



SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

PROFILE REPORT



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KOSOVO

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Background

Tensions between the Slavic and Albanian communities in Kosovo came to a head in the 1980s, the period following the death of Yugoslavia's post-war leader, President Josef Broz Tito. But social, economic and political cleavages had already begun to surface in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1970s, constitutional changes had expanded Kosovo's already existing autonomy and allowed greater independence for the Albanian majority. However, these had the effect of increasing the anxiety within the minority Kosovo Serbian community. Province-wide demonstrations by Albanians in 1981 for the status of a republic further exacerbated the tensions with the Serbian community. Increasingly repressive measures by Belgrade began to follow.

A significant watershed in Kosovo's current problems can be traced to June 1989 when Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic made Serbian nationalism a key plank of his administration. This shift stimulated ethnic tension by resurrecting long-held grievances and sharply reduced the autonomy that Kosovo had enjoyed within the Yugoslav Federation. Kosovo's population, 90 percent Albanian, refused to accept direct rule from Belgrade and a movement initially based on non-violent resistance began.

In July 1990, ethnic Albanians issued a declaration of independence, and formed their own parallel governance structures as well as separate civic and professional institutions. Ibrahim Rugova was voted in as president in elections that were not recognised by outside parties. While trying to prevent violent revolt, he sought to internationalise the problems in Kosovo, while at the same time undermining the legitimacy of Serbian rule.

Belgrade responded with numerous repressive measures. Meetings of the parallel structures were banned, Albanians were arbitrarily detained and torture became frequent. Albanians were also dismissed from their jobs because of their ethnicity, and there were cases of ethnicity-based evictions of Albanians from government-owned housing. By late-1995, according to Human Rights Watch, about three quarters of Albanians formerly employed by the state had lost their jobs. The teaching of Albanian was banned, and travel by ethnic Albanians was sharply limited.

Against this backdrop of worsening relations, an underground armed group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in mid-1995. In February 1996, it began to claim credit for a number of violent acts such as the killing of several Serbian officials and policemen. Ethnic Albanians who were considered to be collaborators with the Belgrade government were also targeted. The Milosevic government responded with a counterinsurgency campaign that involved indiscriminate attacks in regions of Kosovo considered KLA strongholds, with women and children among the civilians killed. Thousands fled to Albania and Montenegro. Villages were systematically destroyed and crops were burned, thus ensuring the ethnic cleansing of the areas.

The Security Council, although preoccupied with events elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia such as the brutal conflict in Croatia and Bosnia, began to follow events in Kosovo in a low-key manner from 1994 onwards. Subsequently, after violence in Kosovo escalated rapidly in 1998, the issue attracted much closer attention in the Council. Between summer 1998 and the early months of 1999, the international community undertook several efforts to abate the growing crisis in Kosovo. In September 1998 the Council, in resolution 1199, affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region, and called for a ceasefire by both the KLA and Serbian troops.

An agreement between US special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in October 1998 averted threatened NATO air strikes. Serb forces temporarily withdrew, and allowed access for 2,000 unarmed monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission, which monitored the ceasefire and verified troop movements from Kosovo to Serbia as part of the withdrawal. Although the Council endorsed the Kosovo Verification Mission in resolution 1203, there was some discrepancy among Council members over the interpretation of the resolution. In the Council discussion of 24 October 1998, Russia and China made it clear that they thought this resolution did not authorise military intervention, while the US representative indicated that he thought it did authorise the use of force.

Despite the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement, forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) failed to withdraw from Kosovo, the security situation continued to deteriorate and fighting resumed. Against the backdrop of its threats that military enforcement would follow if a peace agreement could not be reached, the Contact Group convened a further round of peace negotiations on 6 February 1999 in the French town of Rambouillet. A break in the talks allowed the Yugoslav government to deploy troops to the border region and step up assaults on villages and other civilian installations. The talks ended in failure on 18 March 1999.

After long discussions, Kosovars were finally persuaded to approve the proposal made by the Contact Group for a peaceful resolution, while Belgrade rejected the agreement, claiming that it involved unacceptable foreign interference with domestic affairs. The draft agreement had included a clause in which both parties “invited” NATO to constitute and lead a force authorised under a Chapter VII Security Council resolution.

A last-ditch effort to keep the peace process on track, a trip to Belgrade by the negotiators and Holbrooke on 22 March, was also unsuccessful. On 23 March, NATO authorised the launch of military operations against the FRY. No attempt was made to secure an authorising Security Council resolution since Russia and China, publicly as well as in Council consultations, had previously indicated that they would likely use their veto to block any action that condoned the use of force in Kosovo.

At Russia's request, the Council held a meeting on 24 March (S/PV.3988) in which the heated discussion revealed deep splits within the Council and UN membership at large. Two non-Council members, Belarus and India, joined Russia and China in condemning the strikes as the unilateral use of force and arguing that it violated the UN Charter. Meanwhile, many other UN member states supported the action as a humanitarian intervention, necessary and appropriate, in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Three Council members—the United States, Canada and France—stressed that the FRY was in violation of its obligations under Council resolutions 1199 and 1203, passed in 1998. Two other Council members, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, argued that the action was legally an appropriate response to a humanitarian catastrophe.

In a subsequent Council meeting on 26 March (S/PV.3989), representatives from Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cuba, Germany, India, Ukraine and the FRY participated in the debate. Supported by representatives from Belarus and India, Russia proposed a draft resolution that called for the immediate cessation of the use of force, but the resolution was rejected by twelve votes to three, the votes in favour being China, Namibia and Russia.

Once NATO began air strikes, the FRY troops in Kosovo began a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing, expelling as many as 800,000 Kosovar Albanians across the southern borders into Albania and Macedonia. Continuing over the period of the next two months, this campaign created a massive refugee influx for the two neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, NATO's campaign of air strikes continued for 78 days.

A proposal for peace was developed in Bonn after lengthy discussions between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, EU envoy (and Finnish president) Martti Ahtisaari, and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomydin. Under pressure from a growing NATO deployment of troops on the FRY's border, Milosevic on 7 June accepted terms offered by Ahtisaari and Chernomydin, and agreed to withdraw FRY troops from Kosovo in a phased retreat beginning 10 June. As well as language from the previous failed peace process in Rambouillet, the agreement included references to the deployment of civil and security presences under UN auspices, the continued presence of NATO forces and the establishment of an interim administration in Kosovo (S/1999/649, Annex).

Within days, G7 leaders and Russia met in Cologne to reach an agreement on a draft Security Council resolution concerning the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and the funding of the operation. At the same time, military authorities from NATO and the FRY met in Macedonia to discuss the timetable and withdrawal of FRY forces from Kosovo. NATO suspended the air campaign against the FRY, and NATO ground troops entered Kosovo on 11 June in one of the largest military operations in Europe since World War II.

On 10 June the Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 1244, which welcomed the FRY's acceptance of the peace agreement, accepted the presence of NATO and established an international civil presence—the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)—to administer the region. The resolution reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, but specifically left the political future of Kosovo to be decided at a later date. UNMIK was tasked with facilitating the political process designed to determine the final status, and also with overseeing the transfer of authority from the provisional institutions established under its authority to those established under a political settlement.

The resolution, which was drafted in broad terms because of the need to accommodate the wide divergence within the Council, included an unusual formula regarding the expiration of the UNMIK mandate. In contrast to virtually all other Council-mandated operations, which have mandates that are renewed or modified periodically, UNMIK continues in place unless the Council decides otherwise.

UN Presence

UNMIK was the first operation of this type in UN history: it was given an unprecedented mandate both in terms of its scope and structural complexity. UNMIK was tasked with re-establishing and running a complete transitional civil administration, responsible for everything from security, justice, law enforcement, health and education to matters as mundane as garbage collection. UNMIK's tasks amounted to reestablishing all the state institutions, and also establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions. Expectations for the performance of the UN were high. From the beginning, however, UNMIK was plagued with shortfalls in funding and was hard-pressed to fulfill all of the demands required of such an extensive operation.

In his preliminary report on 12 June 1999, just two days after resolution 1244 was passed, the Secretary-General delineated the basic structure that the UN mission would take. The report outlined the division of labour between the UN mission, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and two international organisations, the OSCE and the EU, which would work together to fulfill the responsibilities of the international presence in Kosovo as determined by resolution 1244.

The Secretary-General's first substantive report followed a month later in July (S/1999/779), with an update and a detailed plan for UNMIK's operations and provided phases for the implementation of its tasks. This report established four areas of activities, called "pillars," to be shared between the UN, the OSCE and the EU:

- Pillar 1: humanitarian assistance (headed by the UNHCR, which was phased out in at the end of June 2000);
- Pillar 2: civil administration (headed by UNMIK);
- Pillar 3: institution building (headed by OSCE)
- Pillar 4: economic reconstruction (headed by the EU).

This four-pillar structure remains in place to date, although it is in the process of being consolidated as more responsibility is transferred to the local administrative structures. In May 2001, however, Pillar 1 was replaced with a new pillar, responsible for police and justice under the direct supervision of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

The pillar system appeared to be chosen to respond to earlier difficulties encountered in coordinating international agencies in comparable situations, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In theory, the coordination of the work by the different pillars came through the daily meetings with the SRSG. However, in practice, day-to-day operations of each pillar were carried out independently, with little or no coordination between them, which has been a source of some of the difficulties in coordinating this large UN mission.

Although resolution 1244 gives the UN control of the administration, almost from the beginning, UNMIK sought to involve local counterparts. In January 2000, UNMIK established, together with local

actors, a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The JIAS consists of twenty administrative departments, across all four pillars of administration. This structure was designed as a way to share responsibility between international and local participants in the reconstruction and governing of Kosovo.

Pillar 1: Justice and Police (formerly Humanitarian assistance)

During the first year of the operation of UNMIK, UNHCR was responsible for the well-being of all returning refugees and internally displaced persons, estimated at almost 800,000 individuals. This pillar was phased out once the emergency humanitarian phase was considered completed in June 2000. In May 2001, Justice and Police, formerly housed under Civil Administration, became a new, separate Pillar 1.

When UNMIK was established in June 1999, there was no court system in Kosovo, and the legal system was in limbo as resolution 1244 did not provide guidance as to what law should be applied in Kosovo. It was unclear whether UNMIK should apply recent Serbian and Yugoslav law, or revert to pre-1989 law, which had been passed by the largely Albanian legislature of that era. Initially UNMIK applied Serbian law, respecting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, but under pressure from the Albanian community, soon reversed its policies and began to apply Kosovo law as it existed in 1989.

Since 1999, there has been gradual but significant progress in the reconstruction of a functioning judiciary system. In July of 1999, the Department of Judicial Affairs consisting of Prosecution Services, the Court Administration section (PSCA) and Penal Management (PM), was established. Initially, 55 judges and prosecutors were appointed on short-term contracts of three months to what was known as the Emergency Judicial System. These were gradually replaced with approximately 374 local judges and prosecutors, who are deployed throughout Kosovo and whose terms will run until the end of UNMIK's mandate. International judges and prosecutors were also recruited to address inter-ethnic and organised crime, until the judiciary system was fully functional, and to address the problem of perceived ethnic bias. Other responsibilities of the Department of Justice (so renamed in May 2001) include the establishment and administration of the correctional system in Kosovo, under the Penal Management Division (PMD), the International Judicial Support Division (IJSJ) and Office on Missing Persons and Forensics.

The police force in Kosovo had to be completely rebuilt and retrained to take over security operations and maintain law and order in Kosovo. Initially, KFOR troops fulfilled that role as the police force was gradually rebuilt and re-staffed. The UNMIK police was created as an integrated structure of both international civilian police and local officers of the Kosovo Police Service working side-by-side. It was increased from an initial 3,000 international police officers to 4,718 officers in October 1999, by recommendation of the Secretary-General, making it the largest police force ever mounted by the UN. The local component of 3,500 police officers was added gradually, at a rate of 250 per month.

Pillar 2: Civil Administration

In June 1999, UNMIK began work to establish a civil administration from the ground up to handle all aspects of administration from revenue collection to the provision of public services. While UNMIK was initially staffed with internationals, it has continued to work towards the establishment of Kosovo's provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) in a context of substantial autonomy. In February 2000, the Joint Interim Administrative Structure was established to share administration with local officials. Since March 2002, when a local government was formed by coalition, UNMIK has gradually transferred responsibility for executive decisions.

Within the civil administration, the following departments were established: Agriculture, Central Fiscal Authority, Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness, Culture Democratic Government and Civil Society Support, Education and Science, Public Services, Health and Social Welfare, Labour and Employment, Local Administration, Non-Resident Affairs, Post and Telecommunications,

Reconstruction, Sports, Trade and Industry, Transport and Infrastructure, Public Utilities, and Youth.

Pillar 3: Institution Building

This pillar of UNMIK, managed by the OSCE, is responsible for the following functions:

- democratisation and governance, including the development of a civil society, non-governmental organisations and political parties;
- organising and supervising elections;
- media affairs, including independent media support;
- regulations, laws and standards;
- human rights monitoring;
- the rule of law; and
- police education and development.

Pillar 4: Economic Reconstruction

Pillar 4, under the European Union, was tasked with reconstruction and the rebuilding of Kosovo's economic and fiscal framework. This pillar created and implemented a tax system, administered the privatisation of government-owned enterprises, established a customs department, administered international trade and other external economic agreements, established a working banking system, and worked to integrate Kosovo into various regional and European economic structures.

The five phases of implementation outlined by the Secretary-General in July 1999 were as follows:

1. establishing and consolidating UNMIK's authority, with a focus on humanitarian relief and reconstruction;
2. administering social services and public utilities and encouraging broadly representative political activity;
3. preparing for elections, and the election of the Kosovo Transitional Authority;
4. providing oversight and assistance for elected officials in an effort to organise and establish provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government; and
5. overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to the institutions provided for under a political settlement.

The Secretary-General has provided regular reports of the implementation of the goals outlined in resolution 1244, and the achievements and challenges which faced UNMIK as it grappled with the administration of the province. Phase 4 is considered virtually completed, and depending on the final status discussions, UNMIK would be ready to move into Phase 5.

Minorities

One of UNMIK's most important tasks has been the protection and integration of the minority communities in Kosovo. UNMIK worked to include minorities in the civil administration structures by reserving seats for minorities and pressing hard for their inclusion in administrative structures. UNMIK also monitors human rights abuses, and promotes minority awareness education and minority inclusion in every aspect of its work. However, the issue of minority exclusion and ethnic bias in Kosovo is a serious and ongoing problem for UNMIK.

The Serb, Turk, Bosniak, Roma, Egyptian and Ashkali communities, which together account for roughly 12 percent of the population, have faced isolation, insecurity and occasional outbursts of deadly violence from the majority Albanian community, such as the ethnic violence in March 2004. The Serbian and Serb-speaking Roma communities have faced the most severe discrimination and violence. Initially, UNMIK was not able to provide minorities with adequate safety, and most minority communities remained isolated enclaves while many fled to Serbia. Returns of Serbian and Roma

communities to the province and their integration into the Albanian administrative structures and social services have been very slow.

Minorities have also challenged the authority of UNMIK by maintaining parallel administrative structures tied to the FRY. These parallel structures challenged the operations for some of the ministries, as well as municipalities, principally in the areas of education, health and administrative services.

‘Standards before Status’ Policy

The UN adopted the policy of “Standards before Status” in an attempt to ensure that certain governance and human rights standards were achieved within Kosovo before the question of the future status of Kosovo could be addressed. This policy was supported by the Council in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2003/26) on 10 December 2003. According to this policy, the provisional institutions had to achieve certain standards, or benchmarks, before the final status of Kosovo could be addressed. The eight standards to be met were:

- functioning democratic institutions;
- the rule of law;
- freedom of movement;
- returns and reintegration;
- economy;
- property rights;
- dialogue with Belgrade; and
- the Kosovo Protection Corps.

A detailed implementation plan was released by UNMIK on 31 March 2004. The conditioning of final-status talks on the fulfillment of the “standards” provoked criticism from local political leaders in Kosovo as well as from international quarters. While local political leaders expressed some resistance to fully implementing the standards, particularly with respect to minority integration, a further problem has been that Kosovo’s political institutions are required to meet standards that are not under their control, but under that of UNMIK and the FRY. For example, the dismantling of parallel structures that are financed by Belgrade is not under the control of local actors. In addition, the reform of the judicial system is under the control of UNMIK Pillar 1, not local Kosovar authorities.

Final Status

The conditionality of final-status talks based on the attainment of the standards came under scrutiny soon after the approach was adopted. Kai Eide, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, was appointed to conduct a comprehensive review of the policies and practices of all actors in Kosovo. In his first report transmitted to the Council in August 2004, he cast doubt on the wisdom of pursuing the “standards before status” policy indefinitely. He stated that the policy lacked credibility and was untenable over the long term and suggested that that it be replaced by a broader policy that would move Kosovo towards final status discussions.

The Secretary-General subsequently appointed Eide in May 2005 as his Special Envoy to assess whether the conditions were in place to open discussions on the final status. Eide’s report transmitted in October 2005 (S/2005/635) stated that despite the uneven success of achieving the standards, the time was ripe to begin status discussions.

The Council, in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2005/51), on 24 October 2005 endorsed the opening of status talks between the parties. On 1 November, the Secretary-General appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy to lead the future negotiating process. While he

keeps the Secretary-General appraised, Ahtisaari is not in any real sense dependent on or supported by the UN Secretariat. He has appointed his own team and works very much as an independent agent. Ahtisaari visited Pristina and Belgrade, as well as neighbouring Skopje and Tirana, in December 2005, and announced at the end of December that the first round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina would be held in Vienna in early 2006.

The key issues in the status talks are whether Kosovo will remain part of Serbia and Montenegro, whether it will be independent, whether its status will fall somewhere in between or whether it will be partitioned. The six-nation Contact Group (the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) takes a close interest in Ahtisaari's efforts. The group agrees on three broad negotiating principles: no return to Serbian control, no partition of Kosovo and no unification of Kosovo with its Albanian neighbours. Beyond that basic agreement, however, there are differences within the group as to how that should be accomplished. Russia has sympathy with Serbia and Montenegro, which has insisted that Kosovo should remain part of the state, albeit with much autonomy. The countries of European Union are divided as to the desirable extent of the independence; the US, while indicating in private that independence was preferable, has tried to remain as neutral as possible in public.

In early 2006, Russia seemed to signal that it was beginning to see Kosovo's independence as inevitable. At a press conference on 31 January, Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the Kosovo parallel, suggested that in a similar way, the independence might be appropriate for two regions of the former Soviet Republic of Georgia: "If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?"

Security Council Involvement

The Council has followed closely the situation in Kosovo through the quarterly reports from the Secretary-General as well as by holding regular meetings, both open and closed, to discuss the matters at hand. Throughout the UN involvement in Kosovo, however, there have often been differences of opinion among Council members.

The first year of UNMIK's presence in Kosovo was accompanied by a great deal of disagreement within the Council. The reports by Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK, and the subsequent discussions were held in closed sessions. Kouchner's presentations at the Council caused a degree of controversy, particularly concerning matters that were viewed as infringing on the sovereignty of the FRY. Chinese and Russian representatives questioned UNMIK's work as impairing the sovereignty of the FRY and encouraging a dangerous trend to separate Kosovo from the FRY, which in their view could destabilise the region.

The municipal elections held in October 2000 were one such bone of contention, producing vigorous debates within the Council. For example, Russia, while not against elections in principle, questioned how elections could be free and fair given the lack of freedom of movement and intimidation of minorities within Kosovo. The United States asserted that elections would be the best route to end the violence. A month later, in September, Russia accused UNMIK and KFOR of contravening the Security Council and violating resolution 1244. The Russian ambassador took the SRSG to task for publicly supporting independence for Kosovo and pointing to the ambiguities of resolution 1244. He further strongly criticised the behavior of KFOR soldiers towards diplomats in Kosovo, which in his

view undermined the sovereignty of the FRY. The Chinese delegation pressed the SRSG to strictly adhere to the provisions of resolution 1244.

The planning of elections in 2001 again brought up differences in opinion. In February 2001, the Russian delegation advised against the holding of elections in Kosovo without guaranteeing security for the minorities, clarifying their relationship with the authorities in Belgrade, or ensuring their participation the future elected bodies.

A consistently important issue for China has been the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. Any actions by UNMIK or KFOR perceived to undermine the sovereignty of the state brought a response from China. While all states expressed concern over the security situation for minorities in Kosovo, China and Russia saw minority issues as a fundamental problem in the implementation of resolution 1244.

In October 2005, the Council agreed that it was time to move on to the final phase in this plan, and begin the discussions of the future status of the province.

Underlying Problems

Economic prospects for Kosovo remain dim: the province has very high unemployment rates of 50 to 60 percent, and few functioning domestic industries.

The problems faced by some of the minority communities are severe. Because of resistance on both sides, ethnic integration seems unlikely or, at best, very difficult to achieve. Ethnic tensions in the region are likely to simmer until the negotiations and future status of Kosovo are resolved. Depending on the outcome and how they are received, the negotiations may have a significant impact on the stability of the region.

The death of Kosovo's President Ibrahim Rugova on 26 January 2006 may present new challenges for the final-status talks. It may be very difficult to find a new Kosovar leader who will be able to negotiate Kosovo's position effectively, and gain approval from the public for a compromise solution if it falls short of full independence.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo, and established UNMIK.
- S/RES/1239 (14 May 1999) called for access for humanitarian relief operations to aid Kosovar refugees and IDPs.
- S/RES/1203 (24 October 1998) demanded that Yugoslavia cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo.
- S/RES/1199 (23 September 1998) expressed deep concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army, and called for a ceasefire by both parties to the conflict.
- S/RES/1160 (31 March 1998) called upon the parties to take steps to achieve a peaceful solution, and referred to OSCE and Contact Group readiness to facilitate dialogue. Arms embargo on Kosovo and the FRY was imposed under Chapter VII.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo, and urged the continued commitment to the implementation of the standards.
- S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaffirmed strong support for the "Standards before Status" policy and, subsequent to the March 2004 violence against non-Albanians, urged the PISG to focus efforts on two key standards: "sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members" and freedom of movement.
- S/PRST/2004/5 (18 March 2004) condemned a wave of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo.

- S/PRST/2003/1 (6 February 2003) further reaffirmed Council commitment to the objective of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo.
- S/PRST/2002/29 (24 October 2002) Council members called for participation in elections, particularly from minority communities.
- S/PRST/2002/16 (24 May 2002) called on Kosovo's elected leaders to focus their attention on the urgent matters for which they were responsible.
- S/PRST/2002/11 (24 April 2002) welcomed progress towards Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, and reaffirmed importance of rule of law.
- S/PRST/2002/4 (13 February 2002) expressed support for the new SRSG, Michael Steiner.
- S/PRST/2001/34 (9 November 2001) called on all Kosovar men and women to vote.
- S/PRST/2001/27 (5 October 2001) welcomed upcoming elections.
- S/PRST/2001/8 (16 March 2001) called for an end to all acts of violence in Kosovo, and expressed concern at the security situation in neighbouring southern Serbia, and the northern Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- S/PRST/2001/7 (12 March 2001) was a letter from the Permanent Representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the UN addressed to the President of the Council (S/2001/191).
- S/PRST/2000/40 (19 December 2000) strongly condemned violent action by ethnic Albanian extremist groups in southern Serbia.
- S/PRST/2000/35 (22 November 2000) called for an immediate and full investigation to bring to justice the perpetrators of violent attacks that took place in Kosovo and southern Serbia.
- S/PRST/1999/5 (29 January 1999) welcomed decisions of the foreign ministers of the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, the Russia, the United Kingdom and United States) subsequent to their meeting in London on 29 January 1999, which aimed to reach a political settlement between the parties and to establish a framework and timetable for that purpose.
- S/PRST/1999/2 (19 January 1999) strongly condemned the massacre of Kosovar Albanians on 15 January, as reported by the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission.
- S/PRST/1998/25 (24 August 1998) called for a ceasefire between the FRY and the KLA, and emphasised the importance of unhindered humanitarian access to internally displaced people.

Secretary-General's Reports / Letters

- S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) this report noted that progress in the implementation of the standards was slower than all other reporting periods, and that there were numerous delays or setback in implementing almost all of the eight standards.
- S/2005/709, (10 November 2005) a letter from the president of the Security Council welcomed the appointment of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Status Talks and enclosed guiding principles for the future status process.
- S/2005/708 (31 October 2005) was a letter from the Secretary-General concerning his intention to appoint Ahtisaari to be Special Envoy for the future status process.
- S/2005/635 (7 October 2005) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council transmitting Kai Eide's report which outlined achievement to date of standards and supported the beginning of status talks.
- S/2005/335 (23 May 2005) this report included an annex which outlined key achievements and priority standards challenges relating to: functioning democratic institutions; rule of law; freedom of movement; sustainable returns and the rights of communities and their members; economy; property rights; cultural heritage; dialogue; and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).
- S/2005/88 (14 February 2005) this report noted tangible progress towards the eight standards, but noted that none had yet been fully realised. Kosovo Serbs seeming unwillingness to support the implementation of the standards was noted as an obstacle. The smooth transition to a new coalition government was noted as showing growing political maturity.
- S/2004/932 (30 November 2004) the Secretary-General's report, entitled "Recommendations for the way forward in Kosovo," contained Kai Eide's report as an annex.
- S/2004/907 (17 November 2004) this report noted progress towards the eight standards remained "limited and uneven."
- S/2004/613 (30 July 2004) was a report on progress, subsequent to the violence in March, in the

reconstruction of damaged or destroyed property, inter-ethnic reconciliation and reform of local government.

- [S/2004/348](#) (30 April 2004) this report noted damaging effect of violence in March.
- [S/2004/71](#) (26 January 2004) this report noted that the record of achievements by Kosovo's Provisional Institutions was mixed, with progress apparently stalled in some areas. It called for more to be done to uphold the values of multi-ethnicity, tolerance and equal rights for all communities.
- [S/2003/996](#) (15 October 2003) the new SRSG, Harri Holkeri of Finland, reaffirmed the key priorities: improving the rule of law and the security situation; furthering returns and minority rights; and strengthening economic development in order to promote substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999).
- [S/2003/675](#) (26 June 2003) this report noted "significant progress" in achieving substantial autonomy and self-government.
- [S/2003/421](#) (14 April 2003) this report noted significant step of the process of transferring further responsibilities to the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.
- S/2003/113 (29 January 2003) this report noted much work still ahead to achieve the benchmarks set for standards. The extension of UNMIK's authority to northern Mitrovica, and the appointment of judges and prosecutors from minority communities illustrated the benefits of constructive dialogue with authorities in Belgrade.
- S/2002/1126 (9 October 2002) this report noted progress in many areas, but that the continued existence of parallel administrative structures challenged the operations for some of the ministries as well as municipalities, principally in the areas of education, health and administrative services.
- S/2002/779 (17 July 2002) this report observed that for the first time since the deployment of UNMIK, the conditions for genuine inter-ethnic dialogue had been put in place.
- S/2002/436 (22 April 2002) this report welcomed the formation of a government in Kosovo following several months of deadlock.
- S/2002/62 (15 January 2002) this report focused on the election process and UNMIK's preparations to hand over authority to the new government.
- S/2001/926 (2 October 2001) this report noted that the primary focus of UNMIK had been on preparing the Kosovo-wide elections, and the acceleration of the transfer of authority at the municipal level.
- S/2001/565 (7 June 2001) this report noted the conclusion of the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government, and the continued ethnic tensions.
- S/2001/218 (13 March 2001) this report noted that despite the challenges facing UNMIK, there was progress in the implementation of its mandate. It declared that the emergency phase was over, and put emphasis on capacity-building. However, it observed that the ongoing conflict in the Presevo Valley of southern Serbia and conflict in the north of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was a serious threat to the region.
- S/2000/1196 (15 December 2000) this report noted that the successful municipal elections marked a watershed in UNMIK's achievements in Kosovo.
- S/2000/878 (18 September 2000) this report noted the completion of the first phase of voter registration, but also difficulties regarding the participation of minority communities.
- S/2000/538 (6 June 2000) this report outlined achievements of UNMIK in its first year.
- S/2000/177 (3 March 2000) this report noted that UNMIK initiated the process of establishing provisional institutions for autonomous government pending agreement on status, and noted progress in demobilising former combatants.
- S/1999/1250 (23 December 1999) this report noted the establishment of the JIAS in Kosovo.
- S/1999/987 (16 September 1999) this report noted some progress in the establishment of the Kosovo Transition Council, but there was still a difficult security situation and continued violence, particularly against minorities.
- S/1999/779 (12 July 1999) this report gave an update of the situation on the ground, and outlined a detailed plan for the operation of UNMIK and the management of Kosovo.

Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.5290 (24 October 2005) the Council agreed that it was time to move on to the next phase of the political process: the question of status.
- S/PV.5188 (27 May 2005) briefing by Søren Jessen-Petersen, SRSG and Head of UNMIK, emphasised the progress in Kosovo towards the standards, but noted that participation by minorities was still low.
- S/PV.5130 (24 February 2005) briefing by Jessen-Peterson noted the past three months had been marked by a positive trend. Council members remarked on the need for more progress in areas of the protection of minorities, freedom of movement, establishment of the rule of law, return of refugees and combating organised crime.
- S/PV.5089 (29 November 2004) briefing by Jessen-Peterson noted that peaceful elections had been held in October, but appealed to maintain current level of NATO forces.
- S/PV.5017 (5 August 2004) briefing by Hedi Annabi, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, claimed “uphill challenge” for Kosovo.
- S/PV.4967 (11 May 2004) briefing by Harri Holkeri, SRSG and Head of the UNMIK, said the March violence was a serious setback to the mission’s efforts and had shaken UNMIK “to its foundations.”
- S/PV.4910 (6 February 2004) briefing by Holkeri, emphasised that the “standards before status” policy was the “core political project” for UNMIK.
- S/PV.4886 (17 December 2003) briefing by Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno launched the “standards before status” policy.
- S/PV. 4880 (12 December 2003) the Council expressed support for the “Standards for Kosovo.”
- S/PV.4853 (30 October 2003) Holkeri noted an unclear short-term outlook, but positive future for Kosovo. Council was keen to have dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.
- S/PV.4823 (12 September 2003) briefing by Annabi and violence affecting returning IDPs cited as major problem by members.
- S/PV.4809 (18 August 2003) violence in Kosovo condemned by members.
- S/PV.4782 (3 July 2003) final briefing by outgoing SRSG and Head of UNMIK, Michael Steiner.
- S/PV.4770 (10 June 2003) briefing by Annabi noted that freedom of movement for minorities, minority participation and refugee returns were still problematic.
- S/PV.4742 (23 April 2003) briefing by Annabi noted that representative and functioning institutions had yet to be established and that ethnic violence and crime were on the increase.
- S/PV.4703 (6 February 2003) the Council focused on the unemployment and security situations and stressed that standards which ensure the needs of the people should have precedence over the determination of the final status of Kosovo.
- S/PV.4676 (19 December 2002) the Council was briefed on the mission to Kosovo.
- S/PV.4643 (6 November 2002) briefing by Guéhenno and the Council focused on recent municipal elections and the security of minorities in Kosovo.
- S/PV.4633 (24 October 2002) Council members called for participation in elections, particularly from minority communities.
- S/PV.4605 (5 September 2002) was a briefing by Annabi.
- S/PV.4592 + Corr.1 (30 July 2002) the Council discussed the persistent challenges relating to strengthening self-government, reintegrating returnees, reforming the judiciary, combating terrorism and organised crime and ensuring multi-ethnic participation in the coming municipal elections.
- S/PV.4559 (26 June 2002) briefing by Guéhenno announced completion of the Kosovo Government following the nomination of Kosovar Serbs.
- S/PV.4543 (24 May 2002) the Council deplored the Kosovo Assembly resolution regarding territorial issue with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- S/PV.4533 (16 May 2002) briefing by Guéhenno stressed the importance of Kosovo Serb representatives taking up their rightful places in the government.
- S/PV.4519 (24 April 2002) briefing by Steiner provided an overview of successful elections, deemed “free and fair.”
- S/PV.4498 (27 March 2002) briefing by Annabi discussed the recent agreement to form a coalition government.
- S/PV.4473 (13 February 2002) the Council expressed support for the new SRSG, Steiner.

- S/PV.4454 (21 January 2002) briefing by Guéhenno noted that UNMIK continued to press political actors to break their deadlock and form a coalition government.
- S/PV.4430 (27 November 2001) briefing by Annabi noted the smooth election held on 17 November, with a voter turnout of 64.3 percent. It also noted "The Common Document," signed by UNMIK and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 5 November.
- S/PV.4409 (9 November 2001) the Council called for all Kosovar men and women to vote.
- S/PV.4388 (5 October 2001) briefing by Hans Haekkerup, SRSG on upcoming elections.
- S/PV.4373 (17 September 2001) was a discussion in a closed meeting including Haekkerup as well as Nebojša Čović, Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- S/PV.4359 (28 August 2001) briefing by Guéhenno and the Council expressed concern at low voter registration for minorities in Kosovo.
- S/PV.4350 (26 July 2001) briefing by Guéhenno noted that preparations for elections were underway. The Council underlined the importance of participation of minorities in the elections.
- S/PV.4335 (22 June 2001) the Council discussed the recent first full Council mission to Kosovo.
- S/PV.4331 (19 June 2001) Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, President of the Security Council, presented the report of the first full Council mission to Kosovo, which included a visit to Belgrade.
- S/PV.4309 and Corr.1 and Corr.2 (9 April 2001) the Council noted efforts to re-establish normalcy in Kosovo, but underlined the importance of stopping the traffic of illegal arms and halting the inter-ethnic violence.
- S/PV.4298 + Corr.1 (16 March 2001) the Council called for an end to ethnic violence and expressed concern for the security situation in southern Serbia.
- S/PV.4286 (6 March 2001) in a closed-meeting the Council held discussions with Zoran Zizić, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- S/PV.4277 (13 February 2001) briefing by Guéhenno outlined the four priorities of UNMIK in the next phase: establishment of a legal framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo; creation of an effective law enforcement and judicial system; establishment of regular dialogue with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and resolution of legal property issues.
- S/PV.4258 (18 January 2001) the Council expressed support for the new Special Representative, underlined the importance of cooperation between the parties in the region, and stressed the need to curb continuing ethnic violence and address the issue of Kosovo-wide elections.
- S/PV.4249 (19 December 2000) briefing by Annabi noted the importance of the recent municipal elections.
- S/PV.4232 (22 November 2000) the Council addressed violence in Kosovo.
- S/PV.4225 (16 November 2000) briefing by Dr. Bernard Kouchner, SRSG and Head of UNMIK during the past 18 months, stressed the success municipal elections of 28 October. He repeated the Kosovar Albanians' desire for independence.
- S/PV.4200 (27 September 2000) briefing by Kouchner drew mixed reactions from Council members: some expressed support, and some expressed reservations.
- S/PV.4190 (24 August 2000) briefing by Annabi drew mixed reactions from Council members: some voiced concern that the planned elections would undermine the sovereignty of Yugoslavia.
- S/PV.4171 and Corr.1 (13 July 2000) briefing by Annabi on the security situation and the upcoming elections drew mixed reactions from the Council.
- S/PV.4153 (9 June 2000) briefing by Kouchner noted that one year's progress in Kosovo was mixed as security was still an issue. He expressed his opinion that changes to human behaviour could not be brought about simply through decisions or actions by the Council or the SRSG.
- S/PV.4138 (11 May 2000) the Council heard the report on the recent Council mission to Kosovo, and gave mixed responses.
- S/PV.4108 (6 March 2000) the Council was briefed in a closed session by Kouchner and General Klaus Reinhardt, head of the international security presence in Kosovo.
- S/PV.4102 (16 February 2000) the Council was briefed in a closed session by Annabi.
- S/PV.4086 (30 December 1999) the Council was briefed in a closed session by Annabi.
- S/PV.4061 (5 November 1999) the Council was briefed in a closed session by Kouchner.
- S/PV.4011 (10 June 1999) was a Council discussion regarding the passage of resolution 1244.

- S/PV.4003 (14 May 1999) the Council called for access for humanitarian relief operations to aid Kosovar refugees and internally displaced people.
- S/PV.3989 (26 March 1999) the Council rejected by a vote of twelve to three the demand for the cessation of the use of force by NATO.
- S/PV.3988 (24 March 1999) was a Council discussion regarding the NATO strikes which revealed deep splits in the Council: some states condemned the strikes as the unilateral use of force violating the UN Charter, while others supported the action as a humanitarian intervention to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe.
- S/PV.3967 (19 January 1999) the Council expressed concern at the escalating violence and welcomed efforts by the Contact Group to set out a framework and timetable for political settlement.
- S/PV.3937 (24 October 1998) the Council demanded that the FRY and the KLA comply fully with resolutions 1160 and 1199.
- S/PV. 3930 (23 September 1998) the Council demanded that the FRY and KLA take steps to improve the humanitarian situation.
- S/PV. 3918 (24 August 1998) the Council called for an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo.
- S/PV.3868 (31 March 1998) was a Council discussion regarding the arms embargo.

Reports of Missions of the Security Council

- S/2002/1376 (19 December 2002) was a report of the Security Council Mission to Kosovo and Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 14-17 December 2002.
- S/2001/600 (19 June 2001) was a report of the Security Council Mission on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), 16-18 June 2001.
- S/2000/363 (29 April 2000) was a report of the eight-member Council Mission to Kosovo from 27-29 April 2000.

Other Documents

- S/1999/655 (7 June 1999) a letter from the Chargé d'affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, addressed to the Council, accepted the terms of the peace agreement.
- S/1999/649, annex (1999) (7 June 1999) a letter from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN outlined the terms offered to the government of the FRY to cease NATO hostilities.

Historical Chronology

10 February 2006 Fatmir Sejdiu of the LDK party was elected as Kosovo's new president. He was the sole candidate.

21 January 2006 Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova died.

16 January 2006 The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Status, Maarti Ahtisaari, and Special Representative Søren Jessen-Petersen met with the Contact Group in Vienna.

December 2005 Ahtisaari toured the region's capital cities for meetings.

17 November 2005 The Kosovo Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution reconfirming the political will of the people of Kosovo for an independent and sovereign state of Kosovo.

14 November 2005 Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, Sergei Baburin, announced that "Moscow will never recognise the independence and occupation of Kosovo and Metohija."

14 November 2005 Ahtisaari stated that it will take longer than three or four months for status to be decided.

10 November 2005 The Council welcomed Annan's intention to appoint Ahtisaari, and issued guiding principles for the process addressing a number of issues including the need for Council endorsement of the final status of

Kosovo.

1 November 2005 Annan appointed Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for Status talks.

October 2005 The Council declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

September 2005 Jessen-Petersen stated he was “very confident” that status discussions will be underway by the end of the year.

May 2005 The Head of Belgrade’s Kosovo Coordination Centre, the Serbian institution charged with affairs relating to Kosovo, stated that there was no possibility for independence for Kosovo.

March 2005 Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj was indicted by the ICTY. He resigned as PM and voluntarily surrendered to the tribunal. The Kosovo Assembly elected a new government, headed by Bajram Kosumi, on 23 March.

November 2004 General elections installed a new government headed by Haradinaj.

6 August 2004 A report by the Kai Eide, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, argued that the “standards before status” policy lacked credibility and that a priority-based standards policy aimed at facilitating orderly future status discussions should replace it.

31 March 2004 UNMIK released the “Standards Implementation Plan.”

17-20 March 2004 Rioting led by Kosovar Albanian extremists against Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities broke out.

12 December 2003 The Council endorsed Standards for Kosovo (S/PRST/2003/26)

March 2002 Rugova of the LDK party was elected President of Kosovo.

February 2002 A coalition government was established.

17 November 2001 Elections were held in Kosovo.

February-March 2001 Fighting erupted on the border between FYROM security forces and armed Albanian militants from Kosovo.

15 January 2001 Hans Haekkerup began assignment as the new SRSG.

28 October 2000 Municipal elections were held in Kosovo.

28 September 2000 Elections were held in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President Vojislav Kostunica was elected.

10 May 2000 The Kosovo Transitional Council adopted a major political statement calling for tolerance, basic rights and freedoms for all Kosovo communities and demanding that all Kosovars held in Serbian prisons and other detention facilities be unconditionally handed over to UNMIK.

2 May 2000 The Joint Committee on Returns was formally established in a signing ceremony in Gracanica.

6 March 2000 Briefing a private meeting of the Council, the Secretary-General Special Representative, Dr. Bernard Kouchner, said the UN’s work in Kosovo lacked clear political objectives and sufficient resources.

3 November 1999 UNHCR and OSCE released a third review of "The Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo," which stated that there is a climate of violence and impunity as well as widespread discrimination, harassment and intimidation against non-Albanians.

20 September 1999 An agreement reached on the transformation of KLA and on the final details of demobilisation and weapons regime.

23 August 1999 In a first step toward policing in Kosovo, UNMIK police took over law enforcement duties in Pristina.

16 July 1999 The first meeting of the Kosovo Transitional Council marked a critical first step towards the development of self-government in Kosovo.

2 July 1999 The Secretary-General appointed Kouchner as his Special Representative in Kosovo.

14 June 1999 The Secretary-General presented a preliminary operational plan for Kosovo to the Security Council (S/1999/672).

11 June 1999 The Secretary-General named Sergio Vieira de Mello as Acting Special Representative for Kosovo on an interim basis.

10 June 1999 The Security Council passed resolution 1244 establishing UNMIK.

23 March 1999 NATO authorised the commencement of air strikes on Kosovo and Belgrade.

18 March 1999 After two rounds of talks facilitated by the Contact Group, the Rambouillet Accords were signed by the Albanian forces but rejected by Serbia and Montenegro.

6 February 1999 The Rambouillet peace discussions convened.

1998 As armed attacks intensified Serbian forces began a campaign of removals, violence and ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians

Early 1996 Armed attacks began by KLA forces in Kosovo.

1995 Kosovo's independence was curtailed by the Serbian government and the province was brought under the direct control of Belgrade.

1989 A Milosevic speech in Kosovo Polje marked beginning of nationalist fervour in FRY. Milosevic abolished Kosovo's provincial government and legislature and began the campaign against the province's Albanian majority.

UN Involvement as of 2005

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)
UNMIK
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Size of UNMIK mission: 910 international staff, 2900 local staff• Size of OSCE mission: 310 international staff, 990 local staff• Size of EU mission: 114 international staff, 244 local staff
Cost
\$2.215 billion as of April 2005 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)
KFOR (NATO FORCE)
Lieutenant General Giuseppe Valotto (Italy)

Size and Composition of Mission
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size: 4 brigades, more than 17,000 troops • NATO Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US. • Non-NATO Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Mongolia, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.
Cost
\$264,625,200
UNMIK Civilian Police
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total of 3,302 officers from 49 countries • Key contributors: Germany, India, Jordan, US