

**Security Council**

Distr.: General  
30 September 2016

Original: English

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**Letter dated 29 September 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments thereto.

I would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

*(Signed)* Rafael Darío Ramírez **Carreño**  
Chair  
Security Council Committee pursuant  
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)  
concerning Somalia and Eritrea



**Letter dated 19 September 2016 from the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea**

In accordance with paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2244 (2015), I have the honour to transmit the requested report on the implementation of paragraphs 23 and 24 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

The humanitarian community working in Somalia wishes to advise that, as with the previous 10 reports, it maintains the definition of “implementing partner” pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), which is as follows:

“Implementing partner” — a non-governmental organization (NGO) or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another NGO and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:

- (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia (or the Common Humanitarian Fund) process; and/or
- (b) The organization is represented in a cluster’s 3W matrix (*Who* does *What* and *Where*).

I remain available should you have any questions about the content of the report or need further clarification on the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

*(Signed)* Kyung-wha **Kang**  
Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs  
and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator

## Report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator

### Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution [2244 \(2015\)](#), the resolution succeeding resolutions [1916 \(2010\)](#), [1972 \(2011\)](#), [2060 \(2012\)](#), [2111 \(2013\)](#) and [2182 \(2014\)](#), in which the Council established the reporting requirement, and the eleventh submission in total pursuant to those resolutions. The Council, in paragraph 24 of its resolution [2244 \(2015\)](#), requested the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator to report by 15 October 2016 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments thereto.

2. The present report covers the period from September 2015 to September 2016. It is focused primarily on the delivery of humanitarian assistance to affected people in areas under the control or influence of Al-Shabaab, which was included on the sanctions list pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#), by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions [751 \(1992\)](#) and [1907 \(2009\)](#) concerning Somalia and Eritrea on 12 April 2010. As in the previous 10 reports ([S/2010/372](#), [S/2010/580](#), [S/2011/125](#), [S/2011/694](#), [S/2012/546](#), [S/2012/856](#), [S/2013/415](#), [S/2014/177](#), [S/2014/655](#) and [S/2015/731](#)), outlined herein are constraints to humanitarian access and the operational implications thereof, as well as mitigation measures put in place to address the politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance. The report is based on information gathered in consultation with relevant humanitarian organizations active in Somalia and information from the Risk Management Unit in the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Somalia.

### Humanitarian situation

3. The humanitarian situation in Somalia remains precarious owing to persistent climate variability, armed conflict, clan violence, insecurity, human rights violations, displacement and poor basic services. During the *deyr* rainy season between October and December 2015, flooding affected an estimated 145,200 people. Some 70,000 people were also displaced by floods in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, in May 2016. Humanitarian partners provided life-saving assistance and rehabilitated damaged infrastructure to mitigate the impact of future flooding. Drought conditions since September 2015 exacerbated by the El Niño phenomenon also compounded an already-fragile humanitarian situation, with some 5 million people in total, or 41 per cent of the population, in need of assistance. More than 1.1 million people are unable to meet their basic food needs. Some 300,000 children under 5 years of age are acutely malnourished, including more than 50,000 who are severely malnourished and require urgent treatment. The northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland were hardest hit by the drought. Partners mounted a life-saving response in those regions, but, while the *gu* rains from March to June provided some relief, they were not sufficient to enable a full recovery. In August, the Puntland authorities appealed for humanitarian assistance for more than 1.2 million people affected by drought. Furthermore, the food security situation in parts of the country is expected to deteriorate between October and December

owing to erratic rains and a below-average *gu* harvest, especially in the major cereal-producing regions of Bay and Shabelle Hoose.

4. Acute watery diarrhoea/cholera remained a challenge in 2016. From January to mid-July, more than 13,000 cases, over half of them children under 5 years of age, were reported, an alarming increase when compared with the 5,257 cases reported in 2015 as a whole. With the support of partners, the Ministry of Health finalized the first draft of a five-year preparedness and response plan of action against acute watery diarrhoea/cholera. The outbreak came at a time when critical health services were already at risk of being scaled down for lack of funding. By the first quarter of 2016, at least 10 health facilities had either reduced their services or closed for lack of funding, while those that remained open were struggling to meet health needs. Overall, some 3.2 million people are in need of access to minimum emergency health services.

5. The access challenges, insecurity and funding gaps notwithstanding, partners had reached about 2.5 million people with some form of assistance by December 2015. Premised on the 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan, assistance continued to reach those in need. Between January and June 2016, humanitarian partners reached 490,500 people with food assistance and 142,400 people with activities aimed at building livelihoods. Some 490,000 people were reached with livelihood seasonal inputs, including seeds, tools, fishing equipment, irrigation vouchers and livestock vaccinations. A total of 125,000 children under 5 years of age were treated for acute malnutrition. More than 1.6 million people received basic health services, and in excess of 1 million were provided with temporary or sustainable access to safe water. The protection cluster also reached nearly 123,000 people, while education partners reached 89,000 learners with temporary learning spaces, school supplies and school feeding programmes. More than 81,600 people were assisted with non-food items and transitional shelter.

6. The 2016 Somalia Humanitarian Response Plan remained underfunded compared with the persistently high needs. By the end of September, it had received \$297 million, or 34 per cent, of the \$885 million requested. Another \$116 million was provided for the humanitarian response outside the Plan. The Plan is premised on a three-year strategy (2016-2018) that takes into account that drivers of needs in Somalia are largely cyclical and long running and therefore cannot be resolved in a single year. To achieve the vision outlined in the Plan, predictable and timely funding is crucial to enhance preparedness and early response. A call for aid was launched on 31 March by the humanitarian country team, requesting \$127 million for drought response in Puntland and Somaliland. With needs increasing as a result of drought, flooding and acute watery diarrhoea/cholera, pooled funds (the Central Emergency Response Fund and the Somalia Humanitarian Fund) have boosted the response. Since January, \$29.2 million has been allocated collectively from pooled funds, with an estimated \$22.3 million used to ramp up drought response in Puntland and Somaliland, flood response in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, and acute watery diarrhoea/cholera response in the Banaadir, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions. Another \$7 million is supporting the humanitarian response to internally displaced persons in Baidoa, Bay region, and Kismaayo, Juba Hoose region.

7. In May 2016, the Government of Kenya, driven by what it described as security concerns, announced its intention to expedite the closure of the Dadaab

refugee camp, which mainly hosts Somali refugees. While continuing to advocate that returns and other durable solutions be carried out only on a voluntary basis, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and humanitarian partners have developed an action plan that provides for enhanced return assistance to address the most immediate humanitarian needs of returnees and to catalyse reintegration support through community-based projects in the key areas of return. According to the verification exercise undertaken between July and August 2016, Dadaab is host to about 280,000 refugees, down from over 326,000 in 2015. By August, more than 24,000 Somali refugees had returned to Somalia from the camp since the beginning of the voluntary repatriation in December 2014. Of those, 18,110 had returned since the beginning of 2016 alone, more than triple the number of returns recorded in 2014 and 2015 combined. A total of 10,057 people returned between June and August, pointing to a significant increase in the number of returns. Most of the returnees have settled in the Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Juba Dhexe, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions and in the Banaadir region (Mogadishu). About 50,000 refugees have expressed a desire to return to Somalia before the end of 2016. Meanwhile, irregular migration of Somalis crossing the sea to seek opportunities abroad continues, owing to instability and a lack of education and employment opportunities. According to the Federal Government, 200 Somali migrants were among the 500 people who drowned in the Mediterranean Sea in a boat tragedy in April 2016. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an estimated 32,400 people have arrived in Somalia from Yemen since March 2015, of whom more than 28,000 are Somalis. In addition, more than 1.1 million Somalis remain internally displaced and continue to face a high risk of forced eviction, discrimination, violation of children's rights and gender-based violence. Almost 130,000 internally displaced persons were forcibly evicted in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Boosaaso, Gaalkacyo, Hargeysa and Kismaayo in 2015, while 31,000 have been forcefully evicted since the beginning of 2016.

### **Security situation**

8. The security situation in Somalia remains volatile, affecting civilians and the operating environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Attacks against humanitarian personnel and assets complicate an operational context beset by insecurity and other access challenges. During the first seven months of 2016 alone, more than 90 violent incidents had a direct impact on humanitarian organizations, leading to the death of 7 humanitarian workers, the injury of 8, the arrest of 10, the abduction of 3 and the assault and detention of 5. In 2015, more than 140 incidents had a direct impact on humanitarian organizations and led to the death of 17 humanitarian workers, the injury of 18, the abduction of 11 and the arrest of 38. Humanitarian organizations continue to be affected, both directly and collaterally, mainly by remote violence and attacks in populated areas.

9. At least half of the deaths of humanitarian workers recorded occurred collaterally, when staff were caught in attacks in populated areas. On 25 June, a doctor working for a humanitarian organization was killed along with 14 others in a complex attack against the Naso-Hablod hotel in Mogadishu, while another humanitarian worker was killed along with 13 others in a twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on 26 July in Mogadishu. At least 11 security personnel contracted by the United Nations were also killed, while 12 sustained

injuries. The explosion also damaged United Nations infrastructure. Indirect attacks, including mortar bombs, have also caused damage, mainly to United Nations facilities. In February, June and July, mortar bombs landed in the United Nations compound in Mogadishu, which is the main operations base and holds the accommodation for the United Nations mission and most United Nations humanitarian organizations. In Baidoa, Bay region, a mortar bomb attack on 2 July affected United Nations humanitarian organizations when two projectiles struck the compound, injuring a security guard and damaging an armoured vehicle in addition to the house of a national United Nations staff member.

### **Humanitarian response, access constraints and operational implications**

10. Delivering humanitarian assistance remains extremely difficult in Somalia, especially in areas under the control of Al-Shabaab. International partners continue to deliver aid through local partners, especially in those areas, given that agencies are unable to operate directly. Roadblocks and checkpoints manned by armed actors in southern and central Somalia severely hamper delivery. Non-State armed actors have continued to implement a ban on commercial activities in areas under their control in the Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan regions, affecting the transfer of humanitarian supplies and basic commercial commodities. Overall, road access is severely constrained in 28 districts in southern and central Somalia and in the contested Buuhoodle district in the north of the country. As in previous years, the three main roads most affected are Mogadishu-Buulobarde-Beledweyne, Mogadishu-Baidoa-Doolow and Mogadishu-Baraawe-Kismaayo. While progress has been made, including the negotiation of access to areas such as Xuddur, Bakool region, humanitarian organizations remain able to have access to Buulobarde (Hiraan region), Diinsoor (Bay region), Garbahaarrey (Gedo region) and Waajid (Bakool region) only by air.

11. As part of efforts to implement road blockades and movement restrictions, non-State armed actors have continued to target trucks carrying supplies. Supplies are often seized, confiscated and/or destroyed, and civilian transporters reportedly punished if apprehended. Methods of punishment vary, but have reportedly gone as far as execution. On 19 June, non-State armed actors set ablaze three trucks carrying supplies near Qurac Joome, Bakool region, two of which had been rented by a humanitarian organization to deliver food. On 26 June, non-State armed actors reportedly killed three civilian men in Ceel Lahelay, Bakool region, allegedly for supplying livestock products to Xuddur. On 19 July, non-State armed actors in Aw Dheegle, Shabelle Hoose region, burned food imported from Turkey on the outskirts of the village. Similar killings of civilian transporters and confiscations of commercial and relief supplies have also been reported in other areas in the Bakool, Bay, Gedo and Hiraan regions, where Al-Shabaab continues to implement its ban on commercial activities. Incidents of looting and destruction of relief items attributed to Al-Shabaab militias were also registered in other areas in southern and central Somalia. In Afmadow, Juba Hoose region, non-State armed actors looted food aid from a warehouse of a humanitarian organization and destroyed office equipment.

12. Road access limitations lead to increased operational and transportation costs for humanitarian agencies delivering life-saving assistance to areas of need. They also increase commercial food prices as traders pass on the high cost of operating in

insecure areas to consumers. For example, non-State armed actors implemented a blockade on Buulobarde, Hiraan region, in March 2014, restricting the freedom of movement of local people and the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance. While Al-Shabaab eased the blockade early in 2016 to allow the movement of commercial supplies from Beledweyne and Mogadishu through Jalalaqsi, commercial transporters are subject to illegal taxes — reportedly \$45 for commercial/passenger vehicles and as much as \$200 if the vehicle is just beginning services in the area. One-way receipts are issued to enable the vehicle to ply the routes in all areas under Al-Shabaab control in the central region. According to local communities, the retail prices of essential commodities are generally higher in areas controlled by non-State armed actors owing to the increased costs of moving commercial supplies.

13. The proliferation of checkpoints manned by armed actors, including those allied to the Federal Government, continues to restrict road access along major supply routes and the movement of humanitarian and commercial supplies. For example, public transporters temporarily suspended operations along the Mogadishu-Balcad-Jawhar route in February following the emergence of 11 new unauthorized checkpoints manned by armed actors aligned with the State and allied local militias who charge between \$5 and \$10 at each checkpoint. In addition, according to commercial transporters, each commercial transporter reportedly pays an average total of between \$4,000 and \$5,000 at the various checkpoints manned by armed State and non-State actors located along the Mogadishu-Baidoa-Dollow route, which remains the worst affected among all access roads. This results in cost increases for consumers.

14. Dialogue between humanitarian partners and national-level and regional-level senior government authorities to remove checkpoints and facilitate the movement of humanitarian supplies and other essential supplies continued in 2016. Assurances that access impediments would be resolved have been obtained from the Interim South-West Administration and Shabelle Dhexe regional authorities and the federal Ministry of the Interior and Federalism. Advocacy to sustainably address the problem has been accorded priority and will continue. Humanitarian organizations have also continued to call upon the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to strengthen the implementation of its mandate to secure key supply routes, including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, pursuant to paragraph 6 (d) of Security Council resolution [2297 \(2016\)](#). Lastly, humanitarian organizations have stressed the need for AMISOM to ensure that all troops aligned to it, including the national armed forces and militia groups fighting alongside the national armed forces, fully abide by international humanitarian and human rights law, take all feasible precautions to prevent and in any event minimize civilian harm in relation to their operations and respect the imperative for humanitarian organizations to observe humanitarian principles.

15. Non-State armed actors have also continued to target civilians, impose what they claim is Sharia law and levy heavy taxes on all productive assets, such as farmland, crops, fruit trees and livestock. There are concerns that this increased extortion of money and possessions from local communities could push vulnerable people further into poverty and undermine their livelihoods and resilience. Local

communities living in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab in Beledweyne and Buulobarde, Hiraan region, have expressed concern over alarming increases in illegal taxation and extortion by Al-Shabaab in recent months. Zakat, which had previously been payable only once a year, is now being enforced for various types of livelihood assets multiple times in a year.

16. Furthermore, there have been changes in the implementation of livestock taxation, with civilians now required to make advance payments before taking livestock to market. Al-Shabaab militants reportedly make estimates depending on the type and size of the livestock and charge 2.5 per cent of the estimated market price to be paid before the livestock is sold. Various types of illegal taxation are levied on trucks ferrying livestock to the port of Boosaaso, including \$230 at taxation points manned by Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a, \$140 at checkpoints manned by the Galmudug security forces and an average of between \$50 and \$150 at seven static checkpoints manned by the national armed forces and allied militias and freelance clan militias. Similar reports concerning agricultural products from Shabelle Hoose indicate that charges include \$3 per hectare and 10 per cent of the value of a sack of sesame. There are allegedly threats that uncultivated farms will be confiscated, while civilians who fail to pay the taxes are reportedly subject to retribution. For example, non-State armed actors detained some 50 elders for reportedly refusing to provide livestock to them as zakat and proceeded to take the livestock by force in Galcad, Galguduud region.

17. Clan militias are also interrupting humanitarian operations. In June, militiamen attacked a team from a humanitarian organization who were conducting an outreach programme in Faafgumare, Hiraan region. In a similar incident in February, militiamen raided the offices of a humanitarian organization in Marka, Shabelle Hoose region. Five national staff of a third party contractor for a humanitarian organization were briefly detained and allegedly assaulted and robbed by militiamen in Afgooye, Juba Hoose region, in February. Furthermore, looting of relief supplies by communities has been reported. In northern Somalia, three incidents have been recorded per month on average over the past seven months. Occasional incidents continue to be recorded in southern and central Somalia. One was reported on 4 February, when armed men broke into a warehouse storing agricultural equipment donated by a humanitarian organization and looted farming tools in Musubiya, Bay region. In Beledweyne, Hiraan region, local young people looted mosquito nets during a distribution exercise; a community member who intervened was shot and injured.

18. Military operations are compounding existing access challenges. The AMISOM and national armed forces troop realignment and reconfiguration exercise, which in some areas entails troop withdrawals, often with minimal or no advance warning, leaves the local population and humanitarian organizations vulnerable, given that Al-Shabaab militias move in and occupy the vacated locations. Suspension, disruption and/or relocation of humanitarian programmes and withdrawal of humanitarian personnel linked to troop withdrawals and subsequent assumption of control of the respective areas by Al-Shabaab were recorded in areas in the Bakool, Gedo, Hiraan, Juba Hoose and Shabelle Hoose regions in 2015, the first quarter of 2016 and June and July 2016. Project relocation often leaves people in the affected locations with no alternative means to meet their needs.



19. Counter-terrorism measures have continued to inhibit humanitarian action, increasing the perceived risk of operating in areas under Al-Shabaab control, which are the areas in which humanitarian needs are believed to be the highest. Some donor Governments have requested the introduction of specific clauses in funding contracts and partnership agreements with humanitarian organizations referring to their national anti-terrorism legislation and/or policies and making it mandatory for direct recipients to carry out detailed background checks on any implementing partner. Such caveats have continued to undermine the ability of humanitarian organizations to address all needs wherever they are.

20. The regulatory environment for humanitarian activities is a key concern. Humanitarian organizations have continued to report significant increases in bureaucratic impediments that surpass the reasonable information and regulatory functions of local authorities, especially in Puntland and southern and central Somalia. On average, humanitarian partners record more than 10 incidents relating to bureaucratic constraints per month, including multiple registration requirements, such as payment of registration fees and arbitrary taxation. To enable aid to be delivered to people in need more efficiently, humanitarian organizations continue to advocate that the authorities expedite a process to put in place fixed enabling regulatory frameworks and revisit taxation requirements for aid agencies.

21. The difficulties notwithstanding, humanitarian partners continue to reach people in need in all 18 regions. International organizations remain dependent on local non-governmental and community-based organizations to deliver assistance in areas to which they have no access. Some progress has been made through local-level negotiations with non-State armed groups in areas such as Xuddur and Tayeeglow, Hiraan region. The United Nations is working closely with partners to strengthen their capacity to deliver life-saving assistance where it is most needed. The humanitarian country team established an access task force in November 2015 to support the humanitarian community to tackle these challenges. Dialogue with national-level and regional-level senior government authorities has been initiated on various issues to facilitate the delivery of assistance.

#### **Risk mitigation measures**

22. Humanitarian organizations strengthened efforts to identify and detect factors that could lead to aid diversion, to evaluate the capacity of implementing partners and to track programmes with stronger reporting and auditing tools to verify the delivery of critical, life-saving programmes.

23. The Risk Management Unit provided the United Nations system with risk management advice, risk management training, monitoring services and risk assessments for potential and existing partners. Risk assessments contain tailored recommendations designed to help agencies to address or mitigate identified risks, including fiduciary, fraud, programme, integrity and reputational risks. The Unit continues to support the Office of Internal Oversight Services as required, through its monitoring team and risk analysts. The Unit developed and updated its Contractor Information Management System to enable the sharing of contract and risk-related information between United Nations agencies. The database contains information contributed by the Unit and 14 United Nations agencies on more than 2,500 contractors and suppliers to the United Nations in Somalia. The value of

contracts covered therein exceeds \$4.2 billion. Regular updates include the listing of entities subject to Security Council sanctions and periodic updates of the World Bank exclusion list and the International Criminal Police Organization list of wanted persons for Somalia. Individuals and organizations identified in the reports on Somalia by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea are added to the database as and when required.

24. The Somalia risk working group, chaired by the Risk Management Unit, shared information on high-risk partners and collaborated in seeking common approaches to risk management challenges. The Unit also chairs the multiparty risk working group, made up of United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations.

25. The Risk Management Unit released an online introduction to risk management course in 2015, which was initially made available to all United Nations staff in Somalia and later released to the wider donor, government and non-governmental organization community. The course provides an introduction to risk management processes, based on the ISO 31000 risk management standard, and is aimed at building risk management knowledge and awareness throughout the Somalia aid community. The Unit increased its engagement with several international non-governmental organizations through the provision of advice and feedback on those entities' due diligence processes.

26. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund, managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, supports a timely and coordinated response providing funds targeted to meet the highest priority needs as identified by partners on the ground. The Fund is governed by global guidelines for country-based pooled funds and includes an accountability framework complete with a set of robust risk management tools. The tools determine partner risk levels by integrating the results of partners' capacity assessments, audit reports and performance and monitoring information. Information from third party contractors and other external sources is also considered. Partner risk levels are used to determine the control mechanisms that are then applied to partner selection, including funding tranches, frequency and type of monitoring and reporting required and maximum budget amounts. Additional compliance measures require all partner audit and reporting requirements to be met before additional funds are approved.

27. More recently, additional guidance to manage cases of possible fraud or misappropriation has been implemented with a view to finding amicable solutions to recover funds and potentially improve partnerships. Nevertheless, challenges remain in seeking justice and recovering funds in more serious cases in which criminal activity has been discovered; efforts are continuing to actively address these issues. With more robust systems implemented since 2012 in the post-famine environment, there has been a significant reduction in the number of cases of possible fraud detected. Of the three cases identified since 2013, one was self-reported by the non-governmental organization, one was identified through monitoring mechanisms and one proved to be the genuine delivery of services in line with the fund agreement.

**Impact of paragraphs 23 and 24 of resolution 2244 (2015)**

28. Paragraph 23 of resolution 2244 (2015) provides that, until 15 November 2016, the obligations imposed on Member States under paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) are not to apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia. While organizations surveyed during the reporting period did not explicitly comment on the impact of paragraphs 23 and 24 of resolution 2244 (2015) on their ability to implement programmes, the non-renewal of the humanitarian exemption would result in additional obstructions to and delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

**Conclusion**

29. After more than two decades of turmoil and being seen as a failed State, Somalia continues to be on a positive, albeit delicate, trajectory towards peace and stability. This encouraging trend comes against a background of persistent humanitarian needs, chronic insecurity, human rights violations and inherent vulnerabilities. As a result of progress made on the political front, the Federal Government, with its constituent states, and the international community are now increasingly focused on addressing the underlying causes of vulnerabilities, durable solutions and long-term development priorities. The Somali Compact between the Federal Government and the international community — and now the Somali-led national development plan — provide critical opportunities to end drivers of humanitarian crises. One such example is the solutions initiative for internally displaced persons, which seeks long-term development solutions to protracted displacement and has led to solutions being mainstreamed as a development priority in the forthcoming national development plan.

30. Delivering aid remains extremely difficult in Somalia, but humanitarian organizations continue to strike a balance between respecting security concerns and ensuring effective service delivery in line with the principle of staying, protecting and delivering. Humanitarian partners also continue their work, notwithstanding the significant access and security challenges, and continue to require flexible and timely funding to effectively assist 3.5 million of the estimated 4.7 million Somalis in need of assistance. The delivery of assistance remains costly and unsustainable. The elimination of impediments, including checkpoints, to improved road access is required to enhance people's livelihoods and to enable humanitarian partners to deliver life-saving assistance effectively. Humanitarian organizations continue to advocate that AMISOM strengthen the implementation of its mandate to secure key supply routes, including to areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, pursuant to paragraph 6 (d) of Security Council resolution 2297 (2016) and Somalia-specific civil-military guidelines signed by the United Nations and AMISOM in November 2014.

31. In the light of the foregoing, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator invites the Security Council to renew the humanitarian exemption provided in paragraph 23 of resolution 2244 (2015).