



# Security Council

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## Situation in Mali

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2584 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2022 and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the resolution. The present report covers major developments in Mali since the previous report ([S/2021/1117](#)), issued on 4 January 2022.

#### II. Major developments

2. During the reporting period, differences persisted among Malian stakeholders and between the transitional Government and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) over the transition time frame, culminating in the imposition by ECOWAS of additional economic and financial sanctions, including the closure of land and air borders between the ECOWAS member States and Mali. Those developments followed the conclusion at the end of December 2021 of a wide-ranging national dialogue on reforms, which, among other things, resulted in the recommendation to extend the transition for a period of six months to five years. The implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali stalled, while efforts continued towards the finalization of a comprehensive politically led strategy for central Mali. Meanwhile, the transitional Government continued to take steps to review and expand the international partnerships of Mali, also in the context of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force from Mali.

##### A. Political transition

3. In keeping with its political agenda, the transitional Government proceeded with the holding of the national dialogue, which will form the basis for the launch of political and institutional reforms to address the root causes of recurring crises in Mali and inform the time frame for the holding of elections and the conclusion of the transition period. Convened at the *cercle*, commune and national levels from 11 to 30 December 2021, the national dialogue resulted in the recommendation of far-reaching political, institutional and governance reforms, ranging from access to basic services, human rights protection, the fight against corruption and the



accelerated implementation of key aspects of the Agreement to the establishment of a single election management body and an extension of the transition time frame.

4. While some participants in the national dialogue and other important stakeholders, including political parties and civil society groups, welcomed its outcome, other stakeholders criticized it. Among the latter were the Cadre d'échange des partis et regroupements politiques pour une transition réussie, which mostly comprises parties of the former presidential majority; the Coordination des mouvements, associations et sympathisants de l'imam Mahmoud Dicko; and a coalition of civil society groups known as "Synergie 22". In separate statements, those groups rejected the proposed electoral calendar, argued that it violated the Transition Charter and had not been discussed with relevant stakeholders, and urged the authorities to allow for a return to constitutional order through the release of a realistic electoral calendar. In a communiqué issued by the Cadre stratégique permanent on 1 January, movements that are signatories to the Agreement announced that, since they had not participated in the national dialogue, they were not bound by its recommendations.

5. Against this backdrop and in accordance with decisions adopted at the sixtieth ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held on 12 December 2021, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, travelled to Accra on 31 December to present the outcome of the national dialogue along with a proposal for a five-year extension to the transition to the Chair of the ECOWAS Authority, the President of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo. Given that the proposal by Mali failed to meet ECOWAS expectations for a short extension to the transition period, the Authority dispatched the ECOWAS Mediator to Bamako on 5 January 2022 to impress upon the transitional authorities the need to resubmit a revised electoral timetable. With little progress towards this end, on 9 January, the Authority convened an extraordinary summit on the situation in Mali, in Accra. Finding the Malian proposal of a five- then four-year timetable unacceptable, the Authority decided, *inter alia*, to impose additional economic and financial sanctions, including the closure of land and air borders between the ECOWAS member States and Mali; the suspension of commercial and financial transactions between the ECOWAS member States and Mali, with some exceptions aimed at avoiding an adverse effect on the population; the freeze of assets held by Mali and those of public enterprises in ECOWAS central and commercial banks; and the suspension of financial assistance to and financial transactions with Mali. The Authority also decided to recall all ECOWAS ambassadors from Bamako for consultations and immediately activated the ECOWAS Standby Force. An extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) held earlier in the day had informed the decision of the Authority.

6. The above-mentioned developments took centre stage in the public arena in Mali. In a communiqué issued on 9 January, the transitional Government strongly condemned the decisions of ECOWAS and WAEMU, which it termed "inhumane, illegal and illegitimate". Based on the principle of reciprocity, it closed its land and air borders to the ECOWAS member States and recalled its ambassadors from the ECOWAS member States. While stating its willingness to enter into a dialogue with ECOWAS, the Government of Mali stressed that it would take "all measures necessary" to counter the sanctions, and developed a national response plan, revolving around diplomatic, economic, social and legal measures. On 21 February, the Government announced that it had filed two lawsuits with the WAEMU Court of Justice over the legality of the financial and monetary sanctions against Mali. In addition, several political, social, religious and civil society actors, as well as trade unions, including those previously critical of the transitional authorities, issued

communiqués denouncing the sanctions. In an expression of support for the transitional authorities, Malians in Bamako and in several regions also took to the streets on 14 January in protest against the sanctions.

7. Throughout January and February, key members of the transitional authorities, notably the Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Lieutenant Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga, gave several interviews, providing information on the Government's response to the sanctions and reiterating its determination to carry out thorough reforms. In January, the Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Algeria, Guinea and Mauritania to share the outcomes of the national dialogue, seek support for the Government's vision for the future and enhance politico-economic cooperation by facilitating alternative trade corridors, in an effort to counteract the negative impact of the sanctions.

8. On 14 January, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union considered the situation in Mali and, *inter alia*, endorsed the decision by ECOWAS to impose additional sanctions on Mali. The Council also took note of the conclusions of the national dialogue, requested the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to engage with the transitional authorities in order to finalize an acceptable electoral calendar not exceeding 16 months, and called upon the Commission to immediately conduct consultations with neighbouring countries.

9. Several initiatives were undertaken to overcome the impasse and apparent lack of trust between Mali and regional and international partners. On 17 January, the Secretary-General held direct consultations with the Transitional President to underscore the importance of finding a consensual way forward. This was followed by other engagements with regional leaders with a focus on the same goal. On 25 January, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission travelled to Bamako and held consultations with the transitional authorities, including the President and the Prime Minister. In Bamako, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, maintained regular consultations with the transitional authorities to encourage the resumption of dialogue with ECOWAS and the submission of a consensual electoral calendar, including through the local transition follow-up committee composed of representatives of ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA.

10. In support of ECOWAS decisions, on 4 February the Council of the European Union adopted sanctions, including a travel ban and an asset freeze, against five members of the transitional Government for "obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition in Mali". Those concerned include the President of the National Transition Council, Colonel Malick Diaw; the Prime Minister; the Minister for National Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion, Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué; the Minister of State Reform, Ibrahim Ikassa Maïga; and the leader of a civil society group, Yerewolo debout sur les remparts, and member of the National Transition Council, Adama Ben Diarra. In reaction, another rally in support of the transitional authorities, organized by Yerewolo debout sur les remparts, was held on 4 February in Bamako. Similarly, various national stakeholders issued public communiqués in which they criticized the European Union sanctions, which they viewed as harmful, given the country's political and security challenges, and as running contrary to the spirit of dialogue.

11. On 31 January, during a meeting with the local follow-up committee, the Government announced its intention to take ownership of the efforts to find a solution for the transition, with the establishment of two working groups at the political and technical levels, respectively. The first is a ministerial-level working group, chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and composed of representatives from Ghana,

Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, the African Union, ECOWAS and MINUSMA, which is aimed at facilitating dialogue among relevant stakeholders. The second is a technical working group, tasked with reviewing the draft electoral timetable proposed by the transitional authorities. Membership of the latter group, which is overseen by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, comprises government, ECOWAS, African Union and MINUSMA technical experts. These consultative mechanisms were established days before the extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS Authority of 3 February, in Accra, at which the Authority upheld the sanctions imposed on Mali, urged the Malian authorities to propose an acceptable electoral timetable and reaffirmed the commitment of ECOWAS to providing the necessary technical assistance, in conjunction with the African Union and the United Nations.

12. Consequently, ECOWAS dispatched a technical team led by its Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and including electoral experts to Bamako from 15 to 18 February. Experts from ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA worked with their Malian counterparts to examine the requisite activities towards holding elections. Discussions focused on three key areas: the prioritization of the reforms necessary to hold elections; the identification of a reasonable timeline for those reforms; and the clarification of the resources required to ensure that the timeline is met. In parallel, the Commissioner and the local follow-up committee held a series of meetings with relevant ministries responsible for the organization of elections.

13. Against the backdrop of the technical consultations, the ECOWAS Mediator for Mali, the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck E. Jonathan, visited Bamako on 24 February to assess progress made towards the elaboration of a mutually acceptable electoral timetable. The Mediator, accompanied by members of the local follow-up committee, composed of the ECOWAS and African Union representatives in Mali, as well as MINUSMA, also held meetings with key government officials, including the Transitional President. In his communiqué dated 25 February, the Mediator, *inter alia*, reiterated the commitment of ECOWAS to continuing dialogue in order to facilitate the return of constitutional order, noted the readiness of the transitional authorities for continued dialogue with ECOWAS and stressed that the local follow-up committee and experts would pursue discussions with the Malian authorities.

14. On 21 February, the National Transition Council unanimously adopted the draft law tabled by the Government to amend the Transition Charter. The revisions included: (a) the abolition of the position of vice-president to avoid a duplication of responsibilities with the minister of defence and the minister of security; (b) the removal of the cap on the number of members of Government; (c) the increase in the number of members of the National Transition Council, for greater inclusivity; and (d) the modification of the transition timeline in line with the recommendations emanating from the national dialogue. The law was promulgated by the Transitional President on 25 February. The revision of the Transition Charter was rejected by the *Cadre d'échange des partis et regroupements politiques pour une transition réussie*, which demanded the opening of a frank and sincere dialogue with political actors before 25 March. The *Cadre* also proposed the establishment of a new transition for a duration of nine months, with a "neutral Head of Government", the establishment of a new National Transition Council and the adoption of a consensual electoral timetable.

15. The reporting period was also characterized by tensions between Mali and some international partners. On 24 January, the Government requested the departure of the Danish forces, deployed as part of the Takuba Task Force, stating that they had arrived without express approval and in violation of existing agreements, an interpretation which was challenged by the bilateral partners concerned. On 31 January, and in

response to public remarks by French authorities, the Government requested the departure of the Ambassador of France from Mali within 72 hours. On 17 February, France and the other European States operating alongside Operation Barkhane and within the Takuba Task Force, as well as Canada, issued a statement announcing their “coordinated withdrawal” from Malian territory. In addition, some bilateral partners continued to raise concern about the alleged presence of a foreign private military company operating alongside Malian security forces. The Government of Mali has consistently rejected such claims, stressing that the foreign troops are military instructors deployed in line with State-to-State bilateral cooperation.

## **B. Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali**

16. Little progress was made during the reporting period regarding the implementation of the Agreement.

17. No progress was recorded on security aspects, including regarding the finalization of the accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the launch of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants did not commence, despite the availability of funding from the World Bank, as the armed groups did not present their lists of candidates.

18. Following the persistent advocacy of MINUSMA and other international actors for the inclusion of women in mechanisms of the Agreement, on 22 February, the Government shared a list of 15 additional women to be included in the Agreement Monitoring Committee and its subcommittees. Preparations continued for the operationalization of the women’s observatory.

19. There was no progress on the Northern Development Zone, owing to persisting issues among relevant stakeholders. In addition, the allotted funding for the Zone from the sustainable development fund has decreased by 49 per cent in the national budget for 2022.

20. In this context, the International Mediation of which MINUSMA is a member, continued its efforts to facilitate progress. In a communiqué issued after its virtual meeting of 5 January, the team underlined that the conclusions of the national dialogue offered encouraging perspectives for the advancement of the peace process and it urged the signatory parties to make headway on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration issues.

21. Across northern Mali, the Cadre stratégique permanent, a coalition created by the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad and a wing of the Platform coalition of armed groups in April 2021, appeared to grow in relevance as signatory movements continued efforts to unify. The visits of the Cadre stratégique permanent to Algeria, the Niger and Europe, as well as within Mali, contributed to its positioning as a key political actor and security provider across and beyond the northern regions. At a meeting held on 15 and 16 January, the Cadre stratégique permanent called upon the transitional authorities to implement the recommendations adopted at the forty-fifth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee and to refrain from taking initiatives parallel to the measures and mechanisms of the Agreement.

22. To address persisting tensions between the signatory parties to the Agreement, from 30 January to 3 February, Ara Pacis Initiatives for Peace, an Italian non-profit organization, hosted a series of mediation talks in Rome with a Cadre stratégique permanent delegation and the transitional Government, represented by the Minister for National Reconciliation. The signatory parties are reported to have recommitted

to overcoming differences over the Cadre stratégique permanent structure and to aligning their positions in order to resume the peace process.

23. The special recruitment process, launched by the Malian Armed Forces in the north and the centre of the country in November 2021, continued in Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu. The process is aimed at integrating 2,000 armed young people who wish to join the military. During the reporting period, 1,157 young people from Gao, Ménaka and Timbuktu, as well as from the centre, surrendered their weapons and ammunition. This process was executed outside the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration frameworks and is viewed by the armed movements as undermining the Agreement.

### C. Stabilization and restoration of State authority in the centre

24. During the reporting period, the transitional authorities continued consultations on the comprehensive politically led strategy for the centre with a view to its finalization. On 25 February, the Regional Committee of the Cadre politique de gestion de la crise au centre du Mali held its first meeting of the year, in Mopti. MINUSMA continued to offer its good offices and provided technical support.

25. Meanwhile, violence attributed to extremist groups continued, with 103 security incidents registered over the first three months of 2022, a significant decrease compared with the previous reporting period, during which 147 incidents had been recorded. The attacks resulted in 69 civilians killed, 29 injured and 83 abducted.

26. The reporting period was also marked by intensified offensive operations by the Malian Armed Forces, which resulted in both a decrease in reported incidents and in the voluntary return of internally displaced persons. Although this contributed to an enhanced sense of security by the population, it was also marked by allegations of serious human rights violations reportedly perpetrated by the Malian Armed Forces (see para. 57).

27. In Niono *cercle*, Ségou region, a Malian Armed Forces convoy reached the village of Farabougou on 6 February, bringing food items to the population. This was the first time that the village was reached by land since radical armed combatants had imposed a blockade on the village in October 2020. In support of the humanitarian assistance to the area, MINUSMA delivered 49.7 tons of food in 22 flights between 21 December 2021 and 6 January 2022.

28. MINUSMA launched six community violence reduction projects in the centre, including a new water supply project for 2,000 beneficiaries in Goundougou village, Bandiagara region, to reduce water-related conflict and a vocational training project targeting 200 local young people in Hombori village, Douentza region. In the villages of Yasso et Mafuné, San region, MINUSMA established a solar electrification project, which will benefit 2,000 people. In all those projects, women represented half of the beneficiaries. In Ségou, MINUSMA supported vocational training in agriculture for 50 unemployed young people, with the aim of reducing unemployment and discouraging their recruitment by armed groups.

#### 1. Promotion of reconciliation

29. MINUSMA continued the training of government officials and community representatives in conflict resolution and supported intercommunity dialogues. In Bandiagara, initiatives targeted the six communes in the southern part of the *cercle*. Follow-up dialogue processes held in five communes in northern Djenné and southern Mopti *cercles*, on 24 and 25 January, paved the way for further consolidation of intercommunity relations, following the earlier dialogue initiatives that had led to the

lifting of the blockade of Marébougou. On 7 March, MINUSMA launched an initiative to build trust between the Malian Armed Forces and the population in Douentza and Hairé through dialogue and small-scale projects implemented jointly in the communities.

30. In Bankass, MINUSMA sought to consolidate the gains achieved following the Ogossogou local reconciliation agreement, through the continued provision of good offices to the communities concerned. In collaboration with the government regional reconciliation support team, from 1 to 3 February, the Mission facilitated a dialogue between pastoralists and farmers in Korombana commune to address grievances and establish a road map for collaboration and a mechanism to settle any future conflict. Further dialogue sessions were conducted in Konio, Djenné *cercle*, from 14 to 16 February to resolve long-standing tensions related to local religious sites. MINUSMA also supported mediation initiatives to address ongoing violent conflict in the communes of Kala Seguida, Mariko and Sirifila Boundy, Niono *cercle*, where interethnic conflict threatens the protection of civilian populations, impedes livelihoods and thwarts social and economic recovery.

## **2. Restoration of State authority**

31. As at 28 February, four of eight prefects (50 per cent) and seven of 55 sub-prefects (13 per cent) were deployed in the Mopti region. In addition, six of seven prefects (86 per cent) and 11 of 39 sub-prefects (29 per cent) were present in the Ségou region. To facilitate the return of State presence in the centre, the European Union and MINUSMA co-financed the rehabilitation and equipment of the sub-prefecture office in Kona, Mopti *cercle*, and handed over the project to the Government on 9 February.

## **3. Fight against impunity**

32. As part of its continuous technical support to the judicial authorities in Mopti, MINUSMA explored possible logistical and security support, mainly for the investigation of three emblematic cases likely to produce swift results in view of the facts or advanced stage of the cases. Given the slow progress observed during the reporting period, the Mission continued to advocate the need to achieve concrete results in relation to that benchmark of the fight against impunity in the centre.

## **D. Support for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel**

33. While it was not possible for the Group of Five for the Sahel to hold critical forums during the reporting period, its Joint Force was able to conduct some operations, including operation Kana, which is ongoing, in the Niger, which dismantled a terrorist site on the eastern border with Burkina Faso.

34. On its side, MINUSMA continued to provide support to the Joint Force in partnership with the European Union to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Force in counter-terrorism. The Mission delivered a total of 702,684 litres of petroleum products and 84,340 ration packs in the area of operations of or at locations nearest the battalions during the last quarter of 2021, in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces.

## **III. Major security developments**

35. During the reporting period, extremist groups continued to harass and attack local populations and security forces across the central and northern regions, while

Malian defence and security forces stepped up operations across the centre, reporting heavy casualties among extremist groups and significant military gains.

36. At the beginning of February, the Malian Armed Forces announced that operations to find and destroy terrorist sanctuaries were ongoing. Later in the month, they released another statement in which they announced that they were consolidating operational gains “in the face of increasingly febrile terrorists who have adopted evasion techniques and resorted to hiding among the population as their course of action”. These operations have resulted in relative calm in some areas, particularly in the Bandiagara region.

37. In northern Mali, terrorist groups appeared to have asserted their presence, sometimes leading to mass population displacements. In I-n-Tillit commune, Gao region, Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin combatants allegedly executed two suspected robbers on 30 January, in line with the group’s propaganda claiming to administer “justice” in the areas under its control. Between 5 and 6 February, extremist armed individuals stormed Tadjalalt and Tinagagui, Tessit commune, reportedly torturing 14 people, destroying the sanitary infrastructure and the water tower, setting an ambulance on fire, and taking away large herds of livestock. Villages and communities nearby were given ultimatums to abandon the area or face attacks, leading to significant and ongoing population displacements. On 8 March, the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Dawsahak reported the killing of 12 civilians and four of its combatants following a clash with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, in Tamalelt commune, Ménaka region. According to the communiqué, three Islamic State in the Greater Sahara combatants were also killed.

38. During the reporting period, a series of incidents were reported in the border area between Mali and Mauritania, leading to the killing of Mauritanian civilians, including seven on 17 January in Guiré commune, Nara region. Other civilians reportedly disappeared in the same border area, further raising tensions between the two countries. On 12 March, the Minister of National Defence of Mauritania and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali announced in a joint declaration the establishment of an ad hoc joint mission to investigate the incidents. The declaration also outlined steps to de-escalate tensions.

39. MINUSMA stepped up its efforts to protect civilians, including through patrols and the facilitation of humanitarian access. During the reporting period, MINUSMA forces conducted a total of 2,384 patrols, of which 362 patrols focused on the protection of civilians, allowing MINUSMA to secure several areas around Kidal, Tessalit and Aguelhok and strengthen relationships with the population. With the support of MINUSMA, the reconstituted battalion of the Malian Armed Forces in Kidal conducted training, patrols and operations involving civilians and military. In the east, following clashes between violent extremists armed groups, MINUSMA patrolled between Gao and Tessit, protecting internally displaced persons travelling along the road and providing them with essential goods. In Gao, MINUSMA, in coordination with local authorities and humanitarian actors, provided security to internally displaced persons through frequent patrols, as well as humanitarian aid and health services. In the west, in close coordination with the United Nations police and the Malian Armed Forces, the Mission intensified their mounted and foot patrols in Timbuktu.

40. In the centre, in coordination with the Malian defence and security forces, MINUSMA continued to protect the roads linking Sévaré to Koro and Bankass and across the border into Burkina Faso. Along that axis, through the trust fund in support of peace and security in Mali, the Mission supported the repair of the Yawakanda and Songo bridges, which had been damaged by presumed extremist groups in August 2021. Those bridges are critical to facilitating the movement of the Malian Armed

Forces and the MINUSMA forces, as well as to ensuring the protection of civilians and their livelihoods in the Bandiagara region. MINUSMA also conducted patrols in support of the populations of Ogossogou to prevent intercommunal violence. Around Douentza, in coordination with the Malian Armed Forces, the MINUSMA force and police conducted daily patrols and, on 2 March, carried out an integrated mission to set up projects aimed at maintaining a safe and secure environment.

## **A. Asymmetric and other attacks**

41. During the reporting period, 55 asymmetric attacks were carried out against national and international forces, including MINUSMA. The centre saw 22 attacks, a decrease compared with the previous reporting period, in which 27 attacks had been recorded. Of the 22 attacks, 18 targeted MINUSMA, which is also a decrease compared with the previous reporting period, in which 31 attacks against the Mission had been recorded. The 18 attacks comprised 6 attacks in Gao, 3 in Kidal, 3 in Mopti, 3 in Timbuktu and 3 in Ménaka, resulting in two peacekeepers getting killed and four injured.

42. A total of 33 attacks were reported against the Malian defence and security forces during the reporting period, including 13 in Mopti, 9 in Timbuktu, 6 in Ségou, 2 in Gao, 1 in Kidal, 1 in Sikasso and 1 in Koulikoro, resulting in 46 killed, including 41 members of the Malian Armed Forces, as well as 65 injured, including 64 members of the Malian Armed Forces, and seven people reported missing.

43. The deadliest attack occurred on 4 March, when presumed radical armed elements in vehicles attacked the Malian Armed Forces camp in Mondoro, approximately 114 km south-east of Douentza, resulting in 27 people killed, 33 injured and 7 missing among the Malian Armed Forces and 47 people killed on the attackers' side.

44. In addition, four attacks targeted the international forces, resulting in one person killed and nine injured. Another deadly attack occurred on 22 January, near MINUSMA Gao camp during an indirect fire attack. Six to eight impacts points were reported in the Barkhane camp adjacent to MINUSMA camp, and none inside the MINUSMA camp.

45. In total, 57 explosive device incidents were reported, including 43 improvised explosive devices, two mine incidents and 12 rockets or mortar attacks.

## **B. Support for Malian defence and security institutions**

46. MINUSMA continued its assistance to Malian defence and security institutions through the training of and provision of capacity-building to personnel. In the central and northern regions, the United Nations police conducted 48 training sessions for 706 Malian defence and security forces officers, including 82 women, on crime scene management, the protection of high-level personalities and securing the electoral process, among other themes. For the first time, Malian defence and security forces personnel units preparing for deployment to central Mali received an enhanced context-specific training in improvised explosive device disposal. From 10 January to 3 February, MINUSMA and instructors from the Malian Police Academy jointly held 10 training sessions on conflict-related sexual violence at the National Police Academy, benefiting 2,475 students, including 575 women.

47. United Nations Police supported the construction and renovation of several offices, security posts, infirmaries and other critical infrastructure in Ansongo, Bandiagara, Mopti and Timbuktu, including the construction of a post for a

surveillance and quick intervention platoon for the national gendarmerie in the Gao region, to contribute to the fight against terrorism and organized crime in the neighbouring communes. The activities of the new platoon will improve the security of the local population and facilitate the resumption of social and economic activities and the return of State authority.

48. MINUSMA also continued to support the Malian defence and security forces through joint patrolling, security assistance and casualty evacuations. MINUSMA Force conducted more than 100 joint patrols with the Malian Armed Forces and four casualty evacuation missions for their personnel. The United Nations police conducted 47 joint patrols with the Malian Armed Forces, in Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu.

### **C. Rule of law**

49. MINUSMA continued to support the return and effectiveness of the rule of law and of State judicial institutions in the north and the centre. On 2 March, as a result of the Mission's high-level advocacy and coordination efforts, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights identified priority actions and adopted a recommendation to establish an integrated monitoring mechanism involving the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, the Ministry of Defence and Veterans' Affairs and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization aimed at furthering the deployment and increased presence of judicial authorities in the north and the centre, including through security support for personnel and infrastructure. MINUSMA supported the efforts of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights to prevent violent extremism and radicalization in prisons through capacity-building on the detection of signs of radicalization and the setting up of a prison intelligence system.

50. MINUSMA and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continued to support the Specialized Judicial Unit against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime and other judicial institutions in the prosecution of those accused of serious crimes through the development of a criminal policy and prosecution strategy on terrorism-related crimes and international crimes, a high priority of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in its fight against impunity. On 15 March, with MINUSMA technical support, the draft law on the reform of the Military Code was validated to enhance the effective investigation and prosecution of offences committed by the military.

51. As at 3 March, the number of individuals being held in relation to attacks against peacekeepers (34) and the total number of investigations under way (44) remained the same as in the previous reporting period.

## **IV. Human rights situation**

52. The human rights situation remained precarious, mostly because of deliberate and widespread attacks on civilians by presumed extremist armed groups. In some instances, counter-terrorism operations also had dire consequences for the civilian population, especially in central Mali. Women and children in conflict-affected areas continued to be the victims of violence. The right to due process of individuals arrested or detained in connection with alleged terrorism-related offences remained under significant strain.

53. Against that backdrop, MINUSMA documented 466 human rights incidents (241 violations and 225 abuses), which is 142 more than during the previous reporting period. They comprised extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (105), other

killings (123), people being injured (64), abductions (43), enforced disappearances (54), torture or ill-treatment (13) and illegal arrests and detentions, notably prolonged detentions and the violation of due process guarantees in terrorism-related cases (64). In addition, there were instances of threats and intimidation, forced civilian displacement, intentional destruction or looting of civilian property and attacks on cultural or religious freedom.

54. Many of those violations and abuses were documented in the centre, notably in the regions of Bandiagara (97), Mopti (49), Douentza (15) and Ségou (59). Violations and abuses were also recorded in the regions of Gao (65), Nara (64), Ménaka (23), Timbuktu (27) and Kita (3) and in Bamako (64). The alleged perpetrators of the violations or abuses included national forces (174), extremist armed groups (191), community-based armed groups and militias (10), signatory or compliant armed groups (24) and international forces (3).

55. Civilians in the centre and in the north of the country continued to face violence perpetrated by extremist armed groups, making it difficult for them to enjoy a range of human rights and freedoms. Civilians continue to suffer from indiscriminate attacks, killings and persistent threats, including in Petaka, in the central region of Douentza, where elements of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin repeatedly threatened to attack the village, prompting the Mission to step up its patrols and other monitoring activities in the area. Between 12 and 15 February, alleged elements of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara conducted a targeted armed attack on five localities in Tessit commune, Gao region, leading to the deliberate killing of many civilians, all members of the Tuareg community, whom the attackers suspected of collaborating with Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, their rival. MINUSMA initiated a human rights investigation to establish the circumstances of the attacks.

56. Furthermore, alleged extremist groups systematically targeted and destroyed at least seven telecommunication infrastructures, especially in the Bandiagara region, and in the northern region of Timbuktu, cutting off entire communities, in some instances, from mobile telephone networks and radio broadcasting. There were at least nine instances of alleged extremist groups attacking mosques, imposing their beliefs on worshippers and threatening severe punishments on anyone acting contrary to those beliefs, a situation which amounts to an attack on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This phenomenon was recorded in particular in the Douentza and Timbuktu regions.

57. Some of the operations conducted by national security forces to counter the violent activities of those extremist groups, reportedly alongside foreign security personnel, were fraught with allegations of serious human rights violations. For instance, it was alleged that, between 26 and 29 January, elements of the Malian Armed Forces summarily or arbitrarily executed at least 20 individuals (19 men and one boy) and deliberately destroyed many civilian dwellings and other property during three incidents in the Bandiagara region. On 7 February, the Malian Armed Forces reportedly launched air strikes on a hamlet near the village of Bouka Were, Ségou region. At least 10 civilians were reportedly killed and several injured. This situation continues to erode trust between the military and the affected population.

58. The United Nations recorded a significant increase of 57 per cent in the number of grave violations against children (396, compared with 252 during the previous reporting period), directly affecting 270 children (181 boys, 76 girls and 13 of unknown sex). The recruitment and use (149), killing (25) and maiming (66) of children, attacks against schools (61) and hospitals (4) and abductions (38) remained the most prevalent violations. Other violations included sexual violence (19) and denial of humanitarian access (34). The alleged perpetrators of these violations were unidentified armed elements (225), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (39),

Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (32), Ganda Izo (27), dozos (27), Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (13), Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (11), the Malian Armed Forces (8), Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (4), Groupe d'autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (2), Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad of the Dawsahak (7) and Mouvement pour le salut de l'Azawad of the Chamanamas (1). Violations were verified in the regions of Gao (152), Mopti (76), Timbuktu (49), Ségou (48), Kidal (39), Bandiagara (14), Ménaka (11), Sikasso (3) and Douentza (1) and in Bamako (3). At least 78 children remained active within armed groups and armed forces in Gao (44), Mopti (27) and Timbuktu (7), while seven boys separated from armed groups during the reporting period.

59. During the reporting period, 1,632 schools (affecting 489,200 children and 9,792 teachers) were not functional, mostly because of insecurity, especially in the regions of Mopti (42 per cent) and Ménaka (40 per cent).

60. Through the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, MINUSMA documented nine cases of conflict-related sexual violence, which is five fewer than during the previous reporting period, perpetrated against seven women and two girls of 13 years of age in the regions of Douentza (4), Gao (1), Ménaka (3) and Timbuktu (1). Those were all cases of rape, perpetrated by unidentified armed men in conflict settings. In addition, the one-stop-centre in Gao reported six cases of conflict-related sexual violence (five cases of rape and one case of abduction for sexual purposes) against four girls of 15 to 16 years of age and two women of 18 and 19 years of age. Two cases were allegedly perpetrated by members of the signatory armed group Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance, two by Malian forces, one by elements of the Ganda Lassalizo armed group and one by unidentified armed men.

61. In compliance with the requirements laid out in the human rights due diligence policy, MINUSMA conducted six risk assessments before material and logistical assistance was provided to non-United Nations forces.

62. As at 1 March, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Mali had registered 25,029 depositions from victims and witnesses. MINUSMA continues to support the Commission.

63. MINUSMA trained or raised the awareness of 387 State and non-State actors across the country with regard to several human rights and humanitarian law-related themes, with a view to enhancing compliance with relevant international standards and improving the human rights situation.

## V. Humanitarian situation

64. The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate, owing to intercommunal conflict and tensions. The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance increased from 5.9 million in 2021 to 7.5 million during the reporting period. More than 960,000 children under five years of age are at risk of acute malnutrition.

65. However, the number of internally displaced persons decreased from more than 400,000 in October 2021 to 350,000 on 31 December 2021. The Government of Mali indicated that approximately 50,000 internally displaced persons had returned home because of improved security conditions, mainly in the Gao region, with 49 per cent of the reported returnees, notably in the *cercles* of Gao, Ansongo, Bourem and Almostrate. The situation, however, remained fluid, with recent population displacement in parts of the Timbuktu, Gao, Douentza and Mopti regions linked to the ongoing operations by the Malian Armed Forces.

66. ECOWAS sanctions have resulted in delays in the delivery of food and non-food goods through the port of Dakar, increased prices for food and non-food items in Mali and challenges in implementing the national response plan, owing to the freezing of assets and the cessation of budgetary aid from some donors. Also worth noting were the difficulties in repatriating Malian migrants stranded in transit centres located in the ECOWAS region and non-Malian migrants stranded in Mali.

## VI. Socioeconomic development

67. Despite the health, sociopolitical, security and humanitarian crises, the economy grew by 4.2 per cent in 2021, driven by household consumption and exports. However, inequality remained high, and the World Bank estimates that 42.7 per cent of the population live in extreme poverty. Further to the economic and financial sanctions against the country, Mali defaulted on the payment of \$4.7 million in interest to its creditors and missed the deadline of 31 January to repay \$26.1 million. In October 2021, before the adoption of the ECOWAS and WAEMU sanctions, the International Monetary Fund had forecast that the country's gross domestic product would grow by 5.3 per cent in 2022 and inflation by 2.1 per cent. The combination of sanctions and the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic could significantly alter those forecasts, reducing trade, job opportunities, productivity, investment and travel.

68. In support of local communities and in response to the authorities' request for assistance from MINUSMA, 42 quick-impact projects were approved during the reporting period, totalling \$1.6 million. Quick-impact projects have been used to provide small infrastructure and basic services to vulnerable populations, with a focus on agriculture, renewable energy, social cohesion, conflict resolution, the rule of law and support for local authorities and security forces. In total, 31 per cent of quick-impact projects (13) was targeted at the centre and 69 per cent (29) at the north. Three new projects, for a total of \$1.4 million were also approved under the trust fund in support of peace and security in Mali. Those projects focus on increasing access to drinking water to the Gao region populations, support for stabilization efforts in Koro cercle (central Mali) and support for the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission to assist in redeploying 466 reconstituted army forces in Gao, as well as on providing fuel to four reconstituted Malian Armed Forces battalions in Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka. Overall, 69 trust fund projects and 160 quick-impact projects were ongoing during the reporting period.

69. The Peacebuilding Fund invested \$8.4 million in six new initiatives targeting young people, women, agricultural self-employment, electoral violence and local peace initiatives to enhance compliance with relevant international standards and improve the human rights situation. As part of the development of the Peacebuilding Fund portfolio in 2022, three cross-border initiatives were approved to support communities in the border areas of Mali with Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal.

## VII. External communications

70. To highlight its positive impact in the country and promote social cohesion and reconciliation through dialogue, MINUSMA disseminated key information through storytelling and radio productions in various languages and direct live interventions by the population through call-ins and testimonies. These activities helped to tackle disinformation and improve the understanding of the Mission's mandate.

71. MINUSMA also relied on cultural activities to promote peace, strengthen social cohesion and reconciliation and foster a better understanding of its mandate and

activities. In that regard, it actively participated in the Ségou art festival, one of the most important and widely covered musical and cultural events in the country, financing a quick-impact project worth almost \$25,000 to support the “Caravan of Cultural Diversity”, a Sahelo-trans-Saharan project supporting peace, tolerance and solidarity and producing more than 10 radio and multimedia programmes with interviews and radio shows and features. With the same aim, the Mission also financed the international film festival entitled “Les écrans de Tombouctou” (The Screens of Timbuktu), the first of its kind in Mali. In support of other initiatives to promote peace and social cohesion, MINUSMA publicized and disseminated messages through news articles, radio programmes and news and multimedia products for the “Desert Festival” (Timbuktu), an event that encourages year-round dialogue, cultural exchanges and environmental protection promoting peace, social cohesion, reconciliation and artistic exchanges; the “Ag’Na Festival” in the Koulikoro region, through six one-hour-long radio programmes dedicated to its artists and their message; several interactive programmes with call-ins; and the “Fofu Festival” in Gao, covering the lectures and discussions dedicated to the restoration of peace, social cohesion and living together among the communities in the region.

72. MINUSMA supported other cultural or social events, such as the community-based “Tea in the Grin” involving local leaders and members of the communities, as well as the “Living Together Festival” in Timbuktu, or film showings in the capital and the regions, followed by debates and press events promoting the films.

## VIII. Capacities of the Mission

73. Although the United Nations is not subject to the ECOWAS sanctions, the closure of borders has had an impact on the MINUSMA operations. Most cargos, except for trucks carrying rations and fuel, have been stopped at the borders of Mali with the ECOWAS member States. MINUSMA is facing significant bureaucratic challenges in importing supplies, contingent-owned equipment and critical spare parts that are held at the port in Dakar. In total, 77 containers were held in Benin, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Togo.

74. The announcement by the Malian authorities on 12 January of a change in the modalities for approving standard flight permits and authorizations for MINUSMA air assets operating in Mali led to the suspension of all MINUSMA flights from 14 to 20 January, except for casualty and medical evacuations. Following discussions between MINUSMA and the Malian authorities, an agreement on the modalities for obtaining flight authorizations was reached, and MINUSMA air operations, including passenger transport, advance reconnaissance for patrols, critical self-sustainment convoys and overflight surveillance, resumed on 21 January.

### 1. Military

75. As at 15 March, 12,266 military personnel had been deployed (corresponding to 92.3 per cent of the authorized strength of 13,286 personnel), comprising 520 staff officers and 11,746 contingent personnel.

### 2. Police

76. As at 15 March, 1,720 police personnel had been deployed (corresponding to 90 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,920 personnel), comprising 278 individual police officers and 1,442 formed police unit personnel. Women accounted for 23.02 per cent of individual police officers and 13.43 per cent of formed police unit personnel. The full deployment of the second Egyptian formed police unit remained hampered by a legal dispute over the contingent-owned equipment, which has been

held in Dakar since January 2020. As a result, only 20 police officers have been deployed.

### **3. Civilian personnel**

77. As at 1 February, United Nations civilian staff numbered 1,828 personnel, corresponding to 93 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,969 positions, comprising 787 international staff, 849 national staff and 192 United Nations Volunteers. Women accounted for 26.04 per cent of civilian staff.

### **4. Safety and security of United Nations personnel**

78. Given the deteriorating security environment and uncertain developments, MINUSMA reinforced passive and active protective measures around United Nations premises in Mali, notably in Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Mopti.

79. Owing to the alarming spike in cases in January, protective measures against the COVID-19 pandemic were upheld, including physical distancing, the wearing of masks inside the camps, the airing of rooms, the disinfection of office space when positive cases were reported and alternate working arrangements to reconcile the maintenance of operational capacities and a reduction of staff exposure.

80. A total of 154 MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed as a result of malicious acts since the Mission was established. During the reporting period, the Board of Inquiry completed 33 reports on seven fatalities and 31 serious injuries among mission personnel, of which 16 were the result of hostile actions against MINUSMA.

### **5. Conduct and discipline**

81. One allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse was recorded during the reporting period, and assistance was delivered to victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. MINUSMA continued to implement its strategy to prevent misconduct, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse, through induction and refresher training delivered to all categories of personnel. The Mission also continued to conduct outreach activities, including awareness-raising for the local population.

### **6. Environmental issues**

82. As part of its move towards meeting renewable energy sourcing targets, hybrid solar and generator systems were being installed in Aguelhok and Tessalit.

## **IX. Observations**

83. While considerable efforts have been made over the past decade, with tremendous international support, the crisis has unfortunately grown in complexity, both on the security and governance fronts. The people of Mali have suffered greatly, and the situation has generated frustration with the limited results that have been achieved and a strong yearning for lasting solutions. The sentiments expressed during the national dialogue epitomized those sentiments, with its recommendations calling for a strong and accountable State capable of delivering for the common good. The United Nations, working with other members of the international community, remains at the disposal of Malian stakeholders to support them towards the realization of their aspirations for a better future.

84. However, for the reforms articulated during the national dialogue to be realized and sustained, consensus among the political stakeholders of Mali is needed, as their implementation will span well beyond the transition period. Responsibility for the

implementation of the majority of these reforms would fall to an elected Government, which would be best placed to mobilize the full support of the international community, including countries of the region. In this regard, it is important that the transitional authorities, while setting the foundations for the country's long-term stability, prioritize those reforms that are directly linked to the holding of elections. Time is of the essence, and Mali has already missed a key milestone on its path to a return to peace and stability. The end of February was scheduled to mark the country's return to constitutional rule. Unfortunately, that objective was not achieved, which has, among other things, led to ECOWAS adopting a set of measures, with the support of the African Union, with the stated aim of expediting the process.

85. In this context, I welcome the ongoing dialogue between Mali and ECOWAS, with the support of the local follow-up committee, to reach consensus on an acceptable electoral timetable. Such consensus will pave the way for lifting the sanctions against Mali, thus avoiding any further negative impact on the population, while also helping to normalize the relations of Mali with its neighbours. I commend ECOWAS for its efforts to overcome the current political impasse and I pledge the commitment of the United Nations to continuing to work in coordination with the subregional organization and the African Union to facilitate a return to constitutional rule within a reasonable time frame that responds to the aspirations of the Malian people and respects the African Union and ECOWAS principles. Given the numerous challenges that Mali faces, the holding of elections will require not only a strong commitment by the Malian authorities and other stakeholders, but also the mobilization of adequate international support. In this regard, I call upon the partners of Mali to stay the course.

86. As they aim to help Mali to expedite its return to constitutional order, international partners should not lose sight of the fact that the long-lasting stabilization of Mali is also contingent upon the successful completion of other processes. Chief among those is the full implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. In this respect, I note that progress has been frustratingly slow, and it is unfortunate that the parties were unable to take advantage of the outcome of the latest meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, in October 2021, to advance on outstanding issues. I urge the signatory parties to refrain from any pronouncements and actions that are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Agreement. Swift progress is needed in the accelerated and global disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the full deployment and operationalization of the reconstituted army battalions, institutional reforms and sustained investment in the development of the northern regions. The parties should build on the call emanating from the national dialogue for the acceleration of the implementation of the Agreement and on the synergies that exist between many of its provisions and the long-term vision for a stable and peaceful Mali, as expressed during the dialogue.

87. I commend the International Mediation under the leadership of Algeria for its efforts and underscore the need for the Mediation to make full use of the powers granted to it both under the Agreement and the Pact for Peace in Mali of 2018 to ensure that the commitments made are honoured and to help to steer the process towards sustainable peace. The Agreement remains the best framework for achieving lasting peace in northern Mali and fostering stability in the region. To this end, I call upon international actors more broadly to sustain their engagement in support of that process.

88. Regarding the situation in the centre, I take note of the ongoing work of national authorities to finalize a comprehensive politically led strategy to address the multifaceted crisis that the region faces, for military efforts alone will not be sufficient to achieve the objectives that have been set. In this regard, I look forward to the finalization of the strategy, which will not only facilitate a better coordinated and

more coherent Malian response but also help to guide international support and ensure that it is aligned with Malian priorities. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team will continue to support that effort.

89. I am concerned by the increasingly precarious human rights situation in parts of the country and the impact of the violations to which the population has been subjected. No effort should be spared to investigate and bring perpetrators to justice swiftly. In this regard, I underscore the responsibility of the State to do all it can to foster accountability and ensure that its military operations, including those conducted with its bilateral partners, are conducted in compliance with its international obligations. This is not only a matter of compliance with obligations under international law but also an operational necessity: the fight against terrorism can only be successful if conducted in a manner that elicits the support of local populations. The Mission is committed to continuing to work closely with national authorities both in the ongoing training of military and security personnel on human rights issues and in supporting investigations into allegations of human rights violations and abuses.

90. As highlighted in the present report, the reporting period was characterized by heightened tensions between Mali and some of its partners, which culminated in the decision to withdraw Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force from Malian territory. This withdrawal will undoubtedly create a security gap, with implications for MINUSMA. There are capabilities that will no longer be available to the Mission. MINUSMA is taking steps to adapt, from reviewing camp security in locations shared with the withdrawing international forces to enhancing its situational awareness and capacity to defend itself when attacked. I also renew my call to all Member States to continue to support the Mission's force adaptation plan and actively contribute to the generation of outstanding air assets and other capabilities, which are critical to ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and installations and a more effective implementation of the Mission's mandate to protect civilians. In this regard, I also stress the importance of the trust fund in support of peace and security in Mali as a critical component of the ongoing stabilization efforts.

91. I would like to underscore that MINUSMA is not only contributing to the stability of Mali but also to that of the region as a whole. Any progress made in Mali will have a positive impact in the rest of the region, especially given the interconnection of the security and governance challenges confronting the Sahel and the geographical centrality of Mali.

92. The United Nations country team will continue its efforts to address development and humanitarian issues in Mali. I reiterate my call to donors to respond more generously to the humanitarian appeal for Mali. I note with concern that, for 2021, the humanitarian response plan had received only \$215.8 million of the requested \$563.3 million, or 38.3 per cent.

93. I wish to extend my gratitude to the MINUSMA leadership and the Mission's civilian and uniformed personnel for their tireless efforts and commitment to implementing the Mission's mandate in a most challenging security environment. I extend my gratitude to ECOWAS and the African Union for their continued close collaboration with the United Nations in the pursuit of lasting peace and stability in Mali.

## Annex I

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization  
Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at  
15 March 2022**

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Armenia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Australia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Austria	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	1 078	45	1 123	1	–	1	221	59	280	222	59	281
Belgium	7	3	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Benin	231	28	259	24	–	24	128	8	136	152	8	160
Bhutan	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia and Herzegovina	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	635	23	658	11	18	29	131	9	140	142	27	169
Burundi	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cambodia	267	26	293	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	1	1	2	8	1	9	–	–	–	8	1	9
Canada	4	2	6	8	7	15	–	–	–	8	7	15
Chad	1 349	41	1 390	13	2	15	–	–	–	13	2	15
China	397	24	421	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	830	29	859	20	3	23	–	–	–	20	3	23
Czechia	4	1	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Egypt	1 064	4	1 068	5	–	5	145	14	159	150	14	164
El Salvador	156	20	176	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland	4	–	4	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
France	27	2	29	13	1	14	–	–	–	13	1	14
Gambia	5	1	6	7	2	9	–	–	–	7	2	9
Germany	548	34	582	2	1	3	–	–	–	2	1	3
Ghana	127	19	146	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Guatemala	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Guinea	619	50	669	6	4	10	–	–	–	6	4	10
Indonesia	9	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ireland	12	–	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	2	–	2	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Jordan	334	–	334	5	–	5	–	–	–	5	–	5

Country	Military			Police								
	Experts on mission, staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Kenya	9	–	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	145	16	161	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	42	3	45	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mauritania	5	1	6	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mexico	4	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal	168	8	176	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	75	5	80	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Niger	870	6	876	24	7	31	–	–	–	24	7	31
Nigeria	61	17	78	2	4	6	104	36	140	106	40	146
Norway	12	1	13	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Pakistan	203	15	218	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	2	–	2	2	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	2
Romania	2	3	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Senegal	931	37	968	17	5	22	276	34	310	293	39	332
Sierra Leone	14	3	17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Spain	1	–	1	1	1	2	–	–	–	1	1	2
Sri Lanka	243	–	243	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	168	10	178	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Switzerland	7	–	7	4	1	5	–	–	–	4	1	5
Togo	684	50	734	13	4	17	243	34	277	256	38	294
Tunisia	82	6	88	15	2	17	–	–	–	15	2	17
Turkey	–	–	–	4	1	5	–	–	–	4	1	5
Ukraine	11	1	12	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	234	22	256	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United States of America	8	–	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Zambia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>11 709</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>12 266</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>1 248</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>1 442</b>	<b>1 462</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>1 720</b>

# Annex II

