Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept that has acquired increasing recognition from the international community, with intergovernmental organisations assuming an important role in shaping the SSR agenda and supporting SSR programmes. For many years now, the United Nations system has also been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities although not necessarily under the label of SSR. What has been absent to date is a comprehensive, coherent and coordinated UN approach to SSR. There is, however, increasing interest within the UN system and strong calls from the field for such an approach, which would serve as a valuable planning, coordination and implementation tool for various UN institutions working on SSR and in related areas. It is against this backdrop that Slovakia, in its capacity as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006-2007, aims to initiate a thematic debate on the UN’s role in SSR during its Presidency of the Security Council in February 2007. In preparation for this debate, Slovakia – with support from partner countries – launched a series of events on SSR. The initial workshop on ‘Developing an SSR Concept for the United Nations’ was held in Bratislava on 7 July 2006. This was followed by the roundtable co-chaired by Slovakia and the Netherlands on the ‘United Nations’ Role in Post-Conflict SSR’, which took place on 3 November 2006 in New York. At both events, participants emphasized the importance for the UN to draw on the experience of regional and other intergovernmental organisations as it begins to develop its own approach to SSR. For that purpose, the second roundtable co-hosted by Canada and Slovakia on ‘Multilateral and Regional Approaches to SSR: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept’ was held on 8 December 2006 at the Millennium UN Plaza Hotel in New York (for agenda, please see annex).

This report from the second roundtable is divided into two section: the first provides an overview of the presentations given by the various speakers, including representatives from UN entities, as well as from the African Union, ECOWAS, OSCE, OECD, EU/EC, and NATO, and the second a summary of the key lessons for the development of a UN SSR concept.

Presentations

The roundtable was launched with a Breakfast Session which featured a keynote address by H.E. Ján Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. Minister Kubiš was introduced by Mr. Robert Orr, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Planning, who noted that the UN would benefit from a common policy on SSR, drawing on past lessons learned. Mr. Orr identified the UN’s key contribution to SSR
as: early identification of security needs, priorities and plans; ensure linkages with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and rule of law; provision of oversight and review of progress; and ensuring transition from peacekeeping to longer-term reconstruction and development. He also recognised the key role of regional organisations as local knowledge is critical to the success of SSR. In his keynote address, Minister Kubiš noted that SSR is essential for building sustainable peace and stability, long-term development as well as good governance and rule of law. He reminded participants that there is an evolving international body of relevant norms, standards and best practices and a growing amount of experience and lessons learned in the field of SSR. He stressed the particular contribution of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in drafting its Implementation Framework for SSR. He also noted that an increasing number of United Nations entities are engaged in a wide range of activities related to security sector reform, and the mandates of UN integrated missions routinely include broad tasks related to SSR. Notably, the issue of SSR has been significantly amplified since the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office. While these developments are encouraging much remains to be done to overcome the fragmented character of current efforts and to fully benefit from orchestrated actions taken jointly by the international community. Minister Kubiš underlined the need for: 1) national ownership; 2) a more coherent UN approach to SSR; 3) enhanced donor coordination; and 4) cooperation with regional and international organisations.

The following sessions of the Roundtable, moderated by Professor Heiner Hänggi from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), focused on the SSR concept and its relevance for the UN, on multilateral and regional approaches to SSR and how these could be drawn upon as the UN begins to develop its own approach to SSR. Mr. Don Sinclair, Director General of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Forces (START) at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, launched the Opening Session by presenting an overview of the Canadian whole-of-government approach to SSR and stressing the imperative for national ownership of SSR, for better coordination among international actors on the ground, and for the existing expertise of the international community to be more effectively employed. Mr. Marcel Peško, Director of the UN Department at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, followed with reflections on the potential for a Security Council Presidential Statement on SSR to highlight the need for the development of UN-wide guidelines and enhanced coordination of international efforts in order to avoid duplicating efforts. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Ms. Carolyn McAskie, continued the session by addressing the political nature of SSR, the central axis role of SSR across the conflict continuum, the importance of engaging regional organisations and partners in the South, and the essential human rights implications of SSR. She also commented on the funding imbalances between peacekeeping (assessed budget) and peacebuilding (voluntary contributions), noting in particular the restraints associated with ‘ODA-ability’ of support to SSR. Finally, UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Ms. Kathleen Cravero, brought the session to a close by emphasising once more the need within the UN for more comprehensive support to SSR, a shared definition of SSR, guidelines for UN support to SSR, and greater clarity for roles and responsibilities within the UN with regard to SSR. She also stressed that SSR is an integral element of good governance and should be included in national development frameworks as a secure environment is a
requirement for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is also critical that the international community and UN bodies avoid competition to ensure optimal effectiveness in delivering support to SSR.

Ambassador Theodor Winkler, Director of DCAF, introduced the first Panel Session on International Organisations’ Approaches to SSR, of which the first speaker was Ms. Alice Mungwa, Senior Political Officer, Office of the Permanent Observer of the African Union (AU) to the UN. Only recently integrated into the AU’s focus, a holistic approach to SSR is being developed, broadening the focus of security beyond the military sector in-line with the AU understanding of poverty as the key threat to security. She then touched on the issue of gender mainstreaming underlining the importance of more effectively integrating gender perspectives in SSR. Mr. Erik Falkehed introduced the security sector governance approach to SSR adopted by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and referred to the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security which codifies *inter alia* the principle of democratic control over armed and internal security forces. He stated that the OSCE has traditionally pursued a holistic, governance-oriented approach to SSR.

The roundtable also provided a platform for the official launch, within the UN, of the OECD’s new Implementation Framework for SSR (IF-SSR). Mr. Graham Thompson from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) on behalf of the OECD introduced the IF-SSR which provides a framework for supporting partner countries to develop locally owned SSR and facilitate greater coherence across donor government departments and instruments. He outlined the key elements of a successful SSR programme: local ownership; comprehensive assessments; partnership; building political will and popular support; understanding incentives and disincentives for reform; realism, flexibility and sustainability; and taking a ‘multi-layered’ approach to enhancing service delivery. He also stressed the importance of balancing support for technical capacity with support for governance capability and ensuring effective sequencing of reforms. Mr. Mark White, also from DFID on behalf of the OECD, addressed the impact of the IF-SSR for donors noting the fundamentally political nature of SSR which, in order to succeed, requires cooperation and input across the security, political and developmental aspects at all levels: this makes one-size-fits-all approaches to SSR not only potentially unsuccessful but also potentially harmful. Mr. White stressed that, where possible, SSR should be linked to national development frameworks and a flexible approach must be taken. Coordination between donors and the UN is also vital, and regional organisations have a key role to play in supporting SSR programmes.

Mr. Mark Kroeker, Police Advisor and the Head of Police Division at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) wrapped up the first Panel Session by noting the necessity of setting priorities, allowing time for change to happen, and being able to measure success. Mr. Kroeker therefore called for better measuring tools – assessing where we are, where we are going and where we have been to see if there is improvement.

Col. Mahamane Touré, Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), opened the second Panel Session on International Organisations’ Approaches to SSR with an account of
ECOWAS’ involvement with SSR. The key factors that have supported greater achievement in SSR for ECOWAS over the last few years include the development of a normative framework for SSR. Col. Touré referred to the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles, the ECOWAS Treaty, revised in 1993, which confers supranationality to the regional body, the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, and the 2001 Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance – all of which constitute a comprehensive framework for reconceptualising human security. Col. Touré described SSR as incremental and relatively ineffective in addressing institutional weaknesses, calling instead for a shift to security sector transformation which entails a more holistic and profound change of the security sector, altering relations of power, transforming institutional culture, promoting professionalism and human rights. Ms. Inger Buxton, Administrator at the European Commission’s Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit, followed by stressing the challenge to bring together the extensive work of the EU/EC in SSR within one common policy framework – given the fact that support to SSR is conducted under a wide range of policy instruments including, enlargement, pre-accession, neighbourhood policy, development cooperation, democratisation and human rights, justice and home affairs, civilian and military crisis management. An overarching EU policy framework on SSR was adopted by the Council of the EU in June 2006 and derives from the EU Concept for ESDP support to SSR adopted by the Council in December 2005 and the Commission Communication adopted in May 2006. The final presentation of the afternoon panel was given by Mr. Gabriele Cascone from the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He mentioned that NATO’s expertise in SSR focused mainly on defence reform, stating that NATO has developed a framework for cooperation with non-NATO countries (‘Partnership for Peace’) which includes ensuring democratic control of armed forces and better cooperation in defence matters.

The Closing Session was introduced by the Permanent Representative of France to the UN, Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière, who reminded participants of the sensitive nature of the national sovereignty issues raised by SSR and stressed that SSR must be done on a case-by-case basis and therefore, depending on the local context, different organisations should take the lead in supporting national efforts, such as the UN, regional and other multilateral organisations. Mr. Laurie Nathan, a Research Fellow at the University of Cape Town and London School of Economics, provided a summary of the day’s discussions with a view to developing elements for a UN SSR concept (see next section). He organised his comments by looking sequentially at the problems, the goals, the policy norms and guidelines, the strategies, the actors and structures, the resources, and the challenges of SSR (for full text, please see annex). The Roundtable was concluded with final remarks from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Slovakia to the UN, Ambassadors John McNee and Peter Burian, the two co-hosts of the Roundtable. Ambassador McNee noted that the discussion with regional and international partners is an important and timely step in fostering an effective and inclusive dialogue on SSR – one that will help draw the key elements of a common approach to SSR within the UN. Ambassador Burian stated that Slovakia would reflect on all of the numerous ideas shared and was heartened by the fact that there is common agreement that SSR is a critical issue. In terms of next steps, Ambassador Burian also mentioned that Slovakia would like to co-host a conference on SSR in Africa in the course of 2007.
**Key lessons for the development of a UN SSR concept**

The presentations and moderated discussions raised several key themes in terms of UN’s relationship to SSR and the lessons to be learnt from multilateral and regional organisations.

SSR must be conceived in a **comprehensive and holistic** way because (1) it provides a framework for military and defence reform as well as reforms in non-military parts of the security sector such as the police, border guards, judicial institutions, etc.; (2) it links measures aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the security and justice institutions to overriding concerns of good governance, rule of law and democratic accountability; (3) it aims at building state capacity to deliver security and justice and simultaneously engaging non-state actors relevant for security sector governance.

**Democratic governance** is the cornerstone of the reform and transformation agendas reflecting *inter alia* the importance of **gender** and **human rights** perspectives and situating SSR within the broader **human security** concept. It is not sufficient that the security services perform their statutory functions efficiently and effectively, security governance, policies and activities must be consistent with democratic norms.

The nature of SSR as a **fundamentally political activity** was repeatedly raised. The international community needs to remain prescient to the fact that it is supporting the redistribution of the means of power within a state and should therefore avoid purely technical solutions. The international community must therefore proceed with sensitivity, care and caution in dealing with SSR.

**National ownership** of SSR is essential. Security sector reform must be shaped and driven by local actors and, if necessary, supported by external actors. This may be extremely difficult in some countries but it is a pragmatic imperative as well as a matter of respect. SSR that is not locally shaped and driven is not sustainable. The aim is national ownership and not simply government ownership.

SSR is conducted in **different contexts** and under various settings, not solely in post-conflict countries. Conflict prevention, democratisation and post-colonial/post-authoritarian transition also constitute highly relevant contexts for SSR. There is thus a need to ensure that support to SSR is both **flexible and adaptable** enough to respond to changes on the ground. One-size-fits-all approaches cannot respond to the demands of a contextualised approach.

SSR is a **long-term endeavour** that takes place over several decades. A host of security needs might be urgent but there is never a quick-fix solution. Short-term donor funding cycles and targets undermine local ownership and lead to dysfunctional and unsustainable outcomes. SSR is a critical element of the transition from peacekeeping to longer-term peacebuilding and sustainable development. Institutional capacity, affordability and sustainability of programmes, sequencing, timing and flexibility are all aspects of SSR which need to be balanced against each other.
Since national ownership is fundamental, the general strategy of external actors (UN system, regional and other multilateral organisations, major powers and donor governments, etc.) should be to support domestic actors engaged in SSR. Areas for external actors’ support to SSR include: the provision of funds; stimulation and facilitation of dialogue and transformation; technical advice on security issues; training and education activities; generate lessons learnt and best practices; and norm setting (in the case of regional and international organisations).

The organisational and structural challenges in international actors’ efforts aimed at supporting SSR are to determine a proper allocation of roles and division of labour; to acquire the necessary institutional capacity and expertise; to minimise duplication and competition; to enhance cooperation and synergy; and to ensure proper coordination. Given its mandate, legitimacy, experience and presence on the ground, the UN has a key role to play and a special responsibility in supporting SSR in close cooperation with member states, regional organisations and other external actors. However, there is currently no common understanding, much less a comprehensive policy framework, that would guide UN support to SSR programmes in a coherent, coordinated and sustainable way.

Although a comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated UN approach to SSR has been lacking to date, security sector reform is very much on the agenda of the UN system. UN support to SSR cuts across a wide range of policy areas from peace and security, to poverty reduction, economic and social development, human rights, rule of law and democratisation. There is a strong consensus that SSR is particularly relevant in post-conflict environments, and that it is key for ensuring transition from peacekeeping to longer-term reconstruction and development. It is also agreed that SSR is inextricably linked with other stabilisation and reconstruction priorities such as transitional justice; DDR; equal and full participation of women; and children in armed conflict among others.

An increasing number of UN organs, departments, programmes, funds and agencies are involved in one or other aspect of SSR support activities – even if they do not explicitly recognise them as such. The UN system’s record of SSR-related activities is particularly extensive in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operations and development programmes, and can be traced back years prior to the introduction of SSR terminology.

The immediate priorities for the UN are as follows: to reach consensus on a concept of SSR; to determine an appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities for SSR among the various UN entities; to determine the specific mandate and programmes of each entity in relation to SSR; to acquire the necessary capacity and expertise; to generate lessons learnt and best practices; to establish coordinating mechanisms within the UN family and with other external actors.

Annex: Programme and Presentations
“Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept”

Roundtable co-chaired by the Permanent Missions of Slovakia and Canada to the UN

**Date:** 8 December 2006  
**Venue:** Millennium UN Plaza Hotel New York, One United Nations Plaza  
**Moderator:** Professor Heiner Hänggi (DCAF)

8:30am-9:30am  **Breakfast Session**
- Breakfast  
- Introductory Remarks by Mr. Robert Orr, UN ASG for Policy Planning (Executive Office of the Secretary-General)  
- Keynote address by His Excellency Ján Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic  
- Brief Q&A

9:30am-10:15am  **Opening Session**
- Welcoming remarks by Canada and Slovakia  
- Presentations by UN representatives

Speakers:
- **Canada**  
  - Mr. Don Sinclair, Director General of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada
- **Slovakia**  
  - Mr. Marcel Peško, Director of the UN Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic
- **UN**  
  - Ms. Carolyn McAskie, UN ASG for Peacebuilding Support  
  - Ms. Kathleen Cravero, UNDP Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

10:15am-10:30am:  **Coffee break**

10:30am-12:30pm  **PANEL 1: International Organizations’ approaches to SSR**
- Opening remarks by Mr. Theodor Winkler, Director of DCAF (overview on intergovernmental approaches to SSR)
- Experience of the **African Union**: Ms. Alice Aghenebit Mungwa, Senior Political Officer, Office of the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the UN, New York
- Experience of **OSCE**: Mr. Erik Falkehed, Analyst/Researcher, Conflict Prevention Centre
- Experience of **OECD**: DAC Implementation Framework: Mr.
Graham Thompson, DfID - Chair, OECD/SSR Task Team, and Mr. Mark White, DFID SSR Adviser

- Wrap-up statement by Mr. Mark Kroeker, UN DPKO Police Adviser, Head of Police Division

• MODERATED DISCUSSION

12:30pm-12:50pm  Lunch break

12:50pm-2:30pm:  PANEL 2 (over buffet lunch): International Organizations’ approaches to SSR (continued)

- Experience of ECOWAS: Col. Mahamane Toure, Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs

- Experience of the European Union: Ms. Inger Buxton, European Commission, Administrator, DG RELEX, Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention Unit

- Experience of NATO: Mr. Gabriele Cascone, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division

• MODERATED DISCUSSION

2:30pm-2:45pm:  Coffee break

2:45pm-3:30pm:  CLOSING SESSION

- Summary of discussion by Mr. Laurie Nathan, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and University of Cape Town, South Africa, and Member of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence, South Africa
  (Conclusions with a view to developing elements for the UN SSR concept)

- Wrap-up statement by Permanent Representative of France to the UN Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière

- Closing remarks by co-hosts Ambassador McNee and Ambassador Burian (also on next steps)
STATEMENT

by

H.E. Mr. Ján Kubiš, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

“Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept”

(8.12.2006 New York)

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome you all this morning to the roundtable on „Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept“, co-organised with our distinguished Canadian friends. I thank you for your interest and participation.

This roundtable is the third official event and second in New York organised by the Slovak Foreign Service in preparation for our Presidency in the UN Security Council in February 2007. We would like to use this opportunity to highlight the issue of the SSR, which we find essential for building sustainable peace and stability, long-term development as well as good governance and rule of law, not only in post-conflict societies.

One of my first duties after assuming the position of the Foreign Minister was to open the workshop on “Developing a Security Sector Reform Concept for the United Nations” that took place in Bratislava on 6 July 2006. The topic of SSR has thus gained a special place in my agenda. I am glad that our activities in the field of SSR have meanwhile reached New York.

Unfortunately, I was not able to attend the roundtable organised by our Permanent Mission here in New York in co-operation with our friends from the Netherlands last month. I am therefore glad to be able to take part in today’s discussion. I am particularly
pleased that today we will discuss experiences of and lessons learned by regional and other international organisations. As former Secretary-General of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, former European Union Special Representative for Central Asia, and former UN SRSG for Tajikistan and Head of UNMOT I have a lot of first-hand personal experiences proving the importance of the SSR for the stable development of countries in post-conflict situations.

And I can share with you also our national perspective – that is the experience of Slovakia with the reform of her own security sector. During the recent years since the Velvet Revolution in former Czecho-Slovakia, and notably since its independence in 1993 the Slovak Republic has gone through an profound reform process that has, among other things, included a reform, or rather a rebuilding, of our security forces.

Today, Slovakia is a stable democracy, with developed domestic security structures under strong democratic control anchored in respective international structures, notably the NATO and EU. Slovakia’s stability, a good record of human rights and of the rule of law have attracted foreign capital and promoted entrepreneurship that have helped to boost our economy. Our GDP has grown continuously for more than a decade, in the 3rd quarter of 2006 it achieved the record 9.8% high growth and the assumption is, that this year’s growth figure will be between 7% and 8%, with a similar prediction for the coming 1-2 years.

I don’t want to draw too far-reaching conclusions from linking SSR and our progress together too firmly. However, I don’t hesitate to say that the security sector reform has in a major way contributed not only to our stability and security, but also to increased rule of law, investments, and prosperity. This is fully in line with the premise of the 2005 World Summit Final Document linking security, human rights and development. Therefore, this experience of ours was one of the initial impulses behind our decision to bring the topic of the SSR to the attention of the UN and eventually of the Council.

Let me refer to another practical experience of Slovakia, which is directly linked to the UN – that is our experience of a non-permanent member of the Security Council. We have been confronted with the issue of the SSR countless times during our first year of membership in this distinguished body. Lack of the reform of the security sector often
emerges in the Council’s deliberations as one of the root causes of conflicts (e.g. in DRC). The need for SSR has been many times acknowledged as a precondition of stable, sustainable post-conflict development for countries like Burundi, Liberia or Côte d’Ivoire. Last but not least, we have unfortunately seen cases when inability to carry out SSR and early withdrawal of comprehensive country-specific efforts also in this area led to a collapse of peacekeeping or peacebuilding efforts and the countries relapsed to and another cycle of instability like in Timor Leste.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The importance of the SSR as an essential element of any stabilisation process in general, and in post-conflict environments in particular, has been increasingly acknowledged by the international community. This has been reflected in growing donor support to states reforming their security sectors.

There is also an evolving international body of relevant norms, standards and best practices and a growing amount of experience and lessons learned in the field of SSR.

Regional and other multilateral organisations have paid great attention to SSR for some time already. We will discuss this aspect of international efforts to a large extent today. Let me, for the time being, just mention the excellent job performed by the OECD in drafting its Implementation Framework for SSR. Slovakia has also initiated a debate within the OSCE aimed at preparing its own framework document on security governance and I am glad, that the Chairman’s statement at the recent OSCE Ministerial conference in Brussels held on 4-5 December 2006 confirmed the will of the OSCE to consider taking stock of the OSCE experience in 2007.

These tendencies and growing interest are naturally visible also within the UN system. An increasing number of United Nations entities are engaged in a wide range of activities related to security sector reform and the mandates of UN integrated missions routinely include broad tasks related to SSR.

Notably, the issue of the SSR has been significantly amplified since the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Support Office.
Finally, the Secretariat has created a United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on SSR to identify current UN engagement in this area.

Last but not least, the Security Council itself has been paying an increased attention to the SSR in its official documents. Let me mention just the Presidential Statement adopted on 12 July 2005 in which the Security Council acknowledged the SSR as one of the preconditions of a successful peacebuilding.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

All these developments are encouraging and promising. Yet, we believe that a lot remains to be done, in order to overcome the fragmented character of current efforts and to fully benefit from an orchestrated actions taken jointly by the international community. There is a lot to be undertaken, yet, let me conclude by focusing on four major issues from our viewpoint:

First, we need to coordinate better the donors effort. As I have just mentioned, there is a growing interest of the international community in promoting the SSR. Yet, a lot remains to be improved. Besides the quantity of the donor support there is also the question of its quality. This is an area that will need greater focus in the future. Individual states, regional and other intergovernmental organizations, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations will have to co-ordinate better their support to states concerned and do it in co-operation with the states themselves, in order to achieve cumulative effect instead of duplicity and competition in the field of the SSR.

Indeed, more attention should be focused on national ownership and commitment, and that is my second point. National ownership is often, and very adequately, mentioned as a precondition for a successful SSR. Yet, the national commitment is equally crucial. We cannot move forward without a strong understanding on the side of the recipient countries that the SSR is beneficial and necessary for their development, stability, security and prosperity and that therefore resolute action and sustained effort is needed on their side.

Thirdly, the role of regional and other international organisation in the field of SSR should be further promoted. They often play a central role in developing and
implementing SSR programmes and in awareness raising in many countries. In addition, their added value is in their ability to embed national SSR processes in regional context.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Fourthly and lastly, there is a clear need for more coherent approaches by the UN. This is in fact the core reason and objective of Slovakia’s effort. As mentioned earlier, the UN has been increasingly involved in SSR related activities. Yet there is a clear gap that needs to be fulfilled. We need to achieve better co-ordination of various actors on the ground and we need to achieve further progress and make sure that the issue of SSR in its full scope and complexity is better reflected in mandates of UN peacekeeping operations and integrated political offices.

The United Nations by virtue of its global mandate, unique legitimacy, early presence on the ground and experience to date has a crucial role to play and a special responsibility in supporting SSR.

We are therefore glad to see a growing interest within the UN to develop a common, comprehensive and coordinated approach to SSR, cutting across the entire peacebuilding spectrum and including longer-term development.

We strongly believe that this effort should culminate in a UN strategy that should define shared principles, objectives and guidelines for the development and implementation of UN support to SSR and make clear the roles and responsibilities of individual players within the UN system. This should then serve as a basic orientation and planning tool for various UN entities working on SSR and in related areas.

Our approach to this topic is process based. We are aware that developing the strategy mentioned earlier will require sustained effort of the UN. As I said earlier, our initiative started some time ago and it is not about to end in February. Following our thematic debate we would like to intensify the co-operation between the UNSC, the Secretariat and other relevant bodies within the UN system with the purpose of giving special consideration to specific areas where the United Nations can play a role in SSR.
This consideration of the possible UN role should include:

a) ways of supporting national governments in defining their security needs in a holistic way;

b) capacities, funding and interagency coordination as well as coordination with other international actors;

c) the importance of regional and national contexts, and;

d) the extent to which the United Nations can draw on the operational experience and policy frameworks of regional and other intergovernmental organisations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me thank you for coming to participate in our event today. I take it as another proof of the growing interest of the international community in SSR. I believe that we are going to have an inspiring and fruitful debate that will further help us in our effort to promote the issue of SSR in the UN and in the Security Council in particular.

Finally, let me express my gratitude to our Canadian colleagues for their invaluable input and support in co-organising this roundtable.

Thank you for your kind attention.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Excellencies, Dear Friends,

Let me first thank for your valuable support we have been benefiting from while advancing our initiative to facilitate the debate on the UN’s role in the Security Sector Reform with a view to hold an open meeting of the UN SC on this topic in the course of our presidency in February 2007. It clearly demonstrates the growing interest within the United Nations and the international community in developing a comprehensive SSR strategy.

Honestly, during the preparation phase we didn’t think that this topic would draw so much attention both in academic and diplomatic circles. At the beginning, it seemed as an unreachable dream that we would be able to advance the process into the current stage. And today, I dare to say, we have a real opportunity to generate a consensus in the UN SC and wider UN family on the development of a common, comprehensive and coordinated approach to Security Sector Reform. So let’s not waste the unique window of opportunity.

Our decision to initiate a debate on SSR within the UN originated from Slovakia’s own transformation experience. We have just recently gone through a deep and wide transformation that touched upon almost every part of our society while security sector reform was an integral part of that process. It has contributed to the democratic consolidation and rapid economic transformation that occurred in my country. Slovakia along with other Central European countries, that are today members of the EU and NATO, is tangible evidence that there is a strong correlation between SSR and profound democratic transition along with successful socio-economic transformation. Although in our case we did not carried out SSR in
a post-conflict environment and the UN has not played a leading role in our transition, there should not be any doubt about strong relationship between SSR, development and good governance and I am confident that this will also be reflected in our future work.

Bratislava seminar mentioned by Minister Kubiš was a starting point of the learning process, which will have its highlight but not the end at the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the UN SC, when we hope for an adoption of the presidential statement. This should include, *inter alia*, an acknowledgment to the UN and other international actors for their engagement in SSR related activities and support to the efforts to develop a common and comprehensive policy framework on the UN SSR. Given the general consensus that more discussion and expertise is needed to have a better understanding of what actually could be considered as system-wide UN SSR principles and guidelines, the work should continue further, but in more coordinated and target oriented manner. In that respect, we would be grateful if the Secretary General is requested to prepare a report on UN approaches and activities related to SSR with concrete recommendations on the way further. In that process we see a strong role for the recently created United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Security Sector Reform at the Secretariat along with Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office. We also noted that the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in its most recent annual report, requested the Secretariat to conduct a process of jointly policymaking on security sector best practices. What we are hoping for is to develop a set of best practices and principles, or a “shopping list”, if you will, which will help the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat and other UN bodies as well as regional organizations to approach future SSR activities in more coordinated and coherent way.

Although we welcome the general recognition of the leading role of the UN in development an overall SSR strategy, at the same time we need to stress that the UN can and should draw on the experience and policy frameworks of regional and intergovernmental organizations engaged in supporting SSR. We do not have to invent what is in place already. What we need to do is to identify which best practices, lessons learned and SSR principles and guidelines applied in the EU, OECD, AU, ECOWAS, OSCE and NATO can be used in the UN context.
In that respect, I am looking forward to today’s discussion, which, I have no doubt, will be beneficial for all of us. I can assure you that the ideas presented today will find their reflection in our future work. Let me thank in advance to all speakers and participants for their active contribution to our common endeavour.

Thank you.
The OSCE is involved extensively in Security Sector Governance (SSG) activities in the field, mainly through its 19 field operations.

1. The nature of this engagement varies according to individual situations. In some cases, it is the result of a division of roles among international organizations operating in a post-conflict environment.

2. In other cases, our initiatives were driven mainly by the needs and the requests of the host states, which decided to benefit from the substantial *acquis* of the Organization in the politico-military field and from its expertise.

The OSCE has a well-tried approach in working with SSG activities.

1. While there is no single OSCE generic concept on SSG, the Organization has over the years developed a number of commonly shared principles and concepts which, taken together, provide sufficiently firm guidance for the development of SSG activities of assistance on the ground.

2. **OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security**, codifies, *inter alia* the principle of democratic control over military and internal security forces. Other relevant document are e.g. the OSCE Concept for Border Security and Management, plus the many documents and decisions regarding SALW and conventional ammunition.

The Code of Conduct is of paramount importance and should be seen as the key OSCE contribution to developing a concept for security sector reform.
The key areas covered by the CoC include:

- Respect for and adherence to existing UN and OSCE principles
- Consolidating efforts to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms.
- Developing legislation and procedures governing the democratic control of armed forces
- Exercising through the constitutionally established authority and institutions democratic oversight not only on military but also on internal security and paramilitary forces.
- Modifying internal regulations for the use of armed forces, introducing the principle of parliamentary approval of all types of mission to which armed forces or internal security forces might be assigned.
- Developing and exercising procedures for stationing armed forces on the territory of other states.
- Providing military information to the public
- Ensuring that defence policies and military doctrines are consistent with international law.
- Ensuring protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of armed forces personnel.

Civilian oversight has a more special significance today than ever before. In this context, the Code of Conduct is regarded as an effective tool in promoting democratic control of armed and security forces.

1. Due to the politically binding nature of the document, there are limits of what can be achieved with the Code of Conduct. In the absence of legal commitments, and a monitoring mechanism, interpretation and implementation of the Code is a matter for national governments. It is very difficult for the Organization as a whole to become involved in judgements about whether or not individual participating States are fulfilling their obligations as laid down in the Code.

2. Regional and national seminars and workshops have proven to be a useful tool for promoting the objectives of the Code of Conduct in the Caucasus, Central Asia and in the Balkans - working with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is an excellent way to promote awareness among legislators.
The OSCE itself is a *regional* arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN’s Charter. The various mandates for the Field Operations set out clear parameters for their engagement in SSG activities. Security Sector Governance related activities implemented by OSCE Field Operations therefore go well beyond defence reform, and aim at integrating the entire security sector into a web of well-functioning democratic institutions. **The OSCE traditionally has pursued a holistic, governance-oriented approach.**

In the OSCE area of responsibility – in all of its four regions - (South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia) the Organization is extensively involved in various types of Security Sector Governance (SSG) activities:

- Building capable and professional security forces
- Reforming the country’s defence structures
- Police assistance activities or programmes
- Supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration:
- Border issues
- Rule of law

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**Co-operation with other IOs**

Nowadays many of the European security challenges are interconnected and carry regional implications. A trans-boundary, co-operative way, therefore, is most effective in tackling them. Consequently the OSCE Field Operations *co-ordinate among each other* and *with other organizations*, and *support regional initiatives* in key areas. In a very practical sense, SSG is an opportunity to make national security systems compatible with each other and **more effective in addressing threats and challenges** of a regional nature.

Strengthening democratic governance in the security sector is a **highly political activity and cannot be addressed by technical assistance alone.**

1. Activities in this field require a profound understanding of the situation in the partner country (political relationships among key actors, how and why decisions are made, incentives and resistance to change etc.)
2. Direct support options are often limited in practice due to **restrictive mandates, legislation or long-standing practice** of many support actors. Restrictions of this
kind make **partnerships among external actors ever more necessary** if partner countries are to be supported purposefully in their reform efforts.

**OSCE has further developed a close interaction with other international actors engaged in this field.**

**UN agencies:** (e.g. UNHCR in Kyrgyzstan, UNDP through the ENVSEC programme in the Caucasus or the MOU on the implementation SALW-related projects) The OSCE mission in Kosovo is structurally part of the UN mission as its institution-building pillar.

**European Union:** on issues such as judicial reform, police reform, democratization, institution building, human rights and refugee return especially in SEE, but increasingly also in other regions.

**Council of Europe:** on many of these issues also our interaction with has also become more operational.

**NATO:** border management strategies in the SEE region has been an area of intense co-operation with both the EU and NATO as well as with the Stability Pact (e.g. Ohrid process and implementation of the Way Forward Document). Co-operation continues to focus on supporting SSR and governance

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**Suggestions and recommendations in regard to a potentially “Closer Partnership between the United Nations and Regional Organisations” in the field of SSG:**

Both the UN and regional organizations would benefit from **clear and explicit goals and objectives** for the particular kind of security-sector reform in which they find themselves collectively engaged in. If each regional organization is assigned **discrete tasks** and **responsibilities** in meeting these goals - **with a minimum of overlap and duplication** - the amount of resulting confusion and friction is likely to diminish.

A consideration for the future could e.g. be for the UN and RO’s (like the OSCE) to embark on **joint projects** where the factors just mentioned are taken into consideration, from the very beginning. Especially, if such joint projects could also be based on guidelines from relevant UN and OSCE documents dealing with SSG.
However, while better coordination is desirable, an obstacle that must be overcome is the fact that most organizations are keen preserving the principle of equality of actors. A suggestion sometimes heard is that the UN headquarters should better take into consideration the human potential and know-how of ROs dealing with security sector governance of the region. By better respecting the comparative advantages of ROs the development of synergies and the potential for maximising the effectiveness of our common endeavours would probably increase notably.

The particular local circumstances should dictate the particular roles. A clear delineation of tasks - whether achieved through common understanding or through the instructions of the UN or some other coordinating body - is more desirable than a free-for-all. But, the particular division of labor should be determined on the ground, and depend primarily on the strengths and capabilities of the organizations present. If the “competition for leadership” could be eliminated and a more pragmatic and open minded approach towards coordination could be applied - by all actors - much would be gained. Furthermore, regular informal meetings of ROs engaged in SSR has proven to be a useful mechanism of UN-RO coordination at the field level. The effectiveness by such framework is further enhanced by the inclusion of domestic and international NGOs active in SSG. In some cases, bilateral meetings between the relevant UN agency and RO engaged in similar projects could also be useful.

It’s questionable if it is meaningful to make firm decisions beforehand whether the UN should focus more on norm-setting or also play the role of strategic coordinator of international SSG assistance in the field. The same reasoning applies to the argument that ROs are generally better placed to take the lead instead. Once again I find the answer to be, this all depends on local circumstances. There is probably no one "right" solution that applies equally to every circumstance. On the same note, there is no “one single” template for achieving successful security sector reform; while transparency and accountability remain desired end states, they may be achieved by different paths (i.e. one size does not always fit all).

There are many relatively capable and resourceful ROs. As a result, as with the UN system itself, many organizations try to do important similar activities. With good will, however, it is possible for these organizations to coordinate their work among themselves. In certain post-
conflict areas, where a "coalition of the willing" is present rather than the UN with a strong coordinating mandate, this is probably the only possible solution - even if it is a resort to "ad hoc" arrangements. In others - such as e.g. BiH or Kosovo - where one person has clearly been given the responsibility of coordinating the work of the international community, this person then becomes the driving force. In Europe, and in particular in SEE, external pressure and the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration are a strong incentive as well as a driving force for conducting security sector reform. A fact, which would suggest that organizations such as OSCE, EU and NATO/PfP are well placed to assume a lead in SSG-related operational activities in this region of the world. Of course, this does not exclude that in other regions, or post-conflict situations, a joint lead role by the UN and/or other relevant ROs could be a better solution/alternative.

In principle, when decisions on who should take the leading role are made, more consideration ought to be given to which is the most appropriate IO/actor to assume the main responsibility. To what extent it is politically realistic to expect this to happen in each and every case, is however, another question.

In conclusion, based on the OSCE work on SSG, I would set out the following policy recommendations:

1. A clear vision of reform goals is crucial in keeping reforms on track.
2. Political will – the countries can not wait for external actors to make a decision for change for them, but need to have the courage and political will to make an effort themselves.
3. The interconnections of reforms are best accommodated within a comprehensive approach to security. This applies especially to the security field, where military-technical reforms need to be connected to overall security sector reform.
4. Maintaining a strong field presence have proven essential when assisting in the implementation of reform goals. Especially reforms in the security sector, which touch on politically sensitive values and institutions of sovereignty, require trustful relationships that cannot be built at distance or short-term.
5. **Flexible planning** and operations. Assistance policies need to adapt quickly to new roles and tasks as the demand for them arises on the ground.

6. **Co-ordination** among international actors themselves crucially affects and determines the quality of inter-state security co-operation.
Supporting Security and Justice

Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)

OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)

- The CPDC is the international forum that brings together conflict prevention and peacebuilding experts from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, including from the UN system, EC, IMF and World Bank.
- These experts meet to define and develop common approaches to help prevent conflict and support peace. The CPDC is a subsidiary group of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
- Website [www.oecd.org/dac/conflict](http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict)

This presentation will cover...

- Security System Reform (SSR) an effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool.
- From policy to practice - the outcomes of the IF-SSR process.
- Guidance from the IF-SSR on how to assess, design, implement and evaluate SSR programmes
- What is next on the SSR Agenda

Security system reform (SSR) an effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool

- SSR is fundamental to reducing poverty, protecting human rights and supporting sustainable development.
- An accountable, effective and efficient security system can be a force for peace and stability.
- SSR is primarily about establishing the Rule of Law and effective democratic governance.
- Addressing fragility: effective states & the social contract

Conflict Prevention is Better than a Cure: why tools like SSR are needed

- Cost of Conflict: World Bank study estimated that the benefit of averting a typical civil war is $54bn.
- Return to Conflict: there is a significant chance that a country that has suffered a conflict will revert into conflict within a 10 year period.
- Low Income Countries are 15 times more likely to go into conflict than OECD countries.
- Recent UK Study (by Bradford University) highlights that $1 spent on conflict prevention saved $4 in post-conflict reconstruction.

Security for Whom?

"Development is the indispensable foundation for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. It is the key to meeting almost every level of threat."

UN High Level Panel Report 2005

As articulated by the DAC, SSR covers three inter-related challenges facing all states:

1. Developing a clear institutional framework for the provision of security and justice that integrates security, justice and development policy and includes all relevant actors.
2. Strengthening the governance of security and justice institutions. Ensuring that security institutions are accountable to civil authorities.
3. Building capable and professional security and justice institutions, capable of upholding the rule of law, and which provide timely access to justice.

Understanding the elements of the security system and how they link together:

- Criminal justice system (police, judiciary, prosecutions, lawyers, probation workers, oversight institutions, community justice providers).
- Intelligence system (police, intelligence – strategic intelligence, analysis – military).
- State security system (police, military, border guards, immigrations, gendarmerie, non-state security).
- Accountability ‘system’ (internal, external, and parliamentary systems).

The security system includes the police, justice and penal sectors, as well as the military and mechanisms for internal-external and parliamentary oversight.

The Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR) .... designed by and for SSR practitioners

A two-year consultative process with practitioners and policy makers from development, security and diplomatic arenas.

Process included:
- Engagement with field staff.
- Partner countries experiences & perspectives
- Whole-of-government meetings.
- Dialogue with non-development actors.
- Thematic workshops on security and justice issues.
- Building on DAC work in other areas, e.g. Paris Declaration.
- Critical Review Panel

The Purpose of the IF-SSR is...

- Collect & share experience, identify evidence based good practise, reflect reality, identify gaps
- To provide:
  - A platform to reach out to non-development actors and to partner countries.
  - A framework to support locally owned, partner country processes to address diverse security and justice needs.
  - A co-ordination tool for donors supporting SSR.
- To help identify needs and entry-points for SSR engagement to support partner countries.

From Policy to Practice in SSR

- Still discussed at the conceptual level.
- “No Peace without Bread”
- Understood that SSR is a POLITICAL process requiring a developmental approach supported by technical inputs – field staff need to reflect this.
- Need to move from ad hoc, short-term ‘quick win’ projects to more strategic, longer-term engagement.
- Need more sophisticated and comprehensive assessments.
- The art of the possible
- Public Financial Management aspects neglected.
- Complete the loop: Feedback from field programmes/operations in policy development process is key.
- Need for greater international co-ordination/harmonisation in the field.
The IF-SSR Handbook provides operational guidance on how to …

- Foster political support for SSR.
- Use a new assessment tool for a strategic approach to SSR.
- Design SSR assistance programmes and work with State and non-State actors.
- Develop national and nation-wide capacity.
- Address key challenges in post-conflict environment
- Support reforms in 9 key sectors (e.g., policing, prisons and democratic governance, justice, etc.).
- Manage, monitor and evaluate programmes.

Undertaking an SSR Assessment

- Contextual analysis and institutional assessment will help to identify constraints and opportunities in security system reform.
- SSR assessment should cover political analysis, the security context, conflict analysis, capacity and governance of security system, and the needs of all (particularly the poor and marginalised).
- The assessment phase of SSR engagement takes time and should be viewed as a confidence-building measure.
- An inception phase allows understanding of core problems/needs.
- Assessments should enable design of programmes that balance building capacity (technical competence) and integrity (quality of governance) of security system institutions.
- Choose an entry point that would allow linkages across the system to develop naturally.

Strategy and Programme Design

"From securing the peace to ensuring stability & improving service delivery"

- Key elements of a successful SSR programme:
  - Ownership.
  - Partnership.
  - Building political will and popular support.
  - Understanding incentives and disincentives for reform.
  - Realism, flexibility and sustainability.
  - Taking a 'multi-layered' approach to enhancing service delivery.
- Need to balance support for technical capacity with support for governance capability.
- Sequencing
- How to build in flexibility and reward innovation and responsiveness as part of an on-going review & evaluation process?

SSR Implementation

- Strengthen National Capacity for:
  - Strategic Planning and Policy-Making
  - Budgetary Processes
  - Management
  - Monitoring, Assessment, Review and Evaluation
- Support institutions that can provide leadership and co-ordination
- Identify and support change agents & strengthen local initiatives
- Assessments should enable design of programmes that balance building capacity (technical competence) and integrity (quality of governance) of security system institutions.
- Choose an entry point that would allow linkages across the system to develop naturally.

What is next for the SSR Agenda?

- Improved post conflict responses: integrated use of enhanced tools tailored to each context.
- If 80% of security and justice is delivered by non-state actors what does this mean for the way we approach SSR?
- Mainstreaming SSR into other Development Processes – service delivery.
- Greater outreach to diplomatic, security and rule of law communities – build whole-of-government approach to SSR.
- Greater outreach to partner countries and regional organisations
- Piloting testing the IF-SSR – as a donor coordination tool and availability of training modules (Jan 2007) for greater coherence across the int’l community.
- Build a broad based community of practitioners – IF-SSR Mark 2 (2010?)

Post Conflict Challenges

- Inclusion of SSR in Peace Agreements.
- Linking SSR & DDR
- Peace Support Operations and SSR.
- SSR, DDR and Transitional Justice.
- SALW
- Financial Sustainability
- Transition from stabilisation to recovery.
Useful Web Links

DAC Network on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC)
www.oecd.org/dac/conflict

DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance
www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr

DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict
www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/preventionguidelines
**Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR):**

**Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept – 8 Dec 2006**

SPEAKING NOTES – Mark White DFID SSR Adviser

**Introduction & Background:**

- Thanks to the Slovaks and the Canadians for inviting me for a second time to address you all. Glad to see Ambassador Rowe from Sierra Leone also present, emphasizing the importance GoSL holds the sector and the initiative itself.
- Am present at this meeting wearing 2 hats – my first is as DFID’s new Security Sector Reform Adviser, as of Monday, and the second is as the former Programme Manager for DFID’s Security Sector Reform, and Justice Sector Development Programmes in Sierra Leone – where I spent the last 2 years up until last Sunday.

**Two main objectives of this presentation:**

- To reinforce Graham’s points with some practical field examples
- Demonstrate precisely why a common, coherent approach to SSR from bilateral, regional and multilateral entities would greatly advance our collective efforts in this sector.

**SSR-IF General:**

- The document is over 150 pages long, but if you wanted to sum it up in one sentence it would be: ‘A guide to help stakeholders decide what to do, and in what order when everything needs to be done at once’.
- The needs are huge in countries suffering from humanitarian crises, collapsed economies, mistrust within communities, poor and corrupt administrations. This document provides some practical advice on how to ensure the security sector acts as the initial enabler for development, whilst at the same time recognizing that SSR is a subset of a broader developmental agenda. What follows are, within the time available, some important messages that I’ve picked out from the document, with examples to indicate their importance.

1. **SSR – A multi faceted approach**

- As Mr Orr explained, the first point that’s key to recognize is that SSR is fundamentally political, but requires political, military and developmental inputs at the strategic, tactical, and operational level. SSR is therefore, in theory at least, the perfect platform for joint working within bilaterals, regional organisations and multilaterals, as well as between them – as long as there is this recognition at the start of the process. All actors can play a key role at the inception stage. The UK’s
work in Sierra Leone is broadly funded through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, but is also complimentary to DFID’s aid framework. Greater effort needs to be made to coordinate with other donors operating on the ground, and good progress is being made now that an integrated UN office has been established.

- There are issues relating to language, systems and thinking between disciplines, but these can be overcome if there is sufficient will for a multifaceted approach. Language needs to be conveyed in a manner understood by all parties.

2. Context is Key

- The SSR-IF places a great deal of emphasis on analysis of context. Often the issue is not the ‘what’ but the ‘how’, the ‘who’ & the ‘when’. A ‘one size fits all’ approach will not produce a successful SSR process, and could actually undermine rather than stabilize the environment in which it is being enacted.

- Important that the analysis is broadened beyond the security sector itself. It will need to consider the threats to security, the thematic linkages between those threats, the drivers of conflict, the agents of change, and their respective capacities. These issues need to be evaluated in the wider political and economic context, whilst also recognizing the limitations of certain key Ministries who may need to engage, but have never done so previously. A good example of this in Sierra Leone was the Security Sector Review, which asked the population to identify their threats to security, and prepared a cross-Government response to mitigate against those threats. The difficulty was that those most engaged were the security sector institutions themselves, when the need was for greater engagement at the political level, as well as from the Ministry of Finance and the National Revenue Authority operationally. Will and capacity are key questions to consider when developing any intervention.

- Wherever possible any SSR intervention should be linked to a broader development strategy, ideally a PRSP (a la Sierra Leone), but failing that a National Development Plan (eg Uganda)

3. Who are the players – donors and recipients?

- Linked to the first point, when assessing the analysis it is desirable to know who is likely to get involved, when, and how. Sensible conversations need to take place as to which donors hold comparative advantage in which areas, and who are the best stakeholders in Government to influence. In many countries, the UN will often undertake this role, hence making coordination between donors and the UN vital.

- Regional organizations have a key role to play – institutional memory and personal connections which are often underutilized.

- Important not to forget World Bank and IMF, who whilst they don’t engage in the sector, make decisions that impact upon it. Security cannot just be seen as a technical issue, need to look at the impacts of decisions made relating to the sector. Issues of affordability and sustainability need also to be taken into consideration.
4. Short-Term versus Medium/Long Term – Do No Harm

- When the initial analysis and the donor mapping takes place, a holistic approach to the security and justice sectors, and the Governance structures that support them is taken. It may be that the interventions take place sequentially, as it may be physically or financially impossible to implement all the activities in parallel. However they must not fall off the radar, as they will only reappear when it is often too late to do anything about it. Good example in SL, was the difficulty of securing the SLP’s engagement in the justice sector. One way in would have been an effective Ministry of Internal Affairs – we had ignored this institution for some time resulting in limited capacity for them to engage. Likewise Ministry of Finance.
- Sequencing within and outside the security sector needs greater attention. Easier to do this if seen as a fundamentally developmental activity.

5. Coordination is Critical

- This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the work. Analysis may not be agreed with, donor restrictions may limit support in key areas of need and political appetite for engagement in certain sectors may not be found. Donors are, on occasion, reluctant to take an holistic approach and so are recipient Govts. No one will turn down a training opportunity for personal advancement offered by a donor even if it doesn’t fit within their institutional strategic priorities.
- Best way around these difficulties is to support the development of a locally owned Sector Strategy that, wherever possible, is linked to a broader PRSP or National Development Strategy. This process makes the rules of engagement clearer, whilst allowing donors to support prioritized objectives in a coherent manner, as articulated by the recipient entities themselves. SSR-IP does precisely this, as does the Justice Sector strategy.


- If a country has developed its own strategies, its own action plans to implement the objectives contained within those strategies and priorities those actions against impact and cost, wherever possible donor interventions should directly support those plans, both financially and technically. We have given money to the SSR-IP, and will do so again next year – it is important to increase the management and accountability of these institutions through funding. Not all donors would be comfortable with this approach, but at a minimum a projectised system should link to the strategic goals of the sector.
- Local ownership needs to be broadened across the Government, and across the population more broadly. With ownership comes responsibility, and the sector needs to listen to the views of the rest of Government, as well as of the people, the donors cannot deal with the sector in isolation.
That said, if an issue doesn’t comfortably fit within one institution, it is better to create one that allocate the issue to an organization uncomfortable with its mandate (eg Office of National Security)

7. **Shifts in Priorities require a flexible approach**

- The nature of the politics of the sector, the shifts in threat assessment, and the changes in the donor environment, means that a flexible approach to prioritization and programming is required. This does not often sit kindly with the traditional project approach favoured by many donors. Often for an intervention to be successful, a long term approach is needed. It takes time to build up relationships, and to influence thinking. However at the same time funding needs to be available to capitalize on opportunities as they arise. One approach is to have a broad goal and purpose within a project, agree this with the recipients, and then develop workplans jointly for 6-12 month periods. That way everyone is in agreement of what needs to be done, without excluding opportunities as they arise. The urgent must not be allowed to get in the way of the important, so regular monitoring at the strategic level is important. It is also important to make sure that short term interventions are implemented in cogniscence of the consequences in the medium and longer term. Affordability and Sustainability are key – SLP Vehicles Example. Capability isn’t everything if there is no plan to maintain it over time.
  - Good example in Sierra Leone so far has been the coordination between the DFID Policing support and the UNPOL. UNPOL have human resources, we have financial resources, and mutual tasking on agreed aims is proving very effective.
  - Removing competition between donors by agreeing common approaches as well as objectives makes life considerably easier.
  - ODA definition still causes difficulties within the sector. Good to hear from Carolyn McAskie that PBF may offer some leeway here.

8. **Monitoring/Evaluation**

- All donors require outputs, and indicators of success. The difficulty with SSR work is that they are hard to define beyond the activity level. The SSR-IF provides some helpful indicators to assist in the development of appropriate measuring mechanisms, and it is important that the broader outcomes of technical inputs are accurately measured and monitored. SSR is always at risk of being purely technical, and without an agreed set of targets can become counterproductive. Capacity building should always be measured.

9. **Risk**

- An often ignored area of project management is risk, and this is particularly the case in Security Sector Reform interventions, which, by their very nature are often high risk programmes. The SSR-IF rightly highlights this, and provides support for the development of risk registers. It is critical that these are seen as a support
mechanism for practitioners rather than a bureaucratic requirement. Diagnosis is as important as any cure.

- Keeping programme diaries is a way of cataloguing key decisions, as well as the reasoning behind them.

10. Clear Exit Strategy

- Linked to the above two points, Security Sector Reform is a long term intervention, and hard to withdraw from. One way of securing joint agreement for the scaling down of support is to recognize SSR as a subset of a broader peacebuilding process. It impacts upon peace building and in turn is impacted upon. Once the security sector has supported a process in which a safe and enabling environment for poverty reduction to occur has been created, inevitably donor resources will be required elsewhere. We live in the real world, and tough decisions need to be made. UN play a considerable role in making Governments aware of the trade offs between different support provided.
- Back to the long term plan, it is important to anticipate this event and prepare the sector for it. Clear qualitative benchmarks need to be developed and cleared with Government more broadly. Though regularly monitored against shifts in the context.

Conclusion:

- What I have attempted to do is provide a SSR cycle, from analysis to mapping to intervention design to implementation to exit, with regular monitoring of both the activities and the context taking place. To a certain extent, the SSR-IF will now follow a similar cycle as it is implemented. Where gaps appear they will need to be addressed, where methodology doesn’t stand up to scrutiny it can be amended. But it is important that bilateral, regional and multilateral donors buy into the process, as by agreeing one common set of rules of engagement we can facilitate greater coherence in our interventions. This is a start of a process to better link policy to practice, a living document that will require amending, and the needs of recipients are as important as the needs of donors and need to be factored in as the document evolves.
- But we also need to evolve institutionally. Just as the ACPP has led to changes in the way DFID, MoD and FCO engage, so it is hoped that the SSR-IF will encourage other bilateral and multilateral institutions to reassess how they coordinate their interventions. The UN agencies, given their involvement in post-conflict and peace support operations have a vital role to play in this regard. Institutional reform is possible in the UN system – look at the Integrated Offices in Burundi and Sierra Leone – needs to be replicated at HQ level to facilitate their success.
- Range of options available for HQ integration, from Cluster approach a la Rule of Law to Gatekeeper functions for key institutions (eg DPKO), all decisions should be made on the basis of what is best for the recipients of our work.
• This roundtable, and the Slovak presidency, provides a valuable opportunity to examine some of these important issues in more detail. We owe it to the recipient countries, and to ourselves, not to let this opportunity pass us by.

Thank You Very Much
United Nations Security Council Roundtable
on
“Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept”

New York, 8 December 2006

“The Role and Experiences of ECOWAS in Security Sector Reform”

Colonel Mahamane Touré
ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary,
Political Affairs, Defence and Security

ECOWAS Executive Secretariat
Abuja, December 2006
Excellencies, Distinguished Guests

It is with a deep sense of humility, honour and pleasure that I accepted your invitation to participate in this panel to share ECOWAS's experiences in the field of security sector reform in contribution to the efforts being made to develop a UN SSR concept.

A. EVOLUTION OF ECOWAS THINKING ON SSR

1. The Background

2. When ECOWAS was established in 1975, the majority of its Member-States were under one form or other of authoritarian rule, and the notions of ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ were held as sacrosanct. ECOWAS could not venture outside its economic integration agenda. The attempts to address the issues of peace and security were informed by the realities and politics of the time, and the rationale was that the dynamics and nature of conflicts were limited to external threats. The adoption of the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression followed later in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, was informed by this thinking. Thus, security sector matters were exclusively the reserve of Member States and ECOWAS could not develop any interventions in this area until the outbreak of civil wars from 1989 that threatened the peace and security of the entire sub-region.
• Conflict dynamics post-Cold War and the nature of security forces and agencies

1. By 1990, two broad trends had crystallised in the sub-region:
   (a) Popular (often constitutional) struggles against dictatorial and autocratic rule that was underpinned by regime-centred security apparatuses (Mali, Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire).
   (b) Open civil wars that pitched regime-centred military and security apparatuses against non-statutory military and security formations, and at times between factions within the statutory military and security agencies (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and now Cote d'Ivoire).

In instances, the military and security agencies perceived that they:
- Were generally poorly paid, ill-motivated and therefore were ill-disciplined in the area of human rights;
- Were not subject to democratic control;
- Believed that they had a mandate to govern;
- Were either ignorant of, or oblivious to, the questions of human rights and humanitarian law; thus widespread violations of human rights occurred.

• ECOWAS Interventions and the Issues of Security Sector Reform

The two trends in conflict dynamics broadly defined the nature of ECOWAS interventions.
1. In the transitions from dictatorial/autocratic rule to democratic dispensations, ECOWAS could not directly intervene in ‘internal
affairs’ of Member States for reasons of sovereignty, unless developments threatened the security of the sub-region. Also historical factors had created different security architectures in different countries, thus complicating efforts to develop common norms and standards in the security sector. At best, therefore, ECOWAS created space for:

(a) collaboration and cooperation between the military and security agencies on cross-border issues (fighting crime, proliferation of small arms, etc.)

(b) collaboration with development partners to organise capacity enhancement workshops for security agencies in the domains of professionalism, roles and responsibilities of security agencies and civil-military relations.

2. The situations of open civil war and the collapse of governance institutions offered both the unique opportunities to restructure the security sector almost from scratch, but also new threats because they constituted uncharted waters and provided dilemmas to ECOWAS.

- ECOWAS experience from Liberia I (1990-1997)
Liberia presented the greatest challenge to ECOWAS in its formative years in the domain of security sector reform. As you may be aware, ECOMOG intervention in the first civil war (1989-1997) was embarked upon as the organisation’s first venture into humanitarian intervention. The signing of a peace agreement that paved the way for elections
offered the very first real opportunity to carry out a thorough security sector restructuring. The security architecture had collapsed as a consequence of the war and the legitimate military force, the Armed Forces of Liberia, had disintegrated into one of the several armed factions in the conflict. However, many factors contributed to thwart ECOWAS' efforts. They included the following:

i. Absence of a laid down normative framework for intervention;
ii. Inadequate preparation;
iii. Inadequate international collaboration and political will;
iv. Inadequate resources, buy-in and sustainability strategy;
v. The collapse of civil society institutions;
vi. The emergence from the war of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia as the single most powerful faction able to dictate terms;
vii. The absence of enforceable sanctions regime to induce compliance.

Consequently, even though the peace agreement called for the right-sizing, reintegration and reorientation of the military and other security agencies, this did not occur. After the elections in 1997, Charles Taylor blocked all attempts by ECOWAS and the international community to restructure the security apparatus. The NPFL became the de-facto army. Thus, the repression and human rights violations practised during the war were carried into the new post-conflict environment. The result was the resumption of civil war that only came to an end in 2002.
The lessons learned in Liberia’s first civil war have greatly helped ECOWAS to evolve positively in the domain of security sector reform.

B. DEEPENING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

- ECOWAS experiences from the sub-region

In Sierra Leone, security sector reform was embedded in the peace agreement that incorporated a comprehensive post-conflict peacebuilding, including DDRR. The right-sizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone entailed a combination of rétrenchment with resettlement pay-outs, retraining and reintegration of sections of the rebel groups into the armed forces, training of a new police service for community protection, coordinated training in professionalism and adherence to human rights and humanitarian laws, and backed by a successful micro-disarmament program.

The formula for relative success could be traced to the following key factors:

i. The re-hatting of the ECOMOG Mission into a UN Mission, as well as the active presence and role of the UK greatly boosted legitimacy, resource mobilisation and sustainability of the exercise;

ii. The active supporting role of international humanitarian organisations, civil society and specialised agencies within and outside the UN;

iii. The establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation process added extra pressure on would-be spoilers.
To a similar degree, the Sierra Leone formula was replicated in **Liberia** at the end of the Civil War II in 2002.

The civil war in **Guinea Bissau** presented a special challenge to the international community for a simple reason. It is the only country in West Africa that gained independence via an armed liberation struggle. The root causes of violence lie in the duality of power, in which the military claims equal legitimacy to political power to the civilian elite. Besides, veterans of the liberation war have not been resettled since the 1970s.

ECOWAS has been working tirelessly with the UN and other development partners to resuscitate what, for all intents and purposes, is a failed state. The international Contact Group on Guinea Bissau has been created and a round table was organised in Geneva in October this year to mobilise resources for a complete overhaul of the state. A central plank of the reform agenda concerns the security sector, whose main thrust will be to:

- right-size the security and defence sectors to match the realistic needs and capacity of the state;
- modernise the security sector in relation to its republican functions under a democracy;
- build the capacity of the security sector within the framework of sub-regional peace and security;
- strengthen the Justice sector to increase its efficiency;
- carry out a review of the situation of war veterans with the view to ensuring their social rehabilitation and support;
promotion of popular participation in security sector reform.

It is worth highlighting the factors behind the achievement of greater successes regionally since Liberia 1.

- **Developing a normative framework for SSR**

The evolving conflict dynamics in the sub-region, coupled with field experience, convinced ECOWAS leaders that there's nowadays a new major paradigm shift within the security sector therefore, the need for them to rethink the inter-relationship between security and development, in order to center it on the people instead of the state alone, raising conflict prevention to the same status as the development agenda. ECOWAS accordingly enacted new statutes to reflect the new realities. ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the **Declaration of Political Principles** on 6th July 1991 on freedom, people's rights and democratization. The **ECOWAS Treaty** was revised in 1993 to reflect the new mood and to confer supra-nationality to the regional body. In 1999, the Institution adopted the **Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security**, followed closely by the adoption of the **Additional Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance** in 2001. Together, these legal instruments constitute a comprehensive framework for reconceptualising human security, which complements state security, enhancing human rights and strengthens human development. This humanistic or holistic approach to security sector approaches, to confront the new threats or risks to peace and security on a more permanent basis.
It allows ground to move from security sector reform, which tends to be incremental and relatively ineffective in dealing with institutional weaknesses, without fundamentally altering its character, culture, or de facto balance of power. In Africa it tends to be perceived as the implementation of policy decisions by the executive from above without any attempt to secure broader participation of and consultation with legislative or non-state actors.

Transformation in contrast, entails a more holistic and profound change to the security sector, aimed at altering the relations of power, to transform the institutional culture, promote professionalism, in respect with human rights, in the context of accountability with the support of a wide range of actors of law and order, civil society...

The development of these norms and standards provide an overarching framework for ECOWAS to engage more meaningfully in SSR.

- **Identification of security sector actors**

An all-embracing definition of security sector actors is indispensable if the aim is to develop a comprehensive framework for engagement with the sector. To this end, security sector actors may be understood to incorporate six (6) categories of key actors which affect the quality of democratic governance in the security sector:

i. Organizations authorized to use force: formal security apparatuses of the state (the armed forces, police, intelligence, and paramilitaries);
ii. Civil management and oversight organizations: civilian statutory policy, regulatory and oversight structures (the executive, parliament, ombudsmen, finance ministries, Auditor-General);

iii. the Judicial, judiciary penal and public safety organisations;

iv. non-state security actors: engaged in legitimate community protection (private security companies, community watch, etc)

v. civil society actors: including NGOs and academia;

vi. External actors (Security actors, development/financial partners, international humanitarian organizations).

• Collaborations and ownership and sustainability

Success in security sector reform is predicated on how all these actors (3 key actors and 3 which influence the process) collaborate to produce the desired outcomes based on the principles of

- Subsidiarity, complementarity and mutual respect;
- division of labour and specialization
- ownership (the primary responsibility for peace and security lies with Member States)
- sustainability.

• Enabling environment for successful security sector reform

For reasons related to ‘sovereignty’, peaceful countries provide both opportunities and challenges to collaborative security sector transformation. Thus, the role of external actors, including regional organizations such as ECOWAS, involve mainly the setting of norms and standards, creation of space, facilitating
resource mobilization and promoting internal capacity building for cooperation and peer learning between states.

In this regard, the process to establish the African Stand-by Force, based on sub-regional stand-by brigades, for peace support operations offers a very good opportunity to harmonise, and streamline not only operational procedures, but also standard norms of behaviour by the security forces. As the stand-by concept entails the development of the civilian component of PSOs, new windows of opportunity will open for greater civilian control, civil-military collaboration and greater adherence to international human rights and humanitarian norms in theatres operation. The new code of conduct adopted by the Chiefs of Defense Staff to be forwarded to their ministers of defense, security internal and economic affairs, border control, should set the standard for harmonized civil military relations.

Post-conflict societies offer the best opportunities to undertake comprehensive security sector restructuring under the DDRR programmes. To this end, the newly established UN Peace-building Commission offers a unique umbrella for collaborative work in SSR.

In recognition of such opportunities, the UN Security Council, in Resolution 1721 of 1st November 2006 on Cote d’Ivoire, urged ECOWAS, in conjunction with AU to organize seminars for commanding and senior officers of the armed forces in the post-conflict countries of West Africa. The seminars, which will take place in the first quarter of 2006, will cover two main themes:
1. Engagement with the higher echelons of the security forces to:
   - convey to them the security sector reform priorities in a post-conflict dispensation;
   - understand their needs and concerns, discuss how to meet these concerns and to secure their full cooperation, as well as that of the ranks and file, in the process of right-sizing, transforming mission objectives and instituting democratic control of the security forces in the transition.

2. Convey in very clear terms to the armed groups their personal and individual responsibilities, and liability to targeted sanctions and arraignment before international tribunals, should they act as spoilers in the process to establish democracy and peace in their countries.

Finally in ECOWAS we believe that sound security sector governance is key to the success of the integration process. Therefore some guiding principles should underline the whole transformation exercise:
- clearly state end state, objectives to be pursued, subsequently identify:
  . roles and responsibilities of political actors, and parliament;
  . oversight responsibilities of the Government;
  . clear process and chain of command within different security organizations to avoid duplication and anarchy;
. roles and missions assigned for each security organization to avoid redundancy and overlap and complementarity;

. the role of the other stakeholders.

Government should from it part:

. provide clear leadership;

. prevent political interference;

. provide adequate resources and impose accountability.

Thank you very much for the attention.
Focus of Presentation
➢ What is the value of developing concepts on SSR?
➢ What should be the focus of a multilateral or regional concept in this area?
➢ Highlight the EU experience of developing a policy framework for SSR support
➢ How does it link into other international efforts?
➢ How does it improve our work in concrete terms?

EU Policy Framework
➢ EU Concept for ESDP support to SSR adopted by the Council of the EU in December 2005
➢ Commission mapping paper followed by Commission Communication in May 2006.
➢ EU Policy Framework – providing an overarching policy adopted by the Council of the EU in June 2006

Scope of EC activities: Predominantly civilian in accordance with OECD-DAC ODA definitions

Developments in the area of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy:
➢ SSR related missions under the European Security and Defence Policy – civilian and military

EU Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform
Presentation on December 8 2006 in New York
“Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept”
By Inger Buxton, European Commission

EU past experiences in the area of SSR:
European Community and EU Member states’ support to sectors in the security system
Under range of policy instruments including EU enlargement, pre-accession, justice and home affairs, neighbourhood policy, development cooperation, crisis management, democracy and human rights
Principles guiding EU support for SSR
- nationally/regionally owned reform processes
- addressing the core requirements of a well-functioning security system
- seen as a framework for addressing diverse security challenges
- based on the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector
- based on political dialogue with partner countries

Recommendation to strengthen the EC contribution to overall EU support
- Strengthening policy and programming dialogue
- Integrating SSR in Country and Regional Strategy Papers, Action Plans etc
- Ensuring coordinated planning
- Strengthening overall implementation of EU support
- Developing tools for planning and implementation

Expanding the expertise and pool of experts for field missions and programmes
- Developing SSR-specific training for the mainstreaming of SSR
- Prioritising SSR under the new Financial Instruments
- Strengthening cooperation with international partners

DRC test case:
EU efforts under way through European Community and ESDP
- Common comprehensive approach
- Division of labour
- DRC ownership and partnership with the international community

Value of Concept
- Benefits:
  - Common perspective based on best-practices and principles for good engagement
  - Basis for comprehensive approach - Integrated missions/programmes
- Challenges:
  - Security labelling (donor and partner country)
  - Mainstreaming challenges
  - How it fits with broader international approaches and national contexts
Introduction

In developing a UN concept of SSR, there is a logical sequence of questions that have to be considered:

- What are the security problems that SSR is intended to address?
- In light of the diagnosis of the problems, what are the goals of SSR?
- What policy norms and guidelines should govern the pursuit of the goals?
- What strategies should be designed and implemented to achieve the goals?
- Which actors and structures will be responsible for implementing the strategies?
- And what resources are required to implement the strategies?

I will follow this logic in presenting a summary of our discussion today, looking sequentially at the problems; the goals; the policy norms and guidelines; the strategies; the actors and structures; and resources. This breakdown also serves to highlight which areas received the most attention and which received the least.

The Problems

In general, SSR seeks to address the following problems: in countries emerging from war, in societies undergoing a transition to democracy and in many developing countries, citizens experience a high level of fear, insecurity and violence; the state does not provide adequately for their security; and the security services are themselves a threat to the security of citizens and the stability of the country.

The specific problems that SSR is intended to address differ from one country to another and might change over time in a given country. The design of SSR programmes should therefore be based on a thorough analysis of country conditions.

The Goals of SSR

A number of speakers stressed the need for a clear and coherent statement of SSR goals. In light of the problem statement presented above, the overarching mission of SSR is to enhance the security of citizens and the goals are as follows:

- To ensure that the state fulfils its responsibility to meet the security needs of its citizens.
- To ensure that the security services perform their statutory functions efficiently and effectively.
- To ensure that security governance, policies and activities are consistent with democratic norms.

In addition, SSR has specific goals in relation to each of the security institutions (e.g. police, military, intelligence etc) and in relation to different countries and different periods in a country’s history.
Policy Norms and Guidelines

The bulk of our discussion focused on this area. The following eight themes emerged, and these might constitute an embryonic UN concept of SSR.

1. SSR is political. It has to do with power and with security, which is the most sensitive sector of the state. It has technical components but it cannot be conceived and undertaken as a purely technical endeavour.

2. SSR is a democratic and democratising project. It seeks to ensure that the security sector complies fully with democratic norms, chiefly the rule of law, accountability, civilian oversight and respect for human rights.

3. National ownership of SSR is essential. Security reform must be shaped and driven by local actors and supported if necessary by external actors. This may be extremely difficult in some countries but it is a pragmatic imperative as well as a matter of respect. SSR that is not locally shaped and driven is not sustainable. The aim is national ownership and not simply government ownership.

4. The beneficiaries of SSR are citizens in general and vulnerable groups in particular. Vulnerable groups differ from one country to another but typically include women, children, the poor and minorities. In SSR design, the security services should also be considered beneficiaries. And the state is a major beneficiary.

5. SSR should seek to heighten gender awareness and sensitivity. There are two challenges in this regard: to attend to the gender-based violence and other security problems experienced by women, and also by children; and to facilitate the transformation of security institutions in terms of their attitudes, organisational culture, activities, composition and leadership.

6. SSR is a long-term endeavour that takes place over several decades. A host of security needs might be urgent but there is never a quick-fix solution. Short-term donor funding cycles and targets undermine local ownership and lead to dysfunctional and unsustainable outcomes.

7. SSR must be context specific. It cannot be undertaken in a mechanical fashion and there is no one-size-fits-all. Instead, security reform programmes have to be creative, flexible and responsive. They require an acute appreciation of politics as the art of the possible.

8. SSR must be conceived in a comprehensive and holistic way because various components of the security sector are interlinked and reforms might be ineffectual if they are confined to only one component. At the same time, particularly where the recipient government is weak, SSR must take realistic account of financial and human resource constraints and requires careful planning, prioritising and sequencing.
Strategies

A basic distinction can be drawn between the strategies of domestic actors and those of external actors. The strategies of external actors, although not discussed in detail today, include the following:

- Provision of funds.
- Stimulation and facilitation of dialogue and transformation.
- Technical advice on security issues.
- Training and education activities.
- Generate lessons learnt and best practices.
- Norm setting (in the case of regional and international organisations).

Since national ownership is fundamental, the general strategy of external actors should be to support domestic actors engaged in SSR. The domestic actors include the executive and government departments; civilian oversight bodies, including parliament; the security institutions; and civil society. These different categories of actor have different roles and undertake different strategies in relation to SSR.

Actors and Structures

The following external actors are involved in aspects of security reform:

- The Security Council and various departments, agencies and other entities of the UN.
- Regional organisations like the AU, ECOWAS and the OSCE.
- Other multi-lateral bodies like the OECD DAC.
- Major powers and donor governments, which might have several departments involved in SSR (e.g. foreign affairs, defence and overseas development).
- The World Bank and the IMF.

Our discussion highlighted the following organisational and structural challenges in relation to these actors:

- To determine a proper allocation of roles and division of labour.
- To acquire the necessary expertise.
- To minimise duplication and competition.
- To enhance co-operation and synergy.
- To ensure proper co-ordination.

The necessity for good co-ordination was emphasised throughout the day. It is required at many levels:

- Within external actors such as the UN and donor governments that have several entities involved in SSR.
- Between external actors at head office level.
- Between external actors at field level where they are working in the same country.
- Between external and local actors in a given country.
- Among domestic actors, both within the state and between the state and other local actors.

The immediate priorities for the UN are as follows:

- To reach consensus on a concept of SSR.
To determine an appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities for SSR among the various UN entities.

To determine the specific mandate and programmes of each entity in relation to SSR.

To acquire the necessary expertise.

To generate lessons learnt and best practices.

To establish co-ordinating mechanisms within the UN family.

To establish co-ordinating mechanisms with other relevant bodies.

**Resources**

Resources are required to design and implement security transformation strategies. They are needed by both external actors and domestic actors and include funds, equipment, people, expertise and skills. The relevant expertise and skills should cover security, democratic governance, development and transformation.

A precise determination of resource requirements depends on the respective mandates, programmes and activities of external and domestic actors.

**Challenges**

The discussion threw up two challenges that require further consideration. First, how is the ‘security sector’ to be defined? It is possible to adopt a broad definition of security in the interests of comprehensive human security, but it does not follow that the security sector should be defined broadly. For example, does the sector include non-state actors and, if so, what are the policy and strategic implications?

Second, how do we measure progress in relation to SSR? We need at the outset to design monitoring and evaluation systems so that we know whether we are having a positive impact and whether we need to change our strategies.
Closing Remarks (Ambassador Peter Burian)

The role played by the UN is fragmented. It would not be absolutely correct to say the UN is not doing enough in the field of SSR. However, the UN should work in this field in a more systematic and comprehensive way, in order to achieve cumulative and synergetic effects.

In other words, the UN could achieve much more even without additional resources if it had a clear strategy in the field of SSR.

Therefore, we believe it is important to draw some basic guidelines, define major tasks and determine responsibility for carrying them out – in other words, it should be defined “what” should be done and “who does what”.

We are aware this strategy will not be delivered overnight. The OECD experts have told us today that they have worked on their Implementation Framework for 2 years. We would, however, like to start a process that could sooner or later (hopefully sooner rather then later) lead to a UN strategy in the field of SSR.

This has been our third official event and we will continue working hard on the issue of SSR. In February, we will, as you already know, organize a thematic debate on SSR in the UNSC preceded by an Aria-formula meeting.

We hope that the thematic debate in the Council will set a solid basis for a deep and wide discussion within the UN system on the ways how to deal with the problem of SSR in the UN framework. We hope that later next year we will be able to come back to the Council and discuss concrete recommendations that will no doubt result from this discussion.

Besides that, we are ready to continue in our awareness-raising activities and move them from the town to the field. We are planning to organize another roundtable in the course of the next year on the continent that needs SSR the most – in Africa.

Let me, in conclusion, to thank you for your presence and your active participation today. I believe that the positive spirit, the enthusiasm accumulated here today will stay even after the Holiday season, so that we will together be able to achieve first tangible results early next year during the Slovak Presidency in the SC.