



Security Council

Distr.: General
20 December 2019

Original: English

Letter dated 20 December 2019 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution [2478 \(2019\)](#), have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 4 of that resolution, the midterm report on their work.

The enclosed report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1533 \(2004\)](#) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 22 November 2019 and was considered by the Committee on 2 December 2019.

The Group would appreciate the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) David **Zounmenou**
Coordinator, Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo

(Signed) Nelson **Alusala**
Expert

(Signed) Raymond **Debelle**
Expert

(Signed) Virginie **Monchy**
Expert

(Signed) Emmanuel **Ngueyanouba**
Expert

(Signed) Sophia **Pickles**
Expert



Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Summary

During the period under review, a new Government was appointed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Group) has begun to establish working relations with the new authorities at the local, provincial and national levels.

The Group notes that, since the outset of its mandate, there have been increased armed clashes between the armed groups Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) and the Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (CMC) in Masisi and Rutshuru territories, North Kivu Province. NDC-R continued to recruit and expand while its leader, sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwiswa (permanent reference number CDi.033 on the sanctions list of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo), remained at large and subject to a Congolese arrest warrant. NDC-R continued to receive arms and ammunition from some members of the armed forces, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC).

The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) remained a serious threat to peace and stability in Beni and Irumu territories and continued to attack civilians and FARDC positions. ADF came under pressure following the launch, on 30 October 2019, of FARDC operations against its stronghold. Although Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) had publicly claimed responsibility for several attacks carried out in Beni territory, the Group was unable to confirm any direct link between ISIL and ADF at the time of writing the present report.

In Minembwe, South Kivu Province, a Mai-Mai armed group coalition led by Mai-Mai Yakutumba affiliated with Babembe, Bafuliru, Bavira and Banyindu communities clashed with Ngomino and Twigwaneho armed groups affiliated with the Banyamulenge community. The Group continued to document the activities of the armed group Résistance pour un État de droit (RED)-Tabara in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Group found that, since 10 June 2019, multiple attacks had predominantly targeted the Hema population of Djugu territory, Ituri Province. The Group established that Lendu militias had carried out these attacks, although it remained obscure how many militias there were and how they were structured and organized. Some members of the Congolese security forces who have been deployed in Djugu territory to protect the population from these attacks also committed exactions against the population.

On natural resources, preliminary findings indicated that armed groups including NDC-R, Mai-Mai Yakutumba and Nyatura factions, criminal networks and some members of the Congolese security forces were involved in the illicit production of and trade in minerals, in some cases facilitated by financial networks. The Group further notes that new gold refineries have been established within States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and that one was planned in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Group observed potential violations of the arms embargo and non-compliance on the part of supplier States with the requirement to notify to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) in advance of the delivery of arms, related military equipment and provision of training.

Sanctioned individual Sylvestre Mudacumura (CDi.012), also known as Mupenzi Bernard or Pharaon de Poeto, commander of the Forces combattantes abacunguzi, was killed on 18 September 2019.

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	5
II. Armed groups	6
A. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové	6
B. Allied Democratic Forces	8
C. Résistance pour un état de droit-Tabara	9
D. Crisis in Minembwe	9
III. Natural resources and finances	10
A. Gold	10
B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten	11
C. Illegal involvement of some members of the Congolese armed forces	12
D. Regional developments	12
IV. Arms	14
A. Failure to notify	15
B. Violations of the arms embargo	15
V. Serious violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law in Djugu Territory ..	17
A. Attacks by Lendu militias	17
B. Attacks by members of the Congolese security forces	19
VI. Recommendations	20
Annexes*	22

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

1. The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Group), whose mandate was extended to 1 August 2020 by Security Council resolution 2478 (2019) of 26 June 2019, were appointed by the Secretary-General on 29 July 2019 (see S/2019/607). The Group began its mandate with a visit to New York from 25 to 30 August 2019 and conducted field investigations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in September and October 2019.

2. In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 8 of its resolution 2360 (2017), and as reaffirmed in resolution 2478 (2019), the Group continued to exchange information with the panels of experts on the Central African Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Somalia and South Sudan.

Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

3. The Group expresses its appreciation for the valuable support and collaboration received from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) during the period under review.

Compliance with the Group's requests for information

4. Following its appointment, the Group addressed 63 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities. At the time of concluding the present report, the Group had received only 21 responses. The Group notes that several scheduled visits to Member States located in the region could not take place. The Group underlines that the lack of timely cooperation from Member States undermines its ability to fulfil its mandate. The Group acknowledges receipt, on 15 October 2019, of the requested copy of the report of an investigation conducted by police in Uganda on gold smuggling (see S/2019/469, para. 184).

Methodology

5. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. Wherever that was not possible, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent and reliable sources.

6. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are few documents that provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, command responsibility for grave human rights abuses and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony given by members of local communities, former combatants and current members of armed groups. The Group has also considered expert testimony given by government officials and military officers of countries in the Great Lakes region and other countries, as well as by United Nations sources.

7. The present report covers investigations conducted up to and including 13 November 2019. Investigations relevant to the Group's mandate that occurred after that date will be reflected in the final report.

Update on sanctioned individuals

8. In the early hours of 18 September 2019, sanctioned individual "general" Sylvestre Mudacumura (permanent reference number CDi.012 on the sanctions list of

the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo), also known as Mupenzi Bernard or Pharaon de Poeto, commander of the Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FOCA),¹ and Sixbert Ndajambaje, also known as Soso, chief of staff of the president of FDLR, were killed during a military operation claimed by Congolese armed forces, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The operation was conducted while the FDLR steering committee was holding a meeting.

Correction of the 2017 final report of the Group

9. In paragraph 108 of its final report of August 2017 (S/2017/672/Rev.1, para. 108), the Group reported as follows: “In October 2016, customs agents in Dubai found 150 kg of undeclared gold in [Ms. Elysée Kanini Chibalonza’s] luggage”. The weight of the exported gold had been recorded as 150 kilograms in an official customs document in Arabic dated 14 September 2015 provided by the United Arab Emirates to the Group on 7 April 2016 (S/2017/672/Rev.1, annex 42).

10. However, based on a second document, an unofficial English translation provided to the Group by the United Arab Emirates after the final report had been published, the Group notes that the correct weight of the gold was 150 grams and the date of the seizure by customs agents in Dubai was 14 September 2015.

II. Armed groups

A. Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové

11. The Group has found that the armed group Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové (NDC-R) has remained active in North Kivu and has continued to recruit and expand. NDC-R engaged in fighting with the Collectif des mouvements pour le changement (CMC) comprised of Nyatura factions, the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS) and FDLR-FOCA in Masisi and Rutshuru territories.

Leadership

12. Sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwissa (CDi.033) remained the leader of NDC-R (see S/2019/469, para. 53). On 7 June 2019, the Office of the Military Prosecutor of North Kivu issued a warrant for Guidon’s arrest (see annex 2). However, the Group notes that the Congolese authorities have not acted on it. During 2019, NDC-R maintained its headquarters in Pinga, Walikale Territory, North Kivu Province, and coexisted alongside FARDC (see S/2019/469, paras. 58–62). The Group documented instances of weapons and ammunition being transferred from certain FARDC officers to NDC-R (see paras. 66–73 of the present report). However, high-ranking NDC-R political leaders in Kalembe, Masisi Territory, North Kivu Province, confirmed that Guidon had not attended FARDC security meetings since the issuance of the warrant.

13. NDC-R sources informed the Group that Guidon had appointed Désiré Ngabo Kisuba as spokesperson to replace Charité Bisapo (see S/2018/531, annex, para. 73, and annex 3 to the present report), the former head of external affairs, who had been based in Pinga.

14. On 7 September 2019, NDC-R appointed “colonel” Jean Lomingo Kamala as commander of a new unit named the 114th brigade. According to one NDC-R

¹ Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FOCA) is the military branch of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

combatant, the brigade comprised some 250 new combatants deployed in the Kalembe area and was comprised of two battalions. As of 30 October 2019, the brigade was fighting with the coalition of CMC, APCLS and FDLR.

Recruitment and training

15. The Group found that, based on a video it obtained and that has been corroborated by interviews with three NDC-R sources from Kalembe and several civil society representatives, on 7 September 2019, Guidon presided over a graduation ceremony in Pinga for 250 new combatants.

16. The recruits in question were trained near Pinga from early July to September 2019. Three NDC-R sources informed the Group that the new recruits were mostly defectors from Nyatura factions² and speakers of Kinyarwanda who were familiar with the local terrain and able to interact with local communities. Some Nyanga and Hunde community leaders from Pinga also contributed to their recruitment by conducting a youth-oriented campaign aimed at encouraging potential recruits to defend the lands of their community. Moreover, two former NDC-R officers have stated that civilians had decided to join the movement in order to exempt their families from taxation.

17. One source familiar with NDC-R told the Group that NDC-R trainers included FARDC defectors and ex-combatants who had transited from various disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration camps to FARDC training centres at Kamina in Haut-Lomami Province and Kitona in Kongo Central Province. The trainers provided recruits with basic military training and information on international humanitarian law.

Taxation

18. NDC-R continued to levy taxes on the population as a means of raising funds (see S/2019/469, para. 148). Villagers were being forced to pay the movement 1,000 Congolese francs monthly per adult. In Kitchanga and Kalembe, the Group witnessed people carrying so-called tokens (*jetons*) issued as proof that they had paid the tax (see S/2019/469, para. 190, and annex 4 to the present report). The Group was also informed that truck drivers were being taxed 30,000 Congolese francs to 40,000 Congolese francs at NDC-R checkpoints. Other taxes applied to timber and charcoal dealers. Charcoal dealers were being taxed three bags of charcoal or \$20 per truckload. Failure to pay resulted in punishments including fines, arrest and beatings. In addition, forced labour (*salongo*) continued to be imposed on the population as their contribution to the movement (see S/2018/531, para. 87).

Expansion into Rutshuru and Masisi territories

19. NDC-R maintained its control over the territories of Masisi, Rutshuru and Lubero (see S/2019/469, para. 53). The Group obtained information from a source close to CMC/Forces de défense du peuple (CMC/FDP), confirmed by civil society actors and one NDC-R member, that since 30 October 2019, NDC-R had taken control of several villages in Rutshuru territory following continuous attacks against CMC/FDP. The villages included Katsiru, Kiyeye, Kitunda, Maziza, JTN, Kayangare and Mbuihi at the time of writing. The Group confirmed that on 7 November 2019, NDC-R defeated CMC/FDP combatants and had regained control over Mweso, a major economic crossroads in Masisi Territory.

² Some elements originated from the former John Love Nyatura faction, others from Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS).

B. Allied Democratic Forces

20. The Group found that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) remained a threat to peace and security in Beni Territory, North Kivu Province, and to the south of Ituri Province. Although Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) publicly claimed that some attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that had been attributed to ADF had actually been carried out by ISIL, the Group was not able to confirm any direct link between ISIL and ADF at the time of writing the present report. The Group spoke with a number of ex-combatants recently captured by FARDC as well as with MONUSCO, national police and civil society sources.

Leadership and locations

21. The Group notes that no major changes have occurred in the ADF leadership since its final report of June 2019 (see [S/2019/469](#), paras. 21–26). Two ADF ex-combatants and two military intelligence sources confirmed that Seka Musa Baluku remained the overall leader of the movement, while Lukwago Rashid Swaibu Hood, also known as “Mzee Meya Pierro” or “Pierro”, remained in place as the military commander (see also [S/2019/469](#), para. 26, and annex 5 to the present report).

22. ADF positions remained largely stable (see also [S/2019/469](#), paras. 16–19). Several ADF ex-combatants and FARDC confirmed to the Group that, since the September 2019 announcement of FARDC military operations, ADF leaders had begun to move materiel and combatants from some camps, including Mayangose and Kididiwe, to Kajaju, Whisper and Bango in the Madina complex (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 17). They informed the Group that some combatants had moved towards Mamove, west of Oicha, while children and the elderly had been transferred northwards from Mwalika camp. Around 20 combatants were left in the smaller camps with a few AK-pattern assault rifles.

Incursions into Boga and Chabi

23. The Group was informed that at least two ADF incursions into Ituri Province occurred. In August 2019, ADF combatants crossed into the south of Irumu Territory and attacked villages in Boga following a May 2019 incursion into Chabi. Three former ADF combatants who took part in the August raid confirmed that ADF was seeking food and medical supplies. They added that ADF had taken approximately 100 hostages and forced them to carry looted goods. Some were detained at the Mwalika camp, while others were released after paying ransom. ADF ex-combatants as well as MONUSCO and FARDC sources told the Group that while there were no ADF camps in South Irumu, some ADF members might have transferred dependants to the area.

Recruitment and training

24. ADF ex-combatants, civil society actors, FARDC and national police sources told the Group that since July 2019, the ADF recruiting network had faced difficulties. ADF ex-combatants recalled that in the last three months, no more than 15 new recruits arrived, whereas in the past, the network had been able to deliver close to 100 to 200 new combatants in the same amount of time. Two FARDC officers and one ex-combatant who spent 10 years with ADF and escaped the movement in July 2019 told the Group that ADF recruiters targeted relatives in Uganda. According to the same sources, ADF leaders had travelled to Uganda in June 2019 to set up new recruitment networks. Many sources indicated that the recruitment of foreigners had continued, albeit in small numbers. The Group notes that ADF continued to use false job promises to lure new recruits into its ranks. ADF also continued to use threats and

intimidation to dissuade recruits from leaving the camps. New recruits were systematically subjected to Qur'anic teaching (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 37).

Possible links between the Allied Democratic Forces and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

25. At the time of writing the present report, the Group had not found any direct links between ADF and ISIL, as claimed by ISIL, such as would be indicated by the use of similar tactics, techniques and weaponry. The modus operandi of the attacks attributed to ADF did not change. Claims made by ISIL did not consistently correspond with attacks on the ground, although a flag similar to the ISIL flag was displayed during ADF training, meetings or combatant parades.

Operations of the Congolese armed forces

26. On 30 October 2019, the Government launched operations against armed groups in North Kivu Province. According to officers, since the beginning of operations, FARDC had gained control of ADF camps including Mayangose, Kididiwe, Vemba, Kadohu, Point 46, Masulukwede, part of Mwalika, Mabeto and Karuhamba, and at least 25 ADF combatants were killed. The Group will continue to monitor the situation.

C. Résistance pour un État de droit-Tabara

27. Since mid-July 2019, Résistance pour un État de droit (RED)-Tabara combatants have moved progressively from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Burundi. On 20 and 22 October 2019, armed elements carried out two armed attacks on Musigati, Bubanza Province, Burundi.

28. A civil society actor in Burundi and three officers of the armed forces of Burundi (Forces de défense nationale – FDN) told the Group that the assailants had targeted military and police positions in Musigati. The Group wrote to the Government of Burundi and looks forward to its response.

29. The Group interviewed local civil society organisations, residents and local workers of non-governmental organizations in South Kivu Province and confirmed that RED-Tabara was still active in the Moyens Plateaux of Uvira, South Kivu (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 84). Sources informed the Group that, in October 2019, RED-Tabara combatants were seen along the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi.

D. Crisis in Minembwe

30. Since September 2019, civilians in Minembwe, Uvira Territory, experienced an upsurge in violence between communities backed by armed groups. A Mai-Mai armed group coalition led by Mai-Mai Yakutumba supported the Babembe, Bafiluru, Bavira and Banyindu communities in clashes against the Banyamulenge community, which was supported by Ngomino and Twigwaneho armed groups.

31. The Group visited Minembwe and spoke with one Twigwaneho combatant, six Banyamulenge leaders and one Ngomino combatant, as well as with six members of the Babembe, Banyindu and Bafiluru communities.

32. The Banyamulenge members reported that since February 2019, the Mai-Mai coalition had targeted their community in the Moyens Plateaux of Uvira and carried

out various attacks during which people were killed, cows were looted and housed were burned down.

33. Members of the Bafuliru, Babembe and Banyindu communities reported that since May 2019, their leaders had been killed by Banyamulenge-affiliated armed groups. There was mass displacement of civilians and destruction of property in the villages around Minembwe. The Group notes with concern the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation and will monitor further developments.

III. Natural resources and finances

34. The Group conducted preliminary investigations into the illegal exploitation and smuggling of tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold and timber (see para. 18) involving armed groups, criminal networks, government officials, and local and foreign individuals and entities. These activities, some of which were supported by international supply chains and financing, contributed to instability and conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.

35. NDC-R, Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Mai-Mai Malaika and Nyatura factions used revenue generated from the production, illegal taxation and the sale of natural resources, including through regional trade, for their survival and, in some cases, for the purchase of arms and ammunition including from members of FARDC, as previously reported by the Group (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 60).

A. Gold

Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové

36. NDC-R taxed artisanal miners in areas under its control and used the proceeds of gold sales to finance its fighters, carry out attacks and purchase weapons and ammunition, in some cases from FARDC members, according to seven sources including senior NDC-R ex-combatants, and consistent with the Group's previous findings (see [S/2019/469](#), paras. 187 and 188, and paras. 66–73 of the present report). Gold mines in areas under NDC-R control included Kasugho in Lubero Territory (see also [S/2018/531](#), paras. 92–93). Coltan mines included Mahanga in Masisi Territory.

37. The Group notes that NDC-R received significant revenue from gold taxation. A former senior NDC-R officer, whose account has been corroborated by two other former NDC-R members, described how gold diggers were being taxed 1,000 Congolese francs to access mine sites and issued tokens (*jetons*) as proof of payment. This system generated more than 30 million Congolese francs (\$18,000) monthly (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 190 and annex 55). NDC-R levied a tax of 10 per cent on large gold finds, which miners paid directly to Guidon. NDC-R also imposed a tax known as "*savon militaire*" ("military soap") on mine site representatives, a contribution to the movement amounting to between 55 g and 60 g of gold monthly. During 2019, between 35 and 40 dredging machines operated by private individuals along the river Ulindi were taxed 10 g to 15 g of gold monthly, according to independent testimony given by three senior NDC-R ex-combatants.

38. A senior NDC-R combatant with first-hand knowledge of the matter and three NDC-R members recounted that gold sales brokered by close relatives of Guidon, who sold to gold buying houses in Goma, also generated cash for the movement. Sales were cash-based and were not usually documented. The Group is aware of two occasions on which senior NDC-R ex-combatants sold gold to buyers in Uganda and one on which they did so in Burundi.

Mai-Mai Yakutumba

39. Nine independent sources confirmed that Mai-Mai Yakutumba derived financial benefits from gold, which is consistent with the Group's previous findings (see [S/2018/531](#), para. 63). Between April and May 2019, Mai-Mai Yakutumba occupied gold mines around Misisi town in South Kivu Province for several weeks. Three Mai-Mai Yakutumba coalition ex-combatants have stated that the movement was taxing gold miners around Misisi, two of whom independently confirmed that the gold was being used to purchase arms.

40. While mining authorities interviewed by the Group in South Kivu expressed the view that Mai-Mai groups had not controlled gold mining sites around Misisi during 2019, the Group established, on the basis of six eyewitness accounts obtained in Misisi and Uvira, that between April and May 2019, Mai-Mai Yakutumba combatants had occupied at least four gold mining sites around Kachanga hill, near Misisi town.

41. In the same period, the armed group occupied one mine for 12 hours and occupied a second for more than two weeks. At both mines, armed men received the gold produced. A digger worked for "hours" for the armed men, handing over his production on three occasions before fleeing. Several armed individuals taxed mine sites from a distance and demanded a share of gold equivalent to "hours" worked, or a part of a mine's production. This practice rendered their involvement more difficult to detect because those responsible were not always physically present at the mines.

42. Gold ore produced at the occupied mines was brought to Misisi centre for crushing and processing, and was sold to established *négociants* operating in the town, according to three miners and two businessmen in Misisi. The Group continues to investigate downstream recipients of this gold.³

Mai-Mai Malaika, led by Sheikh Hassani

43. The Group notes that in Maniema province, combatants of the Mai-Mai Malaika faction, led by Sheikh Hassani, had claimed a part of an industrial gold mining concession at Namoya Mining SA, belonging to Banro Corporation Ltd., to allow artisanal mining based on an agreement that is now being contested, according to documents seen by the Group. Prior to the agreement, in July 2019, Mai-Mai Malaika combatants took four Banro staff members hostage. This and a series of other events led Banro Corporation Ltd. To suspend its operations at four of its entities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Namoya Mining SA, on 24 September 2019 (see annex 6).

B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten

44. In Masisi Territory, two validated mine sites, Kibanda (coltan) and Rubonga (coltan and cassiterite), remained under the control of disputing Nyatura factions and NDC-R combatants. Kibanda and Rubonga had last been validated by the Ministry of Mines in February 2016 and have held "green" status since that time, despite the presence of armed elements, according to an official list of mines validated between 2012 and 2019 (see annex 7 to the present report; see also [S/2018/1133](#), para. 51). A failure to renew the validation of mines every six months, as required by Congolese law, undermines the reliability of validation information as do long delays between qualification missions and issuance of governmental validation decrees (see annex 8).

³ Official production figures for Misisi for the first semester of 2019, seen by the Group, record 5,399.2 g of gold. At the time of writing the present report, 10 mining sites had been validated in Fizi Territory.

45. In September 2019, the Group visited two clandestine depots in the Mabanga and Katindo suburbs of Goma. Two smugglers who had temporarily stored untagged coltan and wolframite there, told the Group that they sold the minerals in Goma or across the border in Gisenyi (Rubavu), Rwanda. Three officials of the Business Federation of the Congo (Fédération des entreprises du Congo – FEC) and two officials of the National Commission on Mining Fraud (Commission nationale de lutte contre la fraude minière – CNLFM) independently informed the Group that increased royalty taxes included in the 2018 revised Congolese Mining Code may have promoted coltan smuggling. FEC wrote to the Minister for Mines requesting a moratorium on the new royalty tax (see annex 9).⁴

46. Two officials of CNLFM, two officers of the mining police (Polimine) and a member of the judiciary informed the Group that smuggling across the border into Rwanda had continued. The Group also independently interviewed two smugglers, who confirmed this information. In Katindo, a smuggler dealing in wolframite showed the Group untagged wolframite stored in bags in varying quantities together with potatoes, and loose wolframite pellets laid out on the ground (see annex 10). The smuggler informed the Group that every week, he obtained wolframite from mines in Masisi territory in bags weighing between 20 kg and 40 kg. The Group notes that mineral trafficking routes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Rwanda remained in place as previously documented (see S/2019/469, paras. 152–156). The Group continues its investigations to establish the identities of other actors in these supply chains.

47. On 12 September 2019, an agreement covering mining and trading activities between the Société minière de Bisunzu (SBM) and the Coopérative des exploitants artisanaux miniers de Masisi (COOPERAMMA) expired. After that, the two parties engaged in negotiations about new trading arrangements (see annex 11). The Group is aware of continued mineral smuggling that undermine the integrity of some coltan supply chains linked to minerals from the Masisi area, as previously reported (see S/2019/469, paras. 153–160; and S/2018/1133, paras. 53–55). The Group continues to investigate.

C. Illegal involvement of some members of the Congolese armed forces

48. The Group acknowledges the efforts made by the Congolese judiciary to prosecute cases involving mineral fraud. However, members of FARDC, including high-ranking officers, benefited directly or indirectly from mineral trading in contravention of Congolese law (see annex 12). Fifteen eyewitnesses, including mining officials, diggers, traders and representatives of civil society, confirmed this trend. The Group is investigating and will document the frequency and scale of such cases. Annex 13 provides four examples.

D. Regional developments

49. The Group is aware of new mineral processing, refining and service provision entities in the area covered by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and notes that those commercial operations that are conducted in adherence to supply chain due diligence laws could add value to and increase the transparency

⁴ See also Democratic Republic of Congo, Law No. 18/001 of 9 March 2018 amending and supplementing the Mining Code, *Official Gazette*, special issue (28 March 2018). Available at https://www.mines-rdc.cd/fr/wp-content/uploads/Code%20minier/J.O._n%C2%B0_spe%C3%ACcial_du_28_mars_2018_CODE_MINIER%20DE%20LA%20RDC.PDF.

of regional mineral trading.⁵ The Group notes that traders and service providers, including those offering brokerage services, have a responsibility to conduct supply chain checks.

50. In July 2019, the Governor of Ituri Province announced plans for a new gold refinery.⁶ In Rwanda, Aldango Entity Ltd., a new gold refinery located in the Kigali Special Economic Zone, officially began exporting in March 2019 (see also S/2019/469, para. 184), and a new tin refinery in Rwanda, LuNa Smelter, started producing in the same period.

51. In Uganda, the Group notes the presence of four gold refining and service provision entities.⁷ These are African Gold Refinery, Bullion Refinery Ltd. and Simba Refinery Ltd. (see S/2018/1133, paras. 97–98) and Metal Testing and Smelting Company Co Ltd. The Group contacted the entities asking for a list of their suppliers and for evidence that they had completed supply chain due diligence checks, including on second-tier suppliers (i.e., their suppliers' suppliers) in order to verify whether the companies were involved directly or indirectly in any sanctionable acts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

52. The Group is aware of efforts by some government authorities in Uganda to improve the transparency of gold refiners and service providers. In a letter dated 24 September 2019 obtained by the Group from multiple sources and addressed to the four companies mentioned above (see annex 14), the Uganda Revenue Authority laid down new reporting requirements, including those regarding supply chain activities and ultimate beneficial ownership information, to be reported to the Commissioner of Customs.

53. Six traders and multiple officials in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces confirmed to the Group that cross-border mineral smuggling, including the smuggling of gold, had continued along established trading routes (see para. 46 of the present report; see also S/2019/469, paras. 178–181). The Group reiterates that regional gold export statistics do not reflect trading on the ground, given the volumes of minerals being smuggled through neighbouring countries (see S/2019/469, para. 183). The Group has not yet received the information from authorities in Uganda about gold production figures for that country, officially requested since May 2019. Trade statistics made public by the URA show that Uganda exported over \$515 million in gold in 2018.⁸ The Group notes that disaggregated export data for coltan, cassiterite and wolframite are published by the National Bank of Rwanda, while gold export figures are not published.⁹

54. The Group notes that the ICGLR database is now in use at the provincial mining offices that the Group visited in South Kivu and Ituri provinces. The Group has copies

⁵ In particular relevant Security Council resolutions, the national law of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and guidelines established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and under the regional certification mechanism of the ICGLR.

⁶ The planned refinery is to be established in partnership with a company named Equinox, which the Group has contacted in writing to establish the terms of the agreement and plans for supply chain due diligence.

⁷ Gold refineries also offer brokerage services in that they refine gold for a fee and help customers to find buyers. The term “service provision” describes such transactions.

⁸ See URA, *Annual Formal Export Trade Statistics (SITC Grouping)* (2019). Available at <https://ura.go.ug/readMore.do?contentId=99900000001443&type=TIMELINE>.

⁹ See National Bank of Rwanda, External Sector Statistics database, available at <https://www.bnr.rw/browse-in/statistics/external-sector-statistics/>. Export statistics available from the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda also do not disaggregate gold exports, see Rwanda, National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, “Formal external trade in goods: first quarter 2019”, June 2019. Available at <http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/formal-external-trade-goods-statistics-report-q1-2019>.

of the 15 ICGLR certificates for legal gold exports to international buyers between 2018 and October 2019 from these provinces.

55. At the same time, cross-border smuggling and attempts to use forged ICGLR certificates continued to undermine the integrity of Congolese and regional supply chains (see [S/2017/1091](#), paras. 50–56). On 20 May 2019, authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo arrested an intermediary in a gold smuggling deal that was accompanied by a forged ICGLR certificate for the export of 18 kg of gold from an unknown mine site in South Kivu Province to CHI Precious Metal Trading in the United Arab Emirates (see annex 15).¹⁰

56. The forged certificate carried the name Andreas Wildt, CEO of CHI Precious Metal Trading. The intermediary in the sale informed the Group that he had met Wildt in Gisenyi, Rwanda, in early March 2019 to plan the sale. Mining authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo confirmed that the ICGLR certificate was indeed fraudulent. The Group wrote to Wildt and CHI Precious Metal Trading and has yet to receive a response. The Group reiterates that proper use of ICGLR certificates and company supply chain due diligence reporting¹¹ is critical to effective regional traceability efforts.

57. The Group has contacted relevant Member States in writing to request information regarding the use of ICGLR certificates at import. Gold importers interviewed by the Group had little awareness of the certificates. On 1 October 2019, Burundi launched its ICGLR certification process for natural resources, in accordance with the 2010 Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (see annex 16).

58. The memorandum of understanding to prevent and detect the smuggling of gold between the United Arab Emirates and the Democratic Republic of the Congo appeared stalled at the time of writing the present report (see [S/2019/469](#), para. 186).

IV. Arms

59. During the first part of its mandate, the Group investigated the delivery of materiel and training to the Congolese security forces by Member States that appear not to have notified the Committee. The Group also continued its efforts to trace materiel that had been trafficked illicitly to armed groups.

60. The Group notes that some of the notifications addressed to the Committee did not contain sufficient details – such as the batch and year of production of the

¹⁰ The Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC), from which CHI Precious Metal Trading operates, has “strongly recommended” members, including those non-accredited to a DMCC accreditation standard, to conduct supply chain checks in line with DMCC Rules for Risk Based Due Diligence in the Gold and Precious Metals Supply Chain.

¹¹ See *Arrêté ministériel no. 0057 CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012 du 29 février 2012 (29 February 2012)*. The Group contacted mining authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to obtain a list of companies that have published supply chain due diligence reports for 2018 and is awaiting a response.

ammunition and the model of the weapons – to allow the Group to effectively monitor the implementation of the arms embargo.¹²

A. Failure to notify

Transfers of materiel and provision of training to Congolese security forces

61. The Group is evaluating the compliance of Member States with the requirement to notify the Committee prior to the shipment of military equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the provision of military training. The Group observed new materiel in the hands of the Congolese security forces that appears not to have been notified to the Committee. The Group notes that, between 2016 and 2018, the Congolese security forces had already been supplied with new materiel (see S/2019/469, paras. 205–208; S/2018/1133, paras. 105–110; S/2018/531, para. 193; S/2016/466, paras. 230–231; S/2015/19, para. 153).

62. The Group was further informed by multiple sources that several Member States have provided training to FARDC. The Group is investigating whether this training was notified in advance of its having been provided.

63. The Group wrote several official letters to the authorities of countries producing and/or exporting documented materiel and/or that have provided training and is awaiting replies.

Foreign registered civilian aircraft providing support to Congolese security forces

64. The Group was informed that on two occasions, on 16 and 19 June 2019, an Ilyushin 76 cargo aircraft with registration number YI-BAT (Iraq) caught fire at Goma airfield (see annex 17). The Group is aware that this aircraft was used to transport military personnel and materiel of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

65. The Group gathered evidence that cargo aircraft belonging to foreign civilian airlines have supported the Congolese security forces by transporting military and police personnel, as well as materiel, since at least January 2013. The Group has sent letters to the cargo companies concerned.

B. Violations of the arms embargo

Diversion of materiel to Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové

66. The Group found that transfer of materiel from FARDC members to NDC-R has continued, which is consistent with previous reports (see S/2019/469, para. 60; S/2018/531, para. 78).

67. The Group has obtained three videos that were recorded between June and July 2019 and late in December 2018 that the Group and a source familiar with NDC-R

¹² The Committee guidelines call for technical specifications of the shipped equipment including the type of the equipment, the name of the items as per the nomenclature used by the manufacturing company, the state of the equipment (newly manufactured or year of manufacture if second-hand equipment), and marking numbers or codes of each shipped item. See Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Guidelines of the Committee for the conduct of its work”, 6 August 2010. Available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1533_committee_guidelines.pdf.

have authenticated. The Group also interviewed 14 present or recently demobilized NDC-R combatants.¹³

68. In the first video, a policeman stationed in Masisi centre asserted that in May 2019, NDC-R combatants spent a day at an FARDC position near the village of Mukohwa, and that on 10 May 2019, FARDC members handed over five boxes of ammunition¹⁴ to NDC-R elements based in Loashi.

69. The policeman also stated that FARDC members and NDC-R combatants jointly operated in pursuit of APCLS combatants in Buabo. The Group believes that this joint operation related to combat that occurred in the second half of May 2019 between NDC-R and APCLS in the Biiri, Bapfuna, Buabo and Banyungu groupements.

70. In a second video, an NDC-R officer explained the prior purchase of military uniforms from FARDC and the future integration of his group's combatants into FARDC (see annex 18).

71. A third video dated 25 December 2018¹⁵ displayed a group of approximately 100 individuals consisting of civilians, some of whom were women, and NDC-R combatants, carrying, among other things, ammunition and weapons prior to the decisive attack on the headquarters of the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD), stationed in Faringa¹⁶ (see S/2019/469, para. 45).

72. The Group confirmed that those named in the video were part of the command and control structure of NDC-R:

- Deputy T1 (administration and finances): “lieutenant-colonel” Eric Kitwana,
- Deputy T3 (operations): Aradjabu Alfani, also known as Alpha,
- Chief T1 headquarters sector: Ragi Hakizumwami,
- Chief T4 headquarters sector (logistics): “colonel” Engulu Mwanabu Georges.

73. The Group observed that at least two 82 mm mortars and one 12.7 mm heavy machine gun were among the materiel delivered to NDC-R in Kashuga (see annexes 19 and 20). The Group is of the opinion that, in addition to being a clear violation of the arms embargo, the transfer of heavy weapons from FARDC to an armed group, in the guise of NDC-R, is particularly concerning, especially given the risk associated with the use of such weapons in an area densely populated with civilians.

Members of the armed forces of Burundi operating in South Kivu Province

74. The presence in the first quarter of 2019 of FDN members in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is referenced in an FARDC document dated April 2019 that was obtained by the Group (see annex 21). A second FARDC document from the same period refers to an operation directed by the intelligence services of Burundi to collect weapons purchased in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by an individual from Uvira linked to those services. The Group reported previously that FDN members had operated in South Kivu Province see S/2019/469, paras. 66–79; S/2017/672/Rev.1, paras. 148–150; S/2015/19, paras. 83–87).

¹³ To protect the source of the information, no indication of the date on which these elements were collected is specified.

¹⁴ This transfer could have involved 3,750 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition.

¹⁵ The comments accompanying this video have been transcribed by the Group.

¹⁶ According to two former NDC-R officers interviewed by the Group, two unsuccessful attacks had been carried out in the days before. This had justified the support in weapons and ammunition needed to lead a decisive effort against the CNRD headquarters. CNRD fighters also told the Group that the attack had involved unprecedented firepower.

Transfer or diversion of materiel to unidentified armed assailants

75. The Group received materiel that had been recovered following the attack carried out against MONUSCO peacekeepers near Dhedja/Kasseli in Djugu Territory, Ituri Province, on 28 July 2019 by unidentified attackers (see para. 83). The materiel consists of a component of a PG7-V rocket and empty 7.62 x 39 mm cartridges. The PG7-V is similar to rockets produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its markings indicate that it was produced in 2018 (see annex 22).

V. Serious violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law in Djugu Territory

76. The Group has found that, since 10 June 2019, multiple attacks targeted predominantly the Hema population of Djugu Territory, Ituri Province. The Group established that Lendu militias were responsible for many of the attacks, although it remained obscure how many militias there were and how they were structured and organised. The killing, maiming, forced displacement, rape, abduction, destruction and looting committed during these attacks constitute sanctionable acts under paragraph 7 (e) of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), as renewed by paragraph 2 of Council resolution 2478 (2019). In parallel, some members of the security forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo deployed in Djugu Territory committed sanctionable acts that included rape, ill-treatment and destruction

77. These findings are based on individual interviews the Group conducted during the reporting period with 90 persons, including 51 internally displaced persons from several communities, local authorities, prisoners, medical staff, representatives of civil society, representatives of humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations, FARDC officers, peacekeepers and staff of MONUSCO, as well as in telephone conversations and messages exchanged with alleged representatives of a Lendu militia, photographs, audio and video recordings, documentary evidence and direct observations by the Group.

A. Attacks by Lendu militias

Patterns of the attacks

78. The mass attacks mainly targeting the Hema population, which started on 10 June 2019, constituted the second wave of violence that occurred in Djugu Territory (see annex 23)¹⁷ since the conflict between the Hema and Lendu communities that occurred from 1999 to 2003 (see S/2018/531, paras. 158–164; and annex 24 to the present report).

79. At least 197 Hema and Alur civilians were killed between 1 June and 20 September 2019, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.¹⁸ Women, men and children, regardless of age, were indiscriminately targeted and brutally killed with bladed weapons and/or by gunshot. The attacks involved systematic and widespread looting, and the destruction and burning of houses, health centres, schools and churches (see annex 25). Hema civilians were routinely abducted to serve as carriers to transport the loot.

¹⁷ All locations mentioned in this section are in Djugu Territory, Ituri Province.

¹⁸ Marta Hurtado, Spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, statement on the Democratic Republic of Congo (Ituri and South Kivu), Geneva, 20 September 2019; <https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25028&LangID=E>.

80. These attacks led to massive displacements of all communities (see annex 26). According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, in October 2019, more than 400,000 people were displaced within Ituri Province or into Uganda.¹⁹ Attackers often threatened to kill Hema civilians if they did not leave their villages and declared that this was “not Hema land, but Lendu land”. Internally displaced members of the Hema community who returned to their villages or fields were often attacked and/or chased away. From September 2019, attacks targeted camps for internally displaced persons at night.

81. Rape, including gang rape, occurred while people were escaping, were being abducted and/or returned to their villages to collect food.²⁰ The Group interviewed six civilians who were raped by Lendu attackers around Wago, Laudjo, Dhendro and Lera between February and September 2019. One recounted that in the course of two days in February 2019, Lendu attackers detained and raped six abducted Hema women, including herself and two girls between 16 and 18 years of age, in their camp near Laudjo.

Perpetrators of the attacks

82. Almost all interviewed Hema witnesses and victims stated that their attackers belonged to the Lendu community, in particular because they had come from Lendu villages and spoke Kilendu.²¹ Many recognized and identified Lendu neighbours as their attackers. For instance, two eyewitnesses recognized a certain Lokana, the chief of Lyio/Lidjo, among the attackers at Tche village on 10 and 11 June 2019. An independent source confirmed that several witnesses and victims had mentioned Lokana’s involvement. One Lendu chief and two Lendu prisoners cited the complicity of certain Lendu personalities with the attackers.

83. Some attackers wore military fatigues and carried firearms, including light machine guns (“SMG” according to witnesses) and AK-47-pattern weapons, while most used machetes, axes, arrows and/or spears. Witnesses and FARDC members observed a few mortars, RPG-7 rocket launchers and PKM machine guns. On 28 July 2019, a MONUSCO peacekeeping patrol was fired at with an RPG-7 (using PG7-V ammunition) while it was rescuing civilians under attack in Dhedja/Kasseli (see para. 75).

84. The similar patterns and simultaneous occurrence of the attacks, and the involvement of attackers from several localities, indicate some level of coordination, organization and planning. One internally displaced member of the Hema community told the Group that, three days prior to the 10 June 2019 attack on Sombuso, Lendu women had warned him that several Lendu chiefs had met in Dhendo to organize the attack.

85. FARDC and the provincial government referred to the Lendu attackers as “the Assailants” and a certain Ngudjolo as their leader,²² and made public his alleged electoral card (see annex 27). Among the eight interviewees who saw Ngudjolo, only

¹⁹ United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Democratic Republic of Congo: humanitarian information note for the provinces of Bas-Uélé, Haut-Uélé, Ituri and Tshopo”, 15 October 2019. Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ochadrc-note_dinformations_humanitaires_bas-uele_haut-uele_ituri_tshopo_20191015.pdf.

²⁰ See also Marta Hurtado, statement on the Democratic Republic of Congo referenced above in footnote 18. Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25028&LangID=E>.

²¹ The Hema and Lendu communities of Djugu Territory speak the same language, but Hema sources mentioned a slight difference in accent and pronunciation.

²² They also mentioned that a sect called CODECO was behind the Lendu militias, but the Group found no conclusive evidence bearing that out (see also S/2018/531, para. 163).

two recognized him as the man in the photograph on the electoral card as Ngudjolo. One stated that Ngudjolo was a different person. They all confirmed that the Ngudjolo they knew was the leader of “the Assailants”.

86. The Group has entered into contact with individuals who said they belonged to Ngudjolo’s movement. According to them, the movement was named “Union des révolutionnaires pour la défense du peuple congolais (URDPC)” and Ngudjolo Mapa Innocent was their leader. The main objective was to fight harassment of the Congolese population by the police and FARDC. That was the movement’s reason for launching attacks against FARDC in Djugu Territory, including on Kparanganza,²³ although the movement claimed that it had not conducted all of them. The individuals denied any involvement of URDPC in attacks against Hema civilians or the abduction of seven Hema civilians in Lokpa/Lichi on 12 September 2019, and instead claimed to have liberated them from their Lendu abductors.

87. They described URDPC as a “self-defence movement” whose structure was not military and comprised 1,853 combatants, all of them Lendu, and under the effective control of Ngudjolo. At the time of drafting the present report, its base was in Loe Groupement next to Jiba, with combatants spread across various locations in Djugu Territory. They possessed 148 AK-47-pattern assault rifles, 5 PKM machine guns, 7 rocket-propelled grenades and 3 mortars acquired in combats with FARDC.

88. A part of this information is consistent with evidence from other sources, in particular where it concerns the motivation for the attacks against FARDC, diversion of weapons and ammunition from FARDC stock, the limited organizational structure of the movement, the spread of troops across locations and their presence close to Jiba. These sources included audio recordings allegedly made by the movement and a directive from “Ngudjolo” addressed to the Lendu population with the reference “MVMT: URRDPC” in the heading (see annex 28).

89. However, the movement’s denial of any involvement in attacks against Hema civilians was contradicted by most of the Group’s sources. In particular, three of the Lokpa/Lichi abductees reported that their Lendu abductors said they had come to the village on Ngudjolo’s instructions. Another source familiar with the abduction confirmed that Ngudjolo had agreed to release the abductees. Two abductees declared that their armed guards in Ngudjolo’s camp had said that members of the movement had attacked the Roe camp for internally displaced persons.²⁴

90. Five independent sources told the Group that several combatants had left the movement when Ngudjolo announced his readiness to cease hostilities under certain conditions (see annex 29), because they wanted to continue fighting, and that Ngudjolo had sent representatives to convene resisting combatants.

Impact on the Lendu population

91. Based on eight independent sources, the Group found that the Lendu militias forced the Lendu population to financially contribute to the war effort in several areas, including Ndr’li, Andri, Ndjalo and Jiba, through the payment of taxes or percentages on goods (see annex 30).

92. Lendu civilians unresponsive of the militias risked retaliation. One Lendu chief admitted the existence of reprisals and of risks for any Lendu civilian who denounced “the Assailants”. Another Lendu source said “neutral” behaviour was essential. Seven sources explained that a Lendu priest was abducted from Jiba from 4 to 7 June 2019

²³ According to MONUSCO, on 13 October 2019, two FARDC positions in Kparanganza were attacked with rocket launchers, machine guns and bladed weapons, at least two FARDC members and one civilian killed and FARDC weapons and ammunition seized.

²⁴ One woman and one girl were killed during that attack on 18 September 2019.

because of his opposition to the movement. Two sources confirmed that the Lendu population was caught between the militias and FARDC.

B. Attacks by members of the Congolese security forces

93. The Group found that members of the Congolese security forces deployed in Djugu Territory abused the civilian population.

Burning of Lendu houses

94. Many independent sources stated that Congolese security forces deployed in Djugu Territory considered the entire Lendu population as “the Assailants”. One high-ranking FARDC officer professed to the Group that “every Lendu community supports the Assailants”, and another that the Lendu are “really lazy”.

95. According to seven sources, including four eyewitnesses, troops of the 3201st FARDC regiment troops in Jiba and Ngudjolo’s combatants engaged in combat in Jiba in July 2019. The eyewitnesses saw FARDC burning and destroying about 25 houses, which forced the population to flee the village (see annex 31). Two eyewitnesses reported that there had been no fighting when FARDC burnt the houses. One of these two eyewitnesses and another stated that the burning was a reprisal for the killing of an FARDC soldier or scout.

Rape

96. Based on the testimonies of six Hema and Mambisa women, the Group found that some members of the Congolese security forces deployed in Djugu Territory had committed rape in Rule, Largu, Blukwa, and Liko, as well as around Djugu centre, between April and October 2019. The rape victims identified their attackers based on their uniforms, ethnicity and languages (Lingala and Swahili).

97. One rape victim explained that all women in Largu had taken to sleeping away from their houses for fear of rape by FARDC members. On one night in June 2019, FARDC members speaking Lingala raped her and at least 10 other women around Largu. The source was raped by two soldiers. The FARDC 1301st regiment was deployed in Largu at that time. A victim raped in Blukwa, close to Largu, stated that whenever FARDC soldiers entered a house, it was to rape or to loot.

98. Six sources mentioned rape cases of Lendu women by FARDC members, but the Group could not gain access the victims.

Mistreatment of prisoners

99. Six Lendu and Alur prisoners told the Group that Congolese security forces had seriously mistreated them following their arrest at several locations in Djugu Territory from June 2019, as well as during the first days of detention (see annex 32).

100. The Group welcomes steps taken by FARDC and the Lendu community to improve relations (see annex 33), and by the military justice system to investigate crimes in Djugu Territory, including by FARDC members.

VI. Recommendations

101. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.

Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

102. The Group recommends that the Government:

(a) Execute the arrest warrant issued on 7 June 2019 against sanctioned individual Guidon Shimiray Mwisso (CDi.033) by the North Kivu Military Prosecutor's Office (see para. 12);

(b) Take urgent action to prevent FARDC members from providing any further support to NDC-R (see paras. 12 and 66–73);

(c) Take all necessary measures to protect the civilian population of Djugu Territory, in compliance with international human rights and international humanitarian law standards, regardless of community membership. This includes ensuring that communities are not collectively punished for the actions of certain individuals or groups (see paras. 76–100);

(d) Continue to investigate and prosecute, as appropriate, individuals, including FARDC members, responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and/or human rights law in Djugu Territory in proceedings that fully guarantee fair trial rights, regardless of community membership (see paras. 76–100);

(e) Establish a high-level inter-agency mechanism in the country's administration to investigate any loss or theft of weapons, ammunition and associated materiel in support of legal proceedings and provide the necessary recommendations to effectively secure the materiel (see paras. 66–73).

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

103. The Group recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

(a) Encourage Uganda to adopt legislation in line with the 2010 Lusaka Declaration implementing the compulsory use of ICGLR certificates (see paras. 55–57);

(b) Request Member States to provide, in their arms embargo notifications to the Committee, all relevant technical specifications of the shipped equipment outlined in the Committee guidelines, including the type of the equipment; the name of the items following the nomenclature used by the manufacturing company; the state of the equipment (newly manufactured or, if second-hand equipment, year of manufacture); and marking numbers or codes of each shipped item (see para. 60).

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

104. The Group recommends that ICGLR encourage its Member States to enforce the requirements of the regional chain of custody and due diligence standards for companies, including brokers and service providers, operating in the minerals sector (see paras. 51–52 and 55–57).

Annexes

Annex 1

Organizations and entities the Group officially met with during its mandate

Organisations et entités que le Groupe a officiellement rencontré durant son mandat

GREAT LAKES REGION

REGION DES GRANDS LACS

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Government

Agence nationale de renseignement (ANR)

Auditorat militaire

Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification (CEEC)

Commission nationale de lutte contre la fraude minière (CNLFM)

Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC)

Ministère des mines, Secrétariat général

Service d'assistance et d'encadrement de l'exploitation minière artisanale et à petite échelle (SAEMAPE)

Organizations

Embassy of Belgium

Embassy of United Kingdom

Embassy of France

Embassy of the United States

Embassy of the Netherlands

Embassy of the Republic of Korea

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

United Nations Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO)

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

OUTSIDE THE GREAT LAKES REGION

United Kingdom

Government

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

HM Treasury

United States of America

Organizations

United Nations Department of Safety and Security

United Nations Department of Peace Operations

Annex 2

Congolese arrest warrant dated 7 June 2019 against Shimirayi Mwishu Guidon

Mandat d'arrêt du 7 juin 2017 contre Shimirayi Mwishu Guidon

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
JUSTICE MILITAIRE

AUDITORAT MILITAIRE SUPERIEUR PRES
LA COUR MILITAIRE OPERATIONNELLE
DU NORD-KIVU

PRO-JUSTITIA
MANDAT D'ARRET

Nous, Col NDAKA MBWEDI Hippolyte, Officier du Ministère public près la cour Militaire Opérationnelle du Nord-Kivu ;

- Vu la loi n° 023/2002 du 18 Novembre portant code judiciaire Militaire ;
- Vu la loi n°15/022 du 31 Décembre 2015 modifiant et complétant le décret du 30 Janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal Congolais ;
- Vu l'Ordonnance n°16/025 du 1 Mars 2016 portant nomination des Magistrats Militaires du Ministère Public ;
- Vu la décision n°AG/007/2016 du Août 2016 portant affectation de l'Auditeur Militaire Supérieur près la Cour Militaire Opérationnelle du Nord-Kivu ;

I. **Dossier Judiciaire RMP 1185/NDM/018.**

II. A charge de **SHIMIRAYI MWISHA Guidon.**

III. **Prévenu de :**

- Participation à un mouvement insurrectionnel ;
- Crime de guerre par recrutement d'enfants ;
- Crime contre l'humanité par viol.

1. Participation à un mouvement insurrectionnel

Depuis plusieurs années, sans préjudice de date certaine, en tout cas pendant la période allant de 2009 à 2014, le précité a travaillé sous les ordres du Chef rebelle NTABO NTABERI dit SHEKA en qualité de commandant en second chargé des opérations et renseignements du mouvement insurrectionnel dénommé **NDUMA Défense of Congo (NDC)**. Il a contribué à l'organisation de cette milice qui a occupé à force ouverte plusieurs localités dans le territoire de WALIKALE et y a exercé l'autorité en se substituant aux autorités locales.

Faits prévus et punis par les arts 136 et 137 du Code pénal militaire.

Sans préjudice de date certaine ,en tout cas vers l'année 2014, étant entré en dissidence avec le groupe armé **NDC/SHEKA**, il a créé et organisé son propre groupe armé qu'il a dénommé **NDUMA Defens of Congo rénové (NDCR)** avec lequel il occupe à ce jour à force ouverte des localités et sites miniers du territoire de **WALIKALE**, des localités des territoires de **LUBERO** et **MASISI**, y commet les exactions graves sur les populations civiles et y exerce l'autorité en se substituant aux autorités locales.

Faits prévus et punis par les arts 136 et 137 du Code pénal militaire.

2. Crime de guerre par conscription

Avoir ,dans les mêmes circonstances de lieu et de temps que dessus, précisément pendant la période comprise entre 2009 et 2014, étant commandant en second chargé des opérations et renseignements du groupe armé **NDC/SHEKA**, organisé le recrutement d'enfants de moins de 18 ans lesquels enfants ont été utilisés comme combattants dans les différentes opérations militaires ;

Avoir aussi de 2014 à ce jour, continuer à enrôler les enfants de moins de 18 ans dans son groupe **NDCR**, lesquels enfants sont utilisés comme combattants lors de différents affrontements armés qui opposent ce groupe à d'autres groupes armés notamment les **NYATURA**.

Faits prévus et punis par les arts 8.2 evii du statut de ROME de la C.P.I, 223.2.7 de la loi n°15/022 du 31 Décembre 2015 modifiant et complétant le Code pénal, 71 et 187 de la loi N°09/001 du 10 Janvier 2009 portant protection de l'enfant.

3. Crime contre l'humanité par viol

Dans les mêmes circonstances de lieu et de temps que dessus, plus précisément dans la période allant de 2014 à ce jour, les éléments de son groupe, le **NDCR** se livrent, dans le cadre des attaques généralisées ou systématiques, aux viols des femmes et filles de tous les âges qu'ils trouvent dans les villages attaqués ou qu'ils croisent dans les champs.

Faits prévus et punis par les arts 7.1.g. du statut de ROME de la C.P.I et 222.8 de la loi N°15/022/ du 31 Décembre 2015 modifiant et complétant le code pénal.

Par ces motifs :

- Vu la loi n°023/2002 du 18 Novembre 2002 portant Code Judiciaire Militaire ;
- Vu la loi n°15/022 du 31 Décembre 2015 modifiant et complétant le décret du 30 Janvier 1940 portant Code Pénal Congolais ;
- Vu l'Ordonnance n°16/025 du 1^{er} Mars 2016 portant nomination des Magistrats Militaires du Ministère Public ;
- Vu la décision n° AG/007/2016 du 12 Août 2016 portant affectation de l'Auditeur Militaire Supérieur près la Cour Militaire Opérationnelle du Nord-Kivu ;

Mandons et ordonnons que le nommé **SHIMIRAYI MWISHA Guidon** soit arrêté en tout lieu où il se trouve, conduit sous bonne garde et remis aux autorités judiciaires compétentes.

Fait à Goma, le 27/06/2019

Officier du Ministère Public



Annex 3

Appointment ceremony of “Colonel” Jean Lomingo Kamala as commander of the newly created 114th NDC-R brigade

Cérémonie de nomination du « Colonel » Jean Lomingo Kamala comme commandant de la 114e Brigade du NDC-R nouvellement créée

Photograph 1



On the left, Guidon presiding over the ceremony.

On the right, “Colonel” Fidel Mapenzi, also known as “Mike”, responsible for administration and logistics within the NDC-R.

À gauche, Guidon présidant la cérémonie.

À droite, « Colonel » Fidel Mapenzi, alias « Mike », responsable de l’administration et de la logistique pour le NDC-R.

Photograph 2



At close distance to Guidon, two individuals wearing Police nationale Congolaise (PNC) uniforms.

Deux individus portant des uniformes de la Police nationale Congolaise (PNC) se trouvent à une proche distance de Guidon.

Photographs 1 an 2 were taken on 7 September 2019 and provided to the Group by a source close to the armed group.
Les photographies 1 et 2 ont été prises le 7 septembre 2019 et fournies au Groupe par une source proche du groupe armé.

Screenshot 3



Flag of the 114th NDC-R brigade
Drapeau de la 114e Brigade NDC-R

Screenshot of a video recorded on 7 September 2019 and provided to the Group by a source close to the armed group.
Capture d'écran issue d'une vidéo enregistrée le 7 septembre 2019 et fournie au Groupe par une source proche du groupe armé.

Photograph 4



Handover of the flag between Guidon and “Colonel” Lomingo on 7 September 2019
Remise du drapeau entre Guidon et « Colonel » Lomingo le 7 septembre 2019

Photograph 4 taken on 7 September 2019 and provided to the Group by a source close to the armed group.
Photographie 4 prise le 7 septembre 2019 et fournie au Groupe par une source proche du groupe armé.

Screenshots 5, 6 and 7






Military parade held in Pinga on 7 September 2019
Défilé militaire à Pinga le 7 septembre 2019

Screenshots of a video recorded on 7 September 2019 and provided to the Group by MONUSCO.
Captures d'écran issues d'une vidéo enregistrée le 7 septembre 2019 et fournie au Groupe par MONUSCO.

Organigram depicting integration of the 114th Brigade into NDC-R
 Organigramme montrant l'intégration de la 114e Brigade dans le NDC-R



Nomination letter of Désiré Ngabo Kisuba as the new NDC-R spokesperson dated 26 September 2019
 Lettre de nomination de Désiré Ngabo Kisuba en tant nouveau porte-parole du NDC-R en date du 26 septembre 2019



Annex 4

NDC-R “jetons”

1,000 Congolese Francs “jetons” gathered in August 2019 in Kahembe, Masisi territory, North Kivu
« Jetons » de 1000 Francs Congolais collectés en août 2019 à Kalembe, territoire de Masisi, Nord Kivu



April, May, June and August 2019 “jetons”
« Jetons » d’avril, mai, juin et août 2019




Truck tax "jetons" gathered in Kahembe in August 2019
« Jetons » pour la taxe camion collectés à Kalembe en août 2019

N.D.C.R
Reçu de recette
Nom : [REDACTED]
Marque camion : FUSO
Montant à payer : 40000FC
Date d'entrée : 18/08/2019
Destination : GOMA
Signature [Signature]

N.D.C.R
Reçu de recette
Nom : [REDACTED]
Marque camion : FUSO
Montant à payer : 30000FC
Date d'entrée : 18/08/2019
Destination : MWESO
Signature [Signature]

Sheet with printed NDC-R “jetons” gathered in 2019 in Kahembe
Feuille avec des « jetons » NDC-R imprimés, collectée en 2019 à Kalembe



X

Summons document of an NDC-R element for abuse of position at a checkpoint assigned by his leadership
Convocation d'un élément NDC-R par sa hiérarchie pour abus de position à un point de contrôle

REPUBLICQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
POLICE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
NDUMA DEFENCE OF CONGO RENOVE
BUREAU DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES
E.M COMDT PNC/NDCR

CONVOCATION N° 16/PNC/019

LE (LA) NOMME(E) [REDACTED] PROFESSION AGENT DE BARRIERE

Résident à MINDEJE Est prié (e) de se présenter à l'Office de la police NDCR de
à KALONDE co. JEUDI No 09/05/2019 à 10 heures

Motif ABUS DE CONFIANCE Art 55 CPL II

Fait à KALONDE le 05/05/2019

L'Officier de Police Adjoint

[Signature]

COM. SUP APL
COMO PNC NDCR




The Group is of the opinion that this document illustrates that the taxes levied by NDC-R are based on a mechanism controlled by the highest authorities of the movement.

Le Groupe pense que ce document illustre que les taxes levées par le NDC-R le sont sur la base d'un mécanisme contrôlé par les plus hautes autorités du mouvement.

Annex 5

Photograph of Lukwago Rashid Swaibu Hood, aka Mzee Meya Pierro or Pierro

Photographie de Lukwago Rashid Swaibu Hood, alias Mzee Meya Pierro ou Pierro



ADF combatants



Screenshots of videos obtained by the Group from an ADF ex-combatant on 25 October 2019
Captures d'écran de vidéos obtenues par le Groupe d'un ancien combattant ADF le 25 octobre 2019

The Group notes that the weapons in the hands of the ADF elements visible on the video recordings and the pieces of uniforms they wear are similar to the materiel used by the FARDC.

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| 1. Type 56 assault rifle | 6. AK-47 or Type 56 assault rifle |
| 2. Type 56 assault rifle | 7. Type 56 assault rifle |
| 3. PKM or M80 machinegun | 8. PKM or M80 machinegun |
| 4. Type 56 assault rifle | 9. Type 56 & Type 69-1 rocket launcher |
| 5. Type 69-1 rocket launcher | 10. Wounded element (unarmed) |

The two Type 69-1 rocket launchers are associated with antipersonnel OG-7 rounds similar to Bulgarian production.

Le Groupe note que les armes aux mains des éléments ADF visibles sur les vidéos et les uniformes qu'ils portent sont similaires au matériel utilisé par les FARDC.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1. Fusil d'assaut Type 56 | 6. Fusil d'assaut AK-47 ou Type 56 |
| 2. Fusil d'assaut Type 56 | 7. Fusil d'assaut Type 56 |
| 3. Mitrailleur PKM ou M80 | 8. Mitrailleur PKM ou M80 |
| 4. Fusil d'assaut Type 56 | 9. Lance-roquette Type 69-1 et fusil d'assaut Type 56 |
| 5. Lance-roquette Type 69-1 | 10. Élément armé blessé (non armé) |

The Group notes that the flag displayed in the background is similar to that of the flag used by ISIL.

Le Groupe note que le drapeau visible à l'arrière plan présente des similarités avec le drapeau utilisé par ISIL.




Comparison with ISIL flag
Comparaison avec le drapeau de ISIL



Annex 6

Letter from Banro Corporation dated 24 September 2019 declaring “*force de majeure*” at four of its entities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Lettre de Banro Corporation datée du 24 septembre 2019 déclarant un cas de « force majeure » pour ses quatre entités en République démocratique du Congo





- Malheureusement, malgré la fin de la prise d'otages, de sérieux problèmes sécuritaires persistent sur le site minier de Namoya/Salamabila. En effet, s'appuyant sur un protocole illégal que le Président Directeur Général de Banro, Monsieur Brett A. Richards, a été contraint de signer pour obtenir la libération des otages et sauver ainsi la vie de ces derniers, Sheikh Hassan et la milice Mai Mai, qui ont de force pris le contrôle de la coopérative des mineurs artisanaux, ont clairement indiqué qu'ils reprendraient toutes les parties des mines de Namoya Mining SA qu'ils souhaitent, considérant qu'ils étaient les plus forts sur le terrain pour imposer leurs lois et principes.
- Lorsque Namoya Mining SA/Banro a refusé de permettre cet empiètement, le Sheikh Hassan a publié le 13 septembre 2019 un "ordre noir" menaçant entre les lignes de capturer et de tuer, comme d'habitude, tout employé de Namoya Mining SA/Banro qui se présenterait au travail, interdisant par ailleurs aux vendeurs locaux de faire affaire avec Namoya Mining SA/Banro, et menaçant les familles ou tout individu lié à Namoya Mining SA/Banro.
- Le fait qu'une force armée rebelle et terroriste ait pris le contrôle de la Mine et ait émis des menaces de mort formelles à l'encontre de tout employé de Namoya Mining SA/Banro qui se présenterait au travail, constitue un événement imprévisible; et vu la certitude avec laquelle il a opéré à travers les prises d'otages précédentes dont un agent avait même déjà été égorgé en pleine forêt après son enlèvement, la certitude pour d'autres événements malheureux de se répéter était et demeure jusqu'à présent inévitable et même insurmontable alors même que la sécurisation de la zone est hors de notre contrôle. Cette situation a pour effet de nous empêcher temporairement de fournir du travail aux employés des entités Banro susmentionnées. **Cette situation de force majeure ne s'applique pas aux employés de Twangiza Mining SA qui devraient continuer à travailler.**

Considérant les faits tels qu'exposés, nous vous notifions en conséquence de cette situation pour que vous puissiez reconnaître l'existence d'un cas de force majeure tel que prévue par le Code du Travail Congolais en son article sus évoqué.

Veuillez noter que, tout en réservant ses droits, Banro, à travers sa filiale Namoya Mining SA, a également déclaré un cas de force majeure conformément au Code Minier congolais en son article 297.

Nous restons bien évidemment à votre disposition pour répondre à toute demande de clarification que vous pourriez avoir.

Dans l'intervalle, nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur l'Inspecteur Général, l'expression de notre respectueuse et distinguée considération.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Brett A. Richards".

Annex 7

Official list of validated mine sites for the Democratic Republic of the Congo from June 2011 to December 2018, last updated October 2019, provided to the Group by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe -BGR)

Liste officielle des mines validées en République démocratique du Congo de juin 2011 à décembre 2018, mise à jour pour la dernière fois en 2019, remise au Groupe par l'Institut fédéral des géosciences et des ressources naturelles (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe -BGR)

This list is truncated due to its total length, which runs to 622 rows. The full list has been filed with the Secretariat of the Committee.

La liste a été réduite à cause de sa longueur de 622 rangées au total. La liste complète a été confiée au Secrétariat du Comité.

	Name of site	Name of 2nd site or sector	Province	Territory	Mineral 1	Mineral 2	Classification	Date of visit	Decree number (N°Arrêté)	Number of visits	Mining title
1	Gangu-Mbill		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	24/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
2	Kanana		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
3	Kilo-Moto		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	23/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
4	Lisala		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
5	Lumbo		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
6	Matali		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	23/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
7	Matundu		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
8	Nambiya		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
9	Sakandali		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
10	Sambillikpanga		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	23/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
11	Séminaire		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	22/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
12	Zua Idée		Bas Uélé	Bondo	Gold		Vert	21/04/20	0682/ 19 Mai 2015	1	Open
13	Bujito/Buzito	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		Vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
14	Kabinungi	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	25/04/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
15	Kakesa	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	
16	Kamaja	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	
17	Kankenze	Camp sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	24/04/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	
18	Kifinga	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	
19	Kiombi-Shiombio	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		Vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
20	Kisele	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	
21	Sengwe	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	21/04/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PR 12456
22	Tompwe	Camp Sowe	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite	Coltan	Vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
23	Boulevard	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba			vert			1	
24	Bunkululu	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		Vert	21/04/20		1	PR 12457
25	Camp Geo	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	25/04/20		1	PEPM
26	Kalume Ngongo 2	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba			vert			1	
27	Kataba	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert			1	
28	Lula	Lula	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		Vert	25/04/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
29	Garage 2	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert			1	
30	Kalume Ngongo 1	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert			1	
31	Kishimakonde	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert			1	
32	Kizwa	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	19/04/20		1	
33	Longwa	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	27/04/20		1	
34	Mwika 1	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	17/04/20		1	
35	Mwika 2	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert			1	
36	Mwika Nord Ouest	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		Vert		0143/17 Mars	1	PE 12457
37	Ngombe	Mitwaba	Haut Katanga	Mitwaba	Cassiterite		vert	17/04/20		1	
38	Kalongo	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba Nkulu	Cassiterite		vert			1	

39	Kamikenke	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Vert	18/04/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PR 12204	
40	Kyazi	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	18/04/20		1	PE 13065	
41	Lubondoy	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	17/04/20		1	PR 12203	
42	Lukanga	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1		
43	Mputu	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Vert	17/04/20		1	PR 12204	
44	Petengwe	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	18/04/20		1	PR 12204	
45	Soma	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1		
46	Twite	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Vert			1	PR 12204	
47	Yolo	Kabozya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1		
48	5 chantiers	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
49	Bulombo	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Coltan	Cassiterite	vert		1		
50	Dialubembo	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
51	Kabayoy	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
52	Kakundji	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
53	Kibungobungo	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
54	Kibuto	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Vert	07/03/20		1	PE 13092	
55	Kimbembe	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Coltan	vert	22/05/20		1		
56	Kinkole/Kikole	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	08/12/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 13092
57	Makaka	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
58	Mayamoto	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
59	Rivière Luena	Kakesa	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Charbon	vert		1	PE 360	
60	Grande Plage	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Vert	13/06/20		1	PE 13082	
61	Kalalalala	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	13/06/20		1	PE 13082
62	Kalombo Misimwa	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	13/06/20		1	PE 13082	
63	Kania/Malenge	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	13/06/20		1	PE 13082	
64	Ankit	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	0143/17 Mars		1	PE 13082
65	Mahoma	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	0143/17 Mars		1	PR 4100
66	Musafiri	Kanunka	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	0143/17 Mars		1	PE 13082
67	Bwela	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1	PE 1090	
68	Kawama 1	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert		1		
69	Kyenze	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert	42143	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 13082
70	Kyungwa	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert			1	
71	Mundu	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert			1	
72	Mutakuya	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert			1	
73	Souple	Kyenze	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	Wolfram	vert			1	
74	Deux-bâches	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Coltan	vert	21/05/20		1		
75	Disase	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		
76	Kabikele	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		
77	Kashiki	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		

78	Kayumbo	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1	PE 122	
79	Misapa	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		
80	Mitantala	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert	42144	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PR 6337	
81	Mwale-Kalumbaye	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		
82	Ville	Mitantala	Haut Lomami	Bukama	Cassiterite	vert			1		
83	Beton	Mitwaba	Haut Lomami	Mitwaba	Cassiterite	vert			1	PE 12457	
84	Kabala / Somika	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	20/04/20		1	PR 5259	
85	Kabala 1	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1	PR 13031	
86	Kabala 2	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	42114		1	PE 13065	
87	Kalwenya	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	21/04/20		1	PR 12676	
88	Kisokelo	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	20/04/20		1	PE 13065	
89	Mamba	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1	PE 13065	
90	Mwanzalulu	Mwanza Seya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1		
91	Bukena	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	05/07/20		1	PR 12453
92	Kalamulongo/Kivwa	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	25/04/20		1	PR 4076	
93	Kamola	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert	25/04/20		1	Open	
94	Kamola 1	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1	Open	
95	Kamola 2	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	vert			1	Open	
96	Kamujillo	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
97	Kasala	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert		1		
98	Kimana	Ngoya	Haut Lomami	Malemba-Nkulu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	42119	0143/17 Mars	1	Open
99	Kafiawema	Mokili Echangé	Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	42322	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	Open	
100	Kanda Te		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	42322	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	Open	
101	Mbembese		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	42320	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	Open	
102	Tokoleko	Ndiabonge	Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	42323	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	Open	
103	Tokomeka		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	42323	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	Open	
104	Unipe Nikupe		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	16/11/20	0005/02 Fév 2016	1	PEPM 7266	
105	Bisisa		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	No	43410		1	PE 364	
106	Camp Bandundu		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43407		1	-	
107	Camp Butembo		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Rouge	01/11/20		1	-	
108	Camp Mambasa		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43405		1		
109	Camp Poussiére		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43410		1	-	
110	Cinquantenaire		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Jaune	43406		1	-	
111	Jérusalem		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43410		1		
112	Kazaroho		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	06/11/20		1	-	
113	Mabukulu		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43410		1		
114	Makodisala		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	43410		1	-	
115	Makpama		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	vert	05/11/20		1	-	
116	Malindibo		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	No	43406		1	PR 2783	

117	Mapeda		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43409		1	-
118	Masikini		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43410		1	-
119	Ngubo		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43406		1	-
120	Sans Souci		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	05/11/20		1	-
121	Sinaï		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	No	43406		1	PR 2783
122	Sozagec		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	No	43407		1	PEPM 7266
123	Tindika		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Jaune	01/11/20		1	-
124	Togo		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43410		1	-
125	Vatican		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43405		1	-
126	Yesu nde Fungula		Ituri	Mambasa	Gold	Vert	43406		1	-
127	Ciel Ouvert	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
128	Kamalenge	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	06/08/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
129	Katanda	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
130	Manguier Zone A	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
131	Manguier Zone B	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	06/08/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
132	Manguier Zone C	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
133	Mashamba	Busanga	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41982	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 2361
134	Kalule Nord	Kamateshi	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	41858		1	PR 2152
135	Kamateshi	Kamateshi	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	Vert	41858	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PR 2152
136	Bac	Minkengele	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	06/08/20		1	PEPM 1929
137	Minkengele ASM	Minkengele	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM 1929
138	Minkengele Si	Minkengele	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	41857	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM 1929
139	Vunda	Minkengele	Lualaba	Lubudi	Cassiterite	vert	06/08/20		1	PEPM 1929
140	Abuki		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert	41512	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 2594
141	Amagandja		Maniema	Punia	Coltan	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	Open
142	Amapondjo		Maniema	Punia	Coltan	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	ZEA 149
143	Atondo	Atonde	Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Wolfram	Vert	0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2592
144	Avanga		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	Open
145	Balendelende/Kasel		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 2595
146	Batamba		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2595
147	Bengo II		Maniema	Pangi	Wolframite	Cassiterite	Vert	0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 21
148	Bimpombe		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert	41509	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 20
149	Binantwane		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert		0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
150	Bisikatike	Mabele 1	Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert	41509	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 20
151	Bunza	Bunza Bengo	Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Wolfram	Vert	0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 21
152	Chamabondo	Tshamabondo	Maniema	Kailo	Cassiterite	Wolfram	Vert	21/08/20	2	ZRG 01950
153	Isongo		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 21
154	Kaitenda		Maniema	Lubutu	Cassiterite	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PE 22
155	Kamungazi		Maniema	Kabambare	Gold	Vert	15/10/20	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	Open

156	Kasongo		Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite	Coltan	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PE 87
157	Katambo		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41509	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	Open
158	Kayeye		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	ZRG 01823
159	Kesise	Kiese (Arrêté)	Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PE 2591
160	Kibila		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
161	Kibundukila		Maniema	Punia	Coltan		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	Open
162	Kimabwe	Digue	Maniema	Kabambare	Gold		Vert	15/10/20	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	Open
163	Kimbala		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2594
164	Kimbiya mbiya		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 2595
165	Kintolo		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
166	Kiyoo		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41513	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	Open
167	La vie malembe		Maniema	Lubutu	Woframite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PR 5322
168	Lasonike		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	23/08/20	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 20
169	Lonyoma		Maniema	Kallo	Cassiterite	Wofram	Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 17
170	Losange		Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite	Coltan	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PE 235
171	Lubille		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2592
172	Lubondozi		Maniema	Kabambare	Gold		Vert	15/10/20	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	Open
173	Lusolo		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2593
174	Lutala		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PR 12005
175	Makundju		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41510	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
176	Mambwe		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	ZRG 02036
177	Mapamboli		Maniema	Lubutu	Cassiterite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PR 5270
178	Masimero		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Wofram	Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2594
179	Matoba		Maniema	Punia	Coltan		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	ZEA 149
180	Meli		Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	ZEA 152
181	Metsera		Maniema	Kallo	Cassiterite		Vert		0915/23 Oct 2015	2	PE 17
182	Mindulu/Kilumazi		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41512	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 2594
183	Misoke		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite	Wofram	Vert	41510	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
184	Moka (Mususano)	Camp Moka	Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0634/19 Oct 2012	1	PE 2592
185	Mukuku		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41509	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 20
186	Mususa	Chantier B49	Maniema	Kallo	Cassiterite		Vert		0915/23 Oct 2015	2	PE 17
187	Nakenge	Lutshurukulu	Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0915/23 Oct 2015	2	PE 2594
188	Ngonomeka		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	41510	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	PE 12
189	Nkenye		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert	Août	0682/31 Déc 2013	1	ZRG 02036
190	N'tufia		Maniema	Lubutu	Cassiterite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	Open
191	Obeya		Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite		Vert		0915/23 Oct 2015	1	PE 19
192	Ogobinako		Maniema	Punia	Cassiterite	Wofram	Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	Open
193	Pas mal		Maniema	Lubutu	Cassiterite		Vert		0262/27 Mai 2016	1	PR 5777
194	Salukwango		Maniema	Pangi	Cassiterite		Vert		0915/23 Oct 2015	2	PE 2594

546	Kahongo	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert			2	
547	Kamalenge	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert	14/08/20	En préparation	3	PR 12745
548	Kawama 2	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert			2	
549	Kyadja	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert			2	PR 12745
550	Kyato 1	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert			2	ZEA 396
551	Kyato	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert	43019	0687/30 Oct 2017	3	ZEA 397
552	Mpuji	Kiambi	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert	14/08/20	En préparation	2	PR 12745
553	Bovu	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	41373		1	PEPM
554	Budjana Matongo	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42198	0143/17 Mars	1	PE 12562
555	Debic	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	18/03/20		1	PEPM
556	Hopital Mulefu	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42081		1	PE 12562
557	La vie	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42198		1	PEPM
558	Mantantali	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		Vert			1	PE 12562
559	Masani	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42081	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 12562
560	Musendekwa	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	01/12/20	0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 12562
561	Ngulu Ya Mabwe	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PE 13118
562	Quatre	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert			1	PE 13118
563	Ringo	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert			1	PE 12562
564	Saba (Sabaa)	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert		0700/04 Nov 2014	1	PEPM
565	Stade Matongo	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42081		1	PE 12562
566	Usinikoroge	Kisengo	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42198	0143/17 Mars	1	PE 13118
567	Kilunga	Kitindy	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Cassiterite	Coltan	Vert	41611	0143/17 Mars	1	PR 12440
568	Mabumbwa	Lengwe	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Cassiterite	Coltan	vert	03/12/20	0143/17 Mars	1	PR 12440
569	Mutchunga	Lengwe	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		vert			1	
570	Tambwe	Lengwe	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		vert			1	
571	Kipe ya yo	Luba	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		vert			1	
572	Luba-Carriere	Luba	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		Vert	42190		1	PR 3247
573	Luyi 1er	Luba	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan	Cassiterite	Vert	42190		1	PR 12432
574	Mbulamiti	Luba	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan	Cassiterite	Vert	41354		1	PE 12607
575	Ombelwa	Luba	Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan	Cassiterite	Vert	42190	0143/17 Mars	1	PR 10196
576	100kg	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		Vert	19/03/20	0143/17 Mars	1	PE 12606
577	Cimetière	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		Vert			1	PE 12606
578	Kahanda	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		vert	42190		1	PE 12606
579	Kungulu Ya Mabwe	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		Vert	05/07/20		1	PE 12606
580	Lwela	Mayi baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan	Gold	Vert	41353		1	PE 12606
581	Malewa	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		Vert	41353		1	PE 12606
582	Mulaya	Mayi Baridi	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		vert			1	
583	Kibola	Mwika Pweto	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert	42961	En préparation	3	PR 12745
584	Mungotshi	Mwika Pweto	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassiterite		vert	14/08/20	En préparation	3	PR 12745

585	Six roue	Mwika Pweto	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite		vert	42961	En préparation	3	PR 12745
586	Fonderie	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	42959	En préparation	2	PR 13359
587	Kalata	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	12/08/20	En préparation	1	PR 13359
588	Kalondabienge	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	42959	En préparation	1	PR 13359
589	Kapenda	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	42959	En préparation	1	PR 13359
590	Ngobo	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	42959	En préparation	2	PR 13359
591	Pêlle électrique	Ngobo	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite	Coltan	vert	42959	En préparation	1	PR 13359
592	Sango Mutosha	Sango Mutosha	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		vert	01/12/20	0143/17 Mars	1	Open
593	Kamindjimba	Secteur	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite		vert	42961	En préparation	3	PR 12745
594	Katende	Secteur	Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite		vert	42961	En préparation	3	PR 12745
595	Billimba		Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		jaune	09/10/20	En cours	1	-
596	Kabwekayi		Tanganyika	Manono	Coltan		vert	43018	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	PEPM 9262
597	Kalama		Tanganyika	Manono	Cassitérite		vert	43018	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	PEPM 9262
598	Kalenga-Sendwe		Tanganyika	Manono	Coltan		vert	43018	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	-
599	Kalonda		Tanganyika	Moba	Wolframite		jaune	43014	En cours	1	-
600	Kalunga		Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		jaune	09/10/20	En cours	1	-
601	Kamatamba		Tanganyika	Moba	Wolframite		jaune	43014	En cours	1	-
602	Kamununga		Tanganyika	Moba	Wolframite		jaune	43014	En cours	1	-
603	Kankobo		Tanganyika	Manono	Coltan	Cassiteri	vert	08/10/20	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	PR 4582
604	Kasongo-		Tanganyika	Moba	Coltan		vert	43014	En cours	1	-
605	Kisimba-Mombo		Tanganyika	Nyunzu	Coltan		jaune	43017	En cours	1	-
606	Kitambo		Tanganyika	Kalemie	Coltan		vert	43012	En cours	1	-
607	Lubule		Tanganyika	Manono	Coltan	Cassiteri	vert	43016	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	PR 12447
608	Mozambique		Tanganyika	Moba	Coltan		vert	07/10/20	En cours	1	-
609	Mukuyi (Phonie)		Tanganyika	Manono	Wolframite		jaune	43014	En cours	1	PE 12713
610	Yoze		Tanganyika	Manono	Coltan	Cassiteri	vert	43015	0687/30 Oct 2017	1	PE 13081
611	Balsi Gbebe		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		No	31/07/20		1	open
612	Tala Yesu		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		Vert	43313		1	open
613	Kita Mata		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		Vert	43313		1	open
614	Victoire		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		Vert	43313		1	open
615	Bakoko		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		Vert	43314		1	open
616	Gbado		Tshopo	Banalia	Gold		Vert	02/08/20		1	open
617	Yambi yaya		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold		Vert	43318		1	open
618	Mangeni		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold				0006/02 Fév 2016	1	Open
619	Mangeni		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold		No	07/08/20		2	PR 13268
620	Masukumanu		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold		No	43319		1	PR 13268
621	Dieu pour Tous		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold		Vert	43320		1	open
622	Bodia		Tshopo	Bafwasende	Gold		Vert	43320		1	open

Annex 8

Ministerial Decree published on 15 July 2019 issuing validation information about 19 mines in Walikale territory, that were visited by a qualification team between 27 March and 3 April 2018

Arrêté ministériel du 15 juillet 2019 portant validation d'environ 19 mines dans le territoire de Walikale, qui ont été visitées par l'équipe de qualification entre le 27 mars et le 3 avril 2018

République Démocratique du Congo
Gouvernement de la République



MINISTÈRE DES MINES

Le Ministre

ARRETE MINISTERIEL N°.....0505...../CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2019
DU15.....2019... PORTANT QUALIFICATION ET VALIDATION
DE 15 SITES MINIERES DANS LE TERRITOIRE DE WALIKALE EN
PROVINCE DU NORD-KIVU

Vu la Constitution, telle que modifiée par la Loi n° 11/002 du 11 janvier 2011 portant révision de certains articles de la Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo, spécialement ses articles 9, 93 et 202 point 36 littéra f ;

Vu la Loi n° 007/ 2002 du 11 juillet 2002 portant Code Minier, telle que modifiée et complétée par la Loi n° 18/001 du 9 mars 2018 ;

Vu la Loi n° 015/2002 du 16 octobre 2002 portant Code du travail ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 17/005 du 08 mai 2017 portant nomination des Vice-Premiers Ministres, des Ministres d'Etat, des Ministres, des Ministres Délégués et des Vice-Ministres, telle que modifiée par l'Ordonnance n° 18/024 du 14 février 2018 portant réaménagement technique du Gouvernement ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 17/005 du 08 mai 2017 portant nomination des Vice-Premiers Ministres, des Ministres d'Etat, des Ministres, des Ministres Délégués et des Vice-Ministres, telle que modifiée par l'Ordonnance n° 18/024 du 14 février 2018 portant réaménagement technique du Gouvernement ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 17/024 du 10 juillet 2017 portant organisation et fonctionnement du Gouvernement, modalités de collaboration entre le Président de la République et le Gouvernement ainsi qu'entre les Membres du Gouvernement ;

Vu l'Ordonnance n° 17/025 du 10 juillet 2017 fixant les attributions des Ministères, spécialement en son article 1^{er} B point 18 ;

Vu le Décret n° 038/2003 du 26 mars 2003 portant Règlement Minier, tel que modifié et complété par le Décret n°18/024 du 08 juin 2018 ;

Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 057/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012 du 29 février 2012 portant mise en œuvre du Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la Conférence Internationale de la Région des Grands Lacs « CIRGL » en République Démocratique du Congo ;

3^{ème} Etage, Hôtel du Gouvernement, Place Royal, Boulevard du 30 Juin - Kinshasa/Gombe – RDC
Site Web : www.mines-rdc.cd
Email : info@mines-rdc.cd



Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 0588/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2013 du 04 octobre 2013 portant Fiche d'Inspection Minière de la CIRGL en République Démocratique du Congo ;

Vu l'Arrêté Ministériel n° 0919/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2015 du 29 octobre 2015 fixant des procédures d'inspection, de qualification et de validation des sites miniers des filières aurifère et stannifère en République Démocratique du Congo ;

Considérant la lettre n° CAB.MIN/MINES/02/0379/2011 du 13 avril 2011 transmettant les termes de référence aux équipes conjointes pour la validation des sites miniers ;

Considérant la lettre n° CAB.MIN/MINES/01/0056/2015 du 15 janvier 2015 relatives aux instructions données aux équipes conjointes de ne plus qualifier et valider les sites miniers situés dans les périmètres des tiers, sans leur autorisation préalable ;

Considérant le rapport d'inspection de l'équipe conjointe pour la qualification des sites miniers de Abambuwa, Alumu, Bashumbo, Bongobongo, Busangi, Kaïtolea, Kambubi, Mabele riche, Mili, Mindumbi, Misoke, Misoke/Mabalaka, Mpafu, Mululuto, Nyamutala, Sangungu, Sous-Sol, Usungu et Zala na Mbangu dans le Territoire de Walikale dans la Province du Nord-Kivu, transmis par lettre n° 088/CAB/MINIPRO/RHEMHPME/NK/2018 du 09 avril 2018 du Ministre Provincial en charge des Mines de la Province du Nord-Kivu ;

Attendu qu'il échet de se conformer aux exigences et directives du Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la CIRGL et du Guide de l'OCDE sur le devoir de diligence ;

Vu la nécessité et l'urgence ;

ARRETE :

Article 1 :

Est approuvé, le rapport de mission effectuée du 27 mars au 03 avril 2018 par l'équipe conjointe en Territoire de Walikale dans la Province du Nord-Kivu, pour la qualification et la validation des sites miniers de cette entité territoriale.

Article 2 :

Le tableau repris en annexe au présent Arrêté fait état des sites miniers validés suivant la qualification conférée par le rapport de mission dont question à l'article 1^{er}.

La durée de validité de la présente qualification est de six (06) mois à compter de la date de signature du présent Arrêté.

Le rapport de mission et le présent Arrêté, y compris son annexe, sont publiés sur le site WEB du Ministère des Mines.

**Article 3 :**

Les sites miniers qualifiés et validés peuvent faire l'objet d'un audit indépendant, soit à l'initiative du Ministre National ayant les Mines dans ses attributions, soit à l'initiative des organismes internationaux tels que l'ONU, l'OCDE, la CIRGL ou tout autre organisme public ou privé national ou international concerné et/ou impliqué dans la mise en œuvre des standards CTC, OCDE et CIRGL.

Les sites miniers qualifiés « **Rouge** » ou « **Jaune** » et non validés ne peuvent faire l'objet d'aucune activité minière.

Les intervenants lésés par la non validation des sites miniers dans lesquels ils opèrent peuvent requérir une inspection de suivi en vue d'examiner l'évolution de la situation sécuritaire et sociale desdits sites.

Article 4 :

Le Secrétaire Général aux Mines, le Directeur Général du Cadastre Minier et le Directeur Général du SAEMAPE sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent Arrêté qui entre en vigueur à la date de sa signature.

Fait à Kinshasa, le 15 JUIL 2019

Henri YAV MULANG

Ministre des Mines intérimaire

Ampliations

- Cabinet du Président de la République : 1
- Cabinet du Premier Ministre : 1
- Cabinet du Ministre des Mines : 2
- Secrétaire Général des Mines : 1
- Cadastre Minier : 1
- CTCPM : 1
- SAEMAPE : 1
- Direction des Mines : 1
- Direction de Géologie : 1
- Direction des Investigations : 1
- Direction chargée de la Protection de l'Environnement : 1
- Division Provinciale des Mines et Géologie du Ressort : 1

Republique Démocratique du Congo
Gouvernement de la République



MINISTÈRE DES MINES
Le Ministre

ANNEXE A L'ARRETE MINISTERIEL N° 0505 /CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2019 DU 15 JUIL 2019 PORTANT
QUALIFICATION ET VALIDATION DE 15 SITES MINERS DANS LE TERRITOIRE DE WALIKALE EN PROVINCE DU
NORD-KIVU

Dénomination	Territoire	Minerais extraits	Code	Coordonnées géographiques			Qualification/Validation		Observation
				Longitude	Latitude	Altitude (m)	Vert, Jaune, Rouge	Validé	
				01 Abambuwa	Walikale	Or et Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BAT/WAN/Mines/Cert/001/2019	027°45'27,9"	
02 Alumu	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/IBI/BAK/Mines/Cert/002/2019	028°21'17,8"	01°40'46,2"	780	Vert	Validé	-
03 Bashumbo	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BANA/BAK/PE-70/SAK/Mines/Cert/003/2019	027°55'09,4"	01°37'01,4"	649	Vert	Validé	-
04 Bongobongo	Walikale	Cassitérite et Wolframite	N.K/T.WAL/BATI/PE-73/SAK/Mines/Cert/004/2019	027°45'06,4"	01°31'46,3"	638	Vert	Validé	-
05 Busangi	Walikale	Cassitérite et Wolframite	N.K/T.WAL/BAB/PR-5270/WAN/Mines/Cert/xxx/2019	027°19'49,2"	01°05'22,9"	652	-	-	Non Validé
06 Kaïtolea	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BANI/BAK/Mines/Cert/005/2019	027°56'57,0"	01°35'21,3"	684	Vert	Validé	-
07 Kambubi	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BANL/WAN/PR-14292/LB/Mines/Cert/006/2019	028°13'23,1"	01°27'24,7"	1.029	Vert	Validé	-
08 Mabele riche	Walikale	Or et Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/OLO/WAN/PR-5270/Mines/Cert/xxx/2019	027°18'32,4"	01°06'05,1"	569	-	-	Non Validé
09 Milli	Walikale	Or et Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/OLO/WAN/PR-5270/Mines/Cert/xxx/2019	027°21'33,7"	01°08'39,4"	572	-	-	Non Validé
10 Mindumbi	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BANK/BAK/Mines/Cert/007/2019	028°17'26,8"	01°37'34,5"	807	Vert	Validé	-
11 Misoke	Walikale	Cassitérite, Or et Wolframite	N.K/T.WAL/BAMU/WAN/Mines/Cert/008/2019	028°08'53,6"	01°13'11,1"	925	Vert	Validé	-
12 Misoke/Mabalaka	Walikale	Cassitérite et Wolframite	N.K/T.WAL/BANA/BAK/PE-70/SAK/Mines/Cert/009/2019	027°50'40,9"	01°36'20,3"	663	Vert	Validé	-

3^{ème} Etage, Hôtel du Gouvernement, Place Royal, Boulevard du 30 Juin - Kinshasa/Gombe - RDC
Site Web : www.mines-rdc.cd
Email : info@mines-rdc.cd

Gouvernement de la République
Ministère des Mines



Dénomination	Territoire	Minerais extraits	Code	Coordonnées géographiques			Qualification/Validation		Observation
				Longitude	Latitude	Altitude (m)	Vert, Jaune, Rouge	Validé	
				13 Mpafu	Walikale	Cassitérite et Or	N.K/T.WAL/BATAK/WAN/WEY/Mines/Cert/010/2019	028°08'49,4"	
14 Mululuto	Walikale	Cassitérite et Or	N.K/T.WAL/BANI/BAK/PE-70/SAK/Mines/Cert/011/2019	027°49'51,3"	01°35'21,8"	643	Vert	Validé	-
15 Nyamutala	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BAT/BAK/PE-70/SAK/Mines/Cert/012/2019	027°49'32,0"	01°35'41,2"	639	Vert	Validé	-
16 Sangungu	Walikale	Cassitérite	N.K/T.WAL/BANG/BAK/Mines/Cert/013/2019	028°14'25,7"	01°38'55,5"	919	Vert	Validé	-
17 Sous-Sol	Walikale	Cassitérite et Or	N.K/T.WAL/BANW/WAN/Mines/Cert/xxx/2019	027°32'45"	00°55'02"	620	-	-	Non Validé
18 Usungu	Walikale	Or	N.K/T.WAL/BATAK/WAN/BUT/Mines/Cert/014/2019	028°07'28,0"	01°23'41,7"	722	Vert	Validé	-
19 Zala na Mbanqu	Walikale	Cassitérite et Or	N.K/T.WAL/OLO/WAN/WAS/Mines/Cert/015/2019	027°21'22,7"	01°14'51,5"	636	Vert	Validé	-

Fait à Kinshasa, le 15 JUIL 2019

Henri YAV MULANG

Ministère des Mines inérimaire

Légende :


BAB	: Village Babomongo	Cert	: Certifié
BAK	: Secteur Bakano	IBI	: Village Ibro
BAMU	: Village Banamutati	LB	: Titulaire « La Boissière Sprl »
BANA	: Village Banansigha	N.K.	: Province du Nord-Kivu
BANI	: Village Banisamasi	OLO	: Village Olomba
BANG	: Village Bananingi	PE	: Permis d'Exploitation
BANK	: Village Banakiundlia	PR	: Permis de Recherches
BANL	: Village Banalufuno	SAK	: Titulaire « SAKIMA »
BANW	: Village Banamwesi	T.WAL	: Territoire de Walikale
BAT	: Village Batulanga	WAS	: Groupement Wassa
BATAK	: Village Batakiwa	WAN	: Secteur Wanianga
BATI	: Village Batike	WEY	: Titulaire « Wema Yobora »
BUT	: Titulaire « Butinda »		

3^{ème} Etage, Hôtel du Gouvernement, Place Royal, Boulevard du 30 Juin - Kinshasa/Gombe - RDC
Site Web : www.mines-rdc.cd
Email : info@mines-rdc.cd

Annex 9

11 June 2019 letter from the Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC), calling on the national Minister of Mines to reconsider raising royalty tax on coltan

Lettre du 11 juin de la Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC) appelant le Ministre national des mines à reconsidérer l'application du taux de redevance sur le coltan



Cette situation rend les exportateurs des minerais de la filière stannifère, en général et d'une manière particulière ceux du coltan, moins compétitifs en comparaison avec les exportateurs des autres filières opérationnels en République Démocratique du Congo et ceux des pays de la CIRGL dont les coûts de traçabilité et les frais payés à l'exportation sont inférieurs.

Aussi, dans les conditions actuelles caractérisée par la baisse des cours de ce minerai au niveau des différents marchés boursiers, l'application du taux de 10 % de la redevance minière à l'exportation s'avère contreproductive parce que ne favorisant pas la rentabilité et la compétitivité des activités des entreprises de la filière concernée au risque d'alimenter le circuit de la fraude et la contrebande minière.

De ce qui précède, Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, qu'il plaise à votre autorité d'accéder à notre requête en attendant de trouver une solution définitive à la problématique des charges supplémentaires inhérentes à la mise en œuvre du Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la CIRGL pour la filière stannifère dont fait partie le coltan.

Veillez agréer Excellence Monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

POUR LES EXPORTATEURS DU NORD KIVU

1. ETS AMUR

6. SOBECA SARL

2. BAKULIKIRA NGUMA

7. METACHEM SARL

3. CMM SARL

8. SAKIMA S.A

4. CDMC SARL

9. SOGECOM SARL

5. HUAYING TRADING SARL

10. RASH ET RASH SARL

11. SOMIMA SARL

12. SMB SARL

20 June 2019 response from the Minister of Mines to the 11 June 2019 FEC letter
Réponse du 20 juin 2019 du Ministre des mines à la lettre du 11 juin 2019 de la FEC

Seigneurie République Démocratique du Congo
Gouvernement de la République

Kinshasa, le 20 JUIN 2019



MINISTÈRE DES MINES

Le Ministre

DATE	28 JUIN 2019
N°	1930
AD	SG
DAECC	DBT
DIVISION	SERVICE

Chambre des Mines des experts encore.

*DFD
pour suite
par la CDH
22 juin 2019*

Transmis copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Président de la Commission Nationale de la Mercuriale
- Monsieur le Directeur Général du CEEC
- Monsieur le Président de la Chambre des Mines
- (Tous) à Kinshasa/Gombe

N/Réf. : CAB.MIN/MINES/01...../2019
V/Réf. :

**Objet : Transmission Note explicative
Accusé de réception**

A Monsieur le Coordonnateur de la CTCPM
A Kinshasa/Gombe

Monsieur le Coordonnateur,

J'accuse réception de votre lettre numéro 186/Cd/CTCPM/LMY/2019 du 06 juin 2019 relative à l'objet repris en marge, par laquelle vous me transmettez une Note explicative, en réaction au Mémoire des sept sociétés de la filière stannifère qui ont présenté les difficultés qu'elles éprouvent (1) dans le cadre de l'application du taux de la redevance minière de 10%, (2) de la problématique des fluctuations des cours de tantalite et (3) des résidus du traitement du coltan et de la cassitérite. Je vous en remercie.

Prenant bonne note de son contenu, je retiens que lesdites sociétés éprouvent des difficultés liées, d'une part, aux fluctuations des cours de tantalite et de niobium et, d'autre part, à la classification des résidus d'étain dont la teneur est inférieure ou égale à 5% Ta2O5 et de tantalite dont la teneur est inférieure ou égale à 55% Sn.

En attendant de trouver une solution à cette problématique dans sa globalité, je vous demande de prendre en charge le problème des résidus et de tantalite dans le cadre de la Commission Nationale de la Mercuriale.

Dans la perspective d'une descente sur le terrain par vos Experts pour s'enquérir des difficultés réelles auxquelles lesdites sociétés font face, j'attends votre rapport pour une décision appropriée.

Veuillez agréer, **Monsieur le Coordonnateur,** l'expression de ma parfaite considération.

Henri YAV MULANG

Ministre des Mines intérimaire

Annex 10

Untagged wolframite wrapped in a plastic bag and concealed in a sack of potatoes, as observed by the Group in September 2019 in a clandestine minerals depot, Goma, North Kivu

Wolframite non étiquetée emballée dans un sac plastique lui-même caché dans un sac de pommes de terre, observée par le Groupe en septembre 2019 dans un dépôt clandestin de minerais à Goma, Nord Kivu



Annex 11

Note from 7 October 2019 meeting of North Kivu mining monitoring committee outlining steps, including with regard to supply chain integrity, taken by Société minière de Bisunzu (SMB) and the Coopérative des exploitants artisanaux miniers de Masisi (COOPERAMMA)

Compte rendu de la réunion du 7 octobre 2019 du Comité de suivi des activités minières pointant les avancées, y compris à l'égard de l'intégrité de la chaîne d'approvisionnement, entreprises par la Société minière de Bisunzu (SMB) et la Coopérative des exploitants artisanaux miniers de Masisi (COOPERAMMA)

1

**COMPTE RENDU DE LA REUNION DU COMITE DE SUIVI DES ACTIVITES
MINIERES TENUE EN DATE DU 7 OCTOBRE 2019 DANS LA SALLE DE REUNION
DU GOUVERNORAT DE LA PROVINCE DU NORD KIVU.**

L'an deux mille dix-neuf, le septième jour du mois d'octobre, s'est tenue dans la salle de réunion du Gouvernorat de la Province du Nord Kivu, une réunion du Comité de Suivi des Activités Minières, sous la modération de son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre Provincial en charge des Mines, Président de ladite commission.

Des points à l'ordre du jour

Quatre points étaient inscrits à l'Ordre du jour, à savoir :

- ✓ **Lecture et adoption du compte rendu de la réunion du 11 septembre 2019 ;**
- ✓ **La présentation synthèse des cahiers des charges SMB sarl et COOPERAMMA GIE;**
- ✓ **Lecture des dispositions légales en rapport aux revendications soulevées dans les cahiers des charges ;**
- ✓ **Echange et dispositions finales.**

1. De la Lecture et adoption du compte rendu de la réunion du 11 septembre 2019.

Ayant constaté l'absence du Chef de Division des Mines et Géologie, Rapporteur de la CSAM, le Ministre Provincial a rappelé les trois grandes recommandations faites lors de la réunion du 11 septembre 2019 à savoir :

- L'élaboration des cahiers des charges par les deux parties (SMB sarl et COOPERAMMA GIE);
- La descente sur terrain pour faire l'état des lieux des activités minières dans le périmètre couvert par le PE 4731 de la SMB sarl;
- L'organisation d'une rencontre entre les décideurs de deux parties.

Pour l'ensemble de ces recommandations, il a été constaté que seules les deux premières étaient déjà réalisées.

2. De la présentation de la synthèse des cahiers des charges SMB SARL et COOPERAMMA-GIE

Le Conseiller en charge des Mines au Ministère Provincial des Mines et Finances, Monsieur KAMABU PALUKU, a procédé à la lecture de la synthèse des deux cahiers des charges. Mais qu'après des interventions dans la salle, il a été

souhaitée que les deux parties se répondent par écrit l'une à l'autre, en annexant des preuves écrites aux allégations faites dans un ou l'autre des cahiers des charges.

Signalons qu'au cours de ce débat, la SMB sarl a proposé que soit mise en place une commission ad hoc pour certifier les dettes et les avancées en paiement entre la SMB sarl et la COOPERAMMA GIE. Pour cette question, il a été proposé que par une décision du Ministre Provincial en charge des Mines et Finances soient nommés les membres de cette commission qui sera composé de sept membres dont :

- Un délégué du cabinet du Gouverneur, Monsieur NKOKORI Roger ;
- Deux délégués du Ministère Provincial des Mines en la personne de monsieur John SAIDI et Mr. MACHO;
- Un délégué de la division provinciale des Mines en la personne de Monsieur KAMBALE MUSAYI;
- Un délégué du SAEMAPE, Monsieur BASOSHI IUBWE Théophile ;
- Un délégué de la COOPERAMMA, Monsieur MUNEZA Aimable;
- Un délégué de la SMB sarl, Monsieur Janvier MWANGACHUCHU.

3. De la lecture des dispositions légales en rapport aux revendications soulevées dans les cahiers des charges.

La lecture des dispositions légales était faite concomitamment avec la lecture de la synthèse des deux cahiers des charges et, un débat suivi de l'interprétation des articles 109 alinéa 3 ; art. 279 du Code minier al.2 ; art. 280 du Code minier avant dernier alinéa.

4. Des dispositions finales

Après avoir suspendu la réunion pour quelques minutes, le Président de la Commission s'est entretenu avec les représentants des services étatiques membres, pour harmonisation des vues par rapport aux points soulevés.

A la reprise de la réunion, les dispositions finales suivantes ont été données en terme d'instruction :

- La poursuite de la collaboration entre la SMB sarl, la COOPERAMMA-GIE et ainsi qu'avec d'autres coopératives minières sur son périmètre minier;
- L'installation de tous les Services habilités dans le chantier de Rukaza pour la traçabilité et la sécurité dans la Mine ;

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink is written over the bottom right of the text. To its right, the letter 'B' is written in a similar handwritten style.

- L'actualisation par la SMB Sarl de son Etude d'Impact Environnemental et Social (EIES);
- La tenue de la réunion tripartite entre le Gouverneur de Province et les deux leaders de deux parties dans un bref délai;
- La fermeture des dépôts non homologués de la COOPERAMMA-GIE pour une gestion conjointe des dépôts homologués ;
- La présentation par la SMB sarl à l'Autorité Provinciale d'un rapport sur les avancées en rapport avec les indemnisations des propriétaires terriens conformément à l'annexe XVIII du Reglement Minier;
- La circulation des agents de la SMB sarl dans tous son périmètre doit être garantie ;
- La SMB sarl doit présenter au Ministre Provincial l'avis favorable ou défavorable de sa demande d'extension d'exploitation d'autres substances dont la tourmaline ;
- Que soit mise en place une commission ad hoc de certification des dettes et des paiements.

Commencée à 09h30', la réunion a pris fin à 12h 30'.

Pour le rapporteur :

1. Mr. René MASUMBUKO BALUME, Chef de Division Provinciale des Mines et Géologie/NK ;

2. Mr. Théophile BASHOSI, Directeur Provincial ai du SAEMAPE/NK.

Annex 12

Article 27 of the revised March 2018 Congolese Mining Code that details mining sector activities that are prohibited for members of the Congolese military

Article 27 du Code congolais des mines amendé en mars 2018 et détaillant les activités interdites aux membres des forces armées congolaises dans le secteur minier

gouvernements provinciaux, des services publics qui en dépendent ou qui sont sous leur tutelle ainsi que des organes de l'Etat expressément visés dans le Code ou dans le Règlement minier, aucun autre service ou organisme public ou étatique n'est compétent pour faire appliquer les dispositions du présent Code et agir directement dans le secteur minier.

Article 16 bis : De la formation

Le Gouvernement définit et met en œuvre la politique de l'emploi et de la formation des nationaux dans le secteur des mines.

Le Règlement minier fixe les modalités de l'application du présent article.

Article 2.

Les articles 23, 26, 27 du Chapitre I^{er}, 28, 30, 31 du Chapitre II, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46 et 47 du Chapitre III au Titre II sont modifiés comme suit :

« TITRE II : DES DISPOSITIONS COMMUNES

CHAPITRE I^{er} : DE L'ELIGIBILITE

Article 23 lettres a et b de l'alinéa 1^{er}

- a. toute personne morale de droit congolais qui a son siège social et administratif sur le territoire national et dont l'objet social porte exclusivement sur les activités minières ;
- b. toute personne morale de droit étranger dont l'objet social porte exclusivement sur les activités minières et qui se conforme aux lois de la République ;

19

Article 27

Ne sont pas éligibles pour solliciter et obtenir les cartes d'exploitant artisanal, de négociant, l'agrément au titre de coopérative minière ou des produits de carrières ainsi que l'agrément au titre de comptoir d'achat et de vente des substances minérales d'exploitation artisanale :

- a) les agents et fonctionnaires de l'Etat, les magistrats, les membres des Forces Armées, les agents de la Police nationale et des Services de Sécurité, les employés des organismes publics habilités à procéder aux opérations minières.

Toutefois, cette incompatibilité ne concerne pas leur prise de participation dans le capital des sociétés minières ;

- b) toute personne frappée d'incapacité juridique prévue à l'article 215 de la loi n°87-010 du 01 août 1987 portant Code de la Famille, telle que modifiée à ce jour ;

- c) toute personne frappée d'interdiction, notamment :

- a. la personne condamnée par un jugement coulé en force de chose jugée pour des infractions à la législation minière et de carrières ou à celles se rapportant aux activités économiques de ses droits minières et de carrières et de ses sociétés affiliées et ce, pendant dix ans ;
- b. la personne à laquelle la carte d'exploitation artisanale ou de négociant a été retirée et ce, pendant trois ans ;

20

28 mars 2018

Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo

Première partie - n° spécial

- c. la personne à laquelle l'agrément au titre des comptoirs d'achat et de vente des substances minérales d'exploitation artisanale a été retirée et ce, pendant cinq ans.

Article 31 dernier alinéa

La nature et la forme de la borne ainsi que les modalités de réalisation du bornage sont déterminées par le Règlement minier.

« TITRE III : DE LA PROCEDURE D'ACQUISITION DES

Annex 13

Four case studies of illegal involvement of some FARDC elements in mineral trading

Quatre cas d'implication de certains éléments des FARDC dans le commerce illicite de minerais

Case Study #1: On the evening of 24 October 2019 the Congolese mining police seized 17 bags of untagged coltan of unknown total weight at the Mushake roadblock, 12 km from Sake along a known smuggling route that is the road connecting Goma and Masisi, North Kivu (see S/2019/469, paras. 162-163). According to eyewitnesses interviewed by the Group, the bags of minerals were transported by armed FARDC elements in a military vehicle. A trader interviewed by the Group confirmed that the coltan originated from a mine in the Rubaya area, North Kivu. At the time of drafting, the ultimate owner and location of the minerals were unknown. Three representatives from the military justice in Goma confirmed to the Group that investigations into the case were ongoing. The Group is aware of several similar incidents along the same route, including one case that occurred on night of 22/23 October 2019. The Group continues to investigate.

Affaire n° 1: Dans la soirée du 24 octobre 2019, la police congolaise des mines a saisi 17 sacs de coltan non étiquetés d'un poids total inconnu au barrage routier de Mushake, à 12 km de Sake, sur une route connue pour le trafic de minerais, à savoir la route reliant Goma à Masisi dans le Nord Kivu (voir S/2019/469, par. 162-163). D'après les témoins oculaires interrogés par le Groupe, les sacs de minerais étaient transportés par des éléments FARDC armés à l'intérieur d'un véhicule militaire. Un commerçant interviewé par le Groupe a confirmé que le coltan provenait d'une mine de la zone de Rubaya, Nord Kivu. Au moment de la rédaction du rapport, le destinataire final et le lieu où se trouvaient les minerais étaient inconnus. Trois représentants de la justice militaire à Goma ont confirmé au Groupe que les enquêtes étaient en cours dans cette affaire. Le Groupe a connaissance de plusieurs incidents similaires qui se sont produits sur la même route, y compris un incident dans la nuit du 22 au 23 octobre 2019. Le Groupe continue d'enquêter.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR
POLICE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE

Rubaya le 24/10/2019

COMMISSARIAT PROVINCIAL DU NORD-KIVU
COMMISSARIAT TERRITORIAL DE MASISI
ESCADRON PMH MASISI
DETACHEMENT PMH P.E.76-SAKIMA

Objet : Rapport circonstancié

A Monsieur le Commandant
ESCADRON PMH MASISI à
SAKE

Info - Chef Minier Territorial Masisi à
SAKE

- Chef du bureau SAEMAPE MASISI
RUBAYA
✓ - Chef du bureau SAKIMA
à RUBAYA

Monsieur le Commandant,

1. Vous informer qu'en date du 24/10/2019 aux environs 23h 57 avons retrouvé un véhicule marque JEEP sans immatriculation vu l'obscurité.
2. Le véhicule a chargé les minerais à 100 mètres de notre bureau de SV PMH Det P.E. 76 SAKIMA / RUBAYA Chez RAZARO ; Av SALAMA. Nous avons filé le véhicule, vu que les militaires qui y étaient été armés de plus que nous lourdement, avons arrêté et nous a dépassé par force.
3. Avertis alerté l'hierarchie et bien même vous connaissez la suite et la décision.
4. Nos investigations continuent et vous faisons rapport.
5. Restons soumis à vos ordres.

Comd PMH P.E.76 SAKIMA/RBY

Mining police incident report of the 24 October 2019 seizure

Procès-verbal de saisie la police des mines du 24 octobre 2019

Case Study #2: The Group documented the ongoing occupation of an unvalidated gold mine in Mwenga territory, South Kivu by at least nine FARDC elements who dug for gold. On 24 September 2019, at Kibe, Kabondo mine, Major Olivier Mazala and around nine other FARDC elements entered the site, of which the ownership is under dispute. Two eyewitnesses confirmed to the Group that the military elements were in the mine and undertaking mining activities. The Group saw official court documents held by the mine owner regarding the case. The Group contacted Mazala by phone several times but did not receive an answer. The Group continues to investigate the onward supply chain of the gold.

Affaire n° 2: Le Groupe a documenté l'occupation en cours d'une mine d'or non-validée dans le territoire de Mwenga, Sud Kivu, par au moins neuf éléments des FARDC qui creusaient pour trouver de l'or. Le 24 septembre 2019, le Major Olivier Mazala et environ neuf autres éléments des FARDC sont entrés dans la mine de Kabondo à Kibe, dont la propriété est disputée. Deux témoins oculaires ont confirmé au Groupe que des éléments militaires étaient effectivement dans la mine et se livraient à des activités minières. Le Groupe a consulté des documents (officiels) judiciaires détenus par le propriétaire de la mine concernant cette affaire. Le Groupe a contacté Mazala par téléphone à plusieurs reprises mais n'a reçu aucune réponse. Le Groupe continue d'enquêter sur la chaîne d'approvisionnement de l'or.

Case Study #3: In a third case, the Group documented how on 17 June 2019 an FARDC element providing off-budget security for an unregistered gold mining company in Ituri province was ambushed by a separate group of FARDC elements in an attempted heist of just over 6.5 kg (6539.16 g) gold, according to official documents. The gold, which was in the form of ingots, was being transported by vehicle from an unvalidated mining site in Adisoma, Irumu, Ituri, to an unknown destination by a representative of Xin Ding Yuan, a company belonging to Chinese investors. Both the representative of Xin Ding Yuan and the FARDC element providing off-budget security were killed in the ambush, according to official records of the event seen by the Group. Investigations by military and provincial authorities, reviewed by the Group, revealed that the heist was orchestrated by Honorable Didier Boyoko Kabange, a provincial politician who has since been removed from office. The Group tried to contact Honorable Kabange, who was sentenced to a USD \$ 20,000 fine and life-long hard labour and who is appealing the case, but was unable to do so by time of publication. The seized gold was valued at USD 235,911.6 and was sold to Muungano na Maendeleo (MNM) a registered gold buying house based in Bunia, Ituri. The Group contacted MNM to confirm the onward trajectory of the gold, but was unable to obtain comment. The Group is aware of at least two other similar cases in Ituri in 2019 and continues to investigate.

Affaire n° 3: Une troisième affaire a permis au Groupe de documenter comment le 17 juin 2019 un élément des FARDC, assurant la sécurité hors budget d'une compagnie minière d'or non enregistrée dans la province de l'Ituri, est tombé dans une embuscade tendue par d'autres éléments FARDC lors d'une tentative de braquage d'un peu plus 6,5 kg (6,53916 g) d'or. L'or, qui était sous la forme de lingots, provenait de la mine non-validée Adisoma en Irumu, en Ituri, pour une destination inconnue et était transporté dans un véhicule conduit par un représentant de la compagnie Xin Ding Yuan, qui appartient à des investisseurs chinois. Le représentant de Xin Ding Yuan et l'élément FARDC assurant la sécurité hors budget ont, tous les deux, été tués dans l'embuscade, selon les procès-verbaux officiels consultés par le Groupe. Les enquêtes des autorités militaires et provinciales, consultées par le Groupe, montrent que le braquage a été organisé par l'Honorable Didier Boyoko Kabange, un politicien provincial, qui a depuis été démis de ses fonctions. Le Groupe a essayé de contacter Honorable Kabange, qui a été condamné à une amende de 20 000 dollars américains et des travaux forcés à vie et qui a fait appel, mais n'y est pas parvenu avant la publication du rapport. L'or saisi a été évalué à 235 911,60 dollars américains et a été vendu à Muungano na Maendeleo (MNM), un comptoir d'or enregistré et basé à Bunia, en Ituri. Le groupe a contacté MNM afin de s'enquérir de ce qu'il était advenu de l'or, mais n'a pas été en mesure d'obtenir le moindre commentaire. Le Groupe a connaissance d'au moins deux autres affaires similaires en Ituri en 2019 et continue d'enquêter.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO

CENTRE D'EXPERTISE
D'EVALUATION ET DE CERTIFICATION
DES SUBSTANCES MINÉRALES
PRÉCIEUSES ET SEMI-PRÉCIEUSES

COMPTOIR: **M N M**

Nature de la substance précieuse ou semi-précieuse: **OR**

Bureau d'Achat situé à: **BUNIA**

Province de: **ITURI**

Quantité achetée: **6 553,10 GR**

Valeur d'achat payée au(x) vendeur(s): **2 359 116 \$**

Montant en chiffres: **2 359 116 \$**

Montant en toutes lettres: **DOLLARS AMÉRICAIN DEUX CENT TRENTE CINQ MILLE NEUF CENT ONZE SOIXANTE CENTAIME**

Date d'achat: **Le 16/07/2019**

Lieu d'achat: **A BUNIA**

ARRÊTÉ D'AGREMENT DU COMPTOIR

N°: []

Valable de: []

ou: []

AB 0115882 A

Acheteur: **KATHO KABUNDI**

Vendeur: **PROVINCIAL ECOTIN**

Délégué CEEC: **LWFUNGHLO**

Document of sale for seized gold, which states a purchase of 6553.10 g. Official documents of the gold seizure seen by the Group record 6539.16 g seized mineral.

Document de vente de l'or saisi, mentionnant l'achat de 6553,10 g. Les documents officiels relatifs à l'or saisi mentionnent 6539,16 g d'or saisi.

Case Study #4: The prosecution of a fourth case involving Colonel Innocent Kabundi of 32nd military region, head of sector operations, Bunia, is ongoing. Military justice informed the Group that the Colonel, who is charged with involvement in illegal gold trafficking, is suspended from duty.

Affaire n° 4: Dans une quatrième affaire, les poursuites impliquaient Colonel Innocent Kabundi de la 32e région militaire et chef du secteur opérations à Bunia, et sont toujours en cours. La justice militaire a informé le Groupe que le Colonel, inculpé pour son implication dans le trafic illégal d'or, a été suspendu de ses fonctions.

Annex 14

24 September 2019 letter from the Uganda Revenue Authorities to four Uganda-based gold refineries and service providers detailing new reporting requirements to the Commissioner Customs**Lettre du 24 septembre 2019 des Autorités fiscales Ougandaises aux quatre raffineries d'or basées en Ouganda et aux fournisseurs de services détaillant les obligations de déclaration au Commissaire des douanes**

URA/CUST/CCD/3/27

September 24, 2019

African Gold Refinery,
ENTEBBE

Bullion Refinery Ltd,
Madhvani Business Park,
5th Industrial Street,
KAMPALA

Simba Refinery Limited,
5th Industrial Street,
KAMPALA

Metal Testing and Smelting Co. Ltd
KAMPALA

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS FOR LICENSING MANUFACTURING UNDER BOND, INWARD PROCESSING, REFINING AND EXPORT OF GOLD

As you may be aware, H.E The President has on several occasions reiterated Government's position against export of unprocessed minerals out of Uganda. I also make further reference to the recent audits we conducted in your companies with a few of streamlining the sector. We have also been faced with rampant cases of fraud in the Gold trade business including forgery and misrepresentation of Customs documents, stamps and signatures.

Further reference is made to the following licensing provisions for manufacturing under bond and Inward Processing in the East African Community Customs Management Act (EACCMA);

Section 160 (1) *The Commissioner may, on application and **subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may impose, issue a license** in the prescribed form to any person to manufacture goods under bond in specified premises; and the Commissioner may refuse to issue a license or, by notice in writing, suspend, revoke or refuse to renew a license on the grounds stated in the notice.*

Section 163 (1) *A manufacturer shall;*

- (a) *Provide office accommodation and **just weights, scales, measures and other facilities** for examining and taking account of goods and for securing them as the proper officer may reasonably require.*

- (b) *Keep a record of all types of plant, machinery and equipment, raw materials and goods manufactured in the factory and keep that record at all times available for examination by the proper officer.*
- (c) *Provide all necessary, labour and materials for the storing, examining, packing, marking, cooping, weighing and taking stock of the goods in the factory whenever the proper officer so requires.*

Section 164 (2) *All manufactured goods shall be duly exported or entered for home consumption within such time and **subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may impose.***

Section 166 (1) *The Commissioner may, subject to such conditions as he may impose and on payment of duties due, permit goods manufactured in a bonded factory, including waste from the manufacturing process, to be entered for home consumption.*

Section 166 (2) *The value for the purpose of determining the duty on the goods removed from a bonded factory shall be determined in accordance with section 122.*

Section 166 (3) *A licensee who, **without the permission of the Commissioner, disposes of, or allows to be disposed of, raw materials or manufactured goods from a bonded factory,** within the Partner States, whether on payment or not, or any person who **acquires, keeps, conceals or has in his or her possession such raw materials or manufactured goods from a bonded factory, commits an offence** and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of five thousand dollars or fifty percent of the ex-factory value of the raw materials or manufactured goods, whichever is the higher, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or both; and the goods in respect of which the offence has been committed shall be liable to forfeiture.*

Section 171 *further states;*

'inward processing' *means the customs procedure under which certain goods can be brought in a Partner State conditionally exempted from duty on the basis that such goods are intended for manufacturing, processing or repair and subsequent exportation.*

Section 172 (1) *The Commissioner shall, subject to such conditions as the Commissioner may prescribe, allow the following goods to be entered for inward processing in a Partner State in one or more processing operations*

- (a) *Goods imported directly from a foreign country*
- (b) *Goods transferred from another Partner State*

Section 172 (2) *Goods entered under subsection (1) shall be exempt from duty.*

Section 172 (3) *The right to import goods for inward processing shall not be limited to the owner of the imported goods but shall extend to a contract in which a foreign consignor remains the owner of the goods and the importer only processes the goods under contract.*

Further reference is made to the **East African Community Customs Management Act Regulations under Part XIII Manufacturing Under Bond (MUB) as well as those under Part XVI Inward and Outward Processing.**

In order to streamline the sector and achieve the country's objective of value addition through processing as well as mitigate the rampant fraud in the sector and line with the above provisions, you SHALL be required to fulfil the conditions listed below before you are allowed to continue operating an MUB facility and exporting gold out of the country:

1. Any licensed gold refinery or precious metal processing company which wishes to export shall produce gold bars that conform to the international specifications as follows:
 - (a) Weight and fineness of the bar:**
 - For 1 Kilogram of tradable gold bar of international standards minimum of 995 purity and /or minimum of 999.9 purity per thousand parts of gold.
 - For a small tradable gold bar an exact weight of 1.00g, 2.5g, 5.00g, 10.00g, 20.00g, 50.00g, 100.00g, 10 tola with a weight of 11.6638 grams minimum 999.0 purity and /or higher purity of 999.9 per thousand parts of fine gold.
 - (b) Appearance:**
 - The surfaces of the bar shall be smooth, free of any irregularities such as layering, surface cavities, bubbles, spots, blowholes or shrinkage.
 - (c) Marks:**
 - The bars should bear the following marks, which shall be clearly legible
 - i) Serial Numbers
 - ii) Hallmark/brand stamp of the refiner
 - iii) Fineness (to four significant figures)
 - iv) Weight (expressed in grams, kilograms or troy ounces)
 - The bars must reflect the year of manufacture, or if not, the year must be stated on the accompanying certificate of the manufacturer.
 - (d) All shapes and sizes of the fine kilobars may have minor variations but the following measurements should be considered as the benchmarks:**
 - Maximum Length: 119 mm
 - Maximum Width: 55 mm
 - Maximum Thickness: 9 mm

2. All licensed refineries are required to **provide to Customs an XRF Machine, an accurate weighing scale and size measuring instrument.**
3. All gold exports shall **be verified, weighed and tested by Customs at the Airport using the equipment provided in 2 above.** For any consignment to be allowed, it must pass all the tests using the provided equipment by all the refineries.
4. Since all mineral dealers are regulated by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals Development, the licensed refineries must only accept gold from licensed dealers or licensed producers for locally produced gold.
5. All refineries must put in place Environmental friendly and sustainable Management practices to manage waste disposal and obtain clearance of the same from National Environmental Management Authority before application for Manufacture Under Bond (MUB).
6. All refineries must establish standards and practices to protect human resources against any dangerous exposure arising from the refining processes. A confirmation on the same from Ministry of Gender and Labour development must be submitted before application of MUB.
7. Any company which is under international sanctions or whose directors are under international sanctions SHALL not be licensed to operate a refinery and export of gold. For this matter, all companies must submit to the Commissioner the Ultimate Beneficiary Owners and shareholders of the legal entity to avoid sanctioned persons getting involved in the business to safe guard Uganda against listing in the United Nations reports.
8. No refinery is allowed to source gold for inward processing from jurisdictions or authorities under international sanctions.
9. All refineries MUST fully comply with the applicable domestic tax laws and submit a tax compliance certificate before application for MUB.
10. All refineries must comply with the Import and Export procedures as per the EACCMA.
11. In order for the Country to further enhance the value chain in the sector, all refineries are required to submit to the Commissioner their roadmap / plan for future value addition i.e. in producing products out of Gold bars by 31st December 2019.
12. Any company whose directors directly or indirectly get involved in smuggling or abetting smuggling of Gold, Money laundering and or violating the provisions for licensing SHALL have their license AUTOMATICALLY REVOKED and directors prosecuted under the Customs Laws.

All the companies are requested to revert back to the undersigned **within 5 days** from the date of this notice indicating their full compliance with the above requirements as a condition for further facilitation by Customs.

By copy of this letter, the Manager Entebbe Customs is instructed to STRICTLY enforce compliance with these requirements with immediate effect.



Dicksons C. Kateshumbwa
COMMISSIONER CUSTOMS

Copy to:

1. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Minerals and Energy Development
2. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development
3. Commissioner General, URA
4. Manager, Entebbe Customs

Annex 15

Forged ICGLR certificate for attempted export of 18 kg of gold from Bukavu, South Kivu to named individual Andreas Willy Giulio Wildt

Certificat CIRGL falsifié, utilisé pour une tentative d'exportation de 18 kg d'or de Bukavu, Sud Kivu pour le compte d'un individu dénommé Andreas Willy Giulio Wildt

Congolese mining authorities confirmed to the Group that both the certificate and signatories on it were forged.


Les autorités congolaises des mines ont confirmé au Groupe que les certificats et signataires y afférents étaient tous les deux falsifiés.



Annex 16

Report of the meeting held from 1 to 4 October 2019 of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, during which Burundi launched the ICGLR certification scheme

Rapport de la réunion de la Conférence internationale sur la région des Grands Lacs du 1er au 4 octobre 2019, au cours de laquelle le Burundi a lancé son programme de certification CIRGL



1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The 19th Meeting of the ICGLR Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation on Natural Resources was held from 1st to 4th October 2019 in Ngozi, Republic of Burundi. The meeting was marked by the official launch of the ICGLR Certificate in the Republic of Burundi. The meeting was officially opened by His Excellency Dr Joseph Butore, the Second Vice-President of the Republic of Burundi.
- 1.2 The objective of the 19th Meeting of the ICGLR Regional Committee was threefold: Official launch of the ICGLR Certificate in the Republic of Burundi, Review of the Status of Implementation of the Roadmap for the 6 Tools of RINR and Consideration of the revised Manual of the Regional Certification Mechanism.
- 1.3 The following Member States attended the meeting: Republic of Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Kenya, Republic of South Sudan, Republic of Zambia, United Republic of Tanzania and Republic of Uganda. The Chairperson of the ICGLR Regional Audit Committee also attended the meeting.
- 1.4 Besides, ICGLR partners in implementation of the RINR, namely GIZ, BGR and IMPACT attended the meeting as observers. It was also attended by the Director General of AMGC and officials of the Ministry of Minerals of the United Republic of Tanzania and those of the Ministry of Mines of the DRC from South Kivu Province.

2. OPENING SESSION

- 2.1 The meeting was officially opened by H.E. Dr Joseph Butore, Vice-President of the Republic of Burundi. The Opening Session was also

Page 2 sur 8



addressed by H.E. Hon. Côme MANIRAKIZA, Minister of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines in the Republic of Burundi, Ambassador Ambeyi Ligabo, Representative of the ICGLR Executive Secretary, Mr Albert NDUWIMANA, Governor of Ngozi Province, Mrs Annick MAKOLET, Vice-President of the ICGLR Regional Committee, and Mrs. Madame Julie Héliane Danielle SERVICE on the behalf of H. E Minister of Geology and Mines in the Republic of Congo and Chair of Ministers in charge of Mines in ICGLR of Member State.

2.2 In his opening statement, the Guest of Honour, His Excellency Dr Joseph BUTORE, Vice-President of the Republic of Burundi, first conveyed to the audience the greetings from His Excellency Pierre NKURUNZINZA, President of the Republic of Burundi.

2.3 He placed particular emphasis on the Protocol on the Fight against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and the objectives assigned to it and recommended that Member States should take ownership of the Protocol. He further called for full cooperation between Member States in the implementation of strategies to combat the illegal exploitation of natural resources and smuggling of minerals, through sharing of information and experiences between more and less advanced countries. He finally stated that mineral resources should further unite Member States of the ICGLR, strengthen them and not divide them.

2.4 In his remarks, His Excellency Minister of Hydraulics, Energy and Mines of the Republic of Burundi, Honourable Côme MANIRAKIZA, welcomed, with pleasure, the various ICGLR delegations at Ruhuka Hotel, in BUYE of which he praised the natural landscape. He framed the event within the ICGLR Protocol on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources before dressing a list of key achievements of the Republic of



Burundi after the signing of the Lusaka Declaration at the Special Summit of ICGLR Heads of State and Government against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, held on 15 December, 2010. Lastly, he acknowledged the support of the Conference Secretariat and technical and financial partners, particularly in strengthening the capacities of the management and staff of the Burundi Mining Authority.

2.5 Ambassador Ambeyi LIGABO, Representative of the ICGLR Executive Secretary, expressed his profound gratitude and thanked His Excellency the Second Vice-President of the Republic of Burundi for having honoured, with his presence, the opening ceremonies of the 19th Meeting of the ICGLR Regional Committee on Natural Resources and the Official Launch of the ICGLR Certificate in Burundi. He reiterated the desire of the ICGLR to see the effective implementation of the Regional Certification Mechanism in all Member States in the aim of cutting the link between the exploitation of the natural resources and the financing of conflicts perpetrated by negative forces, and thus contributing to peace, security, stability and sustainable development of our States.

2.6 In his welcome note, the Governor of Ngozi Province, Mr. Albert NDUWIMANA, thanked the ICGLR Secretariat and the Regional Committee for choosing Ngozi Province as the venue of the 19th meeting of the Regional Committee against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. He then wished all the participants a nice stay while stating that the whole province is calm and peaceful.

2.7 The Vice-Chairperson of the ICGLR Regional Committee, Mrs Annick MAKOLET, thanked the Republic of Burundi through His Excellency the Second Vice-President of the Republic for the warm welcome extended to the various delegations. The same thanks were addressed to the Executive Secretary of the ICGLR for the



adequate logistical and financial arrangements for the success of the work. The Vice-Chairperson reminded the delegations of the ICGLR Member States about the urgent need highlighted by urgency highlighted by the 7th Summit of ICGLR Heads of State and Government and the 5th meeting of Ministers in charge of Mines, both held in Brazzaville in October 2017 and December 2018, respectively, for the implementation of the Self-Financing Mechanism of the Regional Initiative on the Fight Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources.

2.8 The representative of His Excellency Pierre OBA, Minister of Geology and Mines of the Republic of Congo and Chair of ICGLR Ministers in charge of Mines, Mrs. Julie Héliane Danielle SERVICE, in the statement by the Minister and Chair, congratulated the Government of Burundi for its determination in issuing the ICGLR Certificate. She stated that her Government is working tirelessly to implement the 6 tools of the ICGLR Regional Initiative on the Fight against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. She concluded her speech by encouraging all Member States to implement the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism, as it is said that, "*Our hard work depends on our people's lives*".

3. OFFICIAL LAUNCH OF THE ICGLR CERTIFICATE IN BURUNDI

3.1. On Tuesday, October 1st, 2019, under the High Patronage of HE Dr. Joseph BUTORE, Second Vice President of the Republic of Burundi, Burundi officially launched its ICGLR Certificate for the export of 3T minerals. The Ministers in charge of Mines of the Member States, in this case the United Republic of Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo were respectively represented by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mineral Resources of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Secretary General for Mines of the



Democratic Republic of Congo and Member of the ICGLR Regional Committee for the Republic of Congo. The Republic of Kenya and the Republic of Rwanda were represented by their respective Embassies accredited to Burundi. Embassies and Diplomatic Missions accredited to Burundi as well as International Organisations partnering with ICGLR and Burundi also took part in the ceremonies.

3.2. The Specimens of the ICGLR Certificate were issued to 3 Mineral Export Companies of the 3Ts in Burundi who had undergone ICGLR Third party Audit, namely, Burundi Mineral Export (BME), Société d'Exploitation et de Commercialisation des Minerais au Burundi (SECOMIB) et Raw Mineral Resources (RMR). The delegations of all 12 ICGLR Member States received specimens for use as reference document whenever required to do so.

4. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

After presentation of the draft agenda by the Vice-Chair of the Regional Committee, the Committee reviewed and adopted it as follows:

- Review of the Status of Implementation of Roadmaps for the 6 tools by Member States and at regional level.
- Review of the revised Manual of the Regional Certification Manual.
- Revision of the Committee's Rules of Procedure.
- Election of the Bureau members of the Regional Committee.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee deliberated on all the items of the agenda and formulated the following recommendations:

1. The Regional Certification Mechanism Manual is approved.
2. The Regional Certification Mechanism Manual shall be evaluated every two (2) years.

3. In case of an audit request by a Red Status exporter, the Audit Committee shall proceed with the request in a timely manner;
4. The ICGLR Secretariat shall send a letter to the Ministers in charge of Mines on the need for the RINR Self-Financing Mechanism to be implemented;
5. A period of six (6) months from November 2019 should be granted to each Member State to pay its annual contributions, which, in case of failing, a penalty system will be applied to it.
6. The Regional Committee took note of the proposed USAID- PACT Project on Mine Site Inspections and Validation in DRC and expressed strong reservation because of the potential conflicts of interest since PACT is also involved in Mineral traceability alongside other traceability service providers in the Great Lakes Region.
7. Member States should support and facilitate logistical arrangements for the development of a ICGLR promotional video for the RINR.
8. The Revised Rules of Procedure of the Regional Committee have been adopted; they will be transmitted to Ministers in charge of Mines for onward transmission to an Approval Authority before it is implemented, namely the ICGLR Regional Inter-Ministerial Committee at its next meeting.
9. Member States are encouraged to nominate two members of the Regional Committee each, a principal and an alternate, preferably one man and one woman, from officials in the Ministry in charge of Mines, while indicating the principal.

10. The Bureau of the RINR Regional Committee will be established on a rotational basis following the alphabetical order of Member States for a period of two years, non-renewable beginning from the next meeting; in case of unavailability of the concerned Member State, the following Member State on the alphabetical list will take the post.
11. An Interim Bureau was constituted until the next meeting and the approval of the Rules of Procedures. It is composed as follows:
- **Chairperson:** Mrs Annick MAKOLET, Central African Republic;
 - **Vice- Chairperson:** Mr William ALIGA, Republic of South Sudan;
 - **Rapporteur:** Mr Assa MWAKILEMBE, United Republic of Tanzania.
12. The Regional Committee expressed deep concern on the refusal of GIZ to facilitate the delegates of Burundi and DRC in participation in ICGLR Regional Committee Meetings. Therefore, the Committee recommends the ICGLR Secretariat to engage with GIZ and find a sustainable solution.
13. Date and Venue of the Next Meeting: The Twentieth Meeting of the Regional Committee on Natural Resources will be held in the Central African Republic or the United Republic of Tanzania or the Democratic Republic of Congo (consecutively with the Regional Forum on Gold) in March 2020.

Done in Ngozi, Republic of Burundi, on 3rd October 2019

Eng. Annick Makolet
Chairperson



Eng. Assa Mwakilembe
Rapporteur

Annex 17

Ilyutshin 76 (IL-76) cargo airplane registered YI-BAT (Iraq)

Avion cargo Ilyutshin 76 (IL-76) immatriculé YI-BAT (Irak)

Photograph 1



Photograph taken on Goma airfield in August 2019
Photographie prise à l'aéroport de Goma en août 2019

Photograph 2



Screenshots 3 and 4
Captures d'écran 3 et 4



RDC: L'armée de l'air met à la disposition de la CENI des avions et hélicoptères

IL-76 registered YI-BAT presented as part of the material handed over to the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) by the Congolese Government on 8 October 2018 at N'Djili airport (Kinshasa).

IL-76 immatriculé YI-BAT présenté comme faisant partie du matériel remis à la Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) par le Gouvernement congolais le 8 Octobre 2018 à l'aéroport de N'Djili (Kinshasa).

Reference : <https://www.ceni.cd/articles/elections-du-23-decembre-2018-la-ceni-dotee-de-materiel-volant-et-roulant-par-le-gouvernement-de-la-republique-democratique-du-congo>



République Démocratique du Congo
Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante

CENI

[ACCUEIL](#) [A PROPOS](#) [ACTUALITES](#) [ELECTEURS](#) [PARTIS & CANDIDATS](#) [ELECTIONS](#) [RESSOUR](#)


CENIRDC / ACTUALITÉS

Elections du 23 décembre 2018 : la CENI dotée de matériel volant et roulant par le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique du Congo



Publié le 29/10/2018 17:50:00

150 camions de type Kamaz réceptionnés à Kinshasa, 135 camions à recevoir dans les villes de la partie Est du pays, 171 Pick-Up, 1.800 motos, 1 avion Ilyusin-76, 1 DC-8, 3 Boeings-727, 1 Boeing-737, 2 Antonov 72 adaptés à des pistes d'accès difficile, 1 Boeing-737 passagers, 5 hélicoptères d'une capacité d'une tonne et demie et 2 hélicoptères de supervision constituent le lot des moyens logistiques mis à la disposition de la CENI par le Gouvernement de la RDC pour des élections du 23 décembre 2018.



CENI list of the material handed over to it by the Congolese government
Liste de la CENI relative au matériel qui lui a été remis par le Gouvernement congolais

Letter from the Director General of the Congolese Civil Aviation Authorities
Lettre du Directeur général de l'Autorité de l'aviation civile congolaise

RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
 AUTORITÉ DE L'AVIATION CIVILE



Le Directeur Général

Kinshasa, le 18 OCT 2019

N° AAC/100/DG/TMJ/KMF/ASST/19

TRANSMIS copie pour information à :

- ✦ Monsieur le Conseiller Spécial du Chef de l'Etat en matière de Sécurité ;
à **Kinshasa/Ngaliema**
- ✦ Son Excellence Monsieur Ignace GATA MAVITA
Représentant permanent de la République Démocratique du Congo auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
- ✦ Michaela Markova
E-mail : markovam@un.org
Tel 002129632647
- ✦ Monsieur David Biggs
Tel : 00212 9635598
E-mail : biggs@un.org
à **Kinshasa/Ngaliema**

A Monsieur David Zounmou
 Coordonnateur du Groupe d'Experts du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur la République Démocratique du Congo
 à **New-York/Etats-Unis**

Concerne : **ACCUSE DE RECEPTION**

Monsieur le Coordonnateur,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre sous référence **S/AC.43/2019/GE/OC.45** du **19 septembre 2019**, par laquelle vous demandez un certain nombre des renseignements précis sur [REDACTED] et un **Ilyushin 76 (IL-76)** immatriculés respectivement [REDACTED] **YI-BAT** et je vous en remercie.


Après investigations, il m'est revenu de constater que lesdits aéronefs sont utilisés par l'armée. Or, l'**article 3 points a) et b) de la Convention de Chicago du 07 décembre 1944** relative à l'aviation civile internationale dispose ce qui suit :

...//...

www.aacrdc.org

Courriel: info@aacrdc.org

Adresse : 117, Blvd du 30 juin, Bldg SCTP (ex Onatra) - Kinshasa / Gombe
 Téléphone : +243 81 22 37 602
 République Démocratique du Congo



Photographs 5-7



Photographs 5-7 were taken on 9 November 2017 at the Kamina military airbase prior to an airlift of FARDC elements.

Les photographies 5-7 ont été prises le 9 novembre 2017 à l'aéroport militaire de Kamina juste avant l'embarquement et le décollage de l'avion transportant des éléments des FARDC.

MONUSCO incident report (16 June 2019)
Rapport d'incident de la MONUSCO (16 juin 2019)

This aircraft stationed on Goma airfield close to MONUSCO's infrastructure and its air fleet, caught fire twice on 16 and 19 June 2019.

Cet avion stationné sur l'aéroport de Goma à côté des infrastructures et de la flotte de la MONUSCO a pris feu à deux reprises, les 16 et 19 juin 2019.

GOMA AIRPORT ECR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT / INCIDENT REPORT						
Date of Incident	Tuesday, June 18, 2019					
Incident type and Class	Engine Fire					
Time start	12:46					
Time stop	13:05					
Incident Commander	Fire Marshal Papa Bruce Mbozi					
Wind	Calm					
Weather	Cloudy and MRI					
Vehicles used	Rescue 1, 2, 3, RVA & ECR Command Vehicles					
Location	RVA Civilian Main Passenger Apron (T1)					
Personnel (Its)	FIRE					
	Fire Marshal	1				
	RVA Fire Officer	1				
	Driver Operator	3				
	Firefighter	7				
	Dispatcher	1				
Injuries (X)	P1	P2	P3	P4	NIL	X
P1 = Critically Injured		P3 = Slightly injured				
P2 = Seriously Injured		P4 = Dead				
Type of Incident	Flight #	A/C Type	Water Used	Foam Used	Zorb Used	Other
Fuel Spill (X)	Class 1					
	Class 2					
	Class 3					
Undercarriage Failure						
Wheel Fire						
Emergency Landing						
Aircraft Fire						
Engine Fire	YI-BAT	IL-76TD	1000 Lbs	NIL	NIL	NIL
Aircraft Accident						
Hot Wheels						
Medical						
Other:						
Summary of ECR Response and Activities / Comments:						
At 12:46, the IL76TD that located on the RVA Main Apron (T1) was doing technical maintenance on engine number 1 and it caught fire during start.						
At 12:46, the Rescue 1 immediately responded by visual contact with the smoke that was coming out and arrived on the scene quickly. The fire began to burn the lower part of the engine caused by leaking fuel, and Rescue 1 crew used the Roof Turret and one attack fire hose to extinguish the fire. Rescue 1 and crew was positioned on the Ramp as per usual arrangement for rapid intervention in case of such an emergency.						
At 12:48 RESCUE 2, 3, RVA and COMMAND vehicle arrived on the scene to support Rescue 1 which was already busy extinguishing the fire.						
At 12:53, The fire was extinguished and RESCUE 1 moves to MONUSCO RAMP to continue emergency standby for MONUSCO operations.						
At 13:03, ECR Command Vehicle, Rescue 2 & 3 were ordered to return to the Fire Station after the emergency operations were completed.						
At 13:05, All Emergency Vehicles were back at the Fire Station. End of emergency operations.						

MONUSCO incident report (19 June 2019)
Rapport d'incident de la MONUSCO (19 juin 2019)

GOMA AIRPORT ECR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT / INCIDENT REPORT						
Date of Incident	Wednesday, June 19, 2019					
Incident type and Class	Engine Fire					
Time start	12:00					
Time stop	12:25					
Incident Commander	Fire Marshal Papa Brane Mbody					
Wind	Calm					
Weather	Cloudy and Mild					
Vehicles used	RESCUE 1,2 & ECR Command Vehicle					
Location	RVA Civilian Main Passenger Apron (T1)					
Personnel (#s)	FIRE					
	Fire Marshal	1				
	RVA Fire Officer	0				
	Driver Operator	2				
	Firefighter	9				
	Dispatcher	1				
Injuries (X)	P1	P2	P3	P4	NIL	X
P1 = Critically Injured		P3 = Slightly injured				
P2 = Seriously Injured		P4 = Dead				
Type of Incident	Flight #	A/C Type	Water Used	Foam Used	Zorb Used	Other
Fuel Spill (X)	Class 1					
	Class 2					
	Class 3					
Undercarriage Failure						
Wheel Fire						
Emergency Landing						
Aircraft Fire						
Engine Fire	Y1 - BAT	IL76 TD	2000 lts	NIL	NIL	NIL
Aircraft Accident						
Hot Wheels						
Medical						
Other:						
Summary of ECR Response and Activities / Comments:						
At 12:00, Goma ATC Tower requested Alpha India (AI) (RVA Fire Department) to assist the IL-76 TD, located on T1 for an Engine Ground Run						
At 12:01, the RESCUE 2 responded from the Fire Station to the RVA Main Apron (T1) for Engine Ground Run standby of the the IL-76TD						
At 12:07, AI requested reinforcement with a second fire truck before the Engine Ground Run could start. Rescue 1 which was on MONUSCO RAMP for standby responded swiftly to T1 for reinforcement. Two Fire Trucks were on Emergency Standby for the Engine Ground Run.						
At 12:09, ECR Command Vehicle with the Fire Marshal arrived at the RVA Main Apron to join the Emergency Standby Team for the IL-76TD						
At 12:10, The IL-76 gave OK signal to start the Engine Ground Run with engine number 1 and it caught fire again right during start up						
Immediately RESCUE 1 crew used the Roof Turret and two attack line hose to extinguish the fire, while RESCUE 2 and crew was positioned on the Ramp in case of support.						
At 12:14, The Fire was extinguished. All ECR Units were ordered to stand down and make up all equipment used.						
At 12:15 RESCUE 1 was ordered to return to MONUSCO RAMP to continue emergency standby for MONUSCO operations.						
At 12:22 RESCUE 2, ECR Command vehicle return to the Fire Station after emergency operations were completed.						
At 12:25 All Emergency Vehicles were back at the Fire Station. End of emergency operations.						



Screenshot from a plane spotter's Facebook page illustrating the second incident
 Capture d'écran de la page Facebook d'un observateur illustrant le second incident



Fire brigade at work on the IL-76 registered YI-BAT
 Brigade des pompiers en action sur le IL-76 immatriculé YI-BAT

Annex 18

NDC-R elements wearing FARDC uniforms

Éléments du NDC-R portant des uniformes FARDC

Photograph 1



Photograph 2



Photograph 3



Photograph 4



In photograph 4, the weapon in the hand of Guidon is a Type 81 light machine gun with similar characteristics to that of Chinese production. The Group has documented that this type of weapon was used by the FARDC. Sur la photographie 4, l'arme entre les mains de Guidon est un fusil mitrailleur Type 81 avec des caractéristiques similaires à celles de la production chinoise. Le Groupe a documenté que ce type d'armes était utilisé par les FARDC.

Photograph 5



Photograph extracted from the Group's report [S/2019/469](#), annex 17
 Photographie extraite du rapport du Groupe [S/2019/469](#), annexe 17

Annex 19

Transcript of the video recording showing the NDC-R logistical efforts prior to the attack on the CNRD HQ in Faringa

Transcription de l'enregistrement vidéo montrant les efforts logistiques du NDC-R avant l'attaque de l'état-major du CNRD à Faringa

Ils sont très nombreux.

Les voici (on observe une colonne de personnes chargées de matériel divers qui progresse).

Les munitions sont aussi très nombreuses.

Voilà, voilà, se sont tous des « révolutionnistes » (sic).

NDC-Rénové, ils sont en train de se battre contre les FDLR, territoire de Rutshuru, chefferie de Bwito (*Commentaire : c'est bien le CNRD qui était sur la chefferie de Bwito à la date où la vidéo a été tournée et non les FDLR.*)

Même les mamans sont décidées de mettre fin à ce phénomène.

Voilà les mamans avec des munitions.

Elles sont des commandantes aussi.

Ah, ah voilà, ils sont là.

Voilà, voilà, il y a un grand commandant que vous voyez ici.

Il s'appelle **MATUNGULU**, un grand commandant.

Ils sont là.

Voilà, toute la population est décidée de mettre fin.

Ils sont en train de se battre contre les FDLR dans le territoire de Rutshuru, chefferie de Bwito.

Ils sont aujourd'hui même.

Il y aura au moins cinq opérations.

Voilà, ils sont là, tous, on est combattant NDC-Rénové.

D'autres sont des patriotes, très « révolutionnistes » (sic).

Voilà, ils sont là, ils sont là en train de passer.

C'est un grand responsable qui vient de passer.

Voilà, il est là le grand maître.

Voilà, ils portent même des armes lourdes.

Mi AA, **mitrailleuse anti-aérienne** (*Commentaire : mitrailleuse lourde calibre 12.7x108mm*).

Voilà les petits qui se battent jour et nuit avec leur (incompréhensible), **des PKM** (*Commentaire : mitrailleuses légères calibre 7.62x54Rmm*).

Ils sont là, ce sont des combattants, tous.

Voilà, il y a beaucoup d'armes, trépieds (*Commentaire : un combattant portant le bipied d'un mortier 82mm est visible*),... je ne sais pas quoi.

Ohhh, mortier 82.

Voilà, voilà, **mortier 80** (*Commentaire : un deuxième tube de mortier 82mm passe devant la caméra*), ils sont là avec beaucoup...

Voilà, voilà, (incompréhensible) l'adjudant, un grand combattant, il est là, il s'appelle **Eric KITWANA** PKM derrière lui (*Commentaire : un combattant porte une mitrailleuse PKM*).

Derrière **KIBARIGA**.

Un grand monsieur, c'est l'**adjoint T3** (*Commentaire : le T3 désigne l'officier en charge des opérations*), un grand guerrier du NDC-Rénové qui s'appelle **Alpha RADJABU ALFANI**.

Avec toute l'équipe derrière lui.

C'est un grand monsieur, c'est un grand combattant.

Voilà, il vient de passer lui aussi.

Les autres sont là... **Bureau 4 !** (*Commentaire : Le « bureau 4 (ou T4) désigne le service ou l'officier en charge de la logistique/approvisionnement*).

Il est là, **chef de secteur**, c'est **Raga HAKIZIMWAMI** avec toute l'équipe, voilà l'adjoint de secteur.

Ils sont tous là, ils sont décidé de mettre fin aux opérations FDLR dans la chefferie de Bwito.

Même les mamans sont très fâchées.

Voilà, voilà, voilà comment les mamans se frappent la poitrine.

Ils sont là, ohh, **OPJ Mouvement** (*Commentaire : Officier de Police judiciaire du mouvement (NDC-R)*), ohh **ParSec du Cabinet** (*Commentaire : Secrétaire Particulier du Cabinet*), ohh, le **chef T1** (*Commentaire : Le T1*

désigne l'officier en charge de la gestion du personnel), le voici, il est là, il est décidé, il part à Rutshuru pour mettre fin aux histoires de kidnapping, aux histoires des convois.

Avec une grande équipe, là.

C'est (incompréhensible) les mouvements décidé là-bas, voilà toute l'équipe.

Ils sont là, ils sont là, ils sont là... très décidé.

English translation by the Group

There are a lot of them.

There they are (we see a long file of people advancing and carrying varying weaponry).

There are a lot of munitions as well.

See, you see these are the "revolutionaries".

The NDC-Rénové, they're fighting the FDLR at the moment, in Rutshuru territory, at Bwito.

(Commentary: it was the CNRD and not the FDLR who were at Bwito the date that this video was taken).

Even the mamas have decided to bring this thing to an end.

See, look at the mamas who are carrying munitions.

They're commanders too.

Ha, there you are.. they are there..

There we have it, a big commander that you see before us here.

He is called MATUNGULU, he's one of the big commanders.

They're there.

See, the whole population has decided to stop this.

They're fighting against the FDLR in the whole territory of Rutshuru, at Bwito area.

They're there today, right now.

There will be at least five operations.

Look at them, they're all NDC-R fighters.

The others, they're patriots, very "revolutionaries".

Well, there they are, passing by.

That's the leader, the man who just passed.

They are carrying heavy weapons.

Mi AA, anti-Aircraft machine gun (*Commentary: heavy machine gun, 12.7x108mm calibre weapon*).

Look at those kids, fighting day and night with their (incomprehensible), the PKMs (*Commentary: light machine gun, 7.62x54Rmm calibre weapon*).

There they are, and all combatants.

So you see there are lots of arms, tripods. (*Commentary: a fighter carrying a 82mm mortar bipod comes into view*).

I don't know what else.

Oh an 82mm mortar

Look, look, an **80 mortar** (*Commentary: a second tube of an 82mm mortar passes in front of the camera*).

They've come with a lot.

Look, look (incomprehensible) the warrant officer, he's a big fighter, he's there, he's called **Eric KITWANA**.

There's a PKM behind him (*Commentary: a fighter carrying a PKM machine gun*).

Behind **KIBARIGA**

A big man, it's the deputy T3 (*Commentary: the T3 designates the officer in charge of operations*), a senior NDC-R fighter, he's called **Alpha RADJABU ALFANI**.

With the whole team behind him.

He's a big man, he's a big fighter.

They've passed by, and him as well.

The others are.. **Bureau 4!** (*Commentary: the "fourth office" designates the service or officer in charge of logistics/supplies*).

There he is, the sector head **Raga HAKIZIMWAMI**, with all the team. There's the deputy sector head. They're all there, they've decided to bring an end to the FDLR at Bwito.

Even the mamas are very angry about it.

See, see how the mamas bang on their chests.

They're all there, ooh **OPJ Mouvement** (*Commentary: the senior judicial police officer of the NDC-R movement*)

ooh **ParSec du Cabinet** (*Commentary: the particular secretary of the Cabinet of the NDC-R*) ooh the **chef T1..**

(*Commentary: the T1 designates the officer in charge of management of personnel*). Him, he's there, it's decided, he will leave Rutshuru to end the kidnapping, this thing with the convoys.

With a big team, that we see.

It's (incomprehensible) the movements decided there, and here we see all the team.
They're there, they're there, they're there, most decidedly.

The Group believes that the names of the individuals mentioned in the video recording belong to the NDC-R command structure and to the HQ Sector of this movement.

Le Groupe est d'avis que les noms des individus mentionnés dans la vidéo appartiennent bien à la structure de commandement du NDC-R et de l'état-major (EM) Secteur de ce mouvement.

Belonging to the NDC-R HQ:

Appartiennent à l'EM NCD-R :

Adjoint T1 (Administration & finances) : Lieutenant-Colonel Eric KITWANA

Adjoint T3 (Opération) : ARADJABU ALFANI, alias Alpha

Belonging to the HQ Sector:

Appartiennent à l'EM Secteur :

Chef T1 EM Secteur : Ragi HAKIZUMWAMI

Chef T4 (Logistique) : Colonel ENGULU MWANANBU Georges

Annex 20

Materiel supplied prior to the NDC-R attack on Faringa

Matériel fourni avant l'attaque du NDC-R sur Faringa

Photographs 1-3



Photographs 4-6



Photographs 7-9



Photographs 10-12



Photographs 13-15



Photographs 16-18

Heavy machinegun (photograph 16), its mounting (photograph 17) and tripod (photograph 18)
Mitrailleuse lourde (photographie 16), son support (photographie 17) et son trépied (photographie 18)



Photographs 19-20

82mm mortar and bipod
Mortier 82mm et bipied



82mm mortar (tube)
Mortier 82mm (tube)



Photographs 21-24


Presence of under age children
Présence d'enfants



Annex 21

FARDC official document related to the presence in South Kivu of Burundian national army elements

Document officiel des FARDC concernant la présence au Sud Kivu d'éléments de l'armée nationale Burundaise



Annex 22

Container for the propelling charge of a PG7-V rocket documented in the aftermath of fire against a United Nations peacekeepers' patrol in Ituri


Container de la charge propulsive d'une roquette PG7-V documentée à la suite de tirs contre une patrouille de soldats de la paix des Nations Unies en Ituri

Materiel produced by the Rocket Industries Group (RIG) which is part of the Iranian Defense Industries Organisation (DIO)
Matériel produit par Rocket Industries Group (RIG) qui fait partie de la Defense Industries Organisation (DIO) iranienne



RPG7-V
LOT 05 DATE : 2018 5-1883-2

Comparison with the materiel documented by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) in Mosul (Iraq) in 2016.
Comparaison avec la matériel documenté par Conflict Armament Research (CAR) à Mosul (Irak) en 2016.




RPG7-V
LOT 76-32A DATE : 2016 3-62233

Annex 23

Maps of Djugu territory

Cartes du territoire de Djugu



Overall map of Djugu territory

Carte du territoire de Djugu



Map of parts of Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Tatsi and Walendu Djatsi sectors, and Bahema Badjere, Bahema Nord and Bahema Baguru chefferies, Djugu territory

Carte de certaines parties des secteurs de Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Tatsi et Walendu Djatsi, et des chefferies de Bahema Badjere, Bahema Nord and Bahema Baguru, territoire de Djugu

Maps provided by MONUSCO and annotated by the Group

Cartes fournies par la MONUSCO et annotée par le Groupe

Annex 24

Short background and history of the Hema-Lendu conflict

Bref historique et contexte du conflit Hema-Lendu

After the 1999-2003 conflict during which the Hema and Lendu communities in Ituri opposed one another, a first wave of violence erupted in Djugu territory, Ituri, between December 2017 and March 2018 (see [S/2018/531](#), paras. 158-164). After a relative lull, smaller-scale attacks on FARDC positions and civilians started from September 2018, in particular on the shores of Lake Albert. According to several sources, including MONUSCO, from 23 to 25 May 2019, multiple attacks targeted the Alur population of Mahagi territory, north of Djugu territory, Ituri. On 10 June 2019, unidentified individuals killed four Lendu men in Zibiti, Djugu territory, including the president of the Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC) in Kobu. Simultaneous mass attacks on Hema localities started immediately afterwards on the same day.

Testimonies varied as to whether the four Lendu men were killed by Lendu individuals because of the alleged opposition of the FEC president to Lendu militias, or whether they were killed by Hema individuals.

Most of the sources interviewed by the Group referred to conflicts related to land and administrative limits between both communities as well as to the unresolved aftermaths of the 1999-2003 conflict. In this respect, a leader of an Hema IDPs camp told the Group that cohabitation between both communities could not exist anymore after this second wave of attacks and that anyone speaking about reconciliation was an enemy of the Hema community.

Après le conflit des années 1999-2003 qui a opposé les communautés Hema et Lendu en Ituri, une première vague de violence a éclaté dans le territoire de Djugu, Ituri, entre décembre 2017 et mars 2018 (voir [S/2018/531](#), par. 158 à 164). Après une relative accalmie, des attaques à plus petite échelle ont été perpétrées contre des positions des FARDC et des civils à partir de septembre 2018, en particulier sur les côtes du Lac Albert. D'après plusieurs sources, dont la MONUSCO, du 23 au 25 mai 2019 des attaques multiples ont visées la population Alur dans le territoire de Mahagi, au nord du territoire de Djugu, dans l'Ituri. Le 10 juin 2019, des individus non identifiés ont tué, à Zibiti, dans le territoire de Djugu, quatre hommes de la communauté Lendu, y compris le président de la Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC) de Kobu. Des attaques massives et simultanées contre les localités Hema ont débuté immédiatement après le même jour.

Les témoignages diffèrent sur la question de si les quatre hommes ont été tués par des individus appartenant à la communauté Lendu en raison de l'opposition alléguée du président de la FEC aux milices Lendu, ou par des individus appartenant à la communauté Hema.

La plupart des sources interrogées par le Groupe ont fait référence aux conflits fonciers et liés aux limites administratives entre les deux communautés ainsi qu'aux séquelles non résolues du conflit de 1999-2003. À cet égard, un leader d'un camp de déplacés Hema a dit au Groupe que la cohabitation entre les deux communautés était maintenant impossible après cette seconde vague d'attaques et que ceux qui parlaient de réconciliation étaient les ennemis de la communauté Hema.

Annex 25

Photographs of villages attacked by Lendu militias and lists of victims, damages, looted items and cattle in several villages of Djugu territory

Photographies de villages attaqués par les milices Lendu et listes des victimes, dommages, biens et bétail pillés dans plusieurs villages du territoire de Djugu



Tche village - Photographs taken between 13-17 June 2019 by United Nations peacekeepers

Village de Tche – Photographies prises entre le 13 et 17 juin par les soldats de la paix des Nations Unies



Dada village - Photographs taken by the Group on 19 October 2019

Village de Dada – Photographies prises le 19 octobre 2019 par le Groupe

Lists relating to IDPs in Loda IDP camp

Listes relatives aux déplacés du camp de déplacés de Loda

Ferme Loda, le 19/06/2019

Doléances des déplacés du site/Loda

Arrivée : le 12/06/2019
Effectif : 6449
Hos : 1156 Fem : 1989 Eftis : 3304

Motif : Genocide des assaillants rendu
contre le peuple hema.

Etat de besoin

1. Abrus + ration
2. AME + vêtements
3. Installation sanitaire
4. Soins médicaux + eau
5. Sécurisation + le retour dans les
milieux d'origine des déplacés +
la prise en charge.

Les constats amers

1. Provenance
 - a) SOMBUSO
Décès : Voir le chef du Groupement.
 - b) DJ'NA
 1. Décès : 6 (cfr tués par les assaillants)
 - 1) DEGU
 - 2) MACHOZI
 - 3) LOBI MUGISA NYGEREKPA
 - 4) NJESHADJO KPAWI JOEL
 - 5) DJIMBU
 - 6) KEZIA DJOKAY

2. Mortes suite aux maladies (le froid)
 illi au site : 10

Hos : 0 Fes : 3 efts : 7

3. Blessé du nom de LOJUMA LIBA GASTON
 le 18/06/2019 présent au site.

4. La destruction méchante

a) Maisons incendiées

b) Centres de Santé détruits
 complètement.

- Le Centre de Santé SOMBOSO et
 le Poste de Santé MAOLLE

- Le Centre de Santé JUVIRE
 à KAROMBO

- Le Poste de Santé KAA/DEMA

c) FERME NGOLO à GORPA.

Bêtes pillées

Maison de la Concession brûlée
 systématiquement.

Maisons détruites

d) produits de champs arrachés

e) écoles détruites.

- E.P. NDODD'E
- E.P. NDJALO
- E.P. KODJO
- E.P. SOMBUSO
- E.P. UCUKPA
- E.P. BEÏELI
- E.P. MAPENDAMO.
- Institut de Ndodd'e.
- Institut de DUVIRE.
- INSTITUTE DE MAPENDAMO.

f) Eglises détruites :

1. CEV NDODD'E
2. CEV DHENA
3. CEV DJID'A
4. CEV JOBA
5. CEV SAOKPAI BETHHEM.
6. CEV NGABI
7. CEV SOMBO
8. CEV. NDJALO
9. CEV DJAILO
10. CEV KERTHO
11. CEV NDJULO.
12. 80^e AIC KANANA
13. 80^e AIC RULE/DJID'A.
14. 80^e AIC KAU/SOMBO
15. 80^e AIC DUVIRE
16. CECA 20 LODHA/RULE
17. CECA 20 KAU/SOMBO
18. CECA 20 NDODD'E
19. CECA 20 MKE
20. CECA 20 DUVIRE
21. DISCIPLE DE JESUS / RULE/DJID'A.
22. FEPACO NZAMBE MALAME / RULE
23. TEMOINS DE JEHOVAH / KAU/SOMBO

- CEV JUDZA + CEV NYALI + CEV JHEMBU

Inquiétudes

- a. Tous les produits restés derrière nous.
- b. Le petit et gros bétails pillés en totalité.

4. Etonnement.

a) Après le retour du président de la République, le phénomène d'assailant continue comme d'habitude.

b) Les assassinats: Même les agents de l'ordre (militaires).

c) Désordres:

- Les bêtes et les produits des champs détruits.
- Les personnes chassées des champs avec les armes à feu et les armes blanches.

d. Les incendies des maisons restantes continuent normalement.

5. SUGGESTIONS

a. Prière de nous faire savoir si nous sommes étrangers ou nous n'avons pas le droit de vivre dans le territoire de Djuba.

b. Réhabilitations:

- Ecoles détruites
- Eglises détruites
- Maisons détruites des victimes.

1. Président ^{se} du comité des déplacés

SAFARI - MALO - CHRISTOME.

2. Secrétaire ^{Genéral} du comité

LOBO - JOACHIM

3. VICE-SECRETARE

URDM - KAKPA - THOMAS


3. Conseillers

a. DHEVI - BELLARMIN.

b. NGONE - GOSSA - RUVALE

c. BORIVE - LOSSI

d. BUMA - NGADHO



List provided to the Group by the civil society on 17 October 2019

Liste fournie au Groupe par la société civile le 17 octobre 2019

Lists regarding the Sombuso groupement

Listes relatives au groupement de Sombuso

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
PROVINCE DE L'ITURI
TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU
CHEFFERIE DES BAHEMA NORD
GROUPEMENT SOMBUSO

LISTE DE PERSONNES TUEES LORS DES ATROCITES DE 2019 A SOMBUSO DU 11/06/ AU 09/08/2019

N°	NOMS & POSTNOMS & PRENOMS	SEXE	LIEU ET DATE DE NAISSANCE	VILLAGES	NOM DU PERE	NOM DE LA MERE	2 ^{ème} RESPO. EN FAMILLE
01	CHUSANI CHOMBE J. PAUL	M	FATAKI, Le 12/05/1962	DZAPA	BBIDDA MAKASI	UWODHA AVATO	KELOKPA CHOMBE
02	VAY KAMELA GBOSI	F	FATAKI, Le 07/09/1945	JUDZA	KATO JOSEPH	DZADZA	DIDO BENOI
03	WATUM KEPKA	M	SOMBUSO, Le 18/02/2001	JUDZA	BOSCO	DHEZI CHALO	DHEZI CHALO
04	DIDZA NYISI YELOSIA	F	DHENDRO, Le 14/03/1958	LAMBAMA 1	TIKPA DHEDJO	LOSI ZAVE	LONE DJOKABA
05	KOVE BIBIANA	F	FATAKI, Le 13/07/1942	LAMBAMA 1	GAIKPA SAVERIO	FEMIA KOVE	GOSAPA LONGAVI
06	DJILO BENGI PELICIANO	M	SOMBUSO, Le 15/04/1939	BENGI	NDENI NIMA	ULEVE BULISI	BURINGA BENGI
07	DZ'LIKPA GBALEBA MICHEL	M	SOMBUSO, Le 18/03/1941	BENGI	NGADJOKPA	KEY	LICHU NGAJOKPA
08	MANGARITA KIVE	F	FATAKI, Le 15/05/1944	LAMBAMA 2	LOPOS	JUSTINA	DHEDA JOKABA
09	TESO NYAKO	M	JIBA, Le 10/02/1984	JOBA	LOGO GASTO	GIPATO MARCELA	MARI MERREY
10	DHENYINI DETA	F	FATAKI, Le 06/07/1967	JOBA	GERARD BUTSO	VIVE VENE	DHEVI ANDRE
11	JASOA LOBA	M	FATAKI, Le 20/06/1935	JOBA	LOBA TOMAS	DELA PRICILA	NAFA
12	TSUKPA PERGOMAS	M	JIBA, Le 16/03/1968	JOBA	LOPOS GBUKPA	DDIDZA LIVE	BAKONI VIANE
13	SEKA TSIDHEMO	F	FATAKI, Le 16/04/1952	JOBA	RETE LONZAMA	FEMIA NATALIA	KOTIKPA
14	FURAH BORIVE	F	SOMBUSO, Le 27/08/2006	JOBA	DZ'KO J. REMO	GEORGINE	DZ'KO
15	BAPU LOSU OLIVIE	M	SOMBUSO, Le 15/03/2012	LOSU	MALABI LORANU	BUVE CHUDHA	MALABI LORANU

16	RAFIKI BAPU BONHEUR	M	SOMBUSO, Le 03/05/2015	LOSU	MALABI LORANU	BUVE CHUDHA	MALABI LORANU
17	NGUDHA GBOSI BIBIANA	F	SOMBUSO, Le 12/03/1947	SOMBO	KATO JOSEPH	DZADZA LOKERESIA	DIROKPA LORE
18	CHUVI ZAMBU GERSOM	M	LINGA, Le 24/02/1981	SOMBO	DHEBU BANDONI	NGADHO NGUDASI	LOBINI ZAMBU
19	NGADHO NGUDASI RUTA	F	NDARO, Le 05/07/1943	SOMBO	KPANA	LUSI	LOBINI ZAMBU
20	NGALIKA KAKWA	M	SOMBUSO, Le 12/05/1924	SOMBO	DYALOKPA KIZA	LUIZA NGAVE	BUSHA DYALOKPA
21	UVOY CHOUNDO LANYONGA	M	MOLA, Le 27/03/1934	SEKE	DJODYA CHOMBE	AMDY ANYEY	KPELE BENOI
22	UKENA MAGBO MALOBI	M	MOLA, Le 14/07/1917	SEKE	BASANI MAGBO	GOY NYAPIO	KPELE BENOI
23	CHECHU CHOMBE BASANI	M	FATAKI, Le 27/07/1969	SEKE	UVONA MALOBI	UKEWA MARTINA	LOJUNGA LEONARD
24	ANGELA	F	FATAKI, Le 07/06/1981	SEKE	JUNGATE	VICTORI	WEDUNGA
25	BEBE ANGELA INNOCENT	M	GOKPA, Le 03/08/2019	SEKE	NGADJOKPA DONATIE	ANGELA	WEDUNGA
26	BIENVENU	M	DUVIRE, Le 06/054/2008	SEKE	NGADJOKPA DONATIE	ANGELA	WEDUNGA
27	BUDZA LODZA PIERRE	M	SOMBUSO, Le 15/06/1951	KATO	PANGA BACHONGO	BRIGITTE TELIY	BU MAURIS
28	KANYO LODZA	M	SOMBUSO, Le 27/02/1978	KATO	BASANI MASKINI	PARNINA KEY	BU MAURIS
29	GODI SINGO SAMWELE	M	DJUGU, Le 11/06/1960	NYAMA 3	LONDE YOANI	KARSI ANA	MATESO SINGO
30	MABE SINGO SANZORA	M	DJUGU, Le 19/09/1964	NYAMA 3	LONDE YOANI	KARSI ANA	MATESO SINGO
31	UMIRAMBE NYAMA	M	SOMBUSO, Le 27/08/1997	NYAMA 3	LEDDA KIVIA	BIATRIZE	ADUVANGO KIVIA
32	NYISI CHUDHA YELOSIA	F	JIBA, Le 17/09/1961	MABILI 1	TIKPA LOKI	LOTSOVE NYIRMBE	BLEKPA RICHARD
33	JOKAY NYOCHA SHALOTA	F	FATAKI, Le 26/03/1971	MABILI 1	LONDRI JOKABA	MELEKA LOVE	CHELE DJOKABA
34	LORANU KPACHALE	M	SOMBUSO, Le 10/11/2009	MABILI 1	KPAGBO MAWAZO	LODYISI DZ'KI	KPAGBO FOSTIN
35	MACHOZI MBIDHA	F	SOMBUSO, Le 07/04/2011	MABILI 1	KPAGBO MAWAZO	LODYISI DZ'KI	KPAGBO FOSTIN
36	DZ'NZAMA LASTI ODETTE	F	LODO, Le 03/08/2010	MABILI 1	LONA KPAKI	JOKAY CHALOTE	CHELE DJOKABA
37	BAHATI BARONGO INC.	M	JIBA, Le 12/07/1996	MABILI 1	LONEMA TSOKPA	BBUDHE GRATIANA	LOMA TSOKPA

38	ATIMNEDI TOTO JUSTIN	M	FATAKI, Le 16/09/1972	KPANDROMA	LODDA RAFAEL	VERONIKA UCHIDDA	CHOMBE STEFANO
39	SERA	F	FATAKI, Le 25/03/1951	BAPU	BAPU EZEKIA	KERENI	LOTS' BAPU
40	ONORETA SINZODZA	F	FATAKI, Le 06/09/1959	MABILI 2	CHURA LORA	NYANGO ZENOBIA	FLORIMO CHURA
41	DZ'NA SOMBUSO PASKAL	M	FATAKI, Le 15/02/1951	BAKO	KODJO BULUKWA	MANDENA	RENE KODJO
42	VIVE DIVE GEORGINE	F	JIBA, Le 23/03/1974	BAKO	MANDRO BULUKWA	MARCELA MBUVE	MANDRO AMETTI
43	UBEMU KIZA	M	FATAKI, Le 28/03/1987	DUVIRE	UKECHA DUVIRE	BIA DJOKAY	UKECHA DUVIRE
44	JIGBO TSORO	M	SOMBUSO, Le 07/02/1971	TSORO	TELE MORIS	JIBETA	DEDONI GAYPA
45	ASA	F	LINGA, Le 27/01/1952	RULE-CENTRE	SAULO MOGO	DHEUDZA GOY	JIKPA
46	SIFURA	F	SOMBUSO, Le 11/04/1960	RULE-CENTRE	SAULO MOGO	DHEUDZA GOY	JIKPA
47	ELIA BU NGUDJU	M	FATAKI, Le 29/07/1924	SAOKPA	UZIA	LAKWE	BAUDJO DHELO
48	BENEZETI DHEMBU KAKARO	M	SOMBUSO, Le 12/06/1943	SAOKPA	TEVI	NGABUST	LONDE SAOKPA
49	DYEDHA MBUVE HONORETA	F	FATAKI, Le 20/01/1955	SAOKPA	LOWI PETRO	NGASINGBA IVRATIA	KPAWA
50	RAFIKI LOGUPA PHILEMON	M	SOMBUSO, Le 26/03/1987	SAOKPA	NGBAGARO DIROKPA	DYEDHA MBUVE	KPAWA
51	MIDESTINA BORIVE	F	FATAKI, Le 19/06/1963	DZATHU	REMI	IRENA	DHEDZ
52	MIKAELI GBALEBA	M	FATAKI, Le 22/03/1944	DZATHU	NGADJOKPA	SIRA	LICHU
53	DIVE CHALO	F	JIBA, Le 22/06/1976	DJEKPA	LONDRI SINGO	MELEKA LOSI	LOMBUNI
54	AFOYO DZ'DZA	F	NDOKEBO, Le 15/06/2003	DJEKPA	BAPINI	DIVE CHALO	LOMBUNI
55	NGABU LENGE	M	DHENDRO, Le 03/05/1999	DJEKPA	DHEDDA J. MARIE	DZ'VENGA	NYATI DJOKABA
56	SELE NYATI GO ESP.	F	SOMBUSO, Le 04/02/1941	UCHUKPA	NGANGU KATO	MASTI MICHELINE	LEMA NGANGO
57	UDUVO J. DE DJEU	M	SOMBUSO, Le 24/07/1991	UCHUKPA	BBLU J. GASTO	LONZAY CELESTINA	LONEMA
58	DRAJIRO NORBERT	M	SOMBUSO, Le 11/06/1998	UCHUKPA	BBLU J. GASTO	LONZAY CELESTINA	LONEMA
59	LOTSOVE IMANI	F	LINGA, Le 13/07/2005	LINYI	FAUSTIN	NDROY ELISABELA	CROKPA
60	JEANNE AROMBO DIVE	F	ABORO, Le 18/09/1978	LINYI	CHOMBE KATANGA	FLOLORA MAVÉ	BUNU
61	JEANETI DJEDHAY	F	SOMBUSO, Le 03/10/1986	MUKENDRE	SOMA	GBOSI KLODINE	PASCAL TSEKPA
62	LOKANA NDODDE	M	SOMBUSO, Le 11/11/1974	MUKENDRE	J. TOBA	NDODESI	J. TOBA

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
PROVINCE DE L'ITURI
TERRITOIRE DE DJUGU
CHEFFERIE DES BAHEMA NORD
GROUPEMENT SOMBUSO

LISTE DES MAISONS INCENDIEES (DETOLEES), LES BETES RAVI ET AUTRES BIENS PILLES

N°	VILLAGES	NMBS DES MAISONS INCENDIEES (DETOLEES)	ELEVAGE DES ANIMAUX				VOLAILLES		MOYENS DE DEPLACEMENT	
			CHEVRES	MOUTONS	PORCS	LAPINS	POULES	CANARD	MOTO	VELO
01	LAMBAMA 1	99	206	38	18	60	250	40	16	5
02	LAMBAMA 2	105	280	70	23	300	850	60	5	16
03	JOBA	211	72	5	12	15	150	12	2	6
04	LOSU	96	250	152	7	12	178	7	2	3
05	SEKE	105	36	4	6	5	126	6	7	10
06	DZAPA	43	45	16	9	22	96	11	2	6
07	NGABI	56	215	27	6	26	107	16	3	7
08	DZADHU	44	132	12	5	13	85	9	2	1
09	KATO	27	112	37	11	17	72	13	1	2
10	BAKO	82	115	31	16	72	134	7	6	5
11	NYAMA 3	35	195	23	6	35	117	24	3	2
12	WASA	27	301	10	11	18	212	13	16	5
13	DYEVICHU	120	390	81	15	25	106	11	12	7
14	RULE-CENTRE	101	230	34	7	9	417	7	6	4
15	UKOKO	98	66	12	6	4	115	11	8	3
16	DJARARA	81	220	59	12	8	263	8	27	7
17	SAOKPA	350	265	110	43	77	695	4	12	3
18	DUVIRE	287	38	11	3	15	313	13	9	7
19	DJEKPA	69	604	25	17	37	437	16	22	14
20	MABILI 1	184	1038	37	22	41	567	23	33	17
21	MABILI 2	55	103	25	7	27	78	22	3	7
22	JUDZA	154	440	275	25	20	216	15	4	3

23	SOMBU	401								
24	NDJALO	29	497	56	17	32	386	15	9	5
25	TSORO	71	75	13	12	42	113	13	2	3
26	KPANDROMA	51	230	15	19	12	135	11	8	3
27	BENGI	73	129	22	23	13	126	16	15	7
28	JOZA	129	88	13	72	12	180	6	8	4
29	BANZ	226	152	22	16	60	263	12	6	7
30	DHENA	222	25	15	22	65	415	45	7	25
31	DJIDDA	212	181	32	14	35	105	21	19	13
32	MUKENDRE	88	132	19	23	27	167	32	7	11
33	UCHUKPA 1	137	121	22	12	19	121	13	5	7
34	UCHUKPA 2	123	67	11	9	24	117	12	6	8
35	NDODDE	302	87	17	11	31	83	13	3	7
36	DHEBADZA	139	213	17	21	57	293	63	12	9
37	NZAY	103	183	47	33	73	117	78	17	12
38	KAWA	86	77	83	11	17	347	91	11	9
39	DJAILO	132	367	127	51	137	407	103	23	22
40	KERTO	97	102	57	17	32	211	11	7	11
41	DISA	102	87	42	12	55	163	17	8	9
42	LINYI	97	107	34	9	62	174	26	6	12
3	BAPU	38	159	87	35	43	213	24	5	13
TOTAL GENERAL		5 287	8 515	1 885	733	1 730	10 176	981	390	338

NOMBRE DE LA POPULATION : 51 427



Lists provided to the Group by the civil society on 20 October 2019

Listes fournies au Groupe par la société civile le 20 octobre 2019

List regarding the Utcha groupement

Liste relative au groupement Utcha

PROCES VERBAL DES ATTAQUES DANS LE TERRITOIRE

TERRITOIRE : DSUGU
 VILLAGE :
 GROUPEMENT : UTCHA
 CHEFFERIE/SECTEUR : B/NORD.

L'an deux mille dix-neuf, le 27^{ème} jour du mois de 08..... Nous Chef de Village
 de ... LOKPA....., Groupement de ... UTCHA..... Chef/Secteur de ... B/NORD.....
 Dans le Territoire de ... DSUGU..... Avons constaté ce qui suit :

DATE	VILLAGE	PERSONNES TUEES					PERSONNES DISPARUES		PROVENANCE DES ASSAILLANTS
		Filles	Garçons	Enfants	Mamans	Viellards	Hommes	Femmes	
1. 07/04/2019	LOKPA	-	CHRISTO MO-BAKAMU						Sont venus de villages: GOUH, SUNI, EADU --- tous de group. GOKPA/DI...
2. 30/5/2019	MALI		BOMBUNI BAHATI	ANNOSIENTA	YVETTE				autres de villages: TETE, TEBU, KOTSOJO, LIPE... tous de groupement LADISO/PITSI
3. 10/6/2019	BUSU		MBUBBAMTESO				MBUBBA- MATESO		en suite de village KPARU de groupement LOGIA/TATSI
4. 16/6/2019	WALIBA		LOMBO TSUJO						
5. 2/7/2019	OLO		UVEAN		UVE MAVE				
6. 9/7/2019	WALIBA		MANDJAMANDSI						
7. 9/7/2019	OLO		MANASE LODYI						
8. 23/7/2019	OLO		GOSAPA						
9. 5/7/2019	MBJAZA		LOGO SOMARI						

NB: Le disparu MBUBBAMTESO KWATSU a été apporté par MANSI
 TANGU et DEBIEU tous de village SUNI groupement
 GOKPA /secteur DIATSI à date du 10/06/2019 vers village
 KPARNGANZA à KPARU.

Ce PV est signé à la date du/...../2019

Chef du Village : TCHESYA LOKPA
 Chef de Localité : TSEDHA FAUSTIN
 Chef de Groupement : MBIDSO NDAHORA KA
 Chef Collectivité : PILOMP LINDRO WILI

List provided to the Group by the civil society on 25 October 2019

Liste fournie au Groupe par la société civile le 25 octobre 2019

Annex 26

Photographs of civilians escaping the attack on Tche and of Hema IDP camps in Djugu territory

Photographies de civils fuyant l'attaque de Tche et de camps de déplacés Hema dans le territoire de Djugu



Civilians escaping the attack on Tche - Photographs taken by United Nations Peacekeepers on 11 June 2019

Civils fuyant l'attaque de Tche – Photographies prises par les soldats de la paix des Nations Unies le 11 juin 2019



Roe IDP camp - Photographs respectively taken on 11 and 18/19 June 2019 by United Nations peacekeepers

Camp de déplacés de Roe - Photographies prises par les soldats de la paix des Nations Unies, respectivement, les 11 et 18/19 juin 2019



Roe IDP camp - Photograph taken by the Group on 23 October 2019
Camp de déplacés de Roe - Photographie prise par le Groupe le 23 octobre 2019




Loda IDPs camp - Photograph taken by the Group on 15 October 2019
Camp de déplacés de Loda – Photographie prise par le Groupe le 15 octobre 2019

Annex 27

Electoral card published by the Ituri Provincial Government as that of Ngudjolo, the leader of the “Assailants”

Carte d'électeur publiée par le Gouvernement provincial de l'Ituri comme appartenant à Ngudjolo, le chef des “Assailants”




Photograph provided to the Group by different sources in October 2019

Photographie fournie au Groupe par des sources différentes en octobre 2019

Annex 28

Directives to the local population by Ngudjolo's movement

Directives à la population locale par le mouvement de Ngudjolo



Letter collected in Kpandroma area, a Lendu area, north of Djugu territory, and provided to the Group by a humanitarian source and MONUSCO

Lettre collectée dans la zone de Kpandroma, une zone Lendu, au nord du territoire de Djugu et fournie au Groupe par une source humanitaire et la MONUSCO

Translation by the Group

1. Respect the time of 6:00 p.m.;
2. Avoid eating spinach (Ndo);
3. Avoid eating pork;
4. No work on Mondays and Thursdays;
5. Respect the day of war;
6. Avoid alcoholic drinks: kaiko + bags;
7. Respect the 10 Commandments of God (see Exode 20).

1. Respecter l'heure de six heures du soir ;
2. Éviter de manger des épinards (Ndo) ;
3. Éviter de manger de la viande de porc ;
4. Ne pas travailler les lundi et jeudi ;
5. Respecter le jour de la guerre ;
6. Éviter les boissons alcoolisées : kaiko + sacs;
7. Respecter the 10 Commandements de Dieu (cf. Exode 20).


Annex 29

Letters to cease hostilities

Lettres en vue de cesser les hostilités

It is unclear however whether these two letters originate from troops belonging or connected to the Ngudjolo's movement.

Il n'est cependant pas clair si ces deux lettres proviennent de troupes appartenant ou connectées au mouvement de Ngudjolo.



REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
PROVINCE DE L'ITURI
TERRITOIRE DE DJU GU
SECTEUR DESW/PITSI

BIKPA, le 17/03/2019
NEEL/BBT/ST/2019

Transmise copie pour
information à
- Monsieur le chef
de Secteur de Walembu
PITSI à LISI.
- A Excellence mon-
sieur le Gouverneur
de Province de l'ITURI
à BUNIA.

Bataillon de DHEMO/BIKPA

Objet: Barua ya kuacha
kupigana na (FARDC)
askari jeshi ya seretali
ya Congo kisa amani.

Excellence monsieur
le Gouverneur,


Sisi wapiganaji
wa groupe amnie hiesabu kuhita makumi
na hie (20 hommes) wanao hatikana kwa
mungini ya Dhembo/BIKPA groupement
Dhembo, tuna omba vito vijabata ya:

- 01. Tuna acha kupigana na askari jeshi la Congo.
- 02. Seretali atabigize katika jeshi la Congo
- 03. Tuna omba mufu kubali kila mutuna cheo yake (Grade).
- 04. Tuna omba seretali atusamhe na kutupa barua ya usamaha (omnistie)
- 05. Seretali atupe vyakada na vito vingi ne vya lazima kwa kisa chungu watai wanigu.


Aksante,

ndat de bataillon.

ndini, comma-



= LT Colonel BUNU-BIKPA-TIMOÏHE =



Letters provided to the Group by MONUSCO in September 2019
Lettres fournies au Groupe par la MONUSCO en septembre 2019

Translation by the Group

Subject: Letter to stop combat with the FARDC for peace

Excellence, Mister the Governor,

We, the combatants of an armed group of about 80 men located in the villages of Dhendo/Bikpa, groupement Dhendo, request the following:

1. To stop fighting with the Congolese army.
2. That the State integrate us in the army.
3. That we be integrated with our grades.
4. That we be amnestied by an official letter.
5. That the State provide us with food and everything necessary to lead my elements.

Thanks

I, the Bataillon Commander, Lt. Colonel BUNU BIKPA Timothée

Bodyguard

Capitaine Mawa Linziba Samuel

Lieutenant Amani Liva

Objet: Lettre de cessation des combats avec les FARDC pour la paix

Excellence, Monsieur le Gouverneur

Nous, les combattants d'un groupe armé avoisinant 80 hommes et se trouvant dans les villages Dhendo/Bikpa, groupement Dhendo, demandons les choses suivantes :

1. Arrêtons de nous battre avec l'armée congolaise.
2. Que l'État nous intègre dans l'armée.
3. Que nous soyons intégrés avec nos grades.
4. Que nous soyons amnistiés par une lettre officielle.
5. Que l'État nous donne de la nourriture et le nécessaire pour encadrer mes éléments.

Merci

Moi, le Commandant de Bataillon Lt. Colonel BUNU BIKPA Timothée

Garde du corps

Capitaine Mawa Linziba Samuel, Lieutenant Amani Liva

Annex 30

Taxation of the Lendu population by Lendu militias

Taxation de la population Lendu par les milices Lendu

Based on eight independent sources, the Group found that the Lendu militias forced the Lendu population to financially contribute to the war effort in several areas. One Lendu source told the Group that on 15 September 2019 armed men, who introduced themselves as “Chief Ngudjolo” representatives and who explained that their stated goal was to expel the FARDC from Lendu’s land, forced him to pay a 1,000 Congolese Francs tax. Every family in Ndr’li and Andri, close to Linga, had to pay that tax (see also annex 28 above).

According to another Lendu source, Ngudjolo movement taxed the population, controlled the markets around Lake Albert, Njalo and Jiba and took percentages on goods. The movement forced each village in the area to pay 35,000 Congolese Francs monthly, issuing receipts to the village chiefs (see receipt below). The movement also erected a barrier at Njalo requesting between 200 and 500 Congolese Francs per person. Two Lendu sources also told the Group that the militias looted the Lendu population.

Sur la base de huit sources indépendantes, le Groupe a établi que les milices Lendu ont forcé la population Lendu dans plusieurs endroits à contribuer financièrement à l’effort de guerre. Une source Lendu a dit au Groupe que le 15 septembre 2019 des hommes armés, qui se sont présentés comme étant des représentants du « Chef Ngudjolo » et qui ont expliqué que leur objectif était d’expulser les FARDC des terres Lendu, l’ont forcé à payer 1000 Francs congolais. Chaque famille de Ndr’li et Andri, près de Linga, a dû s’acquitter de cette taxe (voir aussi ci-dessus annexe 28).

D’après une autre source Lendu, le mouvement de Ngudjolo a taxé la population, contrôlé les marchés autour du Lac Albert, Njalo et Jiba et a pris des pourcentages sur les biens. Le mouvement a forcé chaque village de cette zone à s’acquitter de 35 000 Francs congolais par mois et a délivré un reçu aux chefs de villages (voir reçu ci-dessous). Le mouvement a aussi érigé des barrières à Njalo et y a demandé entre 200 et 500 Francs congolais par personne. Deux sources Lendu ont aussi dit au Groupe que les milices pillaient la population Lendu.



Document provided to the Group by MONUSCO in September 2019

Document fourni au Groupe par la MONUSCO en septembre 2019

Translation by the Group

Request for help

We request the Youths' Office and the locality of [redacted] to help the youths with 35,000 FC for food. This is the request from General Ngodjolo, number 0822774096.

Greetings and thanks for your understanding

Received by the chief of locality of [redacted]

Secretary

0817001353

Demande d'aide

Nous demandons au Bureau des jeunes et à la localité [caviardé] d'aider les jeunes avec 35 000FC pour la nourriture. C'est la demande du Général Ngodjolo numéro 0822774096.

On vous salue et bonne compréhension

Reçu par le chef de localité [caviardé]

Secrétaire

0817001353

Annex 31

Photograph of destroyed houses in Jiba

Photographie de maisons détruites à Jiba



Photograph taken by the Group on 19 October 2019

Photographie prise par le Groupe le 19 octobre 2019

Annex 32

Mistreatment of Lendu and Alur prisoners by Congolese security forces

Mauvais traitements infligés par les forces de sécurité congolaises aux prisonniers Alur et Lendu

Arrested persons	Date of arrest	Mistreatment inflicted according to the arrested person	Place of mistreatment	Mistreating authority
23-year old Lendu man	1 July 2019	FARDC soldiers trampled him on his chest with boots and beat him with the butts of their rifles, resulting in persistent pain in the chest and breathing problems (including at the time of the Group's interview in September 2019). The soldiers also told him that he was a bad person.	Monbgwalu, Djugu territory	FARDC soldiers with red PM armbands who guarded him
Lendu man	1 July 2019	He was arrested together with six other Lendu men. They were thrown like flour bags inside a truck. He was seriously beaten on his feet, on his head with cords and on his left side, including the knees with the butts of rifles. At the time of the interview in September 2019, he said that he still had a scar on his bottom, that he could not walk normally anymore and that his feet were swollen.	Monbgwalu, Djugu territory	FARDC elements
26-year old Lendu man	1 July 2019	He was arrested with two other men. The three men were beaten and kicked all over their body by FARDC elements in their vehicle. The FARDC elements kept on asking questions about weapons and wanted responses "whatever the cost". Since he has problems with one of his hands and ribs (right side).	Monbgwalu, Djugu territory	FARDC elements with PM armbands
26-year old Alur man	Around 15 May 2019	He was beaten all over his body with cords when arrested.	FARDC État-major in Tchomia, Djugu territory	FARDC naval forces elements
47-year old Lendu man	15 June 2019	He was beaten on his left hand with a piece of wood.	Mbi FARDC detention facility,	Four FARDC soldiers

		<p>He had his hands tied up with handcuffs behind his back during two weeks.</p> <p>When it interviewed him in September 2019, the Group observed marks on his wrists and that he could not move his left hand, consistent with his statement.</p> <p>The FARDC soldiers who mistreated him said that he was a detainee and that detainees were beaten up.</p>	Ladhedjo groupement, Djugu territory	
25-year old Lendu/Alur man	5 July 2019	<p>He was arrested together with 18 other men, all Lendu and/or Alur.</p> <p>He was kicked and beaten with weapons. He still had a scar on the right side of his body at the level of his ribs.</p>	Police camp in Hudjo in Kpandroma, Djugu territory	Police

Personnes arrêtées	Date de l'arrestation	Mauvais traitements infligés selon la personne arrêtée	Lieu des mauvais traitements	Autorités qui ont infligé les mauvais traitements
Homme Lendu de 23 ans	1 juillet 2019	Des soldats FARDC l'ont piétiné sur la poitrine avec leurs bottes et l'ont battu avec la crosse de leurs fusils, lui causant des problèmes respiratoires persistants et des douleurs à la poitrine (y compris durant l'interview du Groupe en septembre 2019). Les soldats lui ont dit qu'il était une mauvaise personne.	Monbgwalu, territoire de Djugu	Les soldats FARDC qui le gardaient et qui portaient des brassards rouges avec l'inscription PM
Homme Lendu	1 juillet 2019	Il a été arrêté en même temps que six autres hommes Lendu. Ils ont été jetés dans le camion comme des sacs de farine. Il a sérieusement été battu sur les pieds, sur la tête avec des cordelettes et sur le côté gauche, y compris sur les genoux avec des crosses de fusils. Au moment de l'interview, en septembre 2019, il a dit avoir toujours une cicatrice sur les fesses, qu'il ne	Monbgwalu, territoire de Djugu	Éléments FARDC

		pouvait plus marcher normalement et que ces pieds étaient gonflés.		
Homme Lendu de 26 ans	1 juillet 2019	Il a été arrêté avec deux autres hommes. Des éléments des FARDC ont battu les trois hommes et leur ont donné des coups de pieds sur tout le corps dans leur véhicule. Les éléments des FARDC leur posaient des questions incessantes sur les armes et voulaient des réponses « quel qu'en soit le prix ». Depuis, il a des problèmes avec une de ses mains and ses côtes (du côté droit).	Monbgwalu, territoire de Djugu	Éléments des FARDC portant des brassards avec l'inscription PM
Homme Lendu de 26 ans	Autour du 15 mai 2019	Il a été battu sur tout le corps avec des cordelettes au moment de son arrestation.	État-major des FARDC à Tchomia, territoire de Djugu	Éléments des forces navales des FARDC
Homme Lendu de 47 ans	15 juin 2019	Il a été battu sur la main droite avec un morceau de bois. Il est resté les mains attachées derrière le dos avec des menottes pendant deux semaines. Lors de son interview en septembre 2019, le Groupe a observé des marques sur ses poignets et qu'il ne pouvait pas bouger sa main gauche, ce qui est consistant avec ses déclarations. Les éléments des FARDC qui l'ont maltraité ont dit qu'il était détenu et que les détenus étaient battus.	Lieu de détention des FARDC à Mbi, groupement Ladhedjo, territoire de Djugu	Quatre soldats des FARDC
Homme Lendu/Alur de 25 ans	5 juillet 2019	Il a été arrêté avec 18 autres hommes, tous Lendu et/ou Alur. Des éléments de la police congolaise lui ont donné des coups de pieds et l'ont battu avec leurs armes. Il a toujours une cicatrice au niveau de ses côtes à droite.	Camp de la police congolaise à Hudjo à Kpandroma, territoire de Djugu	Éléments de la police


Annex 33

Commitment act signed by Lendu chiefs and personalities

Acte d'engagement signé par des chefs et notable Lendu

A delegation comprising, among others, the Lendu Chiefs of Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Tatsi and Walendu Djatsi, representatives of the Lendu cultural association LORI and FARDC officers, supported by MONUSCO, conducted a sensitization campaign across 25 Lendu villages from 18 October to 6 November 2019. According to MONUSCO, 305 Lendu local leaders and personalities signed the commitment act below.

Une délégation comprenant, entre autres, les chefs Lendu de Walendu Pitsi, Walendu Tatsi et Walendu Djatsi, des représentants de l'association culturelle Lendu LORI and des officiers FARDC, soutenus par la MONUSCO, ont conduit une campagne de sensibilisation dans 25 villages Lendu du 18 octobre au 6 novembre 2019. D'après la MONUSCO, 305 chefs Lendu locaux et notables ont signé l'acte d'engagement ci-dessous.



pris de paix,

Réitérons l'engagement :

- I. D'œuvrer pour la PAIX gage de développement durable ;
- II. De soutenir l'approche de résistance populaire prônée par S.E Gouverneur de la Province de l'Ituri, en Province de l'Ituri en général et en Territoire de DJUGU en particulier contre toutes menaces internes et externes pour sauvegarder l'unité des peuples congolais vivant en Province de l'Ituri ;
- III. De faire échec à tout individu et/ou groupe d'individus qui chercheraient ou tenteraient de déstabiliser les pouvoirs légalement établis au niveau Provincial ou National ;
- IV. De promouvoir et défendre les acquis de la paix en âme et conscience avec toutes les communautés de DJUGU pour la coexistence pacifique et harmonieuse entre les différents groupes ethniques (Articles 51 alinéa 1 de la Constitution de la RDC de 2006 telle qu'amendée dans ses certains articles en 2011) ;
- V. Encourager tous les peuples BBALE à se désolidariser et de dénoncer les ennemis de la paix qui endeillent le Territoire de DJUGU en particulier et la Province de l'Ituri en général ;
- VI. De collaborer étroitement avec l'Etat congolais à travers ses différents services compétents afin de bénéficier ses appuis nécessaires ;
- VII. Le non respect du présent Acte d'Engagement dûment adopté par les signataires, soumet le contrevenant à la rigueur de la loi.

Fait à RETHY/KPANDROMA, le 18 OCTOBRE 2019



N°	NOM ET POST NOMS	QUALITE	SIGNATURE
01	Mr TAWIPA ANGATA	PRESIDENT LOCI	<i>[Signature]</i>
02	Jean-Denis NAJAZA	Vice-président	<i>[Signature]</i>
03	Hon. DHESSA TIKPA	Député National	<i>[Signature]</i>

04 Hon. LOKANA BAHATI
Fidèle
[Signature]

Document provided to the Group by a local authority in October 2019

Document fourni au Groupe par une autorité locale en octobre 2019