Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 2646 (2022), requested me to submit, by 3 January 2023, a report on my good offices, in particular on progress towards reaching a consensus starting point for meaningful results-oriented negotiations leading to a settlement. In the resolution, the Council encouraged the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to provide written updates to my mission of good offices on the actions they had taken in support of the relevant parts of the resolution since its adoption, in particular with regard to paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8, with a view to reaching a sustainable and comprehensive settlement, and requested me to include the contents of those updates in my report. The updates submitted by the two leaders are contained in annexes I and II to the present report.

2. The present report is focused on developments from 15 June 2022 to 12 December 2022. It provides an update on the activities carried out by my mission of good offices under the leadership of my Deputy Special Adviser on Cyprus, Colin Stewart. It also includes an update on my ongoing engagement with the sides, as well as discussions that have taken place on my behalf related to exploring common ground on the Cyprus peace process.

II. Background and context

3. Due to the ongoing lack of progress by the two sides towards finding common ground during the reporting period, public confidence in prospects for reaching a negotiated settlement in Cyprus remains low island-wide. Polling commissioned by my mission of good offices reflects this low confidence but also indicates that a majority of the population in each community still urgently desires a mutually agreed settlement. The positions of the two sides remain far apart, and both sides maintain their opposing views about the way forward. In the absence of constructive or harmonized messages from the two leaders that could resonate with both communities, the climate between the two sides and vis-à-vis the United Nations has deteriorated.

4. The political landscape has been further complicated by disputes and statements regarding areas in and adjacent to the buffer zone and in Varosha, including over civilian activities, as described in the latest report on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (S/2023/3). The situation on the island is
compounded by ongoing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean region, including with respect to competing maritime zone claims and a worsening of relations between the guarantor powers Greece and Türkiye.

5. The reporting period began with a renewed commitment from the sides to move forward with energy on measures that would build trust between the sides, as a means of creating conditions conducive for eventual settlement talks. Beginning in October, however, hardening demands related to the status of the north and political rhetoric in the south in the context of electoral campaigning increased perceived psychological barriers to cooperation.

6. While the overall climate has become increasingly negative, with a further deepening of mistrust, some progress has nonetheless been achieved by the technical committees in reducing existing barriers to intercommunal contact and trade, as called for by the Security Council. Although official data was not available, this included increased trade volume seen after the Republic of Cyprus eased certain restrictions on the trade of processed food items of non-animal origin under the European Union Green Line Regulation. Such progress was achieved also owing to the intensive engagement of my mission of good offices with the two sides, supported by weekly trilateral meetings at the working level and with the Deputy Special Adviser, and separate bilateral meetings several times a month between the Deputy Special Adviser and each of the representatives of the leaders. This intensive engagement schedule provided an ongoing dialogue between the sides on the initiatives of the 12 technical committees, as well as other issues affecting the daily lives of Cypriots. On 7 December, despite the polarized political environment, both leaders attended an end-of-year reception organized by the mission and had a warm informal exchange. This was the first time the two leaders had met on the island since April 2022.

7. In separate meetings with the Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar, following the start of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly, I underscored my commitment to supporting the parties in finding common ground to address the Cyprus issue, including through high-level engagement from the Secretariat for a comprehensive settlement on the island. I also stressed the importance of the technical committees and mutually acceptable confidence-building measures.

8. Dialogue, meetings and cooperation continued among religious leaders of Cyprus, who sustained their commitment to peacebuilding, reconciliation and human rights within the framework of the Religious Track of the Cyprus Peace Process, under the auspices of the Embassy of Sweden. During the reporting period, changes took place in the leadership of the faith communities. The late Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, who had played an essential part of the Religious Track since its inception in 2009, passed away in November 2022. Notably, representatives of Christian and Muslim faith communities among others gathered for the wake and attended the funeral of the Archbishop, where they were joined by religious and world leaders and by the Deputy Special Adviser. Efforts to further reinforce the dialogue in the Religious Track continued, on the basis of the commitment of the relevant stakeholders to this peacebuilding process and their willingness to be at the table engaging in dialogue.

9. Representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties continued their meetings under the auspices of the Embassy of Slovakia. Beginning in October 2022 with a meeting addressed by my Deputy Special Adviser, the bicommunal dialogue returned to its full-fledged mode of operation, which had been suspended more than two years ago owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Approximately once a month, a different political party assumes the role of host, suggests a topic for the dialogue and prepares a draft joint communiqué. The
participation of political parties in the dialogue also changed during the reporting period, with a new member, the Greek Cypriot Democratic Alignment, joining and the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party in returning to the dialogue after an extended absence of two years. The need to create a better political atmosphere, de-escalate tensions and return to the negotiating table were the most dominant shared messages expressed by the political parties. In their dialogue, they also expressed a heightened sense that the two sides should move forward urgently on the Cyprus issue.

III. Status of the process: United Nations Headquarters-based efforts and engagement with the parties

10. Discussions have continued on the way forward with the leaders of the two communities and their representatives, as well as representatives of Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In addition to my separate meetings with the two leaders as well as Greece and Türkiye, the Assistant-Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, Miroslav Jenča, visited Cyprus from 30 June to 1 July and from 16 to 17 November, and visited Türkiye from 27 to 28 June. He had also visited the other guarantor powers in the previous reporting period (Greece from 3 to 4 May, and the United Kingdom from 5 to 6 May). All interlocutors expressed support for the continued efforts, and engagement continues in the search for a way forward.

IV. Status of the process: activities of my mission of good offices

11. My mission of good offices continued to reach out to a broad network of interlocutors, both on the island and in the relevant capitals, to promote intra-island interaction, cooperation and trust-building. The Deputy Special Adviser held 86 meetings with the two leaders and their representatives, political parties, religious leaders, civil society organizations and actors, the European Union, the World Bank and the diplomatic community, as well as with visiting senior officials from a range of Member States. These discussions covered a broad range of issues related to creating conducive conditions for the peace process, advancing mutually acceptable confidence- and trust-building measures, reducing obstacles to greater inter-communal interaction and trade and supporting the work of the technical committees. Staff from my mission of good offices held another 211 meetings with the same categories of interlocutors at the working level and conducted working-level visits to Ankara, Athens, London and Brussels for meetings with Greek, Turkish, United Kingdom and European Union officials.

12. The 12 technical committees formed by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to build confidence and improve the daily lives of Cypriots continued their important work, albeit with uneven success and with growing challenges later in the reporting period. The mission of good offices continued to coordinate, facilitate and support the work of the committees, with support from UNFICYP, and to sustain dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. Despite the difficult political environment, a number of the technical committees continued to implement approved projects and submit new projects.

13. Renewed positive dynamics in the Technical Committee on Culture led to more regular meetings among committee members. Two project proposals – a networking and mapping event for the arts in Cyprus entitled “Connecting Arts” and a video and drawing competition for children and young people – were formulated and approved for implementation. While implementation of the video and drawing arts competition
has begun, the “Connecting Arts” project was delayed owing to the expiration on 4 October of the European Union funding facility. Nonetheless, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was able to secure funding to allow the project to be implemented by December 2022, although it was ultimately delayed by the Turkish Cypriots owing to electoral cycle timing.

14. As per the agreement reached between the two leaders on the extension of the Joint Contact Room in Pyla/Pile and its subsequent launch in April 2022 (more details are set out in the latest report on UNFICYP, S/2023/3), one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot work together to ensure an ongoing exchange of information. Two raids on illegal casinos took place, resulting in the closure of both. The co-chairs of the Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters and the Joint Contact Room in Nicosia continued their exchange of information on crime and criminal matters, and such exchanges reached new levels.

15. The Technical Committee on Economic and Commercial Matters met regularly to identify ways to make advances on its list of priorities. It finalized a pre-feasibility study on the management of electronic and electrical waste, which it hopes to kick-start soon through a business-to-business trade model. The Technical Committee also played a key role in broader efforts to increase Green Line Regulation trade volume, which reportedly reached record levels in 2022, albeit from a very low baseline. Longstanding efforts to allow direct bank transactions between the two sides, facilitate the crossing of commercial vehicles and exchange old Euro banknotes from the north had still not borne fruit. Efforts were also under way to allow Turkish Cypriots to open bank accounts in the south.

16. The Technical Committee on Broadcasting and Telecommunication maintained a productive role in addressing issues requiring their attention, including frequency interference in civil aviation and radio frequencies. The implementation of the project to pave the way for the deployment of 5G networks on the island has continued, with the clearance of the 700 MHz frequency bandwidth and introduction of 5G in the south since May. The project is now estimated to be finalized towards the third quarter of 2023.

17. The Technical Committee on Health successfully implemented its project on mapping risks for vector-borne disease and organized an event on 30 September to disseminate the main findings of the project related to a new invasive species of mosquitoes, including measures taken to contain it in the interest of public health and safety across the island. The co-chairs of the Technical Committee on Health continued to exchange information on the epidemiological situation on both sides, including vaccination data and sanitary measures that could be instituted as necessary. The Committee continued to ensure delivery of European Union-approved COVID-19 vaccines to the Turkish Cypriot community, albeit on a small scale owing to the overall reduced demand for COVID-19 vaccination.

18. Following the experience earlier in the year during a large forest fire in the north, when assistance was provided by the south and neighbouring countries, with ad hoc coordination assistance from UNFICYP, the representatives of the two leaders requested the Technical Committee on Crisis Management to work with the United Nations in Cyprus to develop recommendations on more efficient standing protocols to manage future crises. UNFICYP, in collaboration with my mission of good offices, developed a paper on the lessons learned from that exercise for consideration by the Technical Committee, with a view to operationalizing crisis management coordination processes, possibly establishing crisis coordination desks on both sides and collaborating with the Technical Committee on the Environment on crisis situations that have environmental consequences. Thus far, while discussions have been held, no progress has been achieved, with an absence of serious engagement on
substantive issues from the Greek Cypriot side noted at the Committee level. On 22 September, the Committee held a seminar on earthquakes.

19. The Technical Committee on Gender Equality continued to engage, including on how to implement further the “Action Plan on ways to ensure women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in the settlement process/an eventual settlement process” in Cyprus that was adopted by the two leaders in January 2022. A year after an agreement was reached on the Action Plan, no significant progress had been made, notwithstanding frequent discussions both at the level of the Technical Committee and at the level of the two leaders’ representatives. An understanding between the two sides was finally reached at the end of the reporting period for an event to be held on women’s participation in early 2023.

20. Apart from its regular joint visits to assess and propose ways to address environmental island-wide issues, the Technical Committee on the Environment also exchanged information on an ongoing basis on situations and activities with environmental impacts. The co-chairs of the Technical Committee also gave a well-received presentation to the third cohort of the United Nations Youth Champions for Environment and Peace programme, described in more detail below. Despite the positive dynamics among Committee members and the full commitment of the co-chairs, however, the long-standing project for the rehabilitation of carob trees suffered delays and blockages owing to terminology issues and the locations involved. The Committee had plans to hold a public launch of the environment website in the coming months, which had also been delayed.

21. The Technical Committee on Crossings met regularly. The Committee agreed to work on improving the flow at the existing crossing points, especially the busiest Agios Dometios/Metehan crossing, and addressing delays, complaints of ill-treatment of individuals by officials belonging to the other community and other ad hoc crossing-points matters.

22. The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage continued to pursue actively its important work, benefitting from the close and productive relationships between the co-chairs and among its members as a whole. Since 2012, the Committee has conserved, structurally supported, physically protected or restored heritage sites island-wide, including Orthodox, Maronite and Armenian churches, mosques and minarets, fortifications, hamams, aqueducts and watermills. It is currently finalizing the implementation of several projects, including the full renovation of the White Church in Risokarpaso/Dipkarpaz. Given its busy agenda, new project proposals and the rising cost of materials and service charges, my mission of good offices worked closely with the co-chairs of the Committee to secure new funding from the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas. As a result of those efforts, the Alliance agreed to partner with the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage and UNDP, under the auspices of the mission of good offices in Cyprus, to work on the conservation of two important cultural heritage sites: St. George of the Latins church in the walled city of Famagusta and the Tuzla Mosque in Larnaca. On 24 October, an event was organized to mark the signing of a grant of $840,000 from the Alliance for this project. This initiative marks the first funding partnership between a private foundation and a technical committee in Cyprus.

23. The Technical Committee on Education did not meet during the reporting period, and no projects were implemented. There was also no movement on intensifying efforts to promote peace education across the island or empowering the Committee to implement the recommendations contained in its 2017 joint report, as called for by the Security Council. On 31 October, the Turkish Cypriots suspended their participation in the award-winning peace education project “Imagine” under the auspices of the Technical Committee on Education. Implemented by the Association
for Historical Dialogue and Research and the Home for Cooperation, the project aimed to increase contact and collaboration among the communities in Cyprus and the fight against racism and xenophobia. Since its inception in 2017, more than 6,100 students from both sides of the divide have been educated, with more than 700 teachers who accompanied their students to bi-communal meetings in the buffer zone. In addition to activities with students, more than 500 teachers were trained in peace education both mono-communally and bi-communally.

24. For the first time since October 2021, the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs met once in late November.

25. The Support Facility, a mechanism created in 2019 in cooperation between the European Commission, my mission of good offices and UNDP to strengthen the capacity of the committees and enhance the impact and visibility of their work, expired in early October 2022. As noted in my previous reports, since its creation, the Support Facility had played a key role in support efforts aimed at reinvigorating the work of the technical committees. Earlier in 2022, in anticipation of its expiry, UNDP advised the technical committees and my mission of good offices that the European Commission would not approve new project proposals from the committees with implementation periods past early October. This created delays and uncertainty, with certain projects being put on hold until there was clarity on funding. UNDP secured internal funding for certain activities as an interim measure, lasting from October to December. While the European Union had advised of its decision to launch a second phase of the facility, consultations with all concerned, including the two sides, were still ongoing.

26. As previously reported, on 20 May 2022, Mr. Anastasiades presented a letter containing a package of previously presented confidence-building measures, last proposed in its current form in 2020. In response, Mr. Tatar presented his own letter to Mr. Anastasiades on 20 June, outlining the Turkish Cypriot position regarding the conditions necessary to resume “meaningful and formal negotiations”. In the letter it was also stated that the Turkish Cypriot side would put forward ideas for “cooperation of mutual benefit” between the two sides in the following weeks. In two subsequent letters sent to me on 1 and 8 July, Mr. Tatar conveyed multiple suggestions for “cooperation on pressing issues”.

27. The confidence-building proposals put forward by the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders cover areas of interest and potential mutual benefit to both sides, and throughout the reporting period the Deputy Special Adviser held discussions with the sides on possible steps forward. An understanding between the representatives of the two leaders to focus initially on a European Union-backed proposal for a photovoltaic park potentially to be located in the buffer zone, and on irregular migration, a pressing issue for both sides, had not yet produced progress on a way forward.

28. Given the relevance of civil society actors for the achievement and sustainability of an eventual settlement, my mission of good offices maintained extensive contacts with civil society, and the Deputy Special Adviser has accorded them a prominent place in his outreach efforts, supporting and encouraging their mobilization, advocacy and participation in wider peacebuilding activities on the island. Regular briefings to students and young people also took place on the mission’s mandate and activities.

29. My mission of good offices continued to work with UNFICYP to support environmental peacebuilding initiatives and activities to highlight and address environmental challenges in the buffer zone, throughout the island and regionally. Mission staff supported UNFICYP in the United Nations Youth Champions for Environment and Peace programme, which just had its third successful year with a new cohort of young people from both communities who engage together in climate
action and advocacy. Representatives from the Technical Committee on the Environment also participated in the Youth Champions programme, discussing environmental peacebuilding opportunities and challenges on the island.

30. My mission of good offices supported a series of public engagements on the need to bring Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots closer together to build ties and foster trust. On 29 September, the Deputy Special Adviser delivered a keynote address at the third annual Cyprus Forum, highlighting how the growing separation on the island was undermining the prospects for a mutually agreed settlement and the need for urgent action to strengthen day-to-day ties between the people on the two sides. On 18 October, at the 18th Annual Economist Cyprus Summit in Nicosia, the Deputy Special Adviser delivered a speech entitled “Revitalizing peace talks through increased intra-island trade”, conveying the message that expanding trade and business ties between the two sides of the island, as well as providing the infrastructure to support these ties, is critical to creating conducive conditions for a future settlement in Cyprus. An additional event organized by the mission of good offices as part of the Cyprus Forum took place on 23 September and brought together the World Bank, the European Commission and representatives of the two Chambers of Commerce on the same theme. On 17 October, the Deputy Special Adviser also hosted the heads of the two Chambers of Commerce in the United Nations Protected Area for their first in-person meeting in over two years. The mission remains engaged in the activities of the working group on entrepreneurship and innovation, together with UNFICYP, which organized the second business and networking fair on 3 December, under the overall theme of women and entrepreneurship. All of the above events provided platforms to promote and underline the urgency of strengthening ties, especially economic, between the two communities on the island as a way of keeping hopes and possibilities alive for a future comprehensive settlement.

31. Also at the Cyprus Forum, staff of the mission of good offices facilitated a public discussion on sport and peacebuilding, with four Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sport experts and practitioners, as well as a representative from the United Nations Office at Geneva. This discussion helped to shed light on sport as an underutilized vehicle for encouraging people-to-people interactions across the island and fostering mutual understanding and respect.

32. During the reporting period, a polling exercise was commissioned by the mission and conducted in the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Similar to polling results in 2021, a majority of respondents from both communities reconfirmed their aspirations for a mutually agreed settlement and expressed the belief that it was imperative to reach one as soon as possible. Despite the desire and urgency expressed, however, significantly fewer respondents of those polled had confidence that a settlement could be reached. The exercise also showed that respondents who had contact with members of the other community, in general, wanted a settlement more urgently, had higher trust and less fear of the other community and foresaw fewer problems in case of a settlement, compared with the respondents without contacts. Many of these findings contrast with anti-settlement viewpoints disseminated in the two sides in certain political circles and amplified in the media.

V. Observations

33. Over the past six months, difficult political and economic developments and regional tensions have impacted both communities. The situation has both reflected and exacerbated the current lack of political space for finding common ground for
formal negotiations, with the positions of the two sides growing further apart, as can be evidenced in the written updates of the two sides, annexed to the present report.

34. Despite the worsening atmosphere, the continued absence of full-fledged negotiations and limited space for engagement on substantive issues in the peace talks, United Nations senior officials have continued to engage with the two sides and the guarantor powers with a view to finding common ground towards negotiations. Furthermore, the two leaders and their representatives have continued to engage with my Deputy Special Adviser on the ground. Given the continuing absence of full-fledged negotiations, the leaders’ presence at the 7 December reception in Nicosia sent a positive signal to the broader public. As we continue to support the sides in seeking common ground, the parties’ flexibility, political will and forward-looking view in the best interests of Cypriots will be of paramount importance.

35. My mission of good offices remained firmly engaged in facilitating dialogue at various levels and promoting contact and rapprochement between the communities. Early in the reporting period, my Deputy Special Adviser urged the acceleration of efforts to build goodwill between the two sides by registering meaningful bi-communal achievements. This strategy was well received by the two representatives of the leaders, and engagement intensified. Unfortunately, this progress shifted mid-period to an increase in rigidity on both sides. The serious efforts by the two sides to protect the work of the technical committees from political obstructions that had borne fruit since the beginning of the year, gave way in the second half of the reporting period to a slowdown and increasing instances of political blockages. It is especially critical in a time of political tensions that the two sides provide the committees with the necessary support and leeway in order to preserve their ability to function, deliver results and address matters with island-wide implications. The technical committees, where both communities can discuss and address issues of common concern, should be protected and insulated from larger political discussions and problems in and adjacent to the buffer zone involving UNFICYP.

36. The slowdowns and obstructions in certain technical committees were particularly unhelpful. The suspension by the Turkish Cypriots of their participation in the peace education project “Imagine” under the auspices of the Technical Committee on Education is highly regrettable. I also call for engagement regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the 2017 report of the Technical Committee on Education. It must remain the highest priority to implement projects that support the education of teachers and children on both sides of the island in a culture of peace and to fight stereotyping and xenophobia. The fact that there has been only one meeting of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs since October 2021 and no substantive meetings of the Technical Committee on Education since July 2021 is disappointing. The delay in the projects initiated by the Technical Committee on Culture is also regrettable. Finally, the lack of progress on creating an agreed process to respond in a coordinated fashion to cross-island crisis situations, such as wildfires, should be addressed urgently, and the Technical Committee on Crisis Management should be instructed to move forward without further delay. In view of the many pressing issues that would benefit from intra-island cooperation, the technical committees remain underutilized overall.

37. I call on the two leaders to direct the Technical Committee on Gender Equality as a matter of priority to implement the Action Plan on ways to ensure women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in the settlement process/an eventual settlement process. In the absence of formal negotiations, it should in particular be explored how the leaders themselves as well as the Technical Committee on Gender Equality regularly engage with civil society, women and youth organizations in advance of and during any possible future Cyprus settlement process, to solicit their views in order
to prepare the ground for a possible future settlement. To this end, international best practice and innovative tools and platforms should be explored in order to help identify and immediately establish a robust standing platform for regular consultations with “all of civil society”.

38. I once again echo the Security Council’s call for greater engagement with civil society more broadly and urge the two leaders to encourage contact and cooperation between the two communities. I call upon the leaders also to aim for more inclusive cooperation and links between the two communities now, and ultimately in the peace process, and to involve underrepresented groups, including women, minorities, young people and persons with disabilities in discussions related to a shared future on the island and incorporate their views accordingly.

39. The expiration of the funding agreement for the Support Facility to the technical committees has created a funding gap. In this context, the recent decision by the European Union to continue to provide funding support is a welcome development.

40. I encourage the two leaders and their representatives to engage in a constructive dialogue and urge them to agree to and implement mutually acceptable confidence-building measures that can contribute to a more conducive environment for settlement. The proposals put forward by the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders cover areas of potential benefit to both sides and may in turn contribute to the improved stability of the broader eastern Mediterranean region. I urge the two leaders to engage in discussions on the proposals in the spirit of building trust and finding common ground for the benefit of all. The United Nations stands ready to facilitate such a dialogue.

41. Both my good offices mission and UNFICYP will continue to be committed to bringing Cypriots together to work on shared issues of importance on the island, such as entrepreneurship and environmental peacebuilding. The situation with irregular migration in particular is worrying, with trends related to climate security globally and in the region possibly exacerbating migrant flows in the future.

42. I have repeatedly stressed the importance of the parties refraining from taking unilateral actions both in and adjacent to the buffer zone that could raise tensions and compromise reaching common ground on peace talks, while also calling upon all parties to engage in dialogue in order to resolve their differences. I reiterate my concern over developments in the fenced-off area of Varosha. The position of the United Nations on Varosha remains unchanged. I recall the decisions of the Security Council on the matter, notably resolutions 550 (1984) and 789 (1992), and I underscore the importance of adhering fully to those resolutions.

43. I remain concerned about growing tensions in and around Cyprus and the broader eastern Mediterranean region. I urge all relevant parties to avoid unilateral actions that could heighten tensions. I also reiterate that natural resources in and around the island should benefit both communities and constitute a strong incentive for the parties to urgently seek mutually acceptable and durable solutions to disagreements related to natural resources and ongoing or planned energy cooperation projects in the region, for the benefit of all relevant stakeholders.

44. In the continued absence of substantive dialogue on the Cyprus issue between the two sides, and given the prevailing socioeconomic and political climate, prospects for reaching common ground on the Cyprus peace process remain uncertain for the time being. As the views on the role and mandate of an envoy continue to differ, no agreement has yet been found regarding the modalities for the appointment of a United Nations envoy, who could explore ways to reach common ground towards resuming negotiations for a lasting settlement in Cyprus. Our engagement with the sides and the guarantor powers continues in this regard. I reiterate that the future of
the process remains in the hands of the parties, and their demonstration of political will and flexibility remains of paramount importance as we continue to support them in seeking common ground. In this respect, a United Nations envoy to lead engagement with the parties could provide critical support.

45. While underscoring the importance of the work of the technical committees and the positive impact of confidence-building measures for trust-building between the two communities, I believe that only genuine progress towards reaching a consensus starting point for meaningful, results-oriented negotiations leading to a settlement will reassure Cypriots as well as the international community that a peaceful and shared future on the island truly remains possible. I have maintained contact and dialogue with the parties, as have the Deputy Special Adviser and senior officials at United Nations Headquarters and on the island, as well as with the guarantor powers, and we will continue to do so in the coming period. In these efforts, I remain guided by relevant Security Council resolutions that have established United Nations parameters.

46. Once again, I encourage all Cypriots to engage actively in shaping the future of the island and to look forward with pragmatism, despite the current prevailing atmosphere. Continued and serious efforts are needed to find a mutually acceptable way forward to ultimately bring the Cyprus issue to a settlement and bring peace and prosperity to all. In the meantime, I urge the guarantor powers to support dialogue and cooperation between the two communities.

47. I would like to thank the partners once again, including the World Bank and the European Commission, that have continued to provide support for the work of both United Nations missions in Cyprus, UNDP and the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and have contributed to the implementation of confidence-building measures.

48. Finally, I would like to thank my Deputy Special Adviser, Colin Stewart, and the personnel serving in my good offices mission in Cyprus for the dedication and commitment they have brought to their work.
Annex I

Written update by the Greek Cypriot leader to the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary-General, pursuant to and in accordance with UNSCR 2646 (2022)

This submission is made in response to the encouragement in UN Security Council Resolution 2646 (2022), to “the leaders of the two communities to provide written updates to the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary General on the actions they have taken in support of the relevant parts of this resolution since its adoption, in particular with regard to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 and 8, with a view to reaching a sustainable and comprehensive settlement.”

The present update includes all developments relevant to the effort to resume the peace process in the framework of the Good Offices Mission of the UNSG, irrespective of their inter-state or inter-communal character. References to communities are without prejudice to the Republic of Cyprus as a Member State of the United Nations and references to UNFICYP are made without prejudice to the Republic of Cyprus as the host country of the Force.

I. Efforts to resume the peace process

Efforts for the resumption of the Cyprus peace process are – since the unsuccessful conclusion of the Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana in July 2017 – impeded by the policy of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriot side to question the agreed basis for a solution of the Cyprus problem as endorsed in the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, namely a bizonal, bicomunal federation with political equality as defined in the said resolutions. During the reporting period we have unfortunately witnessed no change with regard to this policy, increasingly accompanied by aggressive rhetoric and actions which aim at undermining the prospect for the resumption of negotiations but also other efforts, including at the level of the Technical Committees, which have the potential to contribute towards a more conducive environment and subsequently towards the strengthening of the prospect for a solution and reunification.

During these challenging times for the international order, when international law, multilateralism and the rules-based international system are being questioned, it is imperative to renew our unequivocal commitment to the principles and values enshrined in the UN Charter which formed the pillars of international peace and stability after the devastating wars experienced by humankind during the last century. We therefore renew our unwavering commitment to the United Nations as our collective accomplishment, established to save succeeding generations from the scorch of war.

In the framework of the Cyprus peace process, we have since February 2014 reached an agreement on a Joint Declaration of the leaders of the two communities which exemplified and reaffirmed the basis for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The extensive negotiations over the various chapters that followed, culminated into the Crans Montana Conference in 2017, which came closer than ever to a comprehensive strategic agreement.

After the unsuccessful conclusion of the Conference in July 2017, we renewed our efforts for the resumption of the peace process from where it was left-off in Crans Montana, being conscious of the imperative need to preserve the body of work that
had been accomplished, in particular the significant convergences on core issues, as described in the UN Secretary General Report of September 2017.

An agreement in principle was reached by the leaders of the two communities in August 2019 for the Terms of Reference for the resumption of the negotiations, which was based on the existing body of work, namely the Joint Declaration of 2014, prior convergences and the 6-point framework presented by the UN Secretary General in Crans Montana. This understanding was confirmed during the meeting of the leaders of the two communities with the UNSG in Berlin in November 2019, paving the way for an informal 5+UN meeting which took place in Geneva in April 2021. Despite all efforts, we were not able to achieve a breakthrough due to the fundamental shift in the position of the Turkish side, also manifested through an unprecedented policy of interventions, the eventual manipulation of political developments in the occupied part of Cyprus and the imposition of a new leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has since been advocating positions that run contrary to the established UN framework as enshrined in UN resolutions. In the context of the same policy aiming to undermine every prospect for the resumption of the peace process, the Turkish side also repeatedly rejected the proposal for the appointment of a UN Envoy with a mandate to facilitate the effort for the resumption of negotiations on the basis of the relevant Security Council Resolutions. The proposal was rejected both during the meeting in Geneva in April 2021 and again during the informal meeting of the leaders of the two communities with the UN Secretary General in September 2021 in New York and still continuous to be rejected by the Turkish side. At the same time Turkey continued to embark on a series of illegal and provocative activities in the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the EEZ of Cyprus, violations of the military status quo along the Turkish forces ceasefire line as well as in Strovilia, and in the fenced area of Varosha, in full defiance of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and decisions. The aforementioned were even more aggravated by Turkey’s continuous upgrade of its military capabilities and infrastructure in the occupied part of Cyprus, a policy entailing grave risks for Cyprus but also for peace and stability in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

These moves by Turkey towards the further militarization of the occupied part of Cyprus were also manifested via decisions for the establishment of a drone base in the illegal military airport of occupied Lefkonoiko, the creation of a naval base in occupied Trikomo and the further expansion of the Turkish military infrastructure in the Karpas peninsula which have been further advanced during the reporting period.

Furthermore, Turkey has recently included the Tymbou “airport” to its list of domestic airports, a move which came only days after its decision to impose a new financial protocol upon the Turkish Cypriot community in the context of its policy of suppression and curtailment of the Turkish Cypriots and the integration of the occupied part of Cyprus to Turkey. Additionally, the policy of suppression against Turkish Cypriots who stand up against these policies continued to be manifested and to be intensified.

Despite this negative background and being fully conscious of the need to put an end to the stalemate and to create conditions conducive to constructive dialogue, we continued to seek ways and to take initiatives for the reinvigoration of the peace process and the revival of the prospect for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

In this context and bearing in mind concerns expressed by the Turkish Cypriots regarding aspects of the issue of political equality and effective participation, we reaffirmed our commitment to the relevant convergences achieved until the Conference in Crans Montana and we furthermore submitted a proposal for the decentralization of the exercise of certain federal competences with a view to
enhancing the role of the constituent states, whilst at the same time strengthening the functionality and viability of the Federation.

In the same spirit, we put forward in December 2020 a package of bold Confidence Building Measures which we have also presented directly to the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in May 2022, with the earnest hope that they could provide a basis for a constructive discussion and progress towards a breakthrough.

The proposed package comprised the following:

(a) Varosha – Tymbou airport: The fenced area of Varosha and the access thereto, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Security Council Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992), be transferred to the administration of the United Nations with the view to enabling the early return to the area of its lawful inhabitants under conditions of safety the soonest possible.

In parallel, the Tymbou airport be also placed under the administration of the United Nations and operate in full conformity with the relevant rules of international law, including the 1944 Chicago Convention as well as the 1960 Treaty of Establishment.

In this context it is necessary to reiterate that there is a single and undivided Flight Information Region in Cyprus (Nicosia FIR).

(b) Famagusta Port – Ankara Protocol: Practical arrangements on trade through Famagusta port, in conformity with Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus to the 2003 Act of Accession to the EU, would be agreed. Such trade would be administered by the European Commission.

Turkey would lift its restrictions towards Cyprus and would implement fully and non-discriminatorily the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement towards Cyprus, thus, permitting, inter alia, access of Cypriot-flagged vessels in Turkish ports and the opening of its air space.

(c) We reiterated in the strongest possible manner that it is not our intention to usurp, either a drop of hydrocarbons or a single penny from any possible revenues, from what our Turkish Cypriot compatriots rightfully are entitled.

That is why we recalled our proposal that when and if the exploitation of hydrocarbons commences, even without a solution of the Cyprus problem, to deposit revenues accrued to an escrow account to the benefit of the Turkish Cypriot community, in accordance to the population /citizens proportion of the future constituent states.

Of course such an arrangement could only be in place if an Exclusive Economic Zone/continental shelf delimitation agreement between Cyprus and Turkey is reached, taking also into account that the current claims by Turkey deprive, not only from the Greek Cypriots but the Turkish Cypriots as well, a large portion of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the island.

Unfortunately, this package was rejected out of hand by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community who subsequently counter proposed in July 2022, confidence building measures that unfortunately reflect the position of the Turkish side for a “two-state” solution. Despite this, we reiterated our readiness to discuss all proposals, as long as this discussion is aligned with the aim of reunification and the established basis for a solution in accordance with the relevant UNSC Resolutions.

This negative reaction by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, in stark contrast to calls from within the Turkish Cypriot Community for a constructive response, has also been combined with further provocative actions and continuing
threats by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side. These include the illegal actions and announcements on further violations in Varosha, in blatant disregard of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions as well as the repeated calls by the UN Security Council to cease violations and reverse unilateral actions.

During this period, we have also witnessed renewed efforts in pursuit of the international upgrading of the secessionist entity, as seen in the recent decision by the Organisation of Turkic States to amend its statute in order to permit the accession of entities and to grant the status of observer to the illegal secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus. This decision is in contrast to international law and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions in particular 541(1983) and 550 (1984) which consider the declaration of the so called “trnc” to be legally invalid and call on all states not to recognize and not facilitate in any way the aforementioned secessionist entity.

In the same vain and in the context of its policy to create new fait accompli, to undermine the prospects for a solution and to pursue the upgrading of the secessionist entity, the Turkish Cypriot side has declared a demand for the the conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the UN in sharp contrast with the legally binding principles that such agreements are being concluded only between the UN and the governments of States that host peacekeeping operation in this case the Republic of Cyprus as enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent Resolutions.

On the ground we continue to be faced with repeated attempts of incursion into the buffer zone in a number of hotspots along the Turkish Forces ceasefire line, thus further risking to undermine efforts for a conducive environment but also altering the basis upon which the process is taking place and bringing about the solidification of the status-quo.

In spite the above, we remain committed to the effort, under UN auspices, to reinvigorate the prospects for a resumption of the negotiations and stand ready to do our part to accomplish this aim. We maintain our firm commitment to continue to work towards a breakthrough and we reiterate our agreement with the position expressed by the UN Secretary General in his letter of 26 October 2020, that the resumption of the talks should build on the existing body of work and that the best way forward is by returning to negotiations and forging a lasting settlement in accordance with United Nations parameters, as established in relevant Security Council Resolutions and from the point they were suspended in Crans Montana.

In this context, the support of the UN and the UN Security Council in particular is imperative, including by further reinforcing the message towards Ankara regarding the need to refrain from any threads and actions that could further undermine the prospects for the resumption of negotiations. Of equal importance is the need to remain firm and unwavering with regard to the goal of reunification as the only viable path ahead, as well as on the need to uphold the long established agreed basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as set out in the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

This is the only common ground upon which a breakthrough can be achieved. Attempts to put forward ideas for new common ground based on a logic of middle ground between the aforementioned mutually agreed basis and the “two state” solution declared by the Turkish side would only serve as appeasement and would encourage an even more arrogant stance.

Notwithstanding our position on the need for the appointment of Special Advisor/Special Envoy of the Secretary General as per the long standing UN practice, we welcome the recent decision by the UN Secretary General to assign a high-ranking
official of the UN Secretariat with the role of liaising with all involved in the context of the effort to find a breakthrough. The subsequent visits of Assistant Secretary General Miroslav Jenča to Cyprus in April, July and November 2022, have been instrumental in highlighting the message about the continued commitment of the UNSG to provide his good offices and to work for the reinvigoration of negotiations.

We earnestly hope that all involved will engage in a spirit of good will, seeking to address the legitimate sensitivities and concerns of both communities and to achieve win-win situations and a new era of friendship between Cyprus and Turkey as well as Greece and Turkey which will in turn have positive repercussions on EU–Turkey relations and the overall security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

II. Effective mechanism for direct military contacts

Given the need to defuse tension on and around Cyprus, the necessity for the establishment of a mechanism for direct military contacts, between the opposing forces in Cyprus, facilitated by UNFICYP, becomes urgent.

Even more so, taking into account the continuous violations of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, in Varosha, the obstructions and interference on behalf of the Turkish occupation forces to the ability of UNFICYP to perform its duties, and the continuous upgrading of Turkey’s military infrastructure in the occupied part of Cyprus.

In this direction, the government of the Republic of Cyprus presented a proposal already in December 2019, outlining a framework for a mechanism for direct military contact between the opposing forces, namely the National Guard and the Turkish occupation forces, at the level of their Commanders, facilitated by UNFICYP at respective level, in accordance with its mandate, as prescribed by the UN Security Council Resolution 186 (1964).

With a view to further facilitating the effort for the establishment of the military mechanism the government of Cyprus has submitted a proposal for the appointment by the respective Commanders of the opposing forces of focal points that will comprise the mechanism along with a representative of UNFICYP at the respective level.

III. Committee on Missing Persons

The work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus remains a fundamental aspect of the peace process and therefore, the support of all parties is indeed considered a conditio sine qua non.

In this regard, we would like to stress once more the importance of access to information from relevant archives of countries and organizations that had a military or police presence in Cyprus in 1963, 1964 and 1974, thus rendering the Committee more effective.

In particular, the Turkish military archives, especially of the period around 1974. Turkey has the obligation to exercise due diligence and provide information from its archives in good faith, to help determine the fate of missing persons in Cyprus.

Access to military archives would inter alia provide information regarding primary locations of burial of missing persons, as well as secondary locations given that a great number of remains were relocated, rendering the efforts of the Committee extremely difficult.
As pointed out numerous times in the past, it is indeed critical to grant access to archives and obtain pertinent information to the question of the fate of missing persons, which constitutes one of the grave humanitarian challenges of the conflict.

IV. Technical Committees

The Technical Committees continue their work, aiming to alleviate the daily life of people from the adverse effects of the status quo, within the framework of their terms of reference as agreed between the leaders of the two communities since 8 July 2006, under UN auspices. Within this framework, their work constitutes an integral part of the peace process and are inextricably linked with the overall effort for a solution to the Cyprus problem on the agreed basis as defined in relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Their work also contributes to the efforts to improve the public atmosphere and to create conditions conducive to the resumption of the negotiations.

During the reporting period, the Technical Committees continued to undertake a number of positive initiatives further building on the achievements they have accomplished.

Regrettably, there have been also occasions of their work being increasingly hampered as a result of decisions taken by the Turkish Cypriot side. This approach has let to delays, postponements and in some cases setbacks on a number of projects.

One of the most indicative examples of this approach concerns the decision by the Turkish Cypriot side in October 2022 to suspend its participation in the “Imagine” programme on anti-racism and peace education, implemented under the auspices of the Technical Committee on Education. It should be underlined that since its first launch in October 2017, “Imagine” has reached thousands of students and hundreds of teachers and is widely recognized as having made a significant contribution to the aim of increasing bi-communal contact and collaboration. Therefore, the decision by the Turkish Cypriot side, taken in the midst of the program’s relaunch for the current academic year and on the basis of unfounded allegations, constitutes a significant setback. It is expected that this decision will be reconsidered and that the program will be fully restored.

The discussion on how to address the increasing challenges as a result of irregular migration has also been at a standstill since our repeated calls for the issue to be discussed in Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters, have been met by the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot side on establishing other layers of engagement outside the context of the Technical Committees which points in the direction of creating a context of cooperation between respective administrations. This approach is in fact questioning the very logic upon which the Technical Committees were established, which was to create a context that will bring together experts from both communities in their personal capacities and on the basis of their professional qualifications, thus bypassing the sensitive issue of contact between so called respective “administrations”.

Discussions on the important proposal for the establishment of a photovoltaic park in buffer zone have also not progressed as expected due to the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot side for the involvement of an “institution” of the “trnc” in the preparation of the relevant pre-feasibility study.

In the Technical Committee on Culture, following long discussions and extensive delays as a result of continuous amendments being requested by the Turkish Cypriot side, the Technical Committee agreed on a proposal for a networking event for artists in Cyprus aiming to bring together artists and academics from the two communities to meet and connect, create a space where they would be able to share
their work and planning as well as create new ties. However, the implementation of this proposal as well as the agreed proposal for a video and drawing competition inspired by the cultural heritage sites of the island, were postponed very late in the process by the Turkish Cypriot side by invoking a “law” that does not allow for the organization of such events in a “pre-election” period.

Despite the challenges outlined above, work has continued on other issues, albeit in some cases with considerable delay. In this context, the Technical Committees have been encouraged to use available tools and resources to deliver concrete results, within the framework of their mandate. To this end, the Technical Committees continued to benefit, up until the expiration of the contract in October, by the Support Facility funded by the EU in the framework of the Regulation 389/2006. This mechanism and the support framework that it provides is of crucial importance for the work of the Technical Committees and in this context we look forward to the rapid conclusion of the relevant process for its continuation.

Following the lifting of all COVID-related restrictions in May, the crossing points have returned to their pre-pandemic operational status. In line with our aim to enhance intercommunal contact, discussions within the Technical Committee on Crossings to further facilitate crossings of people and interaction between the two communities continue. In this context our efforts concentrate, among others, on initiatives that will speed up relevant checks at the crossing points, including through improvement works and the hiring of additional staff.

Contributing in the contacts, the understanding, the respect and the trust building between the two communities through joint work on the restoration of cultural monuments and sites, the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage has maintained a steady output with 13 projects already concluded in 2022, 13 projects which are still ongoing and 21 more projects which are upcoming in the following year. Their work has inspired other Technical Committees as well, including the choice of theme for their projects.

The Technical Committee on Gender Equality is currently continuing its work for the implementation of the practical recommendations included in the Action Plan agreed in response to the UN Security Council call to the leaders of the two communities for a concrete commitment to increase women’s full, equal and meaningful participation in peace talks and to provide direct support and encouragement to civil society organisations to enhance inter-communal contact and trust-building. In this context, discussions within the Technical Committee are currently focusing on the organisation of a seminar during which, women from both communities who have been involved in previous negotiation rounds will share their experiences and perspectives. As a next step, we proposed also the organisation of an event with the participation of women who took part in other peace process.

At the same time, the Technical Committee on Economy continues the discussion on ways to further advance trade on the basis of the Green Line Regulation. Following the recent implementation of the decision to expand the list of traded products to include certain processed foods of non-animal origin, discussions are underway to further expand the range of traded products, as well as the respective financial transactions mechanisms. Taking into account the need to advance economic interaction it should be noted that much work remains to be done to ensure that trade works in both directions, bearing in mind in particular, existing obstacles in the “reverse trade”. The Technical Committee on Economy has also worked on ways to enhance and further highlight economic cooperation between the two communities., Moreover, a feasibility study on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment recycling involving both communities has been concluded with the Technical Committee unanimously endorsing its content and recommendations. Following this, we have
expressed our full support to the timely implementation of this proposal, recognizing its importance, not least from a trade and environmental perspective. We look forward to a positive reply by the Turkish Cypriot side once it has concluded its own review.

The Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters has maintained a well-functioning channel for exchange of information regarding criminal activity through the Joint Contact Room (JCR). The sub-facility of the JCR, launched in Pyla in April 2022, has also contributed to efforts to address the particular challenges in the area. At the same time, the increasing number of unauthorized “police” operations in the village, are a source of serious concern. These actions contribute to a worsening climate, both within the local community as well as more generally, and constitute a clear attempt to create the false impression that Pyla is an area under the “co-administration” of two sides. We therefore stress the need to refrain from such actions, underlining the status of Pyla as an area that lies within the buffer zone and in which the UN peacekeeping force has specific responsibilities in accordance with its mandate.

The Technical Committee on Health has sustained its exchange of information relating to public health issues, such as COVID-19 and the monkeypox outbreak. It has also concluded the second phase of the programme on the identification and distribution of mosquito vectors, contributing to the enhancement of capacity building in identifying mosquitoes of medical significance and increasing public awareness on protection measures against mosquito bites.

Moreover, the Technical Committee on Education is continuing its work on the implementation of the Prevalence, Correlates and Prevention of conventional bullying in schools and cyberbullying project, in synergy with the Technical Committee on Crime. Of particular importance in the context of the Technical Committee on Education is the project on Lessons Plans, comprising 30 modules of supplementary educational material to be made available to students and educators for voluntary use. This was envisaged as a pilot project in response to the call of the UN Security Council in its Resolutions to promote peace education in Cyprus. Although the experts have concluded their work last September, the project continues to remain under review by the Turkish Cypriot side.

Finally, the Technical Committee on Environment has reached agreement on the proposal for Protection and preservation of Carob trees with relevant site visits currently underway in the context of implementing the project. A number of other projects are also in the pipeline, including the ones relating to the Geological Heritage of Cyprus, the Environmental Innovation Challenge Competition and the Protection of Vultures.

The Technical Committees have a considerable role as contributors to a more positive political environment, in the framework of their mandate and in this context we renew our commitment in further supporting them in their quest to deliver their task, which forms integral part of the peace process and of the overall effort to achieve a solution and the reunification of Cyprus on the agreed basis.
Annex II

Actions taken by the Turkish Cypriot Side in support of the relevant parts of the Security Council Resolution 2646 (2022)

General Outlook

I, as the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), would like to share the critical developments that unfolded within the past 6 months which have played a crucial role in respect to the future of my State and the Turkish Cypriot People whom I represent.

As the TRNC, we continued our efforts for the reaffirmation of our inherent rights, namely sovereign equality and equal international status, which we have been deprived of by force in 1963.

The President of the Republic of Türkiye, H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his address in September 2022 at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in New York made a historic call to all Member States to officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. At a platform where the representation of my People continues to be denied, President Erdoğan called on the international community to put an end to the oppression towards the Turkish Cypriots and to the efforts to isolate us from the World through inhuman restrictions, contrary to the principles of the United Nations, and to officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as soon as possible. This landmark call reminds the Member States of their responsibility to take steps to dispel the illusion that the Greek Cypriot government, under the guise of the legally defunct Republic of Cyprus, is the sole legitimate authority of the island of Cyprus.

Concrete results to this end will bridge the unlawful and unfair gap between the statuses of the two equal Sides and prepare the needed common ground for the start of meaningful formal negotiations between them under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General.

From the first day that I assumed my duties as the President, upon the mandate given to me by my People, I have been advocating the reaffirmation of these inherent rights as the only realistic basis on which the 59-year-old Cyprus problem could be solved. The ongoing denial of re-affirmation of the inherent rights of the Turkish Cypriot People has not only been blocking a just and sustainable settlement, but has also led to the sustenance of an uncertain future for the Island of Cyprus.

As regards the inherent equal rights of the Turkish Cypriot People: the two Peoples have exercised their inherent equal rights and have co-founded the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus. The equal status of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and their equal rights in the effective governance of the Island, including in determining their future, were enshrined in the 1959-60 international agreements and the 1960 Constitution by means of which the Republic of Cyprus was established as a sovereign state and under which the structure of its government was determined. The governance of the partnership Republic, including the precise manner in which power would be shared by the two Peoples, was determined in the Basic Articles of the Constitution which were set out in the Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959. The 1960 Constitution preserved and protected fully the Basic Articles and expressly prohibited their amendment, whether by way of variation, addition, or repeal.

The Republic of Cyprus acquired its international recognition within the strictly defined framework laid out in the international agreements, which were also
prescribed in its Constitution, on which the partnership Republic was founded, and began to exercise its limited sovereignty and international legal personality within the confines of its internationally protected structure.

Despite the clearly defined power-sharing arrangements, that required the maintenance of a delicate balance, which were secured by the three Guarantor Powers and the two Peoples, in 1963, the Greek Cypriot partner started her unilateral campaign, unconstitutionally amending the “unamendable”, internationally-sanctioned Basic Articles of the Constitution, destroying the essentials of partnership by restricting the inherent rights of the Turkish Cypriot People, thereby turning the State apparatus into one that they unilaterally governed. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot partner maintained this unilaterally created unlawful status through force of arms and pursued a policy of depriving the Turkish Cypriot partner of its inherent rights in all walks of life.

The UN acknowledged the unlawfulness, and in 1964, it proposed to deploy its Peacekeeping Force in the Island (UNFICYP) to undo it, and to halt the disproportionate armed violence against Turkish Cypriot civilians.

What was lacking at the time was a UN Security Council resolution to recognize the fact that the partnership Republic was indeed defunct. Disregarding its obligation to that end, the UN, instead, chose to seek the consent of the Greek Cypriot partner which created the unlawfulness, thereby serving to its sustenance. All relevant parties define this unlawfulness as the status quo of which they clearly express to be unacceptable and unsustainable.

UNFICYP not only failed to prevent the bloodshed against Turkish Cypriots, but the situation further deteriorated on their watch. By 1974, mainland Greece joined in the Greek Cypriot campaign through organizing a coup d’état to unite the island with Greece in July 1974 and the further violation of the 1960 Treaties necessitated the intervention of Türkiye as part of its obligations therein.

Intervention by Türkiye stopped Greek Cypriot and Greek-instigated genocide attempts against the Turkish Cypriot People and brought non-violence and stability to the island by securing the present borders of the two States. After the establishment of the borders, the two Administrations, under the auspices of the UN, managed to conclude a Population Exchange Agreement, whereby Turkish Cypriots moved to the North and Greek Cypriots to the South. This landmark Agreement set the ground for the democratic legitimacy of the two Sides.

Since then, the two Sides have been conducting their democratic elections, electing their Presidents, forming their governments, and running their States. Each Side knows where its sovereignty, authority and jurisdiction start and end.

In 2004, for the first time in the history of Cyprus negotiations, both Leaders agreed to put the internationally-sanctioned UN comprehensive settlement plan, also known as the Annan Plan, before the citizens of their States to vote for their approval in separate and simultaneous referenda according to their respective national legislation, which entailed the enactment of a separate referendum law by the Parliaments of both States. The referendum that were held on 24 April 2004 were conducted by the electoral boards of both States that supervised the implementation of their own legislation on elections. The Annan Plan was approved by 65% of the Turkish Cypriot electorate and rejected by 76% of the Greek Cypriot electorate. Turnout for the referendum was high at 89% on the Greek Cypriot Side and 87% on the Turkish Cypriot Side, which is indicative of the extent of interest attached to the Plan and the legitimacy of the procedure on which the separate simultaneous referenda were held.
The international community’s persistent denial to recognize these factual realities on the ground is unacceptable and unsustainable. In violation of international law, the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to act as if it has the capacity to represent the Island as a whole, with the support of the international community’s policy of denial.

This illusion is the creator of the Cyprus issue and the guardian of its existence.

Reality pushed this illusion to start to shatter in 2003 upon the opening of the first crossing point between the two States. The Greek Cypriot propaganda machine that has been instrumental in preserving this illusion began to break-up as the Greek Cypriot People began to cross to the TRNC and experienced the factual reality of the Island of Cyprus - the existence of two States. The reality is that both Sides are sovereign equals and are equally entitled to enjoy equal international status.

My vision, which is fully supported by the Republic of Türkiye, not only registers this reality, but also offers the international community the opportunity to free themselves from maintaining this illusion and thus protecting the unsustainable and unacceptable status quo. Consequently, my vision opens the door for the start of a new, formal settlement process based on a realistic basis.

Our Cooperation Proposals

As the Turkish Cypriot Side, I reiterate my readiness to start a new, formal process immediately, following the reaffirmation of our inherent rights, and to resolve the Cyprus issue based on a cooperative relationship between two Sides.

Until then, I proposed six areas for cooperation with the Greek Cypriot leadership. My proposals were prepared in a constructive, forward-looking manner, for a win-win outcome. These proposals, if implemented, will be beneficial to the two Sides, the Island of Cyprus and clearly contribute to the stability and the welfare of our region.

On 1 July 2022, I have conveyed our first set of cooperation proposals to His Excellency, the UN Secretary-General Mr António Guterres, which was then kindly conveyed to the Greek Cypriot leadership.

The first set of cooperation proposals focus on energy-related issues on the following four areas:

As the first area, I have proposed cooperation on co-owned hydrocarbon resources on the Island, a fact that is accepted by all relevant parties and stakeholders. So far, the discovery of hydrocarbon resources off the shores of the Island remains an area of contention between the two Sides and has a negative impact on the relations among the coastal States and the involved stakeholders. The reason for this is the hegemonic vision of the Greek Cypriot Side and its insistence on pursuing a unilateral course. I prefer cooperation and diplomacy over unilateralism. I repeatedly stated that the Turkish Cypriot proposal dated 13 July 2019 is still on the table, and even updated this proposal on 1 July 2022 to address the excuses put forward by the Greek Cypriot leadership in order to urge them to utilize these resources in a mutually acceptable manner.

The updated Turkish Cypriot proposal thus envisaged the establishment of a committee to be composed of an equal number of members appointed by the two Sides, with the power to jointly decide on offshore hydrocarbon activities, including revenue-sharing. After the formation of this joint committee, the energy companies that have been separately licensed by the Turkish Cypriot Side and the Greek Cypriot Side, could be authorized by the contracting Side, to establish a committee, which
will be facilitated by the United Nations, with the European Union as observer. The committee would be entrusted with, *inter alia*, cooperation on and coordination of future off-shore activities, future contracts and aspects related to monetizing and sharing, while making recommendations on the transfer of these resources to international markets. Decisions taken and the arrangements made in this respect shall not prejudice the legal and political positions of the Turkish Cypriot Side and the Greek Cypriot Side on the Cyprus issue.

As the second and third area of cooperation, I proposed transition to green energy which is of paramount importance. We have been experiencing unprecedented man-made and natural disasters worldwide. Naturally, the island of Cyprus is not immune to the adverse impacts of climate change.

I am convinced that the tackling of this global challenge necessitates cooperation between the two States on the Island. As a first step, I proposed the establishment of electricity interconnectivity of the Island with Europe through the geographically closest and economically most feasible Türkiye route, which is already connected with the former. Following this important step, the Island of Cyprus will be part of the European interconnectivity system through the utilization of the already existing inter-connected electricity grid between the two Sides. Both Sides are predominantly using fossil fuels to produce electricity, which is polluting the environment. Interconnectivity with Europe will clearly enable expanded use of green energy on both Sides.

Interconnectivity would also contribute to the stability of our respective electricity grids, by avoiding grid imbalances and overloading, and ensure the utilization and trade of renewable energy among interconnected countries.

To complement the transition to green energy, I also proposed to establish a joint committee, composed of an equal number of authorized officials from both Sides, with the aim of optimizing the utilization of solar energy, including investments throughout the island, to the benefit of both the Turkish Cypriot People and Greek Cypriot People.

As the fourth area of cooperation, I proposed the establishment of a joint committee, with the participation of equal number of authorized officials from both Sides, to work towards cooperation on the rational use of freshwater resources of the Island. This proposal entailed the possibility of sharing the water we have been receiving through underwater pipelines from Türkiye. Water is the indispensable yet scarce resource that is of paramount importance, particularly for our island which is drought prone.

On 8 July 2022, I have conveyed my second set of cooperation proposals to the UN Secretary General, who kindly conveyed it to the Greek Cypriot leadership. The first area of cooperation aimed at clearing the remaining landmines that constitute threats to the safety and well-being of the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People.

As the President, I considered it as my primary duty to protect my People by ensuring their physical safety from apparent threats like landmines. The Turkish Cypriot Side has put forth comprehensive proposals to the Greek Cypriot Side in 2014, in 2015, and in 2018, for the demining of the Island, starting with the areas adjacent to the buffer zone, one in Derinya under our jurisdiction, and three in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot Side, near Akincilar village. The ultimate goal of my proposal is the clearance of the 29 remaining suspected hazardous areas with a view to reaching a mine-free Island. To that end, I proposed the creation of a mechanism whereby UNFICYP could facilitate the demining activities, in coordination with the two Sides. I also proposed that the demining operations in each
Side are conducted proportionally and simultaneously. On my end, I expressed the readiness of my authorized officials to sit down with their Greek Cypriot counterparts, to discuss, in detail, the modalities for the implementation of the demining operations with a view to addressing the matter without further delay. This is a legacy that we owe to our future generations.

In my final proposal, I addressed the global phenomenon of irregular migration as neither the Turkish Cypriot Side nor the Greek Cypriot Side is immune from this challenge. Prepared by our relevant Governmental bodies, this cooperation proposal took into consideration the sensitivities and concerns of both Sides. The proposal was prepared so as not to prejudice the rights and procedural guarantees for persons applying for asylum, in line with the UN Convention of 28 July 1951 on the Status of Refugees. In this proposal, I suggested the establishment and functioning of a cooperation mechanism, composed of equal number of officials from the relevant departments from each Side, including the Departments of Police Immigration, Immigration Departments of the Ministries of Interior and the Offices of the Attorneys-General. The cooperation mechanism would be under the auspices and facilitation of the UN, without prejudice to the respective legal and political positions of the two Sides and in a way that shall not be construed as altering their respective stand with regard to the Cyprus issue.

Our Island’s geopolitical and strategic importance is obvious. We live in a dynamic environment and need to act in accordance with the realities and needs of the conjecture around us. The aim of my proposals is to increase island-wide cooperation, in order to prepare the ground, pending the reaffirmation of our sovereign equality and equal international status, which would be conducive for political settlement in Cyprus. The realization of this objective would serve the elevation of the Island of Cyprus in the international arena, due to our contribution to peace, stability and welfare in the region. We are yet to receive a formal response from the Greek Cypriot leadership and we believe it is high time for the international community, including the UN, to urge the Greek Cypriot Side for a positive approach.

The Unhelpful Role of Third Parties

Although all agree that the two Sides in Cyprus are inherent equals, this equality needs to be demonstrated and seen not just in words, but in practice. The continued treatment of the unlawful Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of the whole island is only helping the sustenance of the unacceptable status quo and non-settlement in Cyprus by disallowing the inherent equality of the Turkish Cypriot Side. This behavior of third parties is encouraging the Greek Cypriot leadership to continue with their intransigence and is solidifying their comfort zone, thus enabling them to take steps that further deteriorate relations between the two Sides and escalate tension at the risk of the future of the Island.

The EU’s unlawful and unilateral admittance of the Greek Cypriot usurped “Republic of Cyprus” to the EU, despite this being in violation of the Copenhagen Criteria for membership and the objections of the Turkish Cypriot Side and Turkey, has further complicated the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The EU, instead of looking forward and helping prepare the ground for an inherent equality based settlement, is stuck in 2004 and continues to deal solely with the Greek Cypriot Side at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot Side. This stance of the EU is helping sustain the status quo, which everybody says is unacceptable, and is the key obstacle for non-settlement in Cyprus.

Making matters worse, the Greek Cypriot leadership used the Ukrainian/Russian war as a pretext to persuade the US to completely lift the arms embargo on them in
return to its so called cooperation with the West. Earlier, the Defence Cooperation Agreement between the French Republic and the Greek Cypriot Side, which was signed on 4 April 2017, came into force on 1 August 2020. These pamper the Greek Cypriot Side further and encourage them in their hegemonic vision in Cyprus. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot leadership is reaching out to other countries to enhance their military capacity. All these further empower the Greek Cypriot Side and further distance the two Sides from an inherent equality based settlement. No doubt these will cause an arms race on the island since the TRNC will be forced to take the necessary steps and measures to defend itself. All these will harm peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We, as the Turkish Cypriot Side, in our contacts with the relevant countries, continue to state our disappointment and urge them to re-consider their counterproductive moves. I am committed to protect the safety of my country and preserve peace and stability that have prevailed on the Island to this day following the 1974 Peace Operation of Guarantor Power Türkiye, which she has conducted pursuant to the Treaty of Guarantee.

The Negative Role of the Greek Cypriot Education System

Hostility and hatred form the epicenter of Greek Cypriot policy towards Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye. The Greek Cypriot Side continues to hold on to this archaic policy as the bedrock of its existence and outlook. To ensure that the next generation also pursues this policy, the Greek Cypriot leadership injects enmity to its education system. The textbooks provided to students are based on this mentality and contain material that cultivates enmity towards the Turkish Cypriot People and Türkiye.

It is with regret that, despite previous calls by the Security Council on the matter, concrete steps have still not been taken by the Greek Cypriot Side to make the needed changes in their education system.

The latest example of the products of this policy was staged at an anti-Turkish protest on 15 November 2022 attended by Greek Cypriot students during school hours through the organization of the Greek Cypriot Ministry of Education in which the students chanted racist slogans of hatred.

Regretfully, the Church is also instrumental in spreading enmity towards Turkish Cypriots through schools. It is a known fact, also confided by one candidate who is standing in the upcoming leadership election in the South that the Church appoints the Minister of Education, and this candidate has pledged that in the event he wins, he will put an end to this practice. The poisoning of young minds undermines reconciliation efforts and puts at risk the peaceful future of the island of Cyprus. The international community should no longer tolerate or ignore these disturbing facts.

UNFICYP’s Status, Presence and Operations in the TRNC

The Cyprus issue continues to be an item on the international agenda for almost 60 years. It is high time the UN and the international community addresses the illusion that the Greek Cypriot Side represents the whole island and takes decisive and practical steps to bridge the political gap between the two inherent equal Sides in Cyprus. In this regard, our consent to UNFICYP’s operations in my country must be sought and a legal framework must be reached upon as a matter of urgency. My authorities continue their engagement with the UN to further our proposal that was presented to the UN in New York last September. The Turkish Cypriot Proposal reflects the UN Model Status-of-Forces between the UN and host countries (UN Doc.
Our consent is an indispensable requirement for UNFICYP to operate in the TRNC, and we continue our engagement with the UN in a realistic and results-oriented manner. Fulfilling this bedrock principle of peacekeeping by the UN in the context of the island of Cyprus will be a win-win outcome for all concerned. This agreement will move us closer to restoring the shattered equilibrium.

Technical Committees

The exercise of whether common ground exists or not is ongoing under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. In the meantime, the work of the technical committees is also continuing. The trilateral mechanism has proven effective and continued with its weekly meetings, taking up not only the works of the technical committees, but also other daily and practical matters important for both Sides. While the European Union, as an institution, as well as a few of its Member States have shown interest to contribute to some specific technical committees and/or projects, their insistence on injecting their political prescription for settlement as a condition for their support has proven to be counter-productive. Such an approach has not only adversely affected the works of the technical committees, but also undermined Turkish Cypriot confidence in the EU, together with confidence between the two Sides, and further undermined the chances of finding common ground at the political level.

Recognizing the added value of the Technical Committees, which should operate on the basis of equality and should act as a tool to build institutional cooperation and confidence, I am committed to support their efforts to improve the daily lives of the Turkish Cypriot People and the Greek Cypriot People, and I have given instructions to that end.

As regards some highlights in the work of the technical committees, the Technical Committee on Health has completed the first phase of the project on the identification and distribution of mosquito vectors to address the risk for disease transmission, and in this context, prepared materials to alert and inform both Sides.

The activities of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage towards the protection of cultural heritage and towards ensuring their preservation for future generations are continuing.

The Technical Committee on Environment has completed the website which is intended to be a platform for experts from both Sides to access and communicate their projects and exchange views and best practices. The Committee has continued its discussions on possible projects which range from the protection of carob trees, feasibility study on geo-heritage and other activities on the protection of the environment.

Regarding the Technical Committee on Crisis Management, our Co-Chair has made a proposal to the committee that entails direct communication with Civil Aviation Authorities in Ercan Airport to ensure air safety for civilian flights. We are expecting a response from the Greek Cypriot on this important issue. The Committee also started to work towards the establishment of a mechanism that would enable effective communication and cooperation between the two Sides whenever necessary, particularly in the cases of natural disasters and emergencies.

Following the agreement of the Technical Committee on Broadcasting to remove TV broadcasting systems from the 700 MHz frequency band in order to make way for the introduction and use of 5G across the island, the tender process to ensure transition from analogue to digital broadcasting has been initiated.
The Technical Committee on Economy and Commercial Matters is working on issues like the enhancing of the trade of processed food from the TRNC, enabling bank transactions between the two Sides and the crossing of commercial vehicles from the TRNC to the South. We are hopeful that the resolution of the issue of exchanging worn out Euros, an issue that has been on agenda of this committee for years, is in its final stage.

The Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters has continued with the exchange of information between the police forces of the two Sides, via the Joint Contact Room (JCR) in the buffer zone, on crime and criminal matters, including the handing over of suspects between the two Sides. The Committee also set up another JCR in the village of Pile and started to exchange information on crimes.

The Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs has agreed to work on raising awareness regarding challenges faced by the elderly and the necessity to ease their daily lives.

The Technical Committee on Gender Equality has agreed on an Action Plan, as called upon by the UN Security Council, on the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in an eventual settlement process. The Committee will continue its technical work towards the implementation of this Action Plan.

The Technical Committee on Culture has agreed to organize a video and drawing competition on antiquities which would be open to the participation of youth and children from both Sides on a voluntary basis. The Committee is also continuing its discussions on the organization of an event for artists and those who engage in arts from both Sides.

The Technical Committee on Crossing Points is working on ways to ease the crossing of peoples at crossing points, yet we are disappointed by the speed with which the Greek Cypriot side is taking up these matters. The Committee is particularly pursuing the Turkish Cypriot proposal to ease crossings especially at the Metehan and Beyarmudu crossing points, in line with the applicable legislation and the decision of our Government to that end.

The Technical Committee on Education is continuing its work on the implementation of the joint project it has prepared with the Technical Committee on Crime and Criminal Matters titled “Prevention of Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools”. The Imagine project has been suspended following the identification that the implementing partner of this project is being partly sponsored, as stated in its web page, by the Greek Cypriot Side, putting their impartiality into question.

In brief, in order to enhance the work of these committees, the participation of authorized personnel from the relevant departments of the two Sides is indispensable so as to effectively tackle the outstanding issues that relate to the lives of both Peoples as quickly as possible, pending a political solution. I wish to underline that institutional cooperation between the relevant departments of the two Sides is essential for the meaningful and effective functioning of the bilateral Technical Committees.

The Committee on Missing Persons

The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) has continued its effective work to find the remains, exhume and identify the missing persons on both Sides of the Island, with a view to easing years-long anguish and pain of the relatives of missing persons.

The support of the TRNC to the work of the CMP is multi-faceted.
Sharing information at our disposal to enable CMP to find the remains is one aspect of our contribution. Since the initial exchange of information on possible burial sites in 1998, TRNC has continued to share any new information that came about on additional burial sites.

Information sharing was maintained through granting CMP access to a number of State archives, and enhanced through the establishment of the Archive Committee, in 2016, which was tasked to respond to the specific requests of the CMP on possible burial sites.

Access was also granted to the Turkish Cypriot Member’s Office of the CMP to the aerial photos dating from 1974, which proved to be a helpful tool to find burial sites through examining photographic images of the disturbances in the soil. In the reporting period, CMP resorted to the aerial photos in 8 different coordinates in 6 different regions.

After corroborating information on possible burial sites, CMP prepares its own exhumation schedule on the places it will excavate. Accommodating access of CMP to suspected sites is another aspect of our contribution to the work of the CMP.

In order to assist CMP, TRNC authorities continue to make the necessary arrangements so that CMP can have access to any suspected burial site throughout the TRNC. In this context, CMP has completed its work in 58 sites. In May 2022, a new list has been prepared and access has been granted for 10 military areas; including 4 sites with the updated GPS coordinates from June 2019 and 6 new sites, where excavations will be conducted according to the excavation planning of the CMP.

In 2022, CMP excavated 49 areas in the TRNC. 4 excavations in the TRNC are concluded in the military areas with the granted permission in June 2019. Moreover, 2 excavations have been completed and 1 excavation is currently ongoing out of the 10 military areas where access has been granted in May 2022.

Monetary contribution to assist CMP in financing its activities is another aspect of assistance we provide. Annul contributions to the budget of the Office of the Turkish Cypriot Member of the CMP is in the amount of approximately EUR 1,000,000 per year. This is supplemented by annual payments, with EUR 75,000 in the reporting period, bringing the total to EUR 508,000. The funds that are transferred by the EU, reaching EUR 33,300,000, are from the funds the European Union has earmarked for the economic development of Turkish Cypriots.

During this reporting period, CMP identified 3 additional missing persons, 1 of whom was a Turkish Cypriot missing person and 1 Greek Cypriot missing person, as well as 1 Greek Cypriot who was not on CMP’s official missing persons list. The Turkish Cypriot Side expects the CMP to proceed with exhumations of Turkish Cypriot reported missing persons in the known mass burial site in Atlılar village without further delay.

**Hellim/Halloumi**

Turkish Cypriot producers continue to be deprived of the opportunities already available to their Greek Cypriot counterparts in the South and cannot export their traditional product, Hellim/Halloumi, to the EU, with the added benefits provided by its registration as a Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) in the EU.

To this day, the modalities set out in the EU legislation have not been implemented for the Turkish Cypriot producers in the TRNC. While the appointed control body, Bureau Veritas, started its operations in the South, as early as 1 October 2021, it has not yet done so in the TRNC. Moreover, for a year and a half, since
12 April 2021, no appointment has been made for the required body to verify the food and safety standards to enable the export of Hellim/Halloumi to EU markets.

In addition to the above, the Greek Cypriot Side is now trying to obstruct the export of Hellim/Halloumi cheese from North Cyprus to third countries. Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/591 clearly states in paragraph 45 that intellectual property rights are governed by the principle of territoriality. As a consequence, the PDO registration is valid within the EU and has no relation to the manufacture or marketing of the product in third countries. Furthermore paragraph 46 clearly states that compliance with the sanitary provisions applied in the EU is only necessary for marketing in EU member states. Despite these provisions the Greek Cypriot Side has sent a note verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of the Republic of Lebanon on November 30, 2022 through its Embassy in Lebanon asking for the prohibition of Hellim/Halloumi imports from North Cyprus. This is clearly an attempt to cripple our economy and Hellim/Halloumi exports from our country. All these are happening despite the call of the UN Secretary General that the acute economic difficulties faced in North Cyprus do not benefit any of the parties to the conflict, but instead make prospects for a settlement more difficult and that the widening of the economic gap will feed resentment and distrust between the two Sides, while exacerbating estrangement between them (5 July 2022, \textit{S/2022/533}, para. 52).

Hellim is a shared traditional cheese product that belongs to both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. In the reporting period, the Working Group established by the European Commission has met twice. We have been doing our best to complete the PDO registration and SPS standards necessary for compliance with the Implementing Regulation and Decision, nevertheless, the Group has failed to change the eventuality whereby Turkish Cypriot producers continue to be excluded from benefitting from the registration, due to unnecessary formalities/obstacles and/or the lack of the necessary inspection schemes. The European Commission has the responsibility to proceed with the cancellation of the PDO registration for the whole Island, should it not function effectively as foreseen in the relevant EU legislation.

Isolation and Restrictions

During the reporting period, there has not been any change in the Greek Cypriot’s obstructionist policy of imposing inhuman socio-economic restrictions and isolation on the Turkish Cypriot People, the latest example being the Hellim/Halloumi case above. Turkish Cypriots have been suffering from these socio-economic restrictions since 1963.

The inhuman and unacceptable restrictions and isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot People must come to an end, and it falls on the UN and the international community to terminate this oppression. This human rights violation is more than a concern and is a reality that needs to be terminated.

During this reporting period, this Greek Cypriot hostile policy was felt in all walks of life, including in cultural, academic and sports events, in the right to travel abroad, communication with the outside world, as well as trade relations with other countries.

This policy also manifested itself as threats, at all levels, including the organization of health and education related events in our country, and our representation abroad.
Hydrocarbons

I am firmly committed to turn the contested hydrocarbon issue, which are co-owned by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, to an area of cooperation.

In this reporting period, my commitment was reflected in a written proposal on 1 July 2022 to pave the way for utilizing these natural resources for the benefit of both Peoples of the Island, and also to contribute to peace, stability and welfare of the region as a whole. I would like to call once again upon the Greek Cypriot leadership, the relevant coastal states and stakeholders to seize this opportunity which, I am confident, will lead to a win-for-all outcome.

Maraş

In this reporting period, the Greek Cypriot applications to the European Court of Human Rights-sanctioned Immovable Property Commission (IPC) concerning the closed part of Maraş has increased to 470. The increasing number of applications by the former Greek Cypriot inhabitants is a clear demonstration that our Maraş opening policy is well-received by the Greek Cypriot People. IPC will evaluate these applications in a timely manner, in accordance with our applicable legislation, as well as our international obligations.

I am determined, together with my Government, to carry out this policy in a way that would address the claims of property owners.