Letter dated 21 November 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 3 (i) of its resolution 1676 (2006) (see enclosure).

The report was presented to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia on 17 November 2006 and was subsequently considered in the Committee on 21 November 2006. The report is being circulated for the information of the Members of the United Nations.

The Committee intends to complete speedily a thorough consideration of the information and recommendations contained in the report, after which I will present the Committee’s views on the report to the Security Council.

I would therefore be grateful if the present letter and its enclosure were issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia
Enclosure

Letter dated 16 October 2006 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (i) of Security Council resolution 1676 (2006).

(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia

(Signed) Melvin E. Holt, Jr.

(Signed) Harjit S. Kelley

(Signed) Joel Salek

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## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>APRCT</td>
<td>Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat against Terror</td>
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<td>BAM</td>
<td>Bakaraaha Arms Market</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAW</td>
<td>Lightweight anti-armour weapon</td>
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<td>MV</td>
<td>Merchant vessel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
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<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket-propelled grenade launcher</td>
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<tr>
<td>SICC</td>
<td>Somali Islamic Courts Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Summary

It is the task of the Monitoring Group to observe and report information regarding arms embargo violations and related matters in the context of unfolding events in Somalia. To that end, the Monitoring Group has highlighted its findings for the current mandate period, noting the major factors and developments in the present summary and describing them more fully in the body of the report.

Since the Monitoring Group’s last report dated 5 May 2006, Somalia has been undergoing a period of great change and transition. The opposition alliance, with its former base in Mogadishu consisting of warlords, dissident Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Ministers, certain businessmen and others, no longer exists. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) has become the pre-eminent force in the central and southern regions. With clearly visible momentum, bolstered by aggressive support from seven States, it is actively strengthening and consolidating its grip on military and political power and the economic infrastructure in the geographical areas under its control. A much weaker TFG, also backed by aggressive support from three States, is attempting to hold on to its tenuously held power base in Baidoa. The possibility of a military confrontation between TFG and ICU is an ever-present threat.

Accompanying and underlying these developments are rampant arms flows to TFG and ICU, the two principal contenders for power in central and southern Somalia. Behind the scenes, large cargo aircraft and ocean-going dhows have been clandestinely delivering arms and other forms of military support from States, arms-trading networks and others, almost on a daily basis. Accordingly, both TFG and ICU are engaged in an aggressive, rapid, large — by Somali standards — and planned military build-up. It involves obtaining a wide variety of arms (including surface-to-air missiles) military materiel and motor vehicles (trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms), the recruitment of new fighters and volunteers from foreign countries and establishing military camps and conducting formal military training. In short, all of the essentials necessary for creating and building armies are present. Both sides, but especially ICU, are also busy acquiring the all-important financial capacity necessary to maintain this greatly enhanced military machinery.

Further adding to the military build-up in arms and materiel, both sides are actively supported inside Somalia by the presence of combat troops, military trainers and advisers from certain States. ICU is supported by Eritrea and TFG by Ethiopia and Uganda, all members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Also aligned with either ICU or TFG are other formidable organized groups of combatants inside Somalia, adding another layer of complexity and instability to an already unpredictable security environment.

As a result of this overdeveloped military environment, tensions between TFG and ICU are exceedingly high and volatile, and are accompanied by all of the ingredients for the increasing possibility of a violent, widespread, and protracted military conflict in most of Somalia. Adding to this momentum towards a military solution is the publicly stated intention of ICU to violently oppose any IGAD or African Union military force foisted on this volatile military mix, which constitutes an environment highly vulnerable to a catalyst for a large-scale fight. Moreover, there is the distinct possibility that the momentum towards a military solution inside
Somalia may spill over into a direct State-to-State conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as acts of terrorism in other vulnerable States of the region.

In seeking responses from the multitude of actors involved in arms embargo violations, a total of 54 letters have been sent by the Monitoring Group to a combination of States, businesses and other entities. It has received 26 replies as of the time of writing of the present report, mid-October 2006. Some of the respondents avoided answering questions by providing information that was not relevant to the questions asked, and others gave conflicting responses to questions concerning the same information. In the final analysis, all respondents denied any involvement in violating the arms embargo; but the unbridled military build-up in Somalia continues.

In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the Monitoring Group proposes new, interrelated recommendations that, if implemented, are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum towards a military catastrophe in Somalia. The new recommendations call for the following actions: (a) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort that is intended to severely curtail or cut off the flow of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support to Somalia, (b) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali-owned and operated businesses, intended to reduce the availability of monies and other financial resources for purchasing arms and military materiel, and (c) a high-level, international diplomatic effort intended to disengage States from contributing to the military build-up in Somalia, while at the same time trying to move political dialogue between all relevant Somali actors towards a political solution.
I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1676 (2006) of 10 May 2006, the Security Council conferred the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:

   (a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution 1587 (2005);

   (b) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;

   (c) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports, airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;

   (d) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and when the Committee deems appropriate;


   (f) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo;

   (g) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo;

   (h) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing within 90 days from its establishment;

   (i) To submit, for the Security Council’s consideration, through the Committee, a final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the termination of the Monitoring Group’s mandate.

2. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following experts: Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium), arms expert and Chairman; Melvin E. Holt, Jr. (United States of America), arms expert; Harjit Kelley (Kenya), maritime expert; and Joel Salek (Colombia), finance expert. The Monitoring Group travelled to Ethiopia, Madagascar and Yemen.

3. Throughout the period of its mandate, the Monitoring Group kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) informed of its activities by submitting biweekly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a midterm briefing to the Committee on 6 September 2006. The Monitoring Group received much-appreciated support and assistance.

B. Methodology

4. The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region, including members of the transitional federal institutions, the Islamic Courts Union and, where relevant, representatives of diplomatic missions, civil society organizations and aid agencies. The Monitoring Group also contacted numerous key, knowledgeable individuals from Somali civil society and the business community.

5. The two reports of the Panel of Experts (see S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) and the previous reports of the Monitoring Group (see S/2004/604, S/2005/153, S/2005/625 and S/2006/229) were also taken into consideration during the investigations. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the Monitoring Group’s first and second reports also apply to the present mandate.

II. Known arms embargo violations during the mandate period

A. Rampant arms flows

6. Information gathered during the current reporting period indicates that arms flows into Somalia, most especially to the two principal antagonists — the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) — has dramatically increased in terms of numbers of arms, frequency of delivery and sophistication of weapons. Arms flows have been aggressively fed by a growing number of individual States and, to a lesser degree, arms-trading networks. This has been taking place in the greater context of a broad-based military build-up by both sides.

7. The majority of arms provided to ICU by States — seven of them — and arms traders include the types that are typically used in Somalia. But, ominously, new and more sophisticated types of weapons are also coming into Somalia, including man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA-7a and 7b “Grail”, and the SA-6 “Gainful” low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers and second-generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.

8. On the other hand, arms provided to TFG by States — three of them — and arms traders overwhelmingly include the types that are historically typical for the Somali environment, including assault rifles, a variety of machine guns and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and large quantities of ammunition.

B. Support from States and arms traders

9. As was the case during the previous mandate, ending in May 2006, the Monitoring Group notes the continuation of an expanding number of States — 10 at the time of writing — providing different types of support to either TFG or ICU, in violation of the arms embargo. State contributions to TFG and ICU are either
clandestinely delivered directly to the intended recipient using State-owned means of transport, or delivered indirectly using an intermediary in the form of a private commercial maritime vessel — usually a dhow — or aircraft in an effort to disguise the contributor’s true identity. Contributions include large quantities of a wide variety of arms, including assault rifles and small-calibre machine guns, large-calibre anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and mines. They also include military materiel, motor vehicles — trucks and land cruisers used as mobile weapons platforms — military troops, trainers and advisers, and funding. The Monitoring Group has identified the arms embargo violations described below.

**Djibouti**

10. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Djibouti has provided military uniforms and medicines in support of ICU, as follows: on 30 July 2006, a Djibouti Airlines aircraft landed at an airfield in Mogadishu with medicines and military uniforms intended for ICU. The true nature of the cargo was disguised, and it was represented as being from the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti in order to conceal its origins. After the cargo was unloaded, the aircraft departed the airfield and proceeded to Mogadishu’s main airport.


**Egypt**

12. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Egypt has provided training in support of ICU in Somalia, as follows: on 26 July 2006, a meeting took place in Mogadishu between officials from ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the residence of the ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: military training would be provided to about 3,800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks, located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; and Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur” were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

13. On 23 August 2006, ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed the first contingent of about 600 recruits, who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

14. On 19 September 2006, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Egypt notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 2 October 2006, the Monitoring Group received a reply from the Government of Egypt (annex III) denying its involvement in the activity described above.
**Eritrea**

15. During the current mandate period, the Government of Eritrea provided at least 28 separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment. It also provided troops and training to ICU in Somalia, as described below.

**Eritrean support for the Islamic Courts Union**

16. On 26 April 2006, a shipment of arms consisting of AK-47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, RPG-7s and a variety of ammunition arrived on a dhow at the seaport of El Ma’an. The arms were from the Government of Eritrea and were destined for ICU.

17. On 6 May 2006, at about 0500 hours, an Eritrean Antonov military aircraft landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud region, Somalia. Awaiting the landing of the aircraft were about 75 people, five lorries and two land cruisers. The vehicles’ headlamps had been turned on to facilitate the landing. The aircraft transported a shipment of anti-aircraft guns, which were offloaded from the aircraft and loaded onto the lorries. The lorries, accompanied by the land cruisers, travelled by road to a natural seaport near Hobyo on the Somali coast.

18. On 9 May 2006, a dhow arrived at El Ahmed seaport, located south of Marka, Lower Shabelle region. On board the dhow were fighters from Pakistan and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The fighters remained on the dhow. Five out of the 75 people associated with the receipt of the anti-aircraft guns on 6 May boarded the dhow, along with part of the shipment of anti-aircraft guns. The dhow then departed the port of El Ahmed, travelling south along the coast for Raskiambooni, in southern Somalia. The Monitoring Group has previously reported that the Raskiambooni area serves as a training and support centre for militant fundamentalists. In charge of the Raskiambooni centre is Sheikh Hassan Abdulle Hersi “Sheikh Hassan Turki”, a known militant and leader of the Munathamul Jihad wa Dawa (Organization for Jihad and Propagation).

19. During a period of about one week starting on 15 June 2006, four Eritrean military aircraft landed at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud region. Cargo on board the aircraft included various types of arms, including AK-47 assault rifles, PKM machine guns, RPGs, a variety of ammunition and military uniforms.

20. ICU member Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”, one of the leaders of the Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), took possession of the arms and military uniforms. The shipment was loaded onto lorries and transported under the protection of 12 technicals to Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, the shipment was separated into four consignments and variously distributed to militant forces in Mogadishu, Marka, Barawe and Kongo (a former TFG military training camp near Jowhar), where the Eritreans intend to set up a military base in support of ICU.

21. On 19 June 2006 a dhow arrived at El Ade seaport (Mogadishu area) containing 24 M72-series lightweight anti-armour weapons (LAWs), 1,200 anti-tank mines, 4,000 F1 hand grenades, an unspecified number of boxes of ammunition for small arms, 2,000 uniforms, 1,500 military-style individual water bottles and medicines. The arms and other items were transported from the port of Assab, Eritrea.
22. On 30 June 2006 a vessel using the name *Selam* travelled from the Eritrean seaport of Massawa to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 2,000 tons of food, about 50 DShK, 50 82 mm mortars, 3,000 AK-47s and 1,000 boxes of ammunition.

23. On 4 July 2006 four flights of Eritrean military aircraft landed at Esaley airport, located in the north-eastern part of Mogadishu. Two of the flights contained arms for ICU, and the other two were transporting approximately 500 military personnel consisting of Eritrean military and fighters from the Ethiopian insurgent groups Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and OLF.

24. Subsequent to their arrival at Esaley, all of the military personnel were transported to El Ma’an seaport. At El Ma’an, militant fundamentalist businessman and financier Abukar Omar Adani made arrangements for the troops to be transported by dhow to the vicinity of Marka, Lower Shabelle. The threefold purpose of the troop deployment to Lower Shabelle is to create an alternative headquarters in addition to Mogadishu and to establish both a new military base and a training camp for foreigners — both military trainers and fighters. The new facility is located near both the seaport and the airport of El Ahmed.

25. On 15 July 2006 Colonel Yusuf Negash Warque, an Eritrean military officer, arrived in Mogadishu on a chartered aircraft. The Colonel, who speaks Somali, conducted a meeting with leaders of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, including from the Executive Committee and the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee). The following day, 16 July, Colonel Warque departed Mogadishu in a Toyota pickup truck and, escorted by four technicals, travelled to Mareer-Gur for a meeting with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys.

26. On 17 July 2006 a vessel using the name MV *Yohana* travelled from Eritrea to Somalia carrying food and arms, as follows: 3,000 tons of food, 50 DShK, 30 82 mm mortars, 2,000 AK-47s and 100 RPG-7s. It should be additionally noted that in a report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia, a vessel using the name MV *Yohana* was also identified as being associated with the Government of Eritrea’s involvement in Somalia arms embargo violations, which, among other things, included delivering arms and transporting troops of OLF (see S/2003/223, paras. 71-73).

27. On 20 July 2006 an Airbus A310-300, operated by Daallo Airlines, departed from Assab, Eritrea, destined for Somalia. On board the aircraft were a variety of arms, as follows: B-10 anti-tank guns; heavy (large-calibre) machine guns; PKM machine guns, with magazines and telescopic sighting devices; AK-47 assault rifles; G3A3 assault rifles; Browning .30-calibre machine guns; 120 mm mortars; and rifle-fired grenades. On or about 21 July 2006 a second arms shipment, consisting primarily of a variety of ammunition, arrived in Somalia on board an Airbus A310-300, also operated by Daallo Airlines.

28. The Daallo Airlines flights picked up the arms shipments in the Eritrean seaport city of Assab, where the shipments had originally been delivered by dhow. Monitoring Group sources clearly indicate that Eritrea is being used as both a conduit and a platform for, as well as a coordinator of, support for the Somali ICU. States using Eritrea for this purpose include Djibouti, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Egypt and certain Middle East countries.
29. The Monitoring Group sent letters on 18 August 2006 to Daallo Airlines and the Government of Eritrea notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses. Both parties replied on 22 August 2006, and both denied participation in the events described above (see annexes IV and V).

30. On 23 July 2006, late in the afternoon, a commercial aircraft arrived at Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud region, with a shipment of arms for ICU. The shipment consisted of the following: shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and second-generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons — 50 units; RPGs — 100 units; AK-47 assault rifles — 540 units; FAL assault rifles — 94 units; PKM machine guns — 106 units; ZU-23 and DShK anti-aircraft ammunition — unknown number of units; and foodstuffs, water supplies and medicines. The aircraft that delivered the arms had reportedly departed from the United Arab Emirates empty and then flown to Eritrea, where it picked up the arms.

31. The arms were loaded onto five trucks and, under escort by seven technicals, were transported to Mareer-Gur, Galgaduud region, which was then the local headquarters of the militants. At a later date, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys relocated the headquarters to Bula’ley, approximately 40 kilometres south-east of Dhusamareeb.

32. On 24 July 2006 an aircraft containing an arms shipment and senior Eritrean military officers arrived at Mogadishu’s Esaley airport. The arms consisted of unknown numbers of rockets and other anti-tank weapons.

33. On 26 July 2006 a meeting took place between officials of ICU and visiting Libyan, Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of the ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: military training would be provided to about 3,800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks, located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; and Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers, with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur”, were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

34. On 23 August 2006 the Islamic military forces opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed the first contingent of about 600 recruits, who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys indicated in comments concerning the new recruits that they would be trained, among other purposes, to participate in the defence of Somalia from both internal and external — foreign — aggression.

35. On 26 July 2006 a dhow originating from Saudi Arabia and carrying food items stopped in Eritrea and picked up a shipment of arms. The dhow then continued to Somalia. On board the dhow was a retired senior military officer of the Egyptian army who is also a member of the Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), using the name Ahmed Abu-Masri. The Egyptian posed as the dhow pilot. Also on board was a Somali businessman, using the name Omar Isaaq, who had coordinated the acquisition of the food items and arms. The dhow arrived in Somalia at Raage Eele, approximately 40 kilometres north of El-Ma’an. The consignments of food and arms were loaded onto waiting trucks and covered to
conceal their true nature. The convoy containing the consignments and the Egyptian travelled to the stronghold of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in the Galgaduud region.

36. The dhow had a load capacity of 88 metric tons and bore the markings XL8.5x10 on its hull. The arms shipment consisted of 3,600 anti-tank mines and 500 hand grenades. On 18 August 2006 the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

37. On 26 August 2006 three dhows transporting 2,000 fully equipped combat troops from Eritrea arrived at Warsheikh, located north of Mogadishu, along the coast. On arrival at Warsheikh, the troops were relocated to an area in north Mogadishu for ultimate redeployment to different ICU-held areas. They were redeployed as follows: 500 of the Eritrean troops went to Baledogle, 500 to Hilweyne training camp and 500 to Lower Shabelle, and 500 remained in Mogadishu and were stationed at Villa Baidoa and the former Police Academy, Bolisiya.

38. At the end of August 2006, at about 0645 hours, a large military transport aircraft arrived at Mogadishu International Airport with a shipment of arms from Eritrea. The shipment consisted of one or more of the following: M-46 130 mm towed field gun, D-30 122 towed howitzer, M-30 122 mm towed howitzer, D-30 152 mm, Zu 57-2-57 mm, Zu-23-2, Shilka-4-23 mm, Zu-23-4, different calibres of mortars, SA-6 “Gainful” low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile, PZRK Strela 2M surface-to-air missile (also known as SA-7 “Grail”) and RPG-7.

Eritrean support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front via the Islamic Courts Union

39. On 8 July 2006 a shipment of arms transported by camels and donkeys, and under the escort of 70 members of ICU along with 160 ONLF fighters, entered Ethiopia through the Abudwaq district, Galgaduud region, Somalia. The shipment consisted of the following: explosives — 6 boxes; shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons — 6 units; PKM machine guns — 22 units; AK-47 assault rifles — 120 units; FAL assault rifles — 40 units; and hand grenades — 6 boxes.

Training of Islamic Courts Union militia members in Eritrea

40. On 27 July 2006 upwards of 500 fighters from the military forces of ICU were flown from Esaley airport, Mogadishu, to Eritrea. They were sent for training in the use of the new types of rockets and surface-to-air missiles shipped by Eritrea to ICU. Of the approximately 500 fighters, 200 were also to receive training in Eritrea in guerrilla warfare. The others were sent to the Libya Arab Jamahiriya (100) and the Syrian Arab Republic (200) (see also the sections on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Syrian Arab Republic below).

41. On 8 August 2006 300 fighters of ICU were also flown from Baledogle airport (north-west of Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle region, to Eritrea for the purpose of attending military training in the use of rockets and surface-to-air missiles that Eritrea had recently delivered to ICU. Earlier the same day the aircraft that transported the fighters had also offloaded shipments of AK-47 assault rifles and PKM machine-gun ammunition at Baledoge airport.
42. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 18 September 2006 to the Government of Eritrea notifying it of all of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

The case of Eriko Enterprise, Asmara

43. On 26 July 2006, at 0745 hours an Ilyushin 76 (IL-76) aircraft containing an arms shipment for ICU arrived at Mogadishu International Airport. Also on board the aircraft were 10 senior Eritrean military officers. The Eritrean officers were lodged in the Ramadaan Hotel, owned by Abukar Omar Adani, who is a financier of ICU.

44. The IL-76 departed from Assab, Eritrea, indicating a flight plan designating a destination of Hargeisa (Somaliland), but the aircraft went to Mogadishu. The IL-76, using the call sign LFT-1221, has the flag of Kazakhstan painted on the tail, and the registration number on the fuselage of the aircraft starts with the prefix UN, which is the code for Kazakhstan.

45. Before landing, all roads in proximity to the airport were closed and vehicle traffic was redirected elsewhere. The security of the area and the offloading of the arms shipment were coordinated by the leader of the Hizbul Shabaab, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow “Abu-Mansuur”. The arms were offloaded onto seven trucks that were covered to conceal the nature of the cargo. Another truck, carrying barrels of fuel, was left uncovered. The arms shipment consisted of a wide variety of weapons, spare parts and ammunition, including assault rifles, hand grenades, mines, PKM machine guns, LAWs, surface-to-air missiles, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns of different calibres, anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. Also on board the aircraft were military uniforms, machine-gun belts (feeder belts) and medicines.

46. On 28 July 2006 two IL-76 cargo aircraft landed — the first of them at 0700 hours — at Mogadishu International Airport. Both aircraft contained arms shipments for ICU. Again, before the aircraft landed, all roads in proximity to the airport were closed to vehicle traffic. The arms shipments consisted of anti-tank weapons; ZP-39 anti-aircraft guns with seats; 80 extra barrels and boxes of ammunition for the ZP-39; DShK heavy machine guns and boxes of ammunition; PKM and boxes of ammunition; AK-47s and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the AK-47; mines; FAL assault rifles and boxes of ammunition; grenade launchers for the FAL assault rifle; SAR-80 assault rifles; anti-personnel mines; B-10 anti-tank guns and boxes of ammunition; and 60 mm mortars and boxes of ammunition.

47. The arms were offloaded onto lorries and, escorted by a security detail consisting of 25 technicals, transported and distributed to three arms-storage facilities in Mogadishu: Villa Baidoa, Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy, Bolisiya (between the international airport and the main seaport). The majority of the arms were divided between Villa Somalia and the former Police Academy.

48. Subsequently, arms from the three shipments of 26 and 28 July were further distributed to militias belonging to ICU in Mogadishu, Jowhar, Buur Hakaba (located along the road between Mogadishu and Baidoa) and Guriel (Dhusamareeb area).
49. On 7 August 2006 an Ilyushin 76 aircraft operated by Eriko Enterprises, using flight call sign LFT-3756, departed Assab, Eritrea, for Mogadishu International Airport.

50. The Monitoring Group sent letters to the Government of Eritrea on 9 August 2006 and 1 September 2006 and to the Government of Kazakhstan on 15 August 2006 requesting their responses concerning four IL-76 flights reported to have variously taken place on 26 and 28 July and 7 August 2006. The Monitoring Group also sent letters on 19 September 2006 to Aerolift Company, based in South Africa, and to the Government of South Africa requesting their responses in regard to the above information. As of the time of the submission of the present report, the Monitoring Group had not received a reply from the Government of South Africa.

51. The Government of Eritrea did not reply to the letter of 9 August 2006. It replied to the letter of 1 September 2006 in a letter dated 6 September 2006 (annex VI) informing the Monitoring Group as follows: “The Government of the State of Eritrea does not have any information on the arrival or departure of the stated aircraft. The Government of the State of Eritrea is gravely concerned about the continued spread of misinformation on Eritrea’s alleged violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).” In the same letter, the Government of Eritrea also stated that the Monitoring Group’s information “is totally wrong and lacks credibility”.

52. However, subsequently, the Monitoring Group received the following information: (a) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Air Traffic Control Authority of a neighbouring country confirmed the flights; (b) on 19 September 2006 the Government of Kazakhstan provided information on the IL-76 in question indicating that the aircraft belonged to Aerolift (annex VII), and (c) on 29 September 2006 Aerolift provided information that indicated that the same IL-76 had been sold to Eriko Enterprise, an Eritrean company, before the flights to Mogadishu took place (annex VIII). Accordingly, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group made several attempts to establish contact with Eriko during the first two weeks of October 2006. Eriko could not be reached for comment.

53. Seeking additional information and clarification, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a follow-up telephone call on 3 October 2006 to the same Aerolift representative who had provided the assistance noted above and asked for additional information. The representative told the Chairman that he would provide documentation showing that the aircraft in question was operated by Eriko. However, as of the time of the submission of the present report, the Monitoring Group had not received the promised documentation.

The case of the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport Ltd

54. The Monitoring Group received information that on 8 and 10 October 2006 a B-707 aircraft — the same aircraft on both days — flew from Massawa, Eritrea, to Mogadishu International Airport. The aircraft bore a Ugandan registration number, 5X-EOT, and used the call sign MHU of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd, formerly Air Memphis. Cargo transported on the 8 October flight consisted of generators, medicines, 2,500 single-person tents and 30 larger tents, 400 pieces of telecommunication equipment for vehicles, 1,500 communication handsets and 10 sealed containers. The intended recipients of the cargo were the ICU military forces based in Raskiambooni, Guriel, Mogadishu and Kismaayo. Cargo transported on the
10 October flight included an unknown quantity of arms and representatives of an ICU military force, following the completion of military training, who were being returned to Somalia from a State that has been providing support to ICU.

55. Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd is based in Kampala. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group placed a telephone call to the Chairman of that company, who furnished the following information: the B-707 referred to above was smuggled out of Egypt on 5 July 2006 and was at the time of its flights from Massawa, Eritrea, to Mogadishu, on 8 and 10 October, operated by Euro Oceanic Air Transport, a company based in Bahrain. That company used a registration number, air operator certificate and call sign without authorization from Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd. The Chairman of Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd further informed the Monitoring Group that it had sent letters to the authorities of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates after learning that the aircraft was transporting arms shipments from Eritrea to Somalia (annex IX).

Ethiopia

56. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Ethiopia has provided arms, training and/or contingents of military units to TFG, warlords, Somali clans and the Puntland administration in Somalia, as described below.

Ethiopian support for the Transitional Federal Government

57. On 28 June 2006, at 0400 hours, four trucks containing 10 metric tons of ammunition left Dolow, Ethiopia, en route to Baidoa. The trucks are reported to belong to a businessman and had been specifically contracted to deliver the cargo to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa.

58. On 29 June 2006 Khalif Isse Mudan, owner/operator of Mudan Airlines, signed a contract with TFG Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi in a hotel in Nairobi granting Mudan Airlines the right to transport weapons and ammunition from Ethiopia to Baidoa for TFG.

59. On 3 and 4 July 2006 two Mudan Airlines aircraft transported Ethiopian troops and arms to Baidoa. The aircraft transported both the troops and the arms from the Ethiopian military installation located in eastern Ethiopia at Goday (Gode). The senior Ethiopian military officer, General Gabre, was in charge of the operation on behalf of his Government and accompanied the flights to Baidoa. TFG President Yusuf requested the troops and arms as a response to learning that Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys had been appointed head of the Majlis Al Shura (Consultative Committee) of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts.

60. Upon arrival at Baidoa, the Ethiopian troops went immediately to President Yusuf’s compound. The troops are part of a plan to support TFG. The soldiers charged with the responsibility of providing security to President Yusuf’s residence are from zone 5 in Ethiopia and have Somali physical features. Their other responsibilities include personal protection of President Yusuf, assisting in the overall defence of Baidoa, offensive manoeuvres against any militant assault and support of Yusuf’s militia.

61. On or about 20 July 2006, late at night, Ethiopian military forces, in a convoy estimated to consist of 93 vehicles, crossed the border from Dolow, Ethiopia, into
the Gedo region of Somalia. The troops were deployed to several locations within Gedo, Bakool and Bay regions, as well as in the vicinity of Baidoa. Among the vehicles in the convoy were 40 armoured vehicles, or technicals, some of which were mounted with multiple rocket launchers. The armoured vehicles/technicals, supported by TFG units, deployed to a location about 25 kilometres east of Buur-Heybe (Buur-Eyle).

62. Sources reported that the Ethiopian units exchanged gunfire with two reconnaissance technicals belonging to Sheik Yusuf Indahaadde in Bullafulay, located north-west of Baledogle, resulting in the killing of three militiamen and the capture of the two technicals and their crews. Ethiopian reconnaissance units were spotted in the former Kabahirig commando training camp approximately 10 kilometres north-east of Baledogle, as well as the perimeters of Jowhar and Baledogle, on 23 July 2006.

63. ICU also deployed some of its units during the same time frame in the areas of Baledogle and Leego. The Monitoring Group learned that over 200 technicals had been assigned to positions associated with all routes leading to Mogadishu.

64. On 25 September 2006 several hundred Ethiopian combat troops arrived in Baidoa from Ethiopia.

65. The Ethiopian military has set up several training sites in the greater Baidoa area, including: (a) Labatan Jirow, a former prison site about 60 kilometres north of Baidoa, jointly operated by the Ethiopians and TFG as a training camp; it also serves as a weapons-storage location; (b) Daynuunay, a former military base about 28 kilometres south-east of Baidoa, a training camp where the Ethiopians have about 30 technicals, 10 of which are mounted with ZU 23-4 or ZP 39 anti-aircraft guns; and (c) Manas, a former military base 30 kilometres south of Baidoa, the largest camp with an Ethiopian presence.

**Ethiopian recruitment of new militia members**

66. During July and August 2006, in the Gedo region, Somalia, Ethiopian military personnel including a security and intelligence officer named Colonel Atto Abraha Getchew were actively involved in recruiting new militia members for TFG. The Colonel is based in Geedweyne, Dolow District, Gedo region, Somalia. The Ethiopians provided incentives to the elders in the form of vehicles and money to promote the recruitment process. Once recruited, new members were sent to military training facilities in the vicinity of Dolow, a town on the border between Ethiopia and Somalia.

67. In mid-July 2006 about 400 new Somali recruits were undergoing military training at the Dolow facility. At the training facility, the new recruits received the necessary individual combat equipment and uniforms. Following their training, the recruits, using 4x4 vehicles and under the command of the Ethiopian military, were tasked with conducting patrol activities in the Gedo region.

**Ethiopian support for Puntland**

68. On 8 August 2006 a delegation from Puntland led by Puntland’s Minister of Interior, Mohamed Ahmed Warsame “Seefta Banaanka”, travelled to Werder town, zone 5, Ethiopia, for meetings with an Ethiopian general. The delegation, which included the commander of Puntland Darawiish forces, briefed the Ethiopian
general on the threats anticipated from the Islamic military forces in their advance towards Puntland. The general responded by ordering arms shipments to be given to the Puntland forces. The arms consisted of 800 AK-47 assault rifles, 120 PKM machine guns, 24 boxes of ammunition and an unknown number of boxes of landmines and hand grenades.

69. In zone 5, Ethiopia, the arms were transferred from two Ethiopian military trucks to two trucks belonging to the Puntland delegation. The trucks travelled through zone 5 to the border with Somalia, where they were joined by 80 armed escorts for the overland journey to Galkayo, Mudug region (central Somalia).

70. A team of three senior Ethiopian military officers, under the leadership of a colonel, accompanied the Puntland delegation back to Somalia. The team’s mission was to conduct fact-finding relative to the threat posed to Puntland by the Islamic military forces.

71. On 7 August 2006 a commercial aircraft containing an arms shipment from Ethiopia arrived in Garowe (capital of Puntland). The shipment consisted, among other arms, primarily of LAWs and ammunition. The transport cost for the aircraft was shared by the Ethiopian Government and President Yusuf (TFG).

72. On 10 August 2006 an aircraft from Ethiopia containing a shipment of arms arrived in Galkayo. The shipment consisted of LAWs and ammunition for the AK-47, PKM and RPG.

73. On 3 September 2006 Puntland “President” Mohamud Muse Hersi (Adde-Muse) confirmed that 300 troops of the Ethiopian Armed Forces were staying in Galkayo, and further stated that they would be training Puntland militia forces.

74. “President” Muse, Ethiopian officials and Qeybdiid had earlier held a meeting in Garowe, Puntland, to discuss the specifics of mutual defence assistance for the purpose of halting the advance of ICU on Galkayo and Puntland. Ethiopia agreed to provide weapons, ammunition, uniforms, medicines, food, transport, military training, troops, command and control, and planning assistance.

75. Following the meeting of 3 September 2006, Ethiopia provided the following support: training for a total of 1,500 personnel representing a combination of militias from Puntland and Qeybdiid, 3,000 fully equipped Ethiopian combat troops, eight troop-transport trucks, 12 4x4 pickup trucks, five land cruisers and four tanker trucks; and the following arms: AK-47 assault rifles — 400 units and 15 boxes of ammunition; RPG 2 and 7 — 60 units and 140 pieces of ammunition; PKM machine guns — 90 units and 20 boxes of ammunition; landmines — 340 units; and anti-personnel mines — 180 units.

76. Further, on 2 October 2006 “President” Muse told the Chairman of the Monitoring Group during a telephone conversation that Ethiopian military personnel were present in Puntland. He specifically mentioned that 32 military advisers were, at the time of the conversation, located in Galkayo (Mudug region) and providing training to “President” Muse’s militias. He added that the Ethiopian training, which he acknowledged would end in two weeks, was being provided to his militias to strengthen their capacity to halt the infiltration of Ethiopian rebels from Somalia into Ethiopia.
77. The Monitoring Group has learned that Somaliland authorities expressed serious concern over Ethiopian military support for Puntland, fearing that Puntland may use it against them in their long-standing border dispute.

**Ethiopian support for Somali clans**

78. On 17 July 2006 Ethiopian military units under the command of Captain Hassey Aliow crossed the border with Somalia in the Beletweyne District, Hiraan region. The Ethiopians conducted meetings with Somali elders and militia chiefs of the Baadi’ade and Ujejeen clans for the purpose of gathering intelligence regarding the activities of ICU in the Hiraan region. The Ethiopian military also distributed an arms shipment to the clans, consisting of 100 anti-tank landmines and 400 AK-47 assault rifles. Adan Jimaale Garas, also known as Adan Geri, of the Ujejeen clan accepted the weapons on behalf of both clans.

79. On 24 August 2006 Ethiopian units arrived in Jawiil, Hiraan region, and met community elders and security officials from the Ujejeen and Galje’el sub-clans of the Hawiye. They discussed security cooperation, and in particular monitoring of the activities of ICU, and gave them 200 AK-47 assault rifles.

80. On 29 August 2006 607 assorted units of weapons (400 AK-47 rifles, 200 PKM and 7 RPG) and communication equipment from Ethiopia were delivered in Galkayo by road and distributed as follows: to the Darood/Harti/Dhulbahante sub-clan — 427 units; to the Hawiye/Habargedir/Sa’ad sub-clan — 100 units; and to the Darood/Leelkase sub-clan — 80 units. The allocation to the Dhulbahante sub-clan was transported by truck to Lasanood on 30 August 2006.

81. On 30 August 2006 Ethiopian military units arrived, with Mr. Donyaale of the Reer-Dalal sub-clan of the Marehan, in the border town of Balanbale, Galgaduud region. They met a few selected individuals and later handed over the following weapons to the Marehan in order to establish security forces and cooperate with them: 5 PKM, 5 RPG, 230 AK-47 assault rifles and 1,000 hand grenades (F1).

**Ethiopian support for Somali warlords — former members of the opposition alliance**

82. On 24 May 2006 the Ethiopian military sent a large consignment of ammunition, including small-arms ammunition, to former Jowhar warlord Mohamed Dheere, via the then-Governor of Hiraan region, Yusuf Dabageed. The shipment was transported on five trucks and, once received by Mohamed Dheere, was, in part, distributed to some former members of the opposition alliance/counter-terrorism alliance in Mogadishu.

83. On 24 May 2006 part of a consignment of ammunition was sent to Mohamed Dheere by the Ethiopians and forwarded through Yusuf Dabageed. The ammunition had been bought with funding by ICU through Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye, former warlord Musse Suudi’s men in Bal’ad. Those two men were paid $20,000 and $40,000, respectively, for their services to ICU.

84. The shipment of ammunition had been transported on five trucks and distributed to former members of the opposition alliance/counter-terrorism alliance, including Mohamed Dheere. Maalim Farah and Gudbaaye persuaded Dheere’s militia commander to sell them 12 metric tons of light-weapons ammunition. Dheere’s militia commander later disappeared and switched sides.
85. Beginning in approximately July 2006 and continuing to mid-October 2006 (the time of completion of the present report), the Ethiopian Government provided certain former Somali warlords, members of the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance, with the following military assistance:

(a) Mohamed Dheere, former Governor of Middle Shabelle, with its capital in Jowhar, received a quantity of AK-47 assault rifles and ammunition and eight 4x4 vehicles to be used as technicals;

(b) Mohamed Qanyare, warlord and former TFG Minister, received 90 AK-47 assault rifles and 20 boxes of ammunition, 30 PKM machine guns and 35 boxes of ammunition, RPG-2 and a total of 140 units of ammunition for RPG-2 and RPG-7, 80 rifle-fired grenades and 200 landmines;

(c) Abdi Qeybdiid, former warlord and police boss of Mogadishu, held talks with Ethiopian military in Goday (zone 5), Ethiopia, and following the talks received arms, uniforms, trucks and Ethiopian troops to accompany him back to the Galkayo area, Mudug region, central Somalia. The items included AK-47 assault rifles, pistols, PKM machine guns, RPG-2 and RPG-7, a variety of ammunition, hand grenades, military tents and radio communication equipment. These items were transported in two trucks, while five trucks were used to transport Ethiopian troops.

86. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 15 September 2006 to the Government of Ethiopia and a letter dated 18 September 2006 to Mudan Airlines notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses. The Monitoring Group received a reply from the Government of Ethiopia (annex X), dated 9 October 2006. The Government of Ethiopia indicated, effectively, that the allegations contained in the Monitoring Group’s letter were “without basis” and that the letter contained “manifestly erroneous information”. However, on the other hand, the Government of Ethiopia acknowledged in its letter that “CCIC [Consultative Council of Islamic Courts] has continued to import all types of sophisticated arms from outside the region, and also has been receiving fighters from areas proximate to our region in great numbers.” It is interesting to note that this latter information is fundamentally consistent with information contained in the present report of the Monitoring Group. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines by the time of the submission of the present report.

Islamic Republic of Iran

87. The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided at least three separate consignments of arms and ammunition and medical supplies and the services of three medical doctors to ICU, as set out below.

88. The Monitoring Group received information that on 25 July 2006 an aircraft containing a shipment of arms from the Islamic Republic of Iran arrived at Baledogle airport and was met by the ICU head of security affairs, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad “Indohaadde” and the Chairman of the Dayniile Islamic Court, Sheikh Hussein Janaqow. The arms shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns and M-79 grenade launchers — 1,000 units; shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles — 45 units; an unknown quantity of mines; 200 boxes of ammunition for the PKM; military uniforms; water cans; first-aid boxes — 2,500 units; and
packaged food — 600 boxes. Also on board were three Iranian doctors to provide first-aid training and other emergency medical support services to ICU. On 9 August 2006 the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply, dated 26 September 2006, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran informed the Monitoring Group that “according to the information received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there has been no transfer or shipment of any kind of weapons or military equipment from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia”. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran further informed the Monitoring Group that “no flight took place from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia on 25 July 2006, therefore the allegations raised against my country in the aforementioned letter are totally rejected” (annex XI).

89. At the time of the writing of the present report, there were two Iranians in Dhusamareeb engaged in matters linked to uranium in exchange for arms for ICU.

90. Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of ICU in exchange for the participation of the military force of ICU in Lebanon, on 14 August 2006 an aircraft from the Islamic Republic of Iran arrived at Baledogle airport containing a small shipment of arms. It also transported about 40 wounded members of the ICU military force that had fought on the side of Hizbollah (see the section on Hizbollah below).

91. In the early morning hours of 17 August 2006, a large dhow containing food commodities and arms destined for ICU arrived in El-Adde seaport, Mogadishu. Before arriving in Mogadishu, the dhow travelled from the coast of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Arab Emirates, where the food commodities were taken on board.

92. The arms portion of the shipment came from the Islamic Republic of Iran and consisted of 80 man-portable, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and rocket launchers. In addition, there were 120 sealed boxes with unknown contents, but the wording on the surface of the boxes indicated that the contents contained medical goods.

93. The dhow’s captain and his assistant were reported to be from Singapore and Bangladesh, respectively. Also reported to be on board the vessel were two engineers who were identified only as Asian and two Somali businessmen from the United Arab Emirates who were responsible for coordinating the consignments of arms and foodstuffs.

94. On 18 September 2006 the Monitoring Group also sent a general letter to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply to that letter by the time of the submission of the present report.

**Hizbollah (Lebanon)**

95. The Monitoring Group received information that the Hizbollah movement (operating in Lebanon) has provided military training to ICU and has made arrangements with other States on behalf of ICU for the latter to receive arms, as described below.
96. During mid-July 2006 ICU sent an approximately 720-person strong military force to Lebanon to fight alongside Hizbollah against the Israeli military. The Somali force was personally selected by ICU Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement) leader Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”. One of the criteria of the selection process was individuals’ combat experience, which might include experience in Afghanistan.

97. Only about 80 members of the force initially returned to Mogadishu after the fighting. Some of the returning fighters were wounded and were sent to a private hospital in Abdul-Aziz, an area in northern Mogadishu. The hospital is operated and secured by ICU. Some of the funds used to buy medicines for the wounded came from a businessman using the name Abdi Karim. The funds for ICU, totalling about $390,000, had been donated from a number of supporting countries.

98. A number of the fighters also remained in Lebanon for advanced military training by Hizbollah. Further, between 8 and 10 September 2006, about 25 Somalis returned to Somalia accompanied by five members of Hizbollah.

99. During the recruitment and selection process for the Somali force, the following financial incentives and arrangements were offered to the fighters and their families: (a) $2,000 for the families of individual fighters to use while the fighters were in Lebanon; (b) in the event that a fighter was killed, between $25,000 and $30,000 would be given to the fighter’s family; and (c) upon return to Somalia from fighting in Lebanon, a fighter would receive “hero money” of $100 per month for an unspecified length of time.

100. In exchange for the contribution of the Somali military force, Hizbollah arranged for additional support to be given to ICU by the Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, which was subsequently provided (see the sections on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic below).

101. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 27 September 2006 to the Government of Lebanon notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

**Libyan Arab Jamahiriya**

102. The Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has sent military aircraft to Somalia and has provided training, funds and at least one consignment of arms in support of ICU, as described below.

103. The Monitoring Group received information that an IL-76 aircraft using call sign LAAF (Libyan Arab Air Force) 930 and operated by the Libyan Government landed on 20 April 2004 in Mogadishu. The Monitoring Group also received information that on 6 September 2005 another IL-76 operated by the Libyan Government landed at Baledogle airport.

104. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 12 June 2006 to the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. On 8 August 2006 the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya informed the Monitoring Group as follows: “The two Libyan aircraft are air-force planes usually used for air cargo. They made two trips to Somalia, one on 20 April
2004 and the other on 14 September 2004. The purpose of both trips was to repatriate illegal aliens who had infiltrated into the country” (annex XII).

105. The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya the requested documentation with regard to the flights, such as air-cargo manifests, an airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

106. On 24 July 2006 a delegation of Libyan military officers arrived at Baledogle airport and on 26 July 2006 participated in a meeting in Mogadishu with officials from ICU and visiting Egyptian and Eritrean senior military officers at the house of the ICU Finance Chief, Abdulkadir Abukar Omar Adani. The meeting resulted in the following decisions: military training would be provided to about 3,800 fighters at the Hilweyne military barracks, located near Bal’ad town, north of Mogadishu; Egypt and Eritrea would provide instructors; facility upgrades, training costs and incentives were to be paid for by the Libyan Government; and Libyan, Eritrean and Egyptian military officers, with support from Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde, Adan Hashi “Eyrow”, Abdullahi Ali Nuur and Mukhtar Roboow “Abu Mansuur”, were to evaluate the condition and needs of the proposed training site the day following the meeting.

107. Subsequent to the meeting, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya provided $1 million to be used to organize the future training and for salaries ranging from $75 to $450, depending on rank.

108. On 23 August 2006 ICU opened the military training camp at Hilweyne and welcomed the first contingent of about 600 recruits, who are expected to undergo a period of intensive military and ideological training.

109. On 31 July 2006 a vessel from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with arms and food for ICU docked in the early morning hours at the seaport of El-Ma’an (Mogadishu area). The vessel’s cargo was given to the following officials from the Security Committee of the Supreme Council of ICU: Abdulahi Moalin Gaab “Abu-Uteyba”, Aden Hashi Farah “Eyrow”, Sheikh Mukhtar Roboow “Abu-Mansuur” and Sheikh Hassan Mukhtar (Raskambooni group). The inventory of the shipment was as follows: 12 DShK heavy machine guns; 24 RPG; 70 PKM; 350 grenade launchers for AK-47 assault rifles; an unknown quantity of ammunition for AK-47, PKM and RPG-2 and RPG-7; 2,000 spare tires of different types for technicals; 80 generators; and vegetable oil, sugar, wheat flour and dates.

110. The Monitoring Group sent a letter on 9 August 2006 to the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

111. On 27 July 2006 100 fighters from ICU were transported by aircraft to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to undergo advanced military training in small-unit tactics and use of special weapons.

112. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 19 September 2006 to the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.
Saudi Arabia

113. The Monitoring Group received information that the Government of Saudi Arabia has provided logistical support in the form of foodstuffs and medicines that were specifically intended for use by the military forces of ICU in Somalia, as follows:

114. On 11 June 2006 a C-130 aircraft, using flight call sign SVA6708, departed Jazan, Saudi Arabia, for Baledogle airport. Baledogle is an important entry point for arms for ICU. In order to obtain details concerning the cargo of that particular flight, the Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 1 September 2006 to the Government of Saudi Arabia notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply, dated 28 September 2006, the Government of Saudi Arabia explained that the flight had taken place for “medical” reasons (annex XIII).

115. The Monitoring Group wishes to note that it did not receive from the Government of Saudi Arabia the requested documentation with regard to the flight, such as air-cargo manifests, an airway bill, flight plans and names of the crew.

116. On 20 July 2006 a maritime vessel originating from Saudi Arabia and containing cargo consisting of foodstuffs and medicines for ICU arrived at the seaport of El Ma’an, north of Mogadishu. The cargo was reported to have been provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia.

117. Following a dispute between Abukar Omar Adani and Sheik Yusuf Indohaadde over the payment of port landing fees, the vessel relocated to Mogadishu seaport, where it was unloaded and the cargo delivered to ICU.

118. On 14 August 2006 seven trucks containing logistical supplies, including food and ammunition, left Mogadishu for an ICU location in the central regions of Somalia. Accompanying the convoy of trucks were 320 fighters from ICU, who were being sent to reinforce the fighters in the central regions. Sheikh Abdullahi Yare was in charge of the convoy and the fighters.

119. On 18 August 2006 and 1 September 2006 the Monitoring Group sent a total of three letters to the Government of Saudi Arabia requesting details relating to the above-mentioned information. The Monitoring Group received a letter from the Saudi Arabian Mission to the United Nations confirming receipt of the letter dated 18 August 2006, but had not received a substantive reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

Somalia

Transitional Federal Government

120. On 11 July 2006 the Monitoring Group received a copy of an e-mail message prepared by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Somalia (TFG) to the United Nations, New York, referring to new developments in Somalia. Contained in that message are references by the Deputy Permanent Representative to very reliable reports received by TFG concerning foreign forces, money and weapons having arrived in Mogadishu, as well as reports relating to the preparation of an attack by ICU. In response to the e-mail message, the Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 17 July 2006, to the Government of Somalia requesting details relating to the
information referred to above. As of the time of the submission of the present report, the Monitoring Group had still not received a reply.

121. Furthermore, at the request of the Monitoring Group, the Secretariat of the United Nations tried several times to organize a meeting between the Somali Mission to the United Nations and the Monitoring Group in early September 2006, when the Monitoring Group was in New York to give its midterm briefing. The Somali Mission did not respond to the repeated requests for meetings.

122. Finally, the Monitoring Group, within the framework of due process, sent a detailed letter, dated 21 September 2006, to the Government of Somalia notifying it of information obtained by the Monitoring Group regarding its involvement in arms embargo violations. As of the time of the submission of the present report, the Monitoring Group had not received a reply.

**Somali Islamic Courts Council**

123. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group had several discussions by telephone with Shaikh Sharif Shaikh Ahmed, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC), regarding the Council’s involvement in arms embargo violations.

124. Within the framework of due process, the Monitoring Group also sent a letter dated 20 September 2006 to SICC, addressed to Shaikh Sharif Shaikh Ahmed, reinforcing the substantive aspects of his earlier telephone conversations with the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and seeking a written reply. The Monitoring Group received a letter dated 2 October 2006 from Shaikh Sharif Shaikh Ahmed (annex XIV). In that letter, SICC dismissed the Monitoring Group’s allegations as “baseless” and “categorically” denied violations of the arms embargo. However, on the other hand, it charged, “Ethiopia is the main country that has been breaking the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia on a regular basis … Ethiopia has been openly supplying enormous quantities of sophisticated arms to the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa”.

**Syrian Arab Republic**

125. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has provided arms, ammunition and training in support of ICU, as set out below.

126. On 27 July 2006 200 fighters from ICU were transported by aircraft to the Syrian Arab Republic to undergo military training in guerrilla warfare.

127. Further to the arrangements made by Hizbollah on behalf of ICU and in exchange for the ICU military force’s participation in Lebanon (see the section on Hizbollah above), approximately between 27 August and 3 September 2006 an aircraft travelling from the Syrian Arab Republic via Eritrea arrived at Esaley airport, Mogadishu, carrying a shipment of arms for ICU. The shipment consisted of a large quantity of handguns, AK-47 assault rifles, RPG-2 and RPG-7, PKM machine guns, three surface-to-air missiles and a variety of ammunition.

128. The Monitoring Group sent a letter, dated 22 September 2006, to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. In its reply (annex XV), dated 9 October 2006, the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic effectively denied its involvement in the matter described above.

**Uganda**

129. The Monitoring Group has received information that the Government of Uganda has provided arms, ammunition and military personnel in support of TFG, as described below:

130. On the morning of 26 August 2006, TFG President Yusuf, Prime Minister Ghedi, the Chief of Staff, General Naaji, and others conducted a closed-door meeting to conclude preparations for the arrival of Ugandans at Baidoa. Following the meeting, three aircraft transporting a contingent of Uganda People’s Defence Forces military personnel and other officials of the Ugandan Government landed in Baidoa. The military personnel were armed and brought with them a variety of military materiel, including a quantity of ammunition, tents, communication equipment, a forklift and fencing material. They also brought with them the barrels of 80 anti-aircraft guns. The remaining parts of those weapons were to be airlifted from Uganda to Ethiopia and then transported by truck to Baidoa.

131. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 31 August 2006 to the Government of Uganda notifying it of the above information and seeking its response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply by the time of the submission of the present report.

**Yemen**

132. The Monitoring Group received information that approximately during the period from 9 June to 6 September 2006, 20 arms shipments were sent from the territory of Yemen to Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, as follows: 14 shipments from the Government of Yemen — 13 to TFG and 1 to the Puntland administration; and 6 shipments from the trading networks — 5 to ICU and 1 to the Puntland administration. The details of the arms shipments are set out below.

*Government of Yemen support for the Transitional Federal Government*

133. Between 9 June and 24 July 2006, Mudan Airlines transported a total of 12 arms shipments from Bossaso (Puntland) to TFG President Yusuf in Baidoa. The arms shipments originated in Yemen and were flown to Bossaso by Government of Yemen military aircraft.

134. The 12 shipments were delivered to Baidoa as follows: on 9 and 16 June — one shipment each day; and on 10, 11, 12, 14 and 24 June — two shipments each day. The shipments variously consisted of large quantities of ammunition for the AK-47 assault rifle, RPG, PKM machine gun, M-79 grenade launcher and portable jeep gun; and large numbers of weapons including one or more of the following: ZPU heavy machine gun, ZP-39 and ZU-23 anti-aircraft gun, M-40 recoilless rifle (anti-tank), M-79 grenade launcher, SG-43 heavy machine gun, RPG-2 and RPG-7, AK-47 assault rifle, PKM machine gun and pistol.

135. On 27 July 2006 four dhows containing arms and military uniforms destined for TFG President Yusuf arrived in Bossaso. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by President Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. President Yusuf sent an envoy to receive the goods on his behalf due to the deteriorating political and
security situation in Baidoa. The shipment consisted of the following: PKM machine guns — 250 units per dhow, for a total of 1,000 units; RPG ammunition — 200 units per dhow, for a total of 800 units; and military uniforms — 3,500 units, total.

**Government of Yemen support for the Puntland administration**

136. On 4 August 2006 four dhows containing arms for the Puntland authorities arrived in the seaport of Bossaso. Transportation costs for the shipments were shared by TFG President Yusuf and the Government of Yemen. The arms consisted of PKM machine guns, AK-47 assault rifles, RPG and a variety of ammunition.

137. On 2 October 2006, “President” Muse told the Chairman of the Monitoring Group during a telephone conversation that Puntland had not received military support (during the current mandate) from Yemen.

**Yemeni arms-trading networks**

138. Yemeni arms-trading networks continue to be active and have been sending large shipments of arms to Somalia on a regular basis. Early in the mandate, when ICU was fighting against the opposition alliance, also commonly known as the counter-terrorism alliance, in Mogadishu, the trading networks were shipping arms to both sides. In the case of the counter-terrorism alliance, the traders sent the arms to the Bakarasha Arms Market (BAM), where the alliance made large and regular purchases. On the other hand, the traders shipped the arms directly to ICU. Following the defeat of the counter-terrorism alliance, the networks began to ship arms almost exclusively and directly to ICU, avoiding BAM. Subsequently, the arms traders also sent arms to the Puntland administration. Below are examples of direct arms shipments to ICU and the Puntland administration.

**Shipments to the Islamic Courts Union**

139. On 10 and 13 June 2006 two shipments of arms, each transported by dhow, arrived in the seaports of El Ma’an and Harardheere, respectively. The 10 June shipment was received by Somali financier and businessman Abukar Omar Adani at El Ma’an; the 13 June shipment was received by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys at Haradheere. Both shipments originated with the Yemeni arms-trading networks. The combined arms shipments consisted of AK-47 assault rifles — 314 units; PKM machine guns — 35 units; DShK anti-aircraft guns — 7 units; ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns — 5 units; and ammunition for all of those weapons. Fuel and medicines were also included in the shipments. The arms and other items were for ICU in Mogadishu and for distribution to other ICU strongholds in central and southern Somalia.

140. On 12 July 2006 a dhow from Yemen, using the name *Al-Soufa*, registration number XL2x60, and containing an arms shipment, arrived in the seaport of El Ma’an. The arms shipment consisted of the following: LAW — 24 units; AK-47 assault rifles — 2,500 units; RPG — 40 units; and RPG ammunition — 1,500 rounds. The consignment was received by representatives of both Abukar Omar Adani and Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys. The arms were to be provided to ICU military elements operating in the Kismaayo and Baidoa areas.

141. On 2 August 2006 a dhow belonging to a businessman from Bossaso (Puntland) and containing an arms shipment and 100 barrels of fuel from Yemen
arrived in El-Adde temporary seaport in Mogadishu. The arms consignment consisted of the following: ZU-23-1 with a seat for the gunner — 18 units; DShK — 60 units; and AK-47 assault rifles — 500 units, along with 24 boxes of AK-47 ammunition. The cargo was given to the ICU Finance Chief, Mohamud Omar Adani, for forwarding to ICU military elements operating in the Hiraan and Galgaduud regions.

142. On 12 August 2006 a dhow from Yemen using the registration XXLB, containing arms and logistical supplies destined for ICU, was seized by pirates near Harardheere, central coast of Somalia. In response to seizure, ICU conducted a military attack on the pirates in Haradheere and retrieved the dhow and its contents. The dhow contained the following cargo: RPG — 25 units; DShK — 10 units; PKM machine guns — 90 units; AK-47 assault rifles — 400 units; fuel — 42 drums; and a variety of ammunition.

**Shipment to the Puntland administration**

143. On 6 September 2006 an arms shipment arrived at Bossaso. The Puntland administration had bought weapons from local merchants in Yemen, and the weapons were subsequently transported via dhow to the seaport at Bossaso. The shipment consisted of following: AK-47 assault rifles — 600 units; DShK — 14 units; shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons — 12 units; PKM machine guns — 60 units; RPD machine guns — 20 units; RPG — 20 units; and fuel — 45 barrels.

144. The Monitoring Group sent three letters, as follows: on 1 September 2006 to the Government of Yemen, on 18 September 2006 to Mudan Airlines and on 18 September 2006 to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (where Mudan Airlines is based), notifying them of the above information and requesting a response. The Monitoring Group had not received a reply from Mudan Airlines and the Government of the United Arab Emirates by the time of the submission of the present report.

145. However, the Monitoring Group did receive a substantive reply from the Government of Yemen (annex XVI), dated 30 September 2006. Regarding Government of Yemen complicity in arms embargo violations, it denied providing “weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to” in the Monitoring Group’s letter. It also indicated its readiness to send a list of flights specifically requested by the Monitoring Group, but did not send it. In the latter regard, it also noted that “most of the flights from our country to Bossaso are transit flights”. Regarding arms-smuggling networks operating from the territory of Yemen and delivering arms to Somalia by dhow, the Government of Yemen affirmed that it is combating the admitted problem in a number of different ways, including by having recently referred the owners and men of several “boats” to the courts.

**C. Bakaraaha Arms Market**

146. Historically, the Bakaaraha Arms super-Market has been a crucial and conspicuous element in the pattern of arms flows in central and southern Somalia. Past reports of the Monitoring Group have detailed large quantities of many different types of arms routinely passing through BAM, which, among other things, contributed to the general condition of insecurity and instability in Somalia. BAM
was also a thriving commercial enterprise, with significant amounts of currency, especially United States dollars, passing from buyers to arms dealers. And, regardless of the purchaser — member of the opposition alliance or warlord, member of TFG, businessman or ICU — funds for arms purchases from BAM came from revenues generated in local administrations, by the commercial activities of businessmen and from contributions or gifts, both from States and from private sources.

147. Previous patterns of overall activity at BAM as described above have changed, however, with the final defeat of the opposition alliance — the Alliance for Peace Restoration and Combat Against Terror (APRCT) — by ICU in the first week of June 2006. Subsequently, ICU gained control over all of Mogadishu, including BAM.

148. ICU has been engaged in talks with principal arms dealers of BAM in an attempt to determine how best to regulate the activities of the market. Although the future role of BAM is uncertain, it remains in operation, but the total volume of arms transiting the market has dropped measurably. Correspondingly, prices for weapons and ammunition have also fallen.

149. In large part, the initial decline in activity at BAM can be attributed to the fact that arms dealers at the market were apprehensive about the possible reaction of ICU to previous sales to APRCT. Another reason for the change has been the direct delivery of arms by traders to the intended recipient without first going through BAM.

150. However, during the last half of the current mandate, arms sales at BAM have been on the rise. The buyers making the most significant purchases at the time of the writing of the present report are some former Mogadishu-based warlords and sharia courts. Different sharia courts continue to buy arms at the market. The courts that are purchasing the arms are reportedly in a friendly competition with one another to see which court can accrue the most lethal and otherwise impressive inventory of arms.

151. The Somali warlords, members of the former Mogadishu-based opposition alliance, are buying increasing numbers of arms and are working through relatives to arrange for clandestine purchases of large-calibre weapons from BAM arms traders. The large-calibre weapons are for mounting on technicals belonging to the warlords. These types of weapons are not normally supplied by Ethiopia to its Somali allies and therefore must be obtained elsewhere.

152. Typically, the warlords’ relatives negotiate with the arms dealers on prices and delivery of the weapons. Once purchased, the weapons are dismantled and the pieces are hidden in trucks that transport food or clothing. The arms are subsequently delivered to the warlords or their agents. The arms transactions are kept secret to avoid discovery by ICU.

153. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the arms experts of the Monitoring Group have gathered details concerning some deliveries of arms to BAM and subsequent purchases (annex XVII).  

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1 Due to document-processing deadlines, the transactions indicated in annex I are current only up to 20 September 2006. However, the Monitoring Group will continue to update information concerning BAM transactions and present additional information, if available, to the Committee.
D. The case of Air Tomisko

154. The Monitoring Group received information that on 2 August 2006 an IL-76 aircraft — registration number YU-AMJ, using call sign TOH607 — operated by Air Tomisko landed at Mogadishu International Airport. The aircraft had departed from Salalah, Oman. Mogadishu International Airport is under the control of ICU, which is in the process of being resupplied with arms and military materiel following its takeover of Mogadishu and its environs.

155. The Monitoring Group sent a total of three letters, dated 18 August 2006, to the airline company Air Tomisko and to the Government of Serbia, where Air Tomisko is based, and the Government of Oman, notifying them of the above information and seeking their responses.

156. The Monitoring Group received a reply from Air Tomisko, dated 30 August 2006, and the Government of Serbia, dated 15 September 2006. Documentation provided by Air Tomisko, including a cargo manifest dated 1 August 2006 (annex XVIII), indicates that the aircraft was transporting bulk cargo consisting primarily of garments and shoes. The Government of Serbia, in its reply, simply reaffirmed the Air Tomisko reply.

157. However, in contradiction of the above-mentioned replies, the Government of Oman, in its reply (annex XIX), dated 25 September 2006, informed the Monitoring Group that the aircraft in question had “repatriated Somalis apprehended while illegally entering Oman”. The Monitoring Group continues its investigations.

E. The case of Global Aviation and Services Group

158. The Monitoring Group received information that on or about 27 September 2006 an IL-76 aircraft — registration number 5A-DQA, using call sign GAK-114/115 — operated by Global Aviation, based in Tripoli, landed at Baidoa. The aircraft had departed from Kufra, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Transported on the aircraft were two bullet-proof vehicles for President Yusuf, and the passengers on the aircraft included senior officers of the Ugandan military.

159. The Monitoring Group sent a letter dated 5 October 2006 to the Managing Director of Global Aviation notifying him of the above information and seeking his response. The Monitoring Group received a reply from Global Aviation, dated 12 October 2006, which included a copy of two different airway bills. However, the reply did not include other important documentation and information requested by the Monitoring Group. As a result, the investigation continues.

III. Finances

A. Introduction

160. As ICU expands politically, militarily and geographically, it is giving great attention to organizing and managing its economic and financial resources. Serious effort is being directed to traditional and other sources of revenue, including: (a) local administrations (checkpoints, seaports, airports); (b) financial support from the business community — a strategic financial alliance between ICU and most of
the Somali business community in an effort to boost key main sectors of the Somali economy, thereby obtaining more revenue; and (c) increasing contributions from inside Somalia and foreign countries. By contrast, TFG does not seem to have an applicable financial plan, has little in terms of available funds and lacks a system to obtain revenue. It depends, for the most part, on the financial support of foreign countries. The purpose of the present section is to approach these topics in more detail, since they involve sources of revenue that both sides depend upon to finance their activities in violation of the arms embargo.

B. Local administrations: changes in the revenue-generating infrastructure

161. In southern and central Somalia, key generators of revenue have changed hands, from the former warlords to ICU. After gaining overall control of Mogadishu in June 2006, ICU started to reorganize and create a self-sufficient revenue system to make its administration viable. At the moment, the most evident elements of this process include a partial removal of checkpoints in Mogadishu and the refurbishing of the infrastructure of long-unused key public assets, such as the Mogadishu seaport and airport, and ICU has instituted a programme of taxation.

Revenues from checkpoints and small businesses

162. For example, ICU removed three checkpoints in the Mogadishu area whose revenues represented cash flows to the former warlords in excess of $1 million annually. The checkpoints were in the Bakahaara, Madina and Sinai districts of the city. Numerous other checkpoints that represented revenues collected on behalf of warlords, exceeding several million dollars annually, were also dismantled. At this point, there has not been a replacement for those revenues, and efforts towards finding alternate funds that in the past allowed the regular maintenance of militias are ongoing. However, an apparent immediate consequence of the removal of checkpoints was in some cases a reduction of up to 50 per cent in the delivery costs for goods and commodities, which ultimately will benefit the business community and, by extension, ICU.

163. In other cities now under the control of ICU, the settlement and establishment of a revenue structure has faced difficulties. For instance, in the city of Jowhar (see S/2005/625), ICU met resistance from small businesses when they were required to pay fees additional to those they were already paying to the ousted administration. There, unlike what happened with checkpoints in Mogadishu, ICU decided to keep checkpoints on the outskirts of Jowhar. In summary, revenues from small businesses account for $655,000 a year, while at entry points to the city of Jowhar revenues collected are in the order of $1.3 million a year (annex XX).

164. In the local administration of Lower Shabelle, traditionally under the control of Sheik Yusuf Mohamed “Indohaadde”, who on 30 September 2006 handed over control of the region to ICU, checkpoints are also still in position. Such is the case at the place called “Laanta Buuro”, where revenues averaging $3.9 million annually were collected. In this local administration, checkpoints continue to be a source of immediate revenue for the maintenance of ICU.

165. Thus, in every local administration now under the control of ICU, conditions relating to the removal or maintenance of checkpoints are different. ICU is required
to discuss the topic with clan leaders and/or members of its own organization. It is clear that ICU is in the process of implementing a plan to secure sustainable sources of revenue in each local administration, but taking into consideration the differences in the political and economic dynamics of each of them.

**Mogadishu seaport and airport**

166. ICU is rapidly taking control of the most important airports and seaports in southern and central Somalia, including along the central coastal portion of the country (Hobyo, Harardheere), airstrips located in the greater Mogadishu area (K-50 and Dayniile)\(^2\) and, most recently, on 24 September 2006, the key seaport and airport of the City of Kismaayo.\(^3\) Mogadishu airport and seaport represent both the actual and the symbolic power of the Somali economy.

167. The ICU authorities consider Mogadishu seaport and airport public assets and therefore have agreed to form an organization to take care of them, operating sort of a national seaport and airport authority. In the case of the Mogadishu seaport, they have initially entrusted its operation to the consortium of business cartels running El Ma'an seaport. (S/2006/229). Since the opening of the Mogadishu seaport in August 2006, the neighbouring seaport of El Ma’an has closed.

168. The ICU has appointed experienced businessmen as managers of the Mogadishu seaport and airport. An example of this approach by ICU is reflected in the strategic finance alliance between ICU and Abdulkadir Abukar Omar, its head of finance, who is also a successful private businessman and partner in one of the Mogadishu-based cartels (annex XXI).

**Seaport**

169. The reopening of the Mogadishu seaport was essential for the strategic finance alliance between ICU and businessmen for the purpose of increasing the volume of import and export operations while lowering operational costs, thereby generating more revenue. The Mogadishu seaport offers more opportunity for revenue generation than El Ma’an due to its ability to operate year round and its port infrastructure.

170. With regard to taxes collected, the Monitoring Group has obtained information indicating that, effective 29 July 2006, ICU and Mogadishu-based business cartels have agreed to certain taxation rates for the seaport that include fees for commodities, labour and transportation. Taxes on goods and commodities are mostly levied by weight (kilograms and tons), volume and type of goods (energy generators, vehicles, timber, mattresses and others) (annex XX).

171. Although it is still too early to establish yearly income amounts, Mogadishu seaport has the potential to produce significantly more revenue than did El Ma’an. To give an indication of the future revenues that may be generated at Mogadishu seaport, figure I shows that during 2003 and 2004 El Ma’an seaport earned $22.5 million and $30 million, respectively, easily surpassing the revenues earned at the other main Somalia seaports. Once fully operational, the Mogadishu seaport may become one of the main revenue generators for the strategic financial alliance

\(^2\) Those facilities generate revenues of $1.4 and $1.5 million a year (see S/2006/229).

\(^3\) See S/2005/625. It is worth noting that on average the seaport produced revenues of about $1.4 million per month, while the airport generated $58,000 per month during the same period.
between ICU and businessmen, as it used to be for the central Government that collapsed in the year 1991.

Figure I

![Revenues generated at the four main Somali seaports during 2003 and 2004](image)

*a Unofficial data.

**Airport**

172. After being closed for about 11 years, the Mogadishu airport was reopened by ICU, effective 15 July 2006. As general manager, ICU has appointed a businessman who holds shares in two of the most important Somali airlines and is also a member of the Somalia Union of Traders.

173. Fees are levied on entering and exiting passengers at a rate of $20 each and for inbound and outbound cargo (especially seafood), handling, security and landing. It has recently been reported that the airport produces monthly revenues averaging $550,500 and has the potential to generate $6.6 million annually (annex XXII).

**C. The Islamic Courts Union and the business community**

174. ICU has made a strategic financial alliance with the great majority of large businesses in Somalia, an alliance that benefits both sides, as described below.

175. The alliance benefits ICU in that (a) it is not a product of improvisation, but neither a deliberate and well-planned alliance; and (b) ICU heavily relies on the know-how of the businessmen, because it wants the businesses to effectively create a highly profitable business environment with wide-ranging and essential infrastructure in key economic sectors; it also wants to promote an environment that supports a strong future relationship between ICU and the business community.

176. The alliance benefits businessmen in that (a) generally, the restoration of law and order is good for business; (b) operational costs are reduced by up to 50 per cent by the removal of checkpoints; (c) an increase in the overall volume of imports equals more profit; and (d) a larger area where humanitarian relief goods are distributed means an increase in private-business profits.
Business structures

177. Considering the importance of the alliance described above, the Monitoring Group now has a better understanding of an increasingly important aspect of financial support for ICU. The Monitoring Group further investigated the organization of the most prominent part of the Somali business community, whose core is composed of approximately 20 experienced businessmen with highly profitable businesses. Their businesses are interrelated and have operations that cover virtually the whole country. The Monitoring Group’s concept of referring to the Somali business community as “business cartels” remains more valid than ever (see S/2006/229).

178. The Monitoring Group is now aware of 11 business cartels (versus 3 reported in S/2006/229) that involve a total of 60 companies, all related to five economic sectors, as shown in figure II. Each business cartel has a number of companies in each of the five economic sectors, with one company for each cartel being managerially and financially stronger than its sister companies. The role of the stronger company in each cartel is to provide leadership and direction to its sister companies in their overall business operations.

Figure II
Business community and main Somali economic sectors

179. The trade sector includes revenues from imports, exports and the operation of seaports and airports. The remittance sector, as mentioned in previous reports, is estimated to have a volume of operations of about $800 million to $1 billion a year. With respect to the telecommunication sector, it is worth mentioning that in Mogadishu there are approximately 25,000 land lines, served by only three companies that charge from $0.10 to $0.30 per minute. The transport and fuel sector obtains revenues from maritime, air and ground transportation, logistics, cargo handling and warehousing, and by supplying the fuel necessary to carry out these operations. The construction sector derives revenues from construction work, mostly required by international organizations.

180. In sum, at the moment ICU seems to have a broad mosaic of economic sectors headed by businessmen ready to provide the necessary financial support.
**Effects on the trade and remittance sectors**

181. The overall expansion of ICU has created a mutually beneficial relationship with the trade and remittance sectors. Expansion in these sectors generates revenues that benefit ICU military expansion, and military expansion benefits the trade and remittance sectors. Examples of this relationship are described below.

**Increased trade**

182. Comparing items imported through El Ma’an seaport from January to June 2005 with those imported in the same period in 2006 shows an increase in the imports of some important goods in Somalia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1st half 2005</th>
<th>1st half 2006</th>
<th>Increase (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>487 units</td>
<td>1 025 units</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>16 067 metric tons</td>
<td>31 685 metric tons</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking oil</td>
<td>297 634 litres</td>
<td>491 392 litres</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>60 717 metric tons</td>
<td>80 507 metric tons</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unofficial data.

183. Since the beginning of 2006, and especially since the takeover by ICU, there has been a steady increase in trade. Somali businessmen inside and outside the country are keener to make more business deals, taking advantage of reduced costs and improved security conditions in Mogadishu, which also contribute to minimizing risks and enhancing profits. Given time, more businesses and greater profits will generate more revenue for ICU.

**Remittance sector**

184. During the present mandate, the remittance sector has seen an increase in the funds transiting the system. In particular, the Monitoring Group believes that some remittance businesses have been actively funnelling money used by both TFG and ICU to commit arms embargo violations. The following three cases are illustrative.

185. **Case 1.** On or about 4 July 2006, a prominent leader of ICU, Sheik Ali Warsame — former chairman of Al Itihaad Al Islaami — sent $250,000 to a businessman in Mogadishu through a remittance business. The money was later handed over to the leadership of ICU in that city. The origin of the funds was a businessman in Saudi Arabia. Initially, the money was sent to a remittance branch in Somaliland and from there resent to its final recipient in Mogadishu, all in an effort to conceal the source of the funds.

186. **Case 2.** On or about 10 July 2006, TFG leaders attempted to send cash in the amount of $100,000 and ammunition to a warlord who at the time was engaged in a fight against ICU militia for the control of an area in Mogadishu. The money was concealed and transported in two trucks carrying vegetables. However it was intercepted by members of ICU at a roadblock in Afgooye, a town near Mogadishu. The original transfer of the funds was made by another well-known Somali remittance business.
187. ***Case 3: tremors in the remittance sector.*** During May 2006 one of the leading Somali remittances companies, Dalsan International, went bankrupt. Dalsan’s co-founder and chairman was Mohamed Sheikh Osman, former spokesman of Al Itihad. The brother of Adan Hashi Farah “Eyrow”, ICU leader of Hizbul Shabaab (Youth Movement), was also part of the management of Dalsan. No official explanation for the bankruptcy has been put forth, and at the time of the bankruptcy about $10 million disappeared from Dalsan’s accounts.

188. Dalsan was among the top five companies in the Somali remittance sector, which shared 75 per cent of the market. Its business operations involved more than 100 agents in 30 countries, and it executed remittances worth more than $150 million a year. It had estimated capital of $8 million, with licensed branches in the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Arab Emirates, among other places. Some Dalsan staff members commented that the reason for the bankruptcy was that branches of the company were lending money without recording the transactions, making it almost impossible to recover the moneys lent.

189. However, according to Monitoring Group sources, one of the reasons for the bankruptcy was that an ICU military leader managed to divert a large amount of money to help support the organization financially in its fight for the control of Mogadishu during the June 2006 confrontation with the counter-terrorism alliance.

190. Additional information obtained by the Monitoring Group during the current mandate indicates that another Somali money-remittance business may have filled the void left by Dalsan. A number of business representatives of Dalsan have moved their operations to the new company. Sources have indicated that ICU also uses this business for its financial transactions.

### D. Greater financial support from inside Somalia and abroad

191. Since the expansion of ICU, information indicates that increasing amounts of money are flowing to support its operations. The funds have their origins both outside and inside Somalia. Reports indicate that individual contributions from inside the country in amounts of as much as $170,000, $250,000 and $600,000 have been sent from Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu, respectively.

**Funds from abroad**

192. According to information obtained by the Monitoring Group, ICU requested wealthy Somali diaspora members to add an extra amount of money in each remittance, ranging from 5 to 10 per cent of the total amount being sent. The explanation given was that funds were needed in order to maintain security and stability in the areas now under its control.

193. The potential for ICU to add more funds to its expanding financial capability may be considerable, amounting to several million dollars a year. For example, during recent months, fund-raising by the Somali diaspora has resulted in donations, via the Hawala system, of an estimated $1.1 million from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and an estimated $300,000 from the Somali communities in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland.
194. However, a small number of Somali companies may have been forced to make contributions to ICU. Information obtained by the Monitoring Group suggests that, for example, three large money-remittance businesses made donations in the form of military hardware to ICU. However, they represent only a small fraction of the overall business community, being 3 out of a total of about 60 large businesses, the remainder of which willingly support ICU.

195. Other examples of significant externally derived funds can be noted in connection with Sheikh Indohaaddhe, who, on or about 15 July 2006 collected about $5 million of an available $11 million reportedly originating from zakat\(^4\) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The funds were also reported to have been transferred to ICU in Mogadishu. In addition, the Monitoring Group has learned that $2 million was reported to have been sent from the Islamic Republic of Iran to ICU in Mogadishu in August 2006 along with a consignment of military cargo transported on-board an IL-76 aircraft.

E. Funds for the Transitional Federal Government

196. The investigation of the Monitoring Group shows that, by contrast, TFG has little in terms of funds available from inside the country, relying almost completely on foreign contributions. Most of its internally generated revenues originate from the operations of the Bossaso seaport, in Puntland. The seaport generated annual revenues of approximately $9 million and $12 million in 2003 and 2004, respectively. While current dollar figures are not readily available, it is safe to say that several million dollars — not much in comparison with the funds available to ICU — is likely available to TFG to make purchases of arms and other military necessities.

A case of money-printing

197. Since October 2005, the Monitoring Group has been investigating a case in which a large amount of counterfeited Somali shillings was seized from the son-in-law of TFG President Yusuf by the customs authorities in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The intended recipient of the shipment was TFG. In order to obtain additional information, letters were sent in December 2005 to Dubai customs, but no reply has been received. Subsequently, in July 2006, the Monitoring Group learned that after facing trial, the son-in-law, who had been arrested for attempting to move 150 billion Somali shillings (about $10.2 million) via Dubai, was exonerated of having the intention to circulate the currency in the United Arab Emirates, and the money was released. TFG officials have indicated that the money was not counterfeit and that TFG had requested a company in Indonesia to print it. It is likely that the money was finally delivered to TFG.

IV. Transport

198. As has been noted in abundant detail in section II above, both States and arms-trading networks have been relying on all manner of transport — motorized road vehicles, maritime vessels and aircraft — to deliver their cargo of arms, military

\(^4\) Zakat is the practice of spending a fixed portion of one’s wealth for the needy.
materiel, combat troops and other forms of support to both TFG and ICU. Large aircraft and dhows have been arriving at seaports and airports on a virtually continuous basis and at an exceptionally high rate that has not been seen by the Monitoring Group during past mandates. During the current reporting period, approximately 26 maritime vessels, including dhows, have landed at Somali seaports. The vessels have used ports located along most of the coastline of Somalia, from Puntland in the north to Lower Juba in the south. Similarly, approximately 52 aircraft have arrived at different airfields and airports located throughout most of Somalia. The combined total of dhows and aircraft arrivals comes to 78 in a period of about five months. The Monitoring Group believes that this figure represents only a portion of the total that have actually come into Somalia, the exact numbers being unknown.

199. Moreover, it is worth mentioning in general that the process involving the transport of arms, military materiel, combat troops and other forms of support from point of origin to Somalia has, as a rule, been deliberately made clandestine in an attempt by the numerous suppliers to avoid discovery by unwanted parties — including the Monitoring Group. Of particular interest are the air transport cases of Eriko Enterprise, Asmara, and the B-707 of Euro Oceanic Air Transport, Ltd, (see section II above). In those cases, the Monitoring Group has observed that the parties involved in the transport process took additional clandestine measures, including adding layers of commercial participants between the source of the cargo and the eventual recipients. They also filed false and deceptive flight information, including incorrect destinations. Finally, as an added ruse, while in flight the aircraft operators avoided making any contacts with regional air traffic controllers.

V. Analysis of trends and patterns

A. The Islamic Courts Union as the pre-eminent military force in Somalia

200. The strongly sustained trend towards total military, economic and political dominance by ICU (referred to as the militant Islamic fundamentalists in the Monitoring Group’s previous reports) in central and southern Somalia continues. It is currently the most powerful force in Somalia and the single most immediate threat to the existence of TFG. And, while TFG has received large quantities of arms and military materiel, ICU has been the recipient of larger quantities and more diverse and sophisticated types of arms. It has also received large amounts of military materiel and financial support.

201. In its rise to pre-eminence, ICU neutralized or subdued other major powerful elements in central and southern Somalia, including the Mogadishu-based opposition alliance, the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), based at Kismaayo, and maritime pirates.

202. The spreading control of ICU over the southern and central parts of Somalia has had a severe dampening effect on the activities of maritime piracy in the waters off the Somali coast. After declaring piracy illegal, ICU took over Harardheere (central coast), which has been the pivotal area for the main group of Somali pirates — the Somali Marines, also referred to as the Defenders of Somali Territorial Waters — which had been the principal threat to maritime shipping in
Somali coastal waters. Since the elimination of that pirate group, there have been no acts of piracy along the central and southern coastal area.

203. Although not monolithic, ICU may nevertheless be characterized as follows: it is focused, and has the drive and will to pursue its aims; it is proactive; it has a master plan, and strategies for accomplishing its plan that are substantially supported and guided by elements outside Somalia; it is operationally and tactically guided and directed with the help of outsiders; it has organization, cohesion — notwithstanding internal disagreements — and discipline; and, importantly, it has the means.

204. The means effectively consist of overall military capability, including an increasingly organized military-style force, as opposed to the loose patchwork of autonomous and independently operating militias prevalent during the warlord era; military command and control; military advice, direction and guidance; diverse forms of military training; arms and the military materiel and logistics necessary to support military operations; and financial and economic strength, both self-generated, through large and affiliated business operations, and from gifts and donations from outside Somalia. ICU also relies to a very considerable extent on State support, including from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic, to maintain its military capability. In sum, its objective successes are as much a clear manifestation of the combined effect of all of these characteristics as a demonstration of its intent.

205. In an effort to consolidate and strengthen its hold on newly obtained areas of central and southern Somalia, ICU has been refining its internal organizations and structures to meet the challenges of its rise to power. It has established command and control centres (covering political, economic and military operations) in different geographical areas under its control, including Marka (Lower Shabelle region) and Guriel (near Dhusamareeb, Galgaduud region), in addition to Mogadishu. It has also deployed units of its military force to those areas, while also distributing the necessary armaments to the units to allow them to maintain military superiority.

206. ICU has established numerous military training facilities throughout central and southern Somalia and has been actively recruiting new Somali militia members. Foreign volunteers (fighters) have also been arriving in considerable numbers to give added military strength to ICU. An unknown number of the volunteers, but believed by the Monitoring Group to be significant, have combat experience gained from participation in wars and hostile conflicts and actions in the Middle East and Asia. Volunteers with this type of experience add the all-important aspect of reality to military training and combat, and greater insight to the leadership of ICU.

207. ICU military training includes instruction in conventional military tactics. But, importantly, foreign volunteers also provide training in guerrilla warfare and special topics or techniques, including the making of bombs and their use against different targets, such as different types of transport and buildings. Other techniques include kidnapping and the conduct of assassination by ambush and sniping. It is the view of the Monitoring Group that ICU is fully capable of turning Somalia into an Iraq-type situation, replete with roadside and suicide bombers, assassinations and other forms of terrorist and insurgent-type activities.
208. In sum, it is the view of the Monitoring Group that the very core of ICU strength and its ability to maintain its position of dominance comes from outside Somalia. The know-how, arms, military materiel and financial support come chiefly from outside Somalia and are essentially arms embargo violations. Without these forms of support, ICU would have the will, but not the means. However, as of the writing of the present report, means continue to flow to ICU.

209. Further, it is the view of the Monitoring Group that ICU is well prepared, in all essential military aspects, as outlined above, to wage a violent, widespread and protracted conflict in defence of its gains in Somalia. As an example, on Sunday, 24 September 2006, ICU took control of the JVA stronghold of Kismaayo and its environs. The JVA stronghold was under the long-term leadership of warlord Colonel Bare Hiraale, who had also been named to the post of Minister of Defence of TFG.

210. The takeover of Kismaayo by ICU, under the command of Sheik Hassan Turki, came as little surprise to the arms experts of the Monitoring Group, who had previously learned that ICU wanted to control Kismaayo in order to deny its use as a possible forward base and logistical hub for any attempted deployment of a foreign peacekeeping force to Somalia. The ICU military forces that took control of Kismaayo consisted of a coalition of troops from the sharia courts, Eritrea, ONLF and OLF.

B. State support and military build-up

211. The overall military strength and power of TFG is diminutive when compared with that of ICU. Nonetheless, TFG is also supported with arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel in violation of the arms embargo. And, similar to the case of ICU, the very essence of TFG military support — the means — comes from outside Somalia. Both sides are overwhelmingly reliant on States for support, but also, to a lesser degree, on powerful individuals and groups in the territories of those same States and elsewhere. As TFG and ICU are the principal contenders for the ultimate control of political power in Somalia, each with its own dedicated State supporters, the result is a deliberate, aggressive and, by Somali standards, large military build-up on both sides. The support received from outside Somalia is, de facto, life-sustaining for TFG and ICU, and all in violation of the arms embargo.

212. Of particular concern, as a case in point, is the most crucial aspect of State support for the military build-up: armaments. It is indicated from an analysis of all information obtained by the Monitoring Group during the current mandate that arms embargo violations involving arms, per se, have been rampant. In particular, for example, as detailed in section II above, in addition to the sheer numbers of arms involved in the violations, the different and new types of arms brought into Somalia represent a dangerous escalation in the level of sophistication of weaponry, adding a new and more deadly dimension to the arms inventory in Somalia. ICU has been the recipient of the new types of arms. As also mentioned in section II, most prominent among the new weapons are the man-portable surface-to-air missiles such as the Strela-2 and 2M, also known as the SA-7a and 7b “Grail”, and the SA-6 “Gainful” low-to-medium altitude missile. Other new types of arms include multiple rocket launchers and second-generation infrared-guided anti-tank weapons.
213. More broadly, the principal sources for the overall military build-up involving arms, military materiel and foreign military personnel can be identified as 10 States: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda and Yemen. Of those States, seven are aligned with ICU: Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic; the remaining three States, Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen, are aligned with TFG.

214. Not included in the foregoing is Lebanon, whose territory is being used by Hizbollah, which has created a reciprocal relationship of assistance with ICU. Also not included is a complete list of the States from which volunteers originate in support of ICU, or States from which individuals or groups send monetary contributions to either TFG or ICU.

215. At the same time, military build-up facilitated by aggressive State support not only perpetuates widespread instability and rising tensions, but also helps to sustain a clearly discernible momentum towards the possibility of a major military conflict involving most of Somalia — Puntland in the north and central and southern Somalia, with Somaliland excepted for the moment. Further aggravating and contributing to this momentum towards possible conflict is the direct involvement inside Somalia of the military personnel of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda — all members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Consequently, there exists the not unlikely prospect of violent confrontations inside Somalia between the military personnel of those States, since Ethiopia and Uganda support TFG and Eritrea supports ICU.

216. Moreover, in addition to the presence inside Somalia of military personnel of those States, further seriously complicating the security situation is the existence of other groups of combatants, also inside Somalia, that are aligned either with TFG or ICU, as follows: in support of TFG militias are some former members of the opposition alliance/Mogadishu-based warlords, Puntland militias, Ethiopian combat units and members of the Ugandan military — five groups altogether; and in support of the ICU sharia courts are the Ethiopian insurgent groups ONLF and OLF, foreign volunteers, or fighters (many with combat experience and specialized military skills), and Eritrean combat units — also five groups altogether. Thus, the two coalitions effectively have a total of 10 distinct groups of potential combatants inside Somalia.

217. It is into this highly unstable, complicated and militarily diverse environment that the regional and international community is actively considering inserting a peacekeeping force consisting of military troops from IGAD or the African Union. It is the firmly held view of the Monitoring Group that committing such a force to Somalia in the current context may in the worst case be the catalyst that sparks a serious military confrontation between the opposing sides, or at a minimum simply adds to the pressing momentum towards a confrontation. And, given the situation as described above, what control would such a foreign peacekeeping force be able to exercise? In virtually any case, there is a very good likelihood that instead of curbing tensions, a peacekeeping force would simply become a part of the problem — another potential combatant in the push towards a military solution in Somalia.
C. The re-emergence of the Somali warlords — former members of the opposition alliance

218. The Mogadishu-based opposition alliance that for so long ruled over the area under its control through a patchwork of individual fiefdoms, or local administrations, was decisively beaten in a series of military-style engagements by ICU and has vacated the areas formerly under its control. ICU has moved in to fill the void left by the alliance. Accordingly, ICU took control of the revenue-generating resources of the local administrations, recruited militia members formerly serving the warlords and confiscated large quantities of a wide variety of abandoned arms. The Monitoring Group believes that it has already documented, during previous mandates, that a considerable portion of the confiscated arms were involved in arms embargo violations.

219. ICU seized heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns and large amounts of ammunition from individual warlords, including Mohamed Qanyare, former TFG Minister of National Security, Mohamed Dheere, former Governor of Middle Shabelle, and Abdi Qeybiid, Mogadishu warlord. Many of the confiscated weapons were mounted on technicals, which were seized along with armoured personnel carriers.

220. In addition to the confiscation of arms and military materiel belonging to various members of the opposition alliance, many of the militia personnel serving those members have been converted to the ranks of ICU. Of those that were not killed in combat, some fled, but hundreds of fighters representing a number of the defeated warlords, along with their weapons, joined ICU. The Monitoring Group learned that several hundred members of TFG militias also joined ICU.

221. The Monitoring Group has learned that, notwithstanding the defeat and subsequent dispersal of members of the opposition alliance, some members, including Mohamed Qanyare, Mohamed Dheere and Abdi Qeybiid, are reorganizing and rearming themselves for the fundamental objective of attempting to retake the local administrations in and around Mogadishu that they lost to ICU. All initial indications are that their intentions are to use military force against ICU. Attempts to take back their former fiefdoms by force will only worsen an already tense and highly explosive situation in central and southern Somalia.

222. TFG and the Ethiopian military have gained the support of the same warlords in order to form a coalition that will be used to defend the areas under the influence of TFG and to protect certain areas bordering Ethiopia. As of the writing of the present report, that coalition has been joined by Puntland forces for the purpose of defending Galkayo against a possible attack by ICU military forces.

223. As the Monitoring Group has detailed above, the Ethiopian Government is supporting both TFG and the former Somali warlords — a contradiction. It is the view of the Monitoring Group that the principal aim of the re-emerging Somali warlords is to regain control of their former vested interests, comprising individual fiefdoms with their attendant political and economic benefits. Their purpose is not to assist in the establishment of TFG as a viable Government. This contradictory activity clearly indicates the self-serving nature of Ethiopian support for Somalia.
VI. Capacity-building

224. In view of the totality of the information provided in the present report describing the highly dangerous and volatile military and security situation inside Somalia and, further, the deep involvement of certain States of the region, including members of IGAD, in support of either TFG or ICU, the Monitoring Group is of the belief that proposing capacity-building measures in the current environment is impractical.

VII. Coordination with States and organizations

A. States

Due process

225. The Monitoring Group sent 54 letters to individual States and businesses identified in connection with information about alleged involvement in arms embargo violations, as noted in section II above. Replies received by the Monitoring Group by the time of the completion of the present report have been cited in the information on alleged arms embargo violations in section II and are reproduced in the annexes. Information concerning arms shipments reported to have taken place was sometimes not sent to the Governments concerned for a response, as in some cases the Monitoring Group received such information only after dispatch of its letters. After all of the letters were sent, the United Nations Secretariat in New York followed up with telephone calls in an attempt to encourage replies from the various recipients.

Somalia


Germany, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates

227. The Monitoring Group is very appreciative of the cooperation and specific investigative assistance extended to it by the Governments of Germany, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates through their letters dated 27 July 2006, 19 September 2006 and 3 October 2006, respectively. The Monitoring Group looks forward to continued cooperation with the Governments of Germany, Kazakhstan and the United Arab Emirates in the future.

B. Organizations

United Nations

228. Members of the Monitoring Group met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, and his Deputy on several occasions during which they exchanged views and information. On 9 October 2006, at Nairobi, at the request of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and the arms expert provided a substantive

**African Union**

229. On 25 August 2006 the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert of the Monitoring Group, held a meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, to discuss the arms embargo, the associated military build-up and the overall threat of an outbreak of civil war in Somalia and its potential negative repercussions for the region (see annex XXIII).

**Somali Donor Group and Finland**

230. On 14 June and 23 August 2006 the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, together with the arms expert, met with the Somali Donor Group and the Ambassador of Finland, respectively, and provided a briefing on the arms embargo and related matters.

**VIII. Conclusions and recommendations**

**A. Conclusions**

231. In an environment of steadily rising tensions and deep anxieties, ICU and TFG are in a bitter contest for control of Somalia. However, TFG is no match for ICU — a powerful, expanding, organized and focused organization in control of most of central and southern Somalia. TFG, on the other hand, is considerably weaker and lacking in focus; it is highly divided internally and controls little of Somalia. The contest is overwhelmingly military in nature, with rampant arms flows to both sides. The arms flows are a premier part of a deliberate, ongoing and broader military build-up taking place on both sides.

232. Aggressive State support from both inside and outside Somalia provides the main means for the military build-up and is one of the key factors driving the tensions higher. A multitude of other organized groups of combatants supporting either TFG or ICU from inside Somalia are also key elements in an increasingly threatening security mosaic.

233. Somalia is a complicated and potentially volatile military mix, a hostile environment that seems to be moving irresistibly towards an unnecessary war, a war that may be widespread and would quite likely be protracted and unconventional. A widespread and protracted war in Somalia involving not only ICU and TFG, per se, but also the multitude of other combatants, has clear regional implications, including the reasonable possibility of reigniting a State-to-State war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and fomenting acts of terrorism in very vulnerable neighbouring States.

234. An alternative to a potentially highly destructive military solution in an intensely complex and aggravated present-day Somalia remains a possibility and is within the grasp of the international community. A combination of stronger enforcement of the arms embargo applied in conjunction with certain economic
sanctions and high-level diplomatic and political efforts could offset the momentum towards a catastrophic conflict in Somalia, a conflict with clearly dangerous implications for the Horn of Africa and East Africa.

B. Recommendations

235. In view of the unprecedented and highly exacerbated security situation in Somalia, the Monitoring Group proposes a new and interrelated set of recommendations that are intended to reduce the level of tension and offset the continuous momentum towards a military catastrophe. In brief, the new recommendations call for (a) increasing the strength of the arms embargo through an all-border surveillance and interdiction effort for Somalia, (b) the application of financial sanctions on significant Somali-owned and -operated business entities and (c) a high-level, international diplomatic and political effort intended to encourage the will of States of the region to avert war and, further, to give States a reason to disengage from contributing to the military build-up in Somalia.

236. Past recommendations put forward by the Monitoring Group were predicated both on an analysis of the information available and a sense of what measures might best serve to curb arms embargo violations, thus providing sufficient room for the implementation of constructive alternative political and social measures. However, no past recommendations have been implemented. Consequently — arguably — the security situation in Somalia has continued to deteriorate dramatically, resulting in an explosion of arms flows, wider militarization of society and, eventually, the ongoing and broad military build-up of the two major contenders for control of Somalia, all in violation of the arms embargo. As a result, the Monitoring Group sees the need to propose a new and equally dramatic set of interrelated recommendations that are intended to effectively neutralize the more threatening security situation that is now in evidence in Somalia.

237. In view of the information that the Monitoring Group has put before the Security Council for its consideration in the form of numerous reports and briefings, and its cumulative knowledge and experience investigating various aspects of the situation in Somalia in connection with specific arms embargo violations, and the broader security environment in general, the Monitoring Group is of the firmly held view that the current relentless momentum towards a violent confrontation between TFG and ICU, and their respective coalitions, may create a protracted and widespread civil war, accompanied by major losses of life and a large displacement of Somalis into neighbouring countries, and regional acts of terrorism.

238. Therefore, to offset this increasingly apparent possibility, and to simultaneously curb arms flows and retard the ongoing military build-up, the Monitoring Group proposes that the Security Council consider implementing a number of interrelated recommendations for Somalia. The conceptual framework for this approach involves three aspects, as outlined below:

(a) Strengthen the arms embargo with the intention of severely curtailing or cutting off arms flows into Somalia by implementing a total border surveillance and interdiction effort involving a combination of sea, air and land military forces supported by other organizations, as follows: (i) sea — employ the naval forces of maritime States of the region and international naval forces present in the region, assisted by the International Maritime Organization and the International Maritime
Bureau; (ii) air — employ the air forces of States of the region and international air forces present in the region, assisted by the International Civil Aviation Organization; and (iii) land — employ a United Nations observer mission, assisted by customs authorities of States of the region and other States. Design a practical and working mix of the foregoing to help in the enforcement of the arms embargo on Somalia through the activities of surveillance and interdiction of arms, military materiel and other forms of military support, as necessary, that violate the arms embargo;

(b) A financial-assets freeze on all Somali-owned and -operated businesses located both inside and outside Somalia that have a relationship with either TFG or ICU and whose assets have been, or may be, used to support the purchase of arms or military materiel and/or to provide military training, or otherwise support activities prohibited under the arms embargo;

(c) A concerted and immediate international political and diplomatic initiative — fully incorporating regional actors — to accomplish, among other things, the following: (i) drawing the attention of all States in the region, and elsewhere, that are involved in supporting either TFG or ICU to the big-picture momentum towards the very real possibility of an extended war and military conflict in the Horn of Africa; (ii) encouraging among those States the will to avert a possible military catastrophe in the Horn of Africa; (iii) working towards disengaging those states that are actively and unilaterally supporting either TFG or ICU with arms or other military materiel in violation of the arms embargo; and (iv) providing guidance, direction and coordination, and encouraging the involvement of all essential Somali actors in meaningful political dialogue leading towards a political solution to the Somali situation.

239. In summary, there are two fundamental, underlying aims of the proposed recommendations: (a) in the near term, to calm the tensions and volatility of the current situation in Somalia and thereby slow and, perhaps, divert the existing momentum towards military confrontation, and (b) in the longer term, to gain the time necessary for diplomacy to seek a political solution for Somalia.
Annex I

Djibouti Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

Djibouti Airlines

Bruno Scheimsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia

Date: 20/08/06
Réf: DJB/MRW-275

Dear Sir,

In reference to your letter dated 18 August 2006 concerning the transportation of medicine and uniform by Djibouti Airlines “to militant Islamic fundamentalist”, we are surprised to hear such unfounded accusation.

As a Djiboutian Airlines operator, we are abide by the Djiboutian Law which in compliance with the measures imposed by the Security Council resolution 733 (1992) do not authorize export of items with military use in Somalia.

Besides, the Djibouti Red Crescent Society never chartered our flights for a cargo of this kind neither in July nor before. The daily flight report of Djibouti International Airport can fully confirm that no aircraft belonging to Djibouti Airlines have operated to Mogadishu or its area on 30th July 2006.

In addition, Djibouti Airlines has in no time intended to assist any Somalia group or acted in violation of UN resolution. Moreover, we are constantly fostering peace and order in line with the Djiboutian government objective of establishing peace in Somalia and in accord with our policy of increasing the market share by taking advantage of the potential Somalia market.

Djibouti Airlines is ready to assist the monitoring group to identify the real perpetrator and are reminding to the concerned to stay more vigilant about those who are trying to tarnish the image of Djibouti Airlines on baseless information.

Looking forwards for your sincere cooperation.

Best regards.

CAPT MOUSSA IBRAHIM ABBERI
CHAIRMAN
Annex II

Red Crescent Society of Djibouti response to the Monitoring Group

[Original: French]
6 September 2006

We were surprised and astonished to learn, through your letter of 18 August 2006, of a possible violation by our national Society of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

This is a serious accusation which calls into question the integrity and credibility of our Society.

We have the honour of communicating the following facts and observations:

– The plane in question was leased not from Djibouti Airlines, as stated in your letter, but from Daallo Airlines, by ICRC, at the request of the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti and the Somali Red Crescent Society.

– The cargo indeed contained medical supplies that had been packaged and labelled by Djibouti Red Crescent Society volunteers, to be sent to the Somali Red Crescent Society, for assistance to victims of the conflict between members of Islamic courts and Somali warlords.

– It should be noted that the ICRC regional delegation in Nairobi paid the transport costs, and a representative of the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti accompanied the cargo. The ICRC logistics unit in Mogadishu received the medical supplies. Moreover, there were not one, but two flights, on 18 May and 20 June 2006, respectively, carrying a total of 31 tons. The cargo plane landed at the “Kilometre 50” airport in the Lower-Chebeley region (Marka), and not Mogadishu airport, which was closed during that period because of the conflict.

– This was a donation of medical supplies, not military uniforms, from the Djibouti Red Crescent Society to the Somali Red Crescent Society, made through ICRC.

It seems that an apology is in order from those responsible for spreading this information, which is harmful to the image of the national Society.

The Red Crescent Society of Djibouti reserves the right to lodge a complaint against the authors of such accusations.

(Signed) Mr. Abdi Kaireh Bouh
Secretary-General
Annex III

Government of Egypt response to the Monitoring Group

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

2 October 2006

Sir,

I wish to refer to your letter no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.59 dated 19 September 2006 regarding the alleged provision by the Government of Egypt of training in support of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia in violation of the Security Council resolution 733 (1992) imposing general and complete arms embargo on Somalia. In this regard, and upon instructions from my government, I wish to convey to you the following in response to the allegations contained in your aforementioned letter:

1- The information contained in the aforementioned letter referring to possible participation by Egyptian senior military officers in a meeting or activities aimed at providing training or any type of military support to ICU is totally baseless and completely false.

2- The commitment of the Government of Egypt to respect and to implement all Security Council resolutions is genuine and applies to all United Nations decisions and resolutions without distinction.

Sincerely,

Maged Abdelaziz
Ambassador & Permanent Representative

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Room S-3055
Annex IV

Daallo Airlines response to the Monitoring Group

22nd August 2006

To: Ms. Loraine Rickard-Martin
   Acting Secretary
   Security Council Committee
   United Nation


I refer to above fax/letter addressed to DAALLO Airlines with regards to operations of AB-310-300 on 20/21 July 2006 in/out Assab, i would like to clarify and respond to your report as follows.

First and foremost, DAALLO Airlines has never owned, leased or ever operated AB310 since its inception in 1991. DAALLO Airlines operates only: B737, B767, B757 in our European and Middle Eastern routes, and AN-24, AN-12, IL-18, Let-410 and initially in 1991, one Cessna aircraft in the Horn of Africa, we also operated IL-76 to Kenya and Uganda, hence your information with regards to AB310 is incorrect.

DAALLO Airlines is a commercial airline and is aware of all IATA resolutions on Dangerous Goods and will, in no way permit the airline to carry such cargo without authorization and specifically as it is against any UN resolutions on humanity.

In the entire history of DAALLO Airlines, we have never been involved in any illegitimate business, our track records with UN is untainted and transparent.

DAALLO Airlines has maintained good reputation with many NGOs and UN organization offices and offer services to the communities, and relief organizations such as UNDP, WFO etc for over the last 10 years and have never been involved in political or siding with any part thereof, our mission is clear and is simply, to provide transportation service to the legitimate community in the Horn of Africa connecting to the Global Village.

At this point, we cannot help but feel that your sources had purposely made up this story to impair the airlines' reputation and image, that I can assure the accusation is baseless and unacceptable.
We therefore, ask you to refer back to your source of information in order to get accurate information and erase the false accusations against us, we are deeply concerned that the contents of the report are a direct accusation and an insult to our reputation.

What surprises us the most, is that the sources were able to describe in detail, the cargo that was on board the aircraft and failed to describe the registration of the aircraft which is clearly marked and printed on the fuselage, these markings are normally visible to all, this by itself indicates intentional fabrication of the story. The question is how it was assumed that the aircraft was DAALLO Airlines.

For your information and let this be on the record, we do not take this matter lightly, we took the liberty to contact and investigate our on-line destinations, only our offices at Mogadishu have advised us that on the 20/21 July 2006 an IL-76 Registration 7607 landed in Mogadishu, however, this was not a DAALLO Airlines operated aircraft as we do not have any record of any movement on that day neither have we filed any flight plan with any authority to operate an IL-76. Furthermore, all the other stations has confirmed that, no such aircraft of any size close to what you have mentioned has landed at their respective airports.

Additionally, I am sure you are aware that AB-310 cannot land in Mogadishu or K50 airport, or any other airports in Somali due to runway problems and sizes. You have not specified the airport used in Somalia, hence we are not in a position to help on further information.

For your easy reference, I have attached two news articles from CNN and Sudan Tribune that clearly disproves that the aircraft in question is NOT DAALLO Airlines.

Last but not least, in this context we would like your confirmation to have DAALLO Airlines removed on the list of suspect of arms smuggling should this be the case.

Should you need further information, do not hesitate to contact myself.

Best regards,

Abdul Wahid Al Hashmy
General Manager

CC: Mr. Bruno Schiemsky UN-MGS/CEO & CHAIRMAN DAALLO Airline
Annex V

Government of Eritrea first response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations

22 August 2006

Dear Mr. Schiernsky,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18 August 2006 regarding the information that the Monitoring Group received on alleged violations by Eritrea of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia.

Eritrea rejects the alleged arms embargo violations mentioned in the letter and it is regrettable that such misinformation continues to spread around with the clear objective of tainting the image of Eritrea in the African sub-region. Eritrea's principled position of non-interference in the internal affairs of Somalia is well known to the international community. One way of putting such groundless accusations, which are finding their way in the work of the Monitoring Group, to rest is by revealing the sources of such information. Therefore, my Government demands the sources of your information to be disclosed without delay.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signature]

Tesfa Aden Seyoum
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Mr. Bruno Schiernsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1876 (2006)
United Nations
New York
Annex VI

Government of Eritrea second response to the Monitoring Group

05 September 2006

Dear Mr. Schiessky,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 01 September 2006 regarding the information the Monitoring Group received on the alleged departure of an Il'yushin 76 (IL-76) aircraft from Asmara, Eritrea, to Mogadishu, Somalia.

The Government of the State of Eritrea does not have any information on the arrival or departure of the stated aircraft. The Government of the State of Eritrea is gravely concerned about the continued spread of misinformation on Eritrea's alleged violations of Security Council resolution 733 (1992).

As repeatedly expressed to the Monitoring Group in previous letters of the Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea, dated 27 March 2006 and 22 August 2006, the information received by the Monitoring Group is totally wrong and lacks credibility. The unfounded information is, unfortunately, contributing to misleading and fictitious reports helping to divert the attention of the international community from the direct intervention of others in the internal affairs of Somalia under the pretext of preserving one national security and vital interests in the Horn of Africa.

The Government of the State of Eritrea stands by its stated policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Somalia and it remains fully committed to the arms embargo on Somalia.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signature]
Araya Desta
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

Mr. Bruno Schiessky
Chairman, Monitoring Group on Somalia
United Nations, New York
Annex VII

Government of Kazakhstan response to the Monitoring Group

866 UN PLAZA • SUITE 586 • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
Tel 212.230.1900 • Fax 212.230.1172
kazakhstan@un.int

New York, 19 September 2006

Dear Mr. Schiemsky,

With reference to your letter (ref.# S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.34) dated 15 August 2006 please find attached information concerning the aircraft Ilyushin 76 collected on the basis of thorough investigation by the law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan (see annex).

Since this issue is under investigation by the law enforcement agencies of Kazakhstan we would highly appreciate it if the Monitoring Group on Somalia would provide us with further possible information concerning the case.

Please accept, Mr. Schiemsky, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yerzhan Kh. Kazykhanov

Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Security Council resolution 1630 (2005)

New York
Attachment

Translated from Russian

In regard to the inquiry regarding the IL-76 aircraft

Fifteen IL-76 aircraft were registered in the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan as of July 2006, and are operated by five Kazakh airlines. Of those, only two aircraft (registration Nos. UN76371 and UN76374), which belong to the Berkut State airline of the Presidential administration, bear an image of the national flag on the vertical tail unit. According to data from the State Enterprise Kazaeronavigatsia, the aircraft in question made no flights in July 2006.

The other aircraft, in compliance with the requirements currently in force in Kazakhstan, bear an image of the national flag of Kazakhstan on both sides of the nose section of the fuselage, near the cockpit, of a size proportionate to the inscription of the name of the operating airline. There is reliable information for 14 of the aircraft on where they are based and the flights they made in July of this year which indicates that they were not involved in weapons transport.

Somewhat incomplete information has been received only in regard to aircraft UN76496, which was rented by the Kazakh airline GST Aero from the airline Overseas Cargo FZE (United Arab Emirates). According to documents received by the Civil Aviation Committee of Kazakhstan, the airline which owns this aircraft sold it on 20 July 2006 to the South African airline Aerolift, in connection with which the rental agreement was cancelled. The relevant request to remove the aircraft from the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan (No. 092 of 20 July 2006) was received from GST Aero by the Civil Aviation Committee. Following a review, certification of the removal of the aircraft from the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan was issued on 2 August 2006.

On 24 July 2006, however, an aircraft manned by a GST Aero crew, using a certificate of registration with the State Aircraft Registry of Kazakhstan, an airworthiness certificate and other previously issued documents, as well as identifying markings of the Kazakh company, carried out a technical flight from the city of Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) to Massawa (Eritrea) to transfer the aircraft to a new owner. The same day, following the transfer, the aircraft’s documents were removed, as were the identifying national and registration markings. What happened to this aircraft after that is not known.

Although the symbol “UN” is indeed the code symbol of Kazakhstan, there was no image of the flag of Kazakhstan on the tail of the above-mentioned aircraft. Furthermore, the LTF call sign is not used by Kazakh airlines.

Given the foregoing, media reports on possible involvement by Kazakh nationals in weapons shipments to Somalia are unfounded.
Annex VIII

Aerolift response (e-mail) to the Monitoring Group

TO : Secretary Security Council Committee UN
Mr. Gregory Boventer
REF : IL-76 operation to Mogadishu
FROM : Evgueny Zakharov /AEROLIFT company
DATE : 29-09-2006

Dear Mr. Gregory Boventer,

Refer to your letters dated 19/09/2006 and 27/09/2006 I would like to confirm the following information on behalf of AEROLIFT company:

1. AEROLIFT company purchased IL-76 aircraft REG: UN-76496 from “Overseas Cargo FZE” (UAE) for purpose to resale it to Eritrean company “ERIKO ENTERPRISE”.

2. “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” and AEROLIFT company agreed that during lease-purchase period “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” will operate under Eritrean AOC (Aircraft Operators License ) and may use AEROLIFT call sign “LFT” until they will get their own ICAO call sign.

3. The conditions “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” using AEROLIFT call sign aircraft will not transport drugs, arms and will operate under ICAO regulations.

4. AEROLIFT suspended agreement with “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” at the moment.

5. AEROLIFT sent copy’s of Your letters to “ERIKO ENTERPRISE” and requested them to provide information you need a.s.a.p.

Please do not hesitate contact directly to “ERIKO ENTERPRISE”:
ERIKO ENTERPRISE
P.O. Box 9302 Asmara, Eretria
Tel. 002911122144&122806
Fax. 002911123137
e-mail: horneriko@yahoo.com
Mr. T. Tango cell: 002917116579.
P.S. I will be traveling next 2 weeks and for quick communication please use email evguenyz@aerolift.org or contact my mobile number +27724616361.

With regards, Evgueny Zakharov.
Annex IX

Sky Jet Aviation (U) Ltd document sent to the Monitoring Group

Sent to: The director Air Navigation & Regulatory Services
Subject: B707 Reg. 5X-EOT M.S.N.19821

Total pages attached including this cover (02 pages)

Dear sir,

Ref. to our letter dated 04/09/2006 faxed to you in relation to the B707 Reg. 5X-EOT (copy attached) requesting your urgent action to contact the UAE Civil Aviation to ground the A/C at FJR where it was parked & to withdraw all documents on board the A/C but no action been taken. As a result EuroOceanic Air Transport took the Aircraft yesterday from FJR and operating ILLEGAL - ARMS TRANSPORT FLIGHTS between MASAWA/ERITERIA and MOGADISHU/SOMALIA.

Appreciate your immediate action with both Somali CAA and Eritrean CAA.

With my best regards

Hamdy M. Eisa

Chairman
Annex X

Government of Ethiopia response to the Monitoring Group

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
366 Second Avenue, 3rd Floor • New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel.: (212) 421-4850 • Fax: (212) 754-8360

Date: 9 October 2006
EPM 255/06

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter Ref. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.52, dated 15 September 2006, in which various instances of violations by Ethiopia on the arms embargo on Somalia imposed by Security Council Resolution 733(1992) has been communicated.

First of all, we wish to acknowledge how vital the work being done is by the Monitoring Group in helping Somalia and the region as whole to achieve peace and stability. Ethiopia has been doing whatever it can to facilitate the work of the Monitoring Group, and will continue to do its level best to help the Group discharge its heavy responsibilities.

With respect to the allegations contained in the letter, without attributing any malice to anyone, we have found that many of the allegations are without basis, and in many cases it has been extremely difficult to conduct investigations because of the manifestly erroneous information contained therein, such as names of officers that are not in the Ethiopian army. Of course we will continue to investigate these allegations but we

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemskey
Chairman,
Monitoring Group on Somalia
New York
can assure you that it has been extremely difficult for us to get to the bottom of these allegations because of what appears to be fabricated information contained in the letter. We indeed understand how difficult it might be to the Monitoring Group that under the circumstances prevailing in Somalia the Monitoring Group it had to rely on information that is usually difficult to verify.

However, what the Ethiopian Government has found most distressing is the fact that the current context in Somalia has been overlooked in all these. The Horn of Africa region is currently the target of active destabilization by dangerous international terrorist groups. There is no exaggeration in saying that Ethiopia and the sub-region are confronted with a growing menace in connection with the activities of these groups.

Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that Ethiopia has no problem with the ascendency of strong Islamic sentiments in Somalia. Accordingly the emergence of the Consultative Council of Islamic Courts (CCIC) is not Ethiopia's preoccupation per se. I have to emphasize this because there is a lot of distortion in the international media with regard to Ethiopia's policy towards Somalia and the CCIC. Ethiopia's concern and the concern of the sub-region emanates from the fact that the extremists within the CCIC have made it absolutely clear that theirs is not a purely Somali agenda. Some of the leaders, including those who are calling the shots at the present time in Mogadishu, have made it clear that they do not respect the territorial integrity of countries neighboring Somalia, and that they will not be bound by international law. Some of these people have a track record which makes them a major threat to peace and stability in the region.

As would be recalled, the CCIC had its first meeting with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in June in Khartoum during which they agreed on a cease fire and to resolve whatever problems they may have between them through dialogue and peaceful means. But events since then have shown that the CCIC has absolutely no interest in the peaceful resolution of the problem in Somalia with the TFG which has been recognized as a legitimate Government of Somalia by IGAD, AU, UN and the International Community as a whole.

However, what is most worrying is the fact that the CCIC has continued to import all types of sophisticated arms from outside the region, and also has been receiving fighters from areas proximate to our region in great numbers. This is being conducted in broad daylight. These fighters have been involved with the CCIC fighters in their recent operation to control Kismayo. At the present time the CCIC controlled areas, primarily Mogadishu, are awash with money and sophisticated arms coming from outside the region. While this is going on, the TFG is bereft of any support from any source. The CCIC took over Kismayo without any fight from the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) because the latter was not in a position to receive even a bullet from any source. The massive violation of the arms embargo by the supporters of the CCIC has made the embargo so meaningless that the general effect has been to tie the hands of the legitimate Government and those like the JVA that has been the ally of the TFG. That is precisely why IGAD and AU have been appealing to the international community for the partial lifting of the arms embargo.
Therefore, I appeal to you to take seriously how much the political landscape of Somalia has changed at the present time, and how the situation on the ground has been transformed beyond anything that anybody, including the Monitoring Group, could have imagined only a few months ago. No doubt the Monitoring Group would not also be oblivious to what has been the genesis of this latest development; a development which had created an opportunity for the CCIC to embark on this dangerous exercise, beginning early this year after having defeated the Mogadishu warlords.

In conclusion, I want to reassure your Excellency, as the Chairman of the Monitoring Group, once again that Ethiopia will continue to cooperate with the Monitoring Group so that it would successfully discharge its heavy responsibilities. But at the same time, Ethiopia appeals to the Monitoring Group not to overlook the context within which the Monitoring Group is called upon to discharge its obligation.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Dawit Yohannes, Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations
Annex XI

Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran response to the Monitoring Group

Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

622 Third Ave New York, NY 10017  www.Iran-UN.org  Tel:+1(212)667-2300  Fax:+1(212)667-7000  E-mail:PR-Iran@un.int

Permanent Representative

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

No. 550  September 26, 2006

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.31, dated August 9, 2006; I have the honor to inform you that, according to the information received from the relevant authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there has been no transfer or shipment of any kind of weapons or military equipments from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia.

I have further the honor to reiterate that according to the same information, no flight has been taken place from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Somalia on July 25, 2006 and therefore, the allegations raised against my country in the aforementioned letter are totally rejected.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

M. Javad Zarif

Mr. Bruno Schiemyek
Chairman of Monitoring Group on Somalia
United Nations
New York
Annex XII

Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya response to the Monitoring Group

The Permanent Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations
303 East 46th Street
New York, N.Y. 10017
(212) 752-5775

No: 81091420

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Monitoring Group on Somalia established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006), and has the honour to refer to the latter's note ref # SVAC.2972006/MGIO:22 dated 12 June 2006, wherein the Monitoring Group requests information about two Libyan aircrafts that landed in Somalia, in 2004 and 2005.

In this regard, the Mission wishes to inform that the competent authorities in Libya have relayed the following information about the above mentioned flights:

The two Libyan aircrafts are air-force planes usually used for air cargo. They made two trips to Somalia one on 20 April 2004, and the other on 14 September 2004. The purpose of both trips was to repatriate illegal aliens who have infiltrated into the country.

The Permanent Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Monitoring Group on Somalia established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006) the assurances of its highest consideration.

8 August 2006

The Monitoring Group on Somalia
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1671(2006)
C/O: The Secretariat of the Security Council Committee
establishes pursuant to resolution 751(1992) on Somalia
Room # G-3055
Fax: (212) 963-1300 or 963-3778
Annex XIII

Government of Saudi Arabia response to the Monitoring Group

Excellency Mr. Bruno Schiemsky,

Referring to your letter (Re: S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.50) dated 25/08/2006 in which you mention the information received by the Monitoring Group on Somalia on the plane that departed from Jazan and your request for further information.

Our delegation received the information from the specialized authorities in the Kingdom that the above mentioned plane is a medical one and it was secured and processed on 10/6/2006 in order to transfer the former Somali President Adam Abdullah Othman from Riyadh to Somalia upon the request of the Somali Embassy in Riyadh. Coordination with official authorities has been done in order to get the necessary permits to cross and land at the airport in Somalia (Baledogle). The plane has landed in the airport of king Abdullah in Jazan in order to refuel and then it departed to continue its mission.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration and respect.

Permanent Representative
Ambassador Fawzi Bin Abdul Majeed Shobokshi

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia

* The correct date of the Monitoring Group’s letter is 1 September 2006.
Annex XIV

Somali Islamic Courts Council response to the Monitoring Group

GOLAHA
MAXKAMADADA
ISLAAMIGA
SOMALIYYEED

Date: __/__/____
Ref: XG/GMIS/084/2006

October 2, 2006

His Excellency Bruno Schliebsky, Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
New York, USA, Fax 001212 9631300/212 963 3778

Excellency:

This is to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of September 20, 2006 regarding Security Council Resolution 733 (1992). On behalf of the Somali Islamic Courts Council (SICC), we would like to thank you for giving us the opportunity to reply to the false information against the SICC about the alleged violations of the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia. These allegations are baseless and we categorically deny any violations of the arms embargo of the UN.

We feel that this misinformation is a desperate attempt to cover-up Ethiopia's constant violations of the UN arms embargo on Somalia. Even though there might be other countries or companies involved, certainly, Ethiopia is the main country that has been breaking the UN arms embargo on Somalia on regular basis. It is obvious that Ethiopia has been openly supplying enormous quantities of sophisticated arms to the Transitional Federal Government in Baidoa and the entire world is watching!

Additionally, Ethiopia has been violating the independence and the territorial integrity of Somalia by illegally occupying several Somali towns and violating the basic human rights of the population.

To mask its invasion and aggression on Somalia, Ethiopia has been pushing the so call AU/IGAD Deployment Force or AU/IGAD “Peace” keeping Force! We do not see these forces as peace keeping. They are desabilizing or invading foreign forces, therefore, we kindly request the UN and the international community to abort this dangerous mission.

Your Excellency, as you know, IGAD is deeply split on this illegal deployment mission. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Sudan have clearly indicated their opposition to this Ethiopian agenda, while Kenya and Uganda are assisting Ethiopia.

Finally, our request to the UN is to maintain its impartial position and continue the arms embargo on Somalia.

Shalish Shalish Ahmed
Chairman, Executive Council
Somali Islamic Courts Council
Mogadishu, Somalia

Tel:00252-1-226191/642951/002528-9-39841.Fax:00252-1-642960 E-mail: Islamic_courts@yahoo.com
Annex XV

Government of the Syrian Arab Republic response to the Monitoring Group

THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
520 Second Ave., 15th Fl., New York, N. Y. 10017
Tel: (212) 691-4515

SC/GEN-598

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Office of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, established by Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), and with reference to its note no. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.63 dated 22 September 2006, has the honour to inform the esteemed Chairman, upon instructions from my Government, that the alleged information contained in the aforementioned document is totally false and is not based on any evidence. Syria fought and still fights terrorism as well as terrorists groups either in Syria or elsewhere in the world. Syria has cooperated with the international community in fighting terrorism in accordance with the Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and Syria reports regularly to the relevant committees of the Security Council in this regard.

The ulterior motive sources that reported the false information on the existence of cooperation between Syria and the ICU are using such allegations as a tool to increase pressure on Syria.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Office of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia the assurances of its highest consideration.

New York, 9 October 2006

Office of the Chairman
Of the Monitoring Group
On Somalia
United Nations
NEW YORK
Annex XVI

Government of Yemen response to the Monitoring Group

[Original: Arabic]

30 September 2006

I. Allegations that our country sent arms shipments to Somalia

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen affirms that it provided no weapons or military assistance to the Somali Government, to Puntland state or to any of the Somali parties during the period referred to in the letter of the Chairman of the Monitoring Group and that the information in that connection contained in the said letter is incorrect.

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to send a list of aircraft flights for the period referred to in the letter of the Monitoring Group, bearing in mind that most of the flights from our country to Bossaso are transit flights.

3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group on Somalia in the same spirit and with the same transparency that it has always sought to display in the past.

4. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ever-determined to implement the embargo resolution on the basis of its responsibility towards the international community, the essentials for stability and security in Somalia and the Somalis’ need for dialogue and reconciliation above all.

5. The Government of the Republic of Yemen stresses the importance of striving to ensure the accuracy, clarity and transparency of the information used and the sources dealt with by the Monitoring Group, as well as the importance of primarily establishing the authenticity of both so that no expediency is lost.

6. The Monitoring Group should take into account the developments in the current politics of Somalia following the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union, in addition to the consequences for the embargo resolution, the mechanisms for its implementation and the worth of its contribution to normalizing the situation and ensuring the success of the reconciliation and dialogue, in view of the multitude of arms sources and the intensification of conflict that is open to all possibilities.

II. Allegations of arms-smuggling from our country to Somalia via arms traders

1. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is making enormous efforts to combat arms-smuggling operations to Somalia and is working hard to finish equipping the coast-guard forces recently established to secure its long coastal strip, a project for which additional support is required from the international community.

2. The Government of the Republic of Yemen welcomes any information from the Group on any arms-smuggling from its territory to Somalia and affirms that it cracks down strongly on boats confirmed to be engaged in arms-smuggling by referring their owners and men to the courts, as was recently done in the case of several such boats. In this regard, it points out the possibility that non-Yemeni entities are using Yemeni boats to transport arms from other countries to Somalia.
3. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is ready to follow up and investigate cases relating to arms-smuggling to Somalia, in which connection it has taken a number of measures aimed at the following:

- Closing arms markets in the context of official efforts for the return and purchase of arms;
- Strengthening control, inspection and monitoring procedures for Yemeni ports, airports and coastal areas in order to enforce the embargo resolution;
- Numbering and listing boats in all ports, particularly fishing boats;
- Strengthening the role of the new coast-guard administration, establishing a radio network and monitoring centres on the coasts and readying a specialist force and armed patrol boats in accordance with available resources.
## Annex XVII

**Arms purchases and sales at the Bakaraaha Arms Market investigated during the mandate period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Those conducting transaction at the Irtogte Market</th>
<th>Type and quantity of arms and date of transaction</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qanyare Afrah Mohamed,</strong> businessman and former Minister for National Security in TFG</td>
<td>80 AK-47, 20 PKM, 20 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong>&lt;br&gt;45 AK-47, 24 PKM, 16 RPG-2 and RPG-7, 2 DShK <strong>10-20.08.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms&lt;br&gt;Bought through businesspeople who are not suspected by the sharia courts in Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rage Shiraar Bashir,</strong> businessman</td>
<td>150 AK-47, 22 PKM, 2 ZU-23 and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muse Sudi Yalahow,</strong> former Minister of Commerce in TFG</td>
<td>145 AK-47, 33 PKM, 12 mortars, 3 DShK, 2 B-10 and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Habsade Mohamed Ibrahim,</strong> MP, Minister of TFG</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition <strong>11.07.2006</strong>&lt;br&gt;110 AK-47, 28 PKM, 3 B-10, 20 RPG-2 and RPG-7, and a variety of ammunition <strong>20.08 to 20.09.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms and brought them to Baidoa&lt;br&gt;Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”,</strong> Minister of Defence in TFG, formerly in charge of Kismaayo</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>11.07.2006</strong>&lt;br&gt;150 AK-47, 40 PKM, 50 RPG-2/7, and mines <strong>20.08 to 20.09.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms and brought them to Kismaayo&lt;br&gt;Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abukar Omar Adaan,</strong> businessman, financier AIAI</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition worth $500,000 <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BAM traders</strong></td>
<td>1 ZP-39, 12 mortars, 6 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>29.04.2006</strong>&lt;br&gt;360 AK-47, ammunition for ZU-23, B-10, RPG-2, RPG-7, DShK and ZP-39 <strong>07.05.2006</strong></td>
<td>From Somaliland via Puntland by road to BAM&lt;br&gt;From Puntland via Galkayo and Beletweyne to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.05.2006</td>
<td>Many AK-47, 63 PKM, 12 DShK, 4 ZU-23, 8 Dhuunshilke(^a) and ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.05.2006</td>
<td>480 AK-47, 24 PKM, 26 RPG-7, 24 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Shipped from Yemen by trading networks to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.06.2006</td>
<td>300 AK-47, 120 RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM on behalf of the sharia courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.06.2006</td>
<td>250 pistols and ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.06.2006</td>
<td>An unknown quantity of AK-47, RPG-2 and ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.07.2006</td>
<td>Small arms, some anti-aircraft guns and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM via the port of El Adde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.08 to 20.09.2006</td>
<td>680 AK-47, 132 PKM, 12 B-10, 15 DShK, 25 82mm and 120mm mortars, landmines, anti-tank mines and a large quantity of ammunition for AK-47, ZP-39, DShK, PKM and RPG</td>
<td>Brought by traders to BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.06.2006</td>
<td>Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde”, warlord/businessman, governor of Lower Shabelle and associated with Al-Itihaad Al-Islaami 100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms and gave them to Yusuf Mire Seerar, deputy of Barre Aden Shire “Hirale”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.08.2006</td>
<td>97 AK-47</td>
<td>Purchased the arms and brought them to Marka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.06.2006</td>
<td>Sharia courts 235 AK-47, 45 PKM, 37 RPG-7, 4 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.06.2006</td>
<td>185 AK-47, 70 RPG-2 and RPG-7 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.06.2006</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Item Description</td>
<td>Purchaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.06.2006</td>
<td>50 AK-47, 6 PKM, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Guriel purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.07.2006</td>
<td>25 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court Saruur purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.07.2006</td>
<td>38 AK-47, 1 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court Jiiramiskiin (Hawaale clan) purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.07.2006</td>
<td>2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court at Balad purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.07.2006</td>
<td>40 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court Daynille purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.07.2006</td>
<td>1 ZU-23-1 and ammunition</td>
<td>Sharia court Buuloburto purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.07.2006</td>
<td>An unknown quantity of mines</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.08.2006</td>
<td>1 ZU-23</td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Botan Ise Alin “Haaraan Kunaar”, former Minister for Rehabilitation and Training of Militias in TFG</strong></td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.2006</td>
<td>120 AK-47, 5 PKM and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Colonel Abdi Hassan Awale Qeybdiid, former police Chief, Banadir region. He controlled checkpoints between Afgooye and Mogadishu. Was arrested/released in Sweden. Rearming his militia near Galkayo</strong></td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.2006</td>
<td>200 AK-47, 15 PKM, 9 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.06.2006</td>
<td>16 PKM, 14 RPG-7, 1 B-10 and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.06.2006</td>
<td>7 RPG-7, 6 mortars and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.06.2006</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.07.2006</td>
<td>A variety of ammunition</td>
<td><strong>Purchased the arms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdirashid Ilqeyte</strong>, businessman, owner of the Sahafi Hotel now under the control of ICU</td>
<td>95 AK-47 and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdi Nuur Siyad “Waal”</strong>, freelance militia leader</td>
<td>45 AK-47, 9 PKM, 3 mortars and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 PKM, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>10-20.08.2006</strong></td>
<td>Bought through businesspeople who are not suspected by the sharia courts in Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Galjeel clan</strong></td>
<td>30 AK-47, 6 PKM and a variety of ammunition <strong>03.07.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yusuf Mire Seeraar</strong>, militia commander in Kismaayo</td>
<td>100 AK-47, 9 DShK and a variety of ammunition <strong>05.2006</strong></td>
<td>Received from Sheik Yusuf Mohamed Siyad “Indohaadde”, who bought the arms at BAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yusuf Dabageed</strong>, former governor of Hiraan region</td>
<td>5 PKM and 1 DShK <strong>09.08.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere”</strong>, former Governor, Middle Shabelle</td>
<td>4 DShK and ammunition <strong>23.07.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 PKM <strong>31.07.2006</strong></td>
<td>Purchased the arms and possibly brought them to his base in Quria Joome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65 AK-47 and 2 B-10 <strong>10-20.08.2006</strong></td>
<td>Bought through businesspeople who are not suspected by ICU in Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2006/913</td>
<td>90 AK-47, 27 PKM, 4 B-10, 6 DShK, 40 RPG-2 and RPG-7, mines and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>20.08 to 20.09.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdishukri</td>
<td>130 AK-47, 6 PKM, 3 120mm mortars, 2 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>05.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Mohamed Aideed, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, TFG</td>
<td>48 AK-47 and ammunition</td>
<td>19.06.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goobaanle, militia commander in Kismaayo</td>
<td>175 AK-47, 26 PKM, 7 120mm mortars, 3 DShK and a variety of ammunition</td>
<td>20.08 to 20.09.2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Dhuunshilke = 1-barrel Zu-23 mounted on a tripod.*
Annex XVIII

Air Tomisko response to the Monitoring Group
25 September 2006

Excellency,

While acknowledging the receipt of your letters nos. S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.38 and S/AC.29/2006/MG/OC.37 dated 18 August 2006 concerning the Monitoring Group's investigation on the possible violations of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by Security Council resolution 733 (1992), I have the honour to inform that all three aircrafts, A/C type: IL-76, AN24 and YK-18, mentioned on your letters which landed in Somalia on flights from Salalah, Oman, repatriated Somalis apprehended while illegally entering Oman.

Please accept the assurances of my esteemed regards,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

FUAD AL-HINAI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

H.E. Mr. Bruno Schiemsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
Annex XX

Finance: revenues from small businesses and checkpoints

Jowhar: revenues from small businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit fee</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Yearly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(United States dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shops</td>
<td>4 000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>432 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stores and warehouses</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>4 290</td>
<td>51 480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance branches</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>6 840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiosks</td>
<td>1 300</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>7 800</td>
<td>93 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1 140</td>
<td>13 680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street vendors</td>
<td>1 150</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>3 450</td>
<td>41 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication branches</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>445.5</td>
<td>5 346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and grass vendors</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>11 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 821.05</td>
<td>54 631.5</td>
<td>655 578</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jowhar: revenues from checkpoints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit fee</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Yearly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(United States dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibus (Mogadishu-Jowhar)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1 920</td>
<td>23 040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minibus (to other regions)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>6 300</td>
<td>75 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>36 000</td>
<td>432 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller trucks</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1 050</td>
<td>31 500</td>
<td>378 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles transiting to Jowhar, Mogadishu and Balad</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2 880</td>
<td>34 560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable vendors</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>13 950</td>
<td>167 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>14 400</td>
<td>172 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grass</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3 600</td>
<td>43 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 685</td>
<td>110 550</td>
<td>1 326 600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unofficial data.
Annex XXI

Finance: letter with regard to Mogadishu seaport fees

Somali Islamic Courts Council

29 July 2006

Thanks be to Allah, today, 29 July 2006 (7 Rajan 1427), the Islamic Courts Council and Banadir-region businessmen met and agreed on taxation for Mogadishu main port, which will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity type</th>
<th>Taxation (United States dollars)</th>
<th>Labourers</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bag of rations (50 kg)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag of fertilizer (50 kg)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.1832</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag of cement (50 kg)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.1559</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag L/D (50 kg)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ton of fuel</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big bundle</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big bundle</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>0.9746</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big carton</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.1213</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small cartons</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small tires/wheels</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big tires/wheels</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.1444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattresses</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.1188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber (cubic metre)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron/steel</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full drum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1545</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer</td>
<td>12,00</td>
<td>43.326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck trailer N-3, etc.</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>43.326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten-ton truck, etc.</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>43.326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle – land cruiser, etc.</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>21.663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxury cars, etc.</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>21.663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big generator</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small generator</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the vehicle taxation, mentioned above are only those vehicles whose weight and capacity are known. However, when those are not known the taxation will be based on their volume and weight.

On the side of Somali Islamic Courts Council, signed by
1. Abdulkadir Abukar Omar, head of finance
2. Mohamed Kahiye Siyad, head of general transportation

On the side of Banadir region businessmen, signed by
1. Mohamud Abdikarim Ali – Chairman of Banadir businessmen
2. Ismail Cabdilahi Siyad (Gooni)
3. Omar Mohamud Hubane (Carabey)
Annex XXII

Finance: fees at Mogadishu International Airport

Previous tariffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unit fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Departing passengers</td>
<td>$20 per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arriving passengers</td>
<td>0 per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departing cargo</td>
<td>$0.010 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departing cargo – seafood</td>
<td>$0.015 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arriving cargo</td>
<td>0 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaders charge for arriving cargo</td>
<td>$0.071 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security charge</td>
<td>$1 100 per flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing fees</td>
<td>$350 per flight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Current tariffs

(United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unit fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Departing passengers</td>
<td>$20 per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arriving passengers</td>
<td>$20 per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departing cargo</td>
<td>$0.015 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departing cargo – seafood</td>
<td>$0.020 per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arriving cargo</td>
<td>$0.135 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaders charge for arriving cargo</td>
<td>$0.007 per kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security charges</td>
<td>$1 100 per flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing fees</td>
<td>$500-700 per flight</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated revenues at Mogadishu International Airport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit fee</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Yearly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(United States dollars)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight charges (security and landing fees)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 700</td>
<td>6 800</td>
<td>204 000</td>
<td>2 448 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers (departing and arriving)</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2 400</td>
<td>72 000</td>
<td>864 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo (imported and exported)</td>
<td>60 tons</td>
<td>152.5</td>
<td>9 150</td>
<td>274 500</td>
<td>3 294 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18 350</td>
<td>550 500</td>
<td>6 606 000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unofficial data.
Annex XXIII

Letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission

Dear Mr. Schlemdsky,

I wish to refer to your letter of 7 July 2006 in which you have requested a meeting with the Africa Union Commission, engaging our interest for a closer working relationship with the United Nations. The Commission commends the work of the monitoring group and is cognisant of the systematic and excellent reports produced on the Somalia arms embargo and its recommendations towards a peaceful resolution of the Somali crisis.

We at the African Union, have continually condemned the flagrant violations of the UN arms embargo on Somalia and denounces any act or omission by state and non-state actors which undermines the much needed security in Somalia, and which lends to the increasing instability in the country. In this regard, the Commission welcomes closer cooperation with the United Nations as informed in the statement issued at the 7th African Union Summit In Banjul, the Gambia; the paramount aim of such collaborative effort is the creation of a secure environment in which concerted efforts are made towards democratic strategies for the consolidation of democracy, the prevention of conflict and the building of a sustainable peace in Somalia. Consequently, the Commission will be pleased to meet with the Monitoring Group at the UN headquarters first week in August 2006.

Please accept, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mr. Bruno Schlemdsky
Chairman
Monitoring Group on Somalia
United Nations, New York
Fax: +1 212 963 13 00/96337 78
Annex XXIV

Countries visited and representatives of Governments, organizations and private entities interviewed

Kenya

Government officials
Kenya Ministry of Defence (Navy)
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence (Navy)
Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
Muhammed A. Affey, Kenya Ambassador to Somalia
Kenya Maritime Authority
Kenya Ports Authority
Kenya National Focal Point on illicit small arms and light weapons

State representatives
Ambassador of Finland
Liaison Office of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic

International organizations
European Union, delegation of the European Commission
Somali Donor Group
Food Security Assessment Unit
ICAO
IMO
Special Representative of the Secretary-General François Lounseny Fall (United Nations Political Office for Somalia)
UNDP Somalia
United Nations Department of Safety and Security
WFP Somalia

Madagascar
East Africa and West Indian Ocean Maritime Security Conference

United States of America

State representatives
Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations
Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations
United States Mission to the United Nations

Yemen

Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs