, which was transporting tiles and ceramics from Oman to Yemen. The commercial truck driver, an individual holding a Pakistani passport, told the customs officers that he received the package from a Yemeni individual called Ali in Mazyuna, a small settlement in Oman close to the border with Yemen, who asked him to deliver it to another Yemeni individual, who would be waiting for him on the Yemeni side of the border crossing. The driver claimed that he did not know what was inside the parcel and that he transported it as a favour, i.e., without receiving material compensation. The Panel understands that the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel disappeared when he saw that the package was impounded, and that the driver was released after questioning. The Panel has obtained the Omani mobile phone numbers of “Ali” and the person, who was supposed to pick up the parcel on the Yemeni side and has contacted Oman requesting more information on the identity of the two individuals. A response is pending.

2. The Panel has obtained images as well as the serial numbers of the thermal weapon sights, which were seized at the border crossing. The Panel notes that the sights have technical characteristics consistent with thermal weapons sights manufactured by Rayan Roshd Afzar, a Chinese Iranian joint venture. Sights from this manufacturer have been seized from dhows in the Gulf of Oman and inspected by the Panel on multiple occasion (see paragraph 52 and annex 20, S/2020/326, as well as paragraph 88 and annex 14, S/2021/79). Iran has informed the Panel that “the thermal weapon sights are NOT consistent with sights manufactured in Iran”, however the Panel has noted information from publicly available sources (see figures 22.4 to 22.6 below), which seems to corroborate the Panel’s analysis regarding their origin. The Panel continues to investigate.

Figure 22.1
RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border

Source: Confidential

242 The Panel has obtained the full details, i.e., license and engine serial number of the truck.
243 The Panel has obtained the name and passport details of the driver.
Figure 22.2
RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border

Source: Confidential

Figure 22.3
RU90/120G thermal weapon sight seized at the border

Source: Confidential
Figure 22.4
Rayan Roshd Afzar promotional leaflet

Source: https://twitter.com/green_lemonnn/status/661560849878925312/photo/4
Figure 22.4
Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk

Figure 22.5
Still from promotional video for Rayan Roshd Afzar night vision equipment

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQB2HqsgNUk
Annex 23  Chain of custody of the 30.600 G OEM pressure transmitter

Figure 23.1
House Air Waybill for the shipping of the transmitters from Germany to China in June 2020
Figure 23.2
Excerpt from packing list showing that the transmitter was exported from Germany to BDS Sensors China in June 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Sales order</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your order</td>
<td>Code Pos.</td>
<td>Sales order Pos.</td>
<td>Prod. order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE800</td>
<td>26.600</td>
<td>21148843</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS2005-043</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2388881</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery/Item: 31143453/000110</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21148843</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN: (10845219 - 10845228)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEM Pressure transmitter</td>
<td>30.600</td>
<td>21148539</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>BDS2005-017</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>SN: (10844242 - 10844441)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 23.3
Bank information showing the transfer of funds from Oman to China for the purchase of the transmitters
Figure 23.4
Air Waybill for the export of the transmitters from BD Sensors China to Oman in July 2020
Figure 23.5
Proof of delivery document showing that the transmitters were received in Muscat
The Panel notes that the letterhead does not show any contact information, the Panel has so far been unable to find more information about this company.
Figure 23.7
Order by Light Energy for Alternative Energy in Yemen (second page), stating that the transmitters are for use in a central air conditioning system
Figure 23.8
Invoice from the importer in Oman for the company in Yemen

The Panel has been informed that the payment was made in cash in advance by a person, reportedly a Yemeni, claiming to act on behalf of the Yemeni company. The Panel has also tried to find out to whom the Yemeni mobile number on the invoice is registered, so far without success.
Figure 23.9
Proof of delivery of the transmitters dated 8 July 2020 and signed by one Ziyad Muqbil Fari’, allegedly acting on behalf of a Yemeni company.

Sources for figures 23.1 – 23.9: Confidential

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246 The Panel was informed that the transmitters were picked up in Muscat. The Panel has contacted both Oman and Yemen regarding the identity of the person, who signed the receipt. Responses are pending.
Annex 24  Chain of custody of the 3W-110i B2 engine

Figure 24.1
Diagram showing the chain of custody of the engine

Source: Panel

Figure 24.2
Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order

Source: Confidential

Figure 24.3
Unofficial translation of the screenshot in Figure 24.2

| Order number: 118674510762461297 | Time of creation: 2018-01-25 00:09:31 | Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 iB2, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany | ¥14999.00 | 25 | Access after-sales portal | Jermozi Contact me | Transaction successful Details | ¥380975.00 (including shipping fee: ¥6000) View shipping Cell phone order |
| Colour: Silver | Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing | | | | | | | |
Figure 24.4
Screenshot from Taobao.com showing the details of the purchase order (continued)

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<th>宝贝</th>
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<th>状态</th>
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<th>数量</th>
<th>金额(元)</th>
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<td>代购的高能力长款款羽绒服实物图</td>
<td>详细描述: 领口, 颈部, 成品肩部, 里外</td>
<td>确认收货</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>详细描述: 领口, 颈部, 成品肩部, 里外</td>
<td>未确认收货</td>
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<td>3809.75</td>
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订单信息

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<th>发货物流公司:</th>
<th>顺丰快递</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>地址:</td>
<td>详细地址</td>
<td>收件人:</td>
<td>收件人姓名</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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备注: 没有备注信息

Source: Confidential
Figure 24.5
Unofficial translation of the screenshot in figure 24.4

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<tbody>
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<td>Current order status: Transaction successful</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taobao reminder</th>
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<td>Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order details</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buyer information</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nickname: jermoz</td>
<td>Real names: A***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location: Guangzhou, Guangdong</td>
<td>Phone number: 0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email: h*** Send site message</td>
<td>Alipay: h***</td>
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<table>
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<td>Third-party purchase of engines for model aircraft, 3W-110 I82, imported from Germany, genuine product shipped directly from Germany</td>
<td>Colour: Silver Type of aircraft: Fixed-wing</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>374975.00</td>
<td>6000.00 (express delivery)</td>
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Payment received: CNY 380975.00

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of transaction:</td>
<td>2018-01-25 00:09:31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time of confirmation:</td>
<td>2018-04-02 17:54:01</td>
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Current order status: Transaction successful

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taobao reminder</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transaction is successful. For after-sales requests from buyers, please engage with buyers to ensure proper after-sales service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shipping information</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recipient address: Mr. Wei, 13699747779, Fuli International Shoe Trade Center, RM 1020, 37 Huanshi West Rd, Liwan District, Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, 510145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping method: Express delivery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of shipper: EMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping number: C9820074000DE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 24.6
Packing list showing that the engine was transferred to Delro Modelltechnik

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artikelnummer / Artikelnummer</th>
<th>Barcodednr / Seriennummer</th>
<th>Artikelgrösse / Box Size</th>
<th>Gewicht / Weight (kg)</th>
<th>verladen / packed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8   1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822108K</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9   1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822093K H124 9.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10  1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822099K H124 9.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11  1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822104K H124 9.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12  1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822094K H124 9.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13  1001 420 3W-1100B2 + Boxerzündung 35 cm</td>
<td>1822103K H124 9.20</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Confidential
Figure 24.7
Invoice for the sale of the engines by Delro-Modelltechnik to TDQQ

Source: Confidential
Figure 24.8
Shipping documents for the delivery of the engines to TDQQ

Source: Confidential
Annex 25  Corporate information on HSJ Electronic (HK) and Vista Automation & Communication

Figure 25.1
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>公司名稱 Company Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HSJ ELECTRONIC (HONG KONG) LIMITED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>商業名稱 (如有者) Business Name (If any)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>公司類別 Type of Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>私人公司 Private company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>本年度的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 / 07 / 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>本年度的財務報告所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the case of its incorporation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6</th>
<th>地址的地址 Address of Registered Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROOM 503, CHEVALIER HOUSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH, TSIM SHA TSUI, KOWLOON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>地區 Region: Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Official Use

Document Ref. No.: 50001522798
Submission Date: 15/07/2019
Resubmission Date: -
Figure 25.2
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Current Holding</th>
<th>Transferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>张红 (Zhang Hong)</td>
<td>廣東省深圳市龍崗區寶龍街道興業路壹號花園1棟壹座21C</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Company Number: 1480116

Date to which this Return is Made Up: 14/07/2019

Total Number of Issued Shares in this Class: 10,000

Remarks:

Specifications: 1/2014 (March 2014)
Figure 25.3
Annual Return of HSJ Electronic (HK) Limited (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Capacity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Director</strong></th>
<th><strong>Alternate Director</strong></th>
<th><strong>Alternate to</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name in Chinese</strong></td>
<td>张红峰</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name in English</strong></td>
<td>ZHANG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HONGFENG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous Names</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alias</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residential Address</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country/Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hong Kong Identity Card Number</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese Passport Number</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issuing Country</strong></td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification Number</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 25.4**

**Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 公司名稱 Company Name</th>
<th>VISTA AUTOMATION &amp; COMMUNICATION INDUSTRIES LIMITED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 商業名稱 (如有的話) Business Name (If any)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 公司類別 Type of Company</td>
<td>Private company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 本申報表的結算日期 Date to which this Return is Made Up</td>
<td>15 / 04 / 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 項本表格交付的財務報表所涵蓋的會計期 Period Covered by Financial Statements Delivered with this Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 註冊辦事處地址 Address of Registered Office</td>
<td>ROOM 803, CHEVALIER HOUSE,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-51 CHATHAM ROAD SOUTH,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TSIM SHA TSUI, KLN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>地址 Region Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

存案 Filed

Form NAR1

公司編號 Company Number

2224659

For a private company, the information in this return should be made up to the anniversary of the date of its incorporation.

For a public company, the return should be made up to the date that is 6 months after the end of its accounting reference period.

For a company limited by guarantee, the return should be made up to the date that is 9 months after the end of its accounting reference period.
Figure 25.5
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>NAR1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Directors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Director (Natural Person)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>身份</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中文姓名</td>
<td>强红峰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name in Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英文姓名</td>
<td>ZHANG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name in English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>姓氏</td>
<td>HONGFENG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surname</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他姓名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Names</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>原用姓名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Names</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英文</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>别名</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alias</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中文</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英文</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>住址</td>
<td>FUSHI 2/C BUILDING 1 ZHENYE LUANCUI GARDEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAOHLE ROAD LONGQIANG DISTRICT SHENZHEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GUANGDONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>电邮地址</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Email Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>身分证明</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) 香港身分證號碼</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Identity Card Number</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 护照</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>CHINAID:140221238;036291X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>護照號碼</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuing Country</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>護照號碼</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Form NAR1 Information]
Figure 25.6  
Annual Return of Vista Automation & Communication (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Shares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>张华</td>
<td>FUSEI 217 BUILDING 1, ZEENTI LUNGJU GARDEN BAGHEROAD LONGGAN DISTRICT, SHENZHEN CHANGDONG</td>
<td>0,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source for 25.1 – 25.6: Confidential
Annex 26  Economic Issues

I. Economic Issues that pose a potential threat to peace, security or stability

1. The Panel examined various issues concerning the economy of Yemen, which pose a threat to its peace, security, or stability. The deteriorating economic situation has resulted in frustration, deprivation, and resentment amongst the population, offering a fertile breeding ground for further conflict and social unrest. Some political groups have sought to take advantage of this situation. The STC’s Economic Committee (EC) under Aidarus Al-Zubaidi held meetings with the Southern Money Exchange Association, without the participation of the or the Government of Yemen and discussed measures to alleviate the economic challenges arising from the volatile exchange rate situation. Such actions by the STC over the banking and exchange companies are viewed by some as a challenge to the authority of the Central Bank of Yemen and the Government of Yemen, as part of a larger ongoing power struggle between the Government of Yemen and the STC.

2. In the past few months, in order to ensure monetary and financial discipline and stability, the Central Bank of Yemen has issued a new regulation to improve the functioning of money exchange businesses, including measures such as stricter licensing conditions for new applicants and the introduction of e-auction systems. The Central Bank of Yemen has also taken some measures against certain exchange companies, suspending 80 exchange companies for legal violations and non-compliance with its instructions and shutting down 141 unlicensed companies. In August 2021, the IMF made a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation for Yemen, worth USD 665 millions of reserves. This, according to the IMF is expected to improve Yemen's foreign exchange reserves by over 70 percent, and help address the crisis, especially food and medical needs of the population.

II. Depreciation of the Yemeni rial (YER)

3. The rapid depreciation of the YER, which hit a historic low in early December, crossing the 1700 mark per USD, not only impacts economic stability, but poses a grave threat to peace in Yemen. The total external assets of Yemen, as a share of total assets, fell to 4.5 percent as of June 2021 from 5.3 percent in 2020 and 9.6 percent in 2019; the net foreign assets of the Central Bank of Yemen, as of June 2021, had further decreased by 13 percent, reaching a negative value of YER 958.3 billion. This decline is attributed to the ongoing political instability which impacted the exports of oil, depriving Yemen of its primary source of foreign exchange. Secondly, in 2020, inward remittances by Yemeni diaspora declined by over 20 percent. The exchange rate which was YER 591 per USD at the end of 2019 reached about YER 700 per USD at the end of 2020, and recently crossed the YER 1700 per USD, restricting Yemen’s ability to finance imports of essential goods, thereby exerting severe strains on the purchasing power capacity of its already impoverished population. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, the cost of the national minimum food basket (MFB), which is indicative of the cost of living,
reached 56,283 YER in June 2021, about 21 percent higher than the cost at the beginning of 2021.\textsuperscript{253} In July 2021, the Government of Yemen, in order to earn additional Government revenue, doubled the exchange rate used for calculating Customs duties on non-essential goods imported through the ports under Government of Yemen control, from YER 250 per USD to YER 500 per USD.\textsuperscript{254} Although this new rate is almost 29 percent of the prevailing market exchange rate of about YER 1700 per USD, this move by the Government of Yemen has increased the cost of imported goods. The Houthis criticised this decision and reacted by reducing the exchange rate for Customs purposes to YER 250 per USD for imports through the Hudaydah port, under their control.\textsuperscript{255} As, currently, there are no imports of non-essential goods through ports under Houthi control, there will not be any real impact of this move by the Houthis and it appears to be part of the propaganda war.

### III. Fragmentation of the Banking and Financial System

4. A stable banking and financial sector is a critical prerequisite for ensuring larger economic stability. The present scenario does not offer promising signs for the future of Yemen’s banking and financial sector, and thereby of its economic stability.

5. In the aftermath of the move of the Central Bank of Yemen’s headquarters from Sana’a to Aden in September 2016, the bifurcation of the Central Bank of Yemen into two rival institutions was effectively formalised with the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden and the cby, Sana’a. This has led to a tussle between the two institutions for regulatory supremacy over the Yemeni banking sector. The escalation of conflict has led to the intensification of the economic crisis and further politicisation of the banking sector.

6. The areas under the control of the Houthis have a higher population; Sana’a is the major financial and trading hub of Yemen, and nearly all banks and exchange companies have their headquarters situated in Sana’a. In order to consolidate its own control and authority in this strategic region, the cby, Sana’a adopted measures aimed at undermining the authority of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden. Chief among these have been the denial of vital information concerning the economy and banking sector of Yemen to Central Bank of Yemen, Aden,\textsuperscript{256} and to ban currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden after 2017\textsuperscript{257}. The Panel has been informed that the Houthi authorities have subjected those financial institutions not complying with such instructions to reprisals and punitive actions, including seizure of their assets and funds, imposition of fines, and detention of bank officials.

7. A central bank requires reports from commercial banks, and exchange companies that contain information on various aspects such as assets and liabilities, local and foreign currency holdings, foreign currency trades, internal and external financial transfers, import financing, and loans. These reports allow the central bank to monitor the banking sector with respect to their financial health, compliance with local laws and instructions, international regulations concerning anti-money laundering and combatting terrorist financing, and to frame and implement monetary, fiscal and economic policies as

\textsuperscript{253} CBY’s Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).
\textsuperscript{254} \url{https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-government-doubles-customs-exchange-rate-boost-finance-2021-07-26/}.
\textsuperscript{255} \url{http://en.ypagency.net/231497/}.
\textsuperscript{256} Circular No. (4) of 2020, titled "Communication with the Enemy", addressed to all the exchange companies and institutions operating in the Republic of Yemen, was issued by the cby's Financial Information in Sana'a on 28 January 2020.
\textsuperscript{257} Circular issued by the ministry of finance in Sana'a on June 23, 2021 to all the finance affairs managers and the treasurers in charge of taxes/customs collection, and circular issued by the headquarters of cby - Sana'a on 27 June 2021.
well as banking and trade regulations. In January 2020, banks and exchange companies operating in Sana’a were instructed by the CBY, Sana’a, not to provide any data to “any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries”, and that the submission of any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and the violator will be held responsible (Figure 26.1 and Appendix 1).

8. In the absence of vital information regarding the operations of financial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas, functional capabilities of the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden stand severely challenged. Objecting to this, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, responded by demanding reports and full access to information from commercial, Islamic, and microfinance banks and money exchange companies concerning all their activities and not merely activities confined to areas under the control of the central Government. Fines have been imposed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden on certain banks not complying with these stipulations. Additionally, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden has also instructed the banks to shift their operational centres to Aden, failing which, they would be subjected to action, including suspension of their licences and informing other entities not to bank with them (Figure 26.2 and Appendix 2).

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258 “In accordance with Commercial Bank Law No. 38 of 1998, YKB, IBY, and YBRD are liable to pay the daily fines (between 51,000-100,000 Yemeni rials) that CBY-Aden have been calculating since June 2020 for the banks’ failure to provide monthly monetary data.” - Yemen Economic Bulletin: Battle to Regulate Banks Threatens to Rupture the Financial Sector - Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies

Figure 26.1
Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana’a to the banks for not sharing data with enemy

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden
Figure 26.2
Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

9. Caught between the conflicting directions from the cby, Sana’a and the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, banks and exchange companies currently struggle to operate and ensure legal compliance in a highly challenging and coercive regulatory environment. The Yemen Bank Association (YBA) and the Yemeni Exchangers Association (YEA) have unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a solution to the challenges faced by them in implementing the conflicting directions of the rival central banks. The YBA has also opposed the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden’s direction requiring banks to shift their operational centres to Aden.\textsuperscript{260} Challenges in implementation and the looming threat of punitive action has meant that the banking community currently faces tremendous stress.

IV. Currency War

10. In order to finance fiscal deficits, the Central Bank of Yemen has adopted the controversial tool of ‘monetary emissions’,\textsuperscript{261} wherein new currency is printed and circulated into the economy. Apart from being inflationary, this has created new economic challenges. There is now a currency war by proxy between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis through their respective central banks. Although the armed conflict began in 2014, the two central banks emerged in 2016 and both areas continued to use the same currency notes up to 2019 until the cby, Sana’a, banned the new currency notes printed by the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, for use in the areas under the control of the Houthis. According to the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden, “the January 2020 ban on newly printed banknotes in the region under Houthi control has limited the government’s ability to pay salaries in this area and complicated monetary policy operations. This has increased the cost of financial transactions, reduced market transparency, and widened exchange rate gaps between Aden and Sana’a — to as much as 100 percent in some instances.”\textsuperscript{262}

11. The Panel has received information that the cby, Sana’a, issued a circular on 23 June 2021 banning the use of certain currency notes, printed in the year 2017 in the denomination of one thousand Yemeni rials in different series, issued by the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden, in areas under Houthi control (Figure 26.3 and Appendix 3). Treating such currency as counterfeit notes, the cby, Sana’a prohibits the dealing, possession, or transfer of these notes within Houthi-controlled areas. Through another circular, issued on 27 June 2021, the cby, Sana’a, reiterated that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of such currency notes would entail prosecution on charges of harming the national economy (Figure 26.4 and Appendix 4).

\textsuperscript{260} See the press release dated 12 August 2021 issued by the YBA, https://yemen-yba.com/10376/.

\textsuperscript{261} Introducing cash to circulation in economy.

\textsuperscript{262} CBY’s Quarterly Bulletin, Economic and Monetary Developments Issue No.4 (September 2021).
Figure 26.3
Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana’a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden
Figure 26.4
Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana‘a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution.

Source: Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

12. A peculiar situation has arisen, as a result, wherein old notes printed prior to 2017 remain legal tender in both areas, and because of the ban imposed by the cby, Sana‘a, the newer notes remain largely in circulation in areas under Government of Yemen control only. Due to this ban, areas under Houthi control face a major cash crunch, while the surplus currency notes in Government of Yemen areas has
led to inflation and the rapid depreciation of the YER rate. The market value of YERs varies between old and new notes and also between the two regions, as entities running businesses in Houthi-controlled areas are forced to purchase old banknotes at high premia from the black market. Since the experiment with the new notes backfired, the Central Bank of Yemen, Aden reportedly printed and put billions of YERs in old banknotes into the market and withdrew the newly printed banknotes of YER 1,000 denomination, allowing the people to get old banknotes from local banks and exchange firms. The cby, Sana’a, promptly banned these newly printed notes. While the exchange rate crossed YER 1700 per USD in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen, the rates in Houthi-controlled areas largely hover around the YER 600 per USD mark. This dismal ground situation has sharply fractured the economies of both parts of Yemen, adversely impacting domestic trade, and threatening economic stability in the country.

13. The international community should take note of the severity of this economic crisis and take concrete measures to prevent further divisions in Yemen which could lead to an irreversible fait accompli. In the absence of rapid improvements in the political and security situations, the future economic prospects appear to be gloomy.

Appendix 1  Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 28 January 2020 issued by cby, Sana’a to the Banks for not sharing data with enemy

Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office
Sana’a

Financial Information Unit

Date : 28/01/2020

Circular No. (2) 2020
To all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Regional Director

Subject / Communication with the enemy

Referring to the above subject, and to the governor’s directives with the orders of the higher authorities to address the banks and money changers not to provide any data to any illegal parties associated with the mercenaries, and to submit any data to any of these parties will be considered as communicating with the enemy and anyone who violates that will be held responsible.

Signed by:

Mr. Wadea Mohammed AL-Saddah,
Head of Financial Information Collection Unit
Appendix 2 Unofficial Translation of Statement dated 5 August 2021 of Central Bank of Yemen, Aden regarding action to be taken against the non-compliant banks

In the interest of the Central Bank for the sound performance of the Yemeni banking sector and the continuity of its activity in the service of the national economy in a manner that ensures the preservation of its reputation with international financial and banking institutions, and based on its legal responsibility under Article (45) of the Central Bank of Yemen Law No. (14) of 2000 AD and Articles (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) of the Banking Law No. (38) of 1998 AD, which gave the Central Bank the right to request any data or information from any bank it deems necessary about its financial position and its various banking operations with the aim of examining them and reviewing them and verifying the soundness of the bank’s financial position and that it carries out its activities in accordance with the laws and instructions of the Central Bank, including the instructions for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing procedures.

In addition to the memoranda issued by the Central Bank to banks regarding the obligation to submit the financial statements within a period of (15) days, which ends on July 6, 2021 AD, and due to the failure of some banks to comply with the requirements contained in those memos. Accordingly, the Central Bank holds the non-compliant banks fully responsible for any consequences that may result from their inclusion in the official list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, which will be announced and made available to all local authorities, banks, external financial and banking institutions and other international organizations.

The Central Bank stresses that all commercial and Islamic banks licensed in our country should expedite the establishment of their operations management centres in Aden, where the headquarters of the Central Bank is located in a way that enables it to carry out verification procedures for all its operations and direct field inspection of its supporters and to ensure its commitment to fulfilling all necessary legal requirements she has. The Central Bank also calls upon all importing companies and commercial institutions not to carry out any financial or banking operations, including opening credits and transfers with banks that will be included in the list of banks classified as non-compliant banks, and the Central Bank will not be responsible for any damages resulting from the implementation of operations or transactions if conducted through those banks.

The Central Bank also confirms that it will carry out the transfer of foreign exchange amounts of licensed and committed commercial and Islamic banks, to feed their account balances with banks abroad, with the aim of covering their credits and transfers for the purposes of meeting their obligations, specifically import operations.

Appendix 3 Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 23 June 2021 by cby, Sana’a banning the use of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Republic of Yemen
Ministry of Finance
Number: 110-380

Date: 23/06/2021

Ministers, Governors of governorates, Heads of boards of directors
Finance affairs managers
Fund custodians having charge of collection

Subject: The prevention of Counterfeit Currency circulation

Based on the authority of the Ministry of Finance and in implementation of the decisions of the National Salvation Government to prevent the circulation of any business, the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen– Sana’a decides to ban dealing with it.

And since the so-called Bank of Aden, managed by the aggression, committed a forgery of printing, denomination of 1,000 rials, issued in 2017, a crime that is added to the record of crimes targeting the national economy and national labor values and affecting legal positions and national capital, then confronting these crimes is a patriotic duty. All components must be promoted, foremost among which are state institutions.

And the Ministry of Finance confirms the following:

1. Prohibition of dealing in (counterfeit) currency, which was confirmed by the Central Bank in its statement dated 06/22/2021 (Copy attached)
2. Whoever receives an amount or denomination promoting any of these counterfeit currencies will be directly referred to the representative and the penal code in force against him will be applied (damaging the national economy in institutions and unauthorized circulation of counterfeit currencies).
3. The importance of educating all government institutions’ cadres towards confronting the economic policies of economic aggression.
4. All those working in the financial position in the institutions of the state must be vigilant and follow up on what is issued about managing monetary policy in the competent authority (the Central Bank – Sana’a) and directed to act accordingly.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8005000) or (8006800) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Signature

Mr. Rashid Abuud Abu Lahuum
Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs
Appendix 4   Unofficial Translation of Circular dated 27 June 2021 by cby, Sana’a stating that the receipt, promotion, and circulation of certain currency notes printed by Central Bank of Yemen, Aden would attract prosecution

Republic of Yemen
Central Bank of Yemen
Head office Sana'a

Circular issued by the Headquarters of the Central Bank of Yemen - Sana'a

An appendix to the statement issued by the Headquarter of Central Bank of Yemen - Sanaa - dated 22/06/2021 regarding prohibiting dealing, possession, or transfer of counterfeit currency in denominations of (1000) riyals, whose serial number is without the letter (A) and recorded in year 1438 - 2017 on it to the provisions of the laws in force, and what the national interest requires of preventing the leakage of false work.

The Central Bank of Yemen calling on all those coming from "the localized areas" (referring to the areas under the control of the legitimate government) to the areas of "the National Salvation Government" (referring to the areas under the control of Houthis) to abide by the following two things:

1) Not to transfer any counterfeit currency.
2) One hundred thousand (100,000) Yemeni Riyals is the maximum permissible limit for transferring the legal Yemeni currency for each person; however, transferring any amount of foreign currency is not prohibited.

And in the case of the violator the competent authorities will arrest the violators and take legal measures in their regard according to the maximum penalties stipulated in the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law and other applicable laws.

The Bank also calls upon all citizens to call the toll-free number (8006800) or (01274327) to report any violation of the foregoing.

Note that the Central Bank in Sanaa will pay the person who reported the violation a reward equivalent to (5%).

Hope everyone is committed to achieve the public interest.

Issued by the Central Bank of Yemen
Head Office - Sana'a
27/06/2021
Annex 27 Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021 issued by the president al-Amana specialised criminal prosecution court to the Tadhamon Bank

Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021

To the President of the Specialised Criminal Prosecution Court

The bank directive

The court, taking into consideration the directives of the president al-Amana

Annex 27

Confidential

Source: Confidential
Appendix 1  Unofficial translation of Memorandum No 3821 of 27 June 2021

No. 3821
Dated : 27/6/2021

Public Prosecution
Specialized Criminal Prosecution

The Manager
Tadhamon Bank

With reference to the judicial rulings issued by the Criminal Court of Al-Amana against the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, Case No. 102 of 2019 Case No. 407 of 2019 which sentenced him to conviction on charges of compromising the independence of the Republic of Yemen and advocate the enemy in communication with occupying country, Israel and death penalty punishment, condemnation and confiscation of all fixed and movable property, and with reference to the memorandum of Chairman of the Committee for the inventory and receipt of the properties of the traitors No. 14174/269 dated 23/6/2021 and included the money of the convicted Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi is seized with Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank that is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customer Name</th>
<th>Seized Amount</th>
<th>Currency</th>
<th>Account Type</th>
<th>Account Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19100 Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi</td>
<td>31.289.623.900</td>
<td>Yemeni Rial</td>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>001-886-271107-000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>636.221.984.25</td>
<td>Saudi Riyal</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>112-682-211101-000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>907.722.643.44</td>
<td>Yemeni Rial</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>112-886-211101-000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And that an account has been opened with you in the Central Bank for the management of the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution.

Therefore

Those funds, which were sentenced to confiscation above, shall be transferred from you to the Central Bank and deposited in account No. (00/1215-10012) Yemeni Rial and account No. (06/1215-10012) Saudi Riyals for managing the recovered and confiscated funds under the supervision of the Public Prosecution according to the law.

Abdullah Mohammad Zahra
President- Al-Amana Specialized Criminal Prosecution
Annex 28  Circular of 28 June 2021 issued by the central bank of Yemen, Sana’a regarding freezing the funds of the Tadhamon Bank

Source: Confidential
Appendix 1  Unofficial Translation of Circular of 28 June 2021

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a

Date: 28 June 2021

Financial Information Unit
(Circular to all public money exchange institutions and companies in the Republic)

General Manager,

Subject : Seizure of all funds and balances of Al- Tadhamon Islamic Bank

In reference to the above subject and to the memorandum of the Chief of the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of Al-Amana, Judge Abdullah Muhammad Zahra No. (3820) dated 27/6/2021 and handed over to us on 28/6/2021 regarding the seizure of all funds of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited in all banking sectors.

All funds and balances of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank deposited with you, in any form, shall be seized immediately and we shall be provided with all the funds and balances seized today.

Chief of Financial Information Unit
Wadi Mohammad Al-Sada

Fax: 274113 Lablon 274093M. Box 393 People - Republic of Yemen Fax 274113
Tel: 274093 P.O.Box:3938, sana'a VR
Annex 29  Telecom Sector in Yemen

1. Despite the ongoing conflict, the telecommunications industry continues to witness significant growth and has been a major source of revenue for the Houthi authorities. According to the World Bank, prior to 2015, government revenue from the telecommunications industry was said to be second largest after hydrocarbons. The number of mobile phone connections rose from 15.7 million in 2014 to 18.6 million by end-2019 and the number of internet users rose from 3.2 million in 2014 to 7.2 million by end-2019.

2. A sector with a high revenue generating potential would naturally attract significant attention from the rival factions in the conflict. The majority of the telecom companies in Yemen are based in Sana’a, and a sizeable number of users reside in the Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthi authorities in Sana’a allegedly exercise control over these telecom companies and the sector, reportedly, has been a major source of revenue to the Houthis. The Panel has received information that the Houthis, under the leadership of Abdullah Misfer Al-Shaer, have taken control of certain Sana’a-based telecom companies.

3. The political, regulatory, and operational roles in the telecom sector in Yemen have not been segregated. The ministry of telecommunications and information technology responsible for the areas under the control of the Houthis is the overarching body that performs all types of roles concerning this sector: formulating bylaws, policies and plans; managing the spectrum for mobile broadband services; granting licenses; maintaining the national numbering plan; approving pricing policies for services; regulating all sub-sectors, namely landline and mobile telephony, internet services, and posts and also enforcing the laws, especially the licensing agreements between the Sana’a-based ministry and the telecom service providers.

4. Companies operating in the areas under the control of the Houthis face policy uncertainties, levy of illegal fees and charges, extortion and confiscation of their assets. Licenses are deliberately issued for short durations to create operational uncertainties for companies. The companies are forced to pay fees for a temporary extension of the operating licence on an annual basis, which provide a regular source of revenue to the authorities, both legal and illegal. The Panel received information that a total amount of about USD 22 million per annum, including an annual renewal fee of USD 13.2 million and the balance towards the frequency fees and the management fees, was collected by the de-facto authorities in Sana’a from some Sana’s-based telecom companies.

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267 Panel received information from the GoY and other sources. “According to unofficial estimates, the Houthis annually receive about 80 billion riyals (equivalent to $160 million) from the public and private telecommunications sector.” see https://alkhaleejonline.net/.
268 Panel received information from confidential sources that annual renewal fees of USD 13.2 million was collected by the ministry of telecom from the telecom companies; and taking into account the frequency fees and the management fees, the total revenue collected from MTN and SabaFon was about USD 22 million per annum.
269 According to a report, published at https://sanaacenter.org/publications/main-publications/12721, “In 2016, MTN Yemen paid $36.4 million for a 29-month extension to their original 15-year license that was granted in July 2000, thereby extending their operating license to December 2017. …. MTN Yemen, which held a market share of 42.8% as of 2016 according to their estimates, presumably paid—according to the terms of their license agreement—what would have amounted to YER 1.7 billion annually for the duration of their 15-year license that became effective in July 2000.” The Panel has written to MTN for confirmation and their response is awaited.
5. The Houthis illegally collect fees under the pretext of regulating the telecommunications sector. The Sana’a-based companies continue to pay various fees such as license renewal fees, taxes, and zakat fees. The Panel has received information that some of the companies have also been subject to financial extortion by the Houthis who have also confiscated the funds and assets of private telecommunications companies in Yemen. Further, according to a media report, Houthis allegedly took over Y mobile telecommunication company after arranging to declare it “bankrupt by a court under their control.” Y telecom, reportedly, “declared bankruptcy in March 2020 and left behind its physical assets such as real estate and its inventory of equipment in Sana’a, to restart its operations in Aden using 4G technology.” Y telecom has been requested by the Panel for a confirmation, their response is awaited.

6. The Government of Yemen has informed the Panel that USD 25 million of funds of MTN, Sana’a, located in the company’s account maintained with the International Bank of Yemen, have allegedly been confiscated. Finally, with effect from 17 November 2021, MTN Group, which held 82.8% of the shares in MTN Yemen, left Yemen by transferring its “majority shareholding in MTN Yemen to Emerald International Investment LCC. Emerald is a subsidiary of Zubair Investment Center LLC, an affiliate of Zubair Corporation LLC, which is the minority shareholder in MTN Yemen.” The Panel wrote to Sabafon in Aden, Sabafon in Sana’a, Y Telecom, YemenNet, MTN, TeleYemen in Aden and TeleYemen in Sana’a about this and for other information. While TeleYemen, Sana’a has replied to the Panel (see paragraph 84), responses from other companies are awaited.

7. The Panel was informed that Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer was appointed as managing director/chairman of Sabafon, Sana’a on 29 July 2019 and that he subsequently appointed the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Executive General Manager and the Financial Manager of Sabafon, Sana’a (Figure 29.1 and Appendix 1).

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270 As per the report of the Emirati al-Bayan newspaper, in 2018, the Ansarullah authorities confiscated YER 51 billion from Yemeni telecom operators distributed as follows: YER 27 billion from Sabafon, YER 17 billion from Y, YER 7 billion from MTN Yemen. See: https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2019-10-08-1.3668294.

271 As per media report, quoting sources in the Sana’a-based ministry of communications and information technology, Sana’a, the Houthi leaders, namely Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, Abu Ali al-Hakem, and others were seeking to take over the mobile telecommunications company (Y) after declaring it bankrupt. “A commercial court subject to the control of the Houthi militias in Sanaa announced in an official announcement in Al-Thawra newspaper published on Wednesday March 11, 2020 the bankruptcy of ‘Y’mobile company.” See https://www.newsyemen.net/new/53464. The Panel has written to Y Telecom for confirmation and their response is awaited.


273 Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.

Figure 29.1
Notification of changes in management of Sabafon

![Notification of changes in management of Sabafon](image)

Source: Confidential

8. On 5 September 2019, Sabafon reportedly held an extraordinary general assembly meeting of the shareholders of the company in Amman, Jordan, attended by the absolute majority of the company's shareholders, including a representative of the Government of Yemen. The shareholders condemned the action of the armed groups of the illegal authorities controlling the capital Sana'a, “breaking in and seizing the headquarters of Sabafon Company in Sana'a, controlling its departments, changing its guard, controlling its facilities, equipment and systems in Sana'a and imposing illegal managers on the company's departments in Sana'a”. The Assembly approved the transfer of the company's headquarters, administration and operations to the city of Aden; the move took place in September 2020 (Figure 29.2). Considering the significance of the internet for security and socio-economic purposes, and to avoid having to operate under Houthi control, the Government of Yemen informed the Panel that it decided to establish its own telecom infrastructure and set up in Aden through AdenNet and TeleYemen, Aden.

275 https://twitter.com/sabafonyemen/status/1178301571769217024.
276 Adennet started operational in end-July 2018.
277 TeleYemen moved to Aden on 1 January 2019.
9. The Government of Yemen has informed the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (IANA) alleging that the office of TeleYemen in Sana’a is controlled by the Houthis and that TeleYemen, owned by the Government of Yemen has been relocated to Aden (Figure 29.4). The Panel wrote to TeleYemen, Sana’a about this, but the company denies any takeover by the Houthis and stated that its management was appointed prior to the current conflict and that this transfer to Aden was never officially communicated and, therefore, it does not recognize the transfer under company law. The Panel is investigating the extent of control exercised by the Houthis over some of the telecom companies.

10. Control over the telecom sector can provide a major strategic advantage to the Houthis. The Panel is investigating whether the Houthis have gained effective control over the national Top Level Domain (TLD), ‘.ye’. Control over the TLD and illegal use of communication interception tools potentially would provide Houthis with the capacity to monitor and interdict traffic, censor content, carry out internet shutdowns, ban social media sites and personal messaging services, monitor private communications of opponents, and block domains in all parts of the country.
11. The Panel has received information that TeleYemen, has recently purchased a ‘bandwidth management system’ that uses deep packet inspection. Deep Packet Inspection can monitor all data, messages, text, voice, and video traffic over any packet in the bandwidth. TeleYemen, Sana’a has stated to the Panel that “the laws of Yemen require ISPs to filter certain content that goes against the law and Islamic doctrines and that they use it for the purpose of protecting children from any inappropriate content and there is no illegal usage”.  

Figure 29.4
Letter from the Minister of Telecommunication and Information Technology, Government of Yemen to IANA

Source: Government of Yemen

Letter from TeleYemen, Sana’a to the Panel dated 17 December 2021.
12. Considering the importance of the telecom sector for the economy and the general needs of the people of Yemen, this sector should be depoliticised, double taxation avoided, import policy reviewed to permit *bonafide* imports for use by the telecom companies across Yemen, and tariff rationalised. Access to telecommunication and internet is essential for the civilian population and any measures taken in respect to this sector should not result in any adverse consequences for the civilian population.
Appendix 1  Unofficial translation: Notification of changes in management of Sabafon

Subject / Notification of changes in management in the company and the change of authorized signatories to the financial system with you

Yemeni mobile phone company - Sabafon

Based on the company’s general assembly meeting and its election of a new board of directors and a new chairman of the board, a new executive management has been appointed for the company, and we ask you to change all dealings with the company based on the new changes in its management through:

1. Radically cut off dealings with the previous administration
2. Completely cancel the powers and signatures of the previous administration
3. Approval of the powers and signatures of the authorized names by the new administration described below, on all checks and transfers from all company accounts on your part, in addition to all financial transactions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer</td>
<td>Chairman of the Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Ahmed Musaid</td>
<td>Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Khaliq Ali al Gaili</td>
<td>Executive General Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ahmed Ahmed Jahiz</td>
<td>Financial Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signature

Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer
Chairman of the Board of Directors
Annex 30: Seizure of Telecom equipment by Yemeni Customs

1. The Panel received allegations that Houthi authorities are illegally importing telecom equipment through land borders at Al Mahara, and that the Houthis have been setting up international calling facilities using satellite receivers, which are connected to SIM boxes that can attach about 100 SIM cards. Houthis also allegedly resort to illegal diversion of international calls and provide international call services to the users at rates less than the official rates. The revenue collected through these illegal call facilities is allegedly used by the Houthis for their activities that threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.

2. The Government has informed the Panel that, “to strengthen their war-disciplined system, the militias are working on importing and smuggling precision equipments and communications equipment, whether traditional or those via satellite”. The Government also informed that they have seized many consignments of telecom equipment, and “there are dozens of shipments that reach the Houthis through smuggling networks, and this poses a great danger to the security and stability of Yemen and Yemenis and contributes to prolonging the war.” The Government has informed that they would share the details with the Panel.

3. The Panel is investigating a case in which a consignment of telecom equipment imported into Yemen in May 2021 through the Oman-Yemen land border was seized by the Yemeni Customs at Al-Mahara, as the said telecom equipment were brought into Yemen without obtaining permission or licence from the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology of the Government of Yemen to import these items.

4. The Panel is investigating if the individuals or entities behind these illegal imports of telecom equipment have any links with or if they act on behalf of individuals designated under the 2140 sanctions regime or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and, if so, whether funds, financial assets or economic resources are being generated out of the use or sale of these equipment and/or whether these are used in violations of the sanctions regime for activities that threaten peace security and stability in Yemen. The Panel continues to investigate the allegations.

279 Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.
280 Letter from the Government of Yemen to the Panel.
Annex 31:  Black-marketing and Illegal Fees on import of Fuel

1. According to various sources, the Houthis have created an artificial scarcity of fuel in areas under their control in order to force the traders to sell oil on the black-market operated by them and collect illegal fees from the sales. As per information made available by the Government of Yemen, the Houthis have collected official revenues on fuel imports in excess of YER 70 billion.281

2. Prior to June 2019, Hudaydah port was the major port of import of fuel into Yemen (48%), compared to Aden (33%), Mukalla (16%) and Nishtun (3%).282 There has been a significant change in the pattern of fuel import into Yemen since then. In April-May 2021, the share of Hudaydah port had come down to 8 percent.283 With the announcement by Saudi Arabia of a grant of USD 422 million worth of petroleum products to the Government of Yemen in March 2021,284 for power stations and to support public services, as the country faced a fuel shortage, the volumes of imports through the southern ports started increasing in May–June 2021. Of the total quantities of fuel imported into the areas under the control of the Houthis, during April-May 2021, only eight percent (54,679 Metric Tonnes (MTs) was imported through Hudaydah port and 92 percent (631,959 MTs) was transported by road after being imported through Aden, Mukalla and Nishtun ports under the control of the Government of Yemen.285 The fuel supply to the Houthi-controlled areas by the land route, during April-May 2021, was about 10 thousand metric tonnes per day, which represented about 65 percent of the fuel imported into Yemen, in contrast to 6 thousand metric tonnes per day in January-March 2021,286 evidencing an increase in supply through the land route.287

Figure 31.1
Fuel Imports from January 2020 to July 2021 in MTs

Source:

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283 https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/.
285 https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/.
286 https://twitter.com/SECYemen1/status/1378097160252751875.
287 https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/13405/.
3. The Panel has received information that although the customs duties are collected at the first port of import in non-Houthi controlled areas, the Houthis, illegally collect additional fees and customs duties from the traders at their land customs stations. The business of supplying fuel to Houthi-controlled areas has been found to be very lucrative for many, except of course the end-consumers: the Government of Yemen has increased its customs revenue from the imports; the STC also allegedly collect fees of about YER12 per litre of imported fuel from the importers; and the importers/traders who seize this opportunity to get enriched. Unfortunately, the consumers on both sides have to suffer, the consumers in the Houthi-controlled areas pay more because of the land transportation cost, double taxation and the illegal practices being followed by the Houthis and the consumers in the Government of Yemen-controlled areas pay more mostly because of the depreciating YER, profits by the traders and other hidden supply chain and distribution costs. As per a report, “Fuel prices at Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) stations in DFA-controlled areas increased by 76% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 6,807 to YER 12,000 per 20 litres. --In IRG-controlled areas, prices rose by 108% between July 2018 and April 2021, from YER 5,372 to YER 11,175 per 20 litres.” The Panel has been informed that the increase in fuel prices has negatively impacted the implementing partners of international humanitarian organizations.

288 The Panel was informed by an importer that the Houthis collect YER 37 per litre since February 2021.
289 The Panel was informed by an importer that earlier they were paying YER 7 per litre but since April 2021, it has been increased to YER 12 per litre and this amount is deposited in some designated account in an exchange company in Aden. During the meeting of the Panel with the Economic Committee (EC) of the STC on 21 August 2021 in Aden, the EC clarified that it represented local taxes.
Annex 32: Saudi Deposit

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.
Annex 33  Investigation of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen

1. In this annex, the Panel presents case studies of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen investigated by the Panel since January 2021.

2. The deterioration of the security situation in Yemen affected the capacity of the Panel to have access to all information needed in respect to several investigations on airstrikes. The Panel itself and its sources were unable to undertake numerous travels, especially in areas near conflict zones. The fear of witnesses in Houthi-controlled areas to communicate with the Panel or to register the geolocation of incidents also affected the Panel’s investigations.

3. The Panel received information, reports and/or pictures relating to six incidents that were allegedly attributable to the Coalition and was able to conclude investigations on two incidents (see appendix hereafter). The Panel sent a letter to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in respect to the six cases and is awaiting a reply.

4. For the four remaining cases described below, the Panel received insufficient evidence to conclude its investigation:
   a) One incident occurred on 28 February 2021 at approximately 1230 hours, in which an explosive ordnance hit a house in al Hawk district, Al Hudaydah. It resulted in the death of five people, including one child, and the injury to a woman, and a child. The Panel received information that the incident could have been a UAV attack. The Panel has not received pictures of explosive ordnance debris and is unable to reach a conclusion in this respect. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 46' 28.2” N, 42° 57’ 58.32” E.
   b) One airstrike occurred on 7 March 2021 at approximately 1430 hours in which a civilian area in Al Amanat Al Asimah (Sana’a city) was hit. The incident resulted in the injury to a man and two children, as well as damage to shops and houses. According to information received by the Panel from two different sources, the location of the incident was in the vicinity of 15° 23’ 28.68’’ N, 44° 11’ 7.8’’ E.
   c) Another airstrike occurred on 10 May 2021 at approximately 1600 hours in Rada’a district, Al Bayda, which targeted a car resulting in the death of one man and the injury of two women. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 22' 48"N, 44° 55’ 15.6” E.
   d) A fourth incident occurred on 18 September 2021, in which a car in Merkhaj al Ulya district, Shabwah, was hit, resulting in the death of five people including a child and a woman. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the location of the incident was 14° 26' 5.28" N, 45° 54' 50.76" E. On 22 September 2021, the spokesperson of the Coalition, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said that: “the Coalition confirms that it has not received any information nor coordination from UN OCHA in Yemen regarding this allegation as per the coordination mechanism in such cases. No such information has been conveyed to the Coalition regarding the claimed airstrike. The Coalition considers these claims seriously, takes all necessary and required procedures to validate them, and announce the results of any investigations through proper referral to the Joint Incidents Assessment Team.”

See online: https://www.spa.gov.sa/2289036.

291 https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/
292
5. In its report S/2019/83, annex 34, the Panel presented the results of its investigation in respect to a shelling incident that occurred on 2 August 2018 in the city of Hudaydah and which hit the al Thawra hospital and a market. The Panel concluded that both Houthi forces and the Coalition could have been responsible for the attack. On 29 September 2021, the JIAT released the result of some investigations, including this specific one, and concluded that the Coalition Surface Forces did not carry out any firing in Hudaydah city on that date. The Panel has still not received any information from Houthi forces in connection to this attack.

Appendix 1  Airstrike against Al Raks village, Al Mahliyah district, Ma’rib, 16 January 2021

I. Background

1. At approximately 0830 hours on 16 January 2021, an explosive ordnance allegedly launched from an aircraft, hit a car in Al Mahliyah district, Ma’rib. The incident resulted in the death of the driver who was, according to information received by the Panel, a merchant transporting food (see figure 33.1).

2. The Panel received different information regarding the specific location of the incident but was not able to verify it. According to a report received by the Panel, the incident occurred in Wadi Dhaza (وادي دحزة) on the road between the Al Amoud area and Al Raks village in the Al Mahliyah district. According to a local source, the incident occurred on the main road of Al Raks village, while the driver was going from one shop to another. According to the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, the incident occurred in Al Raks village at 14° 33’ 37.08”N, 45° 17’ 34.8”E.

II. Legal analysis

3. According to information received by the Panel, the victim was not involved in hostilities and there were no military activities or fighting in the area at the time of the attack.

4. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all times, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants. They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

5. Based on the information received by the Panel, it seems unlikely that the principle of distinction was respected.

Figure 33.1
Car after the incident

Source: Confidential

Appendix 2: Al Salif Port, Al Hudaydah, 21 March 2021

294 https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/
295 See CIHL, rule 1 at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul
296 CIHL rule 16 at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul.
I. Background

1. At approximately 0230 hours on 21 March 2021, two explosive ordnances launched from an aircraft hit, approximately five minutes apart, a warehouse and a building owned by the Yemeni International Company for Food Production Ltd at Al Salif port (15° 18' 51.50"N, 42°40' 36.16"E) (see figures 33.2, 33.3 and 33.4). The incident resulted in the injury of six workers of the company.

2. The Panel received pictures of remnants of the explosive ordnances found in both buildings and they are consistent with guided bombs used by the Coalition (see figure 33.5).

3. The Panel sent a letter to the Coalition in respect to this incident and is awaiting a reply.

II. Legal analysis

4. The Panel received information from several sources that the Houthis are using the port of Al Salif for military activities, among others for the manufacturing of sea mines. However, the Panel still lacks conclusive evidence.297

5. According to information received by the Panel, the two buildings in the port of Al Salif referenced above were used for civilian purposes and not for military operations. They are located in a compound separated by a concrete wall in which several offices, accommodation, warehouses and grain silos are housed.

6. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, at all time, distinguish between civilians and combatants, and direct attacks only against combatants.298 They also have the obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects.299

7. Based on the information received, the Panel concludes that it is unlikely that the principles of distinction and proportionality were respected, however, if additional information is provided, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

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297 The Panel welcomes any information and evidence in this respect.
298 See CIHL, rule 1 at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul
299 CIHL, rule 16 at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul.
Figure 33.2
Location of the two buildings hit in Al Salif port

Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 33.3
Damages to the accommodation buildings

Source: Confidential
Figure 33.4
Damages to the warehouse and impact crater

Source: Confidential

Figure 33.5
Pictures of debris found on the site after the incident

Source: Confidential
Annex 34  Violations in the context of detention

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.
Annex 35  Use of explosive ordnance in civilian populated areas attributed to Houthi Forces

1. The Panel is investigating eight incidents of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by Houthi forces in Ma’rib and Ta’izz, which allegedly led to the deaths of 33 people, including eight children, and injuries to 51 others, including 11 children (see Table 34.1).

2. The Panel’s investigations are based on interviews with victims and witnesses, reports, pictures and videos, as well as other information available in the public domain. The Panel sent a letter to the Houthi authorities in that respect and is awaiting a reply. If the Houthi political or military leadership can provide information and evidence regarding these attacks that may counter the Panel’s preliminary findings, the Panel stands ready to review its findings.

Table 35.1  Cases of indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance in populated areas by the Houthi forces between December 2020 and November 2021 investigated by the Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Impact Point</th>
<th>Victims/Damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12 December 2020</td>
<td>13°34'28.36&quot; N, 44° 1'23.75&quot;E</td>
<td>Al Ahli Football club, Ta’izz</td>
<td>Two people killed, including one child, and two children injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 January 2021</td>
<td>13°35'58.8&quot;N, 43°57'45.6&quot;E</td>
<td>Near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar Ta’izz</td>
<td>One child killed, one woman and one child injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20 February 2021</td>
<td>13°35'51.7&quot;N, 44°00'58.1&quot;E</td>
<td>Al Qahira, Ta’izz city</td>
<td>One child killed, four people injured, including three children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 March and 8 May 2021</td>
<td>13°35'12.16&quot;N, 44° 1'25.01&quot;E</td>
<td>Al Thawra hospital, Ta’izz hospital, Ta’izz</td>
<td>One person killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 April 2021</td>
<td>tbc</td>
<td>Al Rawda, Ma’rib</td>
<td>One child killed, four children injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5 June 2021</td>
<td>15°28'50.3&quot;N, 45°18'47.4&quot;E</td>
<td>Gas station, Ma’rib</td>
<td>Allegedly 14 killed, including one child, and 5 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 June 2021</td>
<td>15°27'54.4&quot;N, 45°19'29.8&quot;E</td>
<td>Mosque, Ambulances, Ma’rib Ambulances, Ma’rib</td>
<td>Allegedly six killed and 32 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>30 October 2021</td>
<td>13°34'30.7&quot;N, 44°01'46.2&quot;E</td>
<td>Al Camp Street, Ta’izz</td>
<td>Three children killed, one child injured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Panel
Appendix 1  Al Ahli football club, Ta’izz city, 12 December 2020

I.  Background

1.  On 12 December 2020, at approximately 0600 hours, an explosive ordnance hit the Al Ahli football club in Ta’izz city. The club is in the vicinity of the Al Shohada’a stadium (13°34'28.36" N, 44° 1'23.75"E) in a civilian area.

2.  Eight civilians were present and the attack resulted in the death of one boy and one man, as well as injuries to three other boys.

3.  The Al Ahli football club is located in the “Olympic field” in Ta’izz, which is an area hosting several sports clubs.

4.  According to the information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance was launched from a mountainous area North of the impact point which is under Houthi control.

II.  Analysis of IHL violations

5.  According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence at the Al Ahli football club or in its vicinity at the time of the attack.

6.  Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.\(^{300}\)

7.  Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in the proximity of civilians and civilian objects, and especially in a densely populated area such as the city of Ta’izz.

8.  The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

Figure 35.1
Location of the impact

Source: Google Earth, Panel

\(^{300}\) See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.
Figure 35.2
Damages to the Club

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nJTA4uBTgo&ab_channel=VICENews
Appendix 2  Area in the vicinity of the old airport in Al Mudhaffar, Ta’izz, 8 January 2021

I.  Background

1.   On 8 January 2021, at approximately 1100 hours an explosive ordnance hit a residential area in Ta’izz city, near the old airport in Al Mudhaffar (13°35'58.8"N, 43°57'45.6"E).

2.   The incident resulted in the death of a 15-year-old boy, and injuries to a woman and a child.

II.  Analysis of IHL violations

3.   According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

4.   Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.301

5.   Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta’izz.

6.   The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

301 See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.
Figure 35.3
Location of the impact

Source: Google Earth, Panel
Appendix 3  Al Qahira, Ta’izz city, 20 February 2021

I.  Background

1. At approximately 1700 hours on 20 February 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a civilian area in Al Qahira, Ta’izz (13°35’51.7”N, 44°00’58.1”E). The attack resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four people: three children and one man.

II. Analysis of IHL violations

2. According to information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

3. Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.\(^{302}\)

4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta’izz.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

\(^{302}\) See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.
Figure 35.4
Location of the attack

Source: Google Earth, Panel
Appendix 4  Al Tharwa hospital, Ta’izz city, 5 March and 8 May 2021

I.  Background

1.  On 5 March 2021, an explosive ordnance hit the operation theatre of the Al Tharwa hospital in Ta’izz (13°35’12.16"N, 44° 1’25.01"E). The incident resulted in injuries to one man. The operation theatre was hit again on 8 May 2021 at approximately 2330 hours and resulted in damage to the hospital.

2.  This is not the first time the Panel has reported on this hospital being hit by explosive ordnances. See appendix 3, Annex 33 of S/2021/79, table 9 and annex 51 of S/2018/193, and paragraph 183 and annex 67 of S/2018/594.

II.  Analysis of IHL violations

3.  Under IHL, hospitals and medical centers exclusively assigned for medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances. Hospitals only lose their protection if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit acts harmful to the enemy. Furthermore, the protection of hospitals and medical units may cease only after a warning has been given and only after a reasonable time has elapsed after such a warning.  

4.  According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance came from the North of Ta’izz where the Houthis occupy a mountainous area.

5.  The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction, and the rules affording protection to medical units were not respected. 

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303 See article 3 common to the Geneva Convention, art. 11 AP II and CIHL rule 28.
304 See article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, art. 13 AP II, and CIHL rule 1.
Appendix 5  Al Rawdah, Ma’rib city, 3 April 2021

I. Background

1. At approximately 1630 hours on 3 April 2021, an explosive ordnance hit Al Rawdah area, Ma’rib city (see figures 35.5 and 35.6). This resulted in the death of one child and injuries to four other children. According to testimonies and reports received by the Panel, the children were playing on the street when the explosive ordnance hit.

2. According to information received by the Panel, the explosive ordnance originated from Sirwah district, parts of which are under the control of the Houthi forces.

3. The Panel was unable to identify the specific location of the impact point but received information that it is located approximately two kilometres South from the Sahn Al Jin military camp and 1.5 kilometres North-West of a military base (see figure 35.7)

II. Analysis of IHL violations

1. As mentioned above, the Panel notes two military locations at approximately two and 1.5 kilometres away from the location of the incident.

2. However, the Panel also notes that the explosive ordnance fell in a civilian area and that only civilian children were victims of the attack.

3. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

4. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.

5. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.
Figure 35.5
Damage resulting from the explosive ordnance

*Source:* Confidential
Figure 35.6  
**Debris of the explosive ordnance**  
*Source:* Confidential

Figure 35.7  
**Rawdah area (within the black line) and proximity of military facilities**  
*Source:* Google Earth with Panel’s annotation
Appendix 6  Petrol station, Ma’rib city, 5 June 2021

I.  Background

1. Between 1700 and 1730 hours on 5 June 2021, an explosive ordnance hit a petrol station in Ma’rib city (15°28’50.3”N, 45°18’47.4”E). According to reports, pictures, videos, and testimonies received by the Panel, the incident resulted in the deaths of between 14 and 21 civilians, including one child, and injuries to five people. Seven cars were also destroyed. The Panel only received conclusive evidence of the death of one child and one man.

2. According to information received by the Panel, several people, including some military personnel, were queuing at the petrol station to refuel at the time of the incident.

3. The Panel received information that there is a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen in the vicinity of the petrol station (see figure 35.9).

4. The Houthi forces acknowledged the attack and said that the target was the military camp nearby and Mohammed Ali Al Houthi called for an independent investigation (see figure 35.8).

5. According to information received by the Panel, the attack was launched from Sirwah district, located towards the West of Ma’rib city from areas under the control of Houthi forces at the time.

II. Analysis of IHL violations

6. The Panel notes the proximity of a military base belonging to the Government of Yemen to the petrol station and that, according to a declaration made on social media by Mohamed Ali Al Houthi, the military base was the intended objective of the attack.

7. However, the explosive ordnance hit a civilian target, a petrol station, and according to information received by the Panel, most of the victims were civilians, including children.

8. Under IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

9. Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas.

10. The Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected.
Figure 35.9
Statement of Mohamed Ali Al Houthi on Twitter calling for an independent investigation

Source: https://twitter.com/Moh_Alhouthi/status/1401614620809433090

Figure 35.8
Location of the impact and proximity of military objectives

Source: Google Earth, Panel

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Non-official translation: “We asked the brothers in the Yemeni Ministry of Defense, and they said that they bombed only the camp in the picture below, and they have proof. We welcome and call for investigation by independent committees into the matter regarding what was said about Ma’rib today or what happened regarding the killing of the children of the Republic of Yemen and civilians in all governorates who were targeted by America and its coalition”.
Figure 35.10
Damage to the petrol station

Source: Confidential
Appendix 7  A Mosque, Ma’rib city, 10 June 2021

I.  Background

1. On 10 June 2021 at between 1800 and 1900 hours, two or three explosive devices and a UAV, hit a mosque (15°27'54.4"N, 45°19'29.8"E) and its vicinity (see figure 35.11). Two civilian houses and a few ambulances were also affected. The incident resulted in the death of six people and the injuries to 32 additional people, including two or three members of the medical staff and one woman. The Panel received a list with the names of all victims. The Panel has not been able to verify the identity of each victim, but the number received from different sources and reports are similar.

2. According to information received by the Panel, the area contains buildings belonging to the Police, the Criminal Investigation Department, the Planning and International Cooperation Office, as well as other governmental offices.

3. According to reports received by the Panel, three ambulances that responded to the incident were also damaged. Successive attacks at an interval of several minutes increase the risk of civilian casualties, in particular to medical personnel and first responders (see figure 35.12).

II. Analysis of IHL violations

4. The Panel notes that the area is located approximately two kilometres from the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 (see Appendix 6) and is in the vicinity of a military base.

5. However, the Panel notes that only civilian objects were hit: a mosque, ambulances, and civilian houses.

6. The Panel, therefore, concludes that it is likely that the principle of distinction was not respected, especially in respect to the UAV which has a high level of accuracy. If the military base was the intended objective, the Panel concludes that the principle of precautions was not respected. Indeed IHL, parties to the conflict must, in the conduct of hostilities, take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.  

310 Confidential source.
311 CIHL, rule 15.
Figure 35.11
Location of attack

Source: Google Earth, Panel

Figure 35.12
Distance between the petrol station hit on 5 June 2021 and the mosque hit on 10 June 2021

Source: Google Earth, Panel
Figure 35.13
Damage to the Mosque

Source: Confidential

Figure 35.14
Debris of the UAV

Source: Confidential
Figure 35.15

Damage to an ambulance

Source: Confidential
Appendix 8  Near al Camp street, Ta’azz city, 30 October 2021

I.  Background

1.  On 30 October 2021, at approximately 1135 hours an explosive ordnance (see figure 35.16) hit a civilian area in the city of Ta’izz (13°34’30.7”N, 44°01’46.2”E) near Al Khaeer mosque, killing three children and injuring a fourth (see figure 35.17). All children were from the same family. Two adults were also reportedly injured, but the Panel has not been able to verify this information.

2.  According to information received by the Panel, this is a civilian area, and no military operations were going on in the area at the time of the attack.

II.  Analysis of IHL violations

3.  According to the information received by the Panel, there was no military presence in the area at the time of the attack.

4.  Under IHL, civilians and civilian objects should not be the object of attacks.\textsuperscript{312}

5.  Mortar bombs and artillery shells have a high level of inaccuracy, and the likelihood of indiscriminate effects increases when those weapons are used on targets in proximity to civilians and civilian objects, and especially in densely populated areas such as the city of Ta’izz.

6.  The Panel concludes that the principle of distinction was not respected.

\textsuperscript{312} See article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, article 13 (2) Additional Protocol II and Customary IHL, rule 1.
Figure 35.16
Remnants found at the location of the incident

Source: Confidential
Figure 35.17
Location of the attack
Source: Google map

Figure 35.18
Impact point
Source: Confidential
Annex 36 Indiscriminate use of landmines, IEDs and other explosive remnants by Houthi forces

I. Background:

1. The indiscriminate use of landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Houthis is endemic and systematic. Since 2016, the Panel has been documenting the impact of landmines and IEDs on civilians (see S/2021/79, paras 140-142, S/2020/326, paras 115-117 and S/2018/193, annexes 43 and 44).

2. The indiscriminate use of landmines is prohibited by IHL. When landmines are used, parties to the conflict must take particular care to minimize their indiscriminate effects. They also must record their placement to the extent possible. In addition, although not directly binding on non-state armed groups, Yemen is party to the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (see section III on the use of anti-personnel mines by Houthis).

II. West Coast:

3. During its visit to Aden, Al Khokha and Al Mukha and Al Khokha in August 2021, the Panel met with a wide range of stakeholders involved in monitoring and demining activities in Yemen, including Project Masam, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) and UNDP. The Panel was informed that there is no centralized database listing all clearance activities, incidents and emergency interventions undertaken by these different entities in Yemen. It is therefore difficult to have complete and exhaustive data.

4. The Panel was nevertheless able to gather significant information, as mentioned below:

- Between November 2020 and August 2021, the following explosive items were removed from the West Coast by the local demining teams (YEMAC, Project Masam and/or West Coast armed groups):

Table 36.1 Explosive items removed from the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021 by district and type of items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts:</th>
<th>Anti-Tank/Vehicle Mine</th>
<th>Anti-Personnel Mine</th>
<th>Sea mine</th>
<th>Explosive devices</th>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Shells (rockets)</th>
<th>Cluster munition</th>
<th>Pressure plates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bab el Mandab</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhubab</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawza</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Mukha</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khokha</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hays</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuhayata</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durahimi</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

313 See CIHL, rules 80, 81, 82, and 83.
The Panel received information from the local authorities of Al Hudaydah and Al Khokha that, between January and June 2021, landmines and other explosive devices laid in those territories of the Al Hudaydah Governorate, which are under the control of the Government of Yemen, resulted in a high number of casualties. Most of them occurred in the district of Al Durahimi. In total, 17 children were killed and 15 were injured, nine women were killed and five injured, and 37 men were killed and 35 injured. The Panel also received information about several incidents affecting civilians between the months of July and October 2021. Two are detailed below.

During a meeting in Al Mukha, the Panel was informed that according to the most recent survey, in 2021, 78 percent of the West Coast territory is confirmed to be a hazardous area, i.e. territory in which the presence of landmines, IEDs and/or unexploded ordnances (UXO) has been confirmed, and the other 22 percent is suspected to be a hazardous area. The Panel was informed that there are ten YEMAC teams on the West Coast: three in Al Mukha, one in Mawza, one in the South of Ta’izz, one in Jabal Habashi, two in Al Khokha, one in Mudhafar, one in Al Ma’afer and one in Durahimi. Each YEMAC team has the capacity of clearing areas of approximately 625m² per month.

The Panel was also informed that demining teams in Yemen, including on the West Coast, proceed only for emergency demining, i.e., clearance of roads and passages to infrastructures and locations used by the civilians such as schools, hospitals, and water tanks. Therefore, no area can be considered as completely cleared and the risk of landmines is always there for the civilian population. In addition, the Panel was informed that in areas near active conflict zones, demined areas are constantly remined by the Houthis. The Panel received a list of 74 locations in Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Ma’rib and Shabwah where demining activities had been undertaken, which since have been retaken by Houthi forces.\(^{314}\)

The Panel received specific information on 62 cases in which demining teams were called for emergency interventions between September 2020 and August 2021 in ten districts across three Governorates, as mentioned below:

i) Ta’izz – Mawza: six incidents, including At Muoa`ad Bin Jabel School\(^{315}\), where three anti-tank mines, three artillery shells, ten fuses, and one IED were found on 12 December 2020.

ii) Ta’izz- Dhubab: seven incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the roads in or near villages, fishing areas and the Al Shaykh Saeid Port.

iii) Ta’izz-Al Mukha: four incidents, where anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, IEDs and artillery shells were found on the village roads, farms and houses. One of these incidents resulted in the death of a civilian in Al Gadeed\(^{316}\) in July 2021.

iv) Ta’izz- Al Wazi’iyah: five incidents, where explosive devices were found on the roads. In one of these incidents, cattle was killed\(^{317}\) and in another one, five anti-tank mines, two IEDs, one

\(^{314}\) Specific GPS coordinates on file with the Panel.
\(^{315}\) N 43°38’06.11”, E 13°22’34.54”
\(^{316}\) N 43°21’53.10”, E 13°06’20.80”
\(^{317}\) N 43°40’20.50”, E 13°17’24.50”
artillery shell, and seven anti-personnel mines were found near roads and houses used by civilians.\textsuperscript{318}

\begin{enumerate}[i)]
\item Tai’zz-Dhubab: 15 incidents, where anti-tank mines were found on the roads used by the civilians, and inside farms. In Al Aradee Almandab, anti-personnel mines were also found at a fishing site.\textsuperscript{319}
\item Ad Dali-Qa’atabah: ten incidents where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
\item Al Hudaydah: 11 incidents, where anti-personnel mines were found in or near civilian houses and farms.
\item Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020.\textsuperscript{320} In Al Khokha, landmines were found at the entrance of Al Fawz school in November 2020,\textsuperscript{321} and others around a water well in December 2020.\textsuperscript{322} In Al Hali, explosive devices were also found near a water pipe in August 2021,\textsuperscript{323} and in Al Tuhayata, two 500-kilo bombs were found near a water pipe and cleared in January 2021 (see figure 36.6).\textsuperscript{324}
\item Lahij-Al Madaribah: four incidents, where anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were found on and near the roads used by the civilians, including on a road leading to a water well.\textsuperscript{325}
\end{enumerate}

- In addition, the Panel received information from Project MASAM that between November 2020, and the end of July 2021, they cleared 1,830 anti-personnel mines, 26,867 anti-vehicle mines, 315 IEDs and 40,141 UXO in Aden, Ad Dali, Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Ma’rib, Shabwah and Ta’izz. Between July 2018 and November 2021, 4,168 anti-personnel mines, 95,525 anti-vehicle mines, 6,109 IEDs and 178,834 UXO were cleared by the group.

III. Anti-personnel mines:

5. In 2021, the Panel continued to receive evidence of anti-vehicle mines modified by the Houthis for use as large anti-personnel landmines. The Panel was informed of two ways by which this is achieved: one is the use of pressure plates and the other is through the reduction of the headspace above the fuse within an improvised anti-tank device (see figure 36.1).

Figure 36.1:
\textbf{Plastic cap used to reduce the headspace}

\begin{center}
\textit{Source:} Project Masam
\end{center}
IV. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

6. Houthi forces continued to manufacture a significant number of IEDs of different shapes and types, including IEDs concealed as rocks, palm tree trunks, as well as different booby traps. Those IEDs are activated through different means including pressure plates, crush wires, and passive infra-red sensors (see figures 36.2 to 36.5)

Figure 36.2:
IEDs activation system: pressure plate

Source: Panel
Figure 36.3:
**IEDs activation system: crush wire**

*Source:* Panel

Figure 36.4:
**IEDs activation system: passive infra-red sensor**

*Source:* Panel
The Panel also received evidence that the Houthi forces use old aviation bombs as IEDs in the civilian areas, with significant risk for the civilian population. For instance, the Panel received evidence of two of these bombs being laid inside a water pipe in Al Thuhayata (43°04'42.01"N, 14°12'07.26"E) and cleared in January 2021 and that another nine were found at the entrance of a school in Medghal, Ma’rib and cleared in November 2018 (15°36'49.29"N, 44°53'2.65"E) (see figure 36.6).
Figure 36.7: **Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018**

![Aviation bombs found at the entrance of a school and cleared on November 2018](image1)

Source: Project Masam

8. The Panel also received evidence of five anti-vehicle mines and 11 IEDs found in a school in al Khokha district, al Hudaydah and cleared on 25 November 2021 (13°52'07.88''N 43°25'32.87''E) (see figure 36.8).

Figure 36.8: **Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha**

![Anti-vehicle mines and IEDs found in a school in al Khokha](image2)

Source: Project Masam
V. Sea Mines

9. During its visit to the West Coast in August 2021, the Panel received documents, pictures, and other information about the use deployment of sea mines by the Houthis from different sources including people involved in demining and military sources. According to the information received, eight sea mines were found and removed from GoY-controlled areas of the West Coast between November 2020 and August 2021. Most sea mines found on the West Coast are contact-type sea mines. Some magnetic sea mines have also been found in the past.

10. The Panel was informed during a meeting with the Yemen Coast Guard in August 2021 that during the period from mid-October to mid-April, due to bad weather conditions, there were fewer patrols on the West Coast and that the Houthis were using this opportunity to lay mines.

11. The Panel also received information that the Houthi forces possess the capacity to produce sea mines, but has not been able to independently verify this.

VI. Examples of landmine incidents affecting civilians

12. The Panel received information on several incidents of landmine explosions killing or injuring civilians in 2021. The Panel conducted broader investigations on two of them to illustrate the danger of unrecorded landmines in civilian areas.

13. On 29 July 2021, in Ad Durayhimi district, Al Hudaydah Governorate, a car transporting 14 people ran over an explosive device hidden in the ground. Three people were killed, including two children and 11 were injured, including three children. Two of the injured people, one man and one child, died later from their wounds.

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326 Information received from confidential source.
327 Approximately at 14°36'38.49"N, 43°01'06.13"E
328 The Panel communicated with three of the victims, received information, including pictures and list of victims from the authorities of Al Hudaydah Governorate, as well as from confidential sources.
14. On 13 September 2021, at approximately 1800 hours a lorry triggered an anti-vehicle landmine in Al Qataba area, Al Khokha district, Al Hudaydah (13°53'44.44"N, 43°15'18.36"E). The incident resulted in the injuries of 13 children and two women.\(^{329}\) On 14 September 2021, a monitoring team

\(^{329}\) Some media reported 17 victims, but the Panel was able to verify 15: [https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/شاهد-17-جرحى-معظمهم-نساء-и-رط](https://alamalika.net/site/2021/09/13/شاهد-17-جرحى-معظمهم-نساء-и-رط). The Panel received information from two different sources as well as video and pictures of the victims at the hospital after the incident.
went to the area to search for and clear other explosive devices. They found a locally made anti-vehicle landmine believed to be similar to the one detonated by the lorry the day before.

Figure 36.11:
Location of the incident

![Figure 36.11: Location of the incident](image)

Source: Confidential

Figure 38.12:
Anti-vehicle landmine found near the location of the incident on 14 September 2021

![Figure 38.12: Anti-vehicle landmine](image)

Source: Confidential

15. The Panel also received evidence of an incident in Mayfa’a district, Shabwah, on 29 September 2021, which resulted in the death of one child and the injuries to three men. The incident was caused
by the explosion of IEDs left in a garbage dump near a mosque. When a fire started in the dump, civilians gathered to control it and were either killed or injured by the explosion.

**VII. Risks associated with Demining**

16. The Panel received information from two different sources about incidents that occurred during demining operations in Yemen. One source informed the Panel that 29 workers had died during demining activities between 2018 and 2021. Another source informed the Panel that between 2015 and 2021, 45 workers had died during demining operations, and 37 were injured. According to sources involved in demining activities, these numbers are high compared to other areas of operation, and increased training and protective equipment should be provided to demining workers in Yemen. The Panel was also informed by different sources in Yemen that Houthis are constantly developing new technologies relating to landmines and IEDs, which makes the task of the demining teams more difficult and requires continuous training.

**VI. Import of demining material**

17. The Panel received evidence that, in one case, requests for importing demining equipment, including protective material and detectors, took over a year and half before being approved by the Government of Yemen. Considering the needs and importance of this matter, the authorities in charge of approving importation of equipment related to mine clearance should take appropriate measures to reduce delays.
Annex 37 Obstruction to humanitarian assistance in Houthi-controlled areas

The Panel has determined that the publication of this annex may pose a threat to individuals and entities, and their activities in Yemen. Therefore, the information in this annex is not for publication.
## List of acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATGM</td>
<td>Anti-Tank Guided Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>APII</td>
<td>Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBY</td>
<td>Central Bank of Yemen in Aden</td>
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<tr>
<td>cby</td>
<td>Central Bank of Yemen in Sana’a</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIHL</td>
<td>Customary International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Economic Committee of the STC</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECDIS</td>
<td>Electronic Chart Display and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUC</td>
<td>End-User Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Floating Storage and Offloading Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Internet Service Providers</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIAT</td>
<td>Joint Incident Assessment Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical Mile</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBNR</td>
<td>Political Bureau of the National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Promissory Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Redeployment Coordination Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket-propelled Grenade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Southern Transitional Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEL</td>
<td>Transport-Erector-Launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Uncrewed Aerial Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMHA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSAT</td>
<td>United Nations Satellite Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>WBIED</td>
<td>Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCJF</td>
<td>West Coast Joint Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YCG</td>
<td>Yemeni Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEMAC</td>
<td>Yemen Executive Mine Action Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YER</td>
<td>Yemeni rial</td>
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