I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2692 (2023), by which the Council decided to extend until 15 July 2024 the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), in accordance with resolution 2476 (2019) establishing BINUH. The report includes developments since the previous report, dated 15 January 2024 (S/2024/62), and provides an update on the implementation of the BINUH mandate.

II. Political issues and good governance

2. Coordinated gang attacks against State institutions, critical infrastructure and other symbols of State authority in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince posed major challenges to political stability and governance during the reporting period. Despite facing major difficulties, the Haitian National Police have continued to conduct anti-gang operations to repel attacks. In February, pressure mounted on the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, to take action on security and elections. From 5 to 7 February, anti-Government protests, some of which turned violent, took place in Port-au-Prince and in other cities to call for the resignation of the Prime Minister. Protesters criticized the inability of the Government to restore security as well as to facilitate a transition to a democratically elected president within the time frame outlined in the 21 December 2022 agreement. Addressing the nation on 7 February, the Prime Minister called for calm, and reaffirmed the commitment of the Government to organize elections and enhance security. Some opposition groups rejected the calls for calm by the Prime Minister and insisted on his immediate resignation. The signatories of the 21 December agreement called upon stakeholders to reconvene for consultations, reach consensus on establishing a national unity Government, and delineate a road map towards elections.

3. At the forty-sixth regular meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in Georgetown, which was held from 25 to 28 February, a statement was issued expressing concern over the deteriorating situation in Haiti, following a meeting with Prime Minister Henry focused on Haiti. It was noted in the statement, inter alia, the commitment made by Prime Minister Henry to move the political process forward, including the holding of general elections to restore the constitutional Government and authority, no later than
31 August 2025. The Heads of Government further stated that, to this end, CARICOM would dispatch an electoral needs gap assessment team by 31 March 2024, in consultation with the United Nations and in line with existing Security Council mandates, with the support of Canada and the United States of America, and the Organization of American States (OAS), to support the planning and efforts of the relevant Haitian institutions to be established.

4. Following the CARICOM meeting, Prime Minister Henry travelled to Nairobi, at the invitation of the President, William Ruto. During the visit, a memorandum of understanding was signed to facilitate the future deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti. As Prime Minister Henry was attempting to return to Haiti on 3 March, coordinated gang attacks on critical state infrastructure intensified, including on the national penitentiary and police stations. On 3 March, the Minister of Finance, Patrick Boisvert, serving as acting Prime Minister, declared a state of emergency, which remains in effect. On 4 March, international flights to Port-au-Prince were cancelled following an attempt to seize control of the Toussaint Louverture International Airport. The same day, the Prime Minister’s chartered flight was diverted from Port-au-Prince to Puerto Rico.

5. On 11 March, Prime Minister Henry announced in a video address that he would leave office once transitional governance arrangements are put in place. On the same day, CARICOM convened a meeting in Kingston, to continue efforts to facilitate a Haitian-owned and Haitian-led vision on transitional governance arrangements. The CARICOM meeting, attended by several international partners and with the virtual participation of Haitian stakeholders, resulted in an outcome statement that announced two key commitments: all parties agreed to establish a transitional governance arrangement that would facilitate a peaceful transition of power through free, fair, credible, inclusive and participatory elections; and Prime Minister Henry committed to stepping down after the formation of the Transitional Presidential Council and the naming of an interim Prime Minister. The Council would be composed of seven voting members, representing diverse political groups (Collectif, 21 December, Engagés pour le Développement/Résistance Démocratique, Compromis historique, Lavalas, Montana, Pitit Desalin) and the private sector, and two non-voting members representing civil society and interfaith communities. The outcome declaration also specified a number of presidential powers to be conferred to the Council, including to select and appoint the interim Prime Minister and, together with the latter, appoint an inclusive Council of Ministers, establish a provisional electoral council and a national security council, and collaborate with the international community to accelerate the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti. On 12 March, the Government of Kenya announced that it would suspend preparations for deploying 1,000 police officers to the Mission to Haiti until a sitting authority was in place.

6. Following some delays, CARICOM received the nominations for the members of the Council. The inter-Haitian dialogue has continued to function remotely, with all in-person meetings and round tables temporarily suspended owing to the prevailing security situation. Nominees held a first meeting with CARICOM facilitators on 22 March and met with international partners to discuss security matters on 24 March. Discussions have focused on voting procedures, the election of the President of the Council and the criteria for the selection of a new Prime Minister.

7. During CARICOM-facilitated discussions on the formation of the Transitional Presidential Council throughout March, there were a number of changes in the nominees designated by the various groups of stakeholders, including the Engagés pour le Développement/Résistance Démocratique coalition, interfaith organizations and civil society. In addition, on 20 March, the political party Pitit Desalin announced its decision to designate its own representative in the seven-member Transitional
President Council, despite having initially rejected the process. On 24 March, the second nominee from the Engagés pour le Développement/Résistance Démocratique coalition, stepped down, saying she had been the victim of political attacks, misogynistic comments and death threats. Those developments, as well as the limited representation of women in the new governance arrangements, elicited some criticism among stakeholders who expressed concerns over the challenges and the perceived delay affecting the establishment of the Council. In the same vein, various political and civil society figures called for the designation of a judge from the Court de Cassation as transitional president, thus partially mirroring a procedure enshrined in article 149 of the 1987 (non-revised) Haitian constitution, which provided the highest judicial instance with the authority to fill a presidential vacancy (upon ad hoc investiture by the National Assembly).

8. On 1 April, the Government issued a statement informing that, on 29 March, Prime Minister Henry had received the names of the nine persons selected for the Transitional Presidential Council, from the President of Guyana and Chair of CARICOM, Mohamed Irfaan Ali. The Council of Ministers was also convened on 1 April to discuss the procedure to establish the Transitional Presidential Council and to appoint its members. On 4 April, stakeholder groups that designated representatives to the Transitional Presidential Council signed a political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition. On 12 April, a decree formally establishing the Transitional Presidential Council was published in the official gazette. The political agreement outlines security, constitutional reform, and elections as the key priorities of the transition. According to the agreement, the Transitional Presidential Council, whose mandate will end by 7 February 2026, with the objective of handing over power to democratically elected authorities, is expected to designate a Prime Minister, form a Government in consultation with the latter, and establish a provisional electoral council within 60 days from the formation of an executive.

9. On 19 March and on 6 April, one of the designated members of the Transitional Presidential Council told media that the challenging security situation in Port-au-Prince should be taken into account in the formation and subsequent establishment of the Council, noting that its members would require close security protection support.

10. BINUH continued to engage stakeholders from across the spectrum using remote platforms. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti continued her outreach to national stakeholders to promote dialogue. On 29 February, BINUH supported a conference on women’s leadership to promote the participation of women in national security discussions. At the event, participants launched an appeal for the rapid deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission. On 1 March, BINUH organized a forum for young leaders aimed at integrating their insights into the political process. The young leaders delivered a set of proposals for the development of a cooperation framework between political parties and civil society, as well as elements for inclusion in a constitutional reform.

III. **Violence reduction**

11. During the reporting period there was a profound shift in gang dynamics, tactics and objectives. An apparent alliance among the main gangs has enabled coordinated attacks against State authority, at a level not seen before, to force the resignation of Prime Minister Henry.

12. Beginning on 29 February, gangs launched a wave of simultaneous attacks against strategic State infrastructure, as well as private businesses and residences across the capital, including the national palace, police stations, prisons, hospitals, the National Library and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Gang leaders
claimed the attacks were aimed at preventing the return of the Prime Minister from his trip abroad and also targeted other Cabinet ministers. State infrastructure and private premises have suffered extensive looting and vandalism.

13. On 2 and 3 March, gangs led planned attacks against the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince and the prison in Croix-des-Bouquets. Over 4,600 detainees, out of 4,700 escaped, some of whom were gang members. Authorities reported that some escapees subsequently joined the gangs. Gangs attacked at least 22 police stations and destroyed a dozen police vehicles, including an armoured vehicle. In total, seven police officers were killed and at least four were injured. These attacks aimed to reduce the ability of the national police to respond effectively to multiple simultaneous gang attacks. On 3 March, the Government declared a state of emergency across the West Department, with support from the Armed Forces of Haiti, and imposed a daily curfew throughout the country from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m., which was subsequently renewed to 10 April. On 18 March, the public electricity company in Haiti reported that gangs had destroyed more than four substations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Gangs continue to carry out attacks against both cargo ships and passenger boats, posing further difficulties to travel from Port-au-Prince to other regions of the country.

14. Gangs publicly claimed the attacks on State infrastructure, threatening to overthrow the whole system, civil war and genocide, unless the Prime Minister resigned. Gang threats continued against political actors taking part in the process to establish the Transitional Presidential Council. On 11 March, in a message circulated on social media, gangs threatened to storm hotels in Port-au-Prince, where political actors regularly meet and stay.

15. In this context, the number of intentional homicides rose significantly, forcing thousands of people to abandon their homes in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Between 1 January and 29 February, BINUH recorded 1,312 intentional homicides, including 190 women, 4 girls and 21 boys, compared with 995 victims during the previous two-month period (November–December 2023). The number of abductions rose to at least 504 victims, including 294 women, 11 girls and 9 boys compared with the 370 victims recorded over the previous two-month period in 2023 (November–December 2023). The main perpetrators continue to be the gang members operating in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department. In the meantime, killings by vigilante or so-called “self-defense” groups and individuals have continued, with at least 27 alleged gang members slain between 1 January and 29 February.

16. On 12 March, the interministerial and interinstitutional task force dedicated to implementing the national strategy for disarmament, disengagement, reintegration and community violence reduction submitted a revised draft law on weapons and ammunition management to the Minister of Justice and Public Security. Drafted with support from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and BINUH, the revision aims to align Haiti’s legal framework with international standards. The document covers various aspects of firearms management, including marking, tracing, transport, storage, destruction protocols and import/export rules. The submission marks a crucial step forward after two years of work to strengthen legal frameworks and regulations surrounding weapons and ammunition management in the country.

17. On 13 February, authorities in Haiti and the United States signed a memorandum of cooperation to formally establish the Transnational Criminal Investigation Unit in Haiti. The new entity is intended to help to streamline the flow of information among law enforcement agencies in Haiti and the United States, thereby bolstering investigative and prosecutorial capacities against transnational criminal activities.
IV. Security and the rule of law

Police

18. The Haitian National Police remains the last visible institution standing against gang violence. In response to the relentless gang attacks against its infrastructure and personnel, the national police continue to protect critical and strategic locations, including the National Palace, the Central Bank of Haiti and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, and have resumed operations to regain control of some parts of the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area. Meanwhile, the graduation on 11 March of 786 new police cadets, including 112 women, from the thirty-third class contributed to offsetting the high rates of attrition among police officers. As at 31 March, the national police stood at 13,893 officers, including 1,686 women. Of them, 1,560 officers, including 167 women, are inactive, Preparations are also under way to ensure that an additional 900 recruits of the thirty-fourth class will be ready to commence fast-track basic training in May 2024, with a view to graduating around 1,600 police officers in 2024.

19. On 30 January, the Prime Minister attended the first meeting of the steering committee of the joint programme to support the professionalization of the national police, also known as the basket fund for police. Committee members agreed to extend the programme by 24 months to complete the remaining police station rehabilitation and construction activities, and to make necessary adjustments based on available funds and new priorities set by the Haitian National Police. The basket fund managed by the UNDP has received $25.7 million out of the budgeted amount of $28 million, leaving a balance of $2.3 million yet to be mobilized. With the support of bilateral international partners and the Standing Police Capacity of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, capacity-building sessions were held between January and March, covering, among others, the strategic planning and budgetary process, investigations and intelligence.

20. BINUH continues to coordinate with the national police, humanitarian actors, and international partners, to ensure effective coordination with the anticipated Multinational Security Support Mission. The national police high command and the Minister of Justice and Public Security participated in a second planning conference held in Washington D.C., on 12 and 13 February to finalize planning documents for the Mission. On the sidelines of the Group of 20 Ministerial Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 22 February, several Member States pledged new financial contributions to support the future deployment of the Mission, and Benin announced plans to contribute at least 1,500 personnel to the Kenyan-led multinational mission.

Corrections

21. The national authorities were unable to adequately respond when a coordinated assault involving multiple gangs, equipped with a drone, stormed the two main prisons in Port-au-Prince on 2 March. Both prisons are located in high-risk areas. As a result, more than 4,600 detainees escaped. The inadequate security, untrained personnel and ineffective protection systems of these prisons highlight the difficulties historically faced by prisons in Haiti. On 30 January, gangs significantly damaged the Cabaret women’s prison, which had been evacuated in May 2023 to other detention facilities, owing to serious security concerns following repeated attempted attacks by gangs.

22. Three prisons in Haiti, the Port-au-Prince National Penitentiary, Croix-des-Bouquets prison and Cabaret women’s prison, are presently non-operational as a result of gang attacks. Following the major prison breaks, as at 3 April prisons in Haiti host 7,296 inmates, including 387 women, 233 boys, and 15 girls. The territorial expansion
of gangs and the security decline in Port-au-Prince pose logistical hurdles for prisons, impacting supply delivery, staff accessibility and raising risks of attacks and riots. To prevent further gang attacks, the prison administration has implemented security measures to reinforce the safety of the 16 remaining operational prisons and reallocate personnel from the affected prisons to the other facilities. BINUH is currently exploring areas of cooperation with relevant international stakeholders to relaunch efforts to comprehensively support the penitentiary system in Haiti to tackle this long-standing, chronic crisis, which has been amplified by the recent wave of gang attacks.

Justice

23. Several former high-ranking government officials, including two ex-presidents and ex-prime ministers, have been subpoenaed by an investigative judge of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance for alleged complicity related to misappropriation of public assets. The issuance of these subpoenas followed the publication of Anti-Corruption Unit reports on 15 November 2023, which alleged that a number of corruption cases occurred in several public institutions. Some suspects were heard by the judge, while those who failed to respond were issued warrants. A former parliamentary head and leader of the political party Alliance pour une société sans exclusion was arrested and detained on 22 January for his alleged involvement in the case. Several civil society and human rights organizations, including Ensemble Contre la Corruption and Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains, criticized the judge’s decisions as illegal.

24. On 25 January, the investigative judge rendered the final order regarding the assassination of former President Jovenel Moïse. The order referred 51 accused persons, including the widow of former President Moïse and a former Prime Minister, to the Criminal Court to stand trial for criminal conspiracy, armed robbery, terrorism, assassination and complicity in the assassination. On 5 April, the Port-au-Prince Public Prosecutor informed BINUH that a number of those accused had lodged an appeal.

25. On 2 February, the Superior Council of the Judiciary completed the vetting of 60 magistrate files from the Commission Technique de Certification, certifying 30, rejecting 12 for integrity issues and returning 18 for further examination. Investigations were facilitated through logistic support from the Programme d’appui a la justice et la lutte contre l’impunité of UNDP. On 29 January, the Ministry of Justice assigned 10 judges to various jurisdictions, aiming to alleviate court staffing issues.

26. On 29 February, BINUH, in cooperation with the United Nations Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity, convened representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Court of First Instance and Public Prosecution of Port-au-Prince, the National Police, the Penitentiary Administration, the Bar Association, the national human rights institution, the National Council for Legal Aid, and members of civil society to discuss the role of Haiti’s justice and penitentiary systems in addressing the potential impacts of a Multinational Security Support Mission. Participants stressed the immediate need for solutions to address infrastructure challenges in judiciary and penitentiary systems during and prior to the Mission’s deployment. Recommendations encompassed reclaiming illegally occupied facilities, boosting logistical capabilities, alleviating overcrowding, and tackling prolonged pretrial detention. Reparations for victims of sexual violence and accountability for human rights violations was also emphasized.

27. The strike by court clerks, which began on 12 December to demand better working conditions, continues despite a memorandum from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security on 9 January urging the clerks, bailiffs and other support staff to return to work while the formalities to address their demands are finalized. As the
strike paralyzes the operations of courts in various jurisdictions in the country, BINUH continued to encourage national authorities to ensure that the issue is addressed in order to preserve the momentum in the ongoing efforts to reduce prolonged pretrial detention.

28. On 16 February, UNDP organized a workshop to launch the gender-based violence model jurisdiction. More than 40 participants took part, including representatives of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the Ministry of Justice, Judges Associations, the national police, the Bar Association, the national human rights institution, the National Council for Legal Aid, BINUH, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), and members of civil society.

29. Other training sessions also took place in the month of February; for example, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), with UNDP and in cooperation with the Magistrates School, trained magistrates on identifying and prosecuting corruption offences. Investigators from the Anti-Corruption Unit received training on anti-corruption and financial investigations. UNODC, with UNDP, also supported the Annual Asset Declaration Day on 29 February, aiding officials in completing forms to avoid any misinterpretations, inform the target audience about the consequences of neglecting such an obligation and make the completion of this formality easier for the asset declaration subjects in accordance with the legal framework.

V. Human rights

30. Human rights abuses committed by gangs and self-defence groups have reached unprecedented levels. Targeted killings, collective rapes, kidnappings, the recruitment and use of children and extortion of businesses and commuters were some of the tactics employed by gangs to consolidate control over strategic areas. These tactics also hindered rule of law institutions, especially in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite. Additional abuses were reported in Belladère, Hinche, Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau. State actors were also implicated in human rights violations during nationwide anti-Government protests, mainly in the context of confrontations between protesters and police.

31. Between 1 January and 31 March, 1,660 persons (1,347 men, 273 women and 40 children) were killed, and another 845 (624 men, 179 women and 42 children) were injured by gang violence. This represents a 53 per cent increase compared with the previous reporting period, making the first three months of 2024 the most violent period since BINUH established its human rights monitoring mechanism in early 2022. The majority of those killed and injured were struck by bullets during gang clashes or in targeted attacks launched by gangs against the population to create panic and suppress the. Casualties also occurred during police-led anti-gang operations and crowd control efforts during anti-Government protests.

32. The first months of the year saw a spike in extremely violent clashes between the two main gang coalitions resulting, in some instances, in the mass killing of local populations, such as those that took place in La Saline and Solino, in the Port-au-Prince commune, in Belekou, Brooklyn, Drouillard and Pierre VI, in the Cité Soleil commune, and in the neighbourhoods located in the Delmas commune. During these incidents, more than 460 members of the population, who were not involved in the clashes, were killed or injured. Among the victims were at least 11 children, the youngest of whom was 8 years old. Some victims were targeted and killed while others were hit by bullets in the streets when gangs burst into their neighbourhoods or intentionally fired into residences, which are easily penetrable as they are made of
metal sheets and wood. In other instances, gangs deliberately set fire to improvised internally displaced persons sites and residences where entire families burned to death, as was the case in Delmas 18, in mid-January. More than 600 public and private buildings, including residences, schools, churches and businesses, were vandalized, looted and set on fire by gangs throughout the capital.

33. In Cité Soleil, gangs continued to target residents living in neighbourhoods controlled by rivals. Positioned on the rooftops of elevated buildings, gang members, armed with military-grade weapons, used sniper fire and indiscriminate mass shootings to kill and injure men, women and children while they were heading to work or to school, or while inside their homes. As a strategy to spread fear and suppress the population, gangs also killed residents who had publicly expressed their opposition to their presence in areas already under their influence, as was the case in Mariani, Carrefour commune.

34. As gangs have tightened their grip over all main roads in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, people have started to use small boats to avoid being killed, kidnapped, raped or extorted, particularly along the southern section of National Road Number 2 which links Port-au-Prince and Carrefour to the southern departments. To force people to continue using this road, during the reporting period, gangs intercepted several of the boats, notably in Mariani, and kidnapped and killed by gunshot or machetes dozens of people, including children and street merchants.

35. Since the shift in gang tactics to target State institutions, and the escape of well-known gang leaders from prison, human rights defenders, journalists and persons affiliated with State institutions, including magistrates, have been threatened, have been kidnapped from inside their homes or have had their residences set on fire. The safety of many of these persons is now seriously compromised. Further, BINUH has received reports that at least two candidates nominated for the Transitional Presidential Council have received threats by gang leaders.

36. The lower areas of the Artibonite Department continued to be heavily affected by gang violence. In the communes of Dessalines, l’Estère, Liancourt, Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Verrettes, gangs attacked the population by shooting indiscriminately at residences and passers-by or executing people for those who challenged their authority. At least 53 persons were killed or injured during these criminal acts. In addition, private and public vehicles travelling on the main roads continued to be forcibly and systematically stopped by gang members who robbed, raped, and/or kidnapped the drivers and passengers, and killing anyone who resisted. Attacks by gangs on farmland and livelihoods have caused farmers to abandon over 3,000 hectares of land and to move to less fertile but safer areas.

37. Kidnappings continued to be reported across the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department. At least 438 persons (234 men, 183 women and 21 children) were kidnapped for ransom between 1 January and 31 March. No social category was spared, and even members of faith-based congregations were kidnapped. At least nine members of faith-based congregations were kidnapped either while travelling to or inside their institutions. Some of the kidnapped victims whose families were not able to gather the money requested were killed in their places of captivity, in particular in Artibonite Department.

38. The violence severely restricted access to health care. At least three health-care centres, located in the communes of Delmas, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre, were looted, and the State University State Hospital in Port-au-Prince was abandoned by medical personnel and most of its patients following heavy gang shootings in the area since 1 March. Hospitals that remained operational continued to face challenges owing to the lack of medical supplies and health-care personnel who did not report for duty for fear of being killed on their way to work or while in the health-care centres.
39. Freedom of movement and socioeconomic activities remained severely restricted by gang violence. In the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, drivers of private and public transport vehicles were forced to pay so-called circulation taxes at numerous improvised “checkpoints” erected by gangs along key roads. Passengers and passers-by were frequently robbed or kidnapped, particularly in Artibonite Department. Owners of truck companies were forced to pay monthly protection taxes, which can reach up to $8,000 per month, plus an additional fee that varies according to the value of the goods transported.

40. Vigilantism, coupled with inadequate police response, led to the lynching of 62 suspected gang members and criminals by the public. Over half occurred in areas outside the capital previously unaffected by gangs, now fearing their spread. In addition, self-defence groups in gang-heavy zones were accountable for 32 more killings of alleged gang members and associates. Some of these brigades, headed by active or former police officers, such as in the commune of Carrefour, killed individuals for not having their personal identification documents with them. In January and February, there were reports that the Public Prosecutor of Miragoâne summarily executed two alleged gang members in public; it is also alleged that he executed at least 16 other gang members in 2023.

Sexual violence

41. Gangs continued to use sexual violence to spread fear, suppress and punish the population. In Cité Soleil, women and girls using the only available road to exit Brooklyn were intercepted by gangs of “rival neighbourhoods” and subjected to collective rape. In January, one of the victims, a 17-year-old girl, while using this route to go to school, was caught by a group of armed individuals and raped several times by multiple perpetrators. She was then shot and killed.

42. According to local sources, on the night of 4 March and the early morning of 5 March, several female inmates were raped by male prisoners at the Jacmel prison (Southeast Department). The male detainees broke into the women’s section of the prison and sexually assaulted them. It is reportedly not the first time that female inmates have been raped at the Jacmel prison, either by other inmates or by the prison’s personnel. After realizing that the prison authorities had not intervened to stop the assault against the female detainees, the attackers tried to escape from the prison. The intervention of the police avoided the escape which resulted in at least three male prisoners killed, and seven others injured. Twenty of the instigators were transferred to the Petit-Goâve prison (West Department), while the women were transferred to the local police station cells to ensure their safety. The victims received sanitary kits, but they did not have access to health-care services.

Demonstrations and civil unrest

43. In the second half of January, anti-Government demonstrations and acts of civil unrest took place in 8 of Haiti’s 10 departments. The demonstrations, which turned violent on several occasions, led to the closure of public institutions and brought basic services and economic activities to a standstill. The demonstrations received the support of some elements affiliated to the Protected Areas Security Brigade, an operational unit of the National Protected Areas Agency, which is part of the Ministry of the Environment. At least 22 people were killed, and 48 others injured, most of them during police interventions to restore order. During an armed confrontation with the national police in Pétion-Ville (West Department), on 7 February, five individuals associated with the Brigade were killed. On 23 February, the Government dismissed the head of the Brigade and replaced him with a technical restructuring commission. Further, on 29 February, the Government ordered all individuals affiliated with the Brigade to report to the Ministry of the Environment to be registered and prohibited
them from patrolling the streets. The order was not complied with, and armed Brigade agents continued to be seen patrolling the streets in several towns.

Impunity

44. Since June 2022, gang attacks have rendered the Port-au-Prince and Croix-des-Bouquets courthouses non-operational, forcing them to share limited space. In addition, the Registry of the Peace Court of Croix-des-Bouquets and the Peace Court of Delmas were burned down by gangs in March. During nationwide anti-Government protests in February, justice buildings in Gonaïves, Trou du Nord, and Petit-Goâve were also burned, with protests infiltrated by gang members.

45. The lack of accountability for past serious human rights violations and abuses committed by both State agents and gangs continued to be a major concern. The emblematic cases of the 2017 Grand Ravine, the 2018 La Saline, and the 2019 Bel Air massacres remained stalled. Some progress was made in investigating corruption among public officials.

46. Among the 51 individuals indicted by the judge in charge of investigating the case of the assassination of President Moïse, were two high profile agents from the Protected Areas Security Brigade, including the former head of the Brigade, who remains at large. The other was in pretrial detention at the National Penitentiary of Port-au-Prince, but escaped during the gang attack on 2 March.

47. Guy Philippe, who was repatriated to Haiti in November 2023 after serving six-years of a nine-year sentence in a prison in the United States for his role in money-laundering and drug trafficking, has relied extensively on the support of individuals affiliated with the Protected Areas Security Brigade to call for civil unrest and the departure of the Prime Minister since his return to Haiti. Two criminal cases involving him are still pending in Haiti. He is accused of orchestrating a violent attack against a farmer’s cooperative and terrorizing residents by shooting high-calibre weapons in the North-West Department in 2004. In addition, he allegedly participated in an armed attack against the police station, prison and the Departmental Units for the Maintenance of Order of the national police in Les Cayes (South Department) in 2016. Neither case has significantly moved forward.

Police oversight

48. Between 1 January and 23 March, the General Inspectorate opened 31 investigations concerning 36 police officers, including 15 cases of alleged human rights violations committed during the January and February nationwide demonstrations. An investigation was also opened into the attacks against the National Penitentiary and the Croix-des-Bouquets prison. During the same period, no investigations were concluded and, therefore, no administrative measures or decisions to refer cases for criminal prosecution were adopted. Moreover, gang violence had an especially detrimental effect on the performance of the General Inspectorate. In particular, since 3 March, the General Inspectorate has been closed and completely deserted owing to constant gang armed activity in Delmas, where its offices are located.

VI. Women and peace and security

49. In the Artibonite Department, UN-Women and its partners provided comprehensive support to 450 survivors of violence, focusing on female heads of households who have filed complaints against their spouses and providing assistance to displaced women. To meet the urgent needs of these survivors, financial assistance was extended to 25 women, including 20 survivors of violence in Saint-Marc and
5 internally displaced women, 2 of whom are disabled. This financial assistance is critical in facilitating access to necessary medical and legal care, setting them on the path to recovery and justice.

50. Deportations from the Dominican Republic have risen significantly, affecting migrant women, young people, and girls at the Ouanaminthe border. UN-Women sent personnel to the border to meet 71 female deportees and provide relocation assistance.

VII. Unemployment and young people and other vulnerable groups

Socioeconomic situation

51. Ongoing security and political instability impacted the nation’s economic performance and citizens’ quality of life, underscoring the necessity of a well-coordinated and prompt response. Furthermore, Haiti’s economy suffered from the 50-day ban on cross-border trade with the Dominican Republic, which ran from 13 September to 31 October 2023. The Dominican Republic is Haiti’s second-largest commercial partner after the United States. An International Monetary Fund study-based data up to 2018 shows that informal trade with the Dominican Republic represents about 50 per cent of the official records, and foregone tax revenues amount to about 7 per cent of total revenues.

52. Haiti’s persistent negative economic growth, which is estimated at -1.9 per cent in 2023, led to a 10.5 per cent decline in gross domestic product between 2019 and 2023. The Government-funded Multisectoral Emergency Programme for Appeasement and Social Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups, was an attempt to stimulate economic activity. However, its implementation was limited and results fell short of expectations despite some effects on final consumption. Forecasts for 2024 are more optimistic, with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and the International Monetary Fund indicating a positive economic growth of 0.5 per cent and 1.4 per cent, respectively.

53. In contrast, by the end of 2023, the Haitian Gourde appreciated against the United States dollar owing to a combination of factors. According to the Central Bank of Haiti, those factors included the country’s aggressive foreign exchange operations and reduced demand for United States dollars caused by a decline in imports. In January, the reference exchange rate was 131.7 Gourdes to 1 United States dollar, compared to an average of 153.3 Gourdes in April 2023.

54. Similarly, January 2024 saw a slowdown in annualized inflation to 20.9 per cent, according to data from the National Statistical Institute. This slowdown may be partially explained by the ongoing decrease in food prices worldwide, which according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reached its lowest point in three years in January 2024. Tensions and roadblocks on the main roads from metropolitan Port-au-Prince to the southern departments affected trade between these departments. These disruptions led to a 23 per cent increase in the food basket in the South and Southeast Departments with prices of some products going up by 66 per cent in some areas between October 2023 and mid-January 2024. Haiti saw a slight increase in monthly inflation in January 2024, approximately 1.1 per cent compared with 2.1 per cent the previous month.

55. The unstable political and security environment in Haiti has significantly impacted business operations, directly affecting economic stability and investor confidence. According to Haiti’s National Statistical Institute, investment dropped by 17.6 per cent between 2022 and 2023, from 63.1 billion Gourdes to 51.9 billion Gourdes. Consequently, Haiti’s labour market remains fragile with high
unemployment rates, especially among youth, leading to increased poverty and economic instability owing to insufficient job creation to meet growing workforce demands.

56. According to data from the National Statistical Institute, the export of manufactured goods, in particular, garments and apparel, which account for nearly 35.0 per cent of total exports, has significantly declined compared with 2022. Exports reached $329.96 million in 2023, down from $449.34 million in 2022, representing a contraction of 26.6 per cent. The decline in activities, in particular in the textile sector, has had consequences for the subcontracted workforce. According to the Employment Bulletin of the Association des industries d’Haïti, from September 2022 to September 2023, the subcontracted workforce lost 11,262 jobs, decreasing from a total of 53,387 to 42,125, representing a decrease of more than 21.1 per cent.

Social protection and food security

57. The food crisis in Haiti is among the worst in the world. More than 4.35 million Haitians, or 44 percent of the population, are experiencing acute food insecurity (phases 3 and 4 of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification). Children are particularly vulnerable, with 7.2 per cent of them suffering from global acute malnutrition (compared with 6 per cent in 2022).

58. Low agricultural productivity, drought conditions, increases in food prices in the South and Southeast Departments, and restricted access to markets and services owing to gang violence are the main causes of food insecurity. Since gangs continue to play a significant role in the local economy, access is frequently restricted by the fees they demand, which drives up business cost and consumer spending overall. The World Food Programme’s (WFP) nationwide representative household survey (hungerMAP) conducted in mid-January shows a 3.4 per cent increase, between December and January, in the proportion of households indicating that their ability to purchase basic food items was affected by rising food prices. Other key factors included limited availability, or lack of access, to supplies of essential components of the diet of most Haitian families such as rice, wheat, flour, maize and red beans.

59. Access constraints during the reporting period, especially in mid-February, had an effect on the abilities to reach the most food-insecure population, particularly children. Widespread protests and persistent insecurity limited access and the capacity of WFP to reach specific areas.

60. On 24 January, the Ministers of Education, Agriculture, and Health signed the updated national School Feeding Policy, supported by the United Nations. The policy aims to produce 100 per cent of school meals locally by 2030, directly supporting the agriculture sector and smallholder farmers. The implementation phase of the policy has already yielded results, including: (i) 50 per cent of the WFP school feeding caseload receives a daily meal produced exclusively in Haiti; (ii) 4,500 local farmers work full-time to supply WFP in Haiti; and, (iii) WFP purchased $8.4 million in Haitian-produced goods in 2023. These figures are expected to grow exponentially in the coming years.

VIII. Basic social service delivery and resilience

Humanitarian needs and access to basic services

61. School closures have denied children their right to an education and have made it more difficult for them to access other services, such as school meals. WFP reported that in January and February 2024, over 310,000 children, out of the 420,000 children who were supposed to receive school meals, were unable to receive a school meal at
some point during that period owing to school closures or the inability by WFP to visit the schools owing to insecurity. WFP reported that during the week of 1 to 5 April, approximately 208,440 school children were unable to receive a school meal owing to insecurity.

62. Significant population movements have occurred in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and across the country as a result of gang violence. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 50,000 people have been displaced in the first quarter of 2024 due to increased gang activity. As at March 2024, 362,551 persons are displaced within the country, 15 per cent more than end of 2023. Of the total displaced population, 98 per cent have been forced to flee their homes as a result of gang violence throughout the country, in particular the southern departments, Artibonite and Centre Departments.

63. In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, more than 86,000 people endure appalling living conditions in 84 different locations, aggravated by a lack of food access, hygiene and sanitation. Host communities across the nation are accommodating over 264,000 people, or 73 per cent of all internally displaced persons, which puts additional strain on the scarce resources available to host families. In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, about two-thirds of internally displaced persons reside in temporary sites, a figure that is increasing over time.

64. Since January 2024, IOM has directly provided essential services to over 48,000 internally displaced persons, including non-food items, water and sanitation services, primary health care, mental health and psychosocial support, shelter through rental subsidies and habitat improvements, transportation assistance to other provinces, and multipurpose cash assistance.

65. Forced returns are taking place at a rate commensurate with 2023. Over 28,000 people have been returned to Haiti against their will in 2024, with approximately 10,000 forced returns in March, 10 per cent more than the entire month of February. The Dominican Republic accounts for 97 per cent of all repatriations, with Turks and Caicos Islands following in second. IOM continues to provide humanitarian aid to migrants forcefully returned by land, sea, and air.

66. At least 5,587 gender-based violence incidents were reported to case managers and gender-based violence service providers in the Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster between January and December 2023, with rape accounting for 86 per cent of those incidents. Compared with the same period in 2022, this represents a 49 per cent increase. Impunity still prevails in the great majority of gang-related sexual assault cases. Restricted access to services in gang-controlled regions has an impact on the partners’ ability to give aid since it reduces access to services for victims of gender-based violence. Furthermore, relocating gender-based violence victims/survivors or implementing temporary safe house placement initiatives remains problematic. It is extremely rare to discover shelter initiatives that provide safe accommodations, reintegration aid, and rehabilitation outside of gang-controlled areas.

67. With the support of UN-Women, five civil society organizations from the West, Artibonite and Northwest Departments launched humanitarian and protection efforts that reached 60,892 people, with a focus on women’s participation and support – 43,462 women and 17,430 men benefited from these initiatives. In the West Department, efforts were concentrated on education and advocacy, with over 42,000 people now better informed about critical issues, such as gender-based violence prevention, family planning and HIV prevention services.
IX. Operating environment

68. The frequent clashes between different gangs and between gangs and the police, as well as vigilantism and roadblocks erected throughout the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince have forced United Nations personnel to remain confined in their respective accommodations since 2 March to minimize risks to their safety.

69. Mounting insecurity and overburdened security capacities required a reduction in the footprint of the United Nations in Port-au-Prince to essential personnel. This reduction was related to the closure of the Toussaint Louverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince, the risks associated with evacuation by road through gang-controlled areas, and the absence of dedicated rotary wing air assets. One United Nations Humanitarian Air Service helicopter conducting humanitarian aid delivery supported the temporary reduction in the Port-au-Prince. On 29 March, a helicopter was temporarily made available for a two-week period to assist in the reduction of personnel in Port-au-Prince.

70. Between 16 and 20 March, 149 personnel working on non-life-saving activities were relocated outside Haiti through special flights organized by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service. In parallel, BINUH has implemented measures to support its national staff who are facing additional burdens due to the crisis.

71. In addition, concerns have persisted regarding the availability of potable water and fuel for the Mission’s operation and staff members who are currently working from home owing to security conditions. One of the main bottled water producers in Haiti has communicated its inability to proceed with water distribution in Port-au-Prince, including to BINUH. While the Mission has short-term water reserves, their availability remains uncertain should the insecurity situation persist. In this context, United Nations senior leadership is currently evaluating options to further reduce the organization’s footprint in Haiti while ensuring that BINUH and the United Nations country team continue to deliver on the essential aspects of their mandate.

X. Sexual exploitation and abuse

72. BINUH registered no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, with or without associated paternity and child support claims, involving personnel from BINUH or from previous United Nations missions, during the reporting period.

73. Efforts to prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse have significantly scaled up through collaborative initiatives between United Nations agencies and civil society organizations, coordinated by the Resident Coordinator’s office. Recent discussions within the national Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse network highlighted the importance of strengthening community involvement in designing tailored messaging on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and setting up reporting channels aligned with community preferences. Such emphasis has been integrated into the 2024 action plan, manifesting in various targeted activities. Furthermore, ongoing discussions aim to enhance the accessibility and referral mechanisms for services in the event of an allegation. This approach not only underscores the commitment to combating sexual exploitation and abuse but also recognizes the pivotal role of community engagement and responsive strategies in effectively addressing and mitigating instances of exploitation and abuse.

74. The Senior Victims’ Rights Officer communicated regularly with IOM and with mothers to follow up on the implementation of the project providing assistance for the basic needs of mothers and their children born of sexual exploitation and abuse primarily by personnel from the former United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.
XI. Observations

75. The coordinated gang attacks at the end of February in Haiti were a brazen challenge to the State’s authority, pushing State institutions to the brink. The rapid evolution in gang dynamics is of grave concern. The new unity of effort against State authority among multiple gangs coincides with bolder and more coordinated attacks that foster unprecedented chaos and terror within the civilian population and have caused loss of life. I strongly condemn the deliberate vandalism and destruction of State infrastructure and other critical installations.

76. Those suffering the most from these attacks are the people of Haiti. Accounts of extreme gang violence against communities with an intent to suppress are only too common. Many women and girls continue to be subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. Thousands have been forced to flee their homes and neighbourhoods throughout metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Violence and the absence of the rule of law are also exacerbating disparities in education and health, and hindering and even reversing development progress.

77. It is critical that the political and security tracks advance in parallel. I welcome the formal establishment of the Transitional Presidential Council and encourage stakeholders to continue making steady progress in putting in place transitional governance arrangements, as agreed on 11 March, including the appointment of an interim Prime Minister. I note the commitment of Prime Minister Henry to step down following the installation of the Council and the designation of the Prime Minister of a new Government, and I appreciate his efforts in the inter-Haitian dialogue. The swift implementation of transitional governance arrangements and the improvement of the security situation remain essential to create the conditions for the restoration of democratic institutions through peaceful, credible and participatory elections. I also underscore the importance of ensuring the representation of Haitian women in transitional governance arrangements and their active participation in the ongoing political dialogue and forthcoming steps. I unequivocally condemn any form of gender-based violence, including when directed at women engaged in political activities.

78. I commend the active role played by CARICOM, as well as other international partners, in facilitating a way forward to resolve Haiti’s political crisis. Their engagement with Haitian stakeholders have been instrumental in maintaining a Haitian-led political process.

79. Although the police managed to repel some attacks, eight police facilities have been destroyed. I reiterate my urgent call for the swift deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti, as authorized by Security Council resolution 2699 (2023). This deployment is critically needed to support the Haitian National Police in addressing the dire security situation. I continue to reiterate my appeal to all Member States, and particularly those from the broader region, to contribute effectively and ensure the Mission receives the robust financial and logistical support it needs to succeed. The United Nations continues to work closely with Member States to maximize our combined efforts to help the Haitian authorities improve security conditions. The establishment of the United Nations trust fund, as requested by resolution 2699 (2023) to receive voluntary contributions for the Mission, marks a significant step forward in this initiative. I strongly encourage interested Member States to urgently contribute to the Multinational Security Support Mission trust fund, which stands ready to receive contributions and make disbursements.

80. I strongly condemn the use of heavy weapons and urge the international community to support a disengagement and disarmament program targeting low-risk
gangs. It is imperative for Haiti to enact and enforce laws regulating the possession, use and flow of weapons and ammunition.

81. I would like to reiterate the solidarity of the United Nations with the people of Haiti and our continued and full commitment to supporting a path out of the multidimensional crisis in the country. It is crucial to allocate sufficient resources to BINUH for the effective implementation of its mandate. In the current operating context, the Mission will urgently need additional resources in planning, information analysis and reporting and strategic communications, as well as security assets.

82. I strongly encourage the international community to intensify its support for humanitarian, development and violence reduction efforts in Haiti. This includes addressing the immediate protection needs of the most vulnerable, while simultaneously developing long-term strategies to tackle the underlying causes of instability. Enhanced support is vital for fostering a secure and stable Haiti with a solid foundation for sustainable development and the protection of human rights for all.

83. Lastly, I wish to express once more my gratitude to the Special Representative and to all members of the United Nations family in the country for their dedication and tireless efforts in support of Haiti and its people.
Annex

Available information on cases of gang violence, criminal activities and human rights abuses in Haiti