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Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

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Friday, 12 February 2010, 3 p.m.
New York

President: Mr. Araud/Mr. De Rivièree .......................... (France)

Members:
Austria ........................................ Mr. Heissel
Bosnia and Herzegovina ........................... Mr. Vukašinović
Brazil ......................................... Mrs. Dunlop
China ........................................... Mr. Long Zhou
Gabon ......................................... Mrs. Onanga
Japan .......................................... Mr. Nakashima
Lebanon ....................................... Mr. Ramadan
Mexico ........................................ Mr. Vargas
Nigeria ......................................... Mr. Lolo
Russian Federation ............................. Mr. Filatkin
Turkey ......................................... Ms. Erdoğan
Uganda ......................................... Mr. Nkayivu
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .... Mr. Green
United States of America ........................... Mr. Donegan

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations
Transition and exit strategies
Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)
The meeting resumed at 3.10 p.m.

The President (spoke in French): I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously.

I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

Mr. Bouchaara (Morocco) (spoke in French): On behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco and my Ambassador, allow me to commend and thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative to hold this important debate. I also thank Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra, the Special Representatives and the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for their important contributions to this debate.

(spoke in English)

I have the honour to address the Security Council on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Allow me to begin by warmly congratulating the French presidency on placing peacekeeping at the core of its monthly debate. Few days separate us from the upcoming crucial session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, during which we hope to have a substantive discussion on the ways to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping.

NAM attaches great importance to the founding principles of United Nations peacekeeping, namely, consent of the parties, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and impartiality. The principles of sovereign equality, the political independence and territorial integrity of all States, and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction should also be maintained. The tenth anniversary of the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) provides us with an opportunity to celebrate and to renew our commitment to these founding principles.

United Nations peacekeeping operations should be provided from the outset with political support, full and optimal human, financial and logistical resources, and clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies. This means that United Nations peacekeeping operations should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflict, which should be dealt with in a coherent, well-planned, coordinated and comprehensive manner, using other political, social, economic and development instruments.

I should like also to stress that transition strategies are most effective when the relationship between the host Government and the peacekeeping mission is based on active cooperation. This entails regular consultations and the setting up of coordination mechanisms to allow for a dynamic communication throughout the lifecycle of the peacekeeping mission. Moreover, the success of a transition from a peacekeeping environment to an exit phase necessitates that due consideration be given by the United Nations to the manner in which its overall efforts can be carried out from the early stage of its engagement in post-conflict situations and continue without interruption after the departure of the peacekeeping operation, so as to ensure a smooth transition to lasting peace and security.

In this regard, the increasingly complex environment in which United Nations peacekeeping missions operate requires the building of an anticipatory approach that would allow the components of the mission — be they civilian, military, humanitarian or other — to be prepared for unintended consequences and to coordinate efficiently among themselves. This, in turn, calls for an increased integration of efforts and strategies to facilitate coherence throughout the lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation.

While it is important to debate exit strategies, the closely related need for entry strategies must also be stressed. This means that when the mandate of a peacekeeping mission is being designed, adequate means and resources should be made available. Equally vital to an entry strategy is a pre-existing political process supported by the parties concerned. A peacekeeping mission cannot be deployed in an environment where there is no peace to keep. The Security Council is vested with the responsibility to intensify efforts to revive faltering peace processes.

Exit is not usually an event but a process of transition. An exit is facilitated by successful mandate implementation and the ability to refine the mandate to fit the circumstances on the ground as they evolve. This requires a degree of flexibility and coordination that is often difficult to achieve in a multidimensional and complex peacekeeping operation.
There is no single recipe for a successful exit, but one can easily conceive that the success of a peacekeeping mission depends on its capacity to shoulder the implementation of early peacebuilding activities, which deliver immediate peace dividends to the population. However, these early activities should be conceived of within broader peacebuilding efforts. That would guarantee that the transition and subsequent exit of a peacekeeping mission is seamless and successful.

The transition from a volatile environment to a secure post-conflict context in which security is guaranteed and conflict management mechanisms are in place must be managed with the full involvement and ownership of the host Government. In this regard, mission strategies must have the flexibility to adapt to realities on the ground and should be geared to securing and retaining the support of the national authorities in carrying out their mandates.

Indeed, one area that needs further attention is the process by which mandates are set and reviewed. The mechanism for triangular cooperation among the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) can be improved in order to ensure successful transitions by building on the first-hand experience of TCCs in developing clear and achievable mandates. Greater consultation and cooperation between the Security Council and TCCs can help address this issue, as stressed in the presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (PRST/2009/24), and incorporate transition and exit strategies into mandates.

A central challenge for effective peacekeeping is to make full use of the synergies between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304) stresses the importance of early peacebuilding action. Early advice from and engagement by the Peacebuilding Commission would ensure early and consistent peacebuilding and a sustained engagement beyond the life of the peacekeeping mission. The Commission has a clear comparative advantage as it engages national Governments in defining their respective needs and priorities, thus enhancing national ownership. The Commission also adopts a tailored, country-specific approach. Equally important is the flexibility of the Peacebuilding Commission to reach out to international financial institutions and other development actors within and beyond the United Nations, which are vital partners for broader and longer-term efforts to sustain peace.

Success factors for early peacebuilding activities in a peacekeeping context include national ownership, which remains essential. Peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Moreover, the United Nations needs to enter each new context with a specific plan, coordinated with national authorities and other actors. These plans need to be developed in stages and through a participatory approach.

In determining its priorities and jumpstarting early peacebuilding activities, the peacebuilding component of a complex peacekeeping mission should aim to achieve the earliest possible transfer of responsibility to local and national authorities. The international community should support and assist sustainable development. This means that more attention must be given to the peacebuilding and development priorities that should accompany peacekeeping.

Before closing, I should like to stress that transition and exit strategies are but components of the lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation. The conditions for setting up new peacekeeping missions are equally vital. The transition from one step to another needs to be carefully planned, properly resourced and given the necessary political support, without which the risk of mission creep becomes high. Peacekeeping is a means to an end. That end is sustainable peace and development.

The President (spoke in French): I now call on the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Sial (Pakistan): This restricted debate on exit and transition strategies, convened under the French presidency, is a timely initiative, especially in view of the ever-increasing United Nations peacekeeping engagements and the global financial crises, which demand optimal resource utilization at the United Nations. We thank Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra, and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their excellent briefings. We also appreciate the dedication of their teams in advancing the peacekeeping work of the United Nations.
Pakistan aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The United Nations as an institution derives its inspiration from our common quest for peace and security. However, the multiplicity of situations and the wide variety of contributing factors make the proposition of total and lasting peace impossible. We therefore see the persistence, recurrence and new eruption of conflict situations in various parts of the world. In spite of the perpetual nature of the challenges on the peacekeeping landscape, we Member States have contributed to the noble objective of peacekeeping in a wide variety of ways.

Pakistan has remained committed to the United Nations collective approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. Our commitment to collective endeavours for peace has led us to become a top contributor of uniformed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Today, over 10,000 Pakistani uniformed personnel are working in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Our unflinching commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations has been tested time and again. More than 100 Pakistani peacekeeping troops have sacrificed their lives in the service of the United Nations.

The inherent correlation between policy formulation, planning and implementation necessitates a comprehensive approach to individual peacekeeping situations. In tandem with our field contribution, we have invested our efforts in the area of policy planning and formulation. Our successful advocacy of a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with the endeavours of other Member States, resulted in the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission.

We have seen that some missions have been successful while others have had several shortcomings. That calls for an urgent re-evaluation of our policy formulation, planning and implementation concepts, processes and parameters.

The fundamental flaw in policy formulation is that policymakers succumb to the temptation of creating parallel institutions and systems in peacekeeping situations instead of investing in existing national structures. Thus, from the very beginning, most peacekeeping operations start as competitors of local systems and, by virtue of being in a position of power, contribute to the decapitation of local structures.

The monopoly on policy formulation and planning is also a huge impediment to ensuring the success of United Nations peacekeeping missions. The rhetoric of triangular cooperation is often repeated in United Nations peacekeeping debates, but with little accommodation. In addition, how can one claim that triangular cooperation involving the Security Council, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the Secretariat is all encompassing while the parties on the ground — the real stakeholders — remain outside the process? The clear commitment of those parties and their affinity to the objectives of a peace mission are not only desired, but should be mandated through an inclusive policy formulation process. Meaningful quadrangular engagement at the very beginning, when a peacekeeping operation is being conceived, will therefore guard against the pitfalls that we very often encounter.

The mechanics of the process itself, which are also discussed in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809), necessitate the orderly closure of a mission. We are of the view that brainstorming and consultations aimed at determining clear and achievable objectives should come first. That requires a thorough study of realities on the ground, engagement with the parties in the field and an assessment of resource needs and availability. The presence of TCC-origin senior officials in the Secretariat could be of great help at that stage in setting achievable goals against the backdrop of the most efficient use of resources.

Secondly, a peacekeeping mission should always be built through a phased and staggered planning approach that underpins the interconnectivity of planning, execution and achievements under the overarching rubric of a mission’s main objectives.

Thirdly, we agree with the observation made in the presidency’s concept paper (S/2010/67) that there is insufficient attention to and early investment in the area of building national institutions. However, in that connection, we would like to underscore that peacekeeping, reconciliation and peacebuilding go hand in hand and are not mutually exclusive.

The pre-eminence of political reconciliation after the initial restoration of peace, within mutually agreed parameters, is of paramount importance. The prospects for peace are often better in the beginning, as third-
party intervention checks the hand of the aggressor or the one at fault. It also opens doors for give-and-take opportunities and strengthens the position of the third party as an acceptable arbiter of peace.

The opposite of reconciliation would be the driving of a wedge between parties by supporting one over the other. Parties derive their existence mostly from demographic realities that cannot be undone through defeat or elimination. Peacekeeping without reconciliation would mean rare success stories and more sordid sagas. Yet, unfortunately, that Charter provision has failed to command respect.

The integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities through institutional arrangements is more a question of managerial efficiency and managerial possibility. The nature of big and cumbersome administrative structures limits top management’s ability to see through the system. It also clouds the need for transparency. Hence, coordination must be strengthened and overlaps must be eliminated. But that should not happen at the cost of institutional efficiency and transparency.

The mandates of peacekeeping missions should be commensurate with ground realities. We have seen the evolution of mandates from traditional to multifaceted ones. Gaps between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates are often covered through different mandate variations. Pakistan supported such variations during our most recent tenure on the Security Council in order to ensure peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement in the cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, such missions without adequate resources are an anomaly, for hosts as well as for Member States, including TCCs. Therefore, all mandates must be matched with adequate resources, including a sufficient number of well-trained and well-equipped troops having rapid-deployment capacities, tactical and strategic reserve capabilities and the requisite logistical support.

Failure sometimes ushers in perfect success, if one is ready to rethink and readjust his engagement strategies. Therefore, a delay in the successful completion of a mission should not force us to abandon a peacekeeping mission. In such a situation, we must be guided by a deeper prognosis of the ground situation, effective engagement with the parties, human ingenuity and an unflinching commitment to the mission. Failure is not an option in the domain of international peace and security. We look forward to further in-depth examination of the important theme of transition and exit strategies in a relevant forum, such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

In conclusion, we would like to pay homage to the men and women who recently sacrificed their lives or suffered injuries while performing United Nations peacekeeping duties in Haiti.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

Mr. Momen (Bangladesh): Let me begin by congratulating the French presidency on placing peacekeeping operations at the core of this open debate. I also take this opportunity to thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Ms. Susana Malcorra and especially you, Mr. President, for inviting my delegation to participate in this important event. I hope your able leadership will guide our deliberations to meaningful and effective transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that:

“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities”.

Bangladesh has been and is always ready respond to this call with whatever means and capacity it has. In this context, I reiterate the views of the Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh, which she expressed during the meeting between the United States President and peacekeeper-contributing countries in New York on 23 September 2009:

“Bangladesh takes pride in contributing to the United Nations effort in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is our constitutional obligation as well.”

We remain committed to United Nations peacekeeping as one of the most universal tools for
helping societies in conflict and post-conflict situations and helping people to rebuild their lives. We subscribe to the view of the Non-Aligned Movement that:

“United Nations peacekeeping operations should be provided from the outset with political support, full and optimal human, financial and logistical resources and clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies”.

In this regard, the often stretched peacekeeping mandates deserve special attention. As we all know, peacekeeping is no longer simply standing between conflicting parties to end hostilities. Peacekeeping has evolved into a complex of activities involving military, police and civilian elements to preserve peace, assist in humanitarian and development activities and thus construct the foundation of sustainable peace through the peacebuilding process. It is therefore critically important to ensure that the countries providing peacekeepers become an integral part of the decision-making process while drawing up the mandate of a particular peacekeeping mission by the Security Council.

They should also be engaged at the decision-making level in the peacekeeping missions. This will allow the United Nations to ensure that the mandate is achievable, manageable and truly effective. At the same time, mandates should be accompanied by sufficient resources, including human, logistical and financial resources, at the disposal of the peacekeepers.

We agree with the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission when he says that “peacekeepers are early peacebuilders”. We emphasize, however, that peacekeepers’ role should not be ended abruptly at any exit point. In terms of the comparative advantages in particular areas, my delegation firmly believes that peacekeepers are uniquely positioned to assist in identifying and drawing on the most relevant capacity requirements on the ground in post-conflict countries. For example, disarmament, demobilization, reorientation and security sector reform are recognized as two key elements in the peacebuilding process. However, these two elements are also included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. Thus, any experiences gained and lessons learned in peacekeeping operations could significantly assist in and complement the peacebuilding process.

In this regard, we would like to recall the ninth paragraph of the Security Council’s presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), which underscores the importance of introducing peacebuilding elements into peacekeeping operations before a transfer to the Peacebuilding Commission. This, in reality, has yet to be translated in any country-specific context. My delegation therefore emphasizes the need for strong synergy between peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates.

Peacekeepers nowadays are entrusted with some non-conventional tasks, including electoral assistance, human rights situation monitoring, the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, the provision of safe passage to United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, security sector reform and the training of security personnel, the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, providing medical and emergency care, women’s empowerment, and assisting in the development of the legal system and community involvement. Thus, United Nations peacekeeping can be considered as an important precursor to peacebuilding missions in many respects.

We need to ensure the proper synergy between the processes in order to achieve the end goal of sustainable peace. We also need to ensure unity of purpose and action for success in the process. The entire United Nations membership — the Security Council, the General Assembly and the peacekeeper-contributing countries — must have a shared and holistic vision about what we wish to achieve and how.

Now, let me turn to some specific areas in which Bangladesh can and is ready to contribute to the cause of sustainable peace and security. Bangladesh has extensive electoral experience. The Election Commission of Bangladesh completed electronic voter registration and national identification for a staggering 80-plus million voters before the most recent general election in December 2008. We are ready to share this experience with other countries, particularly in post-conflict countries.

Microcredit financing has been playing a critical role in Bangladesh, including in income generation, poverty alleviation, youth employment and women’s empowerment. This model has been successfully replicated in many countries as part of their development planning and in post-conflict situations — for example, Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone, just to name a few.
Microcredit financing, however, must be supplemented by other essential poverty alleviation and job creation tools, such as building rural infrastructure, human capacity build-up, the development of microenterprise and provision of primary health care and universal education, including non-formal adult education, which can create an environment in which access to financial capital can add significant value. Microcredit financing can be useful if it is seen as a means rather than a goal.

Bangladesh also has the expertise of community involvement in nation-building efforts, and its non-governmental organizations have proved to be a successful agent of change. Bangladesh is ready to share its best practices and experience at any time.

We have also established the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training as a training centre for peacekeepers from around the world. It has state-of-the-art facilities, and Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy has visited and was pleased with it. In line with the recommendations of the Brahimi panel, Bangladesh strongly feels that the Institute should be recognized as a regional peacekeeping training institute. We would be happy to welcome potential peacekeepers for training at the Institute and returning peacekeepers for debriefing.

Before concluding, allow me to stress that the success of transition from a peacekeeping environment to an exit phase requires due consideration of the whole process, from mandate creation to drawdown and the exit phase. Transition from one phase to another needs to be planned carefully, with due emphasis on overlapping activities between phases. Experience acquired in previous steps must be used in subsequent steps to ensure the efficient and effective use of human, financial and logistical resources. The exit phase must be preceded by work adequate to fostering sustainable peace and development and the involvement of the local community to avoid creating a vacuum in which undesirable elements can take over, or so that the community feels let down, with no light at the end of the tunnel. It is imperative that exit strategies create an environment of hope and a feeling of stability and empowerment on the part of the local populace, so that the peacekeepers’ exit leaves behind no vacuum or hopelessness.

The President (spoke in French): I call on my colleagues to kindly limit their statements to five minutes for their own well-being, if they wish to leave for the weekend.

I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India): We would like to thank the French presidency for organizing this thematic debate on the issue of peacekeeping. This is the fourth time in seven months that my delegation is speaking in the Security Council on peacekeeping, a fact that attests to the centrality of this activity in the United Nations. I would also at the outset like to thank the French delegation for its recent efforts, which have led to improvements in the consultative mechanisms of peacekeeping. My delegation appreciates the spirit behind these initiatives.

We also note with appreciation the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to reach out to Member States in the ongoing work of developing operational concepts. I am optimistic that this spirit of cooperation will find reflection in the forthcoming deliberations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

The concept paper (S/2010/67) circulated by the French presidency for today’s debate is both comprehensive and useful. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to align itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Council today has to manage its primary responsibility of responding to threats to international peace and security in an environment that has changed very substantially since 1945. The Council has to deal with situations that have complex, multidimensional aetiologies. They cannot be easily labeled or categorized. They have also proved very tenacious and have defied straightforward solutions.

We are in this situation because every so often the Council has mandated operations without a clear understanding of what was required. In the rush to do something, it has got into situations where objectives have been confused. Mandates have been unrealistic; time frames have been too ambitious. A band-aid approach has been used and the resources allocated to the task — financial, logistical, and above all, human — have been pegged at minimal levels. Our conclusions are reinforced by the joint study by the DPKO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, entitled “Protecting civilians in
the context of United Nations peacekeeping operations”, which states that “Confusion over the Council’s intent is evident in the lack of policy, guidance, planning and preparedness”. It is evident that the Council requires a new paradigm and new approaches if it is to discharge its responsibilities.

We first need to recognize that there are no shortcuts to peacekeeping. We are not dealing with classic belligerents who are looking for a quick victory. We are dealing with forces that have a stake in continuing instability. We are dealing with forces that flourish in the absence of the rule of law and in the presence of violence and intimidation. We cannot deal with these forces unless we are committed to the long haul. Transition and exit strategies need therefore to be approached accordingly.

Eighty per cent of United Nations peacekeeping resources, financial and human, are deployed in post-colonial societies. The problems they face are not unique and have been confronted in many nations in Asia and Africa. It stands to reason that successful post-colonial nation-building experience is the most relevant to understanding how to approach the successful management of complex peacekeeping operations.

I am proud to represent a nation that has been an active participant in United Nations peacekeeping since 1956 and has contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers to 40 United Nations operations. I also speak on behalf of a country that is a well-established and successful democratic polity that responds to the aspirations of one of the most diverse populations of the world and that is among the fastest growing economies of the world. Imperialist thinking at the height of the colonial era described all such countries as ungovernable. Facts and history speak otherwise.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not mutually exclusive. It is our understanding that both need to continue simultaneously over extended periods of time. Precipitate withdrawal of peacekeepers is a recipe for disaster and a temptation that should be avoided at all costs. As a peacekeeping operation gathers momentum, it requires more resources, not fewer. The military component will have to be supplemented, and not supplanted, by police and rule-of-law capacity and by a capacity for development administration. By development administration capacity, we mean the ability to respond to the basic aspirations of the people beyond law and order.

It is also important to remember that United Nations operations are essentially in aid of national authorities and national capacities. National authorities usually have a good idea of what they require. The Council and the Secretariat must not just listen more to national Governments; they must also listen carefully. There is no substitute for national capacities. The only role the United Nations can play is to help in creating conditions where these capacities can be exercised. We believe that support for national authorities is key in two areas. One is security sector reform and the other is in providing primary inputs for socio-economic development.

Security sector reform, in particular, needs far greater coordination, cohesiveness and unity of purpose. The training, equipment and working methods of national police and other rule-of-law institutions must be structured in a manner that is consonant with the wishes of national authorities and not the priorities of donors. In the case of economic development, national authorities, as the experience of the Peacebuilding Commission indicates, are capable of developing strategies and plans. What they need is resources and social investment.

Peacekeeping, which is the main contribution of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, has a budget of $7.8 billion. This is a little more than 0.5 per cent of worldwide military expenditures. As the concept paper circulated by the President points out, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a ratio of one peacekeeper to 3,500 inhabitants. This is also the equivalent of one peacekeeper for every 120 square kilometres. It needs very little imagination to grasp the utter insufficiency of 17,000 peacekeepers in the task of providing support to national authorities in an area of responsibility roughly the size of western Europe. It is evident that resources for peacekeeping are utterly inadequate.

It stands to reason that an increase in the number of quality troops is the first requirement. It also stands to reason that troops require proper equipment and enablers. We would like to see an increase in the deployment of police and rule-of-law capacities. The current composition of the DPKO as it exists today does not have the capacity to plan for the nation-
building activities that are central to peacebuilding. This capacity must be developed and will require a multidisciplinary approach involving the development pillar of the United Nations and greater cooperation with countries in the global South.

It is very difficult to use objective parameters to determine an exit point from complex peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping operation will have succeeded if there is durable peace. Durable peace can follow only from a successful peace agreement. The conditions that can lead to a successful peace agreement are also difficult, if not impossible, to define. Peace processes and political settlements cannot be subjected to budgetary discipline and evaluation by administrators. The creation of peace, as we are all learning in many different parts of the world, is not a business process. It is a complicated political undertaking with many imponderables. The Security Council is not bound by benchmarks on when and where it decides to intervene. Each decision is unique and subjective judgments are involved. Similar subjective judgments will have to be involved on when an operation can be wound up.

I would like to conclude by referring to the issue of accountability. Should there not be an accountability requirement for those who mandate? Surely, their responsibility cannot end with the generation of mandates. If unachievable mandates are generated for political expediency or if adequate resources are not made available, who should bear responsibility? A deficit in the willingness and ability to enforce mandates is leading to an erosion of the credibility of the United Nations itself.

Let me thank you again, Sir, for organizing this debate. India pays tribute to peacekeepers who have fallen, most recently in Haiti, and reiterates its commitment to contributing, through its peacekeepers and its national capacities, to the promotion of peace and security and to the role of the United Nations.

The President (spoke in French): I call on the representative of Egypt.

Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I should like to thank you, Sir, for calling for this important debate and for the attention given by France to the ongoing deliberations on the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations and on addressing their challenges. I also thank you for the concept paper prepared by your Mission (S/2010/67) as a basis for this debate on strengthening the drafting of Security Council mandates by providing resources and capabilities, developing exit strategies, and achieving the smooth and gradual transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and the long-term sustainable development of countries emerging from conflict.

I would like also to thank the Secretary-General for his statement early in the debate and the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support for their briefings. I also thank Japan for its efforts to enhance the interaction of the Security Council with troop-contributing countries through the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

In our capacity as the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, we fully associate ourselves with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Movement.

While the United Nations is proud of the steady increase in the number of its peacekeeping troops and police, that increase also reflects the weak ability of the Organization to reach successful political settlements of existing disputes in host countries. It also reflects in most instances a lack of interest in developing the dimensions of peace settlements, through cooperation with United Nations organs and other entities, to create urban communities that provide decent lives for belligerent forces and persuade them to lay down arms and devote themselves to building their country and to preventing it from descending yet again into conflict.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon is most clear in peacekeeping operations, at least 75 per cent of whose budgets is allocated to reimbursing troop and equipment costs, leaving less than 25 per cent to development activities, to promoting peaceful settlement efforts and to strengthening peacebuilding efforts on the ground. That is a perfectly unacceptable ratio that does not reflect the required balance between peacekeeping, peace settlement and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Egypt has repeatedly stressed the need to prevent peacekeeping missions from being transformed into missions that manage rather than settle conflicts. Egypt has also indicated the importance of focusing on building the national capabilities of host countries from the outset of a peacekeeping operation through parallel efforts in peacebuilding. That will contribute to ending
the growing reliance of host countries on the role of peacekeeping missions in support of national capacities in the areas of defence, security and the rule of law, particularly in the light of the consequences of prolonged peacekeeping missions in the absence of a national alternative capable of performing the same tasks and of protecting and consolidating whatever stability has been achieved. All of these issues must be taken into consideration in our search for a vision of sequential transitions, with defined phases, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, based on the need to achieve comprehensive economic development as a basis for such transitions.

In a contribution to defining a number of elements that can be addressed in the context of developing and implementing transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping missions, I wish to stress several important aspects that can be helpful to formulating a new strategy in this regard.

First, there is a need to focus greater attention on strengthening the Organization’s political efforts, from preventive diplomacy, mediation and reconciliation through peacekeeping, peacebuilding and support for the development capacities of host countries, in cooperation with United Nations organs and international financial and economic institutions, to the organized end phase of missions. That should be done within a framework of respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping operations reflected in the consent of the parties, national ownership, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence or to implement a Security Council mandate.

Second, the Security Council must draft mandates that are clear, achievable and based on a technical assessment and sound political and military planning. The Council should also indicate precisely what goals are to be achieved and the role of each component of the mission in achieving them. This must be done in such a manner as to guarantee the required gradual transition from peacekeeping to comprehensive peaceful settlement, and in the light of clear development plans for the transition to post-conflict peacebuilding and the withdrawal of the United Nations in coordination and cooperation with the host country once it is able to assume its responsibility for defence, security and enforcing respect for the rule of law. The strategy should also take into account the evaluation set out in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) regarding the need for multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations to launch a limited number of critical peacebuilding activities, pursuant to a phased plan for the smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Third, we must enhance trust between peacekeeping parties represented in the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, and strengthen coordination on the ground between the Security Council’s special political missions, regional organizations, and financial and economic institutions operating in host countries in order to ensure unity of purpose and consistency in addressing the political, military, economic and development dimensions.

Fourth, institutional cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council must be consolidated in order to take advantage of the Commission’s advice in planning the peacebuilding activities of United Nations peacekeeping missions, taking into consideration the results of this year’s upcoming review of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Fifth, we must pursue the development of relevant Secretariat bodies and increase coordination and interaction among them within the two Departments of the peacekeeping sector, and with the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to achieve an integrated and coherent vision that ensures unity of purpose and action on the ground, in consultation with Member States and within a framework of transparency and ongoing dialogue aimed at overcoming problems related to insufficient personnel and equipment and at ending the lack of coordination of United Nations activities on the ground.

Sixth, we must enhance resort to regional and subregional organizations in addressing post-conflict peacekeeping issues, without prejudice to the Security Council’s competence but within a framework of joint efforts to achieve peace and stability. Foremost among such organizations is the African Union, which already plays a lead role that deserves appreciation and support.

Seventh and lastly, we must avoid addressing peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues from the perspective of reducing costs and disputing the competences of the Security Council and the General Assembly, represented respectively by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the
Peacebuilding Commission. The Economic and Social Council also has to play a more dynamic role in strengthening the capabilities of countries emerging from conflict to relaunch the sort of effective economic activities that guarantee an end to conflicts and promote development.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of Nepal.

Mr. Acharya (Nepal): My delegation greatly appreciates the French initiative to hold discussions in the Security Council with all the relevant stakeholders on transition and exit strategies and for the succinct concept paper on this important issue (S/2010/67). I feel that a debate like this at the Security Council level with troop- and police-contributing countries would also help to add substantive value to our efforts to make United Nations peacekeeping operations more effective and efficient, thereby helping us ensure an orderly transition and exit.

I thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Mr. Alain Le Roy, Ms Susana Malcorra, the two Under-Secretaries-General and the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for their morning presentations. Before I begin, I associate myself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

As a country participating consistently over the past five decades in peacekeeping operations, we have seen great transformations in such operations in that time. Today, they are more diverse, more proliferate and more challenging. But we also see that there are also opportunities to contribute to peace and security through successful peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

Devising transition and exit strategies should be an integral part of any peacekeeping mission. It should be planned at the earliest phase of the mission, while keeping in view the end objective, provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement signed by the parties to the conflict, and the nature and complexity of the problem in a realistic manner. We need to have firm and clear discussions with the parties on the ground about transition and exit around the time of the comprehensive peace agreement itself, and clear political and security objectives should be formulated with benchmarks for each phase of the mission’s life so as to streamline the transition process. As exit strategy is largely influenced by the political and security situation in the host country, a balance should be maintained between an untimely exit and the possibility of relapse into violence.

Besides the ground reality, how the mandate is drafted, what it includes, and how much resources are allocated, and whether or not necessary political support is consistently rendered at the critical moment have a great bearing on the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping missions. In this context, the close coordination and consistent involvement of the troop-contributing countries would also strengthen the effective operation of peacekeeping operations as well as their successful completion. This was also clearly put forth in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809), the New Horizon paper and the report of Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations led by Japan. After all, the way the peacekeepers respond to the various evolving situations on the ground should lead towards the successive progress of the situation, which in turn depends very much on how we drafted our mandate in the beginning. The specific and synchronized integration of peacebuilding elements into peacekeeping operations has immensely contributed to ensure a smoother transition and exit.

We should effectively start the integrated concept of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a seamless evolution in some of the situations. As we have seen around the world, the coordinated delivery by the United Nations system under one umbrella with one integrated framework, national ownership, the building of national institutions, matching resources as per the mandate, and strong and consistent political support, together with cooperative regional support, would ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and eventually towards the normal developmental activities of the United Nations.

I would like to stress that in order to make peacekeeping operations an effective stage towards the peacebuilding phase, the formulation of the concept of operations and strategic guidance should focus on the implementation of mandates and identified key tasks. Based on the reports from the field, the Security Council, in consultations with the troop-contributing countries, should then review the mandates and resources with a view to examining whether they are matched with each other and whether there is a need for an added impetus to the mission’s effectiveness, leading towards the desired progress.
Similarly, the Security Council should ensure the timely availability of allocated resources, especially air assets and enabler components, for the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates within the stipulated time. More often, we do not see an equal level of commitment to providing support, especially lifting capacity, when the area of coverage is large and extensive and the situation precarious. Their timely availability helps make peacekeeping operations immediately operational and more effective, which will lead towards early transition to the next phase.

In considering the transition issue, security, peace and development have to be considered as an integrated whole. Security is paramount to peace and development, but they have to be promoted simultaneously in order to make peace sustainable and to ensure the peace dividend so that it reinforces strong national ownership of the process. National leadership is critical to long-term peace, development and progress. The conceptual framework on capacity-building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform should be agreed upon at the outset with the parties concerned in the conflict to ensure its smooth implementation, which also ensures effective exit later.

We believe that the coordination of international efforts is a must to establish an effective framework for the protection of civilians in the mission area. This is an overarching factor in the implementation of Security Council mandates. But it should also be pointed out that United Nations peacekeeping operations cannot have an unlimited area of responsibilities without a proportionate level of deployment and resources. Otherwise, we would create a level of expectation that cannot be fulfilled and which in the long run would undermine the credibility of United Nations efforts themselves.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of Jordan.

Mr. Al-Allaf (Jordan): At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to wish you every success in fulfilling the tasks entrusted to you. I would also like to thank the previous president, the Permanent Representative of China, for the efforts he had made during his presidency.

I thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Susana Malcorra, for their comprehensive and candid briefings this morning. I also thank their staff and salute all United Nations colleagues who labour tirelessly in the field on behalf of the Organization, recognizing their good work in challenging and hazardous conditions.

The initiative of France to hold today’s important debate is very welcome. It comes at a timely moment as the United Nations is involved in a systemic exercise of reviewing peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While Jordan aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, allow me to make additional observations on the key aspects underlined in the concept paper prepared by the French delegation (S/2010/67).

United Nations peacekeeping is an instrument important to the maintenance of international peace and security. It cannot be, however, a substitute for a permanent solution or for addressing the underlying causes of conflicts. United Nations peacekeeping operations should be accompanied by an inclusive peace process that is well planned, carefully designed and supported by the consent and adherence of the parties concerned. The Security Council should also sustain its political support for the process.

Peacekeeping operations have been mandated to assist, in many different ways, countries torn by conflict, to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping operations have also come to take on a broader and more complex range of important new tasks. That having been said, it is important to note that no peacekeeping operation is intended to continue indefinitely, and that the lifecycle of any peacekeeping operation must at some point include an exit and, or, a transitional phase.

We strongly concur with the view that exit and transition strategies are key elements of the success of any mission and that they ought to be strengthened. However, an exit should only be considered the result of achieving mission objectives and not a departure from the goals supported by the international community and set forth in Security Council resolutions. Exit strategies should come into play when a comprehensive settlement has been implemented and sustainable peace achieved. Nevertheless, exit strategies should also be flexible and adjustable to deteriorations in any given area.
As many of the previous speakers have articulated, a good exit strategy is facilitated by a good entrance strategy. Therefore, peacekeeping operations must have clear, achievable mandates, realistic goals and end states that are not linked to artificial deadlines or based on decisions that are irrelevant to the political and security realities on the ground. To fully achieve this task, the special representatives of the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries have to be involved in the decisions of the Security Council at the various stages of peacekeeping operations. The expertise and experience of troop- and police-contributing countries, objective information provided and the situation on the ground should be taken into consideration.

Moreover, adequate resources should be provided at all stages of peacekeeping. Budgetary pressures should not result in the premature termination of a mission or in scaling it down in a manner that would make it incapable of performing its tasks efficiently.

Good integrated planning is at the heart of a coherent response to the needs of countries emerging from conflict. An effective transition following the conclusion of a peacekeeping mission must be factored into the planning process from the outset as part of a system-wide approach. Planning must specifically incorporate a comprehensive peacebuilding approach that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of the conflict. Moreover, there should be a clear idea of what conditions are necessary for transition at the end of the peacekeeping phase of a mission. The planners should also take into consideration the significant planning demands an actual transition will impose. Transition into peacebuilding requires an examination of the political, financial, institutional and bureaucratic implications for all parties, including the Security Council.

The achievement of a self-sustaining peace in countries emerging from conflict requires a unified, long-term effort involving the relevant parts of the United Nations system as well as other key external partners, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional organizations. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations constitute one piece of a broader puzzle and must always be deployed as part of a long-term strategy.

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is intended to play a key role in fostering greater coherence at the strategic level between the various players involved in efforts to assist war-torn countries. Hence, earlier engagement by the PBC might provide a means for the Security Council to explore an earlier but still sustainable exit from the military phase of peacekeeping.

There are no hard and fast criteria, measures or indicators that can determine when to close down a peacekeeping operation. Since each situation is unique and has specific problems, Council decisions will, of course, have to be based on evolving realities and considerations. The objective assessment of a given situation in both the medium- and the long-term perspectives is required for both exit and transition. Such an assessment should take into consideration the political, military, humanitarian and human rights aspects, the views of parties, and the regional dimension.

Although it is the prerogative of the Security Council to decide when a mission has fulfilled its mandate, close consultations with the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat remain essential to any objective assessment of the progress made towards laying the foundations of a self-sustaining peace and the likely consequences of a significant reduction in or the total withdrawal of the peacekeeping presence. Peacekeeping operations must aim at achieving the earliest possible transfer of responsibility to other actors — first and foremost, local and national authorities, but also international actors that will remain behind to assist with development and other issues. In this regard, some key benchmarks may be used in determining at which point the process of consolidation can be safely handed over to the national authorities, assisted where necessary by international actors, including United Nations agencies. These benchmarks may include, for example, the absence of violent conflict, the return of displaced persons, progress made in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the successful holding of elections and formation of legitimate political institutions, and progress made in the establishment of governance and rule-of-law mechanisms.

The specific set of benchmarks used will vary from one situation to another, depending on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics in
play. Whatever the benchmarks adopted, they should be regarded as interim objectives in the broader effort to build a self-sustaining peace.

**The President (spoke in French):** I now give the floor to the representative of Rwanda.

**Mr. Ndabarasa** (Rwanda): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I should also like to join others in commending your delegation for having convened this apt and propitious debate on an issue of critical importance to the future conduct of peacekeeping operations and for the instructive concept paper (S/2010/67) circulated to facilitate this discussion.

We are grateful for and welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate, and thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their presentations this morning, and all those who have put forward recommendations that we believe will greatly enhance our consideration of these issues.

Peacekeeping operations, their conception, authorization, implementation and eventual transition are more likely to succeed if a number of key factors are considered. These include a viable peace process or a peace to keep; political will, commitment and clarity of purpose on the part of all stakeholders; clear and achievable mandates; the impartial implementation of mandates; adequate and predictable financial, human and logistical resources; and distinctly defined transition and exit strategies. The very helpful concept note circulated by the French delegation to facilitate this dialogue examines some of these issues and raises a number of questions that my delegation will endeavour to address.

One issue raised is the drafting of mandates. All stakeholders must work together to ensure that we arrive at clear and achievable mandates that include a desired end state, benchmarks and adequate resources.

In addition, due to the volatile environments in which peacekeeping missions often operate, mandates should allow for enough flexibility to adapt to changes. The views and perspectives of the host country, troop and police contributors and other relevant stakeholders are critical to that end. To enable the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, mandates should also seek to reflect the lead role of a viable national Government, as well as the role of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Planning should commence at the conception of a peacekeeping operation. It is imperative that an integrated planning process be in place, with strategic and operational objectives, in addition to clear benchmarks that allow for evaluation and accountability.

With regard to capacities and resources, peacekeeping operations should focus on fostering national ownership and building the capacity of the host country to better respond to, and address, the security challenges it faces. Those efforts should be matched with appropriate resources that will ensure long-term sustainability and allow for well-timed transition and exit strategies.

With regard to the coordination of international efforts, peacekeeping missions are often blighted by duplication of effort and contradictory initiatives. The coordination of international efforts is imperative to developing successful transition strategies. Coordination is key in fostering the credibility of planning and implementation strategies. The buy-in of key stakeholders can be achieved through coordination and consultation.

With regard to process, the development of viable transition and exit strategies is dependent on the presence of clear benchmarks that allow for evaluation and accountability. The Secretary-General’s reports on peacekeeping missions should reflect the progress made in the implementation of mandates. At the same time, clearly established benchmarks should be balanced with the need for flexibility — in effect, to be able to change course when necessary.

In conclusion, it is important to point out that successful transition and exit strategies are not an end in themselves but, rather, offer the possibility for comprehensive conflict resolution.

**The President (spoke in French):** I now give the floor to the representative of Uruguay.

**Mr. Cancela** (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): First of all, I would like to express my gratitude for the important statements made this morning, in particular by the Secretary-General and by Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra.
Allow me to join others who have preceded me in thanking you, Mr. President, for this timely initiative. It is timely, first of all, because of the current situation on the ground, in which complex scenarios and missions require integrated approaches and strategies from the United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding system. Secondly, it is timely precisely because the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding will soon be considered by the entire membership in two different contexts, namely, the process of reviewing the Peacebuilding Commission and at the next session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

“No exit without strategy” is the title of a report on this issue that the Secretary-General prepared in 2001 at the request of this organ (S/2001/394). In our judgement, several of its recommendations are still valid, including, for example, the one that says that “a good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy” (para. 6).

In that regard, it is important to take into consideration lessons learned in the preparation of such strategies. The work that the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations has decided to carry out on the experiences of various completed missions therefore seems to us highly relevant. In that connection, based on our very positive experience as a troop contributor participating in meetings of the Working Group in 2009, we reiterate our full readiness to contribute to that undertaking on the basis of our experience in a number of peacekeeping missions.

Having said that, however, we believe that there is no sustainable exit or transition strategy that does not include a serious and consistent consideration of the underlying causes of a given conflict — be they ethnic or political reasons or disputes over territory or control over natural resources, among others. To that end, the first step is to thoroughly understand the causes of a conflict. In that regard, it is worth pointing out that the change in the focus of many missions in recent years from inter- to intra-State conflicts makes the problems we must face even more complex.

A peacekeeping operation is hard pressed to resolve all the sources of conflict. Nor do we believe that this should be its purpose or its benchmark in deciding on the termination or transition of a mission. What is crucial, however, is that, from the very outset, a mission work to strengthen national institutions and capacities so that they can begin to manage these problems in a peaceful manner, thereby making a reality of the principle of national ownership, which we all endorse, and effectively laying the foundations for a future transition.

In that regard, it is crucial to strengthen institutional capacities in the areas of security and the rule of law. We therefore encourage the Council to continue to incorporate that element in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. However, that is not the only area in which peace operations have capabilities and in which they can have a positive influence.

While taking into consideration the specificities of each case, it could be very important if, from the beginning of a mission, emphasis were placed on other tasks linked to early peacebuilding activities such as, among others, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the rebuilding of infrastructure and quick-impact projects that produce tangible peace dividends. In addition, actions aimed at addressing the causes of conflict should not be put off. These could include, for example, increasing political participation, electoral system reform, respect for ethnic identity and agrarian reform.

There certainly seems to be broad consensus on the benefits that peacekeeping operations can include in their mandates and early peacebuilding activities, in particular in the areas of security sector reform and the rule of law. However, the same cannot be said of the role of the peacekeeping system with regard to socio-economic aspects of peacebuilding. That is true in particular when it comes to efforts aimed at medium- and long-term economic recovery, which is necessary for ensuring that peace and security are sustainable and that, once a mission comes to an end, its benefits are not lost and the risks of a relapse are minimized.

In that regard, it is important to analyze the types of economic development that provide for a clear exit strategy and to foster the conditions necessary to a return to growth from the outset. In general, we must be cautious and take into account the level of social and economic devastation in the country or region in question.

The actions and areas of focus that will promote sustainable transitions through the different types of United Nations presence on the ground, ultimately leading to a complete handover of responsibilities to
the host States, require a serious effort of integration and coordination, beginning within the United Nations system. It is essential that there be certainty regarding the roles that each body and agency must play, as well as the leadership of these coordination efforts on the ground.

In this context, we believe that there is an important role for the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the body created a few years ago to deal specifically with post-conflict activities. If it is to play that role, however, the PBC must be strengthened. This would call for more resources, which could well give rise to legitimate doubts as to the advisability of such an approach and on the true ability of the United Nations to ensure sustainable transitions.

Fortunately, in the past few years, various studies have demonstrated the great imbalance between the costs of conflict without a United Nations presence and the estimates for a peacekeeping operation that meets its goals effectively. Conflicts without a United Nations presence are four times more expensive than our peacekeeping operations. Moreover, we have all witnessed successful examples of transition and should keep those lessons in mind. We therefore believe that it is worth committing ourselves to peacebuilding from the outset, providing the system and its entities with the resources necessary to fulfil its purpose.

Finally, allow me to reiterate three ideas that we consider to be important in this process. First, there must be clear objectives and exit strategies from the beginning of a mandate’s discussion. Secondly, there must be coordination of United Nations action on the ground under the leadership of a representative, lending the overall effort coherence and purpose. Thirdly, peacebuilding tasks must be prioritized with adequate human and financial resources.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of Italy.

Mr. Ragaglini (Italy): I thank you, Sir, for promoting a useful debate on peacekeeping that focuses on the actual effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, based on the capacity to assist a country in its transition from conflict to peace. I also thank you for inviting Italy, the most important European troop-contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, to add its reflections to this debate. I also wish to fully align myself with the statement delivered by the representative of the European Union.

A debate on transition and exit strategies requires a focus on at least three different levels. First is the strategic level, here in New York, with the participation from the start of the Peacebuilding Commission and the troop-contributing countries in drafting mission mandates and planning; second is the involvement, whenever possible, of the regional organizations most affected by the crisis; third are national contributions, which should be focused, among other priorities, on building the security conditions indispensable to any transition.

On the first point, Italy considers it essential that the main protagonists, present and future, be brought in at the very first stages of forging a peace mission. These are the countries that contribute military and police forces, and the Peacebuilding Commission, a body conceived specifically to coordinate efforts to consolidate institutions in States emerging from conflict. Only integrated participation, a strategic vision and shared responsibility from the outset among the various actors of a peacekeeping operation will permit timely preparation for the changing of the guard between military Blue Helmets and peacebuilders deployed to help a country stabilize. Such joint efforts will unfailingly promote clearer mandates and fill present transition gaps.

Members know that this is not a totally new idea. In its presidential statement adopted in August, the Security Council underlined the following conclusion:

“The Security Council… re-emphasises the need for coherence between, and integration of, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development to achieve an effective response to post-conflict situations from the outset” (S/PRST/2009/24, p. 3).

In the same statement, the Council recognizes that a peacekeeping mission should be a complement, not an alternative, to a political strategy. Bearing in mind the very wide deployment of United Nations troops around the world, we believe that the moment has come to shape concretely the coherence required by the Security Council in that statement.

The five-year review of the Peacebuilding Commission offers us the chance to move from words to deeds. It is an opportunity to establish new working methods, more cooperation and greater synergy between the Security Council and its national and institutional partners, which are called on to share the
In this context, we cannot ignore the issue of strengthening the status of the Peacebuilding Commission in the framework of the United Nations institutional architecture.

On the second point, recent history illustrates the growing role of regional organizations in the international context. Sharing the burden of peacekeeping with them maximizes the global effectiveness of the United Nations, rationalizes the resources available, and often increases the possibilities of a successful transition. One example should suffice; with the status of Kosovo clarified, the United Nations is gradually passing the baton to the European Union. Similar cooperation has proved useful with the African Union, an organization that should be encouraged and supported to share the burden of peacekeeping.

With their shared geopolitical interests, economic and trade relations, historical ties and cultural affinities, the regional organizations are natural partners, with the greatest interest in managing a crisis afflicting one of their members or neighbouring States. They are also increasingly institutionalized international actors, as the recent Lisbon Treaty has shown for the European Union. We thus need to encourage a deeper and more structured partnership between regional organizations and the United Nations, foster adequate recognition of them, and structure better cooperation and working methods with the Security Council. The African Union-United Nations Panel has made important efforts in this direction.

The Secretary-General has reminded us that transition and exit strategies are dependent on countries assuming responsibility for their own security. Security and the rule of law are thus crucial to assuring the handover from the Blue Helmets to peacebuilding workers. The police component of peacekeeping missions, which have dramatically increased in the past few years, and the inclusion of a civilian capacity, particularly in the area of the rule of law, are indispensable to helping a country work towards resuming full national ownership and responsibility.

Italy provides a key contribution in this area. The deployment model for Italian peacekeepers, especially carabinieri, is to help re-establish State control and security over the territory. But it is accompanied by an ability to relate to the local population and an approach that integrates the civilian components of a mission. The perception of police forces in relation to training projects, infrastructure protection, reconstruction and liaison with local authorities naturally increases trust in peacekeepers. If we add to this the training activities done in Italy to assist foreign police units assigned to United Nations peacekeeping missions, the effectiveness of this approach increases even more.

Italy, together with the European Union, will continue to make its contribution, in the conviction that, under the leadership of the United Nations, a comprehensive approach at the strategic level combined with national ownership are the essential ingredients to ensuring a successful transition strategy for peacekeeping missions.

The President (spoke in French): I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

Mr. Davide (Philippines): I hope that the Philippines, as the second-to-last speaker on the list, will be given more than five minutes.

Let me start, Sir, by extending to you my delegation’s warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of February 2010 and for organizing this debate on transition and exit strategies, which underscores the special importance that the French presidency places on peacekeeping. I also wish to thank you for inviting the Philippines to participate in the discussion.

The Philippines associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, as a troop- and police-contributing country, the Philippines wishes to make the following points on the issue under consideration.

First, peacekeeping is in a constant state of evolution. In the past 60 years, we have seen how our efforts to keep the peace have metamorphosed from the more traditional form of separating warring States and maintaining ceasefire lines to more complex and multidimensional operations involving various stakeholders, which have come to include even non-State actors. The unprecedented surge in the demand for peacekeeping in areas of conflict worldwide during the past several years cannot be expected to end. While the cost of keeping the peace may be staggering — it was estimated at $7.8 billion in the past year alone — we cannot afford to fail. It is
thus incumbent upon all States Members of the United Nations to ensure that we succeed in our efforts to deliver and maintain the kind of peace that is needed to allow people caught in conflict to move on and build.

Secondly, the role of the international community is to promote and facilitate the handover of responsibilities for lasting peace and the sustainable development of a post-conflict area to its people. That makes exit strategies for missions both sound and necessary. Logic and reason therefore dictate that, before we step in to help keep the peace, we should also know when to step out and prepare the transition towards that end. It is therefore imperative that a clearly defined exit strategy be put in place in formulating the mandate of any peacekeeping operation. That means that the Security Council should provide mandates that are not only clear and achievable but are also provided with the proper resources to accomplish the missions.

Thirdly, the Security Council must be able to set a realistic time limit for the transition of any peacekeeping mission. Critical tasks or identifiable benchmarks before mission drawdown should accompany the given deadline. A timeline will provide us the ability to measure progress throughout the mission and to protect the gains of years of peacekeeping operations. However, such a timeline should be based on existing realities on the ground and on consultations with various stakeholders. Efforts must be exerted to avoid a repetition of the premature exit in Timor-Leste in 2005.

Fourthly, in setting and reviewing mandates, the existing consultative mechanisms involving the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries must be strengthened and reinforced. The Security Council could benefit from the actual experience on the ground of troop- and police-contributing countries in formulating new mandates and in reviewing existing ones. Cooperation among various stakeholders, especially among the actors involved in the conflict, is necessary to create an environment conducive to the success of our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Close cooperation and coordination between regional organizations and the United Nations system are necessary to ensure the effective execution of exit strategies.

Fifthly, efforts to keep the peace must go hand in hand with efforts to build peace. It is imperative that peacebuilding activities be incorporated in the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission, to empower and prepare national and local authorities for the eventual transition and exit.

Finally, to put everything in place, in the light of the inputs put forward today by delegations, the Security Council may now consider the creation of a special ad hoc working group exclusively tasked with preparing — after open-ended, transparent and inclusive consultations and a thorough review of the history of United Nations peacekeeping and previous mandates — a working paper on general plans, programmes, activities and strategies, which may be in the form of rules and regulations, on the entry, transition and exit of peacekeeping operations. That would make the process transparent and accountable and avoid ad hoc solutions, which could be affected by temporary interests. Of course, the rules and regulations can include flexible clauses to respond to extreme emergency situations.

The President (spoke in French): I understand that the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations would like to make a further statement. I give him the floor.

Mr. Le Roy (spoke in French): I would just like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this debate. I believe it has been very productive and that every statement has been very useful for each of us — for both the Security Council and of course for us in the Secretariat’s Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. I think that we entirely share the idea that peacebuilding activities should begin as soon as possible in the context of peacekeeping efforts, as we have very clearly said in the New Horizon study. I also think that today’s debate validates everything we proposed in that study. It is for us to make use of all the integration tools at our disposal — such as the Integrated Mission Task Force, the integrated mission planning process and the integrated strategic framework — to ensure that the whole host of peacebuilding activities are integrated as soon as possible into peacekeeping efforts. I think that there is consensus on this. Once again, we proposed it in the New Horizon paper, and we are very pleased to take note of today’s consensus. Thank you, Mr. President, for making this debate possible.
The President (spoke in French): I thank the Under-Secretaries-General for their statements and for their participation in today’s debate.

Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

“The Security Council reaffirms the statement of its President of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24) and its continued commitment to enhance further the overall effectiveness of United Nation peacekeeping.

“The Security Council stresses in particular its commitment ‘regularly to assess in consultation with other stakeholders, the strength, mandate and composition of peacekeeping operations with a view to making the necessary adjustments where appropriate, according to progress achieved or changing circumstances on the ground’. The Council stresses that the overarching objective should be to achieve success through creating the conditions for sustainable peace on the ground, thereby allowing for reconfiguration or withdrawal of the United Nation peacekeeping mission.

“The Security Council underlines that an advanced peace process is an important factor in achieving successful transition from a peacekeeping operation to other configurations of United Nations presence. It also highlights the importance of a host State protecting its population, managing political disputes peaceably and providing for basic services and long-term development.

“The Security Council recognizes the importance of supporting political processes and national institutions, in particular for rule of law, security and peacebuilding assistance at the earliest stage. In this regard, the Council reiterates the urgency of improving United Nations peacebuilding efforts and achieving a coordinated United Nations approach in country as highlighted in the statement of its President of 22 July 2009 (S/PRST/2009/23) and in the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding (S/2009/304).

“The Council underlines the importance of national ownership, constructive dialogue and partnership between national authorities and the international community in helping to address priority peacebuilding needs and the underlying causes of recurring instability. Further improvement can be made in Security Council practice, supported by the Secretariat, to ensure successful transitions, by developing clear, credible and achievable mandates, to be matched by appropriate resources.

The Security Council

“undertakes, whenever possible, to include in peacekeeping mandates a desired outcome of the implementation of mandated tasks and a clear prioritization of tasks to achieve it, reflecting the need to create favourable conditions for sustainable peace;

“stresses the importance of an appropriate level of military expertise for Security Council decisions;

“stresses the need for precise and clear recommendations to be made available by the Secretariat at least a month before mandate renewals, on the content of the mandate and any necessary adjustments, taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the host country, relevant troop- and police-contributing countries, and other parties as appropriate;

“requests the Secretariat to plan military, police and other peacebuilding tasks in phases with clear objectives and taking into account local conditions that should be attained to allow mission success and transition from a peacekeeping operation, taking also into account the recent lessons learned from transitions to integrated peacebuilding offices;

“recognizes the utility of strategic workplans and will consider extending their use in peacekeeping operations. Progress in achieving priority tasks laid down in Security Council resolutions should be measured, as appropriate, through benchmarks that can be easily monitored by the Council;

“recognizes the importance of ensuring that mandated peacebuilding tasks
are implemented as early as possible in a peacekeeping operation in coordination with the United Nations country team and with due respect for security concerns and the priorities of the host Government, taking into account pre-existing programmes and policies implemented before the inception of the operation. In this regard, the Council reaffirms the need to fully implement the Integrated Mission Planning Process, and also notes the importance of the Integrated Strategic Frameworks. The Council also notes the importance of the civilian capacities review now being undertaken by the Peacebuilding Support Office;

undertakes to enhance coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and looks forward to the 2010 review of the PBC and the recommendations on how its role can continue to be enhanced;

welcomes the adoption by the Security Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations of its programme of work, and commends in particular its decision to address key lessons learned from past and current missions about the successful implementation of transition strategies, with a view to improving Council practice;

recalls the necessity to take into account the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict, as and when mandated, throughout the lifecycle of United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions, in line with Security Council resolution 1894 (2009).

The Security Council commits to regularly monitoring progress and achievement of the different stages of a given peacekeeping operation. The Council stresses the importance to maintain an efficient reporting and information collection system.

The Security Council reaffirms its belief that United Nations peacekeeping is a unique global partnership that draws together the contributions and commitment of the entire United Nations system. The Council is committed to strengthening this partnership and acknowledges the key role of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee in that regard. The Security Council recognizes the need for continuous review of the Secretariat’s military planning, police, judicial, rule of law, and institution-building capabilities to ensure their effective utilization and coordination.

The Security Council recognizes the contribution of regional and subregional organizations to transition. The Security Council calls upon all Member States and regional, subregional and international partners to promote coherence and coordination of their peacebuilding plans and programmes with those of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and the wider United Nations presence on the ground.

The Security Council undertakes to provide the political support necessary to ensure the effective implementation of peace processes, in order to promote the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The Council stresses the importance of considering early peacebuilding in its own deliberations and of ensuring coherence between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to achieve effective transition strategies. The Council looks forward to further discussing the implementation of this integrated approach and requests the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts in this regard.

The Security Council remains committed to improving further the overall effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, including through the recognition and enhancement of linkages with wider peacebuilding efforts, and will conduct a further review of progress in this regard in late 2010.”

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2010/2.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.