



**Security Council**

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/26738  
12 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SUBMITTED IN PURSUANCE  
OF PARAGRAPH 19 OF RESOLUTION 814 (1993) AND PARAGRAPH A 5 OF  
RESOLUTION 865 (1993)

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 and paragraph A5 of Security Council resolution 865 (1993) of 22 September 1993.

2. Section I of the report describes the general situation at present. Section II reviews the successive stages of the mandate regarding Somalia and takes note of significant events since 31 July 1993, the closing date of my previous report. Section III sets forth my observations.

### I. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN SOMALIA AT PRESENT

#### A. Humanitarian and economic

3. Somalia has come a long way from the devastating famine of 1991-1992. United Nations and non-governmental organization (NGO) assistance has now reached all parts of Somalia including the north-west and north-east.

4. The major problems of the emergency phase have, for the most part, been successfully addressed. There continue to exist pockets of acute nutritional and medical problems, and targeted feeding programmes of dry food distribution need to continue for the foreseeable future. About 1 million affected Somalis require assistance through the provision of shelter, medical care and life-sustaining articles such as clothing, blankets and cooking utensils.

#### 1. Children and education

5. Among the principal victims of the protracted conflict was an entire generation of Somali children denied access to education. As a result of the civil war, all schools were thoroughly stripped of facilities and equipment. Schools and educational institutions have been closed for long periods and many teenagers and orphaned children joined the militia or gangs of looters and armed robbers.

6. In the last six months, NGOs, United Nations agencies and UNOSOM II forces have provided substantial assistance to the education sector. A large number of schools have been rehabilitated with military assistance. NGOs have reopened schools and are paying incentives to school teachers, as well as providing school supplies. The World Food Programme (WFP) is supplying food for work and school lunches. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is currently assisting 40,000 pupils in schools located in Adado, Afgoi, Baidoa, Bardhere, Belet Weyne, Dusa Mareb, Hoddur, Merca, Mogadishu, Rabdhure and Wajit through the provision of education kits. In the south of the country, nine additional schools were opened in September with UNICEF support, bringing the number of schools in the south to around 51. More than 10,800 pupils are enrolled in classes. Just a few months ago less than 1,000 children in the region attended school.

7. One hundred fifty thousand textbooks are being distributed throughout Somalia. These texts conform to the former core curriculum and cover the Somali language, mathematics, science, Islamic studies and Arabic. One educational development centre has been established in Mogadishu by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and seven others can be functioning by the end of 1994.

8. Teachers are now being identified to design and implement training workshops on teaching methodology, introduction of the new curriculum and management of resources, including textbooks. A scholarship programme for Somali university students to complete their studies abroad has been established and contacts have been made with specialized institutions to get the programme under way.

## 2. Health

9. Some 32 hospitals are now operating throughout the country as well as 81 maternal and child health (MCH) centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams are covering the country, working towards sustainable immunization coverage. Estimates are that about 75 per cent of children under 5 years of age have received measles vaccination under very difficult operating conditions. Supplies, medicines and other equipment are being made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

10. Mogadishu's main water supply system has been rehabilitated to 40 per cent of its pre-war efficiency. City water supply systems in Afgoi, Hargeisa and Berbera have also been rehabilitated. About 60 per cent of Hargeisa's population now has access to clean water, and work will soon begin on a second phase, which will give the whole town access to clean water. Adequate quantities of chlorine tablets are now available throughout the country to disinfect water. Sanitation activities in support of safe water programmes include installation of pit latrines, provision of health education services, a major waste disposal exercise and emergency cleaning of sewerage and drainage systems in Mogadishu.

11. United Nations agencies and NGOs are continuing to pursue sanitation and employment projects with food-for-work programmes. In Mogadishu alone there are 120 such projects that provide food for teachers, hospital and sanitation workers. Other similar projects are supported throughout Somalia.

## 3. Agriculture

12. Agriculture historically has been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings. A good measure of success has been achieved in reactivating food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, has resulted in a substantial increase in the rainy season harvest. The delivery of relief food aid has been adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. Relief organizations also have

been purchasing food in the countryside in order to stimulate local production and to provide seeds for the coming agricultural season to deficit areas.

13. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals has facilitated the resuscitation of exports. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock have been exported since April 1993. Cattle export from Mogadishu has recently restarted.

14. Targeted support in these areas holds great promise for returning large numbers of enterprising Somalis to productive employment. These efforts can help to remove some of the main constraints to expansion and growth.

#### 4. Commerce

15. Commercial and trading activities are showing encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's ports has increased dramatically since December 1992. Civilian ship movements at Mogadishu port increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investments are on the rise. Telecommunication services are now available in parts of Mogadishu. Local companies are also providing fuel throughout the country.

#### 5. Reconstruction and recovery

16. A draft framework for planning of long-term reconstruction and recovery has been prepared by a task force comprising donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, under the coordination of the World Bank.

17. The purpose of the framework is to ensure that scarce human and financial resources are used to their fullest potential to support the re-emergence of the country as a stable and economically productive member of the international community. Given the fluid nature of the situation in all regions of the country, the process of programme planning and implementation must be a dynamic one, with a coordinating framework capable of responding to changing conditions.

18. The objectives of the framework are as follows:

(a) To establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia;

(b) To identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation;

(c) To construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital resources. The mechanism would be available to the future Government of Somalia as a basis for development planning.

19. Somalia will need external assistance to start reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure. While international partners have begun to invest in these areas, there is need to agree on priorities for action and a mechanism for coordination. Some interventions made in the relief phase

of the crisis, for example the levels of salaries now paid by numerous agencies, cannot be sustained in the future.

20. On 22 October 1993, the third informal meeting of donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, organized by the World Bank, was held in Paris. Participants reviewed the draft framework and discussed the next steps. It was clear that continuing reconstruction in Somalia will be possible only in the context of movement towards a stable and generally acceptable political environment. The Somali people must contribute to the design of the framework and eventually take ownership of the planning process.

21. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts are central components of the overall attempt to assist Somalis to rebuild their country. In aspects of these efforts, the sustained support of the international community is critical, especially in this period of transition from relief to rehabilitation.

#### 6. Refugees and resettlement

22. Humanitarian agencies have worked effectively in coordinating approaches to the issue of resettlement. An agreement is now in place on providing support for resettlement efforts. This agreement is based on the following:

(a) The focus should be on community capacity to create a welcoming environment for returnees;

(b) The decision and timing of return must be freely determined by the returnees themselves.

23. As many as 1.7 million people were forced to leave their homes as a result of the turmoil and the famine in Somalia. Of these, more than 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu, and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions are supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.

24. The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya is increasing. It is estimated that about 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area have returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossasso. Assistance is being provided to approximately 800 refugees a week returning to the Gedo region and to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas. It is estimated that these latter areas will receive the greatest number of refugees per square kilometre.

25. Until recently, political tension both in Dobley and around Kismayo precluded the spontaneous return of refugees and displaced people to the Lower and Middle Juba. Agreements reached between elders in Dobley, the recently completed peace conference in Kismayo and the successful resettlement of more than half of the Kismayo displaced have increased the attraction of early return to home areas.

## B. Political

### 1. District councils

26. My Special Representative and his staff continue their strenuous efforts to rebuild political institutions in Somalia. Thirty-nine district councils have been established so far out of a total of 73 districts, excluding the districts in the north-west and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, consultations have begun on the establishment of district councils.

27. Training programmes for district councillors, which focus on various aspects of leadership, management and development, have been conducted for the district councillors from eight regions of Somalia with the assistance of the Life and Peace Institute of Sweden and the Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute. As of 17 October, 651 councillors from 31 district councils had participated in the programmes. The Nordic countries are also providing administrative starter kits to help the councils.

### 2. Regional councils

28. Regional councils have been established in six areas. I expect more regional councils to be inaugurated soon, moving Somalia closer to the January 1994 goal of establishing its Transitional National Council (TNC). In the meantime, a consultative body to UNOSOM II, which would include representatives of the factions, would be formed as soon as a majority of the membership of TNC has been nominated by the regional councils. Such a body would be named the Somali National Consultative Council (SNCC) and could, among other things, serve in an advisory capacity to UNOSOM II by providing its views on major national and regional issues and help to prepare for convening of TNC. Its advisory function would cease immediately after TNC is established. While SNCC, in its proposed form, was not anticipated by the Addis Ababa agreement, I believe its formation would not contradict the letter and spirit of the agreement as long as it enjoyed the support of the regional councils.

### 3. National reconciliation

29. In continuation of efforts described in my earlier report, UNOSOM II has continued to sponsor efforts towards reconciliation among the Somali people.

30. In the north-east and central regions - from Bossasso to Galkayo - my Deputy Special Representative and UNOSOM II political affairs officers have facilitated the reconciliation of two competing wings of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership in the area. The success of this effort, if sustained, will lead to greater stability and facilitate disarmament and reconciliation among other factions and clans in the central region. Efforts towards the reconciliation of clans in the north-west in Erigavo also have been supported by UNOSOM II. The Gedo region is inhabited by both Rahaweyn and Marehan clans. The relations between these two clans have been tense as a result of the civil war. UNOSOM II has initiated reconciliation between the two clans.

31. In Mogadishu, UNOSOM II is undertaking a number of efforts to support various initiatives aimed at national reconciliation. Several meetings have been held between UNOSOM II officials and a 47-member supreme committee of the Hawiye sub-clan. These meetings are aimed at bringing together the sub-clans of the Hawiye for a pan-Hawiye conference. From 30 September to 1 October 1993, an all-Somali conference attended by 600 delegates was supported by UNOSOM II. This conference, like others, was part of efforts to reconcile the varying clans in Somalia. Another pan-Hawiye conference took place in Mogadishu from 14 to 16 October 1993 with the participation of Habr Gdir sub-clan. The conference, among other things, called for a peace rally in Mogadishu. Despite UNOSOM II's attempts to discourage it, the march was held on 17 October and provoked inter-clan fighting in Mogadishu.

32. My Special Representative travelled to Berbera in the north-west region on 6 November 1993 and met with Mr. Mohamed Egal and his senior officials. The discussion covered a range of topics, including assistance to the police, justice and penal systems, the disarmament/demobilization effort and the participation of the delegation of the north-west region in the Fourth Coordinating Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993.

33. It will be recalled that, on 1 October 1993, I wrote to the President of the Security Council (S/26526) regarding the request made by Mr. Egal's administration for UNOSOM II's withdrawal from the north-west region by 2 October 1993 and sought the guidance of the Security Council on how to proceed in view of the security concerns and given the fact that the mandate of UNOSOM II was under Chapter VII of the Charter. In his reply (S/26527), the President informed me that the members of the Council had expressed the hope that UNOSOM II would be able to continue its work in the region using all peaceful means, and had expressed the confidence that I would take the necessary precautions for the safety and protection of all United Nations personnel deployed in the region. As members of the Council are aware, the authorities in the region did not pursue the matter further and United Nations personnel continue to assist the people of the region. The recent visit of my Special Representative to the region has helped to clarify the issue further and the relationship between Mr. Egal's administration and UNOSOM II has been strengthened.

#### 4. Police

34. Following Council approval of recommendations in my previous report (S/26317), UNOSOM II has continued to support small locally based police forces in the UNOSOM II areas of operation and has provided some support to police forces in the north-east and north-west regions. During the past six months, 5,000 former Somali policemen have been hired to assist in the performance of police functions. Three thousand were recruited in Mogadishu area and 2,000 in the various regions. These programmes are being funded from the UNOSOM II budget. UNOSOM II is in the process of finalizing a police training programme that should provide basic training for a large number of Somali policemen who would assist in the maintenance of law and order. Police experts from Italy, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland also have arrived and in coordination with UNOSOM II, are formulating assistance

programmes which their respective Governments could implement. The United States of America has announced a US\$ 6 million grant for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems, as well as a US\$ 2 million assistance programme for the police force and up to US\$ 25 million-worth of equipment, as required. Norway has contributed \$1 million and several other Governments have also indicated interest in assisting this programme.

35. UNOSOM II has started discussions with district and regional councils throughout Somalia regarding communications equipment, vehicles, uniforms, renovation of police stations, court houses and prisons, and the payment of salaries of policemen, judges, magistrates and custodial corps for a limited period of time.

## 5. Information

36. A crucial part of UNOSOM II's work continues to be its informational services. These convey news of such positive developments as the establishment of district and regional councils, the reopening of courts, and the restoration of normal economic activity. Radio Maanta broadcasts a 45-minute programme daily. The newspaper Maanta has the largest circulation in the country, with 31,000 Somali-language copies. I pay tribute to the Somali radio and newspaper staff, whose work has been invaluable in conveying the message of progress to the people of Somalia. Reporters, translators, printers and distributors continue to carry out their duties despite the loss of life of several of their colleagues and death threats to themselves.

## C. Security

37. By mid-1993, the security situation throughout most of Somalia had vastly improved in comparison with 1992; it offered the potential for the eventual achievement of true stability. In subsequent weeks, however, as coercive measures of disarmament ceased and outbreaks of violence did not meet with effective responses, the situation became uncertain. Since the 9 October unilateral cessation of hostilities by the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), the situation has been generally quiet, but Mogadishu remains tense and, in the capital and elsewhere, major factions are reportedly rearming, apparently in anticipation of a return to widespread fighting sometime in 1994.

### 1. Disarmament

38. UNOSOM II is seeking to achieve voluntary disarmament, with emphasis on the militias and their heavy weapons. In the past two months some small success has been achieved in disarming militia in the central and north-east regions of Somalia. Through continued contact with political and military leaders of SSDF, limited cantonment of heavy weapons in Gardo or Garowe has occurred but this does not extend to the north-east and central regions. Progress in these regions as well as in the Juba regions of course depends on whether it is believed that the USC/SNA militia no longer poses a threat.

39. In the north-west, the initial process of disarmament, demobilization and retraining of militias is progressing. Approximately 5,000 militiamen are now being retrained at Mandera camp. The United Nations agencies, particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and WFP, and NGOs are assisting in this effort. Even though the process has only recently begun, the regional authorities are expected to proceed systematically to enable the demobilized militiamen to become productive members of society. Elsewhere, limited voluntary disarmament has taken place in the Baidoa area, Dobley and many other areas where United Nations forces are established.

40. The desire of the Somali people for peace and security through disarmament is clear. This is a message heard repeatedly as UNOSOM II officials meet Somalis throughout the country. At a peace conference held in Mogadishu on 1 and 2 October 1993 by 12 of the 15 political factions and attended by representatives from all segments of Somali society, including youth groups and women's organizations, the participants condemned the violence against UNOSOM II and called for the simultaneous disarmament of all militias throughout the country in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993.

## 2. Demobilization

41. Demobilization is a particularly challenging problem in Somalia which has experienced years of conflict and a shattered economy. Many of the militiamen are youths who have been brought up in a violent society and have little experience other than war. Training and rehabilitation will require substantial resources and careful planning, in order to reintegrate them into society. The process may take years to complete, particularly if the economy is slow to recover.

## 3. Mine clearance

42. Somalia is 1 of the 10 most heavily mined countries in the world. Demining will be indispensable to the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts for decades to come. The debilitating effects of the widespread and largely indiscriminate nature of mine warfare as it has been conducted in Somalia are felt throughout the entire socio-economic spectrum. Thousands of kilometres of roads, major trade arteries for local as well as international commerce, have been mined, as have traditional pasturage and migration routes used by the nomadic populations of the interior. Urban areas, small airstrips and even local watering holes have been extensively mined, with the heaviest concentration infesting the north-west. A similar danger exists in the north-central and southern areas of the country.

43. UNOSOM II efforts to deal with the Somalia-wide mine problem have been limited by lack of trained staff and the heightened security threat to the UNOSOM II presence and mission. Mine clearing that has been conducted by UNOSOM II military forces has been local in nature and directed primarily at keeping open lines of communication deemed necessary for accomplishing the immediate UNOSOM II mission. A demining effort funded by a consortium of countries and institutions has been taking place in the north-west, and a small

corps of local ex-militia members has been trained as mine clearers. The funding for this venture will expire at the end of 1993.

#### 4. Deployment

44. Over the next four months, the Indian Brigade will be deployed to the Baidoa area of responsibility and the Kismayo area to relieve the French, Belgian, Zimbabwe and Moroccan forces currently operating there. The Zimbabwean battalion will be located in Afgoye, relieving Pakistani forces, which, in turn, are being deployed in Mogadishu. The Moroccans have assumed control of the Merka area of responsibility, relieving two Pakistani companies for deployment to Mogadishu. Nepalese forces, which arrived at the end of October, have been given responsibility for the security of UNOSOM II civilian staff working and living in Mogadishu.

45. Two additional battalions from Egypt have already been deployed; the third battalion and a brigade headquarters are expected to arrive in a few weeks. Pakistan has agreed to strengthen its contingent with a division-level headquarters, a brigade headquarters, one mechanized infantry battalion and a tank regiment. The Egyptian forces will be deployed in the Medina area of Mogadishu, while the new Pakistani forces will reinforce the Pakistani troops now located in the capital. It would be prudent, however, not to discount the possibility of substantial delays or even review of such decisions as well as of additional withdrawals taking place.

46. UNOSOM II plans to expand the Italian area of responsibility as far north as Galkaia, provided that logistical requirements can be met. Any further major expansion will depend on the security situation in Mogadishu and on the availability of appropriate logistics and engineer forces and equipment. If the security situation and disarmament progress sufficiently, it is hoped that some smaller deployments to the north-east will be possible and supportable logistically. Should, however, the security situation not improve, it would not be possible to deploy in that region because of constraints of adequate overall strength of UNOSOM II.

47. The present strength of UNOSOM II is 29,284 all ranks, broken down as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Australia	Movement control	48
Bangladesh	Infantry battalion	945
Belgium	BDE HQ Infantry battalion	948
Botswana	Infantry company	326
Canada	Staff personnel	4
Egypt	Infantry battalions	1 100
France	BDE HQ Infantry battalion Aviation unit Logistical battalion	_____
	Total, France	1 107
Germany	Logistical units	1 726
Greece	Medical unit	102
India	BDE HQ 3 infantry battalions Mechanized company Light mortar battery Signal company Medical unit Engineer squadron Logistical company Helicopter unit	_____
	Total, India	4 937
Ireland	Transport company	79
Italy	BDE HQ 3 infantry battalions Aviation unit Logistical/engineering unit Medical unit	_____
	Total, Italy	2 576
Kuwait	Infantry company	156
Malaysia	Infantry battalion	871
Morocco	Infantry battalion Support unit	_____
	Total, Morocco	1 424

<u>Country</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Nepal	Security Company	311
New Zealand	Supply unit	43
Nigeria	Recce battalion	614
Norway	Headquarters company	130
Pakistan	BDE HQ Infantry battalions 4 tank squadron Signal unit Supply and transport company Engineering squadron Medical unit Electrical and mechanical engineering workshop Military police company Ordnance company	_____
	Total, Pakistan	5 005
Republic of Korea	Engineer battalion	252
Romania	Field hospital	236
Saudi Arabia	Infantry battalion	757
Sweden	Field hospital	148
Tunisia	Infantry company	142
Turkey	Infantry battalion	320
United Arab Emirates	Infantry battalion	662
United States	Logistical unit	3 017
Zimbabwe	Infantry battalion Signal company	895 63
Military Police Company (composite)		100
Headquarters staff		<u>240</u>
Grand total		<u>29 284</u>

48. There are approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which do not form part of UNOSOM II and are not under the operational command of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. This number includes the Quick Reaction Force, which is deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

## II. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AFFECTING UNOSOM II

49. UNOSOM II's record of general progress throughout most of Somalia has been seriously marred by the incidents that took place between 5 June and 3 October 1993. These incidents challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia, created a situation of instability in South Mogadishu and stimulated factional elements elsewhere to prepare for a future of renewed fighting.

50. UNOSOM II is now at a critical juncture. To understand the present situation, it is important to recall the nature of the mandate as it has evolved over time through the various resolutions of the Council and, in this context, to assess the situation comprehensively in the aftermath of 3 October 1993.

### A. Review of the mandate

#### 1. United Nations Operation in Somalia

51. In my first report to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia (S/23693), I noted that the tragic situation in the country was extraordinarily complex. It presented a special challenge to the international community in general, and to the Security Council in particular. I stressed that the problem had eluded conventional solutions. I noted the need to explore new avenues and innovative methods commensurate with the existing humanitarian and political situation in order to facilitate a peaceful settlement. The evolution of the United Nations mandate in Somalia has underscored the complexities involved.

52. Security Council resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 encapsulated the mandate which the Security Council had entrusted to the Secretary-General in its resolution 733 (1992) of 29 January 1992: to help the Somali parties to establish and maintain a cease-fire, to distribute humanitarian relief and to promote national reconciliation and a political settlement.

53. In resolution 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, the Council took the further step of agreeing in principle to establish a security force to provide security for humanitarian activities in Mogadishu.

54. In resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, the Council decided to extend this mandate to cover other areas in Somalia. This was to be implemented, as originally stipulated in resolution 751 (1992), in consultation with the parties concerned. In practice, fulfilment of that condition proved to be impossible. Agreement could not be obtained for the deployment of United Nations forces in areas where the protection of humanitarian operations was most desperately needed. When agreement was obtained, it was violated; and the small unit whose deployment in Mogadishu was agreed to was far from adequate to control the increasingly violent and lawless situation in the city.

55. In my letter of 24 November 1992 to the President of the Security Council (S/24859), I described the deteriorating situation in Somalia and the factors that were preventing UNOSOM from implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. I suggested that the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia should be reviewed. In my letter of

29 November 1992 (S/24868), I set out options for the Security Council's consideration. I informed the Council that, if it was to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States had expressed to me its readiness to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

## 2. Unified Task Force

56. The Council, responding promptly and positively to this initiative, adopted resolution 794 (1992) in which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, it authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. Pursuant to that decision, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established and deployed.

57. It was the wish of the Security Council that a transition back to peace-keeping operations be achieved promptly. In this regard, I emphasized that two conditions should be met. First, UNITAF should take action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions were neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs were disarmed before it withdrew. Second, and equally essential, the authority entrusted to UNITAF should be exercised throughout Somalia. I stressed at that time that, unless effective action was taken to fulfil those two conditions, the international community's efforts to help the people of Somalia would continue to be at risk from heavily armed and lawless groups.

58. In my report to the Security Council of 26 January 1993 (S/25168), I congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. However, events in Kismayo and Mogadishu during the first half of 1993 demonstrated that the volatile situation continued to exist and that a secure environment had not been established. No deployment of troops took place to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border where security was a matter of grave concern. It was against this background that I stressed that, if the Council determined that the time had come to move to another stage in its operations in Somalia, it should be prepared to ensure that UNOSOM was fully in a position to carry out its tasks.

## 3. United Nations Operation in Somalia II

59. Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 acknowledged the need for a transition from UNITAF to an expanded United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The mandate of UNOSOM II conferred authority for appropriate action, including enforcement action as necessary, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II sought to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate also empowered UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national

political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

60. The substance of resolution 814 (1993) reflected the complexity of the anarchic situation that had developed in Somalia from factional strife, causing prolonged suffering of its people. It was evident that, to reconstruct the country's political, social and material infrastructure on a lasting basis, time, effort and risk would be required.

#### 4. Factional attacks

61. The effective actions of UNITAF and, after 4 May 1993, of UNOSOM II with its expanded mandate led to significant progress throughout most of Somalia. The necessity of achieving disarmament, including by coercive means if necessary, generated resistance by those fearful of losing power.

62. It is in this context that the ambush of 5 June 1993 took place, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers and wounding 40. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading behaviour. Security Council resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 expressed grave alarm at the premeditated armed attacks by forces apparently belonging to USC/SNA against UNOSOM II personnel. Citing resolution 814 (1993), resolution 837 (1993) called for all necessary measures to be taken against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. My previous report to the Council (S/26022) contained a description of the 5 June 1993 attacks on UNOSOM II troops and the measures under way to implement Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

63. On 12 July 1993, the United States Quick Reaction Force, under the direction of UNOSOM II, conducted an operation against a major USC/SNA militia command and control centre located in a compound in South Mogadishu known as the "Abdi house". The purpose of the operation was to neutralize USC/SNA command and control capability and to continue disarmament of the hostile SNA militia throughout Mogadishu. UNOSOM II ground forces swept the area for communications equipment, arms and documents. Following the withdrawal of United Nations forces from the site of the operation, journalists from the international press drove to the scene to cover the events. A large crowd of Somalis, some carrying weapons, surrounded the journalists and attacked them. Four journalists were murdered in the course of the attack.

64. On 8 August 1993, while on a routine patrol in South Mogadishu, four United States soldiers serving with UNOSOM II were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a command-detonated device.

65. In my further report to the Council dated 17 August 1993 (S/26317), I comprehensively described the status of actions taken to implement resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993. I stated that, despite the deliberate attempts of a few factional leaders to prevent UNOSOM II from performing the tasks assigned by the Security Council, the overall situation in Somalia had undergone a major transformation: humanitarian assistance was being delivered; people were going about their normal activities; schools were reopening; land was being tilled;

and local councils of clan leaders were meeting and cooperating with United Nations efforts to help Somalia to re-establish itself.

66. On 5 September 1993, a Nigerian infantry company, which was in the process of taking over from the Italian contingent in Mogadishu, was attacked by gunmen. Seven Nigerian soldiers were killed and 10 wounded with 1 soldier missing. The missing soldier was subsequently released on 14 October; since his release, he has stated that he was tortured during his captivity.

67. On 9 September 1993, Pakistani soldiers were in the process of clearing roadblocks on 21 October Road in Mogadishu, with assistance of army engineers from the United States contingent, when they were ambushed by heavily armed militiamen numbering approximately 300. The UNOSOM forces defended themselves and requested assistance from the United States Quick Reaction Force. One Pakistani soldier was killed and two other Pakistani and three United States soldiers were wounded.

68. On 15 September 1993, two Italian soldiers were killed by snipers in Mogadishu.

#### 5. Resolution 865 (1993)

69. On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 865 (1993), reaffirmed all previous resolutions and underscored the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities.

#### B. The 3 October 1993 incident

70. On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers launched an operation in South Mogadishu designed to capture a number of key aides of Mohammad Farah Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack on Pakistani soldiers, as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The operation was conducted in a highly dangerous area of Mogadishu. It succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to Aidid. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. As the Rangers were in the process of evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, they came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured but subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the United States soldiers were treated in a most despicable and humiliating manner.

71. The planning and execution of the Ranger operation of 3 October 1993 was decided by United States commanders and carried out by United States forces that were deployed in support of the UNOSOM II mandate, but were not under United

Nations command or authority. Not until the rescue phase of the incident did a multilateral operation take shape.

72. Following the events of 3 and 4 October 1993 the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

73. In all these incidents, the bodies of the peace-keepers who lost their lives were subjected to inhuman and insulting indignities. Such shocking behaviour has aroused justifiable condemnation, not only among the troop-contributing countries concerned, but also by the entire international public opinion. At the same time, it is a matter of deep regret that a large number of Somalis also have lost their lives during these encounters. What is particularly deplorable is the use of women and children by the gangs as human shields while attacking UNOSOM II personnel.

74. A total of 740 Somalis were arrested during the course of these operations. Six hundred ninety-eight of them have already been released. Decisions on the remaining 42 will be taken in the near future.

75. On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces. This has been followed by intensive United Nations efforts toward achieving an adequately stable political and security situation by March of 1994.

#### C. Steps pursuant to resolution 865 (1993)

76. In resolution 865 (1993), the Council affirmed the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment on an urgent and accelerated basis of UNOSOM II's objectives of facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order, and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia, so that it can complete its mission by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the "Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities".

77. I travelled to the Horn of Africa region in October to consult with the leaders of the region on UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy with regard to its humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993). I had the opportunity to meet with and to discuss in great detail the situation in and relating to Somalia with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. I visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, where I held talks with military and civilian officials of UNOSOM II as well as with Somali elders.

78. During my visit to the region, I also had occasion to attend a meeting convened on 14 October 1993 in Cairo by President Hosni Mubarak, the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with the participation of the Secretaries-General of OAU, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in an effort to help to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to lay the groundwork for its continued reconstruction and development. It should be noted also that participants at the meeting were concerned about the consequences of the withdrawal of the United States troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the participants reaffirmed their joint determination to continue their ongoing search for common solutions to the problems of Somalia. They committed themselves to advancing the process of reconciliation and rebuilding begun by Somali leaders themselves and recognized the achievements of the United Nations in providing humanitarian relief and security to most of Somalia. The Cairo meeting also called for the setting up of a trust fund for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia and urged all countries of Africa, the Arab world and the Islamic community to contribute generously to its establishment and operation.

79. I have decided to convene the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993. The meeting will review developments in the humanitarian situation in Somalia since the previous meeting in March and assess the current situation with a view to reaching agreement on actions that need to be taken in the immediate future, to include measures to enhance the transition from relief assistance to reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. The conference will also provide an opportunity to begin consultations on more long-term development planning. As in the previous humanitarian meetings, participants will include countries, regional organizations and relevant United Nations and other international organizations. Every effort will be made to ensure the widest possible Somali participation.

### III. OBSERVATIONS

80. For over a year now, the Security Council has responded, in a flexible and creative manner, to the highly complex and continually evolving situation in Somalia. The international community has had no precedent to guide it in dealing with the tragic situation in Somalia. Consequently, the response of the Security Council has had to be adjusted, from time to time, to take into account different circumstances that have not been possible to anticipate. This explains the evolution of the international presence in Somalia from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The wider international community as well as the people of Somalia, by and large, have appreciated the constructive responses of the Security Council.

#### A. Fact of progress

81. The uniqueness of the situation in Somalia, which riveted the attention of the international community on the situation there and led the Security Council to adopt the various resolutions so far, has changed in some important aspects. The most dramatic and visible change is of course the enormous success in reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country today. There have been other significant improvements as well in the fields of public health, education, agriculture, etc., which have been detailed in the earlier part of this report. This is not to suggest that the Somali society is completely back

on its feet. Indeed, the situation even in these areas is fragile and needs careful watching as well as continued assistance from the international community.

82. In other important and crucial respects, however, the situation in Somalia continues to be unique. There is still no effectively functioning government in the country. There is still no disciplined national armed force. There is still no organized civilian police force or judiciary, although impressive progress has been achieved in initiating the recreation of the police and judiciary. Consequently, the problems of Somalia must continue to engage the attention of the international community.

#### B. The importance of disarmament

83. I have always been firmly of the opinion that, without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and stability. The Security Council has endorsed the crucial importance of disarmament in its various resolutions and conferred the necessary mandate on UNOSOM II. The enormous task of disarming Somalia can be achieved only with the cooperation of the Somali people and of neighbouring countries. Comprehensive disarmament will take a long time and will have to be conducted in phases, beginning with the demobilization and rehabilitation of the heavily armed militias. Finding hidden stockpiles of weapons will require the cooperation of the vast majority of the Somali citizens, who must genuinely want to change from rule by the gun to rule by law. The Somali police force will be one of the key instruments for creating the perception that this is a Somali programme. Disarmament must not destabilize the security balance and must equitably reduce the threat to all segments of the population. Clearly we must generate the support of the people, and cooperative methods ultimately are the only way to succeed. Fortunately, the desire for disarmament among the people appears to be strong.

84. It was the universal wish and even hope that disarmament would be achieved on a voluntary basis. This hope was based on the commitment of the Somali parties, embodied in the cease-fire agreement and the Addis Ababa agreement which they signed in January and March 1993 respectively, committing themselves to complete simultaneous disarmament throughout the country. At the same time, the Somali parties themselves had anticipated that the disarmament might not proceed smoothly and that some form of coercive action might become unavoidable. This explains their request to UNOSOM II, contained in the Addis Ababa agreement, to assist in the disarmament process and "to apply strong and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the cease-fire agreement of January 1993".

#### C. Efforts to achieve dialogue

85. UNITAF achieved commendable results in the distribution of relief assistance in the country. However, the objective of ensuring a secure environment throughout the country had not been achieved nor had adequate numbers of troops been deployed before UNITAF was withdrawn.

86. Voluntary disarmament did succeed to some extent both during UNITAF and in the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to coercive methods to enforce disarmament in South Mogadishu. At the same time, it is a reality in Somalia that unless USC/SNA also is effectively disarmed along with other factions, the prospects for genuine peace and stability in the country would always remain bleak. In this connection, I welcome the unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities by USC/SNA with effect from 9 October 1993. This initially led to somewhat reduced tensions in the city. However, threats made by General Aidid in his press conference of 6 November were followed by a demonstration and gunfire on 8 November aimed at preventing United States and UNOSOM II humanitarian and security operations in the city. Such actions raise serious questions about USC/SNA's sincerity.

87. Nothing would please me and UNOSOM II more than if USC/SNA were to respond positively to UNOSOM II's invitation to join the other factions in a meaningful dialogue. In an effort to build on the unilateral cessation of hostilities announced by USC/SNA, UNOSOM II has established a Mogadishu Security Advisory Committee, to which it has invited all the factions. USC/SNA boycotted the first meeting. It sent a representative to the second meeting on 4 November, but its representative used the meeting only to deliver a long speech against UNOSOM II, after which he left the meeting. USC/SNA did not attend the third meeting of the Mogadishu Security Advisory Committee, which was held on 8 November. In addition, after assuring the Ethiopian and United States representatives that it would participate in a smaller group involving the USC, UNOSOM II and the United States, USC/SNA also failed to show up for that separate meeting. In spite of these setbacks, UNOSOM II will persevere in its efforts to establish a dialogue with USC/SNA.

#### D. The situation in perspective

88. It should be obvious from the above that the situation in Somalia will continue to remain complex and complicated for the foreseeable future. This, in turn, would mean that the Security Council will have to display flexibility as well as firmness in any decision that it will take while renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II. That the mandate of UNOSOM II must be extended is, of course, self-evident.

89. I have given deep thought to what I should recommend to the Security Council in terms of a renewed mandate for UNOSOM II. I have held extensive consultations with my Special Representative and the Force Commander, as well as my senior colleagues at Headquarters. I am conscious that the international community cannot take for granted forever the generosity of the troop contributing countries, their readiness to put the lives of their sons and daughters on the line in pursuit of what is perceived to be a somewhat distant and ill-defined objective and the willingness of the States Members of the United Nations to make the necessary funds available on the present scale. Since, however, it is not for me to presume, in one way or another, the willingness of the Member States to make the necessary sacrifices, I have decided to present three options for consideration by the members of the Security Council.

90. Before I present the options, however, it is essential to put the situation in its proper perspective. The most significant development is that the United States has announced that it will withdraw all its combat troops and the bulk of its logistics support troops by 31 March 1994. The Governments of Belgium, France and Sweden earlier had announced their decisions to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. It remains to be seen whether other troop-contributing countries also decide to withdraw their troops either before or after 31 March 1994. I have written to 42 Member States inviting them to contribute, or to increase their contribution, in terms of troops and logistics support. Here, I would like strongly to reject the insinuations made in some circles that only the troops from Europe and North America have the necessary qualities to implement the mandate given to UNOSOM II. The contingents from other continents have performed with exemplary courage, dedication and efficiency. It is none the less true that, for logistics support, UNOSOM II has had to depend primarily on the United States. The vacuum that would be created by the departure of the United States logistics contingent will have to be filled through other means. I am told that commercial arrangements can be made at a cost of about US\$ 33 million for the period ending 31 March 1994; this estimate does not include the cost of the equipment that the contractor would have to acquire from the United States.

#### E. Three options

91. In the first option, the present mandate of UNOSOM II would remain essentially unchanged as laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993) and 878 (1993). UNOSOM II would not take the initiative to resort systematically to coercive methods to enforce disarmament. Indeed, it is the hope of UNOSOM II that all factions, including USC/SNA, will cooperate to ensure peaceful conditions in the country. In Mogadishu, this would mean that USC/SNA would remove its roadblocks and strong points throughout the city so that UNOSOM II is able to escort humanitarian convoys from and into the city. It would also signify that UNOSOM II personnel would be able to move freely throughout Somalia without any danger of being ambushed or subjected to remotely detonated mine explosions. Should these expectations not be met, however, UNOSOM II, under this option, must retain the necessary capability for coercive disarmament and retaliation against attacks on its personnel. UNOSOM II would also pursue its present plans in relation to the re-establishment of an impartial and professional Somali police force and judicial system. The objective would be to create and maintain secure conditions for humanitarian assistance and foster national reconciliation as well as of other elements of the existing mandate.

92. Were the Council to renew UNOSOM II as described above, it should reauthorize the maintenance of its present troop strength. Indeed, I feel that it would be necessary to deploy an additional brigade, the need for which I had mentioned in my previous report (S/26317). In addition, the Member States must fulfil their financial obligations, promptly and in full, which will amount to approximately US\$ 1 billion for one year. This option calls for sustained political will on the part of the troop-contributing countries, which must be prepared to make available the necessary troops and armament under United Nations command and to accept the risks associated with such a course of action.

93. In the second option, the Security Council would take a conscious decision that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods anywhere in the country but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties in order to discharge its mandate. UNOSOM II would use force only in self-defence, for the protection of its personnel, in accordance with traditional peace-keeping practices. Disarmament would be entirely voluntary. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumes in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while making every effort not to be involved in it, must retain some capability to defend its personnel if so warranted by circumstances. The emphasis would be on ensuring unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation of the infrastructure of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system and in keeping the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas secure. As far as Mogadishu itself is concerned, efforts would continue to engage USC/SNA in a political dialogue and the security of the routes in Mogadishu would depend upon the goodwill of USC/SNA, as well as other factions.

94. Under this option, it would not be necessary fully to replace the contingent that would have withdrawn by 31 March 1994 or those that might withdraw soon thereafter. The troop requirement would be of the order of 16,000 all ranks, with one brigade deployed in Mogadishu, one assigned to convoy duty and one for the security of refugees and of critical areas in need of assistance. A Force Logistics Supply Command of about 2,500 all ranks would also need to be established. The financial requirements for this option would be considerably less than the first option.

95. Under the third option, the mandate of UNOSOM II would be limited to keeping under its secure control the airport and port in Mogadishu as well as important ports and airports in other parts of the country so as to keep the supply routes open for humanitarian purposes. UNOSOM II would assist United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in the delivery of humanitarian aid. It would help development agencies and programmes, especially UNDP, in undertaking development projects. It would, of course, continue to assist in the training of a Somali police force. This course of action would presuppose that the local authorities in various regions of Somalia would be prepared to cooperate with UNOSOM II and would provide a secure environment for the humanitarian and development functions mentioned above. The main feature of this option is its emphasis on the regions as opposed to the importance, under the other two options, of bringing about a secure environment in Mogadishu. This option would call for the deployment of about 5,000 all ranks. Under this option, as indeed under the other two options, UNOSOM II would continue to offer its good offices to resolve inter-clan differences and to promote harmony among all the factions. The financial requirement for the third option would be substantially less than the other two options.

96. There could theoretically be one more alternative, namely, a complete withdrawal of UNOSOM II from Somalia. I myself would reject this possibility. The international community must not abandon Somalia in view of the incontrovertible desire of the Somali people for the continued presence of UNOSOM II in their country. Total withdrawal would not be a responsible act.

97. In presenting these options, it is not my intention that the Security Council should pronounce on them or take a decision in favour of one of them at

this stage. I have outlined the options in this report principally to alert the Security Council to the various possibilities as the situation evolves in the coming weeks and months. Nevertheless, I feel that the time might come, fairly soon, for the Council to consider these options and to decide on an appropriate course of action, depending on the prevailing circumstances and the willingness of Member States to provide troops, the necessary finances and, equally important, the required political will.

#### F. Continuing political effort

98. In the meanwhile, UNOSOM II troop strength is adequate for the present purpose, although logistical capability may diminish somewhat by December 1993. UNOSOM II is not using coercive methods to ensure a secure environment which, by and large, is lacking mainly in South Mogadishu. UNOSOM II will continue to make a determined effort to initiate a political dialogue with all the factions, including USC/SNA. In this, UNOSOM II will seek and welcome support from Somalia's neighbours, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from OAU, LAS and OIC. It is imperative that we all work together, and are seen to be working together, in this important common endeavour. At the same time, UNOSOM II will stand ready to protect its own personnel as well as the personnel of other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. UNOSOM II might also have to be prepared to use force to keep open the lines of communication and supply routes in Mogadishu and elsewhere.

99. The importance of genuine national reconciliation in Somalia is self-evident. One must, however, take into account the possibility that, despite the best efforts on the part of all concerned, the process of national reconciliation might not succeed. In such an eventuality, the probability of a resumption of civil war in Somalia would be high. There are already reports, as yet not fully confirmed, of additional supplies of weapons entering the country. In that event, UNOSOM II, without the required resources, might become a hapless spectator to the tragedy. I shall, of course, immediately bring such developments to the attention of the Security Council.

#### G. Financing

100. I should like to emphasise the importance of ensuring reliable financing for UNOSOM II. The General Assembly, by its resolution 47/41 C, has authorized commitment for the operation of UNOSOM II for the period from 1 November 1993 to 28 February 1994 at \$84,700,000 gross per month, subject to the extension of the mandate beyond 31 October 1993 by the Security Council and the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Should additional resources be required for the extension period decided upon by the Council, recourse will be made to the Advisory Committee and to the General Assembly, as appropriate.

101. As at 9 November 1993, the outstanding assessments in connection with UNOSOM II amounted to \$140.6 million. This represents approximately 23.6 per cent of amounts assessed on Member States since its inception until 31 October 1993.

102. The Security Council, by resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to States or operations involved in establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. The total contributions to the Fund established as "The Trust Fund for Somalia - Unified Command", were US\$ 105 million. The expenses to date amount to US\$ 57 million. In its resolution 814 (1993), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to maintain the Fund for the additional purpose of receiving contributions for the maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces and for the establishment of a Somali police force. The contributions received so far in this regard amount to US\$ 7 million.

#### H. Logistics

103. Owing to the withdrawal of the United States logistics contingent by 31 March 1994, changes are envisioned in connection with the provision of logistic support to UNOSOM II through the use of commercial contractors. This could result in an increase in the overall expenditure of the mission. In addition, the monthly cash flow requirements will increase. Whereas in the past, reimbursements to Governments could be delayed because of the late payment of assessed contributions, it will not be possible to delay the payment of invoices presented by commercial contractors for goods and services provided to UNOSOM II. In this regard, there has been an indication that over 35 per cent of any assessment to be made between now and the first half of 1994 will not be paid. This can only worsen the cash position of the UNOSOM II special account as indicated above.

104. I must indicate that, unless there is substantial improvement in the payment of assessments as currently forecasted, UNOSOM II will run into serious financial problems during the course of the next mandate extension.

#### I. Recommendation

105. I therefore recommend that the Security Council renew the existing mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 March 1994. Should circumstances warrant, I will immediately bring to the attention of the Security Council any developments that might have a bearing on the ability of UNOSOM II to discharge its existing mandate or which might make it desirable to modify UNOSOM II's mandate.

#### J. Concluding remarks

106. It is evident that the overwhelming majority of the Somali people want the United Nations to continue to support the process of reconciliation and rehabilitation which their representatives agreed upon in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993. They realize that the international community has devoted enormous resources and made considerable sacrifices to assist them in achieving this noble objective. The people of Somalia, I am convinced, are prepared to move forward with the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction if Member States are willing to stay the course.

107. In concluding the present report, I wish to express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Jonathan Howe, to my Deputy Special Representative, Ambassador Kouyate, to the Force Commander, General Bir, and to the men and women, civilian and military, of UNOSOM II. They have made an outstanding contribution to the implementation of United Nations mandate in Somalia, under difficult and dangerous conditions. My gratitude also extends to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to NGOs and relief agencies and to the many Governments that have assisted and reinforced the efforts of UNOSOM II. Above all, I pay tribute to the soldiers and the Somali workers of UNOSOM II who have lost their lives in endeavouring to help Somalia in its hour of need.

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