United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-fourth year

6075th meeting
Friday, 23 January 2009, 10.20 a.m.
New York

President: Mr. Ripert ...................................... (France)

Members:
Austria ................................................ Mr. Mayr-Harting
Burkina Faso ......................................... Mr. Kafando
China .................................................. Mr. La Yifan
Costa Rica .......................................... Mr. Urbina
Croatia ............................................... Mr. Vilović
Japan .................................................... Mr. Takasu
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ............................. Mr. Dabbashi
Mexico .................................................. Mr. Heller
Russian Federation .................................. Mr. Churkin
Turkey .................................................. Mr. İlkin
Uganda .................................................. Mr. Butagira
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .... Sir John Sawers
United States of America ........................... Ms. DiCarlo
Viet Nam ............................................... Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations
The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

The President (spoke in French): I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representatives of Canada, the Czech Republic, India, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan and Uruguay to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council’s agenda, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, the representatives of the aforementioned countries took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (spoke in French): I propose, with the consent of the Council and in accordance with the provisions of article 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, to extend an invitation to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; Mr. Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; and Ms. Lila Ratsifandrihamanana, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I should like, first of all, to thank my colleagues and the invitees for their participation in the debate that we have organized today under the French presidency of the Council. Collectively, participants represent the key branches of the Secretariat responsible for carrying out peacekeeping operations, several of the main troop contributors from every geographical group, the two regional organizations with the most extensive cooperation on the ground with the United Nations and countries responsible for a very large portion of the financing for peacekeeping operations.

It seems to us that it is high time that the Council hold a debate on peacekeeping, which has and continues to make it possible to achieve great things, in particular thanks to the skill and dedication of the staff of the United Nations. However, peacekeeping also has its shortcomings and problems. In that connection, the analyses contained in the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) and the conclusions reached by the Council itself almost 15 years ago, as reflected in its presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/62) of 1994, are as relevant as ever.

However, we are at a critical juncture as a result of the scale of our engagement, deteriorating conditions, the increasing complexity of mandates and the growing constraints on our resources. All of us acknowledge that the situation calls for a response. Numerous initiatives have been launched, beginning with the Secretariat’s own efforts but including also those of others, including our Canadian friends. I am sure that they will tell us about them in due course. Nevertheless, the Security Council has a special responsibility, both because the Charter confers upon it the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and because it is the Council that defines peacekeeping operations. In that connection, there has been significant improvement in the way that the Council carries out its own work, including in its daily activities and in its relations with the main protagonists in the area of peacekeeping.

It is for those reasons that France and the United Kingdom have sought to initiate a debate in the Council on how we can make the improvements that are so necessary. In that regard, we circulated a background document to serve as the focus of the first informal exchange among the members of the Council during the informal seminar we hosted yesterday at the French Mission in cooperation with the British Mission. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom and I could provide participants with more information about that. However, we feel that the very first stage of that undertaking should be to listen to the planners and organizers of peacekeeping operations and those responsible for their day-to-day functioning, including special representatives, troop and financing contributors and others providing support for this crucial activity. Success would not be possible without them.

The Council must of course be responsible for its own duties, but it must also be in a better position to
discharge its peacekeeping responsibilities. That is a collective function in which everyone must play their part. In turn, every voice must be listened to carefully. It is therefore my pleasure now to give the floor to participants.

At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; and Mr. Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. I now give the floor to Mr. Le Roy.

Mr. Le Roy (spoke in French): The United Nations turned an important corner 10 years ago. The year 1999 was one of profound changes for peacekeeping operations as well as for international peace and security. The reports on Srebrenica, the operations in Rwanda and the monumental failure of the United Nation Operation in Somalia led to great introspection and, ultimately, to new ways of thinking about peacekeeping. That undertaking was in great part possible thanks to the report (S/2000/809) of the High-Level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi report, which was published in 2000.

A surge in peacekeeping operations in 2000 resulted in an increase in personnel from 14,000 to about 40,000. This growth has been ongoing and continues today, exactly a decade later, with over 112,000 personnel deployed and many more to come with the strengthening of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the ongoing development of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the authorization of an enlarged mission in Chad. These numbers will continue to increase in the coming weeks. As Council members know, planning and preparation for a potential new mission in Somalia is also under way.

Today, we are more numerous and widely spread than at any time in our history, with mandates that are, as members know, both more complex and more robust than ever. These Council mandates reflect, of course, a better appreciation by the international community of the complexities of current conflicts, as well as the desire for more comprehensive peace settlements by the various parties to the conflicts.

The last decade has also, as I mentioned, been a time to rethink United Nations peacekeeping operations, undertake reforms within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and gradually strengthen the professionalism of our operations. We have seen many improvements. We have clarified our thinking on peace operations and strengthened the institutional capacity of the United Nations to support them. Nevertheless, as we can all see, much remains to be done.

The growth in United Nations peacekeeping over the past years clearly reflects its success and its necessity. These operations can indeed provide the international community with a credible response to assist in the implementation of peace agreements; they can also provide a platform for a wide range of assistance and support to help countries move from conflict to stability; and they can, of course, bring the legitimacy of the United Nations and its neutrality to bear, so it can serve as an honest broker in many instances. Ultimately, they have proven to be a flexible and resilient tool in the maintenance of peace and security.

(spoke in English)

Yet, as Council members are well aware, the last 10 years have not always brought good news. We have faced operational challenges in almost all of our theatres of deployment and the reform at Headquarters has not always resulted in as much improvement as is needed. The implementation of the Brahimi recommendations, the Peace Operations 2010 reform agenda, and most recently, the Secretary-General’s initiatives to create two strengthened departments — the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support (DFS) — have all been a manifestation of our desire to strive constantly to do the job of peacekeeping better.

The Council has been our partner in this ongoing process and we want to assure members of our continued commitment to this agenda for professionalism and improvement. We are open to new ways of tackling persistent challenges and to new ways of doing business in partnership with the Security Council, the General Assembly and our operational partners.

I believe that 2009 is a pivotal year for peacekeeping. A number of our missions face risks that are so significant that there is a potential for mission
failure, with terrible consequences for the entire United Nations.

In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the parties recently brought the country to the brink of catastrophe and MONUC was hard-pressed to manage the crisis. The mission was called upon to support the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo in combat even as it crumbled and at the same time protect hundreds of thousands of civilians spread across a vast area.

In Darfur, UNAMID continues to face difficulties in deploying, while the parties on the ground are increasingly belligerent and the political negotiations move slowly. Even at full strength, UNAMID will continue to face daunting challenges. Over 2.5 million refugees and internally displaced persons look to UNAMID for protection. At the same time, as members know, the Mission still lacks the helicopters that would provide the mobility essential to carry out its important mandate.

As I speak, our DPKO and DFS colleagues are on an assessment mission looking at the situation in Somalia. The Security Council’s resolution on the intention to establish a future United Nations peacekeeping operation is clear. In the interim, our colleagues in DFS now face the dual challenge of continuing to prepare and plan for a mission that will undoubtedly face tremendous operational hurdles while simultaneously strengthening and supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia. As members know, there remains no peace to keep in Somalia.

It is clear that United Nations peacekeeping is overstretched. We face operational overstretch and, I would argue, political overstretch too. With 18 operations deployed in five continents and with 78,000 military, 11,500 police and 23,500 civilians deployed, the operational challenge of maintaining full support to all our missions and mounting new ones is far beyond what the Brahimi reforms envisaged. They were scaled to allow the United Nations to launch one peacekeeping operation per year. Only last week, the Security Council voted through two new mandates for Chad and for a potential mission into Somalia. Meanwhile, we are still in the deployment phase in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Darfur. That represents four operations at the same time for DFS in particular.

At the same time, our missions carry out mandates that represent much more than the deployment of uniformed personnel. Many are fundamentally political operations supporting complex transitions to peace within deeply divided countries. Even with well-crafted operations supporting complex transitions to peace within deeply divided countries. Even with well-crafted mandates, these missions need continuous and concerted international support as they manage constant tactical and political adjustments on the ground. Even after the adoption of a resolution, this support is clearly badly needed. Yet for many of our missions, there is no consensus in the international community regarding the optimal political direction.

Therefore, we face three sets of fundamental questions. First, is peacekeeping being developed beyond its capabilities? Is the current model of peacekeeping up to the challenges of these new mandates? Does it have the right resources? Are there sufficient troops of requisite capabilities? Can we find the air assets essential to meeting these robust mandates with mobility and deterrence? In too many cases, the answer is no. There is now a constant strain between mandates and resources and between expectations and our capacity to deliver, and there is a strain on Secretariat resources to plan, manage and support our current pace and scale of operations. My colleague and friend, Susana Malcorra, will speak more about the operational challenges that lie immediately ahead.

Secondly, is the United Nations properly configured to manage the complexity of the peacebuilding challenges that are at the heart of resolving internal conflict and civil war? Many of our peacekeeping missions are early peacebuilding missions, but do we have the expertise and resources necessary to rapidly deploy and plan the complex and long-term assistance required to support national actors in rebuilding their States? The linkage of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council in aligning political direction, aid strategies and donor support is an important issue. The linkage of the missions, the United Nations country teams and international financial institutions and bilateral donors on the ground is, of course, equally important. We are working hard on these partnerships, and we have done a lot to integrate the United Nations response on the ground. However, there is much left to be done if, together, we are to provide a comprehensive peacebuilding response. I am conscious that this is an issue that will be addressed in an upcoming report of
the Secretary-General in March, so I will not dwell extensively on it here.

The third type of question — and probably the most fundamental for peacekeeping — is the question of where peacekeeping fits into the overall political response of the international community to complex crises. Are the political and regional dimensions which drive the crisis being adequately addressed, and is peacekeeping the right tool to do that? Is there, in many cases, a peace to keep? Peacekeeping, however well resourced, will simply not be sufficient where the parties are not willing to achieve peace. Indeed, over the past few years we have seen increasing signs of non-cooperation from host Governments and increased resistance from some parties to conflict to our presence and actions.

Many of these questions were of course raised in the broad Brahimi process, and we would do well to return to look at how recommendations have, or have not been implemented. Some of the issues we face have arisen since the Brahimi reforms. Indeed, United Nations peacekeeping as a whole also faces questions of a more systemic nature: a deepening world economic crisis that will further limit our resources and our flexibility to respond to crises and changed circumstances on the ground, normative and legal developments in the fight to end impunity and ensure justice that have repercussions for peacekeeping operations, and increased demand for the implementation of protection of civilian mandates, among other questions.

The very fact that we are engaged in this dialogue now, and not after a catastrophe, is an important indication of the seriousness of our collective intent to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. If we act in concert, together we can ensure that peacekeeping does not falter, as it did in the 1990s.

United Nations peacekeeping has proven remarkably resilient and has established a good track record. It is a uniquely universal burden-sharing arrangement and enjoys a high degree of legitimacy when used appropriately. It combines military response within an integrated civilian approach, a critical attribute that gives it a niche role in the spectrum of options for the maintenance of peace and security. But it is not a tool for all situations. When used inappropriately, its failures can tarnish not just the image of the operation in question, but the credibility of the Organization as a whole as the guarantor of peace and security that saves succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Yet, there are also areas of potential opportunity which we should bear in mind as we consider the challenges. There is an increased engagement of regional organizations as instruments for the maintenance of regional peace and security. How best should they, and the United Nations, fit into an overall international capability? There is an increased recognition by international and regional financial institutions of the need for early engagement in fragile post-conflict countries. The new Chairman of the World Bank was very clear on this issue. And of course, we now have an increased interest by Member States to support United Nations peacekeeping. We, collectively, must transform these opportunities into structural supports for United Nations peacekeeping.

United Nations peacekeeping is a unique partnership, in which we all have a stake. It is an endeavour of the Security Council and the General Assembly, of contributing nations and host nations, of the Secretariat and the field missions, of individual peacekeepers and the populations where they are deployed, who hope for security and a better future. We all need to work together to protect the investments we have made and the successes we have achieved. That calls for a renewed consensus on the state of peacekeeping, its challenges and its way forward.

In order to move together to face our new set of challenges as one, I feel that there are some fundamental questions we must ask ourselves, for which we must find solutions together. Do we share a common vision of what United Nations peacekeeping can and cannot do? Do we have a common vision of how United Nations peacekeeping differs from other options for peace and security? Can better conflict prevention avoid demands for peacekeeping? Do we understand the limits of peacekeeping and its comparative strengths? Have we entered an era where we appreciate that United Nations peacekeeping is the institution of first resort for some situations but is ill-suited for others? What other tools can be called upon reliably when United Nations peacekeeping is not the best instrument?

Within DPKO, we have struggled with some of these questions in the enunciation of our internal publication — the so-called capstone doctrine — on
principles and guidelines for United Nations peacekeeping, which sets out our views, from the implementation perspective, about what modern peacekeeping is doing and what it is able to do. It builds upon the Brahimi review process and captures internal lessons and good practices that we have learned. This effort to arrive at a common vision is not easy, even internally, and it would surely be even more difficult across a partnership as diverse as the United Nations peacekeeping partnership. But it is this sort of intellectual endeavour that will be at the heart of establishing a common vision for the future. We can then construct solutions to impediments through an honest exchange on what is working and what is not.

To ensure that United Nations peacekeeping remains a viable and indeed a stronger instrument for the future, I believe we need to follow two simultaneous tracks this year. First, we must survive the current operational workload and the looming challenges in the months ahead. This demands concrete and practical action on several fronts. For example, we must find short-term measures to close the gap between the troops and material we are able to raise and the authorized levels needed to meet our mandates. At the same time, we must begin to find new potential contributors to the peacekeeping endeavour.

To deploy at high pace into remote territories, we must find innovative ways to draw on support which only Member States can provide. The recent support in moving materiel for UNAMID is an example of the sort of assistance that, on a larger scale, may be needed to establish fully and quickly those underdeployed and expanding missions.

We need on-hand capacities to reinforce missions from the strategic level if a crisis erupts. Contingency plans for those likely crisis spots must begin to emerge immediately. In missions where we have stabilized the peace process, but where lack of peacebuilding investment is threatening gains — such as in Haiti, Liberia and Afghanistan — critical resources need to flow to shore up peacekeeping efforts. And we need, of course, to find ways to intensify and sustain political efforts — a political surge if you will — to support peace processes or to help realize peace where it has not yet been realized.

I will dwell for a minute on that last point of political support. Too often, missions are launched only to find themselves later being tested on the ground as they pursue their mandates. When these missions are tested, as we recently were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or as we were with the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and as we are continually in Darfur, it is not just the mission that is being tested. It is a test of the will of the international community and of the Security Council.

In those situations, the mission, while needing to play its part, must also act knowing that the political response will also come from the strategic level. In those situations, the unified voice of the Security Council — an unequivocal political message — and behind-the-scenes political pressure from key players in the Council and countries in the region are critical. Peacekeeping and political leverage must work together. Political support from the Security Council can assist in other ways too, for example in mobilizing troops and other resources through démarches and bilateral engagements with prospective troop and police contributors.

The Secretariat needs continuous support from the Security Council and Member States after a resolution is adopted. At the same time, we are, of course, ready to work with the Security Council to ensure that it has the information it needs to craft mandates with relevant benchmarks and to engage with the Council in monitoring and evaluating them.

That leads me to the second track of work: we may need to tackle larger, systemic challenges. We need to bolster — and, in some instances, mend — the global partnership that we need for a healthy and well-functioning United Nations peacekeeping system. United Nations peacekeeping is effective only if all actors have a shared vision of what that instrument can and cannot achieve.

Much needs to be done to achieve a better convergence of views. Peacekeeping, although owned by all, is not commonly understood by all. Today we find ourselves looking at a very complex puzzle from different angles and with differing assumptions and expectations. The Secretariat, the troop and police contributors, the Fourth and Fifth Committees of the General Assembly and, of course, this body, the Security Council — each of us carries a fragment of the puzzle that is peacekeeping. Those puzzle pieces must be brought closer together than they are today.

I hope that we can harness our intellectual energies and our capacity to come together to solve
problems in order to address some of the persistent challenges we face. For that reason, I am extremely grateful for the debate that is starting today. It marks the beginning of a process of reflection in the Security Council.

The Council is, of course, a major part of the equation, but others need to act as well. Several weeks ago, Susana Malcorra and I initiated an internal process of introspection and stock-taking to review how far we have come in the Brahimi process and to consider how to meet new challenges on the horizon even as we grapple with today’s urgent issues. We need to look at our own house and to find new and innovative ways to tackle the challenges of modern peacekeeping. We will, of course, share our findings with the Security Council and the General Assembly with a view to building consensus on the way forward and sharing our reflections.

The General Assembly, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee are absolutely pivotal actors in that partnership. The Secretariat looks forward to continuing its ongoing dialogue with the Special Committee and the Fifth Committee in the coming session on many peacekeeping issues that lie squarely within the Assembly’s remit. I hope that 2009 can be a decisive moment for re-energizing our thinking on how we can better support United Nations peacekeeping. With troop contributors, police contributors and those who fund capacity-building efforts, we need to build a fully functional dialogue on what is needed. The first step in strengthening our partnership is to work together constructively to develop a more shared appreciation of what United Nations peacekeeping is today and can be tomorrow.

Ms. Malcorra (spoke in Spanish): I take great pleasure in coming before the Security Council today as Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Field Support in the first of what I hope will be a series of discussions on the future of peacekeeping operations in the United Nations. In that context, I am grateful for the opportunity to inform members about some of the challenges facing us in the area of field support.

Undoubtedly, a process of cross-fertilization of ideas regarding support issues, on the one hand, and substantive issues, on the other, is what is needed at this time, and it is absolutely critical that we address that.

My friend and colleague, Alain Le Roy, has clearly articulated that we in the United Nations peacekeeping community are at a new watershed after a decade of unprecedented expansion. Structurally, Secretary-General Ban recognized that soon after he had taken office, when he proposed the creation of a new department specifically dedicated to the staffing and equipping of United Nations field-based peace operations. The newest United Nations department — the Department of Field Support — now supports 16 peacekeeping missions and 18 special political missions and oversees more than 22,000 international and local civilian staff. It operates and maintains more than 250 medical facilities, 300 aircraft, 18,000 vehicles and 40,000 computers.

There is a growing recognition that field support issues are gaining in prominence and stature. The
Department now sits at the table as an equal partner in crucial discussions at every stage of the mission life cycle: planning, deployment, sustainment, reconfiguration and, eventually, liquidation. When problems are encountered, we are able to engage at the political level with Member States and partner organizations to find solutions. As it happens, I just returned two days ago from precisely such an engagement: a third round of discussions with the Sudanese Government and the African Union to facilitate the free flow of people and materials for our mission in Darfur. I am happy to report that as a result, we have thus far been able to meet the agreed-upon deployment targets.

The creation of the Department has also led to greater clarity of purpose, with an improved focus on the delivery of service to the field — becoming field-centric, if you will. The political direction is determined by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations — in partnership with Member States, of course — and it is up to my team to focus “simply” on getting the right staff on board, securing sufficient financing and providing the equipment and the logistics necessary for the operation. The beauty of having a narrow mandate is that it is easier to establish baselines and measure progress. One of our current challenges is how to calibrate that support to the increasingly varied size and nature of various field presences. I believe that there is an opportunity for a more targeted and nuanced approach.

In addition, we are making good progress in developing capacities in the various support streams. For example, we will soon have a specialized in-house capacity to advise both departments on how to manage and mitigate risk — a badly needed source of expertise. The establishment, several years ago, of a Conduct and Discipline Unit at Headquarters — it is now housed in the Department of Field Support — and of related teams within the missions is starting to pay dividends. We are also developing the capacity to introduce “greening” aspects into all our operations.

The challenges laid out by Alain are indeed daunting — even intimidating — and no less important for DFS: the rapid expansion in breadth, scope and complexity of missions; an increasingly hostile security landscape in a number of different locations; and the gap between the scope of the mandates and the resources available to perform them.

From the support perspective, I would also add to that list the difficulties of working within a regulatory framework not designed for fast-paced operations deployed in high-risk environments. The resulting tension is simply unfair; either we comply with the existing rules, but face the ire of this body when we do not deliver services in a timely manner, or we get the job done by testing the limits of the rules, risking censure from the oversight bodies. We must be able to find a way to reconcile results with compliance and getting things done with due process.

While I agree that we are not in a crisis, we are nevertheless under great strain. We need to reflect, take stock and think deeply about the way forward. I will be the first to acknowledge that the new DFS is still finding its feet and that we have some way to go. A more elaborate assessment of the restructuring exercise will be put before the General Assembly this spring, but let me just say at this juncture that putting in place a new structure, new staff and new systems and properly embedding these changes takes time and perseverance under any circumstances. The fact that this process has taken place at the same time as peacekeeping has undergone a 30 per cent increase in the authorized strength of its personnel has truly tested the limits of the new structure.

The new missions — the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad — are two of the most complex and difficult operations ever contemplated by the United Nations. The task of moving materiel and people in these regions would challenge the most solid, stable and mature of structures. With a new and untried support concept emerging from the recent resolution 1863 (2009), on Somalia, a country even more challenged by security and infrastructure constraints, DFS has an even more daunting task ahead in the year to come.

Perhaps one of the advantages of having DFS at the table is that it can provide a reality check to discussions. In this spirit, I would like to offer some concrete illustrations which I hope demonstrate the magnitude of the support challenges before us. In Darfur, thousands of kilometres from the nearest seaport, we must move heavy equipment and supplies for the construction of 35 camps, which are required to house our almost 26,000 troops and police. The road networks are unreliable and unsafe; the existing airfield infrastructure is poor and the wet season halts...
movement and construction progress for up to four months a year. At a certain point during the deployment, we had 8,000 containers making this journey.

We face an even greater test in neighbouring Chad. Abéché is 2,400 kilometres from the nearest port, roughly the same distance as between London and Moscow. The sea-land route, known as the Douala corridor, connecting the Cameroonian port of Douala to Abéché, is approximately the same distance — 2,400 kilometres — of which only 900 kilometres have railroads. Aside from poor road conditions, the Douala corridor is, in relative terms, one of the world’s most expensive commercial transportation routes.

In Somalia, without prejudging the outcome of the technical assessment mission, we can well imagine that supporting the African Union Mission in Somalia will require logistics, resources and efforts that surpass even those being made in Darfur and Chad. In addition to challenges posed by infrastructure, security, terrain, climate and social fabric, for the first time the United Nations has been requested to provide logistical support to a regional organization with a significant level of resources attached to it.

On a systemic level, we often struggle with the competing priorities of deploying troops, setting up the necessary infrastructure and negotiating with the host nation. Sometimes, troops are deployed prematurely because of mandate commencement pressures, but without having first secured the necessary agreements, for example, on usage of land. At other times, sequencing questions arise over whether an engineering company should deploy first to establish a battalion campsite or whether security elements move in first to protect the engineers and the list of challenges goes on.

I am, however, afraid that with the magnitude of the operational challenges before us, the urgent ones often trump a more thorough assessment of the important ones. By this I mean finding a more strategic approach to doing our business; exploring new, more efficient and effective ways of working; doing it right and fast; achieving the kinds of economies of scale one would expect from a global operation of more than $7 billion; partnering with Member States, others in the United Nations family, regional organizations, civil society and others in meeting the support challenge; and finding a regulatory framework which is strong yet agile, and prudent yet reasonable.

To address those concerns, we are making a concerted effort to develop the details of the support strategy. The strategy, which we intend to share with Member States later this year, will explore a number of themes.

First, the notion of support hubs could provide logistics and administrative support services from more secure locations to missions in the region, rather than attempting to recreate a full support structure in each and every mission.

Secondly, there could be greater delegation of managerial and administrative authority to managers in the field, while ensuring that appropriate training is provided in advance and that predefined monitoring and oversight mechanisms are in place.

Thirdly, there could be a diversified approach to sourcing goods and services required for field missions from local, regional and international sources through greater use of partnerships and a broader set of suppliers and service providers.

Lastly, there could be a smarter approach to technology by using different applications in the provision of aviation tasks, equipment usage, military support and rapid response. Technology must be an enabler of business, particularly in the environments where we deploy.

These are, I believe, fully in line with the first track of issues Alain mentioned on which concrete and urgent actions are required this year. In addition, we intend to move quickly in implementing the provisions of the recent General Assembly resolution, which, we hope, will pave the way for a more flexible, mobile workforce and address the excessive vacancy and turnover rates we are experiencing in critical field positions. With the Department of Management, we are also working to develop a framework for procurement governance more suited to the supply needs of the field.

Finally, I think we may want to pursue a more in-depth examination of the funding arrangements for peace operations, the use of trust funds, memorandums of understanding and partnership models.

On that last point, I would like to return to the idea of United Nations peacekeeping as a complex
international partnership in which many different actors play an important role. From my corporate background, I might call that a joint venture: a shared enterprise in which we all have equity and a share of the resources, direction and control. This joint venture, as Alain mentioned, must be strengthened to better ready ourselves for challenges both today and tomorrow.

Support is not an end in itself, and DFS is not an island. The support concept works only as a key component in this wider partnership. Without strong working relations with troop- and police-contributing countries and the broader United Nations family, and without the full support of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee, the support lines to peacekeeping quickly crumble.

In the support business — perhaps more than for anyone else in this equation — we will only ever be as effective as the common vision that guides this joint venture. If we are not clear on the nature of the enterprise we are supporting, the challenge of finding the most appropriate support models is compounded. If mandate makers, policy setters, budget developers and troop and police contributors do not share a vision of what the joint endeavour is, then the mixed signals become extremely difficult to resource and organize around, and building a most effective and efficient support mechanism will probably remain as elusive as ever. The costs of a lack of common vision are high and efficiencies harder to find. As in all enterprises, support strategists and resource providers are at their most effective when treated as strategic enablers and brought into the dialogue early. On top of that, we must be able to agree on a contract of mutual trust as the basis of our work together.

Today’s discussion should also be the start of a dialogue that is sustained across the various organs of the United Nations. The Secretariat, of course, meets each of the Member States represented here today in different guises, in different chambers and at different times of the year. All too often, though, the messages received may be mixed and even inconsistent, depending on the forum. And, of course, the Secretariat is often chastised for exactly the same sin — sending different messages through different people in different forums. We can all improve our game on this front. My team and I are personally committed to improving the quality, frequency and form of exchanges with Member States in formal and informal ways alike.

In conclusion, I join Alain in commending to the Security Council the notion that the different actors in the international partnership for peacekeeping are at a critical moment. Recent history has seen rapid and unrelenting growth. This is perhaps a vote of confidence in United Nations peacekeeping, but the challenges are gathering ever more quickly. The magnitude of the peacekeeping enterprise requires an investment in strategy. It requires that we move together in concert, with a shared purpose and in full recognition of the challenges ahead.

The President (spoke in French): I thank Ms. Malcorra for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Annabi.

Mr. Annabi (spoke in French): I thank you, Sir, for giving me the honour and for kindly inviting me to participate in this important debate on United Nations peacekeeping. The informal document that you have distributed is an excellent basis for discussion and reflection, and will certainly prompt a fruitful debate.

Certain aspects of the document address the internal operations of peacekeeping, which is, of course, appropriate and necessary to any discussion held at the Headquarters of our Organization. However, given the fact that I am now a man of the field, I should like to leave my colleagues at Headquarters to address those aspects. Given the responsibilities they bear, they are in a better position than I am to speak to them, and they have in fact already done so.

For my part, I wish to attempt to set out the main challenges that peacekeeping faces, addressing in particular the three following questions.

(spoke in English)

First, when is United Nations peacekeeping the right instrument? Secondly, what tasks can United Nations peacekeeping accomplish? Thirdly, how can we help United Nations peacekeeping become more effective? I will try to highlight some areas where we need to change, together with certain principles that have been repeatedly validated over time. I hope that I may speak openly, since I am among friends who share a common vision of peacekeeping as a key dimension of United Nations activities and as a means to advance the goals of the Charter.
When should United Nations peacekeeping be used? As reflected in the non-paper, the issue of when to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation is one of the most difficult questions that the Council faces. Deployed appropriately, a peacekeeping operation can achieve remarkable results in a relatively short period. The people of Guatemala, El Salvador, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia and East Timor — to name a few — can testify to our ability to make a difference. Each successful experience has, in turn, strengthened the standing of the United Nations and its ability to address future conflicts. But when United Nations operations are deployed in the wrong circumstances, the results can be disastrous for the population within the conflict area, for the peacekeepers themselves and, even more importantly, for the viability of the instrument of peacekeeping.

How can we distinguish between those two kinds of situations and know when peacekeeping is the right solution? I believe, I am afraid, that the commonly cited formula remains valid. Peacekeeping operations can be deployed where there is a peace to keep or, at the minimum, a viable political process that a peacekeeping presence can help nurture and lead to a meaningful conclusion.

Over the past decade, peacekeepers have helped to tip the balance and have overcome some opposition on the margins of a peace process. A display of strength has sometimes made its use unnecessary. We have responded vigorously to certain spoilers and shown in several theatres — including Haiti — that robust action by United Nations peacekeepers can at times deter those who seek to foster instability. Multinational and regional forces have also played an important complementary role in that area.

These are valuable lessons, but they should not blur a core understanding that United Nations peacekeeping remains primarily a political, rather than a military instrument. Its effectiveness demands that a critical mass of those in the conflict area believe that their interests can be most effectively pursued through peaceful means rather than by violence. If this precondition does not exist, Blue Helmets should not be present. Every time we have overlooked this basic premise, we have come to regret it.

While refraining from inappropriate deployments, we must also avoid the opposite peril, which is an undue hesitation to act when circumstances permit. Even at a time of limited resources, the United Nations must remain ready to assume its responsibilities under the Charter. The world does not and will not forgive the United Nations if it is seen to stand by when it can make a difference.

Peacekeeping partners can sometimes contribute, and it is sensible to share the burden when others have a comparative advantage, but at other times there may be no realistic alternative to a United Nations operation. It is essential for the standing of the United Nations that any decision on whether or not to deploy or to downsize an existing operation be based primarily on substantive concerns and not on financial considerations.

Even from a financial perspective, a United Nations operation can prove to be good value. Conflict, as we know, is extremely costly, and a swiftly deployed and appropriately mandated and equipped peacekeeping operation can provide enormous savings in the long term, even if it entails a significant short-term expense.

In weighing decisions on deployment, both the Secretariat and Member States have a key role to play. The Secretariat must exercise due diligence, assessing and reassessing the situation on the ground and conveying its understanding faithfully to the Member States. Moreover, as Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi — who remains an inspiration for us all — wrote in his report of August 2000 (S/2000/809), today’s international civil service must have the courage of its convictions and must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, and not merely what it wants to hear.

Member States can make a vital contribution by providing information that may assist in decision-making. They should also seek to listen with an open mind to the Secretariat’s recommendations, giving them serious consideration, and should resist undue pressure to act in a way that is politically expedient but that may be fundamentally unsound.

Secondly, I would like to discuss which tasks peacekeeping should undertake. Broadly, a United Nations peacekeeping operation should assume those tasks that are indispensable to cross a threshold towards lasting peace and that they are best equipped to discharge. What this means in practice has evolved rapidly over the past decade, alongside our understanding of the requirements for stability and of
the capacity of peacekeeping operations. Many activities that we once would have regarded as beyond our responsibility or reach have now become standard fixtures in the peacekeeping repertoire. Operations have become more active politically; they have taken on more ambitious roles in security; and above all they have engaged in institution-building, particularly in the area of the rule of law, which is now a core part of our mandate in many conflict areas.

This expanded activity has helped us to meet multifaceted challenges on the ground and has represented, I believe, a wise investment. But further reflection is required to address other shortcomings. In the area of institution-building, it is important to strengthen institutions of governance beyond those concerned with the rule of law. In many conflict countries, the dearth of technical administrative capacity affects the society’s ability to address its problems effectively or to manage its resources in a way that permits lasting stability. Bilateral and multilateral technical assistance programmes will generally remain the most appropriate means to remedy such weaknesses, but it may be necessary to complement these traditional approaches with other mechanisms to help local administrations to deliver urgently-needed services to the population in the short term while jump-starting a coherent programme of institutional reform in the long term.

One experiment that may offer useful ideas for the future was the framework for international assistance that was elaborated in Liberia, known as the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). Other interesting experiences, including our efforts in East Timor and Kosovo, where a small corps of well-placed technical advisers remained in place after the initial transfer of administrative authority to strengthen the capacity and performance of local governing bodies.

A second area where further efforts are absolutely indispensable is socio-economic development. In many post-conflict areas, including Haiti, political tensions and insecurity are compounded and fed by socio-economic privation and inequality. My current functions have reinforced my conviction that, in such areas, support for early recover, reconstruction and development constitutes an integral component of the search for peace, and that stability will be consolidated only when the local population can see a tangible improvement in their daily lives.

Socio-economic development cannot realistically be achieved during the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation. But we must find ways to accelerate aid processes from the outset of a peace effort so as to generate what we call a peace dividend: the kind of visible results that foster public confidence and hope and reinforce the legitimacy of local authorities while laying the groundwork for future progress. Important related innovations within peacekeeping operations include the use of quick impact projects and the community violence-reduction programme in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Other positive results have been achieved through closer cooperation between peacekeepers, United Nations agencies and international financial institutions. Examples include MINUSTAH’s collaboration with the United Nations country team to conduct a nationwide vaccination campaign in Haiti and a joint project now under way with the World Bank, following a similar successful experiment in Liberia.

More coherent action by all elements of the United Nations system in support of peace and security priorities can be fostered by Member States through their representatives in the governing boards of all those bodies. It may also be timely to engage other actors in a wider debate on how to make a difference within post-conflict environments, combining international aid, effective national decision-making and private-sector activity. The need to address the social and economic dimension of stability is shared by others who can assist, including the World Bank and various members of the private sector and the non-governmental organization community.

Even in a difficult global financial environment, an effort to step up aid programmes should be pursued as a matter of urgency. This can save a lot money in the long term, by preventing relapses into conflict. It can also buttress the global cooperation envisaged in the United Nations Charter, by highlighting the commitment of industrialized countries to complement and support the work of the Blue Helmets, who include a very high representation of troops from developing countries.

Finally, I would like to offer a few brief thoughts on the functioning of peacekeeping, speaking from a field perspective. From my current vantage point, the key measurement of the effectiveness of the peacekeeping machinery is its ability to support
missions in obtaining what they need to do the job — in other words, a political framework for their activities, a tight institutional support structure and provision of the necessary human and material resources.

In Haiti, we have received strong overall political support in the form of coherent, practical and well-crafted mandates that identify the core areas where progress is critical and give us the scope required to act. I have also profoundly appreciated the strong support we have received at every level from Member States and the Secretariat, particularly at difficult moments of crisis in 2008. The assistance of colleagues and friends in Port-au-Prince, New York and national capitals was indispensable in responding to unrest over rising prices in the spring and to the destruction wrought by hurricanes in the autumn.

The institutional support structure has also provided valuable assistance. As noted in the non-paper, Member States have delegated significant authority to the Secretariat, which has in turn given the mission considerable latitude to make necessary operational and tactical decisions on the ground. At the same time, a number of existing structures provide a good framework for a regular and vigorous exchange between the Security Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, although the potential of those structures tended in the past to be significantly underutilized.

These arrangements are thus an appropriate subject for review by Member States. However, from the perspective of MINUSTAH, the current organization of decision-making and dialogue has worked well and constitutes a key element of our effectiveness. It has ensured our credibility as impartial servants of the Charter, acting on behalf of 192 Member States. It has also enabled us to respond appropriately to rapidly changing circumstances on the ground. Meanwhile, drawing on new technology, Headquarters has worked to enhance information flow in peacekeeping, enabling mission staff to form “communities of practice” with colleagues around the world and helping troop-contributing countries to harmonize and update national peacekeeping training programmes.

At the same time, since peacekeeping situations are by definition ad hoc, experience on the ground will often inevitably be ahead of policy instruments. It is therefore essential to retain a flexible approach, recognizing that guidelines and doctrine should ultimately support practical solutions and not become an end in themselves.

Finally, in terms of material support, we have seen progress in enhancing the availability of key equipment and personnel. In MINUSTAH we are grateful for the provision of experts in such relatively new areas as corrections and border management, and we appreciate the efforts to enable us to undertake riot-control efforts with restraint and professionalism.

Peacekeeping will continue to face new and unexpected situations. It is therefore important that Member States be ready to provide new skills and new capabilities as they become necessary and to facilitate a swift response to urgent needs in pursuit of mandated activities.

In conclusion, I wish to thank you again, Mr. President, for having allowed me to participate in this debate. I am convinced that it is possible to continue to enrich and adapt United Nations peacekeeping operations to enable them to fully respond to the needs and problems of tomorrow. However, we must see that that adaptation is done in the spirit that, I am sure, is inspiring our debate today, that is to say, first, by being open to change but without renouncing certain fundamental principles that have demonstrated their usefulness; secondly, by committing ourselves to the practice of effective multilateralism, which, in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter, involves the balanced participation of all in working for peace; and finally, by committing ourselves to strengthening and protecting this valuable instrument of peacekeeping.

The President (spoke in French): I shall now open the debate to members of the Council.

Sir John Sawers (United Kingdom): May I begin by paying tribute to Ambassador Butagira for his much-valued work to the United Nations over the past five years and to wish him good luck in whatever lies ahead.

I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s debate. It is an important first step in this Franco-British initiative that you and I have launched on the instructions of our Foreign Ministers to improve the way in which the United Nations system, and in
particular the Security Council, handles peacekeeping issues. The speakers we have heard in the last hour have set out the importance of the issues we are addressing. I thank them all for their contributions, especially Mr. Annabi for coming from Haiti to give us the benefit of his experience on the ground.

Peacekeeping is at the very heart of what the United Nations stands for. If one asks people on the streets of one of our capitals what the United Nations means to them, they will probably reply with an image of a blue-helmeted soldier watching over an uneasy peace. It is a powerful image, but it needs updating. Today, as Under-Secretary-General Le Roy implied, it could be not just a of soldier but of a police officer or a humanitarian worker or a human rights expert. Often they will have little in the way of a peace to watch over. The challenges have become more demanding as many of the conflicts we address involve non-State actors, and United Nations peacekeeping has to change to meet the new demands.

United Nations peacekeeping is not in crisis, but, as Under-Secretary-General Malcorra said, it is struggling to cope with the scale and complexity of these new challenges. United Nations peacekeeping is to some extent a victim of its own success, but it is too precious a commodity to be put at risk.

The issues are not new. Lakhdar Brahimi addressed many of them in what remains a landmark report (S/2000/809), whose conclusions are as relevant today as they were in 2000. We have been reminded of their importance during our recent discussions of Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. The point now is to revisit the Brahimi report — build on it, adapt it where necessary and, most importantly, make sure that we implement a more rigorous and strategic approach to peacekeeping across the board in the Security Council.

The United Kingdom and France set out our initial thinking in the non-paper we issued earlier this week. The first part outlined the challenges, which we grouped into three areas. First is effective strategic oversight, especially the need for better preparation, planning, oversight and evaluation of operations. Second is addressing the resource constraints, including the importance of finding new ways to deal with the pressure on funding and the availability of troops and other resources as the demand for United Nations peacekeeping continues to rise. The third area is lessons from implementation, including how the increasingly complex mandates that we give to United Nations peacekeepers can be delivered.

That is a daunting agenda, but its scale cannot be an excuse for inaction. We have suggested that we focus first on the issues around effective strategic oversight, many of which fall to the Security Council to address. Let us put our own house in order first.

We made a good start at the informal seminar held yesterday at the French Mission. I was struck by the following themes of our discussion: the need for a clear sense of the challenges we are addressing here in New York and in the field, and the importance of building capacity, not just in the missions themselves but also in the Secretariat, which is constrained by rules that were not designed for the new realities of peacekeeping.

The Council itself needs better information and, most importantly, better military advice. The Council must improve its own practices, including more realistic mandates, clear completion strategies and measurable benchmarks to enable us to assess progress. The Council must also ensure that peacekeepers have a peace to keep, and not put poorly equipped peacekeepers into a war zone in the hope that they will have an effect.

While the Security Council should rightly play its leading role, this must be an inclusive process, drawing on the expertise and resources of all Member States and all parts of the United Nations system. We welcome the work under way in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Services, and we very much welcome the initiatives under way, not least from our Canadian colleagues, which we see as complementary to work within the Council.

Following yesterday’s seminar, we will work with our French colleagues to revise the joint paper to reflect both the discussion yesterday and today’s debate.

I look forward to hearing from Council colleagues and other speakers today on how we can move this agenda forward in practical ways. We have discussed it many times, but we now need to turn our attention to a practical programme of action. We will all have noted the emphasis that our new American colleague, Ambassador Rice, put on these issues during
her confirmation hearing. Following her confirmation last night by the United States Senate, we look forward to welcoming her to the Security Council next week and to working closely with her on what will be one of the great challenges facing the Council during 2009.

Mr. Urbina (Costa Rica) (spoke in Spanish): Allow me to begin by thanking your delegation, Mr. President, and the delegation of the United Kingdom for the timely and necessary initiative to revisit this matter. I also wish to express my gratitude for the comments and questions from Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Annabi. I believe they are important contributions to the Council’s discussion of this matter.

As the Council knows, I come from a part of the world where three United Nations peacekeeping missions operated and successfully concluded their activities in Central America, verifying compliance with commitments adopted by five countries in order to restore peace and promote development in the subregion. The key to that success can be found in the simple elements that we all know, but perhaps it is worth reiterating them: appropriation of the processes by the recipient countries, a regional commitment to the processes, clarity in the Security Council’s objectives and mandates and, of course, broad, transparent and timely communication among all the actors involved. With this experience and with some knowledge of how this Council operates, we would like to take advantage of this meeting to highlight a few points.

I will begin with the obvious, because perhaps it is not really so obvious, and that is the nature of the problems that has brought about a natural evolution in the scope of peace operations. I call them “peace operations” because they go so much further than simple peacekeeping. Very frequently, we persist in thinking in terms of old instruments to tackle completely new problems without making a more creative use of the range of instruments that we have at our disposal for addressing these new problems. That is why we have repeatedly advocated the concept of integrated missions that comply with the Council’s duty to promote peace, and not simply to maintain it.

We are convinced that that is the best way to address and possibly meet the expectations generated by the deployment of the United Nations flag. In those places where the flag flies, the formal distinctions that are of great concern to us here are irrelevant. People who see the United Nations flag flying on the horizon believe that a better future is at hand, hope that their grief is coming to an end, and are pleased because their security and their very existence are no longer threatened. For these people, it is difficult to understand that their security and expectations may or may not be part of a mandate and that, as a result, those who represent the Organization on the ground may not be able to accomplish what these populations are hoping for and urgently need.

That is the enormous challenge that must be met by the United Nations and, in particular, the Council. We have to manage growing expectations with increasingly limited resources. That is why today’s debate must be the beginning of a process of rationalizing the way in which the Security Council fulfils its mandate. The great majority of the necessary provisions have already been agreed to by the Council. The measures to be taken are included in resolutions and presidential statements that are now more than 10-years old. We need to bring together all that we have agreed upon, revise the way these decisions are implemented and incorporate elements that experience has shown to be crucial to success on the ground.

We have to review our own internal logic. Despite the fact that Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the Council was established to ensure prompt and effective action in the field, we are often more concerned with achieving results on paper. The logic of achieving results on paper explains the fact that our decision-making processes are exclusive. It is much easier to achieve prompt and effective results on paper if decision-making is limited to members of the Council, and even easier if the decision-making process starts with a consensus among permanent members. That is absolutely counterproductive if we seek to achieve prompt and effective results on the ground.

No one around this table is unaware of the distance between those who take decisions on peace operations, those who implement them, those who allocate resources, those who have to implement the decisions on the ground, and the recipient country.

That is why we have to review the way in which we establish and renew Security Council mandates. Specifically, we believe that we need to have interactive and informal meetings with the troop-
contributing countries and with the Secretariat. It is also crucial to improve our interaction with the General Assembly through the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and with the Fifth Committee. With appropriate and timely information, we can produce clear, convincing and viable mandates, and with the appropriate interaction among bodies we can guarantee that we will faithfully implement the decisions of the Council in the field. We also need to have inputs from the host country and other concerned players.

The Council’s decision-making process on a peacekeeping operation requires more active support from the Secretariat. As we have seen in many negotiations in the General Assembly, when our experts meet to negotiate a resolution we need the advice of the Secretariat to tell us, in a timely manner, the practical implications of our proposals or of our silence, including the financial and operational implications of mandates. Moreover, we must effectively follow up on the resolutions and mandates. If something is not working as it should, we have to identify and take measures to correct it.

We have reached the limit of our resources. We can no longer establish mandates in the hope that our mere presence in the field is enough. This perspective was identified and approved by the Council when it considered the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), and it would therefore be timely to hold an open debate on the implementation of the recommendations contained in that report.

I would like to conclude by saying that we believe that it is important to deepen and strengthen our relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission. The peacebuilding component is crucial, as was pointed out by Mr. Alain Le Roy. As a result, when we talk about having the timely advice of the Secretariat, we are referring not only to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, but also to the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office.

We are convinced that, although our recommendations could prolong negotiations, the final results will be much more effective in the field, and that is where the Charter asks us to be prompt and effective.

The history of United Nations peacekeeping operations is, generally speaking, a success story. We are victims of our own success. Our discussion today is a step in the right direction towards achieving the proper conceptualization and implementation of what the peace operations of the twenty-first century must be.

Mr. Kafando (Burkina Faso) (spoke in French): At the outset, I, too, wish to tell my friend, Ambassador Francis Butagira, now that he is leaving us, how deeply we have appreciated his effective contributions to the work of the Security Council. I wish him all the best in his future duties.

Mr. President, we would also like to thank you and the entire French delegation for your choice of this subject, which is most timely. We have no doubt that today’s debate will contribute to enriching our thinking on one of the important activities of the United Nations — peacekeeping operations.

We also would like to thank Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Annabi for their statements.

In a world in which crises are more complex than ever, where the resolution of conflicts often favours the use of the force and violence, ensuring international peace and security, as is done by the United Nations, is no easy task. It is all the more difficult when the soldiers of peace become potential targets of fighters or are themselves responsible for reprehensible acts.

Most fortunately, and despite a few missteps, the Organization is discharging its mission fairly well. Moreover, it is tirelessly working to adapt to new paradigms of conflict. Thus, it has decided to incorporate in the field of action of peacekeeping operations such issues as humanitarian and human rights issues, electoral assistance, demining, disarmament, the demobilization and reintegration of fighters, the strengthening of cooperation with regional organizations, and so on. All of those are things that require, if not a new approach, a different way of dealing with peacekeeping operations, from the establishment or alteration of a mandate to the organization and coordination of participants on the ground.

Various developments in countries in conflict have underscored the need to strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping operations by giving them mandates with clearly defined goals and command structures. In addition, they should also have the appropriate logistical capabilities and financing to enable them to
be more effective on the ground. Along the same lines, it is essential to share best practices in order to enhance effectiveness.

The slow pace of deployment in urgent situations is another area of concern. As recommended in the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), we should work to ensure that delays are reasonable. In that regard, the troubled deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur provides us with a perfect illustration of the efforts that still need to be carried out.

Effective coordination is one of the keys to the success of peacekeeping operations. We must therefore decisively improve communication and coordination among the various bodies involved in the decision-making process, namely, the Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations agencies and programmes and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

There has already been substantial progress with regard to the process of planning for integrated missions. It is important that that be strengthened by better coordination and unity of purpose with regard to efforts on the ground. The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and the credibility of the United Nations also hinge on the policy of zero tolerance, which my delegation strongly supports.

With regard to cooperation with Member States, it is important to improve relations between those who plan, coordinate and manage peacekeeping operations and the troop-contributing countries. The experience and specific knowledge of those countries can contribute to the planning process as well as to clarifying the decision-making process. It would therefore be useful to strengthen the system of three-way communication between troop-contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

As has been pointed out in the Council itself, the maintenance of international peace and security is both a shared and collective responsibility. Member States should therefore continue to support the Organization by deploying contingents and mobilizing the necessary resources of all kinds. For its part, my country, which has made contributing to the settlement of conflicts a major focus of its foreign policy, continues to honour its commitments in that regard.

The planning process should not ignore the role of the host country, upon which the success of a peacekeeping mission sometimes depends. To that end, in line with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it is important to clearly bear in mind the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States. Peacekeeping operations must be carried out both with the consent of the host country and in an impartial way.

The contributions of subregional and regional organizations are crucial to the success of the operations deployed by the United Nations. Being close to the protagonists in a conflict and to the reality on the ground, those organizations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, play an important and unique role in that regard. Unfortunately, the demands of some conflicts are such that regional arrangements do not yet have the necessary resources to meet the task.

That reality is most in evidence, and the consequences most tragic, on the African continent, which, unfortunately, is where most of the world’s areas of tension are found. Such is the case with the African Union Mission in Somalia, whose current configuration does not allow it to address the challenges of the conflict in that country. The adoption of resolution 1863 (2009) was an important step that must be followed up as soon as possible, for in Somalia time is against those who are working towards peace and national reconciliation.

We therefore urge the international community to support the efforts of the African Union, both in Somalia and elsewhere on the continent. We also appeal for greater support for the efforts of African subregional organizations, which are essential but often forgotten links in the chain of peace.

The right to security and protection for which the United Nations is working requires that we accord the same attention to saving, comforting and helping people in dire situations or in places where there is need. At the same time, the Organization, first and foremost the Security Council, must continue to emphasize the prevention of conflict by strengthening mechanisms for early warning and rapid reaction. Above all, it must invest further in eradicating the underlying causes of conflict through coordinated, well-planned and coherent efforts. Only development and the full realization of people’s potential, supported
by effective preventive diplomacy, as required, will make it possible to ensure peace and to alleviate the situations of the already overburdened peacekeeping operations.

In conclusion, allow me to express our great appreciation to peacekeepers, who, under extremely difficult conditions and at the risk of their lives, make an invaluable contribution to the establishment of a safer world. We unreservedly condemn deliberate attacks on United Nations forces, for which there is no justification whatever.

Mr. Takasu (Japan): I would like to begin by thanking Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and Special Representative Hédi Annabi for their extremely useful introductory statements.

United Nations peacekeeping operations, which were invented out of necessity, have now played a central role over 60 years now in restoring stability in countries emerging from conflict. I would like to pay tribute to all those who have ever served on those missions over the years. At the moment, there are 90,000 uniformed military and police and 20,000 civilian personnel serving around the world. Many dedicated men and women have given very selflessly of themselves.

Launching a peacekeeping mission is one of the most effective measures that the Council can take to promote peace and security. Due to rapid changes in the operational environment, United Nations peacekeeping efforts are now facing challenges. The nature of conflicts and threats has changed. Missions are increasingly confronted with non-State actors, who have little respect for international law and threaten the stability of entire regions, employing sophisticated tactics and ever-more-lethal weapons. United Nations workers are often the first targets of those actors.

The growing complexity and enormity of the tasks that the Council mandates those missions to carry out are also having a serious impact on the performance of missions. Peacekeeping missions are increasingly asked to do much more than traditional tasks such as monitoring ceasefire agreements. Their mandates now cover providing protection to civilians, supporting humanitarian assistance and coordinating international support for socio-economic stability. Such mandates require diverse skills and expertise, and significant changes must be made in the way they are implemented.

Obviously, when the Council takes action that includes a mandate for the protection of civilians, it creates expectations. If those expectations are not met, that leads to criticism and disappointment about the apparent under-implementation of mandates. It is primarily the responsibility of the Council, and not of the Secretariat, to rectify that situation and decide what the changes should be.

We have seen many successful cases of peacekeeping operations, but we have also experienced disappointments. The year 1994 was one of great crisis that is not comparable to the present. But we do have challenges, operational challenges that entail different kinds of issues. We should try to find a way to more effectively and efficiently implement peacekeeping operations. That is the task, as well as to better meet the expectations of people on the ground. We therefore appreciate the initiative of the delegations of France and the United Kingdom to develop practical recommendations in due course.

In 2000, the Council adopted resolution 1327 (2000) after reviewing the farsighted Brahimi report (S/2000/809). The Council decided on that occasion to give peacekeeping operations “clear, credible and achievable mandates” (resolution 1327 (2000), annex, part I) and “to ensure that the mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations are appropriate to the situation on the ground including such factors as the prospects for success” (ibid., part II). This is an overriding principle of the utmost importance, both today as at the time.

Since this is a kick-off debate on a policy review of peacekeeping operations stretching over the next few months, I would like this morning to make three points on improving strategic oversight.

First, to make a sound decision on launching a new or expanded mission, the Council should be fully informed of the realities on the ground. Timely political and military information and high-quality and professional analysis are indispensable if we are to fully comprehend the nature and challenge of the situation and if we are to enable the mission to respond swiftly and achieve the intended objective. The lessons learned from other missions should be fully taken into account in formulating a plan of operations. Specific steps should be taken to institute this practice.

It is also important to examine the scope and feasibility of proposed mandates in depth with the
participation of not only members of the Council, but also other stakeholders, such as prospective troop-contributing countries, prior to a formal decision by the Council. The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations could be better utilized as a forum for this purpose.

Secondly, after a mission is launched, the Council should closely and continuously monitor the operation of the mission, exercise flexibility with respect to its mandate and strength and make the necessary adjustments to improve its efficiency. The Council must always ensure that missions are provided with sufficient support and the means to carry out their mandates.

At the same time, the United Nations should exercise maximum flexibility and seek out the most efficient use of available resources for peacekeeping operations, because, as a whole, they are greatly overextended and overstretched. We therefore highly appreciate the recent good practice of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) in eliminating one battalion and arranging for cooperation with a neighbouring mission.

The third point relates to political issues: we should always consider a peacekeeping mission in the broader context. It is not a substitute for but only a supplement to the political process. The presence of a mission, if it is mobilized together with a serious political effort, will have a stabilizing effect on the ground and create conditions for national reconciliation. But without a credible, sincere effort to persuade the parties to reach a political agreement, the impact of a mission is limited. The Council should put as much focus as possible on the political process during the time peacekeepers are deployed.

Peacekeeping missions cannot be deployed forever. Like the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and UNOCI, every mission, in principle, should in the future set clear benchmarks, with a realistic timeline against which progress is regularly monitored and reflected in future planning.

Peacebuilding efforts should produce tangible results and change in the lives of the people on the ground after a ceasefire or the achievement of a peace treaty and should not wait until a peacekeeping mission completes its mandate period. Some multidimensional missions, such as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), already include elements of peacebuilding in their own mandates. But experience in other missions, such as those in Liberia, Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire, are also encouraging. Even in more conventional missions, strategic consideration should be given from the earliest stage of planning to ensure a smooth, gradual transition to early recovery and peacebuilding. In some cases, both processes — peacekeeping and peacebuilding — could overlap for a definite period, but not too long, for a seamless transition. The Peacebuilding Commission could provide very vital support to this work of the Council.

In conclusion, today’s debate will contribute to deepening our understanding of the challenges to peacekeeping. We highly appreciate this timely initiative and look forward to participating in finding concrete and practical steps for improvement. We also support the ongoing initiative of the Secretariat — the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support — to review and identify approaches to maximize the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly and, of course, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations also have an important role to play.

It is essential that all these efforts in various entities be directed towards the same goal of enhancing the effectiveness, impact and efficiency of peacekeeping operations and are synchronized in such a way that, within a reasonable time frame, we will complete our work and come up with concrete recommendations for improvements.

In this context, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that the Council created after reviewing the Brahimi report can be reactivated as a forum for exchanges of views among the Council members and other stakeholders, which will yield creative ideas and make a useful contribution to the work of the Council. As the Chairperson of the Working Group, I intend to see to it that we collectively take a harder look at mission-specific operational issues and at generic issues with general implications, always benefiting from the lessons that past missions have taught us.

It is my hope that the policy review by the Council over the next few months will be able to achieve tangible improvement in this indispensable tool created by the wisdom of our forebears.
Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the French presidency for convening today’s meeting of the Security Council and also to Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and Mr. Annabi for their substantive presentations on United Nations peacekeeping.

The rising numbers of peacekeeping operations and the personnel involved in them, the growing complexity of peacekeeping mandates and the lack of financial and logistical support for them make it necessary to review existing United Nations peacekeeping practices and to formulate a comprehensive strategy for their planning and implementation.

We believe that any measures designed to reform United Nations peacekeeping should be aimed at enhancing the efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping operations and should be evaluated precisely according to that criterion. It is of fundamental importance that they be carried out in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the norms of international law, with unfailing respect for the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in accordance with the universally recognized principles of peacekeeping.

We see ways for improving United Nations peacekeeping, above all in the areas of peacekeeping operations management, making use of the potential of regional organizations and United Nations capacity-building and preventive diplomacy. As regards peacekeeping operations management, we advocate further improvement in the practice of operational consultations among Security Council members, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat on all aspects of peacekeeping operation activities, including in the planning stage, on the basis of existing formats and previous decisions of the Security Council. We believe that, to establish this dialogue, it is essential to involve more actively the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations. In this connection, we look forward to the initiative to be undertaken during Japan’s chairmanship of the Group.

The Security Council bears a particular responsibility in formulating realistic peacekeeping mandates. We believe that the decisions of the Council on the deployment of United Nations operations must be based on preliminary agreements with potential troop-contributing countries to provide peacekeeping operations with the necessary personnel and operational capacity. This conclusion has been confirmed by the experience of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

In the context of the increasing complexity of modern peacekeeping operations, there is a growing need now to differentiate their functions in specific areas of peacekeeping and in promoting post-conflict reconstruction. We believe that it would be rational to mandate peacekeepers only with the primary tasks of post-conflict reconstruction, while the actual processes of peacekeeping and socio-economic recovery should more actively engage the relevant United Nations bodies, in particular the Peacebuilding Commission, and regional organizations, international financial institutions and bilateral donors.

Special attention must be given to the issue of ensuring the required level of military expertise for the Security Council, which remains unsatisfactory. We support the involvement of the military experts of Council members in the formulation and review of peacekeeping mandates. At the same time, we must ensure a more systematic approach by the Security Council to the military aspects of peacekeeping.

In that regard, we believe that it is now time and justified in all respects to revitalize the activity of the Military Staff Committee, with the full participation of the 15 members of the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee’s assessment of the military situation in countries in which peacekeeping operations are deployed, its formulations of recommendations regarding operational aspects of peacekeeping and its participation in missions to assess the readiness of troops and services assigned to peacekeeping operations would ensure that the Council is provided with reliable and timely information and would also enhance United Nations peacekeeping military expertise as a whole. My delegation is ready to share our specific proposals on the possible organization of the Committee’s work.

We also wish to stress the responsibility of the Secretariat for improving the integrated planning of operations and coordination between Headquarters and the field. My delegation believes that, in the context of the recent restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field
Support, the strengthening of the Office of Military Affairs and the establishment of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, the Secretariat has all the necessary potential to effectively address those tasks. The achievement of a systematic approach is possible only through the effective redistribution of labour and responsibilities among the various departments and offices of the Secretariat, while preserving the unity of command and control. Those objectives are particularly important now in the light of the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

It is clear that, in order to enhance United Nations peacekeeping, it is essential to increase cooperation with regional operations during the deployment of such missions. Experience has shown us that the greater involvement of regional organizations is justified provided that they act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and when their relationships with the United Nations and especially with the Security Council are regulated on the basis of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Given the growing scale of United Nations peacekeeping operations, it is becoming increasingly urgent to strengthen the Organization’s potential on parallel tracks, above all in the areas of preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacebuilding. In that context, the forthcoming reports of the Secretary-General on mediation and post-conflict peacebuilding should provide us with food for thought with regard to enhancing United Nations mediation capabilities by combining the peacekeeping and peacebuilding components of peacekeeping mandates and by creating a roster of United Nations civilian experts.

Russia attaches great importance to increasing its participation in United Nations peacekeeping Russian peacekeepers have been participating in peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, various regions in Africa, Haiti and Kosovo. A Russian helicopter unit is operating as part of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and another Russian aviation group is being dispatched to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.

Another important area is the involvement of the Russian Ministry of the Interior in the training of African specialists at its All-Russian Institute for Enhancing the Skills of Staff Members. We are planning to render further assistance to the United Nations in the area of police training. In particular we are working on the issue of training and contributing officers to formed police units, and on the training of senior police staff.

Russia is ready to engage in constructive dialogue on enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, both within the framework of the Security Council and in close cooperation with the Secretariat, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission and other bodies of the United Nations system.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): I would like first to thank the Permanent Representative of Uganda for the excellent cooperation we had and I only regret that we did not have a chance to work longer together on the Council.

(spoke in French)

As for the issue being discussed today, I wish first to thank the Security Council presidency and the delegation of the United Kingdom for having taken the initiative on today’s debate and for their efforts in preparing the debate.

Like previous speakers, I wish to emphasize that the Brahimi report remains relevant as a basis for any discussion of the peacekeeping. Since its publication, many challenges remain the same, but new ones have emerged. We now face an unprecedented level of peacekeeping activities in often hostile contexts and with increasingly complex mandates. At the same time, given the rapid growth in the number and size of missions, we are approaching the limits of available resources. Changes involving work methods and institutional changes in the planning, implementation, follow-up and assessment of peacekeeping operations will help us to address those issues more effectively.

My delegation notes with great satisfaction that the Secretariat has launched a similar process to analyse key questions relating to future peacekeeping operations. Austria is a long-standing troop contributor in the framework of the United Nations and of regional structures, such as the European Union and the NATO Partnership for Peace. Since 1960, some 60,000 Austrian soldiers have served in peacekeeping operations under United Nations authority. It goes without saying that we are following this work with
great interest and that we are ready to participate actively in it and to share our relevant experience and expertise.

Given the growth in peacekeeping operations and the fact that their mandates are becoming increasingly complex, cooperation with regional organizations will be more important than ever. Support for creating the expertise and capacity is necessary to allow those organizations to play a more important role. While the Security Council must not abandon its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations must strive to play a growing role as a bridging force until the regional organizations are able to take up the slack. That would also contribute to strengthening regional ownership of crisis management.

Austria supports the idea of strengthening the expertise available to the Security Council and all of its members in the preparation of the Council’s decisions on new peacekeeping missions. That is clearly true for military expertise and for the specific expertise that may prove necessary for action on such issues as the protection of civilians in conflict. We are also in favour of a temporary strengthening, if necessary, of the strategic capacity of the Secretariat to manage and oversee particularly complex operations.

Moreover, Austria supports an interactive process in which the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries would meet from the outset of the planning phase to the follow-up and assessment of missions under way. A more in-depth dialogue among existing structures within the Security Council and the Secretariat would allow for better integration of our collective political, financial and military expertise and also make it possible to ensure that the mandate of a peacekeeping operation reflects from the start its needs and challenges and those of the individuals who must be protected.

Austria also welcomes in that context the idea of organizing, on a more regular basis, meetings among the Security Council, the Secretariat, commanders in the field and troop-contributing countries to discuss the implementation, progress and challenges of the various operations under way.

Austria firmly supports strengthening the mandates of peacekeeping operations in the area of civilian protection and recognizes the important role of such operations in the promotion of human rights, the protection of children affected by armed conflict, the strengthening of the rule of law and the role of women in peace processes and in supporting peace.

In our view, an important challenge is the lack of instructions and guidelines for force commanders and troops on the ground for the specific implementation of their mandates. Such instructions and guidelines should be developed through close cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries, taking into account the review of existing missions and best practices. This could also play an important role for troop-contributing countries in preparing troops for such tasks, including by integrating those aspects into pre-deployment training.

Austria supports a study commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that will examine those issues. We also support the idea of improving the assessment of current mission mandates, including in terms of strategic objectives and benchmarks. The lessons learned from a mission could be an important source of information for the Security Council in planning and following up on existing missions. That process should also be shared with and enriched by the troop-contributing countries.

In conclusion, we support and are very interested in follow-up to this debate and are prepared to actively contribute during our Security Council mandate.

Mr. Vilović (Croatia): First of all, I should like to pay tribute to Ambassador Butagira for his five years with the United Nations and, in particular, for his time working with us here in the Council.

I would like to commend the French presidency of the Security Council and the United Kingdom delegation for the initiative to convene of this important and timely meeting regarding an issue of great importance, not only for the States members of the Council, but also for the entire membership of the United Nations. Although the issue of peacekeeping operations has, understandably, been a focus of this body for many years — and with noteworthy results — we find it appropriate, particularly at this moment, to engage in a thorough discussion of some of its key elements on the basis of the non-paper prepared by France and the United Kingdom. I wish also to express my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General Malcorra and Special
Representative Annabi for their valuable briefings today.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement to be delivered later by the representative of the Czech Republic on behalf of the European Union.

The world landscape has changed markedly in recent years. The nature of contemporary conflicts has been increasingly shifted from the inter-State to the intra-State level. As a result, we are witnessing new challenges and threats to international peace and security. In reacting to those challenges, the Security Council has, since the beginning of the 1990s, increasingly resorted to peacekeeping operations as a basic instrument at the disposal of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Today, it seems that those efforts have reached their peak, with more than 112,000 personnel engaged in current peacekeeping operations, while the annual budget for those missions is three times the size of the annualized regular budget of the United Nations. It is fair to say that that enormous jump in the size of the peacekeeping budget was a consequence not only of the rising number of peacekeeping operations, but also of the considerable change in their nature from simple military operations to multidimensional, integrated military-civilian projects.

In our opinion, the basic precondition for reaching a well-founded decision on establishing a peacekeeping operation and sending it to a certain area — and, equally, on any changes to its mandate and on the final closure of a mission — is to have timely and current information regarding the situation on the ground, as well as accompanying military and political analysis of the conflict. In that context, we are of the view that the information available to the Council through various mechanisms is adequate, although more needs to be done with regard to the quality of the information received.

Similarly, we deem it appropriate that the Council, in an adequate manner and at an appropriate time, include other States — especially troop-contributing countries or States that offer other significant contributions to a peacekeeping operation — in the process of information exchange and decision-making. In addition, we think that the potential of preventive measures and diplomacy within the United Nations system should be further explored and strengthened.

Moreover, it is important to stress that the United Nations, unlike some military alliances, does not strive to resolve a conflict first and foremost by military means, but rather seeks to address its root causes, measuring, inter alia, the level of security by the level of improvement in everyday life for the affected population. Croatia fully supports the standpoint of the United Nations according to which lasting peace and security can be solidly built only through three interlinked and firmly grounded basic pillars: security, development and the protection of human rights.

It is obvious that, when we address peacekeeping operations in their new, three-pillar context, the civilian and police components of such operations are becoming increasingly important. We are of the opinion that it is extremely important that States provide qualified civilian and police personnel to engage in those tasks. We reaffirm our readiness to contribute to the establishment of permanent rosters of civilian experts experienced in post-conflict stabilization, who can be deployed to a conflict area on short notice immediately after the establishment of a ceasefire. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that peacekeeping operations are not intended primarily to engage in reconstruction or to rebuild a country in which they are deployed, as other specialized organizations and institutions can carry out such activities more efficiently and less expensively.

It is becoming self-evident that the capability of many traditional troop-contributing countries to contribute troops to peacekeeping operations has been significantly diminished. On the other hand, new contributors often lack the infrastructure, equipment and training necessary for the effective integration of their troops into more complex missions. In order to share the burden imposed by peacekeeping operations, the United Nations should strengthen its cooperation with regional organizations, as well as improve cooperation between its agencies and other international agencies active on the ground.

Since the majority of United Nations peacekeeping operations take place in Africa, we believe that cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States is particularly important. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that those organizations lack precisely what peacekeeping operations need: qualified personnel and resources for peacekeeping activities. Nonetheless, active
cooperation and support in building the capacity of regional organizations would have enormous long-term benefits.

Finally, in further discussions of the challenges confronting peacekeeping operations, the Security Council needs to carefully examine the question of whether resources are being properly allocated or whether room exists for reallocating resources by downsizing some old missions or closing them altogether. The answer to that question will have significant influence on the future of United Nations peacekeeping.

All of that said, it is impossible not to refer briefly to the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) and some of its main recommendations. Although it does not answer all of our questions, the report clearly contains guidelines that, even almost 10 years after they were developed, need to be taken into consideration. As a representative of a country that, within a short period of time, hosted a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions and consequently had the opportunity to experience the performance of each of them first-hand, I would like to draw the attention of members to the following recommendations.

First, we need to ensure a clear and achievable mandate. Secondly, we need to provide, before the establishment of the mission, the resources necessary for the full execution of the mission’s mandate. Thirdly, forces must be appropriately equipped and have the capacity, if mandated, to confront violence. Lastly, we need to ensure political and resource backing from Member States, as well as adequate staffing.

From our individual perspective, we would also add to the aforementioned recommendations that it is important to involve domestic resources whenever possible, but without exacerbating existing political tensions. This can help to improve the effectiveness of an operation at minimal expense and help to secure a unique perspective towards the conflict not otherwise available to outsiders. The value of this approach lies in the possibility to develop the capacities necessary for reconstruction and the establishment of a national administration to govern the country after the departure of the international community. It can also have the added benefit of having the local population better accept the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and its forces.

Croatia would like to stress that, while the United Nations has clearly defined criteria for monitoring the implementation of DPKO mandates, it is important that these criteria not be open to political interpretation, and that, once adopted, they be strictly upheld. It is our belief that this last issue, especially the question of assessing benchmarks, opens the possibility for closer cooperation and additional information exchange between the Secretariat and the Member States.

It is precisely the strict implementation of the aforementioned criteria that led us to different evaluations of the success or lack of success of the missions that were active in our own country. Our experience with the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium is a telling example of how a peacekeeping operation, when acting in full compliance with all the aforementioned criteria, can achieve excellent results.

In conclusion, let me add that Croatia now contributes to 13 United Nations peacekeeping operations and intends to continue to add its specific experiences and expertise to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the years to come.

The President (spoke in French): I wish to inform members of the Council that, given scheduling constraints for the speakers remaining on the list, in particular the representatives of the Secretariat, whom we thank for their continued attendance, I intend to conclude this meeting when the list of speakers is exhausted, not to suspend and resume it this afternoon. Therefore, I would respectfully ask my colleagues to respect the five-minute rule for their statements. I would be grateful to speakers for distributing their written statements if they are longer. I would ask colleagues still on my list of speakers to shorten their statements as much as possible.

Mr. Butagira (Uganda): In keeping with your advice, Mr. President, my statement will be circulated and I will try to brief, giving only a summary of my text.

I would like first of all to thank Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and the Special Representative Hédi Annabi for their thoughtful remarks.

As we have heard, the number and scope of United Nations peace operations are approaching what
may be their highest levels ever, improving prospects for conflict resolution but stretching the capacities of the system.

Peacekeeping has changed dramatically over the past two decades. The patrolling of static ceasefire lines, which was once the norm, is no more; now it is almost the exception. United Nations peacekeepers are regularly charged with the responsibility not only of protecting themselves, but in many cases, such as the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of also protecting innocent civilians in their areas of operation. As new and peacekeeping missions are reviewed, it is therefore imperative that they be properly trained, equipped and ready to succeed.

In the immediate wake of the cold war, the international community supported peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives around the world, including in Africa. That brought some significant successes. However, the inability of the United Nations to restore peace in Somalia in the 1990s, culminating in the Security Council’s unprecedented decision to withdraw from the country before completing its mission, clearly dampened international support for conflict intervention and precipitated a rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. One tragic consequence acknowledged by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan was the failure of the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene in order to prevent genocide in Rwanda. The perception of the Organization’s near indifference by the international community over Rwanda left a poisonous legacy that continues to undermine confidence in the United Nations throughout the continent.

But in any consideration of a peacekeeping operation, there is a need for a clear understanding of the prevailing situation in the country. That must be studied well before designing mandates. This requires a clear analysis of the situation on the ground. Clear and measurable benchmarks should be set in the light of the problems on the ground. Establishing the criteria for determining when they are met is important. In addition to exit strategies, entrance strategies also must be well elaborated. It should be understood that a conflict can flare up upon the departure of the peacekeeping force if it leaves too soon, amounting to the abandonment of a fragile peace. Exit conditions, rather than the setting of dates for departure, are critical.

There is no doubt that the international community is slowly learning some of the lessons of the major tragedies of the past. But we still find ourselves engaged in some of the old debates. In a crisis situation, the lingering questions remain. Do we decide to call the attention of the world to the crisis and bring the assets to that crisis, risking that we will not have enough assets and that the crisis could turn into a United Nations debacle, possibly damaging the credibility of peacekeeping for years to come because we are unsure of final support levels throughout every step of the road? Or do we look the other way, thinking that maybe the storm will blow away, that it will not be a disaster and that it will go away without United Nations involvement? That is the key dilemma of peacekeeping, and we have to face it head on.

Once conflicts have ended, it is vital to undertake actions to consolidate peace and prevent the recurrence of armed confrontation. That requires not only diplomatic and military action, but also measures within an integrated peacebuilding effort to tackle the various factors which have caused or are causing threats of conflict. The crucial underlying need in post-conflict peacebuilding situations is the security of ordinary people in the form of real peace and access to basic social facilities. That has been stressed by a number of speakers. Such efforts must be timely, multifaceted and adequately financed, and there must be high-level strategic and administrative coordination among a large number of actors.

Finally, before I conclude, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and all my colleagues for the very kind words spoken about me. This being my last day and meeting in the Council, I feel very nostalgic in saying farewell to all my colleagues. It has been a pleasure and great delight working with all of them. I appreciate the support and cooperation that I have received from all members of the Council within this brief period. I trust that the same support will be extended to my successors.

The President (spoke in French): I assure Ambassador Butagira that we shall miss him and his red rose in the Council.

Mr. Dabbashi (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (spoke in Arabic): Mr. President, you spoke for all of us in
praising Ambassador Butagira of Uganda. I wish him every success in his future endeavours.

I take this opportunity to express our gratitude and appreciation to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. We also thank Ms. Susan Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, for her efforts in establishing her new Department. We thank them both for their statements. We also thank Mr. Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his valuable briefing.

The United Nations has had great success in its peacekeeping operations. The Organization has helped to save the lives of countless civilians, reduced tensions and prepared proper conditions for sustainable peace. That success reaffirms the central role of the United Nations as a bellwether of many parts in the maintenance of international peace and security. Of course, peacekeeping cannot replace the definitive settlement of conflicts, a goal we all share, which can be met only by addressing the comprehensive political, security, economic and humanitarian dimensions of a given problem.

The growing number of peacekeeping operations requires us to analyse the root causes of conflicts if we are to resolve and end them. Conflict resolution requires States to provide the Organization with the necessary human, financial and logistical resources and political support. Communication and coordination between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and all agencies and departures involved are also needed. We must make a sustained study to prevent the recurrence of mistakes and to assess the threats to peace. Information regarding accidents and casualties must also be freely communicated. In that respect, we condemn all attacks on peacekeeping personnel, missions and property. We fully support a policy of zero tolerance for sexual abuse. We condemn all such violations and call for their perpetrators to be brought to justice.

Security sector reform must be included in the comprehensive reform process if we are to ensure security, stability and development. The United Nations is highly experienced in that area. The Peacebuilding Commission has assumed the critical role of strengthening States’ post-conflict security capacities. We therefore support the important post-conflict security sector reform efforts of peacekeeping operations.

We believe that the United Nations role should be one of coordination in providing support and advice to States in the reform process and in mobilizing resources and enhancing their effectiveness. Reform is multidimensional; no single solution can be applied to all sectors. National circumstances, needs and priorities must be taken into account if we are to help States to achieve their own priorities. Security sector reform is key to establishing peace and security in regions that have been subject to conflict or are in a post-conflict phase.

Peacekeeping mandates must be created or renewed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and established criteria and guidelines, including the consent of the State concerned, the non-use of force except in self-defence, total neutrality, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and non-interference in their internal affairs. We believe it important for all troop-contributing countries to be involved in every phase and dimension of a peacekeeping operation.

In conclusion, the African Union (AU) is playing a growing peacekeeping role in certain conflict zones on the African continent. The AU has launched initiatives that deserve our encouragement and support. We believe it necessary that we continue to implement the joint work plan between the AU and the United Nations in order to build the short- and long-term peacekeeping capacities of the former. We hope that the United Nations will take specific and concrete measures in support of the AU’s peacekeeping in Somalia, pursuant to resolution 1863 (2009).

Ms. DiCarlo (United States of America): My delegation, too, would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Butagira and thank him for his valuable cooperation.

We also thank you, Sir, for presiding over this timely meeting. This morning, we heard from Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and Special Representative Annabi of the new challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping is one of the most valuable tools of the United Nations to promote peace and security. We must ensure that peacekeeping missions have the
necessary mandates, resources and policy oversight to achieve their objectives. In that regard, my Government welcomes this initiative to review United Nations peacekeeping and pledges to take an active role.

In recent years, the Security Council has asked peacekeepers to take on multiple and increasingly complex tasks. In Haiti, Liberia, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur and elsewhere, peacekeepers have been mandated to protect civilians, to facilitate humanitarian access, to support political negotiations and elections, to implement security sector reform and disarmament, and much more. The Secretariat has made great efforts to implement these complex mandates. We applaud the Secretariat for the frequency of its briefings to the Council and for its outreach to troop-contributing countries. We look forward to cooperating with the Secretariat as it implements its new-horizon project, an effort to anticipate challenges to peacekeeping missions.

We also want to make certain that the Secretariat has the ability to respond to the increasingly complex mandates the Council is adopting. In that regard, the United States supports the streamlining of United Nations procedures for deploying and supporting United Nations missions.

Despite all of our concerted efforts to improve peacekeeping practice, we cannot say, more than eight years after the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) was issued, that we have fully succeeded in institutionalizing its call for clear, credible and achievable mandates. As one means of approaching that standard, my Government believes that the Council should include specific benchmarks, whenever possible, when creating new peacekeeping mandates. We believe that such benchmarks would greatly improve mandate clarity, and we believe that they can be articulated without overlooking the unique circumstances that give rise to each peacekeeping operation.

Clearly-stated strategic goals would greatly enhance the capacity of the United Nations to undertake effectively complex peace operations and to review those operations once undertaken, to ensure that they contribute to the strategic objectives sought by the Council.

The Council should carefully review these mandates periodically to determine whether missions have fulfilled their objectives or outlived their usefulness. Member States must also ensure that these missions are cost-effective and efficient. And we must continue to demand that peacekeepers meet ethical standards, particularly regarding sexual exploitation and abuse.

My Government believes that improving United Nations peacekeeping performance demands that we help improve the operational capacity of available peacekeeping troops. Too often, Member States that are willing to assume the responsibility and risk inherent in peacekeeping deployment find that the domestic training and equipment available to their troops are inadequate to the task at hand. Some Member States, including the United States, make bilateral efforts to train and equip troops of troop-contributing countries. But this effort needs to be far more systematic and greater in scale if we are to meet the ever-increasing demand for effective peacekeeping troops.

Also, peacekeepers can only be one part of a larger effort of political reconciliation and economic development that will ensure their ultimate success and eventual departure. United Nations peacekeepers cannot be the solution to every problem. Peacekeepers neither fight wars nor develop economies. In the right circumstances, and as part of an integrated solution, Blue Hats can be the difference between endless strife and suffering and a reasonably quick return to stability and development.

The United States looks forward to working with our partners on the Council, with the Secretariat, with troop-contributing countries and with other Member States to ensure the success of United Nations peacekeeping.

Mr. La Yifan (China) (spoke in Chinese): We join other colleagues in wishing every success to Ambassador Butagira of Uganda.

I would like at the outset to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this open debate. My thanks go also to Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra and Special Representative Hédi Annabi for their briefings. I pay special tribute to all those who have given their lives for United Nations peacekeeping.

Last November, the General Assembly unanimously adopted its resolution 63/16, to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of United Nations peacekeeping.
Nations peacekeeping. These 60 years of history encompass the tireless efforts that we the peoples of the United Nations have made for peace and security, and they demonstrate the firm determination of we the peoples of the United Nations to ensure that equity and justice prevail. Over the past 60 years, worldwide, we have deployed 63 peacekeeping operations, with the participation 120 countries, at a cost of some $54 billion and 2,500 lives. Today, some 110,000 peacekeeping personnel are deployed in 18 operations. United Nations peacekeeping has become an important means of defending world peace and strengthening collective security.

United Nations peacekeeping operations have experienced moments of glory, but also setbacks and challenges. At present, world crises relating to finance, food and energy have exacerbated the difficulties faced by many developing countries, especially those where peace is fragile and where there is a need for greater investment by the international community. But there is increasing demand for United Nations peacekeeping operations. They are becoming larger and more complex and require increased human and management resources.

We must effect reform from the ground up. In my view, we must adhere to the three principles of peacekeeping: the so-called Hammarskjöld principles. Indeed, we have seen that these three pillars — consent of the country concerned, non-use of force except in self-defence, and neutrality — remain valid and provide a solid foundation for the success of peacekeeping operations. They also provide common ground for reform. It is a fact that both theory and practice are constantly changing, and we should explore new theories and approaches, in the light of those three principles.

Reform should ensure sufficient resources for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Contributions by United Nations Members are the main source of funding for peacekeeping operations; we must continue to pay our contributions in full and on time. That is crucial in order to ensure that operations are properly carried out and can respond to the greater demand for peacekeeping. We favour seeking new means of financing and new approaches to mandates. Review and monitoring will help enhance the effectiveness of operations and to effect savings given our limited resources. We must also devote greater attention to preventive diplomacy and to post-conflict reconstruction in order to ease the pressure being placed upon peacekeeping and its financing.

Reform ought also to improve our capacity in terms of contributions of contingents, including in the areas of logistics, management and command. We encourage more countries to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations and the international community should also help countries in training their personnel. We must enhance our logistical support capacity, and we encourage the Secretariat to explore effective means for logistical support. We encourage countries with the means to provide assistance to do so. We must strengthen our management capacity; Headquarters needs able personnel and must act in a transparent manner. On the ground, we must select the best possible Special Representatives and Force Commanders. Coordination between Headquarters and the field must be strengthened. Reform must ensure full participation by all parties concerned.

The reform process will involve the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries. We must benefit from what all those stakeholders have to offer and strengthen synergy and cooperation. Reform should also take into account the views of the various parties and should be in keeping with our long-term interests. Reform also has to pay particular attention to Africa, a continent that has special peacekeeping needs. At present, 75 per cent of peacekeeping personnel are deployed in Africa. In 2008, 70 per cent of peacekeeping contributions were spent in Africa. But even with those figures, we cannot fully satisfy Africa’s needs.

The Security Council must assume its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. At the same time, we must encourage the African Union to play a more active role and strengthen strategic cooperation between the two organizations. We welcome the report submitted by the African Union-United Nations high-level panel, and we are ready to discuss its recommendations.

We have always played an active role in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and we shall continue to make our contribution. To date, we have sent 20,000 military, police and civilian personnel to 22 peacekeeping operations. At present, we have more 2,100 peacekeeping personnel working in 11
operational areas. We are ready to continue to provide our support to peacekeeping operations and we are ready to work with all parties in order to contribute to peace and human progress.

Mr. İlkin (Turkey): Mr. President, in view of your request, I shall be extremely brief. Let me first thank you for organizing today’s debate on United Nations peacekeeping operations. I would also like to thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Ms. Susana Malcorra and Special Representative Hédi Annabi for the extensive, thought-provoking and clear presentations they made at the beginning of the debate.

I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all the United Nations and other peacekeepers throughout the world who risk their lives to make our planet a more peaceful and safe place to live.

The debate today and the exercise that we are launching is indeed timely. As a major troop-contributor, we will actively participate in the debate and in the review process.

We will soon make available the text I was intending to read out.

Let me also wish continued health, happiness and success to our colleague, Francis Butagira.

Mr. Heller (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish): First of all, we are very grateful to Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra and Mr. Annabi for their presence at today’s debate and for their statements. We would also like to take this opportunity to wish Ambassador Butagira every success in the future.

Without a doubt, convening this debate is a constructive and necessary initiative, which opens the prospect of a relevant collective discussion within the Organization on the challenges facing peacekeeping operations, with a view to enabling them to continue to be an effective and crucial tool of the United Nations. Undoubtedly, the results and recommendations that will stem from this analysis will make it possible to identify the areas where we need more action as well as best practices that can be implemented in the future, given the growing complexity of the international situations in which United Nations peace operations find themselves.

I would like to very briefly speak about five aspects. The first relates to the decision-making process. For Mexico, the decision-making process behind the establishment of a peacekeeping operation is crucial to success. In adopting decisions for the establishment and definition of mandates, it is crucial to incorporate a comprehensive strategic vision that considers political, logistical and financial aspects and has clear and realistic objectives. Likewise, Mexico believes that this process should be inclusive and should not simply be limited to a group of countries.

This process has to be based on a solid, high-level political approach within the Organization. That is necessary if the Organization is to have the ability to offer a prompt and effective response. Consensus and genuine cooperation of the parties to a conflict that gives rise to a peacekeeping operation are also crucial for ensuring the operation’s viability.

Secondly, there is the question of mandates. In our opinion, mandates must provide very specific political guidelines that help define the conditions that will determine the success of the mission, including the way in which the distinct components of the mission are integrated and unified, the nature of the relationship with regional organizations and with the different actors in the field, in order to achieve effective cooperation. In this effort, we must also consider the various components of peacekeeping operation mandates — military, technical, humanitarian and legal aspects, among others — which also involve the coordination of a wide and diverse group of actors.

Thirdly, there is the multidimensional nature of peacekeeping operations. Undoubtedly, operations are increasingly complex, encompassing a large number of political, social and economic variables, which range from the establishment of the rule of law to ensuring the political viability of a State, taking into account the regional and local environments. Scenarios constantly evolve, and the nature of conflicts is always changing. No two countries are alike, and therefore no two peacekeeping operations can be alike.

Furthermore, it is clear that, in these multidimensional operations, threats to peace require a collective approach based on different types of cooperation. Mexico acknowledges that the cooperation between the Organization, particularly the Security Council, and regional and subregional organizations is increasingly necessary for collective security, provided that regional organizations have the
needed legal and material capacity. The experience of United Nations peace missions in Africa, for instance, has highlighted the importance of having not only a common strategic vision between the African Union and the United Nations, but also a broader strategy involving conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

In that context, it is very important that, from outset, we ensure coordination with United Nations programmes and agencies and with the various regional organizations in the field. A challenge that we cannot overlook is the fact that the lasting solution to a conflict means that we have to go beyond military and security measures, incorporating broader and more effective long-term responses that address to the root causes of a conflict and promote future stability. Otherwise, the recurrence of conflict in a given State will be the rule, and not the exception. Here, we agree with Mr. Annabi.

Fourthly, there is the question of the protection of civilians. This element is essential as we seek to strengthen peacekeeping operations, especially when it has special significance given the specific circumstances. This is a sensitive subject, but it is important to avoid the creation of vacuums between mandates defined in Security Council resolutions and their implementation on the ground. In this regard, we find extremely relevant the independent study that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Department of Peacekeeping Operations are carrying out on the implementation of civilian protection mandates in peacekeeping operations, whose objective is to review the stages of the process of developing these mandates, and to carry out an analysis from the stage of the negotiation of the wording of a resolution to its implementation in the field.

Finally, there is also the issue of effective coordination and planning for peacekeeping operations. We believe that it is essential that the Security Council support an effective planning and coordination mechanism that includes a special representative of the Secretary-General in charge of coordinating and managing a mission’s military, civilian and humanitarian components. It is an inescapable fact that the complexity of peacekeeping missions requires that they be given realistic, comprehensive and viable mandates. However, in order not to doom them to failure, they must also be accorded better planning, capabilities and resources.

In the United Nations context, Mexico believes that it is essential that the Security Council launch an ongoing dialogue between the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which is currently chaired by Japan, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, otherwise known as the C-34, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, troop-contributing countries and the programmes and agencies of the United Nations on the ground, especially the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF and the High Commissioner for Refugees. It is also crucial to establish a permanent dialogue with major contributors of financing for peacekeeping operations. Along the same lines, it is also necessary to consider the issue of the sharing of financial responsibility between the Security Council and the General Assembly when in comes to peacekeeping operations, especially given the growth in such operations.

In conclusion, it is a fact that the various current mandates of peacekeeping operations — from mediation and intervention functions to those of post-conflict reconstruction — include tasks that are difficult to reconcile with the resources available. Political constraints and the financial limitations of the Organization should therefore be taken into account at the time mandates are established. Few things could be more damaging to the United Nations than to establish missions that have no chance of meeting the goals set for them. Mexico believes that, in order to ensure the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations, it is necessary to set up peacekeeping missions endowed with the appropriate financial, political and military resources to fulfil their mandates in the way I have described.

Mr. Hoang Chi Trung (Viet Nam): We too wish to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this open debate. We also thank Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra and Special Representative Hédi Annabi for their respective statements. We also join previous speakers in expressing the best of wishes to Ambassador Butagira in his new responsibilities. Viet Nam associates itself with the statement to be made later by the representative of the Kingdom of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The cumulative complexity of protracted conflicts and hot spots has overstretched the capacity of the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping.
There has also been a drastic change in the environment in which peacekeeping operations are deployed. Peacekeeping is now confronted with a number of challenges. Most fundamental of all, it is required to address the related challenges of personnel management, logistical support, quality assurance, oversight and political engagement, as well as the durability of the political commitment of national stakeholders, the burden-sharing of the international community and the efficiency of coordination among a number of United Nations agencies.

Furthermore, the abrupt surge in the number, scope and size of peacekeeping operations and in the demand for them has also exposed questions such as how to better reconcile the confluence of local peacekeeping and conflict prevention and resolution, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding within the collective framework of preventing the recurrence of conflict and ensuring a smooth transition to durable peace, security and sustainable development.

We wish to reaffirm our strong support for the efforts and initiatives to make peacekeeping operations more effective and more efficient. It is our conviction that the establishment and deployment of peacekeeping missions should strictly observe the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles that have evolved to govern peacekeeping, namely, the consent of the parties concerned, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and impartiality. In a broader context, the success, credibility and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations continue to rest upon respect for the fundamental principles of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction.

Given the widening gap between the increased demand and diversification of mandated activities, on the one hand, and existing resources and capacities, on the other, my delegation strongly supports efforts aimed at enhancing the Organization’s ability to effectively and efficiently manage peacekeeping operations across all related phases of planning, establishing, deploying, conducting and terminating mission mandates.

We commend the efforts undertaken by the Secretariat along those lines and wish to reiterate that any initiative to be taken should work to ensure the greatest degree of unity of command, lines of accountability, integration of efforts and the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers. In that connection, my delegation shares the view that there is a need to develop effective strategic oversight with a view to improving the preparation, planning, monitoring and evaluation of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The President (spoke in French): I should now like to make a relatively brief statement in my national capacity.

First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Annabi for participating in this debate. At the very least, that demonstrates their clear desire to work with the Security Council to further improve peacekeeping procedures. In addition, along with the representative of Turkey, I too would like to say how much we cherish those who have died in the service of peace.

At the outset, I would like to say just how pleased I am that it has been possible to hold this meeting, just a few months following David Miliband’s urgent appeal to the Secretary-General for a fresh process of reflection here in the Security Council. It seems to us a promising development indeed.

I should also like to reiterate France’s great commitment to strengthening United Nations peacekeeping capacities. Given that we will soon have deployed about 1,800 very well-equipped men in Blue Helmets to peacekeeping operations, especially in Lebanon and Chad, France is no doubt a significant contributor. That is especially the case when one considers the troops and contributions we have provided to operations under United Nations mandates. France’s annual financial contributions to United Nations operations easily surpass €1 billion.

Beyond those numbers, we are especially committed to peacekeeping, both because it is one the main responsibilities of the United Nations and because the lives of millions of men, women and children depend upon such operations, to say nothing of the survival and reconstruction of entire regions of the planet.

France has always advocated improving the outstanding tool that peacekeeping operations constitute. We welcome the improvements that have
already been made, especially thanks to the exemplary cooperation between the Secretariat and the States members of the Council and the General Assembly, and especially the members of the Fifth Committee. We also welcome the establishment of the Department of Field Support, about whose progress and hopes Ms. Malcorra has told us. On the military front, we welcome, inter alia, the establishment of the Strategic Military Cell and the increase in the number of staff in the Office of Military Affairs. In addition, we welcome the improvement in the Council’s practices — with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, just a few weeks ago, as well as with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad — with regard to the development of mandates and the monitoring of operations through the establishment of benchmarks.

The European Union has also always been among the strongest supporters of the United Nations when it has required support. I am thinking in particular of the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Kosovo. My colleague from the Czech Republic will soon make a statement on behalf of the European Union, and I fully associate myself with that.

There is, of course, still a long way to go. That is why we have launched this joint initiative with the United Kingdom today. John Sawers has correctly outlined it and highlighted our expectations and the British and French positions on the issue.

I would merely like, at this stage, to make a few comments prompted by the statements already made by my colleagues.

It seems to me that there is a clear awareness here of the magnitude of the questions that we must deal with and of our collective will to tackle them. I note that the questions raised in the French and British non-paper have been raised on numerous occasions and seem to be concerns shared by all of the members of the Council. In particular, these include greater involvement of the Council in the planning, follow-up and evaluation of peacekeeping operations at the strategic and technical levels; the strengthening of dialogue and exchanges of information with the Secretariat; the strengthening of the military expertise of the Council; and improvement in the drafting and development of mandates; better management of available resources in thinking about alternatives to troop deployments; substituting civilian for military means whenever possible; the capacity for reducing and then closing operations; and a better use of instruments other than peacekeeping operations to manage crisis exit strategies, for example within the Peacebuilding Commission.

We must now define better integrated missions for peacekeeping operations with overall coherence. Having worked on the comprehensive reform of the system and defined the concept of “One United Nations”, I believe we now need to work on the concept of “One mission”.

I also note the very clear will of the Council to have its own practices evolve, together with the Secretariat, in the preparation, follow-up and evaluation of operations in the field.

Finally, this discussion also demonstrates, I believe, the critical importance of the various stakeholders in peacekeeping and peacebuilding: the troop-contributing countries, the financial donors and the various existing forums for dialogue, including the Fifth Committee, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission.

The particularly important role of regional organizations is also a subject of consensus. We need to better define the modalities for intervention in cooperation with the Council. The essential element in achieving that is to draw up a transparent and inclusive process, conducted in cooperation with all key partners. It is to several of such partners that I would now, in my capacity as President of the Council, like to give the floor.

I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. Sandhu (India): Before I begin, I should inform the Council that Ambassador Sen is indisposed and has asked me to represent him at this debate today. Thank you very much, Mr. President, for arranging this debate on a critical and very visible aspect of the work of the United Nations.

Peacekeeping is a subject that involves the larger membership of this world body, and it is entirely appropriate to consider how this crucial activity can be improved, especially at the current juncture. Today, over 140,000 personnel have been authorized to serve as peacekeepers in 18 operations, which are deployed across five continents, at a total budgeted cost of $7.2 billion. These statistics illustrate the size and scale of
the task that peacekeeping involves. The thoughtful briefings provided separately by the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and for Field Support illustrate several of the challenges in this regard. The suggestions made by them merit greater consideration by all stakeholders, within and outside this Council.

We associate ourselves with the statement to be made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement by the representative of Morocco.

While the number of peacekeeping operations may not have increased greatly in the past decade, there has been an unprecedented surge in the number of peacekeepers deployed. This surge has generated enormous challenges, not merely because of the numbers involved, but also because of the manner in which some of the missions have been established, the mandate provided to them and, not least, the tools they have been provided with. From this standpoint, it is a very welcome step that this Council has scheduled today’s discussion on peacekeeping at this juncture, and India congratulates France for doing so under its presidency of the Council this month.

Article 24 of the Charter defines the functions and powers of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. That Article begins by underscoring that these powers were being conferred on the Council in order to ensure prompt and effective actions by the United Nations. However, when the Council is neither prompt nor effective in its consideration of such challenges, it ceases to discharge its primary responsibility. There are a number of examples of this, which are perhaps best not elaborated upon at this juncture, although some of them have been mentioned by previous speakers.

It is in this context that the powers of the Council, in the context of its operational efforts in the maintenance of peace and security, need to be read in consonance with Article 44 of the Charter. In the current international context, that Article should be read as implying that the Council should invite non-Council members to participate in the decisions of the Council concerning the employment of contingents of the member’s armed forces. Clearly, therefore, the Charter visualized peacekeeping as a tool jointly invented and honed by the Council and the General Assembly. It was not intended to be an attribute of the power accorded to the Council by the Charter.

Regrettably, in reality, the Security Council has completely monopolized its hold on United Nations peacekeeping operations. The corollary of this is, of course, the fact that the Council bears major responsibility for the situation as it exists. It is therefore timely for the Council to seriously undertake an in-depth review of the situation as it obtains today, including the question of whether it should continue to have an exclusive monopoly in establishing and running peacekeeping operations.

India has been a leading proponent of the view that the mechanism of triangular consultation between troop-contributing countries, the Council and the Secretariat must be energized. In this context, we note the holding of private meetings under the format established by resolution 1353 (2001) and the increase in the frequency of briefings by the Secretariat for troop-contributing countries.

However, such briefings continue to be held, quite literally, on the eve of the renewal of mission mandates, making them pro forma exercises, as there is little real scope for serious or meaningful discussion. We reiterate the imperative of involving troop-contributing countries both early and fully in all aspects and stages of mission planning. This should include the stage of preparation and planning of the operation, the monitoring and conduct of an operation and, finally, the evaluation of an operation, including the identification of lessons learned. Their views, if found reasonable, must be reflected in mission mandates. It must be borne in mind that, today, many of those who have the final say in Council resolutions often do not participate in their implementation and are therefore not called upon to bear the brunt of criticism when missions face difficulties if their mandate is unrealistic or the means authorized are inadequate.

In this context, the draft concept paper circulated in the context of today’s debate — the start of a collaborative process — does not appear to envision substantive collaboration in the context of the involvement of troop-contributing countries. I must reiterate that the experience of participating in an operation gives troop-contributing countries a unique ability to contribute to the planning process. Troop-contributing countries can assist the Council in making appropriate, effective and timely decisions on operations. The 2008 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations acknowledged this and called for substantive consultations with troop-
contributing countries during all stages of peacekeeping operations.

It is time that these recommendations are implemented in letter and spirit in order to achieve meaningful outcomes. Those should include moving towards an integrated approach and establishing effective strategic oversight by those Members both inside and outside the Council with stakes in a particular peacekeeping operation.

There are a few more specific points that I should like to underscore. First, it must be reiterated that there can be no peacekeeping operation when there is no peace to keep. That is to say, peacekeeping must be built upon a peace agreement that is credible, not the other way around. Secondly, troops are contributed by countries contributing to a larger cause: that of peace in far-off lands. The safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers must be of paramount concern to the Organization, in whose name they serve. The tally of sacrifice by peacekeepers in years past underscores this concern.

Furthermore, India fully supports implementation of a policy of zero tolerance with regard to the conduct and discipline of troops, including with regard to sexual exploitation and abuse. There is a need to raise the awareness of those entrusted with managerial and command responsibilities and to establish standards of conduct, training and investigation. Careful preparatory training, in terms of a multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant outlook, is as important as swift punitive action once culpability is established.

It is also desirable to develop professional training programmes for peacekeepers in consultation with Member States. Here, too, the experience of troop contributors with a long history of assisting in peace operations should be fully drawn upon by an integrated training service.

We support greater cooperation by the United Nations in peacekeeping efforts. However, such programmes must be in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations cannot absolve itself of its responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The real challenge before the Organization is to strengthen peacekeeping without regionalizing it.

India stands committed to continuing to assist the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security. India has a proud history of contributing to United Nations peacekeeping that dates back to the inception of that activity in the 1950s. Over the decades, India has contributed nearly 100,000 troops and participated in over 40 missions, including in some of the most challenging operations. We salute the 118 personnel of the Indian forces, as well as peacekeepers from other countries, who have made the supreme sacrifice in the interests of world peace while serving in various United Nations missions.

India looks forward to constructive and meaningful engagement with the Security Council to carry the debate forward and to ensure fruition of our joint efforts in this very visible activity of the United Nations. We hope that through our collective efforts we can evolve greater coherence and integration in the process of identifying solutions to the challenges facing international peacekeeping.

Mr. Ahmad (Pakistan): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, on behalf of Ambassador Amil and the Pakistan delegation for the opportunity to participate in this important debate initiated under your presidency. We align ourselves with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. Let me also thank our three briefers for their important briefings this morning.

Peacekeeping is today the biggest enterprise of the United Nations, rightly termed its flagship activity. It is restoring peace, bringing solace and offering hope to millions of people afflicted by conflict and complex crises around the world. Success in recent years has raised expectations — and rightly so — as well as the demand for United Nations peacekeeping. And the ensuing challenges of making peacekeeping work even better are equally complex and exceptional. We believe it is the collective responsibility of Member States to ensure a more effective and successful employment of this tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is in this spirit and context that we see the initiative.

Pakistan brings multiple perspectives to the debate. First, it is a leading contributor of military and police personnel to United Nations missions over the years. Pakistan’s current contribution of 11,135 is an all-time high, constituting over 12 per cent of total United Nations deployments. We have been the overall top contributor since the advent of the surge in demand
in 2003. A large part of our participation is in the most
difficult and complex situations in Africa.

Secondly, Pakistan is also host to one of the first
United Nations peacekeeping missions, the United
Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,
a mission which has played an invaluable role in
confidence-building and maintaining peace and
stability in that region.

Thirdly, our field perspective is complemented by
our continuing and deep engagement in the policy
discussions on peacekeeping. In the Council itself,
Pakistan was the first to put a special focus on the issue
of surge and other growing challenges of complex
missions, in which regard a wide-ranging presidential
statement (S/PRST/2004/16) was adopted in May
2004.

Pakistan believes that the challenges facing
peacekeeping need to be addressed in a comprehensive
manner and with a common strategic vision. The
Brahimi report (S/2000/809) made a pivotal
contribution to that work and remains relevant today,
although not fully implemented.

On the initiative of the Secretary-General,
Member States approved, during the sixty-first session
of the General Assembly, a major peacekeeping reform
proposal aimed at strengthening the overall capacity to
achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in the
implementation of mission mandates. A review of that
process is now due. Peace Operations 2010 is also
underway in parallel. In our view, any new initiative or
process, whether driven by Member States or by the
Secretariat, should be gauged in the context of its
relevance and coherence with the ongoing processes, as
well as the role and responsibilities of the relevant
United Nations bodies with regard to peacekeeping.

Our collective efforts to address the challenges
and to attain the objectives of peacekeeping cut across
a range of key issues, some of which were mentioned
by other delegations today. I would like to highlight a
few that are essential for success.

The first is the continuing need to adapt
peacekeeping and equip it for the changing
requirements. Secondly, the basic and agreed tenets of
peacekeeping must be respected. Thirdly, the identity
of United Nations peacekeeping vis-à-vis other kinds
of peace operations must be preserved. Fourthly, there
is need for equal attention in addressing inter-State
conflicts and intra-State crises. Fifthly, a truly holistic
approach to conflict prevention must be
operationalized, addressing the root causes of conflicts
and preventing their relapse through a fuller interface
of peacekeeping and peacebuilding and formulation of
the right exit strategies. Sixth, cooperation potential
with regional organizations within the framework of
the Charter should be exploited, making use of the
comparative advantages but without substituting the
primary role of the United Nations. Seventh, clear,
realistic and achievable mandates must be formulated
based on an objective and comprehensive analysis of
realities on the ground and provision of commensurate
resources to enable the missions to fulfil those
mandates. Eighth, and perhaps most crucial, is the
political support and collective commitment of
Member States to United Nations peacekeeping.

In our view, those overarching issues should
guide the process of any strategic oversight. The issues
listed in the presidency’s non-paper — preparation,
planning, oversight and evaluation — are right on spot.
Those are the core functions and activities that need to
be given prime attention, not only by the Council but
also in the work of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations. To better perform those core
functions, some of the questions identified in the
non-paper are quite relevant.

There are three sets of priorities: first, reinforcing
interaction among all key actors; secondly, enhancing
the flow and exchange of information in all directions
and at all stages; and thirdly, improving the capacity to
generate accurate and objective analysis and
assessments and feeding them into decision-making
processes that are designed to perform the core tasks
better.

From the nature and scope of those activities, it is
obvious that they cannot be only Council-centric. As
the central body writing and reviewing peacekeeping
mandates, the Council should carry out all the
necessary internal thinking and improvement of its
working methods so that it can better carry out its
responsibilities. We welcome all efforts in that
direction. However, since mandates are to be
implemented on the ground by troop-contributing
countries — the majority of which are not members of
the Council — there is an obvious need to bring them
fully into the loop. That requires a genuine and
meaningful partnership, which should extend from the
deployment and operational aspects to a role in
decision-making and policy formulation. We believe that partnership with troop-contributing countries must also encompass their proper representation in operational terms, as well as top managerial positions both in the field and at United Nations Headquarters.

Member States would agree that effective strategic oversight also requires full adherence to the principle of unified command and control under the United Nations. In the field, that must apply to all peacekeeping operations. There also appears to be a need for strategic oversight in the Secretariat, which is still grappling with the complexities of a new structure.

The strategic objective of the Security Council is the maintenance of international peace and security. That is also the objective of peacekeeping. We believe that some of the difficulties of decision-making — where and where not to deploy, where to strengthen, where to cut or draw down — could be overcome by establishing peace and security as an objective and as the main benchmark. We agree that that is easier said than done. However, if individual interests and expediencies could give way to that common objective, things could be done better by the Council.

In the same vein, we believe that cost, although it is a consideration, should not override the interest of saving lives and preventing conflicts. There must also be efficient management of resources. However, as previous speakers have said, resources must not be stretched to a limit that risks the viability and the success of missions. The fact that, of the many possible options, United Nations peacekeeping is the most economical — a point that Mr. Annabi made this morning — should make us invest more in that enterprise through much broader sharing and contribution on the part of all Member States.

We believe that we can meet the challenges of peacekeeping and attain our objectives through a cooperative and collective endeavour. We therefore thank you, Mr. President, for consulting us. We will remain engaged with your country and with all other Member States in order to take our work forward.

The President (spoke in French): I now call on the representative of Jordan.

Mr. Al-Allaf (Jordan) (spoke in Arabic): Permit me at the outset to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this Security Council meeting, which is taking place at an appropriate time. Indeed, for us, it means considering the manifold issues related to peacekeeping operations.

I also wish to thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; and Mr. Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, for their extremely important briefings this morning.

My delegation welcomes the Franco-British initiative, which has provided us with a concept paper that cites a great many noteworthy ideas and guidelines. In addition, Jordan associates itself with the statement to be made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

My country, Jordan, is participating in this debate to reaffirm its commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security and to express its desire to contribute to the creation of a positive environment of peace. As a troop- and police-contributing country, we are also keen to see cooperation among all parties involved in peacekeeping operations in the three areas referred to in the concept paper: strategic and effective oversight, overcoming resource constraints, and drawing on lessons learned. Furthermore, my delegation intends to participate seriously in the follow-up to this debate.

I believe that the Security Council must take three important decisions before it decides to establish a peacekeeping force. First, the Council must determine the nature, scope, intensity and scale of threats to international peace and security. That preliminary and essential decision will serve to guide the Council in making choices and adopting implementation mechanisms, thus ensuring the success of its subsequent decisions. When a decision is taken as part of an effective and in-depth strategy, the available options are appropriate, sound and far-reaching. To that end, decisions must be based on thorough analysis and appreciation of the threat. Thus, the threat should be addressed as part of a strategic approach with a regional and international dimension.

In order to do that, the Security Council may utilize analyses by regional organizations, as well as the expertise within the United Nations system as a whole. In addition, an early warning system should be developed to detect signs of regional or international crises that could pose threats to international peace and
security, thus providing the Council with a continuous overview of such threats and perhaps enabling it to prevent conflict. That would be a much more effective tool than intervention following the outbreak of a conflict.

The second decision concerns involvement and is highly strategic, involving not only resources and the peacekeeping budget, but also security and political strategies for the whole conflict zone. A conflict may spread to other regions and affect millions of people. Therefore, this decision must be based on an analysis of possible choices and repercussions, which would help the Council in achieving the desired results in the conflict zone.

The third decision deals with mandates. Mandates are essential in the life cycle of peacekeeping operations, because they act as a vehicle for the realization of objectives and determine both the structures and resources necessary to meet expectations regarding troop-contributing countries and the quality of the contributions. Mandates also determine a force’s operational level of performance.

It is not possible to assess objectively all these elements without first engaging in a comprehensive strategic study. Unfortunately, it is the mandate which gives the forces their legal and political legitimacy, and which can guarantee the potential for success. Therefore, there is a need for the Council to work together with the Secretariat to adopt a graduated and systematic approach that would include all elements of a mandate to achieve a coherent, solid and integrated strategy.

It is not possible to achieve success of this kind without an overall integrated strategic assessment. The United Nations gives nearly total responsibility for strategic planning to the Secretariat, but we believe that this is an extremely sensitive area in which politics is intertwined with strategy. That is why there is a need to go well beyond present efforts. There needs to be an effort to create a comprehensive and complete strategy. Member States must work together with the Secretariat to draw up such a strategy and outline it for the Security Council, showing the available military, political, financial and geographic options and the options regarding resources. Those are the elements that the Security Council must consider before conducting its assessment.

Therefore, there is a need for greater interaction between the strategic and the political facets. The Secretariat should provide brief and clear statements during the planning stage, which could make it possible to sketch out the political, security and human rights situation in and around the conflict zone, in order to identify the major priorities for the maintenance of international peace and security. That approach would make it possible to answer two important questions we find in the non-paper.

The first question relates both to Member States receiving detailed and coherent military analysis from the Council and to enhancing the dialogue between the Council and the Secretariat regarding military operations. If cooperation is carried out in an open manner that makes provision for the participation of the troop-contributing countries together with regional organizations and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, then there will be better possibilities in the long run for achieving mature decisions that will make it possible to achieve the Council’s strategic objectives.

The troop-contributing countries should participate in that evaluation. That will not only serve the strategic objectives of the Council but will also help the States themselves in their own internal assessments to better understand the political and military situation of a conflict on the ground. That will ensure coherence between military resources and the overall objectives of the mission. Effectiveness in the field necessarily hinges on the symbiosis between objectives and allocated resources. In the fuel analysis, the result can only be favourable and will provide valuable assistance to troops on the ground, in line with the standards set out in the concept document.

These steps can form the substance of an integrated strategy which could result in maximum efficiency for peacekeeping operations. Missions then would be in a position to meet the needs and developments of the present, as well as the growing need for peacekeeping missions. When I commanded the Jordanian observers in the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission between 1989 and 1991, I had hoped to see a Security Council delegation visit our mission to discuss our mandate, resources and implementation mechanisms. I noted that there was a very significant gap within the mandate between operational and human needs and military resources, in
particular regarding the protection of women and children.

I continue to think this gap is still there and does not allow for effective protection. I think that the Security Council should organize annual visits to the field to allow for a proper assessment of the relationship and interaction between the command and operation in the field, as shown in the concept paper. I think the participation of the troop-contributing countries would provide valuable assistance there.

In conclusion, political and strategic guidance by the Council and a system of strategic planning within the Secretariat cannot replace logistical or operational planning. There must be a pragmatic and systematic approach in the field, which must be carried out in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

The environment in which peacekeeping missions work is tense, volatile, multidimensional, chaotic and violent. There can be total anarchy or lack of discipline. The number-one objective of the military command of these missions is to ensure a forceful presence on the ground, control hostile acts and develop trust between parties to the conflict. Such implicit operational duties are generated by commanders and are not found in Security Council or Secretariat documents. We must ensure that these are included in the operational planning process so that the work of the mission in the field is in full harmony with and complements the planning operation, be it political or strategic.

If the Security Council is to achieve its political and strategic objectives at the operational level, it must review its entire operational planning process. We can only benefit thereby, with a minimum use of resources. An interactive debate must be held at the political, strategic and operational levels before troops are dispatched. That will ensure that the operation can continue and have a lasting peacekeeping effect.

I reaffirm my delegation’s gratitude to you once again, Sir, for your initiative and for the background concept paper, and its readiness to continue to work on this important process.

Mr. Onemola (Nigeria): Having been actively involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities since 1960, Nigeria is grateful to the French presidency of the Security Council for convening this meeting to re-evaluate the enormous challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping operations. We are delighted by the invitation extended to our delegation and by the concise concept paper circulated to facilitate the discussions. We also thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; and Mr. Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, for their informative briefings.

Today, peacekeeping has become complex and multidimensional in scope and nature, with a broad range of challenges, including resource constraints, gaps between mandates, inadequate preparation and planning of operations, as well as ill-defined exit strategies. Several missions are not only not self-sustaining, but lack even basic equipment, transport, food and medical supplies. Yet, my delegation is of the view that these constraints do not diminish the importance of United Nations peacekeeping as a fundamental tool for conflict resolution around the world, particularly in Africa. As weighty as the challenges are, we believe that they can be addressed if the political will exists and if the following measures are put in place.

There is a need to strengthen the triangular cooperation between the Security Council, which exercises strategic oversight on peacekeeping issues, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat. It is imperative that the troop-contributing countries, which implement the mandates at the operational and tactical levels, be involved from the conception to the deployment of peacekeeping missions. They should also be involved in the determination and review of mandates. That will ensure that operations are well conceived and administered right from the outset.

There is also an urgent need for synergy in the performance of the duties of the special representative of the Secretary-General and that of the force commander in peacekeeping missions. The special representative must be able to relate to what is happening on the ground without impinging on the role of the force commander. Experience has shown that, too often, the ability of force commanders to implement mandates is limited by the actions of special representatives.
Resource constraints remain the single most important challenge to effective peacekeeping. They dampen the morale and enthusiasm of peacekeepers and the political will of troop-contributing countries. Our delegation believes that neither the outsourcing of peacekeeping activities to third parties nor the deployment of civilian capacity in theatres of conflict is a viable option in tackling the problems of resource constraints. Outsourcing will create consent and confidence issues. It will also impinge on national ownership of the process, while civilian capacity deployment will create security problems. What is required is commitment and the adequate provision of resources to strengthen existing missions, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the African Union Mission in Somalia, and to support the establishment of potential hybrid missions in such places as Somalia.

The downsizing or closing of existing missions is necessary, but it should be a function of the successful attainment of mandate benchmarks and a well-conceived exit strategy, including a peacebuilding mechanism. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding must go together from the beginning of an operation.

A key lesson that emerges from 60 years of United Nations peacekeeping is that the mandate and the welfare of peacekeepers and the enhancement of the capacity of the United Nations to render them unflinching support should constantly engage our attention. United Nations peacekeeping must continuously be rooted in impartiality, national and local ownership and respect for established principles, including the territorial integrity of States and the consent of parties before the deployment of peacekeeping forces. For maximum effectiveness, peacekeeping mandates must be clearly defined and robust.

In addition, resources to accomplish the mandated tasks must be adequate and predictable. Moreover, there should be constant and reliable communications between the Secretariat, the field missions and the troop-contributing countries. Similarly, adequate predeployment training should be a prerequisite to the successful implementation of any mandate.

Over time, it has become apparent that those who provide the material resources and logistics support for peacekeeping have captured the peacekeeping process and relegated the welfare of peacekeepers to the background. Nigeria calls for a change of attitude. Attention and respect must revert to the peacekeepers, who risk their lives in dangerous circumstances, often without adequate logistics support, in the cause of global peace. It is only respect and support for peacekeepers that will encourage troop-contributing countries to continue to commit their troops and attract potential troop contributors.

There is a need for the Security Council to continue to support regional and subregional peacekeeping efforts. In particular, we call for support for the development of a standby force capacity at the regional and subregional levels in Africa.

Finally, Nigeria supports the call for intensified dialogue and consultations among the Fifth Committee, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Security Council Working Group on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to overcome some of the identified challenges to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The President (spoke in French): I call on the representative of Uruguay.

Mr. Cancela (Uruguay) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, allow me to thank you, Sir, for your invitation and to welcome your very timely initiative to convene a debate on the current situation of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We also thank in particular the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for their valuable briefings.

This is a sensitive period for peacekeeping operations, with an unprecedented increase in field operations, increasingly complex and difficult mandates to implement, greater risks to United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, a deterioration in respect for human rights, and costs that are rising in a context of budgetary constraints and an international financial and economic crisis.

As an example, I must mention the significant and growing gap between the number of military and police personnel approved under Security Council mandates and the number of troops actually deployed in the field. This is a clear illustration of the serious
difficulties facing the system. This calls for in-depth consideration of the entire issue, but it also calls for decisions, to try both to improve the situation in the short term and to create sustainable conditions for the medium and long term.

Even if interim answers can be found, there are no magic formulas to instantly resolve these problems. Suffice it to recall that a few years ago the Organization engaged in a wide and profound examination of this issue, from which important recommendations arose. In many cases, these were translated into concrete reforms, whose results we are beginning to see.

It is important that the Organization continue the reform process that was initiated, in particular by pursuing the initiatives towards strengthening the strategic approach of a United Nations presence in conflict zones. This approach takes into account the various activities that can contribute to attaining peace processes that encompass conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

As we seek to improve the situation regarding peacekeeping operations, we cannot forget those other two components. The Organization has been taking concrete steps with the goal of achieving a comprehensive approach in order to provide stability and peace in conflict zones. Uruguay firmly supports the intensification of these efforts and the specific initiatives that have been developed by the Secretariat. These include the integrated mission planning process, which we fully support; prevention of conflict activities, including a strengthened role for the Department of Political Affairs; and post-conflict reconstruction.

Although the number of conflicts in the world has diminished in the past few years, the cases in which a United Nations presence has been required have increased considerably. On the one hand, this can be given a positive reading: that the system possesses both legitimacy and an significant foundation of credibility. On the other hand, it is clear that even with the best efforts in the areas of recruitment, financial contributions and operations management, the United Nations system will not be able to have a peacekeeping operation in every conflict. That reality makes prevention and reconstruction efforts even more crucial, as the latter is ultimately a form of prevention as well.

In this respect, while activities to maintain security are key, they are insufficient to guarantee sustainable stability without efforts to promote the economic and social development of the conflict zone. Moreover, it is far less costly to prevent the emergence or resumption of a conflict.

Uruguay is committed to these efforts, and it is for that reason that we have so vigorously sought membership of the Peacebuilding Commission. We believe that the Commission is a crucial forum and a crucial tool, through which we hope to contribute in the best way possible on the basis of our experience on the ground in the sphere of public security, as well as on the basis of our experience of achieving growth with social equity based on respect for the rule of law, democratic values, legal empowerment and equal opportunities for all.

Another very sensitive subject that everyone agrees must be addressed is the mandates agreed upon by the Security Council, particularly for operations taking place in complex situations, which involve, inter alia, the protection of civilians, the defence of human rights and reconstruction. We share the concern of those who advocate greater clarity in these mandates, but we would also note that emphasis must be placed on making these mandates realistic. It is our concern that forces on the ground should have the human and material resources needed to fulfil those mandates, so that, as the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 2000 put it, United Nations forces can “pose a credible deterrent threat” (S/2000/809, para. 51).

Finally, I should like to address the issue of the effective strategic oversight of peacekeeping operations, which undoubtedly a key area for the system’s sustainability. This is an area in which the management of truthful and accurate information as well as consultation and coordination among the parties concerned are key elements for the decisions that the Council must take, which have a direct effect on the ground — and thus on the troops that have been deployed. In that regard, we endorse the ideas set out in the non-paper prepared by the United Kingdom and France with the aim of promoting broader participation by troop-contributing countries.

Those States, most of which are developing countries, provide the largest part of the personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations. But their level of participation in the management of the operations is
very low, and they have few opportunities to provide inputs which could be valuable, in particular in the preparation and planning stage, when crucial elements must be carefully considered in order to have a successful mission, such as the provision of adequate human, financial and logistic resources; exit strategies; and capacities that can provide flexibility on the ground in case of unexpected events.

Moreover, when mandates are reviewed, first-hand information and the perspective of a country that has troops in the field can be of great value in the process carried out by the Council to understand the situation and consider the opportunities and threats on the ground.

That is why we attach central importance to an enhanced level of exchange of information, coordination and consultation with troop-contributing countries during the stages I have mentioned. As we have said during consideration of the reform of the Security Council’s working methods, as a troop-contributing country we aspire to having a real opportunity to express our opinion before the specifics of an operation are defined.

In that regard, we propose the creation of a mechanism that would make such interaction possible. We particularly wish it to be a depoliticized and effective mechanism that will help minimize risks and maximize the efficiency of peacekeeping operations.

On a related subject, let me conclude by recalling that delegations are invited to participate in the workshop organized by the Missions of Australia and Uruguay on the implementation of civilian protection mandates in the context of peacekeeping operations, which will take place on Tuesday, 27 January, at the Millennium Hotel.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of the Czech Republic.

Mr. Kaiser (Czech Republic): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia and the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

Let me begin by thanking the French presidency of the Council and the United Kingdom delegation for undertaking this important and very timely initiative, which should launch a process of deliberations on a topic that is essential not only for the Security Council, with its special responsibility for peacekeeping, but also for the entire United Nations system and all Member States.

I would like to extend special thanks to Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and to Special Representative Annabi for their informative and comprehensive briefings.

The European Union (EU) fully supports the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping. Indeed, the last decade has been one of increased challenges in that regard. The demand for peacekeepers has been growing steadily since the 1990s, and this trend is likely to continue. Moreover, the peacekeeping operations have become more complex and challenging in terms of planning, mandating and management.

At present, peacekeepers are needed in highly volatile environments such as the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. The enormous requirements for deployable, well-trained and adequately equipped personnel constantly remind us that United Nations peacekeeping resources are not unlimited. In parallel, the United Nations peacekeeping budget has increased five times over the last ten years and is currently bigger than the regular budget. Despite all these difficulties, United Nations peacekeeping operations have brought security to many destabilized regions.

The European Union has a long-established partnership with the United Nations in the field of crisis management. Our long-standing cooperation — which was formalized in the first joint United Nations-European Union declaration, signed on 24 September 2003 — has developed substantially over the years. Today the EU and the United Nations work side by side in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Western Balkans.

While being active in conflict prevention and resolution in different parts of the world, the European Union has also successfully conducted peacekeeping operations mandated by the United Nations and
consistent with its Charter. The level of support that the European Union has been providing is perhaps best illustrated by the current EUFOR military operation in Chad and in the Central African Republic, or by the first EU maritime operation, launched off the Somali coast in December 2008 to protect the supply of humanitarian aid to the Somali people.

The European Union member States also actively participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions and contribute over 40 per cent of the United Nations peacekeeping budget. Furthermore, some 20 operations under the European Security and Defence Policy have been carried out so far, many under a Security Council mandate. I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the troop- and police-contributing countries for their continuing commitment.

The European Union is seriously concerned at the increasing number of fatalities among United Nations peacekeepers and would like to stress again that attacks against United Nations personnel are absolutely unacceptable. The safety and security of United Nations personnel must be given the highest priority, and the European Union supports all possible protective measures. At the same time, peacekeeping troops need to demonstrate impeccable behaviour. The European Union is gravely concerned about recent reports of sexual abuse and exploitation by United Nations peacekeepers. The EU fully supports the zero-tolerance policy.

The sixtieth anniversary of United Nations peacekeeping operations provides a unique opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved. The task of such peacekeeping operations has evolved, as has the context in which they operate. These developments require new approaches when formulating their respective mandates. The objectives of each and every operation need to be clear and realistic. The mandates should be developed in close consultation with the Secretariat and must be matched with adequate resources. In that regard, we all have a common responsibility as United Nations Member States. Clear benchmarks and exit strategies should be developed prior to the deployment of peacekeepers so that the international community can monitor progress and fill the gaps as needed.

In other words, the main elements of the mandates should be elaborated in a systematic, well-coordinated and realistic manner in order to ensure that they are achievable. Such an approach will also contribute to enhancing the credibility of the United Nations.

Recently, peacekeeping missions have increasingly become multidimensional and integrated. At least eight of the current operations have an explicit mandate to protect civilians. The European Union strongly believes that protection of civilians should be an integral part of the mandate of peacekeeping operations and that the United Nations should strengthen its capacity to deliver in this area.

The European Union supports a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to peacekeeping. In its conflict-management capacities the United Nations should focus on the root causes of conflict and put special emphasis on supporting credible political peace processes and immediate post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, notably in the areas of police, the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform. The European Union welcomes the increased attention that those issues have recently received in the Secretariat and the Security Council and among Member States.

The monitoring capacities and the evaluation of operations need to be strengthened. The European Union underlines the importance of recruiting qualified personnel in a timely manner and supports the creation of a roster of civilian experts who could be deployed whenever and wherever necessary.

Past experience has shown that a smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is vital. In that context, the European Union underlines the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission in advising the Security Council on relevant issues.

United Nations peacekeeping capacities should be deployed only when there is no other viable option, and only for the shortest time necessary. Peacekeeping is costly, and rebuilding peaceful and sustainable societies after armed conflicts requires a lot of resources. Therefore every effort the international community undertakes in order to prevent conflicts is worthwhile.

The European Union continues to look for more ways to support peace and security endeavours. One of the important tools is the EU Instrument for Stability, with a seven-year budget of more than two billion euros. In addition, the joint Africa-EU strategy adopted
in 2007 has an important security component. Another way that the EU is supporting Africa-led peace operations is the African Peace Facility, aimed at enhancing the institutional capacities of the African Union and African subregional organizations in relation to peacekeeping and prevention of armed conflicts. The European Union aims at an effective partnership in order to improve planning, deployment and management of African peacekeeping operations in a framework of predictable funding mechanisms and clear guidelines.

Allow me to conclude by underlining once again that United Nations peacekeeping faces many challenges. Nearly a decade after the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), it is time to revisit the panel’s recommendations, review their implementation and take a strategic look into the future. Much can be done to improve our practice, in particular on the three series of issues identified in the Franco-British non-paper. We therefore welcome this timely debate in the Security Council and are ready to carry forward this discussion in other forums, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. We very much look forward to the outcome of the process launched today.

Mr. Loulichki (Morocco) (spoke in French): Mr. President, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), I would first like to express to you our pleasure at participating in this very important debate, launched by the French presidency in conjunction with the delegation of the United Kingdom. I would also like to assure you, Sir, of our ongoing commitment to enriching this debate.

(spoke in English)

The Non-Aligned Movement has long-standing positions regarding peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, and in this respect would like to outline its views on the issues under consideration today. The challenges posed by the evolving nature of peacekeeping brings to the fore its multidimensional complexity, which requires a genuine and concerted response by the entire membership of the United Nations. NAM would like to express its willingness to engage in the proposed collaborative process and, as a first step, to provide its views on effective strategic oversight.

From the outset, we wish to stress that, in the context of taking a comprehensive approach to and with the objective of ensuring success in peacekeeping, United Nations peacekeeping operations should be accompanied by a parallel and inclusive peace process that is well planned, carefully designed and supported by the consent and adherence of the parties concerned.

In order for the operational planning process for any peacekeeping operation to be successful, political planning should be of utmost importance, since what is at stake is not the planning per se, but what to plan for. It is therefore time for the Organization to rethink the planning process itself.

The 2006 integrated mission planning process is an effort to provide a much-needed integration framework for a full United Nations presence in the field. However, such efforts are hampered by the major and interrelated challenges of limited financial and human resources that impair the managerial and organizational capacity of the Organization. Difficulties also arise from the way the deployments are mandated or planned, especially where there is little or no peace to keep, which is a fundamental existential test for peacekeeping. Such an environment requires not only adequate measures to guard against higher risk in planning and budgeting, but also improved engagement, communication and cooperation among the Secretariat, the troop-contributing countries and the Security Council.

Indeed, the NAM troop-contributing countries provide more than 80 per cent of United Nations peacekeeping personnel, which entitles them to be fully involved in the planning process in all aspects and stages of United Nations peacekeeping operations. More frequent and substantive interaction among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop-contributing countries continues to be key to the full and effective implementation of the existing mechanisms set forth in resolution 1353 (2001) and in the Note of the President of the Security Council dated 14 January 2002 (S/2002/56).

NAM wishes to underscore in particular that the experience and expertise of troop-contributing countries can be drawn upon when the Security Council implements, extends or adjusts United Nations peacekeeping mandates. Troop-contributing countries are best placed to contribute to an objective assessment of the situation on the ground. In this regard, enhanced and better interaction between troop-contributing countries and the Security Council Working Group on
Peacekeeping Operations could also contribute to a more inclusive consultation and decision-making process.

To meet the political, operational and managerial challenges of peacekeeping operations, NAM would like to reiterate that United Nations peacekeeping operations should, from the outset, be provided with political support, sufficient human, financial and logistical resources, and exit strategies. Mandates need to be achievable and therefore clearly defined. United Nations peacekeeping operations must be part of a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of conflict in a coherent, well-planned and comprehensive manner, with relevant political, social, economic and developmental instruments at their disposal. NAM further stresses that the United Nations should give special consideration to ways of ensuring that those efforts can continue without interruption so as to facilitate a smooth transition to lasting peace, security and development.

The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the United Nations, and the role played by regional arrangements should not lead to the fragmentation of United Nations peacekeeping operations, should be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, and should not in any way substitute for the role to be played by the United Nations or circumvent the full application of the guiding principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In this context, the Non-Aligned Movement wishes to express its support for continuing efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities and to emphasize the importance of the continued implementation of the Joint Action Plan for United Nations support to African peacekeeping capacities in the short, medium and long terms.

NAM reiterates that peacekeeping operations should strictly observe the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as well as the guiding principles that have come to govern peacekeeping, namely, the consent of the parties, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and impartiality. NAM believes that the principles that have guided United Nations peacekeeping operations over the last five decades remain valid and relevant, both politically and militarily.

NAM believes that the United Nations must better manage its peacekeeping operations, focusing on key areas such as the planning, deployment, decision-making and monitoring processes, which will allow peacekeeping operations to succeed in the complex environment in which they are being asked to deploy.

Finally and in conclusion, and looking back on 60 year of peacekeeping, NAM is proud to have been represented by its members in almost every peacekeeping operation since 1948. We will remain engaged in advancing our common objective of strengthening United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The President (spoke in French): I call on the representative of Canada.

Mr. McNee (Canada): I would like to thank the mission of France for organizing this important debate on peacekeeping and for inviting Canada to speak in the light of Canada’s role in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. I would also like to thank Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra and Special Representative Annabi for their thoughtful and, indeed, thought-provoking presentations this morning.

The fundamental commitment to peace and improving the lives of others remains a cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy. As part of this commitment, Canada is proud to support a wide variety of United Nations-mandated peace operations, including supporting Afghanistan, including through extensive civilian and military personnel; the provision of vital equipment to African Union forces in the Sudan and over $285 million in voluntary contributions to the African Union Mission in Sudan and then to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; the provision of 100 police experts and more than $100 million in support of security, development and stabilization in Haiti this year. In addition to our military and police contributions and our efforts in terms of capacity building, Canada provides support to all areas of United Nations missions’ mandates, including through the deployment of Canadian correctional, judicial and development experts.

As the Under-Secretaries-General made clear today, United Nations peacekeeping is under increasing strain — heavily deployed, heavily mandated and too often under-resourced. At the same time, the global demand for United Nations peace operations continues to rise. The combination of existing overstretch and increasing demand for new or expanded missions represents a fundamental strategic challenge for the United Nations and its Member States.
While the underlying causes of the overstretch challenge are complex, they can nonetheless be broken down into a number of constituent parts, many of which were first highlighted by the landmark report of the Brahimi Panel (S/2000/809). Those underlying issues represent unfinished business from the Brahimi Panel and include the need for clear, credible and achievable mandates, the necessary resources to implement mandates and improved mission leadership and doctrine.

Since the Brahimi report, the international community has seen the deepening of some of those challenges and the emergence of others. In Canada’s view, five stand out as meriting particular attention. In the interest of time, I shall only list them. The full text of my statement is being circulated. The first challenge is peacekeeping financing and support; second, United Nations partnerships with regional and other organization; third, delivering on the imperative of protecting civilians; fourth, harnessing the preventive capacity of the Council, and fifth, developing the political dimensions of peace operations.

Canada strongly endorses the efforts of France and the United Kingdom to re-assess and further implement the Brahimi principles as a means of better managing the Council’s heavy workload. The Council bears special responsibility for peacekeeping operations. It is both timely and appropriate to take a hard look at how the Council mandates, prepares for, plans and monitors peace operations. It is important that the mandate of a United Nations peace operation does not create expectations that cannot be met.

All of us have a stake in the success of the collective security system. As we explore future challenges, it is vital that the voices of all Member States be heard. We must also ensure that the entire membership can participate in the dialogue regarding the difficulties to be overcome and potential solutions to resolve them. In that connection, we would like to emphasize the importance of closer cooperation among the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat.

In that regard, I am pleased to announce Canada’s intention to launch, in cooperation with the New York University Center on International Cooperation, an informal series of thematic debates on effective peace operations. That effort aims at facilitating dialogue outside formal United Nations structures regarding the full range of issues confronting the peacekeeping agenda in the years ahead. We are pleased to invite all Member States to participate in that process of reflection and dialogue.

Meanwhile, we continue to be prepared to work with you, Mr. President, the members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Secretariat to ensure that both current and future challenges receive the requisite attention in United Nations bodies.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations.

Mrs. Ratsifandrihamanana (spoke in French): I am especially pleased, Mr. President, to have been invited to this debate on peacekeeping. We are grateful to all those who have participated today, especially Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Annabi. We fully endorse the initiative and position put forth by France and the United Kingdom in preparation for our debate. We assure you, Mr. President, of our preparedness, at every stage of the consultations, to share the experiences and lessons learned by the African Union in this area.

It is clear that today’s debate has raised various questions. With regard to the growth in the number of peacekeeping operations, the question before us is whether to reduce the number of operations or run the risk of being unable to address the various conflict situations. Should we no longer address root causes? The African Union has consistently emphasized underlying problems, including poverty, lack of development, challenges to democracy, lack of good governance, complex crises and so on.

The growth in peacekeeping operations also means the proliferation of all sorts of weapons. Concerted efforts, especially to eliminate small arms and light weapons, have therefore been undermined; it is precisely those weapons that will fuel additional conflicts, thereby creating a perpetual cycle.

Is there, at this stage, a need to reconsider the mandates of peacekeeping forces? Should we still expect that there is peace to keep? In any case, the African Union did not hold back in Somalia — with the Council’s authorization. Such considerations have been put forth in support of an appropriate

There is also the question of mobilizing donors, troop-contributing countries and all other potential actors, including the private sector. Experience has shown that the willingness of countries to provide troops is too often curtailed by the difficulties encountered in mobilizing logistical means and resources, which must of course meet the strict requirements of the United Nations. The bilateral negotiations that contributing countries must themselves carry out with donor countries serve to delay the deployment of troops.

How can we motivate troops on the ground, who are the real forgers of peace? How can we ensure that those who comprise the various missions are treated equally, including those under regional organizations authorized by the Security Council, such as the African Union? By way of a concrete example: troop-contributors prefer to send their troops to Darfur rather than to Somalia, where they are much less well paid and where their situation is often precarious.

How are we then to rationalize the costs of peacekeeping operations? The African Union has frequently noted that peacekeeping operations, which are becoming increasingly burdensome, are being often being carried out at the expense of development efforts and in order to advance conflict prevention. Simplifying bureaucratic procedures and involving local economic actors in the supply stream of peacekeeping operations could certainly contribute to reducing their costs.

(spoke in English)

We have witnessed a great evolution in the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations with the establishment of the first hybrid operation in Darfur. The constructive engagement between the two organizations revealed what can be achieved through such collective efforts. The tripartite approach to decision-making and preparation has also shown great merit. A concrete example in this connection is the provision of security by the Sudan for the movement of convoys of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. It would thus be instructive to further explore the full potential of this tripartite approach with respect to security of peacekeepers and mission resources.

This growing cooperation is also illustrated by the African Union-United Nations panel established by the Secretary-General to consider in-depth the modalities of how to support a number of issues concerning peacekeeping operations. The panel has concluded its work, and we believe the Security Council will soon be considering its report, which may offer constructive ideas for enhancing peacekeeping operations.

One of the constant practices has been the advance role played by the African Union at the early phases of crisis. This has been the case in Chad and the Central African Republic, where African Union political missions have supported efforts to prevent the escalation of tensions and to conduct negotiations, pending the full engagement of the international community. In other cases, such as Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, the African Union has, with the authorization of this Council, deployed advanced peacekeeping operations, which, in Burundi and Darfur, were followed by United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the case of Somalia, we are eager to see such an operation take over from the African Union Mission in Somalia in the light of resolution 1863 (2009).

It might be instructive to consider the lessons learned, in particular with respect to the quality of actions performed by the advance African Union missions, since these operations ultimately constitute the foundations of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We have witnessed the consequences of the weakness of African Union advance missions, such as in Somalia, where the lack of necessary strength may result in many lost windows of opportunity to secure lasting peace.

The strengthening of linkages between the counterpart bodies of the African Union and the United Nations would also be crucial for the development of both the doctrine and field conduct of peacekeeping operations. This includes systematic exchanges between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and this Security Council; greater cooperation between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support with the African Union Peace and Security Directorate; and general interaction and joint programming between the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat.
Finally, I take this opportunity to call on the Security Council to lend its full support to the development of the African Union peace and security architecture, particularly within the context of the present reflection. I also thank all those who underscored the African Union role in particular during this debate.

The President (spoke in French): I give the floor to Mr. Le Roy to make any additional observations or respond to any questions.

Mr. Le Roy (spoke in French): Given the time, I will be very brief. I would simply say that this debate makes those of us in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) optimistic on the collective willingness to work on questions that concern us all. I was very pleased to see that the challenges that we are facing were mentioned by all of the speakers and that everyone is ready to carry out some soul-searching, including the Security Council, just as those of us in DPKO and DFS are. I am very pleased to see that many speakers are ready to work on this, including Canada, of course; Japan through the revitalization of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; the African Union, which we have just heard from; the European Union, which we heard from earlier; the Non-Aligned Movement; and the troop-contributing countries. I believe that this dialogue has now begun. Everyone has expressed their concerns. We have taken note of everyone’s message.

Once again, I would like to thank France and the United Kingdom for this initiative. We hope that it will continue. I would like to reiterate that, for our part, we are ready to provide the Council with our own internal observations so that we can come up with recommendations before the end of the summer. The more complicated ones might be provided before the end of the year, but before the summer, we hope that there will be recommendations on the table, which will be approved by the Council if possible, but also by the various bodies of the General Assembly.

The President (spoke in French): Would Ms. Malcorra like to add anything?

Ms. Malcorra: Just very briefly, I think I can only endorse what Alain Le Roy has just said. We must make sure that we commit ourselves fully to actively participating in this process, because we all see that the outcome of such a good dialogue will be positive for our missions.

The President (spoke in French): I now turn to Mr. Annabi, if he would like to make some comments.

Mr. Annabi (spoke in French): I would simply like to thank you, Mr. President, once again, for having invited me to participate in this debate.

The President (spoke in French): All that remains is for me once again to thank Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Annabi for their most useful participation and that of all of those who have spoken during this debate.

There are no further speakers on my list. I think that this has been a useful and enriching debate, which has provided many new elements to fuel the upcoming exercise. On the basis of these exchanges and the ideas we have heard, France, together with the United Kingdom, now intends to distribute, as an official document of the Security Council, a revised version of our non-paper. On that basis, we can launch our work over the next few months. I would reiterate that we attach great importance to having everyone work along these lines. We are counting on the upcoming presidencies of the Security Council to continue this work and organize events and discussions on it — in short, to strengthen this exercise and refresh it.

In conclusion, a first stage could be completed by mid-year, perhaps during the United Kingdom presidency in August, and a presidential statement could then be adopted in order to formally announce the results of this exercise. That is what France and the United Kingdom intend to do.

The meeting rose at 3 p.m.