Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Peacekeeping is again at a crossroads, and this Committee’s session once again offers a timely opportunity to begin discuss the way ahead.

Four years ago, when I joined the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO was at an historic juncture. The recommendations of the Brahimi report were before us, and together, we set out from that milestone to ensure that peacekeeping would be ready, operationally, to address the lessons of the 1990’s and meet the challenges of the future.

In 2001, we worked to strengthen the staff of DPKO, and give it the human resources necessary to properly backstop our missions. And we have accomplished that.

In 2002, we focused, among other things, on rapid deployment. We managed to bring into existence the Strategic Deployment Stocks and the Pre-mandate Commitment Authority. We could not have deployed the new missions over the past year, as we have done, without these significant innovations. We also looked closely at the question of the Rule of Law and how it fits in with peacekeeping efforts. There, too, we have started to make real progress in developing a common vision for the way forward.

Last year, our wide-ranging discussions included coordination with regional organizations. The fruits of that effort can be seen in the UN-EU Joint Declaration, and ongoing UN – AU cooperation. We also discussed gender issues. This week we will be launching the gender resource package for peacekeeping and other field operations.

We have made real progress, on these and other fronts, and we can take some measure of pride in what we have accomplished together in the past four years.

In August 2005, it will be five years since the Brahimi process was launched. That milestone should understandably lead all of us to reflect on some fairly fundamental questions. To what degree has the world of peacekeeping changed since then? What will the next five years hold for UN peacekeeping and what might that imply for the types of
capacities the UN System – DPKO, in particular -- should begin to build now in order to be prepared?

These are the big questions that we in the Secretariat need to begin discussing with Member States, but just as importantly, that you need to begin discussing with one another, in the lead up to the Summit to be held in September 2005. The soon-to-be issued report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change will certainly contribute significantly to that discussion. I, therefore, would not want to anticipate or preempt what the Panel will say on the subject of peacekeeping, or how the Secretary-General or you will react to it. But, I would like to use this opportunity to inject into the dialogue a few personal reflections on certain trends and realities that appear to be dominating the peacekeeping terrain.

First, the peacekeeping demands throughout the world today exceed what the UN or any other regional or sub-regional organization, by itself, can meet. From the UN's perspective it is very welcome that a growing number of international organizations and actors are engaging in post-conflict work. Regional and sub-regional organizations should equally welcome continued investment in the UN’s capacity for peacekeeping. After all, the fact that DPKO has reached a total of 17 operations now, with more potentially on the horizon, is ample confirmation of the fact that UN peacekeeping remains indispensable. The universality of the UN continues to offer UN peacekeepers a unique legitimacy. And UN peacekeeping has built up - over decades of hard-won experience – a formidable degree of expertise and some unique capabilities.

Second, if the current demand for UN peacekeeping will remain roughly constant over the next five years, concurrent with the demand for non-UN run operations, then we are going to face a serious resource deficit in the field. There is a need to take a very serious look at the total pool of financial and human resources – military, civilians, and police -- available for post-conflict work; and, to agree on reliable bases for their allocation to UN and other operations, as and when needed.

Third, that there will be demands for peacekeeping is one of the few things in this business that is predictable. As for the rest, we should be prepared to expect the unexpected. We need to equip ourselves for nimble, competent, quick and flexible response. Operations continue to have to be mounted with short notice, and without the sort of planning lead times that would give our SRSGs and their staff the preparation they would ideally want. Moreover, though we are learning lessons and codifying best practices, we must also recognize that, to a great degree, each of the operations we mount remains sui generis. They each face unique political, economic, social and security challenges, with different mandates and a different array of partners and spoilers. Cookie-cutter or rigid template approaches will not, therefore, provide a short-cut to rapid and effective deployment.

Fourth, the complexity of post-conflict transitions means that our operations must advance concurrently on many tracks – political, humanitarian, development, human rights and security – often in high risk environments. Many of their tasks are peace
building, as much as peacekeeping, and so our integrated peace operations must be linked to longer term peacebuilding and development approaches. Addressing multiple, interdependent problems at the same time takes integrated programmes from within and beyond the UN system.

These realities present us with some difficult dilemmas. On the one hand, peacekeeping has been strengthened and we are working hard on many fronts to continue building its capacity and that of the rest of the UN system. On the other, demands are growing in scale and complexity, and resources are limited. Should UN peace operations work at the scale that is currently demanded? If so, are the resources available? And what more is needed to strengthen them? Or should UN peace operations focus on a more limited number of niche tasks? And if that, how else do we meet the whole range of needs on the ground?

The cases of Afghanistan and the DRC alone illustrate the nature of the crossroads at which we find ourselves. In Afghanistan, we faced a security challenge beyond the means available to the UN. In line with the recommendations of the Brahimi report, we responded by proposing to limit the scope of our mandate - albeit to a very important civilian assistance role. There were others willing and better equipped to assume responsibilities in the security sector. In the DRC, however, there has been no such alternative option. We therefore need a greater quantity of forces and increased capability if we are to achieve the basic security needed to support the transitional peace process.

And as demand increases, it is harder to find the quantity of resources needed to meet our mandates. Harder still, has been finding the quality we need in specific areas. From helicopter resources to strategic lift, from specialized police trainers to judicial mentors, we find that it is often not only a question of meeting the gross numbers of mandated personnel – though that is vital – but also a question of finding specific, high-demand resources. Increasingly it is clear that there is no substitute for these specialist capabilities.

All of this leads me to conclude that at least two areas are crying out to be addressed as a matter of priority in the coming year.

The first concerns the processes by which we get the right capabilities – the troops, the specialized components, the police, the civilians – on the ground in time to implement the mandates of peace operations.

The second relates to how these capabilities are best organized and deployed on the ground; how we integrate and rationalize the joint efforts of the UN system and the rest of the international community to assist the consolidation of a sustainable peace.
The generation of capabilities

Despite the winding down of significant UN commitments to Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste, the surge in peacekeeping activity over the past year has taken our total number of peacekeepers:

From 32,200 troops to 54,200
From 4,400 civilian police to 5,900
From 9,700 civilian staff to 11,600

The budget of our operations is approaching $3 billion a year. And this picture of current operations does not capture all the demands that are on the horizon. The field support structures in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations also support key non-peacekeeping field missions led by the Department of Political Affairs. The demand on the system’s machinery will continue to increase if the UN deploys further to Iraq, and perhaps Sudan.

Force Generation

Out of the 17 operations we are supporting on the ground, 5 have yet to reach their mandated troop strength.

The shortfall on the ground is of some 5400 troops, troops that are either pledged - but yet to deploy - or not yet available. We owe thanks to all our troop contributors for the great efforts made towards force generation that have given us a sizable proportion of the needed troops. I cannot name them all, but I want to note particularly some of those that have increased significantly their already large contributions, such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Ghana, Pakistan and South Africa.

However, the force generation picture is, overall, a mixed one. As I mentioned before, there are key gaps where we lack critical enabling and niche capabilities such as Maritime, Helicopter, Communications, Special Forces. Thus, our overall troop numbers do not reflect the difficulties we face finding the capabilities that can mean the difference between success and failure for an entire force structure.

Rapid deployment of our forces is also key. How can we ensure that, when the call comes, the personnel needed are available, ready to move, in a rapidly deployable, coherent and capable way? We need together to explore new options, to prepare the ground to avoid future shortfalls.

Our need to be able to call on and rapidly deploy coherent and capable military forces, with certainty, continues to confront us in the field. We need such forces to assist startup of new missions and to come to our assistance when existing missions are significantly challenged. The UN standby arrangements in their current form do not provide any such strategic reserve. We can foresee preparing, and maintaining in reserve,
pre-trained and equipped units, held within the command of troop contributing countries. With an arrangement allowing for their quick deployment to peacekeeping operations when needed, such reserve units could reliably and quickly be called for and brought into a peacekeeping force under UN command. Apart from providing reliable capacity, there are a number of benefits to such a strategic reserve concept that may not be immediately obvious. The mere existence of this sort of capacity can deter so-called spoilers in the first place. It would allow more certain risk management regarding the size of our missions. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss and work out the details of any such arrangement, including the financial and logistical requirements to maintain and eventually deploy such a reserve. But I would be grateful to have your initial views on such a concept. I believe it could represent an important advance in peacekeeping.

**Police**

In terms of generating our civilian police requirements, we have a similar picture, particularly in Francophone missions. With a total of 9,704 civilian police, including formed units, on the ground, we still need 960 - and all of them French-speakers. This is a real challenge, and I should mention the contributions of Francophone police made by Senegal and Cameroon, and the efforts of non-francophone countries such as Spain, Turkey and the United States to locate those skills in their police forces.

We also need to reconsider our overall approach to meeting police requirements. Lessons from past operations indicate that merely training police officers is not sufficient. There must be a sustainable law enforcement institution to support them and bolster the rule of law. Our civilian policing philosophy has evolved with mainly a bottom up approach, focusing on the individual local police officers. We need to augment this with what might be termed a top down approach, paying greater attention to helping local police institutions. While such an approach might require fewer civilian police, it would call for more highly qualified police officers and civilians - experts in such areas as policy and planning, police operations, police administration, budgets, personnel and logistics, intelligence and investigations.

We need to develop these specialist capacities. The “On Call” list system was supposed to address this need. It is not working very well, to be frank. We need therefore, to consider moving from unreliable standby arrangements to a small but reliable UN standing capacity on this front. We are therefore considering how we might establish a small body of professional civilian police staff, ready to plan, deploy and frame the strategies of mission civilian police components. I also look forward to your views on these issues.

**Civilian Personnel**

The critical backbone of all our peace operations are the civilian staff who ensure support to all components of the mission and help move peace process forward. We can
and will do a better job at identifying, selecting, and recruiting the range of civilian specialists that our missions need today. This will be a priority for DPKO in the coming year.

We need to attract, recruit and retain high quality staff. We look to you to help as well, in providing the conditions that will attract the best. We must remember the complexity and hardship of their work, as well as the increasing security challenges. It is has become imperative to review the conditions of service in the field. This starts with a change in the use of 100 and 300 series contracts in the field - the subject of a recent report by the Secretary-General.

The proposal, for which I request your support, is to use short term contracts for personnel engaged in time-limited activities while regular 100 series contracts should, as a rule, be offered to staff engaged for six months or longer in functions for which there is a continuing requirement.

**Mission support**

With respect to mission support, the Brahimi reforms have improved our capacity for rapid deployment, but those mechanisms too have been stretched by the surge in demands, and need to be recalibrated.

Pre-mandate commitment authority has proven a very effective tool to advance mission start-ups by funding the deployment of initial civilian and military personnel, the purchase of equipment and materiel not available in from our stocks. However, we may need to take another look at the level of resources available under the mechanism, since the funding can be rapidly exhausted when supporting larger missions.

The establishment of the Strategic Deployment Stocks in Brindisi has allowed the UN, perhaps for the first time, to provide the kind of logistical support required for rapid deployment, as we saw in the start-up of the mission in Liberia. While SDS works well for the first mission, additional missions have proved challenging. You will recall that SDS was only approved to support one complex mission at a time. Faced simultaneously establishing three new missions, the limits of these stocks have been strained. We may need to re-examine SDS levels, the mix of stocks, and replenishment mechanisms.

**Integration**

Distinguished Delegates,

I have mentioned some ways in which we can build upon the gains made since the Brahimi report, to augment the UN’s peacekeeping in light of new demands. I want to turn now to the nature of peacekeeping itself, and how DPKO works with the whole of the UN system.
Consider for a moment, the SRSGs who lead our missions in Afghanistan, the Congo, Haiti and Liberia, to name only a few. They are mandated to draw the entire UN family together, to integrate UN activities on the ground so that each plays a mutually supportive part, supporting the political processes, institutions and development needed on the path from conflict to peace.

The UN system at the headquarters level still has some way to go, if it is to offer those SRSGs a fully integrated advisory and support system. We have made some progress, from the first Integrated Mission Task Forces, to mission specific policy and operational teams, such as the integrated planning team for Sudan, but there is more to be done to integrate the planning, support and management of operations. We are working with our partners in the UN system and those outside, including regional organizations, to improve from the very beginning the integrated strategies we put in place.

At headquarters, DPKO cannot, and should not, duplicate capacities elsewhere. We have our core expertise, and we draw on other parts of the system to put together the expertise necessary to complete mission mandates. But where a DPKO led operation is deployed, drawing the whole system together is a central task. DPKO must serve to integrate. This task, in and of itself, requires expertise in key areas of coordination and dedicated resources. DPKO may need to restructure to play this role effectively, linking with specialized partners across the spectrum of planning, deployment and operational management. At the same time, our partners must be ready to operationalise their capabilities to the pace and scale required.

Not all of the challenges of integration lie in the hands of the UN Secretariat and its partners. We will need your help too. We continue to experience the inherent weakness of using rules and regulations designed for yesterday’s peacekeeping in today’s complex peace operations. One of the greatest of these challenges has been the discrepancy between the financing of different activities. Certain security activities are traditionally covered by assessed contributions while reconstruction or development activity must rely on voluntary contributions. Yet the success of a peace process depends on both. For example, peacekeeping budgets today will largely cover the disarmament and demobilization costs of former combatants but not activities designed to reintegrate them or the large numbers of women and girls associated with the fighting forces, back into society.

Remember too, that our missions deploy, supported by their assessed budgets, into the midst of societies left in extreme poverty and need. Our hosts see the personnel and the capabilities of the mission and naturally expect it will directly translate into improvements in their lives. But the voluntary budgets available for development programmes may be late in coming, and sometimes only a fraction of the mission budget. The result is obvious - failed expectations, and bitterness. This can even result in popular anger which can threaten the mission, and the men and women you put at the UNs service.
Perhaps true integration would mean that we would consider, as a whole, the resources available to a country, and apportion it accordingly. I don't wish to be mistaken, the assessed budget is a vital element of our work, but success in post conflict work depends upon how we address the totality of the needs on the ground. Ensuring the viability of reintegration, reconstruction and other so-called peacebuilding activities is necessarily an integral part of a peace and security strategy. DPKO is ready to play its part in the dialogue between the development agencies and member states on these matters, including in the context of ECOSOC.

Integration is also part of the answer to the challenge of security in the field. Even before the bombing of our Headquarters in Baghdad, there was a need to improve our security management. Over the past two years, in close coordination with UNSECOORD, DPKO has established specific policies and procedures, starting with a DPKO policy statement and security operating procedures for its field missions. These documents all carry the same message throughout peacekeeping; that is, security cannot be dissociated from operational activities. Security must not be viewed as a Mission stand-alone function or be narrowly defined. Rather, it has to be seen as an operational function that cuts across all military, civilian police and civilian activities, ranging from planning to contingency response, and, in this way, forms an integral part of mandate implementation. It is also an important goal for our missions to work effectively with our humanitarian, development and other partners in the field. This is increasingly important as we expand our operations. The sharing of information is key—our collective security depends on it. We cannot afford not to know the threats we collectively face.

It is for these reasons that DPKO has pursued, in full consultation with UNSECOORD and UN field agencies, the development of a unified integrated security management structure, with the sole responsibility for security management invested in a single UN official in-country. The unified security management structure is now operational in new missions. It is a more robust, more specialized, capability, using improved technologies in emergency communications, staff tracking and a DPKO-led security risk management process, which aims to provide users with a tool to undertake realistic risk assessments. Now, as you are aware, the Secretary-General has recently issued a report on A Strengthened and Unified Security Management System for the United Nations under a new Directorate of Security. If adopted, it will make important changes in how the UN system at large deals with security, at Headquarters and in the field.

Beyond the UN, we are working to integrate UN peace operations with the capacities of regional organizations. The UN has provided technical advice, equipment sustainability, and training to regional organizations in Africa, including the AU and ECOWAS, for example in planning for the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, and recent planning and support for the AU efforts in Darfur. We have shared our experience with the AU in a number of areas, such as the establishment of African Standby Force, and modalities for operation of the AU Military Staff Committee.
We are also engaged with the EU on a number of fronts, including how UN operations might link with the EU 'Battle Group' capacity that is being developed. It is important that this dialogue and exchange is developed and strengthened, so that the various mechanisms available to the international community can be brought together, with flexibility and efficiency, depending on the context.

**Conclusion**

Ladies and gentleman,

These are the crossroads at which we find ourselves today: significant capabilities have been developed, but increased demands at headquarters and in the field are straining the system, and still more innovation is needed if the instrument of UN peacekeeping is to meet, for the people in the countries where we are deployed, the full promise of our mandates. We must deploy with the credible capabilities, and the quantity of human resources that are required, and we must do it rapidly. We must link, through our operations, the expertise of the full range of the UN system and beyond, channeled through integrated strategies and operations to keep, consolidate and build peace in post-conflict societies.

As DPKO deploys and manages 17 operations spread around the world - with an extreme range of risk and complexity - the UN is today asked to operate on a scale that only this Organisation can. But if we are, together, to navigate the risks and realize the opportunities for success in each operation, we will need continue in our quest to ensure the necessary quantity and quality of resources, to deploy them rapidly enough and manage them efficiently, and to use the wide array of the UN system’s capabilities to full effect.

Thank you.

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Final -- Check Against Delivery

Opening Remarks of Mr. Jean Marie-Guéhenno
Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

31 January 2005

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to appear before this Committee again, now for the fourth time. I look forward to these sessions as an opportunity to exchange views with you on the future of UN peacekeeping and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which I am honoured to head.

The topics for discussion at this year’s session are clear, as laid out in the Secretary-General’s report. It should contain no surprises. We have also circulated a matrix summarizing the implementation status of all of the Committee’s previous recommendations that are not covered in the report.

I look forward to hearing your initial reactions, especially on the proposals to establish a standing civilian police capacity and a military strategic reserve force. These are two investments, in my view, that could help make UN peacekeeping operations more efficient, effective and therefore more cost-effective as well.

Too often we spend a great deal of effort and money making up for lost time and correcting mistakes committed at the outset of missions. But imagine if we were able to deploy, within 72 hours, 20 highly skilled police specialists, geographically and gender balanced, who had trained and worked together before, to plan and kick start UN police mandates? They could probably make more of an impact than 10 times their numbers of generalists, trickling in, piece-meal, over the course of several months.

And what if there was a predictable and rapid military response available to shore up a UN peacekeeping operation threatened by crises beyond its means to contain? The proposed UN strategic reserve force would be an important insurance policy for the substantial investments you make in complex peacekeeping operations. The certainty that a mission would be provided with swift additional help if seriously challenged could also deter potential spoilers.

I know that you have considerable interest in these proposals, but also questions and concerns. As there will be ample opportunity to discuss these and other important initiatives later in the week, I thought I would take advantage of this occasion to share my reflections with you on the big picture. What were the most important developments in
UN peacekeeping in 2004, and what might they imply for the year ahead? For me, three things stand out in particular, as follows:

- **First, there were many positive developments that may not be on everyone’s radar screen.** Several missions have met or exceeded expectations, and a few are preparing to actually wind-down, having successfully completed their mandates. A substantial number of the reforms proposed in the Brahimi Report, and supported by you, have been implemented and have improved the way we plan and deploy UN peacekeeping and related operations. We continue to get better at what we do. Your investments over the past four years have paid off. They will continue to yield dividends in the years to come.

- **Second, I am nevertheless concerned about taking on too much and spreading ourselves too thin.** Despite the successes and the depth of reform that has taken place, several missions are operating in volatile and precarious environments. They need to be bolstered and supported, in order to achieve their mandated objectives. There are also many reforms that still need to be consolidated. And, there are complex strategic dilemmas about the direction UN peacekeeping should take over the next five to ten years, the implications of which have yet to be fully thought through, let alone reconciled. For these, among other reasons I will explain a bit later, I sincerely hope that the Organization will not be required to deploy any new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is already on our plate or in the pipe-line.

- **Third, allegations that MONUC personnel have sexually exploited and abused Congolese is cause for serious concern.** Just as the catastrophic failure of any one operation could irreparably erode public confidence in UN peacekeeping, so, too, could acts of gross misconduct, if we do not respond to them with the utmost seriousness in 2005. We have a real substantive problem, not just a PR issue that needs to be “spun”. We have to deal with it collectively, aggressively and quickly. And, we must prevent it from happening elsewhere.

I will elaborate on each of these three points.

**Point 1. The good news is that investments and reforms are paying off.**

In many respects, 2004 has been a very good year for UN peace operations. Long-term efforts are bearing fruit in a number of locations previously considered irreparable, for example:

- in Timor-Leste, the UN is successfully winding down its mandate to assist in creating the sustainable institutions of a viable and independent democratic state;
in Sierra Leone, a democratically elected government, while still consolidating a fragile situation, is in the process of taking over responsibility for security from the UN mission. Prior to the mission's arrival, over five years ago, the country was fractured and engulfed in bloody and vicious warfare;

the UN mission in Afghanistan started the year by successfully supporting the Afghan Constitutional Loya Jirga as it approved a new constitution, and in October, UNAMA played an instrumental role in helping Afghans – including millions of women – to democratically elect and install Hamid Karzai as their President;

in Liberia, over a decade of war has come to an end and the country, a founding member of the UN, is experiencing a measure of stability that its younger generations have never known;

and, the UN operation in Burundi deployed swiftly and established its credibility from day one as a critical component of promoting peace in the country.

The reforms at Headquarters initiated in 2001 also are paying off in how we generate forces, deploy and sustain them. If not for the investments you made a few years ago, we would not have been able to meet the dramatic surge in activity in 2004. Today, the 17 UN peace operations managed by DPKO comprise over 75,000 military, civilian police and civilian personnel, compared to 55,000 this time last year. That represents a net increase of over 35 percent.

In total, 120,000 military and civilian police personnel, drawn from over 100 countries, rotated through our missions in 2004. We generated resources, deployed and sustained them, this time around, in a manner that no other organization in the world could replicate as efficiently or as cost-effectively. This has entailed making skillful use of 127 systems contracts, aggressively deploying Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), negotiating over 300 Memoranda of Understanding with Member States, and conducting in-depth evaluations and inspections. We chartered 319 aircraft and 52 ships, and currently operate an aircraft fleet comprising 57 fixed-wing and 114 rotary-wing aircraft – a 50% increase in 2004. We transported 580,000 passengers and 470,000 metric tones of cargo-in over 90,000 flight hours. We currently operate 14 military hospitals and 120 clinics, operate over 4,000 generators with a total capacity of 300 MW, enough to supply power to 200,000 homes – one third of Long Island, NY. You will no doubt appreciate that much of this activity was achieved in areas with little or no infrastructure at all.

New missions deployed with force packages that took into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report and the painful lessons of the 1990s. They arrived with close air support assets (i.e. attack helicopters), quick response forces and formed police units capable of responding to civil unrest without resorting to lethal force. This shift in our posture has already paid off. In Liberia and Haiti, for example, UN
forces were tested and proved equal to the task, helping to restore order in Monrovia and working with local law enforcement to improve security in Port-au-Prince.

The way we plan new operations has also undergone a positive transformation. DPKO planners have been present at key moments in the peace talks on Sudan. In some instances they have been able to advise on the feasibility of security provisions. They have been able to conduct planning on the basis of first hand knowledge of the negotiations. Concurrently, an advance mission was established in situ, thereby ensuring that the core of the mission’s headquarters would already be on the ground once the anticipated full-scale deployment began. And, at Headquarters, our Sudan Team in the Office of Operations has guided a truly inclusive planning process along the lines recommended by the Brahimi Report and articulated in the Integrated Mission Planning Process template. These reforms should not be over-looked, even if the tragic developments in Darfur, and the parties’ own sensitivities vis-à-vis the force composition, have greatly complicated efforts.

As you can see, a great deal has been accomplished in 2004. Of course, none of this would have been possible without the contribution of troops, civilian police, financial assistance and political support from you, the Member States. In a world in which the commitment to work together for the common good is not always clear, your continued investment in UN peacekeeping represents just that. I can sincerely say that, in many countries recovering from war, that investment has been worth it. Millions of some of the world’s most vulnerable populations now have a real chance for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future.

The second point I want to stress is that we should now consolidate the successes and reforms, instead of growing too fast or spreading ourselves too thin.

Despite the good news, there should be no illusions. The road ahead in Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Haiti, the DRC, and Cote D’Ivoire will be perilous. Political processes we are concurrently managing in Kosovo, Eritrea/Ethiopia, and Georgia remain extremely complex and sensitive. Add to these 9 very fluid cases, several other more predictable yet important operations, and the imminent deployment of a complex operation to Sudan, Africa’s largest country. We will have our hands full.

Moreover, we are not resourced or structured to keep launching one new mission after another, while keeping the reform effort on track. During the deliberations on the Brahimi Report, we asked you how many new complex operations we should be prepared to launch in any given year. You indicated one. Yet, we had to launch three in quick succession – in Burundi, Haiti, and Cote D’Ivoire – in the first half of 2004 alone, virtually on the heels of deploying our largest operation to Liberia, at the end of 2003. The expansion and restructuring of MONUC in 2004 might be added to the list, insofar as it has been as complicated and labour intensive as establishing a new operation.

The numbers I mentioned earlier are impressive, but they come at a cost. I am certain that there would be more consistency in the quality of people we recruit, if we
were not overwhelmed by the sheer quantitative demands. I am also convinced that we would have done demonstrably better in preparing our people to do their jobs, if we had had to launch only one new operation in 2004, rather than three and half.

The *sui generis* nature of each undertaking is a given. That should not, however, mean that each operation should be launched as if it were the first. We have learned a great deal about some practices and procedures that should be standard features of any operation. Yet, this was not fully reflected in the new missions established in 2004.

We are still facing difficulties to put together quickly the right mission leadership teams and to provide them with the type of standardized induction and orientation that they deserve. Quick and transparent recruitment of niche expertise, as opposed to generalists, remains a serious challenge. So, too, is the rewarding of our best performers and the weeding out of the poorer ones. And, there is still a paucity of guidance documents, in the form of updated manuals, SOPs and specific training programmes to help personnel who are new to the UN not only to hit the ground running, but also to ensure they are pointed in the right direction.

The qualitative challenge is as daunting as the quantitative one. The operations now in existence range from complex transitional administration of territories to small “traditional” observation and monitoring missions. Some are primarily comprised of civilians deployed along a “light foot-print” model with regional and bilateral arrangements providing security; others are fairly “heavy-deployments”, with the UN taking on the full range of military peacekeeping, “police-keeping” and peace-building responsibilities. It is no wonder that there is some confusion about what distinguishes a “peacekeeping operation” from a “peace operation” or an “assistance mission”, or for that matter why DPKO is not called DPO, i.e. “the Department of Peace Operations”.

Furthermore, the Department not only manages its own operations, but also provides services and support to an almost equal number of operations and offices managed by others, principally DPA, including the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq. And now, with Darfur, we are providing some support for an operation run by the African Union. Is this a trend you expect to continue?

More generally, what kind of operations and services, and how many, will the department be called upon to manage over the next five to ten years? The answer to this question will set the strategic direction for the department. It needs to be thought through carefully with you, the Member States, and with our partners in the UN system and in regional organizations, within the broader context of the deliberation on the recommendations of the High Level Panel. As the report before you indicates, getting the relationships right with our partners inside and outside the UN system remains a strategic priority for us this year.

In summary, we need to reflect on the strategic direction of the department, consolidate the reform effort, make Sudan a model deployment, and give proper attention
and support to existing operations, at least 9 of which are extremely active, operationally challenging and politically complex. That is a fairly tall order for 2005.

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not making a pitch for another 50 percent increase in resources for DPKO, as was provided through the "Brahimi process". Our current management structure is not designed or equipped to absorb such an increase effectively. We will be seeking less than a 10 percent increase in the next support account submission, because we believe that is the minimum required to handle the dramatic increase in work-load, while ensuring that each post is properly justified and can be put to good use.

In any event, limitless growth is not a smart business model in any field, and especially not in ours where humility should be the rule. Surely, one of lessons of the 1990s is that the UN was asked to take on too many peacekeeping operations, with too few resources, in too many places where they did not necessarily belong. Let's not repeat history.

There comes a point when the demands exceed your ability to get the job done properly, while concurrently putting in place in the reforms necessary to make sure that we do it even better down the road. As we experienced in 2004, as in the early 1990s, it is difficult to run and tie your shoe-laces at the same time. But, if you do not tie those laces, there is a danger that you will trip and fall. I want to avoid that. I want us to take care of the loose ends, before we push our luck by taking on additional new complex operations in 2005, beyond Sudan. I would rather use whatever breathing space and time we can steal, to clarify our strategic direction and invest in the reforms needed to improve the performance of missions that may need to be established in 2006 and 2007.

The third point I want to make is about the allegations of MONUC personnel sexual exploiting and abusing Congolese

This is more than a loose end. It is more than a minor setback. Let me be clear. If we do not tackle this problem as one of our highest priorities in 2005, then the damage to the image and reputation of UN peacekeeping could be irreparable. The multi-lateral system is under strain at the moment, and its capacity to absorb bad news is weak.

The report before you explains the nature of the problem and the immediate steps we are taking to address it. Some issues bear elaboration.

Scores of MONUC personnel, in all categories, are alleged to have solicited prostitutes. The term "prostitution", incidentally, can mask the exploitative nature of the dynamic. In many cases in the DRC, the so-called sex workers have been paid scraps of food, and have been girls as young as 13 and 14 years of age. And, in several cases, the allegations are of an obvious criminal nature, involving rape, including of children.

Regardless of one's moral or philosophical views on prostitution, the fact is that the Secretary-General's October 2003 Bulletin on Special Protection from Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets, and MONUC's Code of Conduct are clear on this issue. Any exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex is strictly prohibited. Furthermore, any type of sexual activities with persons under the age of 18 years is prohibited. Mistaken belief in the age of a child is not a defense or an excuse. Where substantiated, these acts warrant summary dismissal in the case of civilian staff, and repatriation and subsequent disciplinary action by Member States for military and civilian police personnel. Where crimes have been committed – whether by civilians or uniformed personnel – it is incumbent upon Member States to ensure that their nationals are brought to justice. The UN, as you know, has no means or authority to do so.

Never before in the history of the United Nations have we witnessed allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in this order of magnitude. And, never before has the UN investigated them as intensively as it is now doing.

One civilian staff member is now in jail in his home country facing charges. Another is no longer in the employ of the Organization. Twenty detailed reports involving allegations against military personnel have been transmitted to the Member States concerned for action, as a result of OIOS investigations in Bunia. More reports from elsewhere will follow. ASG Angela Kane is leading a special team now in the DRC to conduct investigations into all outstanding allegations. ASG Jane Holl Lute is leading a Task Force here at Headquarters to ensure a coordinated intra- and inter-departmental response to this crisis.

And, HRH Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, graciously accepted to serve as the Secretary-General’s Adviser on this issue. As you know, Prince Zeid has been helping us to ensure that the concerns of the membership, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) in particular, factor into all facets of our response, as we develop a plan of action to prevent the reoccurrence of these despicable acts.

A problem has been identified and we are taking aggressive action. The road ahead, however, will not be easy.

It is, quite frankly, hard to believe that scores of allegations can emerge without being illustrative of a wide-spread problem. We do not know how many cases are going unreported, whether in MONUC or elsewhere. In all likelihood, peacekeepers have committed acts of sexual exploitation and abuse in other missions throughout the past decade, but the vast majority has not been formally reported to Headquarters. It is now apparent that neither you nor we have been aggressive enough to search for and expose these cases. That new allegations came to light in DRC, even after the OIOS investigation was launched, makes it patently obvious that some peacekeepers even still have not gotten the message.

We need your help to send the right message to them, by taking swift action where clearly warranted, while respecting due process and the presumption of innocence.
before guilt is proven. We need your help to address obvious shortcomings in our investigative capacities. Proving sex crimes is one of the most difficult prosecutorial challenges for even the most sophisticated criminal justice systems let alone for peacekeeping operations, which, at present, are woefully ill-equipped to investigate them. And, we need your help to make significant improvements in prevention measures.

The public relations dimensions of this problem are secondary. The most important priority is for us to collectively tackle this issue, substantively. We simply cannot abide by the vulnerable being victimized by even one peacekeeper sent to protect them. We need to do the right thing, even if that means exposing further weaknesses in the system in the short-term.

That is why we have taken several measures that are described in the report before you. It is also why we are proposing in our next Support Account submission to establish a dedicated unit, in my office, headed at the D-1 level to deal with all forms of personnel misconduct including sexual exploitation and abuse.

But these measures will not be enough. A drastic overhaul of the system is required. In the report before you, the Secretary-General indicates that he would be willing to put bold, imaginative and creative ideas on the table for you to consider, very quickly, building on the excellent work of Prince Zeid. I sincerely hope that you will take him up on the offer. The Secretariat cannot solve this problem on its own. We need your support and full cooperation.

Concluding remarks

I have spoken at length on this subject because it greatly pains me to know that it is an ugly stain on a remarkable record of achievement in 2004.

Thousands of peacekeepers risked their lives, braved violent and desperate conditions, put their personal obligations to family and friends on hold, in order to bring peace to war-torn countries. It is ultimately thanks to their professionalism, bravery and sacrifice that the successes I mentioned earlier could be achieved. That includes the ultimate sacrifice that over 100 of our fallen peacekeepers made in 2004. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to their memory and to reiterate the debt of gratitude the international community owes to them and to the Member States from which they come. Member States contributing the largest numbers of troops and civilian police, in particular, deserve to be thanked rather than have their national honor impugned by the gross misconduct of a minority, whether from within or outside their ranks. The vast majority of them perform their duties with great distinction. It is and should be a source of pride for all of us.

When I said earlier that 2004 has been a very good year for peacekeeping, I sincerely meant it. In order for 2005 to even better, we have to attend to unfinished business. Prudence and bitter-experience dictates that we should get the jobs done and
invest in the future, before we take on more responsibilities. It will be up to the Security Council, of course, to determine if, in 2005, prudence is a luxury we can or cannot afford.

UN peacekeeping is not always the right solution for a post-conflict situation. But, in order for UN peacekeeping to be a viable option among a variety of tools, it requires constant reform, retooling and investment. That is what the report before you is ultimately about. The senior management team in DPKO looks forward to fleshing out these proposals with you during this session, and throughout 2005.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word about our senior management team.

Kiran Bedi is ending her two-year tour of duty as the Police Adviser in DPKO, in order to return home to national service. The Civilian Police Division, under Ms. Bedi, has had to generate and deploy 14,000 civilian police officers to 15 missions during her tenure. This includes 2,000 for francophone missions, which has been extremely challenging. The Division has done an admirable job under her leadership and I thank her for the tremendous energy and dedication she brought to the task, and the government of India for making her services available to us. We wish her the very best in her career.

All of you now know well Major-General Patrick Cammaert. He has ably led the Military Division over the past two years. I am especially grateful for the military advice he has provided to me and the department, during a period of tremendous surge. Fortunately, we will not be losing General Cammaert’s experience, but rather applying it to one of our most challenging missions. As you know, the Secretary-General has asked him to serve as Division Commander of UN forces in the eastern DRC. He has already left New York and regrets that he could not be here with us today. We are grateful to the Netherlands for continuing to make his services available to the UN.

Just as I have been committed to having DPKO staff rotate to the field, so, too, have I been keen to bring field-tested veterans to Headquarters. I am therefore pleased to announce that both the new Military and Police Advisers have served with great distinction in UN peacekeeping operations.

The new Military Adviser, Major-General Randhir Kumar Mehta of India proved his dynamic leadership and planning capabilities as Sector Commander in UNAMSIL, helping pull the mission back from the brink of disaster in the wake of the May 2000 crisis.

The new Police Adviser, Mark Kroeker of the United States, arrives fresh from his assignment as Police Commissioner in the UN Mission in Liberia. This is his second tour of duty for the UN. He previously served as Deputy Police Commissioner of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both assignments, he has demonstrated his intimate understanding of what it takes to build responsible and accountable police services in countries recovering from war.
There will also be a change in the leadership of the UN Mine Action Service. We are actively looking now for a successor to Martin Barber, who is retiring in a few months time. His shoes will not be easy to fill. Relying on decades of experience, from headquarters and the field, Martin has put UNMAS on the map as one of the most innovative and effective parts of the UN system. He earned the respect and trust of UN agencies and donors alike. I am very grateful for the contribution he has made and will sorely miss his wise counsel. We will be looking to fill the position with yet another field-tested and seasoned veteran.

I am sure that the new DPKO senior management team in 2005 will bring great dynamism and experience to bear, as we seek to strengthen UN peacekeeping in the years ahead. I know I can count on your support to all of them. We now look forward to listening carefully to your statements.

Thank you.