Letter dated 24 May 2022 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2571 (2021), the final report on its work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya on 4 May 2022 and was considered by the Committee on 20 May.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Alia Aoun
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011)

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Expert

(Signed) Georg Kerschischnig
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Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya

Summary

The prospect of presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021, as set out in the road map adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in November 2020, created a new dynamic that had an impact on various aspects of the sanctions regime.

The position of armed groups towards the elections proved to be intrinsically linked to their risk-benefit assessment of their own interests. The uncertainty surrounding the process planned for in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum exacerbated enduring fault lines while opposing candidates doubled down on efforts to secure support from forces on the ground. Thus, most Libyan territory is still controlled by Libyan armed groups. Throughout the period of electoral preparation, a set of factors coalesced and led to the 22 December 2021 statement of the High National Election Commission invoking force majeure that prevented it from organizing the elections on 24 December 2021. On 20 February 2022, the House of Representatives designated Fathi Bashagha to form a new government. At the time of writing, Government of National Unity leaders had rejected the subsequent formation of a new government and remained in power. Alliances of armed groups remained fluid as uncertainty around the political way forward resulted in susceptibility to deal-making.

Designated terrorist groups remain present in Libya and are often active, although subjected to repeated counter-terrorist operations across the country. The continuing presence of Chadian, Sudanese and Syrian fighters, and private military companies, in the country is still a serious threat to the security of Libya and the region as the 5+5 Joint Military Commission’s progress towards the withdrawal of foreign fighters, is hampered by the political stalemate.

Despite a noticeable decrease of active military hostilities during the reporting period, serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law persisted on a large scale with impunity. The Panel finds that, in particular, seven Libyan armed groups systematically used arbitrary and unlawful detention as a punitive measure against perceived opponents of their authority, and as an effective method of demonstrating their power and autonomy from Libyan judicial and government institutions, severely undermining those institutions. They routinely ignored the applicable international and domestic laws in violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person, fair trial and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead, detainees were blatantly held outside the protection of the law, in complete dependence on the detaining authorities’ arbitrariness, under conditions that had a severe impact on their life and well-being. Migrants were extremely vulnerable to human rights abuses and regularly subjected to acts of slavery, rape and torture.

The arms embargo continued to be ineffective, with some Member States continuing to violate it with impunity. Control of supply chains by these Member States continued, thus significantly hindering detection, disruption or interdiction. Although the number of violations identified was much lower than during 2019 and 2020, and the number of air bridge flights was significantly reduced, the Panel assesses that arms stockpiles remained high and sufficient to sustain any future conflict. The Panel has updated the baseline of arms types illicitly transferred to Libya, which will assist in identifying future violations but also illustrates the total disregard shown towards the arms embargo in the past few years. The ever-evolving technology and relatively low...
cost of smart electronic fast-moving consumer goods, such as optics and uncrewed aerial vehicles, and the ease of modification of civilian all-terrain vehicles to convert them into combat-capable vehicles makes such items ideal for military use in low-level conflicts. This is being exploited by the majority of armed groups in Libya.

In terms of maritime issues, the Panel established that vessels sailing internationally under the flag of Zambia did so illicitly, as Zambia at this time does not operate an international open ship registry and does not register international vessels. The Stability Support Apparatus, affiliated to the Government of National Unity, appeared as a new maritime actor, using armed civilian and naval-type vessels to intercept and return migrants attempting to leave Libya. The mounting of weapons on civilian-type vessels post-delivery was routinely used to evade the arms embargo. A Haftar Affiliated Forces maritime unit arbitrarily detained merchant vessels within a self-declared sea area. The unit demanded payment of an unlawful financial penalty as a condition of release, and in one case stole the personal property of crew members. The Panel qualifies this as piracy.

The technical requirements for the reunification of the Central Bank of Libya were identified by an external consultant to the Bank, but progress towards implementation remained slow.

The public oil sector found itself at the centre of a power struggle between the leadership of the National Oil Corporation and the Ministry of Oil and Gas, which manifested itself in failed suspensions of the Corporation’s Chair and publicly traded accusations of improper management of its daily operations. In a worrying development, members of the management of the Corporation and affiliated entities were detained for alleged administrative improprieties. The reporting period also saw clashes between armed groups that damaged oil installations and resulted in extortionary denial of use of the oil infrastructure.

During the reporting period, there was one alleged attempt to illicitly export crude oil from Libya. Smuggling of petroleum products via the sea did not return to previous levels, while smuggling via the land borders persisted and internal diversion became more prominent.

The asset freeze measure continued to pose the same challenges as during previous mandates, reflecting the lack of uniform implementation by Member States. The different interpretation of some jurisdictions of paragraph 19 of resolution 1970 (2011) regarding the active management of frozen assets continued. The Panel still considers that such management is not allowed under the auspices of paragraph 19.

The designated entities need to improve their transparency relating to beneficial and legal ownership, effective control and the activities of their subsidiaries. Monitoring is still required.

Designated individuals travelled during the reporting period under a standing exemption. Guidelines issued by the Security Council Committee pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2571 (2021) for the implementation of these exemptions were not followed by all involved Member States.
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Annexes*
I. Background

A. Introduction

1. The present report, provided to the Security Council Committee pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2571 (2021), covers the period from the submission of the Panel of Experts' previous report (S/2021/229) on 8 March 2021 until 25 April 2022. It includes updates on ongoing investigations detailed therein. An overview of the evolution of the sanctions regime concerning Libya can be found in annex 1 to the report.

2. In conducting its investigations, the Panel complied with the best practices and methods recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel maintained the highest achievable standard of proof, even though travel to Libya and other destinations was still restricted owing to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

3. The Panel relied on corroborated evidence and adhered to its standards in respect of the opportunity to reply. The Panel has maintained transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence in its investigations.

B. Cooperation with stakeholders and institutions

4. A list of Member States, organizations and individuals visited or consulted can be found in annex 4. Panel correspondence records can be found in annex 5. The Panel also maintained contact with the Committee, Member States and other interlocutors, including other Panels of Experts, through electronic platforms.

5. The Panel benefited from regular exchanges with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation IRINI) also supported the Panel, specifically its investigations into non-compliance with the arms embargo and on the illicit importation and exportation of crude oil and petroleum products.

6. The Panel travelled to Libya once, in mid-September 2021. Between October 2021 and February 2022, the Panel’s requests for support for a visit could not be met due to UNSMIL logistical constraints. After the expiration of the Panel’s visas to Libya at the end of January 2022, Libya did not renew the visas. Therefore, the Panel’s planned visit to Libya in March 2022 could not take place. The Panel’s travel to Libya remains crucial to its mission and should be given priority by Member States and supporting United Nations bodies.

7. The Panel visited Benghazi on 21 September 2021 and met with interlocutors from the Libyan National Army. This was the Panel’s first visit to eastern Libya and

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1 All references to S/2021/229 should also be understood to encompass S/2021/229/Corr.1 and S/2021/229/Corr.2.
2 All hyperlinks accessed on 8 April 2022.
3 The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing. Owing to the word limits on reports of monitoring mechanisms, the Panel has provided further details relating to several investigations in the annexes. A table of abbreviations and acronyms can be found in annex 2.
4 Further information on methodology and the opportunity to reply can be found in annex 3.
its first direct engagement with Haftar Affiliated Forces (HAF)\(^5\) since the Panel’s visit to Tubruq in July 2015.\(^6\)

II. Acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya or obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition

A. Libyan armed group dynamics

8. The dominance of armed groups over the Libyan security sector reported in S/2021/229\(^7\) continued. Although many of the western armed groups held official mandates, had access to government funding (see annex 6) and nominally reported to State institutions, they still operated without real oversight.

9. A topical example of this was the outcry that followed the 14 August 2021 letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission\(^8\) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister (see annex 7) recommending the review of the hierarchical structure of several security and military agencies. The Stability Support Apparatus and the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces\(^9\) immediately reacted by accusing the Commission of exceeding its mandate (see annex 8). A diplomatic representative with whom the Panel met in Tripoli considered the Commission’s initiative as an attack driven by Khalifa Haftar targeting the western Libyan institutions. On the other side of the spectrum, a military officer from the east and member of the Commission\(^10\) explained to the Panel that the contentious letter was meant to support the military colleagues from the west who were dismayed by the excesses of armed groups.

10. Yet, most of Libya went through a period of relative calm in the aftermath of the formation of the Government of National Unity in February 2021, with various actors adopting a “standby position” pending the policy direction taken by the new executive team. In the lead-up to the elections and after the missed election date of 24 December, major armed groups maintained a cautious attitude.\(^11\)

1. Situation in the west

11. When asked about his position towards the planned electoral process, Nawasi brigade leader Mustafa Qaddour stated\(^12\) that his attitude would depend on the capacity of the interim government to deliver on its promises. If the Government of National Unity proved able to offer the long-awaited services and jobs needed by the civilian population in Tripoli, who had taken up arms to topple the Qadhafi regime

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\(^5\) These include the armed group previously referred to as Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (which is now being restyled as the Libyan Arab Armed Forces), and domestic and foreign armed groups. The Panel uses “Haftar Affiliated Forces” (HAF) to cover all Haftar-affiliated armed groups. The lower case is used to refer to armed groups that refer to themselves as, for example, “Brigade” or “Battalion”, to identify the group without providing them with the legitimacy of being a formed military unit of a government. Similarly, the lower case is used, if appropriate, when referring to the authorities in the east of Libya.

\(^6\) See S/2016/209, para. 11.

\(^7\) Para. 8 and annex 6.

\(^8\) The 5+5 Joint Military Commission is made up of five senior military officers appointed by the Government of National Unity and five others chosen by Khalifa Haftar.

\(^9\) Established by the Presidential Council on 11 January 2021; also known as the Security and Stabilization Agency or the Stability Support Service.

\(^10\) Panel meeting (21 September 2021).

\(^11\) See para. 14 on the Stability Support Apparatus and para. 32 on acts that obstruct or undermine the political transition in Libya.

\(^12\) Panel meeting (7 April 2021).
and to repel the 4 April 2019 HAF offensive, it could, in Qaddour’s opinion, legitimately retain power. Indeed, under the tenure of the Government of National Unity, the Nawasi brigade preserved its control over the Tripoli port and the General Intelligence Service. Nawasi’s influence was also reflected in the appointment of Mustafa Qaddour’s brother, Hafiz Qaddour, as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of National Stability formed by Fathi Bashagha in March 2022. 13

12. Representatives of the Special Deterrence Force expressed the hope that the establishment of the Government of National Unity would foster better cooperation with eastern authorities on counter-terrorism matters. 14 Like most of the major western groups, the Force kept its distance, at least publicly, from the political controversies in the pre-electoral period.

13. Sporadic and limited outbreaks of violence 15 turned into serious confrontations on the western coast, 16 in Tripoli 17 and around Bani Walid 18 starting from June 2021. They often involved the Stability Support Apparatus.

14. The head of the Stability Support Apparatus, Abdel Ghani Khalifa, 19 confirmed to the Panel 20 his organization’s expansion policy 21 and emphasized its law enforcement mandate. The Apparatus is an alliance of armed groups from Tripoli, Warshafanah and Zawiyah that has significantly developed its exposure and influence over recent months. 22 The efforts deployed by both the Prime Minister-designate,
Fathi Bashagha,\textsuperscript{23} and the incumbent Prime Minister, Abdulhamid Al Dabiba,\textsuperscript{24} to garner the support of the Apparatus highlight the importance it has gained since its creation by the Presidential Council on 11 January 2021. In December 2021, it was reported that the Presidential Council had had to postpone its decision appointing a new commander of the Tripoli Military Zone\textsuperscript{25} to replace Abdel Baset Marwan, a close ally of Abdel Ghani Khalifa.\textsuperscript{26}

15. Opponents of the Apparatus, such as Mohamed Bahrun (also known as Al Far)\textsuperscript{27} (S/2021/229) and Mahmoud Hamza,\textsuperscript{28} Commander of the 444 Brigade, also stated to the Panel that they were legally mandated by their respective supervisory authorities and were enforcing the law. This illustrates the continuous struggle over resources and influence in the west.

2. Situation in the east and south

16. The killing of Mahmud al-Warfalli\textsuperscript{29} on 24 March 2021\textsuperscript{30} (see annex 9) and Mohammed El Shgagi (also known as Mohammed al-Kani)\textsuperscript{31} on 27 July 2021\textsuperscript{32} occurred during the reporting period. The Panel was able to determine that the strained relations they had with the leadership of HAF had brought the two men closer to each other shortly before their deaths. The military attorney-general from the east, major general Faraj Sosaa,\textsuperscript{33} told the Panel that both had been on trial before a military court. The circumstances surrounding the deaths of these two important figures associated with HAF have yet to be clarified.

17. The formation of a force for combating terrorism and organized crime in southern Libya by the Presidential Council (see annex 10) on 17 June 2021 led to another salient event. Masoud Abdallah Masoud Abdeljallil (also known as Masoud Jeddi),\textsuperscript{34} the then commander of 116 brigade and main military ally of HAF in Sabha, was appointed by the Presidential Council as head of this new “force”. Subsequently, Khalifa Haftar issued a decree on 11 September 2021 disbanding the HAF 116 brigade (see annex 11), although the larger faction of its elements remained on the side of HAF, under the command of Ibrahim Aldib Alslimani, still using the unit title “116 brigade”.\textsuperscript{35} Since then, minor skirmishes have taken place between HAF and Masoud Jeddi’s new group.

\textsuperscript{23} Appointment of Issam Busriba, the brother of the deputy commander of the Stability Support Apparatus, Hassan Busriba, as minister of Interior.

\textsuperscript{24} Illustrated by the appointment of Ayub Aburas from the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, one of Ghenewa’s deputies, as head of the Presidential Guard and a widely publicized 7 March 2022 visit of Prime Minister Al Dabiba to Abu Slim prison: see https://ssa.gov.ly/%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b1%d8%a6%d9%8a%d8%b3-%d8%ad%d9%83%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%ad%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%88%d8%b7%d9%86%d8%b7%d9%82, 7 March 2022.

\textsuperscript{25} See S/2022/31, para. 33.


\textsuperscript{27} Panel meeting (16 September 2021).

\textsuperscript{28} Panel meeting (22 September 2021).

\textsuperscript{29} See S/2017/466, para. 100.


\textsuperscript{31} See S/2021/229, paras. 36–39 and annex 16.


\textsuperscript{33} Panel meeting (21 September 2021).

\textsuperscript{34} See S/2019/914, para. 31.

\textsuperscript{35} See https://twitter.com/alsaaa24/status/1471539343911235592?s=11&t=zcxZyIZm6f6vHQUREbJLYg, 16 December 2021.
18. In July 2021, Prime Minister Al Dabiba ordered the formation of a “joint security operations room” to secure the south.\(^{36}\) There are no indicators that this unit is yet operational.

19. Despite these efforts of the Government of National Unity to extend its influence into the south,\(^ {37}\) the presence of HAF is still dominant, with the latter preventing visits from Government of National Unity officials to Sabha, Ghat or Kufrah in August and October 2021. The major improvements in the operational capability of HAF illustrates its determination to maintain its leading position in the east and the south (see annex 12).

3. Creation of a joint task force in the central region

20. By the end of August 2021, following yet another disruption of water supply\(^ {38}\) affecting the Great Man-Made River,\(^ {39}\) the leaders of Misratah’s 166 Battalion and the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade reached an agreement for joint patrols in the area from Bani Walid to Shuwayrif.\(^ {40}\) The move was endorsed by Prime Minister Al Dabiba and Khalifa Haftar and welcomed by UNSMIL as “a very significant step forward towards the unification of the military institution and the country”.\(^ {41}\)

B. International terrorist groups and individuals

1. International terrorist groups and individuals

21. The Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces and HAF both disrupted terrorist cells and arrested high-profile individuals affiliated to both Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Libya (ISIL-Libya) (QDe.165) and The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014). Further information on events related to terrorism and counter-terrorism in Libya can be found in annex 13.

2. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Libya (QDe.165)

22. ISIL-Libya (QDe.165) remained a moderate threat as it continued to move around the desert area in southern Libya to avoid detection. Regardless of the setbacks it has endured from continuous counter-terrorist operations targeting its capabilities, this group has retained a capability to perpetrate attacks. During the reporting period, ISIL-Libya (QDe.165) claimed responsibility for five attacks in the south, near Sabha, Zillah and the areas of Mount Haruj, Qatrun and Umm al-Aranib, where individuals affiliated with the group operated. Individuals affiliated to this group were also detected in Misratah, Sabratah and Tripoli.\(^ {42}\) On 13 March 2022, the group pledged allegiance to the newly appointed leader of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115), Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.\(^ {43}\)

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\(^{37}\) Government of National Unity officials made multiple visits to the south: head of the Presidential Council, Mohamed al-Menfi, to Sabha in February 2021; Vice-President of the Presidential Council, Musa al-Koni, to Awbari; Minister for Foreign Affairs, Najla El Mangoush, to Qatrun in May 2021; and Prime Minister Al Dabiba to Sabha in July 2021.

\(^{38}\) See [S/2021/229](https://www.un.org/), para. 29.

\(^{39}\) In support of calls to release Abdullah el-Senussi from detention.


\(^{42}\) Panel meetings with Libyan security agencies in September 2021.

3. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014)

23. Although this terrorist group did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attack on Libyan territory during the reporting period, individuals of the group were identified as present in Libya. Arrests of individuals affiliated to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb were reportedly made by both the Government of National Unity and HAF in different parts of Libya. Members of this group were spread across several towns, such as Birak al-Shati’, Awbari and Ghat in the south-west of the country.  

C. Foreign armed groups and fighters

24. Private military company operatives, and foreign fighters from Chad, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic, affiliated to the conflicting parties, were still present in Libya. There has been little verifiable evidence of any large-scale withdrawals taking place to date. On 3 October 2021, the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs, Najla El Mangoush, confirmed the exit of “some foreign fighters” from Libya.  

25. The 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement between the then Government of National Accord and the HAF Libyan National Army stipulated that all “mercenaries and foreign fighters” should depart from the Libyan territories within a period of three months.  

26. On 11 November 2021, the HAF representatives of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission issued a statement indicating that the General Command of HAF had decided to evacuate an initial group of 300 mercenaries and foreign fighters (see annex 14). On 1 January 2022, a HAF spokesperson informed the national press that 300 Sudanese fighters had been transferred to the Sudan by air during the final week of December 2021. This statement was promptly refuted by two high-ranking HAF officials, who denied the transfer; however, the Panel identified that at least 300 Sudanese fighters had left Libya, but not within the framework of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission initiative (see annex 15).  

1. Chadian fighters

26. On 11 April 2021, the Chadian group Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT) launched an offensive from Libyan territory against the Chadian army in the area of Tibesti, Chad, that lasted for several days. The President of Chad, Idris Déby Itno, travelled to the area and died on 20 April 2021 from wounds he sustained there.  

27. On 14 September 2021, the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade initiated an offensive against FACT, its former ally, in the area of Tarbu. On 14 September 2021, FACT issued a statement reporting that the brigade had been backed by Sudanese elements (see annex 16). The brigade published photos and videos on its official social media platforms documenting the operation against FACT.  

44 See S/2022/82, para. 32.  
48 See https://nabd.com/s/98170976-4a92dd, 1 January 2022.  
50 26°1’4.02"N, 15°16’42.44”E.  
28. Other Chadian opposition groups were still present in Libya but without apparent participation in the country’s political or armed conflict. On 13 March 2022, the Chadian military transitional council and representatives of several Chadian opposition groups, including those present in Libya, such as FACT, the Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République, the Union des forces de la résistance and the Front de la nation pour la démocratie et la justice, started a “pre-dialogue” in Qatar\(^\text{53}\) in an attempt to achieve peace as an outcome viewed by the Government of Libya as a step that would push for the return of the factions present in Libya and prevent their use of Libyan territory as a base for destabilizing the security of Chad.\(^\text{54}\)

2. Sudanese fighters

29. The signatories of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan,\(^\text{55}\) who had previously moved some of their forces to the Sudan in accordance with the security arrangements included in the Agreement, still maintained forces in the south of Libya. These forces frequently moved back and forth to and from the Sudan. Most of these forces were visible in the areas of Sirte, Jufrah, Zillah, Hun and Suknah, and were affiliated to the HAF 128 battalion. Recruitment of Sudanese fighters by HAF and their interest in Libya slightly decreased, but for different reasons, including decreasing financial incentives and the appeal of the incentives under the Agreement. Non-signatories of the Agreement, such as the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and Abdallah Banda’s group, still maintained members in Libya (see annex 15).

3. Syrian fighters

30. The Panel noted the continuous presence of Turkish-backed Syrian fighters in Government of National Unity-Affiliated Forces military camps in Tripoli (see annex 17). On 31 August 2021, demonstrations were held to demand the payment of their delayed salaries (see annex 17). Officials affiliated to the Government of National Unity-Affiliated Forces confirmed the presence of Syrians in Tripoli but denied their involvement in any military or civilian activities. These individuals are paid between $800 and $2,000 per month.\(^\text{56}\) Some Syrian non-governmental organizations informed the Panel\(^\text{57}\) that at least 200 Syrians had returned to Syria permanently,\(^\text{58}\) and that there had been back-and-forth transfer operations of Government of National Accord Affiliated Forces Syrian fighters from and to Libya during the reporting period, as those with finished contracts had been taken out of Libya and replaced by a new batch.\(^\text{59}\)

31. Syrian fighters affiliated to HAF operate alongside ChVK Wagner\(^\text{60}\) in Jufrah and Sirte. They were tasked with combat support tasks such as building trenches and


\(^{55}\) These groups are the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi, The Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces, the Justice and Equality Movement, the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council and the Sudanese Alliance.

\(^{56}\) Panel interactions with Syrians for Truth and Justice, a Syrian non-governmental organization.

\(^{57}\) Syrians for Truth and Justice and confidential sources.

\(^{58}\) See also www.syriahr.com/450065/المصرد-السوري-لحقوق-الإنسان-مدى-الم/4 October 2021.

\(^{59}\) See also annex 88.

\(^{60}\) ChVK is the Russian acronym for “private military company”. The Wagner organization will be referred to as ChVK Wagner throughout the report.
improvised roads or guarding sensitive ChVK Wagner positions. At least 300 of these Syrians returned to the Syrian Arab Republic and were not replaced by HAF.

D. Acts that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of the political transition in Libya

32. Paragraph 11 of resolution 2571 (2021) provides the Panel with the mandate to identify individuals and entities engaging in or providing support for acts that obstruct or undermine the elections, as part of a wider mandate to identify acts that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of the political transition in Libya.

33. The prospect of elections dominated the scene in Libya throughout the reporting period. A major fault line separated those who favoured presidential over parliamentary elections from those who favoured the opposite. Over and above the debate about the constitutional basis or the electoral calendar, there was disagreement between the actors, groups and States benefiting from the status quo and others hoping for a return to, or consolidation of, power.

34. On 22 December 2021, the High National Election Commission issued a statement publicizing its decision to postpone the announcement of the final list of presidential candidates, considering that “the interference of political interests with the judicial rulings […] may be described as a force majeure situation. The Commission was unable to make its announcement, and therefore unable to set 24 December as election day even though, from a technical standpoint, it was fully prepared to conduct the process on that date” (see annex 18).

35. It is apparent to the Panel that many factors have contributed to obstructing or undermining the elections planned for in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map. These included a disputed legal framework and a multitude of threats and security incidents (see annex 19). The political and security tensions reached a point that raised fears of serious unrest. These coalesced and resulted in the 22 December 2021 statement of the High National Election Commission invoking force majeure, and the subsequent failure to hold the elections on 24 December. The Panel has yet to determine if specific individuals or entities meet the designation criteria.

E. Acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or that constitute human rights abuses

36. Pursuant to paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2213 (2015) and subsequent resolutions, the Panel investigated violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and human rights abuses, committed in Libya.

37. These acts that threaten peace, stability and security in Libya persisted on a large scale with impunity. Judges and lawyers have consistently told the Panel that security threats and armed conflict over the past 10 years have significantly weakened the judicial system to the extent that currently there are no real prospects of bringing responsible individuals to justice. Fifty-four individuals testified that they were left without access to effective remedies and reparation for gross human rights violations that they had allegedly suffered. They all believe that the international community

See also annex 100.
has the responsibility to ensure accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Libya.\textsuperscript{63}

1. **Violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in the context of deprivation of liberty**

**Acts committed in detention facilities**

38. The Panel has investigated 23 incidents of serious violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that have taken place in eight detention facilities under the control of six armed groups since 2015. A summary of these incidents is provided in annex 20 to illustrate the scale of the issue.

*Special Deterrence Forces*

39. The Panel interviewed eight witnesses of arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty, torture, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity\textsuperscript{64} committed by members of the Special Deterrence Forces in the Mitiga detention facility\textsuperscript{65} in Tripoli. The violent acts included: (a) brutal beatings on a continual basis; (b) appalling material conditions, such as severe overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions; (c) prolonged solitary confinement with no access to food and potable water; and (d) the forcing of detainees to perform military tasks.\textsuperscript{66} The Panel identified that the Forces’ personnel responsible for the supervision of detention, Osama Najim and Adel Mohamed Ali (also known as Sheikh Adel), had unlawfully transferred detainees from unofficial and official detention places in Tripoli to the Mitiga facility for the primary purpose of using them for forced labour as a form of slavery (see annex 21).\textsuperscript{67}

*Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade*

40. The Panel identified two cases of arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance and mistreatment of individuals targeted on political grounds. Victims were illegally abducted from their workplaces and transferred to the Brigade’s Al-Saadawi Camp in Ayn Zarah. There they were subjected to cruel treatment in the form of violent practices such as prolonged incommunicado detention, harsh detention conditions, and extensive and abusive interrogations about the victims’ involvement in the election processes and alleged affiliation with HAF.\textsuperscript{68}

*Haftar Affiliated Forces Libyan Arab Armed Forces*

41. The Panel investigated six incidents of arbitrary and unlawful detention, torture and other ill-treatment, and denial of fair trial rights in temporary and permanent detention places under the control of HAF. These included the Gernada facility in Bayda’, internal security agency offices in Marj, the Kuwayfiyah detention facility in Benghazi, and an unofficial detention place under the control of the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade in Sidi Faraj in Benghazi.\textsuperscript{69} In four cases, detainees were cumulatively subjected to: (a) systematic and brutal beatings; (b) prolonged incommunicado

\textsuperscript{63} These qualitative data are consistent with the statistics provided to the Panel by Lawyers for Justice in Libya (publication forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{64} See common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

\textsuperscript{65} Known locations of all established detention facilities and other places used for detention are contained in annexes 20, 23 and 24.

\textsuperscript{66} Panel interviews with former detainees (international humanitarian law confidential sources 3, 4, 5, 6, 48, 49 and 61) and a family member (confidential source 8).

\textsuperscript{67} See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4.

\textsuperscript{68} Panel interviews with eyewitness confidential sources 9, 10 and 38.

\textsuperscript{69} Panel interviews with former detainees (confidential sources 1, 54, 73, 79 and 80) and family members (confidential sources 7, 13 and 81).
detention; (c) deliberate denial of medical care; (d) psychological abuse; and (e) intimidation.

42. Two former detainees held in the Kuwayfiyah facility recognized the head of guards, Captain Bashir Al Jahni, as a direct perpetrator of acts of torture performed on them in the form of brutal beatings by wooden sticks while forced to be nude. The Panel established that these acts had caused permanent physical injuries to the victims’ bodies and severe psychological trauma.\(^70\)

**Al-Kaniyat armed group**

43. As reported in [S/2021/229],\(^71\) the Panel received further evidence of seven incidents of arbitrary and unlawful imprisonment and violence to life and person, including the murder of five detainees that took place in detention places under the effective control of the Al-Kaniyat armed group.\(^72\) Three witnesses consistently stated that three Al-Kaniyat commanders, including Abdurahem El Shgagi (also known as Abdurahem Al-Kani), were responsible for those acts.

2. **Attacks against human rights defenders, social activists and media workers**

44. The Panel identified attacks against six human rights defenders, social activists and media workers that severely deprived these individuals of their human rights, in particular the right to life, liberty and freedom of expression (see annex 22).\(^73\) Two high-profile female human rights defenders were subjected to intimidation and threats due to their engagement in public life and activism. Attackers exploited cultural and gender norms to intimidate them and their family members with threats of public humiliation within their immediate local community.

3. **Violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers**

45. The Panel identified 26 incidents of serious human rights violations committed against migrants and asylum seekers in three correlative contexts of human trafficking and migrant smuggling: (a) along human trafficking routes controlled by networks of human traffickers; (b) in detention centres for migrants; and (c) in association with maritime operations.

**Acts committed in unlawful places of detention under the control of human traffickers**

46. The Panel established that human rights abuses against four migrants took place in secret detention facilities created and controlled by networks of human traffickers in the areas of Tazirbu and Bani Walid. Victims were unlawfully detained under deplorable sanitary conditions, and were enslaved and tortured by being severely beaten day and night, deliberately starved to the point of life-threatening weight loss and malnutrition, and denied medical care. Two former female detainees, who were 14- and 15-year-old girls at the time, further testified to the Panel that multiple perpetrators had repeatedly raped them and subjected them to sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence during a period of over 18 months in a secret detention facility in Bani Walid (see annex 23).

\(^70\) Medical documentation of 21 February, 31 March, 13 April and 21 April 2021.
\(^71\) See [S/2021/229], paras. 36–39.
\(^72\) Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
\(^73\) See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6, 9 and 19.
Acts committed in detention centres for migrants

47. The Panel identified three parallel detention systems for migrants and asylum seekers operating under the control of three distinct detaining authorities since at least December 2021: (a) the official detention system, composed of around 24 detention centres holding between 1,400 and 2,000 migrants,74 under the authority of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration; (b) at least three former Directorate detention centres that, although officially closed, continued to be operated under the oversight of the former Directorate management; and (c) unofficial detention centres under the authority of the Stability Support Apparatus Department for Combating Settlement and Illegal Migration (see annex 24).

Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration detention centres

48. The Panel interviewed 11 victims in relation to five detention centres for migrants nominally under the authority of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration prior to December 2021: Ayn Zarah, Mabani, Shara’ al-Zawiyah and Tariq al-Sikkah, all in Tripoli; and Al-Nasr in Zawiyah.75 In all cases, members of the Libyan Coast Guard had captured victims in Libyan territorial and/or international waters while they were attempting to reach European ports and transferred them to places of detention where they were subjected to torture. Victims’ accounts provided eyewitness evidence of prolonged arbitrary and unlawful detention, forced labour, torture and cruel and degrading treatment. Methods of torture and other ill-treatment included brutal beatings that caused severe physical injury to detainees’ bodies, forced nudity, intentional denial of adequate food, water and medical care, and being forced to live in overcrowded and humiliating conditions (see annex 24).

49. The Panel further finds that individual guards responsible for protecting the most vulnerable migrants held in the Shara’ al-Zawiyah detention centre directly took part in or turned a blind eye to consistent acts of rape, sexual exploitation and threats of rape against women and girls detained in the centre. These offences took place between January and June 2021.

Stability Support Apparatus detention centre

50. The Panel identified six cases of serious violations of human rights, and in particular unlawful detention, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, that had taken place as of December 2021 in the Mayah detention centre for migrants under Stability Support Apparatus control. In three cases, victims were mistreated to death in violation of their right to life.76

51. Three former detainees recognized the head of the Mayah detention centre, Mohamed Al-Kabouti, as a direct perpetrator of brutal acts of mistreatment, and in particular severe beatings, to which he regularly subjected them throughout the entire period of their prolonged unlawful imprisonment.77

74 Panel interview with the head of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, 23 March 2022; and confidential sources 33 and 45. The Panel notes that the exact number of detained migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the number and status of Directorate detention centres, fluctuates on a regular basis. Data as at 23 March 2022.

75 The Panel is protecting the interviewees’ identities as a personal security measure.

76 Panel interview with witness (confidential source 100) and documentary evidence, including medical reports and photographs of victims’ dead bodies with clear signs of mistreatment.

77 Panel interviews with former detainees (confidential sources 101, 102 and 103).
Acts associated with maritime operations

52. Four distinct command and control structures carried out maritime security operations in Libyan territorial and international waters: (a) the Libyan Navy; (b) the Libyan Coast Guard, also under the command and control of the Ministry of Defence; (c) the General Administration for Coastal Security under the authority of the Ministry of Interior; and (d) maritime units controlled by the Stability Support Apparatus. This operational fragmentation created a serious protection gap. Difficulties in identifying the appropriate Libyan maritime agency placed migrants and asylum seekers at a real risk of serious human rights violations and eroded prospects for accountability in relation to reported human rights violations. Eyewitnesses were confused as to the unit to which the potential perpetrators belonged. The coordination of maritime operations among the responsible Libyan authorities was weak and often not in compliance with applicable international law.

Libyan Coast Guard

53. The Panel received evidence of human rights violations committed in two incidents, on 30 April and 30 June 2021, by the Libyan Coast Guard against approximately 93 migrants and asylum seekers, including children, in distress in international waters. The Panel finds that individuals of the Libyan Coast Guard subjected the distressed persons to cruel and degrading treatment and used excessive force that placed the migrants at a foreseeable risk of losing their lives (see annex 24). The accounts of these human rights violations are consistent with Panel interviews of four other victims who testified, in separate incidents, that members of the Libyan Coast Guard had shot at them while they attempted to cross the Mediterranean Sea, beaten them, unlawfully confiscated their private property upon capture and/or verbally abused them.

Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre

54. The Panel investigated a shipwreck incident that occurred in the Libyan Search and Rescue Region on 22 April 2021. Based on extensive evidence, the Panel finds that the responsible Libyan authority, the Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre, violated the right to life of around 130 migrants and asylum seekers by failing to take appropriate measures to render assistance to persons in distress at sea (see annex 24). The Panel further received information on five similar incidents in which Libyan authorities had failed to provide a search and rescue response to boats in distress carrying migrants and asylum seekers in the Libyan Search and Rescue Region.

Stability Support Apparatus maritime units

55. The Panel identified that members of the Stability Support Apparatus used excessive force against migrants and asylum seekers in two incidents at sea, on 12 August 2021 and 19 January 2022. Distressed persons were subjected to degrading treatment, and one person was unlawfully deprived of life. The Panel has also received information on the lethal use of force, attributed to Stability Support Apparatus maritime units on 21 November 2021 and 18 February 2022, which the Panel continues to investigate.

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79 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6 and 7.
80 Panel interviews with former detainees (confidential sources 6, 17, 18 and 20).
III. Implementation of the arms embargo

56. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 to 13 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent resolutions, the Panel continued to monitor, investigate and identify violations and non-compliance regarding the arms embargo. The Panel has continued to refine and use the maritime and air delivery profile indicators to assist in determining the likelihood of violations and occurrences, and thus determine the focus of Panel investigations (see annex 25). Multiple indicators are required before a vessel, aircraft or airline is classified as of interest to the Panel or reported as being in violation or non-compliance.

57. The arms embargo will continue to be totally ineffective while Member States control the logistical flows and supply chains to the parties that each Member State is supporting. As no action has yet been taken against individuals and entities reported as violating the arms embargo, and which meet the designation criteria in paragraph 11 (e) of resolution 2213 (2015), the deterrent effect of the sanctions regime is very low.

58. It is now over 11 years since the initial resolution imposed restrictive measures on the supply and transfer of arms and military materiel into Libya. Annex 26 includes a summary of the types of arms and military materiel transferred into Libya over that period in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011). The present summary illustrates the variety and technical complexity of the weapons and military materiel now available within Libya; it also serves as a baseline to assist in the identification of any future violations.

A. Technical violations and dual-use technology

59. The introduction of military, naval or aviation assets into Libyan territory by Member States has been a recurring issue during the whole period of the Libyan arms embargo, all requiring investigation by the Panel until the rationale for their presence is identified. Many of these assets were identified as being deployed to Libya under the auspices of paragraph 3 of resolution 2214 (2015), an issue that the Panel raised on multiple occasions.

The Panel considers that “a violation” has occurred when there has been a physical transfer of arms and military materiel, training or the provision of material support. The Panel also uses the term “technical violation” for the temporary transfer of military materiel into Libya, such as naval vessels and military cargo aircraft, where there is no obvious intent to provide military capability to parties to the conflict, for example, the use of military aircraft or vessels by Member States to resupply diplomatic missions, deliver humanitarian items or provide humanitarian assistance.

“Non-compliance” refers to those occurrences in which an entity has not taken the appropriate action, as contained in the resolution, for example, to prevent “a violation”, by not inspecting aircraft or vessels bound for Libya, or to provide required or requested information to the Committee and/or its Panel. “Technical non-compliance” refers to a situation in which the responsible party could not reasonably be expected to know at the time of transfer that it would be an incident of non-compliance and should take action to improve its due diligence protocols and procedures.

In that paragraph, the Security Council called upon Member States to help build the capacity of other Member States where necessary and appropriate and upon request, to address the threat posed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL, Ansar al-Charia and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda operating in Libya, in coordination with the Government of Libya.

60. Yet, there were also cases during the reporting period of Member States using military aviation assets to deliver humanitarian aid\textsuperscript{86} or naval assets to deliver “supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use”\textsuperscript{87} under the auspices of paragraph 9 of resolution 2095 (2013); neither cargo type requires notification of the Committee. Nevertheless, the means of delivery involves the introduction of military aircraft and/or naval vessels into Libyan territory, which the Panel considers a technical violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011). Considering that there is no intent in these instances by Member States to provide a military capability to any of the armed groups in Libya, the Panel considers that it should not report such cases as violations of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011). However, each incident carries reputational risk for Member States and requires investigation by the Panel, which could be avoided if Member States were to notify the Committee of the delivery of such materiel or aid, if using military aviation or naval assets to do so (see recommendation 1).

61. The ever-evolving technology and relatively low cost of smart electronic fast-moving consumer goods, such as optics and unmanned aerial vehicles,\textsuperscript{88} and the ease of modification of civilian vehicles to convert them into combat-capable vehicles\textsuperscript{89} make such dual-use items\textsuperscript{90} ideal for military use in low-level conflicts. During the reporting cycle, the Panel continued to identify cases in which fast-moving consumer good technology had been procured and used for military purposes in Libya. The Panel considers that where such technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

B. Maritime issues

1. Regional response

62. Resolution 2578 (2021) extended the authority for the inspection of vessels on the high seas off Libya until 3 June 2022. Although inspections were undertaken during the reporting period by the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), no arms seizures resulted.

63. On 29 July 2021, in response to a notification about the inspection of the Zambian-flagged MV Antalya (International Maritime Organization (IMO) No. 7615232), the Permanent Mission of Zambia informed the Committee that Zambia did not have an open ship register and did not register international vessels. Hence, another Zambian-flagged vessel, the MV Gauja (IMO 7612474), was also sailing under a “false flag” when it was inspected by Operation IRINI naval assets on 11 May 2021.

\textsuperscript{86} For example, Egypt delivering medical supplies to Sabha on 14 April 2021 by military C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft and Turkey delivering COVID vaccines to Tripoli on 14 April by military A400M Atlas cargo aircraft.

\textsuperscript{87} For example, on 2 December 2021, the Italian Navy San Giorgio landing platform dock (L9892) was used to deliver a Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre facility to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (see annex 31).

\textsuperscript{88} See S/2021/229, annex 73, and figure 77.8 to annex 77, and annex 80.

\textsuperscript{89} For example, the conversion of 4x4 light utility vehicles for use as weapon platforms known as “technicals”. See S/2021/229, appendix A to annex 35.

\textsuperscript{90} Note that the term “dual use” used in the report does not equate to the definition of “dual-use goods and technologies” used in the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, or the definition of “dual-use goods” used in the European Union export control regime (Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items). See para. 61 for the Panel’s use of “dual-use”.

86 For example, Egypt delivering medical supplies to Sabha on 14 April 2021 by military C-130 Hercules cargo aircraft and Turkey delivering COVID vaccines to Tripoli on 14 April by military A400M Atlas cargo aircraft.

87 For example, on 2 December 2021, the Italian Navy San Giorgio landing platform dock (L9892) was used to deliver a Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre facility to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy (see annex 31).

88 See S/2021/229, annex 73, and figure 77.8 to annex 77, and annex 80.

89 For example, the conversion of 4x4 light utility vehicles for use as weapon platforms known as “technicals”. See S/2021/229, appendix A to annex 35.

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2. Vessels of significant interest and maritime violations

64. Several vessels are considered “of significant interest” to the Panel based on open-source and confidential information; maritime profile indicators, including deactivation of the automatic identification system; change of destination port en route; flag State refusal of inspection; and the structure of companies owning and operating the vessels. The Panel has written to relevant Member States and owners and operators of several vessels and is awaiting responses.

Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces

65. In S/2019/914, the Panel raised the issue of naval-type patrol vessels supplied to Libya under the non-lethal exception of paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013) and subsequently armed post-delivery. The Panel noted that, during the reporting cycle, the Stability Support Apparatus had created its own maritime unit. This unit undertakes law enforcement and other maritime operations in Libyan territorial and Search and Rescue Region waters, in parallel with Libyan Coast Guard, the General Administration for Coastal Security and Libyan Navy operations (also see para. 52).

66. The Stability Support Apparatus maritime unit operates at least five vessels, including two civilian vessels converted to patrol boats: (a) the Alqayid Saqar, which notably is coloured yellow, suggesting use for search and rescue, but which also mounts a heavy machine gun; (b) the Alqayid 1, which was seen both in a civilian configuration and with a detachable heavy machine gun; and (c) a Lambro Olympic D74 class naval-type fast patrol boat (see table 1 and annex 27). While the transfers of (a) and (b), if unarmed, do not fall under the arms embargo, their post-transfer arming is a circumvention of the embargo. In the Panel’s view, the transfer of (c) does not fall under the exceptions for non-lethal military equipment contained in paragraph 9 (humanitarian or protective use) or paragraph 10 (security or disarmament assistance) of resolution 2095 (2013).

67. Paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013) applies only to the Government of Libya, and hence only to forces under its control. To that effect, in response to paragraph 6 of resolution 2278 (2016), the Government of National Accord submitted information on the forces under its control to the Committee in May 2017, which was reflected in paragraph 6 of resolution 2362 (2017). The Stability Support Apparatus was not one of the units determined as being within “the structure of the security forces under its control”. The Panel understands that the units under control of the Government have significantly changed since that notification, with, for example, the formation since 2017 of the Stability Support Apparatus, a joint operations room and seven military zones. An update on “security forces under the control” of the Government would lead to more clarity for the implementation of the arms embargo (see recommendation 2).

Haftar Affiliated Forces

68. In S/2019/914, the Panel reported on the transfer in 2013 of vessels, including naval-type patrol vessels, that ended up under the control of HAF. The Panel has now identified that individuals of a HAF maritime unit, the Susah Combat Marine Squadron, have used some of these vessels and a newly identified naval-type rigid-hulled inflatable boat in acts that impeded freedom of navigation and amounted to

91 Paras. 78 to 80.
93 See https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/148571149463472000; https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1437425542441820163; and https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1487425542441820163, 29 January 2022.
94 Those forces being the Libyan Coast Guard, explosive ordnance disposal units and the Presidential Guard.
95 Para. 79 and annex 33.
96 Also known as the Sousse Marine Combat Squadron or the Susah Marine Combat Company.
piracy in at least five incidents under the Panel’s investigation. These acts of piracy were executed on the high seas in the form of arbitrary and unlawful detention of neutral foreign-flagged merchant vessels and unlawful seizure of the property of their crew (see annex 28). Since at least late 2020, the pattern of unlawful behaviour by Squadron individuals has consisted of them acting and presenting themselves as the Libyan Coast Guard with the intention of illegally obtaining financial gains from captured vessels. To secure their release, vessels were forced to pay a negotiable fine of up to LD 200,000 (approximately $42,000) in cash in response to the justification by Squadron individuals that these vessels had violated one of the two unlawfully declared HAF maritime zones, the “no-sail” and “prohibited” maritime zones, which both extend into international waters (see figure). 99

69. First declared by the Libyan National Army in 2015 as an enforcement measure to interdict arms shipments, the “no-sail zone” has remained active to date. The zone encompasses the area south of the 34th parallel and, although not clearly defined in its lateral extension, it extends from Bayda’ to Darnah, but may also reach Benghazi. This ambiguous zone thus extends out up to 70 nautical miles (nm) from the coastline of Libya, well beyond its territorial waters and only about 10 nm short of the major shipping lane traversing the Mediterranean Sea.

70. It is unclear when the “prohibited zone” was first promulgated, but an undated notification to merchant and other vessels defining the zone was shared by local merchant agents with a maritime services company as recently as January 2022 (see annex 29). It forms part of the “no-sail zone” but extends further to the east. Only the eastern part exceeds Libyan territorial waters, at its maximum extension by 16.9 nm. A representative of the Susah Combat Marine Squadron confirmed to the Panel the veracity of the “prohibited zone” and said that vessels were allowed passage on the condition of providing information related to the ship, voyage and cargo. He indicated that the “prohibited zone” had been established to interdict movements of arms and individuals to terrorist groups in Darnah. The Panel notes that Darnah was declared “liberated from terrorists” by HAF as of the end of June 2018. 103

97 The Panel adopts the definitions of the terms “freedom of navigation” and “piracy” under customary international law codified in articles 87 and 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See also International Law Commission, Articles concerning the Law of the Sea with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1956, vol. II, arts. 27 and 39. The Panel’s use of these terms is without prejudice to the status of concerned non-State actors under international law.

98 The Panel considers only the Libyan Coast Guard under the control of the Government of National Unity as the State-official Libyan Coast Guard.


100 The Panel could not find the primary source of the Libyan National Army declaration, which appears to have been done through its now defunct Facebook page. Secondary sources: https://medium.com/libya-security-monitor/libya-situation-update-12-15-december-4aa69983ad01, 16 December 2015; https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/676999971082780672, 16 December 2015; 24 March 2020.


103 www.france24.com/ar/20180629
71. Libya officially declared a sea area designated for fishery protection, which is referred to as the Libyan fisheries protection zone. This is only for fishery management and the protection of stocks (see figure).¹⁰⁴

Figure
Haftar Affiliated Forces “no-sail” and “prohibited” zones and officially declared fisheries protection zone

3. Maritime violations

72. The Panel identified one confirmed and one highly probable maritime violation and two maritime technical violations (see table 1).\textsuperscript{105}

Table 1
Maritime violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/type</th>
<th>IMO/hull no.</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Violation</th>
<th>Technical violation</th>
<th>No. of profile indicators</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luccello*</td>
<td>7800112</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 100 military armoured vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Offloaded in Benghazi (Haftar Affiliated Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• See annex 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambro</td>
<td></td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>• Patrol boat in use by the Stability Support Apparatus naval component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic D74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fast patrol boat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Means and date of delivery unidentified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Giorgio</td>
<td>L9892</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>• Military vessel used for delivery of items not falling under the arms embargo (Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landing platform dock\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• See annex 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capri, Tremiti</td>
<td>A5353</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>• Continued presence in Abu Sitta naval base since 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and/or Caprera</td>
<td>A5348</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• See annex 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coastal transport ships\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>A5349</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Now sailing as the MV Victory Roro under the flag of Equatorial Guinea.
\textsuperscript{b} Italian Navy San Giorgio class landing platform dock.
\textsuperscript{c} Italian Navy Gorgona class coastal transport ship.

73. The Panel finds that the owners/operator of the vessel listed in table 2 violated paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) on the transfer of military materiel to Libya.

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\textsuperscript{105} The Panel has written to the relevant Member States and owners and operators of vessels and received some responses. Details can be found in the appropriate evidentiary annex.
### Table 2

**Maritime transfer confirmed violations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Flag</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Transfer to entity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luccello</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Medred Ship Management Co Ltd, Turkey</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Haftar</td>
<td>Affiliated Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Now sailing as the MV *Victory Roro* under the flag of Equatorial Guinea.

### C. Arms transfer and military training violations

1. **Background**

74. The Panel has identified that 18 incidents of arms transfers\(^{106}\) and four examples of military training\(^{107}\) in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) took place during the reporting period. The Panel also identified 26 arms transfer and 5 training violations that took place and went unreported during previous reporting periods; they are included in the present report to provide the evidence for the baseline data mentioned in paragraph 58. The Panel has also been able to attribute responsibility for two cases reported as unidentified in S/2021/229.

75. Violations are presented in a chronological tabular basis for ease of reference in annex 32. Infographics for transfer violation cases can be found in annexes 33 to 76, and for training violation cases in annexes 77 to 85.

2. **Military training provided to the Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces by Turkey**

76. The official website of the Presidency of the General Staff to the Libyan Army showed Major General Nouri Shenuk, Training Director of the Libyan Army, visiting the Headquarters of the Training Management and Operations Authority of the Ministry of Defence of Turkey on 16 November 2021.\(^{108}\) The purpose of the visit was to discuss ongoing joint cooperation between the two countries in the field of military training, and to review the progress of the current training provided to the Libyan Army by Turkey.\(^{109}\) Subsequently, on 30 November 2021, the Turkish Ministry of Defence spokesperson, Pinar Kara, stated that Turkey would continue its “military assistance to Libya under a bilateral agreement at the invitation of the internationally recognized legitimate government”.\(^{110}\) The spokesperson further disclosed that Turkish forces had, up until 30 November 2021, trained 6,799 Libyan soldiers in

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\(^{106}\) “Transfer” relates to the transfer of arms and military equipment.

\(^{107}\) “Training” relates to training provided by a third party and relating to military activities.


Libya and Turkey, while 974 other soldiers were still in training. The Panel wrote to Turkey on 10 December 2021 requesting details about the training. The response of Turkey of 14 February 2022 confirmed that Major General Nouri Shenuk had visited between 14 to 21 November 2021 but provided no further details on the type or scope of training.

77. The Panel acknowledges that some specialized training provided by Turkey, for example, in explosive ordnance disposal, falls under the exemption auspices of “humanitarian ... training” under paragraph 9 of resolution 2095 (2013). The remainder of the training provided by Turkey to the Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces is military or naval in nature and thus a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

3. Anti-trafficking

78. The 4,348-km land boundary remains porous, and small-scale smuggling of weapons (“ant-trafficking”) continues unabated at a scale that is difficult to either determine or control. Seizures are rare on either side of the border and, during the reporting period, only four seizures were reported: (a) 80 weapons in the Niger on 13 April 2021; (b) 37 weapons in the Sudan on 13 September 2021; (c) small arms ammunition in the Sudan on 8 January 2022 (see annex 71); and (d) weapons and small arms ammunition on the Algerian border seized by the HAF 106 brigade on 4 January 2022.114

D. Aviation violations and non-compliance

1. Air bridges

79. In 2020, the Panel identified from its profile indicators (see annex 25) that centrally planned air bridges were in operation primarily between: (a) the United Arab Emirates and western Egypt/eastern Libya (HAF); (b) the Russian Federation, via the Syrian Arab Republic, and eastern Libya (HAF); and (c) Turkey and western Libya (Government of National Unity). In S/2021/229, the Panel found that operators of aircraft forming the air bridges were in non-compliance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

80. Traffic on these air bridges was generally significantly lower during the reporting period compared with the previous one. For example, flights by Russian Federation military cargo aircraft into western Libya declined by 61 per cent (see annex 86). The Panel also notes that Russian Federation military cargo aircraft used Libya as a technical stop for flights to, for example, the Central African Republic and Mali. Flights by Turkish military cargo aircraft into eastern Libya declined by 62 per cent (see annex 87). Conversely, flights by Cham Wings Airlines of the Syrian Arab Republic increased by 79 per cent (see annex 88) and, although still being used for the rotation of foreign fighters, were also used as part of an irregular migration route.

2. **Aviation-related violations and non-compliance**

81. The Panel has continued to investigate the owners and operators of aircraft that are either of interest to the Panel or identified as violating the arms embargo (see summary in annex 89, and annexes 90 to 96).

82. Aircraft continue to be regularly switched between owners and operators to introduce a layer of opacity to disguise their illicit flight operations. In particular, the Panel has noted an increase in the number of aircraft owned by Space Cargo Inc of the United Arab Emirates operating in support of HAF, and therefore in violation of the arms embargo.

E. **Violations by private military companies**

1. **“Project Opus”**

83. The Panel identified a programme by Space Cargo Inc and BU Shames FZE, both registered in the United Arab Emirates, for the repair, maintenance and test-flying of the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters deployed by the Project Opus organization and reported in annex 76 of S/2021/229. South African technicians contracted by Space Cargo Inc initially deployed to Benghazi on 18 December 2020. The aircraft were made test-flyable and were first seen flying in the HAF parade marking the seventh anniversary of Operation DIGNITY on 29 May 2021 (see annex 97).

84. Updated information regarding: (a) the LASA T-Bird aircraft registered as YU-TSH; and (b) the use of disguised company ownership can be found in annex 99. This is still an open investigation.

2. **ChVK Wagner**

85. The Panel continues to investigate the deployment of ChVK Wagner and transfers of arms and related materiel to support ChVK Wagner operations. Further information on their operations and logistics during 2020 can be found in annex 100, which also includes details on a violation of international humanitarian law.

3. **AR Global Group FZE LLC**

86. The Panel has identified that the company AR Global Group FZE LLC, which is registered in the United Arab Emirates, is acting as a broker or supply agent for HAF. The company attempted to procure a dual-use communications surveillance system on 27 September 2020. The procurement was disrupted in May 2021 when Lithuania denied an export licence for some dual-use components of the wider system. The end-user certificates supplied by HAF can be found in annex 101. AR Global Group FZE LLC was offered an opportunity to respond on 14 February 2021. No response was received.

F. **Summary of violation and non-compliance responsibilities**

87. The Panel finds that the countries, entities or individuals listed in table 3 are:

   (a) In violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011);

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115 See also para. 83 for the involvement of Space Cargo Inc in private military operations.

116 A-0059-03 Flamingo Villas, Ajman, United Arab Emirates. The chief executive officer is Hazem Abdurrahim Imam.
(b) In non-compliance with paragraph 19 of resolution 2213 (2015) due to failing to properly inspect vessels and/or aircraft bound to or from Libya; and/or

(c) In non-compliance with paragraphs 14 and/or 15 of resolution 2571 (2021) by not supplying information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures and/or failure to provide unhindered access to documents the Panel deems relevant to the execution of its mandate.

Table 3  
**Summary of responsibility for violations and/or non-compliance**

|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------|
| Libya (Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | • Procurement of arms and related materiel while failing to request advance approval by the Committee  
• Failure to inspect on arrival vessels and aircraft used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya  
• Failure to provide information to the Panel on request |
| Jordan | ✓ | | | • Failure to inspect vessels and aircraft used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya |
| Russian Federation | ✓ | | | • Routine transfer of arms and related materiel in and out of Libya, specifically military cargo aircraft |
| Syrian Arab Republic | ✓ | | | • Failure to inspect on arrival vessels and aircraft used to transfer foreign fighters to Libya |
| Turkey | ✓ | ✓ | | • Transfer of arms and related materiel to Libya for use by Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces  
• Provision of training related to military activities to Government of National Unity Affiliated Forces  
• Failure to inspect vessels and aircraft used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya |
| United Arab Emirates | ✓ | ✓ | | • Transfer of arms and related materiel to Libya for use by the Haftar Affiliated Forces (HAF)  
• Failure to inspect aircraft used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|
| Haftar Affiliated Forces  | ✓                               | ✓                               | ✓                               | • Procurement of arms and related materiel  
                               |                                 |                                 |                                 | • Failure to inspect on arrival vessels and aircraft used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya  
                               |                                 |                                 |                                 | • Failure to provide information to the Panel on request |
| Alpha Air LLC (Ukraine)   | ✓                               |                                 |                                 | • Flight operations for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance to Libya |
| Cham Wings Airlines (SAW) (Syrian Arab Republic) | ✓ | ✓ | | • Flight operations for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance to Libya  
                               |                                 |                                 |                                 | • Failure to provide information to the Panel on request |
| FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) (Kyrgyz Republic) | ✓ | | | • Flight operations for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance to Libya |
| FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) (Ukraine) | ✓ | | | • Flight operations for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance to Libya |
| Green Flag Aviation (GNF) (Sudan) | ✓ | | ✓ | • Provision of other assistance relating to military activities, specifically aviation logistical support to the military operations of HAF within Libya  
                               |                                 |                                 |                                 | • Failure to provide information to the Panel on request |
| Medred Ship Management Co Ltd (Turkey) | ✓ | ✓ | | • Transfer of arms and related materiel to Libya  
                               |                                 |                                 |                                 | • Failure to inspect a vessel used to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya |
| Sapsan Airlines LLC (KGB) (Kyrgyzstan) | ✓ | | | • Flight operations for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance to Libya |
| Space Cargo Inc (United Arab Emirates) | ✓ | | | • Provision of other assistance relating to military activities, specifically aviation logistical support to the military operations of HAF within Libya |

* Listed alphabetically by generic group.
G. Responses to arms embargo violations

88. Some Member States and regional organizations have taken a range of actions in response to non-compliance with the arms embargo by entities based in or registered within their territories (see annex 102).

H. Launch of tactical ballistic missiles by the Haftar Affiliated Forces

89. The test launch of at least three tactical ballistic missiles on 7 March 2022 by HAF was an unexpected occurrence, as the general consensus of demining and stockpile management organizations was that no operable tactical ballistic missiles remained in Libya. See annex 103 for analysis of this incident.

IV. Unity of State institutions

90. The issue of the unity of State institutions was examined in the light of the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 2509 (2020).

A. Reunification process of the Central Bank of Libya

1. Overview

91. In July 2018, the former Prime Minister of Libya, Fayez al-Sarraj, sent a letter to the Secretary-General in which he requested that the United Nations facilitate a financial review of the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli and the parallel branch in Bayda’, in the east, with the aim of restoring integrity, transparency and confidence in the Libyan financial system and creating the conditions necessary for the unification of Libyan financial institutions.

92. In July 2021, after having perused the financial situation of both the Tripoli and Bayda’ branches, Deloitte delivered a final report based on six main pillars and a set of 15 recommendations (see annex 104). The Panel notes that the main issues impeding the reunification process identified in the report are:

(a) A need to reform and improve the process for issuing letters of credit;
(b) Non-utilization of the International Financial Reporting Standards;\(^{117}\)
(c) A need to assess the impact of the devaluation of the Libyan dinar;
(d) The need to establish a requirement for effective governance and internal controls;
(e) The repeated rejection of budget proposals by the House of Representatives;\(^{118}\)
(f) Issues related to the leadership of both branches.\(^{118}\)

2. Road map and update on the current status of negotiations

93. The recommendations of Deloitte serve as the basis for the terms of reference that it issued on 9 July 2021, which now guide the reform and reunification process.

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\(^{117}\) The International Financial Reporting Standards are a set of accounting rules for the financial statements of public companies that are intended to make them consistent, transparent and easily comparable around the world. They were developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (see www.ifrs.com).

\(^{118}\) Note that the House of Representatives attempted to replace the current Governor of the Central Bank in September 2014 and April 2015; however, he refused to vacate his position.
The Panel was informed that, on 20 February 2022, the Governor of the eastern Central Bank of Libya, Ali al-Hibri, had confirmed the following approach: there would be an initial agreement on short-term measures, addressing liquidity, bank balances in the east and cheque clearing, after which the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Libya would address the commercial banks, adjust the membership of the Board of Directors of the Libyan Foreign Bank to include experts in banking and subsequently restructure the Central Bank of Libya. Meanwhile, the project management office, headed in the eastern Central Bank by Ali Jehani, would move forward at the staff level with the integration of bank supervision and regulation, with Bayda’ handling the east and Tripoli the west, but without competing agendas. (For example, the Jumhouriya Bank would have a general assembly, with the participation of both the Central Bank of Libya and the eastern Central Bank of Libya, with balanced representation on the Board of Directors of Jumhouriya Bank.)

The Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Libya has yet to begin this work. Nevertheless, initial discussions between the directors of both branches have taken place. In parallel, Deloitte carried out a workshop in mid-February 2022 to move forward with implementing the terms of reference, beginning with settling on specific objectives. The agreed scheduling is as set out in table 4.

Table 4
Target timeline for implementation of the terms of reference for the reunification and reform of the Central Bank of Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Target start date</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparation for reunification</td>
<td>End of January 2022</td>
<td>Three months</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of reunification</td>
<td>End of April 2022</td>
<td>Three months</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>End of July 2022</td>
<td>One month</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform objectives</td>
<td>End of July 2022</td>
<td>Six months</td>
<td>• Accounting enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bank supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Restructuring</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The process is supported by seven workstreams:

(a) A vision and operation model;
(b) Public debt;
(c) Currency issuance and circulation;
(d) A clearing system;
(e) Hard currency distribution;
(f) Extension of the financial review to cover accounts from mid-2020 through 2021;
(g) Government budget and spending.

There has been no progress on arranging for the Board of Directors to begin the above-mentioned work, which is considered essential for the reform’s success.

119 Nominally also the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank.
120 Confidential source.
Nevertheless, it is considered that advances are being made with regard to the remainder of the workstream.


97. The 2020 report of the Libyan Audit Bureau was released on 24 August 2021 and highlighted some of the dysfunctional practices of the Central Bank of Libya. The main findings relate to the Bank’s operations department.

98. The split in the Central Bank has affected the normal functioning of its activities in different ways, among which it is worth mentioning the divergent payment system, as banks in the east operate independently. A dual payment system has been created: (a) banks in the west process payments via the real-time gross settlement system; while (b) banks in the east perform transactions manually, as the eastern Central Bank has been disconnected from that system. This has negatively affected the fulfillment of their obligations, as the Central Bank of Libya does not recognize the manual system.

99. The report noted the failure of the Central Bank of Libya to switch to an electronic clearing system, due to its inability to unify the above-mentioned banking systems and the failure to unify and monitor fees. Consequently, the eastern and western branches of the bank each unilaterally decide their own fees.

100. The Audit Bureau also reported that the Central Bank of Libya had refused to provide the necessary documents and data relating to measures to combat money-laundering.

B. **National Oil Corporation**

101. The reporting cycle was marked by a tug-of-war regarding influence over the country’s oil sector between the Minister of Oil and Gas, Mohamed Aoun, and the Chair of the Board of Directors of the National Oil Corporation, Mustafa Sanalla. In August and October 2021, Aoun unsuccessfully attempted to suspend Sanalla for alleged administrative improprieties. Also in October 2021, four individuals affiliated to the Corporation, including a member of the Board and Sanalla’s office manager, were arrested upon the order of the Attorney-General. The Corporation denounced the arbitrary arrest and detention of public figures as an intimidation tactic that could have repercussions on the operations of the oil sector. It expressed its concern that armed groups were increasingly attempting to exert influence over the Ministry and the Corporation.

102. Armed clashes at the Zawiyah refinery on 26 October 2021 led to the damage of storage tanks and the leakage of crude oil and refined petroleum products. While

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the attacks are potentially also linked to historical rivalries and grievances between Zawiyah-based armed groups, control over the Zawiyah refinery and its distribution network is a coveted prize.

103. Production levels rose to, and mostly remained at, between 1.2 and 1.25 million barrels per day. However, production was affected by several events, illustrating that the country’s oil infrastructure continues to be used by different parties as a tool of coercion. On 20 December 2021, the National Oil Corporation confirmed a stoppage of production at the Shararah, Fil, Wafa and Hamada oil fields due to a blockage of pipelines and terminals by Zintani elements of the Petroleum Facilities Guard. This action was in response to the removal of the head of the Board of Directors of Akakus Oil Operations, 127 who was also from Zintan. 128 The Corporation declared force majeure, 129 and output in early January 2022 was down to 729,000 barrels per day before a deal was reportedly reached. 130 Around the same time, eastern tribes threatened to close the Sidra and Ra’s Lanuf facilities over outstanding HAF salaries. 131 On 6 March 2022, the Corporation declared force majeure due to a local group closing pumping valves at the Shararah and Fil oil fields, reducing output by 330,000 barrels per day. This represented a daily loss of more than LD 16 million, and the matter was referred to the Attorney General. 132 The group hailed from Zintan and tribal leaders were involved in negotiating a resumption of operations. 133 Two days later, it was announced that the situation had been resolved. 134

104. Internal rifts between the Ministry and the Corporation also spilled over into the operative environment. Between 23 February and at least 3 March 2022, the Corporation temporarily suspended exports, claiming bad weather had affected oil ports across the country. 135 The Ministry publicly disagreed with that decision, asserting that weather conditions were suitable for export and lamenting the loss of potential income. 136 The Panel notes that, during the period in question, on some days the sea state reached World Meteorological Organization (WMO) level 6 (wave heights of 4 to 6 metres) but averaged around level 5 (wave heights of 2.5 to 4 metres). Sea state level 5 should not significantly impede loading operations. Data available on maritime subscription sources show that terminals appear not to have been closed over the entire period in question, as loading operations took place on several days at

the affected terminals. The public airing of disagreements among the leadership of the sector impedes institutional unity.

V. Prevention of illicit exports or illicit imports of petroleum

A. Illicit exports of crude oil

105. No vessels have been designated pursuant to paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014).

106. On 23 January 2022, the focal point pursuant to resolution 2146 (2014) informed the Panel about an impending attempt to illicitly export 400,000 barrels of crude oil from Marsa al-Hariga. The data provided allowed the Panel to identify the tanker that was allegedly to be used. On 1 February 2022, confidential sources confirmed to the Panel that that tanker, which had not displayed an automatic identification system signal for months, was in the anchorage area off Marsa al-Hariga. It remained there without entering the port until it departed Libyan territorial waters on 4 February 2022. No ship-to-ship loading took place at the anchoring position. The Panel has written to the relevant Member States and to the vessel’s owner and operator; investigations continue.

B. Illicit exports of refined petroleum products

107. Despite consistent increases in the price of refined petroleum products over the reporting period, fuel smuggling by sea did not rebound to previous levels. Several factors contributed to a change in smuggling dynamics, including law enforcement activities by Italy and Malta, and the momentum of the oil market. Fuel smuggling took place on a much smaller scale, with smaller multipurpose vessels being used simultaneously or consecutively to transport other licit or illicit goods. While this modus operandi likely increased the number of individual smuggling instances, smaller loads restricted the geographical reach of smugglers, as the transport of other illicit items offered higher margins. This does not exclude the possibility of ship-to-ship loading from smaller vessels to larger ones in international waters, but the Panel did not become aware of any specific cases in this regard during the reporting period. At the end of the drafting period of the present report, a sudden uptick in alleged illicit exports of petroleum products was reported in the media and by confidential sources. Whether this indicates a developing trend remains to be seen; the Panel continues to investigate.

108. While overland fuel smuggling continued, mainly across the southern and western borders of Libya, diversion within the country became more prominent. This was demonstrated by chronic fuel shortages at gas stations, in particular in the south, forcing the population to resort to the illicit market and driving inflation higher than in the north. Armed groups across the country benefited from the proceeds along the entire fuel diversion supply chain, which was pervasive and well organized.

138 The focal point was reconfirmed by the Government of National Unity during the reporting period.

139 United Nations Code for Trade and Transport Locations LYMHR.


VI. Implementation of the asset freeze on designated entities

A. Overview

109. The Panel continued to engage with the Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001), the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LYe.002) and other interested parties. The designated entities were generally cooperative. The complexity of the financial issues necessitated the Panel engaging with multiple interlocutors, including Member States, fund managers and representatives of the designated entities.

110. The Panel continued to focus on: (a) the receipt of interest and other earnings from frozen assets as dividends; (b) requests or notifications from Member States for exemptions from the asset freeze; (c) the payment of management fees and basic expenditure; and (d) the differing treatment of subsidiaries in various jurisdictions.

111. The Libyan Investment Authority provided the Panel with updates on the progress of its strategy to govern and manage the company according to the Santiago Principles. Even if the reported efforts of the Authority are effective, there is still further work to be done to fully comply with the International Financial Reporting Standards (see annex 105). The Panel’s concerns regarding management’s lack of transparency have not been alleviated, as it is still reluctant to provide updates on some of its subsidiaries’ activities. In this sense, in the Panel’s view, doing business under the umbrella of subsidiaries could result in non-compliance under the sanctions regime and still pose a risk of possible diversion of assets.

B. Misrepresentation of the Libyan Foreign Investment Company and the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company as aliases for the Libyan Investment Authority

112. The Panel notes that the initial designation of the Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001), in resolution 1973 (2011), included the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) as an alias. Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1 of 7 March 2012 also included LAFICO as an alias of the designated entity. On 27 June 2014, after a recommendation of the Panel (see S/2014/106), the Committee amended the listing reference on its sanctions list from LAFICO to “Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC)”. No subsequent amendment to reflect this change has been made to Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1. In S/2018/812 and S/2018/812/Corr.1, the Panel noted that the legal status of LFIC, which operates under the acronym LAFICO, had been discussed in previous reports (see S/2013/99 and S/2017/466). The Panel reiterates that the listing of LFIC (and initially LAFICO) as an alias of the Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001) was incorrect, and that it is 100 per cent-owned by the Libyan Investment Authority (see recommendation 3).

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142 The Santiago Principles consist of 24 generally accepted principles and practices voluntarily endorsed by members of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds. The Santiago Principles promote transparency, good governance, accountability and prudent investment practices while encouraging a more open dialogue and deeper understanding of sovereign wealth fund activities (see www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf).

143 Paras. 238 and 289 (a).

144 Para. 232.

145 Para. 225.

146 Paras. 237 and 238.
C. Update on the Belgian court case on Euroclear

113. In S/2018/212 and S/2018/212/Corr.1, the Panel reported that the interest and other proceeds from frozen assets of the Libyan Investment Authority held at Euroclear Bank had been made available to other bank accounts of the Authority in the period between 2011 and 2017 in non-compliance with the asset freeze. As at 25 October 2017, the judicial authorities of Belgium had subjected these funds and interests to legal attachment as a preliminary measure in the ongoing criminal investigation of alleged money-laundering and other misconduct related to the management of the Authority’s frozen assets in that country.

114. In the context of these criminal proceedings, the Chair of the Authority, Ali Mahmoud Hassan Mohammed, was summoned to appear before the court in Belgium in fall 2021. He did not accede to that request, claiming that Libyan domestic law prevented him from testifying. Consequently, on 9 January 2022 the Belgian investigative judge issued an international arrest warrant against him. The Attorney General of Libya met with his Belgian counterpart in Brussels in an attempt to resolve this issue.

115. The Panel continues to monitor this case and recalls that any release of interest and proceeds from frozen assets should remain frozen as well, as laid out in S/2018/812 and S/2018/812/Corr.1.

D. Exemptions under the asset freeze

116. The Panel noted inconsistent implementation of paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011), which lays down the requirements of the asset freeze.

117. An asset freeze is usually defined as “preventing any move, transfer, alteration or use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management”.

118. The Panel notes that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland consistently continues to interpret paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011) as allowing for the issuance of licences for the active asset management of frozen funds. Its rationale is that active asset management is necessary to maintain the value of the funds, which are ultimately to be made available to and for the benefit of the Libyan people. The Member State indicates that the issuing of such licences does not give the designated entity access to frozen funds, and that the intent of the asset freeze is therefore maintained.

119. The Panel holds a contrary view, considering that an asset management activity involving discretionary management or income from rental payments, even if such income remains frozen, does not currently fall under the scope of “basic expenses” or “routine holding or maintenance” of frozen funds expressed in paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011).
resolution 1970 (2011). The exemptions set out in paragraphs 19 to 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) continue to remain in force. Any exemption notification cannot be considered if not covered under any of the extant provisions, regardless of whether the designated entity has access to the funds.

120. In view of this varying interpretation of paragraph 19 of resolution 1970 (2011), the Panel continues to assist the Committee by providing further suitable guidance on this issue. This underscores the need to monitor the application of the provisions of the paragraph 19 of that resolution regarding active management.\textsuperscript{153}

E. Other issues

121. The Libyan Investment Authority continues to highlight issues of concern regarding the sanctions regime for itself, LAFICO and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio, and their various subsidiaries. These are: (a) the non-availability of interest pursuant to Implementation Assistance Notice No. 6; (b) negative interest rates; (c) the inability to reinvest and to maintain existing investments; and (d) procedural issues with Member States.

122. The Authority refers to the asset freeze as the main cause of fund losses, which was estimated by an international consultant’s audit report as approximately $4 billion.\textsuperscript{154} The Authority considers that without the ability to manage frozen funds, the company cannot be properly managed, and that the Authority is being forced to deplete its dwindling unfrozen resources in order to cover its routine operational expenditure. It regards the licence regime as functionally inoperable for a sovereign wealth fund that requires agility to execute commercial or strategic decisions.\textsuperscript{155}

Assessment of the policy of negative interest rates in an asset freeze environment

123. The Committee has received several requests for the discharge of certain Libyan Investment Authority funds to pay fees or commissions in accordance with the national legislation of Member States. Paragraph 19 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011) is usually invoked. Some of these requests correspond to the charging of negative interest rates in accordance with national legislation.

124. The Panel considers that the policy of negative interest rates used in commercial banking is questionable in the exceptional situation of funds that are subject to an asset freeze measure. The policy results in the erosion of frozen funds, thus contradicting the aim of the sanctions regime, which is to preserve these funds for the benefit of the Libyan people. The banking policy of negative interest rates is imposed on long cash balances to deter clients from retaining cash funds for a long time, which is disadvantageous to the Authority, as it cannot transfer frozen funds to avoid negative interest rates.

125. The Panel understands that this is a national issue for Member States but suggests that such a policy should be examined at the national level as to whether it should be applicable to assets frozen under United Nations sanctions (see recommendation 6).

\textsuperscript{153} See S/2021/229, para. 168, regarding some LIA and LAIP assets actively managed and the Panel’s view on that.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., paras. 152 to 163.

\textsuperscript{155} Panel meeting (20 September 2021).
VII. Implementation of the asset freeze and travel ban on designated individuals

A. Saadi Qadhafi

126. On 6 September 2021, the Government of National Unity announced the release of Saadi Qadhafi (LYi.015) from detention in Tripoli (see annex 106). Official Libyan sources confirmed to the Panel that he had left Libya on the evening of 5 September 2021, on-board a plane belonging to the Government of Libya (Dassault Falcon 900EX, registration no. 5A-DCN), landing in Istanbul, Turkey, at 1.37 a.m. on 6 September 2021. The Panel wrote to Turkey and Libya on 8 September 2021, and to Turkey again on 17 November 2021, providing additional identifying information. No response was received. The Panel continues to investigate.

B. Abu Zayd Umar Dorda

127. Media reports announced the passing on 27 February 2022 of Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006). The Panel wrote to Libya and Egypt, the countries of nationality and residence as per his list entry. Egypt responded that Dorda had died of natural causes on 28 February 2022 and provided a copy of his death certificate (see annex 107). The death certificate included an additional middle name – Hmeid – with the name given as Abu Zayd Umar Hmeid Dorda. No response has been received from Libya (see recommendation 5).

C. Standing travel ban exemptions

128. On 1 December 2020, the Committee decided to grant a six-month “unlimited” humanitarian travel exemption to three listed individuals. This means that exempted individuals can travel during that period without having to seek separate exemptions for each trip, so long as relevant information on each trip is communicated to the Committee in advance. This enables the Committee to remain informed of the whereabouts of these individuals and the purpose of their travel.

129. This exemption has since been continually extended, with the latest renewal expiring on 31 May 2022. The Committee communicated in the relevant press releases and notes verbales to all Member States that information on each individual trip still needs to be submitted prior to and within one month after travel, in accordance with the Committee’s guidelines and Implementation Assistance Notice No. 4. The Committee also indicated that “any State(s) allowing any of the three individuals to travel into or through their territories shall be required to notify the Committee within 48 hours after arrival or passage within their territory. The notification should be in writing, indicating date of entry and expected duration of stay”.

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157 See www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14369.doc.htm, 1 December 2020; these individuals are Safia Farkash Al-Barassi (LYi.019); Aisha Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar Qadhafi (LYi.009); and Mohammed Muammar Qadhafi (LYi.012).
130. During the reporting period, two exempted individuals travelled to, or transited through, Egypt, Turkey and/or the United Arab Emirates. None of these Member States notified the Committee according to the above-mentioned guidance issued by the Committee. Oman and Switzerland both notified the Committee of the travel of exempted individuals in accordance with the guidance.

131. In the interest of full implementation of the Committee’s guidelines and Implementation Assistance Notice No. 4, the provision of timely and more targeted information to relevant Member States might be required (see recommendation 4).

VIII. Recommendations

132. The Panel recommends:

To the Security Council:

Recommendation 1. To consider a requirement that Member States notify the Committee when delivering diplomatic supplies or humanitarian or protective items to Libya using naval vessels or military aircraft. [see para. 60]

Recommendation 2. To request the Government of Libya, in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2278 (2016), to update the information on its focal point and to provide information relevant to the Committee’s work on the structure of the security forces under its control. [see para. 67]

To the Committee:

Recommendation 3. To remove the also known as information for the “Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFIC)” from the entry of the Libyan Investment Authority (LYe.001) on the sanctions list and to consider listing the Libyan Foreign Investment Company (also known as the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company) as a separate designated entity on the sanctions list. [see para. 112]

Recommendation 4. To remind relevant Member States of their notification requirements when information in relation to upcoming travel under an unlimited travel ban exemption is received by the Committee. [see para. 131]

Recommendation 5. To update the sanctions list entry of Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006) to reflect his death and additional middle name. [see para. 127]

To Member States:

Recommendation 6. To take into consideration the exceptional situation of funds that are subject to an asset freeze measure under a United Nations sanctions regime in national policies regarding negative interest rates. [see para. 125]
## Annexes

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Annex 1  Overview of the evolution of the Libya sanctions regime

1. By resolution 1970 (2011), the Council expressed grave concern at the situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against civilians and deplored the gross and systematic violation of human rights. Within that context, the Council imposed specific measures on Libya, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including the arms embargo, which relates to arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, in addition to the provision of armed mercenary personnel. The arms embargo covers both arms entering and leaving Libya. The Council also imposed travel ban and asset freeze measures, and listed individuals as subject to one or both measures, in the resolution. Furthermore, the Council decided that the travel ban and the asset freeze were to apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling or otherwise directing the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in Libya.

2. By resolution 1973 (2011), the Council strengthened the enforcement of the arms embargo and expanded the scope of the asset freeze to include the exercise of vigilance when doing business with Libyan entities, if States had information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians. Additional individuals subject to the travel ban and asset freeze were listed in the resolution, in addition to five entities subject to the freeze. The Council decided that both measures were to apply also to individuals and entities determined to have violated the provisions of the previous resolution, in particular the provisions concerning the arms embargo. The resolution also included the authorization to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. In addition, it included a no-fly zone in the airspace of Libya and a ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.

3. On 24 June 2011, the Committee designated two additional individuals and one additional entity subject to the targeted measures. By resolution 2009 (2011), the Council introduced additional exceptions to the arms embargo and removed two listed entities subject to the asset freeze, while allowing the four remaining listed entities to be subjected to a partial asset freeze. It also lifted the ban on flights of Libyan aircraft.

4. By resolution 2016 (2011), the Council terminated the authorization related to the protection of civilians and the no-fly zone. On 16 December 2011, the Committee removed the names of two entities previously subject to the asset freeze.

5. In resolution 2040 (2012), the Council directed the Committee, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to review continuously the remaining measures with regard to the two listed entities – the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio – and decided that the Committee was, in consultation with the Libyan authorities, to lift the designation of those entities as soon as practical.

6. In resolution 2095 (2013), the Council further eased the arms embargo in relation to Libya concerning non-lethal military equipment.

7. By resolution 2144 (2014), the Council stressed that Member States notifying to the Committee the supply, sale or transfer to Libya of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, should ensure such notifications contain all relevant information, and should not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by parties other than the designated end user.

8. By resolution 2146 (2014), the Council decided to impose measures, on vessels to be designated by the Committee, in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya and authorized Member States to undertake inspections of such designated vessels.

9. By resolution 2174 (2014), the Council introduced additional designation criteria and requested the Panel to provide information on individuals or entities engaging or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability of security of Libya or obstructing the completion of the political transition. The resolution strengthened the arms embargo, by requiring prior approval of the Committee for the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including related ammunition and spare parts, to Libya intended for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan government, with the exception of
non-lethal military equipment intended solely for the Libyan government. The Council also renewed its call upon Member States to undertake inspections related to the arms embargo, and required them to report on such inspections.

10. By resolution 2213 (2015), the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya until 31 March 2016. The resolution further elaborated the designation criteria listed in resolution 2174 (2014).

11. By resolution 2214 (2015), the Council called on the 1970 Committee on Libya to consider expeditiously arms embargo exemption requests by the Libyan government for the use by its official armed forces to combat specific terrorist groups named in that resolution.

12. By resolution 2259 (2015), the Council confirmed that individuals and entities providing support for acts that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya or that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of the political transition must be held accountable, and recalled the travel ban and asset freeze in this regard.

13. By resolution 2278 (2016) the Council extended the authorizations and measures in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil, while calling on the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) to improve oversight and control over its oil sector, financial institutions and security forces.

14. By resolution 2292 (2016), the Council authorized, for a period of twelve months, inspections on the high seas off the coast of Libya, of vessels that are believed to be carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya, in violation of the arms embargo.

15. By resolution 2357 (2017), the Council extended the authorizations set out in resolution 2292 (2016) for a further 12 months.

16. By resolution 2362 (2017), the Council extended until 15 November 2018 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2146 (2014), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya. These measures were also applied with respect to vessels loading, transporting, or discharging petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, illicitly exported or attempted to be exported from Libya.

17. By resolution 2420 (2018), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2292 (2016) and extended by resolution 2357 (2017), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

18. By resolution 2441 (2018), the Council extended until 15 February 2020 the authorizations provided by and the measures imposed by resolution 2362 (2017), in relation to attempts to illicitly export crude oil from Libya.

19. By resolution 2473 (2019), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2292 (2016) and extended by resolutions 2357 (2017) and 2420 (2018), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

20. By resolution 2509 (2020), the Council extended until 30 April 2021 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions 2362 (2017) and 2441 (2018), and modified the designation period in paragraph 11 of resolution 2146 (2014) to be one year, and requested the Panel to report any information relating to the illicit export from or illicit import to Libya of petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products.

21. By resolution 2526 (2020), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2292 (2016) and extended by resolutions 2357 (2017), 2420 (2018), and 2473 (2019), for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

22. By resolution 2571 (2021), the Council extended until 30 July 2022 the authorizations and the measures in resolution 2146 (2014), as amended by paragraph 2 of resolutions 2362 (2017), 2441 (2018) and 2509 (2020), in relation to attempts to illicitly export petroleum, including crude oil and refined petroleum products, from Libya.
23. By resolution 2578 (2021), the Council further extended the authorizations, as set out in resolution 2292 (2016) and extended by resolutions 2357 (2017), 2420 (2018), 2473 (2019), and 2526 (2020) for a further 12 months from the date of adoption of the resolution.

24. To date the Committee has published six implementation assistance notices which are available on the Committee’s website.\(^1\)

## Annex 2  Abbreviations and acronyms

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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>BPD</td>
<td>Barrels Per Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBL</td>
<td>Central Bank of Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCMSR</td>
<td>Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ChVK</td>
<td>Russian language abbreviation for private military enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIM</td>
<td>Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSIM</td>
<td>Department for Combating Settlement and Illegal Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOB</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECBL</td>
<td>Eastern Central Bank of Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>EU Naval Force Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euro</td>
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<tr>
<td>FACT</td>
<td>Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMCG</td>
<td>Fast Moving Consumer Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNDJT</td>
<td>Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FZE</td>
<td>Free Zone Enterprise (UAE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GACS</td>
<td>General Administration for Coastal Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMMR</td>
<td>Great Man Made River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Government of National Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNA-AF</td>
<td>Government of National Accord Affiliated Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Haftar Affiliated Forces</td>
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<td>HNEC</td>
<td>High National Election Commission</td>
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<td>HoR</td>
<td>House of Representatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAN</td>
<td>Implementation Assistance Notice</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFSWF</td>
<td>International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IHRL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Joint Military Commission</td>
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<td>JPA</td>
<td>Juba Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>km</td>
<td>Kilometre(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAAF</td>
<td>Libyan Arab Armed Forces (HAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFICO</td>
<td>Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAIP</td>
<td>Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCG</td>
<td>Libyan Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFB</td>
<td>Libyan Foreign Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFIIC</td>
<td>Libyan Foreign Investment Company</td>
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<td>LIA</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
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<td>LIA</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIDCO</td>
<td>Libyan Investment and Development Company</td>
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<td>LN</td>
<td>Libyan Navy</td>
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<td>LNA</td>
<td>Libyan National Army (now LAAF)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPDF</td>
<td>Libyan Political Dialogue Forum</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>Metre(s)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Military Armoured Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MV</td>
<td>Motor Vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nm</td>
<td>Nautical Miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOC</td>
<td>National Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>Panel of Experts</td>
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<td>PC</td>
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<td>Private Military Company</td>
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<td>PMO</td>
<td>Project Management Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHIB</td>
<td>Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats</td>
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<td>RTGS</td>
<td>Real-Time Gross Settlement System</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SCMS</td>
<td>Susah Combat Marine Squadron</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Special Deterrence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA/AW</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid</td>
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<td>Stability Support Apparatus</td>
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<td>TBM</td>
<td>Tactical Ballistic Missile(s)</td>
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<td>TBZ</td>
<td>Tariq Ibn Ziyad (brigade)</td>
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<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>TRB</td>
<td>Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade</td>
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<td>UFR</td>
<td>Union des Forces de la Resistance</td>
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<td>UN Support Mission in Libya</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
</tr>
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</table>
1. The Panel ensured compliance with the methodological standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997). Those standards call for reliance on verified, genuine documents and concrete evidence and on-site observations by the experts, including taking photographs, wherever possible. When physical inspection is not possible, the Panel will seek to corroborate information using multiple, independent sources to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard, placing a higher value on statements by principal actors and first-hand witnesses to events.

2. The Panel used satellite imagery of Libya procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations, as well as open-source imagery. Commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data were referenced. Public statements by officials through their official media channels were accepted as factual unless contrary facts were established. Any mobile phone records from service providers were also accepted as factual. While the Panel wishes to be as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would have exposed them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel decided not to include identifying information in this document and instead placed the relevant evidence in United Nations secure archives.

3. The Panel reviewed social media, but no information gathered was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.

4. The spelling of toponyms within Libya often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update. All major locations in Libya are spelled or referenced as per the UN Geographical Information System (GIS) map at appendix A.

5. The Panel has placed importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agreed that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions and recommendations by a majority of five out of the six members including the Coordinator. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.

6. The Panel is committed to impartiality in investigating incidents of non-compliance by any party.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in the majority of incidents that are covered in this update. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel’s findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix B.

8. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is provided in appendix C.
Appendix A to Annex 3: UN GIS place name identification

Figure 3.1
UN GIS place names Libya
Appendix B to Annex 3: ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity\(^2\) in a Panel’s report could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/materiel in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.

2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
   (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
   (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
       (c) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
       (d) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
       (e) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
       (f) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field; or
       (g) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.

3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.

4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.

5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.

6. In no circumstances can third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.

7. The individual, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or his/her government) to communicate on his/her behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

\(^2\) Hereinafter just the term individual will be used to reflect both.
Appendix C to Annex 3: Violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses investigative methodology

1. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is set out as below:

   (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.

   (b) In carrying out any investigations on the use of explosive ordnance against the civilian population, the Panel will rely on at least three or more of the following sources of information:

       (i) At least two eye-witnesses or victims;

       (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;

       (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel obtains copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;

       (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of explosive events such as the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open-source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eye or by checking for pixilation distortion;

       a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and

       b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other source information.

       (v) The utilisation of open source or purchased satellite imagery wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;

       (vii) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;

       (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;

       (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground. (For example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area);

       (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or

       (x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

   (c) In carrying out its investigations on depravation of liberty and associated violations the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
(i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
(ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
(iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
(iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
(v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
(vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
(vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
(viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
(ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
(x) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, which can include forced displacement and threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:

(i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
(ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
(iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
(iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident; and/or
(v) Open-source information to identify other corroborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

(e) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. Detailed information on incidents will not be provided when there is a credible threat that would threaten Panel sources.

(f) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, as called upon by paragraph 14 of resolution 2571 (2021), the Panel may consider this for reporting to the Committee.

2. The Panel will not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel may include more source information in confidential annexes.

3. The Panel will not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable Panel sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result. The Panel stands ready to
provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will be taken though to protect the anonymity of its sources.
Annex 4  Member States, organizations and institutions consulted

This list excludes individuals and certain organisations or entities with whom the Panel met, in order to maintain the confidentiality of the source(s) and so as not to impede the ongoing investigations of the Panel.

Table 4.1  Member States, organizations and institutions consulted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Location</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Representative or International Organization</th>
<th>Institution / NGO</th>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; UNODC &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; Office of the Public Prosecutor &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Federal Police &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>EU EEAS</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Embassies to Libya (in Tunis) NGOs &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>India &lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries and departments</td>
<td>Permanent Mission to the UN &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; HQ EU NAVFOR Guardia di Finanza Office of the Public Prosecutor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>Permanent Mission to the UN</td>
<td>Designated entities, Office of the Attorney General, CBL, NOC NGOs</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>IOM &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; UNHCR UNICEF &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; UNSMIL UNODC &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Country/ Location</td>
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<td>Representative or International Organization</td>
<td>Institution / NGO</td>
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<td>USA 🟢</td>
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<td>Mission to the UN</td>
<td>C4ADS 🟢</td>
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</table>

*Countries indicated ‘*’ are permanent members of the Security Council.*

*Countries indicated ‘*’ are non-permanent members of the Security Council (2022).*

*Via VTC or other electronic platform only.*

*Sexual Violence in Conflict.*

*Children and Armed Conflict.*
### Annex 5  Summary of Panel correspondence

Table 5.1  
Correspondence with Member States (2571 (2021) Mandate)\(^3\)  
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) \(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State / country</th>
<th># letters sent by the Panel(^b)</th>
<th># replies from Member State</th>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Excluding updates to the Committee, letters to the Chair or visa requests to Member States.

\(^b\) The Panel sent letters to the Member States listed in the left-hand column.
Table 5.2
Correspondence with regional organizations and other entities (2571 (2021) Mandate)
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or entity</th>
<th># letters sent by the Panel b</th>
<th># replies from Member State</th>
<th># awaiting reply from Member State</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General’s Office Libya</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union (FRONTEX)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad</td>
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<td>HAF LAAF</td>
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<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution 2571 (2021), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel. Letters requesting responses after 25 April 2022 are not included in the table.

Table 5.3
Correspondence with commercial companies (2571 (2021) Mandate)
(15 May 2021 to 25 April 2022) *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization or entity</th>
<th># letters sent by the Panel</th>
<th># replies b</th>
<th># awaiting reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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* 15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution 2571 (2021), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.
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*15 May 2021 being the date the Panel was appointed pursuant to resolution 2571 (2021), and 25 April 2022 being the last date for which responses had been requested by the Panel.*
Annex 6  Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU

Panel’s observations:

- Line 16 allocates LYD 16.8 million to the Stability Support Agency
- Line 24 allocates LYD 15 million to the Internal Security Service
- Line 65 allocates LYD 25 million to the Joint Task Force
- Line 87 allocates LYD 15 million to the Special Deterrence Force

Figure 6.1
Urgent expenditures committed by the GNU (source: Confidential Source)
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</table>

الإجمالي: 4,588,016,832

المعدة المشتراة في شعب الثاني: 2,163,131,997

رقم التمويل: 931,583,166

الجهة الملتزمة: 2
Annex 7    Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister

Figure 7.1
Letter addressed by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) to the Presidential Council and to the Prime Minister (14 August 2021)
I. Letter to PC-GNU on AGs (14 August 2021)

5+5 Joint Military Commission

Re: Review of agencies

Date:....................

Corresponding to: 19 August 2021

Joint Military Commission 32/167

To: The President of the Presidency Council
President of the Government of National Unity

At its meeting held in Sirte on 14 August 2021, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, considered the security situation in the State of Libya as it impinges directly the Commission’s action plans for banishing the spectre of war and restoring security and stability. It noted that there is a multiplicity of security and military agencies and bodies that have been charged with overlapping tasks or granted overlapping military and security authorities. These agencies are subsidiary to a variety of different entities (the Presidency Council, the Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of Defence) and have not had their tasks and duties clearly defined. This has created instability and severely undermined the performance of military and security institutions.

The agencies in question are as follows:

1. The Stability Support Apparatus
2. The General Security Service
3. The Counter-Terrorism Force
4. The Emergency Operations Centre
5. The Special Deterrent Force
6. The Misratah Joint Force
7. The Military zones (Central - West - Tripoli)
8. The operations rooms in general
9. Any other agencies directly subsidiary to the Commander-in Chief that we may have failed to mention

The Commission recommends that the hierarchical structure of these agencies be reviewed and rearranged to bring them under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior depending on the tasks assigned to them, so they can be re-evaluated and restructured, have their tasks defined by a scientific and professional study, and have their budgets placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Ministry of Interior rather than being independent.

May peace and God’s mercy and blessings be upon you.

(Signed) Major General Ahmed Ali Abu Shahma
Chair of the 5+5 Commission

(Signed) Lieutenant General Emraja’a Emhammed Mohammed Al-Ammami
Chair of the 5+5 Committee

Libyan Parliament/ Please be advised . . .
بيان رئاسة الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي

نُصير... ورُصد، ما خطت عينات 5 المركبة من إجارات سامس في ضعف بعض التورنت وخطاب
الكرامة بين ابن أم للوطن الواحد، وخلال مناخ من جهل سياسي بين القلوب، حيث أشرت على عودة أعداء
من المتضمنين من المحتجين إلى أهلهم ورواههم، وساهمت في فتح الطريق الساعي لتسهيل حركة دكّ المواقع
بين شرق البلاد وغربها.

وأليا... تقترب من موعد الاستئثار الأنتخابي في 24 ديسمبر Näbaً بالحراك لجنة 5+5 عن مسارها
المهمة والمهمة المرسوم ودمجها في الشروع السياسي المناط حسبا بالسلطة التنفيذية القائمة، هذه التنافلات
المزيفة وغير المهنية لها التماسات سلبية على مهام المجلس الرئاسي باعتبار القائد الأعلى الوحيد وعلى
مهام حكومة الرئاسة الوطنية المناط بها إدارة الأمن العام وحماية دول غرب أخرى.

فخور... نستغرب خطوات هذه اللحظة وخطاباتها الأخيرة التي قد يسراه كثير من الفيضين بالشأن الوطني
والسياسي بأن دورها أصبّ كله سلفة، كما قررت للسائفات الساطعة للنظام المتارف، كما تزداد دعاء على الدوام رغم أننا
جلد كبير بين فئات عديدة من أبناء الشعب الليبي مؤسسات، طلما تميزت وسيطرة على الفيال ردماً نائبا
تعمق صور المعاني ورسمها الانتقائية على شخصية هذا الزمن القصير. كما تناولت خانقاتها الأخيرة
الأمنية والسياسية القائمة وفقاً للشعارات التي كان ممتولاً بها في زمنها وأغلقت الفجوة الكبيرة التي
قامت بها بعضها في كمالة الإصلاحات والخدمات والمحافظة في الاستقرار الأمني.

وقابضًا... على ذلك وحتى تديد المفاوضات الدائمة عن هذه الخطابات تأتي تلبية لأنشطة المرأة في
حكومة الرئاسة الوطنية رؤية الدافع الدخل برفقة هذه التجارب التي لا تتفاوت حالة الناس السياسي
والاجتماعي، وأن يكون عملها منهجياً طبقة لسياسات هذه السلطات القائمة.

حفظ الله لعبدالله
جاسم علي أحمد الحداد
رئيس رئاسة الأركان العامة للجيش الليبي

Figure 8.1
Statement of Al Haddad (17 August 2021)
Statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces

We appreciate and commend the achievements of the 5+5 Military Commission, which has contributed to reducing the level of tension and hate speech among the people of our one country and creating an atmosphere conducive to political debate among various factions. It has overseen the return of numerous detainees from both sides to their families and helped to open the coastal road, thereby facilitating the movement of citizens between the country’s east and west.

However, as we approach the 24 December election deadline, we are surprised that the 5+5 Commission has deviated from its customary professional and technical approach and chosen to interfere in political affairs that should be the exclusive purview of the current executive branch. These unacceptable and unprofessional interventions are having negative repercussions for the functions of the Presidency Council as the Commander-in-Chief and functions of the Government of National Unity as the sole entity entrusted with managing public affairs.

We are particularly dismayed by recent steps and statements of the Commission that could be interpreted by those who take an interest in national political affairs as arrogating to itself the role of a new authority above existing national authorities. One of the steps it has taken that has created considerable friction among broad segments of the Libyan public and its institutions has been its request for the immediate appointment of a new Minister of Defence, even though we all know that it would be difficult to reach agreement on any particular person for the short time available. Its statements regarding security and military agencies formed in accordance with previously existing legislation ignore the significant efforts made by some of those agencies in the fight against terrorism and crime and their contributions to national stability.

Given the preceding, and with a view to dispelling the concerns raised by these statements, we call on the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Government of National Unity, as well as the Minister of Defence, to intervene to put a stop to these infringements, which do not serve the cause of political and social peace, and to ensure that the Commission behaves professionally and in accordance with the policies of these existing authorities.

May God save Libya and its people.

(Signed) Staff Major General Muhammad Ali Ahmad al-Haddad
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces

Farnaj - Tripoli - Libya  www.pgsla.gov.ly  00218 21 462 4103
بيان

في الوقت الذي يؤكد فيه على الجهود المبذولة من قبل اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 والتي تجहز بحل العديد من المشاكل العالقة، من بينها فتح الطريق الساحلي الرابط ما بين الشرق والغرب، نؤكد ولن نتوقف على ما جاء في بيان عزالة العمليات المشتركة للمنطقة العربية التابعة لجامعة أركان العامة بالبحرين الليبية، والذي يؤكد على صورة إن انتفجارة اللجنة العسكرية 5+5 اختصاصاتها المكلفة لها. حيث تدخلت هذه اللجنة في إعادة مبادلة الجبهة الأهلية والعسكرية التي شكلتها حركة الوقاية الحقيقية، وهذا ليس من اختصاص الجيش المسنين 5+5 حيث أن هذا العمل هو من اختصاص الحكومة. إضافة إلى عدم ذكرها إعداد قيادة العمليات في الشرق لتكون ضمن اجتماع جمعية الجيش العسكرية وعائلات وفاعلات ثقافاً من ذلك، وكذلك تتخللها في تهديد وتعزيز طابعى اختصاص أصول للحكومة بالتشاور مع المجلس الرئاسي واعتماد مجلس الأمن.

جهاز دعم الاستقرار يطالب بجلسة 5+5 بالالتزام بالمعاهد المكلفة بما من المجلس الرئاسي ودعم النخب إلى طرف دون آخر، وذلك ضمها للحفاظ على وحدة الوطن وسلامه والاستقرار.

حفظ الله ليبيا آمنة ومستقرة
جهاز دعم الاستقرار
صادر بتاريخ: 18 أغسطس 2021م
Statement

While we commend the efforts of the 5+5 Military Commission, which have culminated in the resolution of many outstanding problems, including the opening of the east-west coastal road, we must express our support for the statement of the Western Region joint operations room (subsidiary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff), which emphasizes the need for the 5+5 Joint Commission not to exceed the authorities assigned to it. That Committee has intervened in the restructuring of the security and military agencies formed by the previous government of reconciliation. That is not a prerogative of the 5+5 Military Commission; it is a competence of the Government. It also failed to mention the reorganization of the General Command in the east to become part of the State’s military apparatus. It completely ignored that. It also interfered in the appointment of a Minister of Defence, which is the prerogative of the Government in consultation with the Presidency Council and subject to approval by the House of Representatives.

The Stability Support Authority calls on the 5+5 Commission to stick to the tasks assigned to it by the Presidency Council and not to align itself with one side at another’s expense. That would ensure the preservation of the unity, security and stability of the nation.

May God keep Libya safe and stable.
Annex 9  Mahmoud Al Warfalli’s death and burial certificates

Figure 9.1
Al Warfalli’s death certificate

Source: Confidential
Official UN Translation
2204597E
Translated from Arabic

Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
General People's Committee on Public Safety
Civil Registry Authority
Form No. 10 bis

Civil Registry Office: Benghazi

Family sheet No.: 65258
Family registration number: 2045604

Entry No. in the register:
Page No.: 1651

District
Locality: Birth
Basic People's Congress

Death certificate
Official extract establishing death

Informant's name: [Redacted]
Address: Benghazi
Identification document and No.:
281228 E&'

Family booklet No.
Issued at:

Three-part name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif
Surname: Al-Warfalli
Sex: Male

Age: 43
Profession: Soldier
Religion: Muslim
Nationality: Libyan

Date of birth: 1978, Benghazi
Causes of death (detailed): gunshots
Address and place of residence: Benghazi

Date/time of death: 
Day: 
Month: 
Sunnah:

Corresponding to/day: 24
Month: March
Year: 2021

Place of death: Benghazi

Reporting party (provide name and address):

Name of deceased's father: [Redacted]
Surname: Al-Warfalli
Mother's name: [Redacted]
Surname:
The data above have been verified and recorded in the register of deaths under the number given above

Registering official: Misbah Amir
Title: Employee
Signature/seal:
Date of registration:
Corresponding to:

Reported on/Day:
Month:
Sunnah:
Corresponding to/day: 25
Month: April
Year: 2021
(Comments):
Figure 9.1
Al Warfalli’s burial certificate

Source: Confidential
State of Libya
Civil Registry Authority
Form No. 40

Civil Registry Office: Benghazi

Burial permit
Date: . 24 March 2021

Name of the deceased: Mahmud Mustafa Busif Surname: Al-Warfalli Sex (Male/female): Male Nationality: Libyan
Identity card or passport, if any: - Date and place of issuance: -
Date of birth: 1978 Age: 43

Name of deceased's father, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: -
Name of deceased's mother, if known to informant: [Redacted] Surname: Cause of death: -

Having verified the identity of the deceased and the cause of death, we hereby authorize burial

Signed by the registrar: (Signed)
Annex 10  Decrees by the Presidential Council

Figure 10.1
Decree no. 7 creating a force for combating terrorism and organized crime in southern Libya

Source: Confidential
Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

Having considered the following:

The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;
Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;
Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;
And the minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021).

Hereby decides as follows:

Article 1
A military force to be called the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force is hereby established in the Libyan south. It shall be made up of the first company of the 116th infantry brigade and shall be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

Article 2
An officer of the rank of no less than major shall be appointed as commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south by decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army.

Article 3
The force shall assume the following functions:

- It shall apprehend armed gangs that threaten the security of the South.
- It shall confront terrorism through arrests and investigations, with assistance and coordination from the relevant authorities.
Figure 10.2
Decree no. 9 appointing Masud Jeddi as Commander of the force (17 June 2021)

Source: https://twitter.com/W_Lacher/status/1406505082066149379/photo/3
Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 9 (2021) concerning the appointment of a commander of the counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army,

Having considered the following:

- The Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 and amendments thereto; The Libyan Political Agreement signed on 17 December 2015;
- Act No. 35 (1977) concerning reorganization of the Libyan army (formerly the armed forces); Act No. 5 (1978) amending certain provisions of military laws;
- Act No. 11 (2012) approving certain provisions concerning the authorities of the leadership ranks of the Libyan army;
- The minutes of the meeting of the Presidency Council in its capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan army (No. 6 on 17 June 2021);
- And the Decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army No. 7 (2021) concerning the establishment of a counter-terrorism and organized crime force in the Libyan south.

Hereby decides as follows:

Article 1
Major Mas’ud Abdullah Mas’ud Abduljalil is hereby appointed commander of the Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Force in the Libyan south.

Article 2
This decision shall enter into force as of its date of issue and the relevant parties are required to implement it.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army

Done on 7 Dhu al-Qa’dah A.H. 1442
17 April 2021
Annex 11  Decree by Haftar disbanding 116 brigade (11 September 2021)

General Command of the Libyan Armed Forces

Decisions

General Commander Decision No. 311 (2021) concerning the disbanding of the 116th and 117th infantry brigades

The General Commander,

Having considered the following:

- Act No. 40 (1974) concerning service in the armed forces and amendments thereto;
- Act No. 1 (2015) amending Act No. 11 (2012) concerning the powers and leadership ranks of the Libyan army;
- House of Representatives Decision No. 20 (2014) concerning delegation of the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the competences of the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Army;
- And Commander-in-Chief Decision No. 20 (2015) appointing a General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces,

Hereby decides as follows:

Article 1

The 116th and 117th infantry brigades are hereby disbanded. All their personnel, functions, vehicles, weapons and ammunition in their entirety are hereby assigned to the Sabha military district.

Article 2

The present decision shall enter into force on the date of its issuance, all provisions contradicting it are hereby rescinded, and the relevant parties shall be required to implement it.

(Signed) Khalifah Abu al-Qasim Haftar
Field Marshal
General Commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Done at General Command headquarters - Rajmah
11 September 2021
Annex 12 Improvement of HAF operational capability

1. On 19 October 2021 HAF 106 brigade released a video on their official social media\(^4\) of their latest combined arms firepower demonstration and exercise. The Panel believes that this demonstrates a significant increase in the professionalism of this unit from the 2019 conflict. Indicators of this include:

(a) The activities shown on the imagery demonstrates a reasonable understanding and execution of combined arms manoeuvre [0:25] and armoured infantry tactics deploying from armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) [27"00’];

(b) The low-level infantry tactics are reasonable, with proper fire and manoeuvre and aimed shots the norm [4"30’];

(c) The main battle tank (MBT) gunnery tactics are good. The MBT are firing from hull-down, protective positions with the appropriate use of camouflage and concealment [8"30’ and 9"20’];

(d) The all arms capability very likely includes engineer manoeuvre support with gap crossing capabilities [30”10’]

(e) The capability to deliver an integrated indirect fire plan was demonstrated using a combination of: (i) fighter ground attack aircraft [22”00’]; (ii) BM-21 free flight rocket units [23”35’]; 3) field artillery [25”12’]; and 4) heavy mortars [24”58’ and 27”28’]; and

(f) The use of ZSU-23/4 for integrated formation air defence along the line of advance [25”36’ and 30”08’].

This brings the 106 Brigade, under the command of Khaled Khalifa Haftar\(^5\) much closer to the qualities of an army unit. Indeed, many of the officers have a "Libyan Army" patch on their uniforms and vehicles display the national flag of Libya.

\(^4\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdyN0wA6AiU, 19 October 2021.
Annex 13  Counterterrorism and terrorism related events in Libya (2021)

1. The Panel has not been able to independently verify some of the events listed in tables 12.1 and 12.2. For those verified the date is in bold type.

Table 12.1
Reported terrorism related events in Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun 2021</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya claimed responsibility in the official ISIL (QDe.115) weekly publication “Annaba’a”, of a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack targeting a HAF checkpoint at the ‘Mafreq Abnae Maziq’ Gate, near Sebha. The explosion killed at least two people including the head of the Sebha Criminal Investigation Department, Captain Ibrahim Abdunabi Mannae, and injured several others.(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jun 2021</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya claimed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack against a HAF patrol in the Mount of Al Haruj, killing the commander of the “Martyrs of Al-Waw” company, Ali Mohammed Othman Al Tibouoi.(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul 2021</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya released a photo set entitled ‘Diaries of Caliphate Soldiers in Libya during Eid Al Adha’ showing a small group of fighters celebrating the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha, presumably in southern Libya.(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 2021</td>
<td>HAF 128 brigade was attacked at the Zillah gate checkpoint near Jufra by a suicide bomber, whose associate survived the blast, identified as a Sudanese national. He was shot as he tried to escape. On 23 August 2021, ISIL claimed responsibility for this attack that wounded some HAF personnel, through ISIL’s official media branch “Aamaq”.(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Sep 2021</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya claimed an attack on a HAF checkpoint south of Sebha. According to initial reports there were no injuries, but the specific details of the incident remain unclear.(^e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 2022</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya claimed an IED attack on a HAF camp in Um al-Aranib, on 17 January 2022, which killed one person and injured two others.(^f)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan 2022</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya claimed an attack against two HAF vehicles, on the road between the towns of Um al-Aranib and al-Qatrun, disabling one vehicle and killing two of its occupants.(^g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mar 2022</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya published photos of its members swearing allegiance to the new leader of the ISIL mother group, Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi appointed on 10 March 2022.(^h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 2022</td>
<td>ISIL-Libya published a video of one of its members called “Abu Tabet Al Muhajer” giving a speech where the latter pledged allegiance to the new leader of core ISIL and urging muslims to join the terrorist groups and fight on behalf of the terrorist group.(^i)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Official ISIL weekly publication “Annaba’a” n°291. [https://letsupload.io/2dtmw](https://letsupload.io/2dtmw), 21 June 2021.

\(^{b}\) Ibid.


Table 12.2
Reported counterterrorism related events in Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Mar 2021</td>
<td>The AGO announced the Misratan Special Task Force arrested six ISIL-Libya members in Zliten, Garabulli, Tripoli and Zawiya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Mar 2021</td>
<td>HAF spokesperson Al Mismari announced the arrest of an ISIL-Libya leader named Mohammed Miloud Mohammed (a.k.a. Abu Omar), in Al Shareb neighbourhood in the city of Awbari.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mar 2021</td>
<td>The Tripoli AGO stated that 10 women and 14 children of Tunisian origin, detained during the recapture of Sirte from ISIL-Libya, have been transferred to Tunis. The women implicated in terrorist cases are still under investigation in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jun 2021</td>
<td>Open-source media reported that the HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade arrested three Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliated individuals in the village of Tarout, 30km from Brak al-Shati in the south of Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jun 2021</td>
<td>Libyan open-source media reported that HAF have undertaken airstrikes within the area of the Haruj Mountains against ISIL-Libya positions around the same area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul 2021</td>
<td>The AGO filed criminal lawsuits against 54 suspected ISIL-Libya members who were arrested during security operations after the liberation of Sirte. They are accused of different crimes against the State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug 2021</td>
<td>HAF’s spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced the arrest of a suspected ISIL-Libya operative of Sudanese origin, named Adam Ibrahim Ahmed, during a security operation near Qatrun. His associates have reportedly fled to the Chadian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Aug 2021</td>
<td>The Libyan Minister of Justice announced the future closing of a few prisons and deportation of 100 ISIL members of Arab and African origins to their home countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Sep 2021</td>
<td>The Misratan Special Task Force (MSTF) had an armed clash with ‘extremist and terrorist’ elements (wanted by the AGO) in the ‘11 July area’ of Misrata, which resulted in the killing of an element of the Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep 2021</td>
<td>The HAF Tareq Bin Ziyad brigade (TBZ) arrested a suspected AQIM member named Al-Ajili Ali al-Hasnawi, near Brak al-Shati. Ajili was reportedly responsible for arms and ammunition transfers to terrorist organisations in neighbouring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep 2021</td>
<td>GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah announced that the Misratan Joint Operations Force had arrested an ISIL-Libyan leader named M’barek Al Khazmi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sep 2021</td>
<td>Open-source media reported that HAF military intelligence arrested an Al Qaeda affiliated Egyptian national in Tobruk named Saad Desouqi Sayyd Mohamed Issa. He is believed to have entered Libya on 12 September 2021 in an attempt to reach the south of Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Oct 2021</td>
<td>Libyan open-source media reported that the GNU-affiliated Counter Terrorism Force (CTF) arrested at least two members of ISIL-Libya in the town of Misrata, one of whom fought previously in Syria. This operation was reportedly conducted in coordination with the OGA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Nov 2021</td>
<td>HAF 106 Brigade announced, through their official Facebook page, the arrest of an alleged terrorist named Ali Al Bakir in his residence neighbourhood of Hejara, in the city of Sebha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 2022</td>
<td>HAF’s Commander of the Moral Affairs, Khaled Mahjoub, reported that the 106 Brigade’s ‘Sahrawi’ unit had arrested members of a criminal gang that trades arms and deals with extremist groups in Algeria and Mali.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 2022</td>
<td>HAF’s spokesperson Ahmed al-Mismari announced in a press conference that 24 members of ISIL-Libya members of different nationalities were killed and one was captured during three days of clashes with LNA forces near Qatrun in south-western Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Feb 2022</td>
<td>Libyan open-source media reported that the GNU-affiliated security services underwent terrorist search and track operations in the areas of Sabratha and Mount Nafousa which resulted in the arrest of an alleged terrorist of Tunisian nationality named Bilal Bin Abdelwahab Bin Torad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb 2022</td>
<td>The Misratan Joint Operations Force published the confessions of four detained members of AQIM and ISIL-Libya who were based in Tripoli. These individuals revealed plans of terrorist attacks against governmental sites in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar 2022</td>
<td>The 10th Unit of TBZ published on its official page a video of six HAF units/brigades affiliated to the Southern Operations room carrying out patrols in the Niger-Tchad border area with Libya, where they had reportedly been able to find a hideout, and a secret prison belonging to ISIL-Libya as well as a grave of one of the members of the terrorist group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* https://akhbarlibya24.net/2021/03/07/الأخبار-المغربية-20210314


*c* March 2021.


*h* https://libyanstand.com/defaultnews/2021-08-12/18501, 12 August 2021.


*q* March 2021.


Annex 14  Statement of the HAF representatives of the 5+5 JMC

Statement of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission

Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces

In keeping with the commitment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to implementing the terms of the ceasefire agreement signed in Geneva on 23 October 2020,

With the support of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces; with a view to encouraging the members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to move forward with bold steps to preserve the dignity of the Libyan homeland and its citizens; with a view to seeing all of Libyan territory liberated in accordance with the determination of our homeland’s citizenry; in keeping with the commitment of the General Command to the sovereignty and security of Libyan territory; and in response to the request made by the French leadership to the General Command to take the initiative on the ground to evacuate an initial group of mercenaries and foreign fighters from areas controlled by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces – as an exception to the condition of synchronized and balanced withdrawal agreed to between members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in its plan to remove mercenaries, foreign fighters and foreign forces under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),

The General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces has decided to evacuate an initial group of 300 mercenaries and foreign fighters. There will be direct coordination with the United Nations Mission during the process of transferring fighters to their countries, accompanied by security precautions and coordination with the countries involved, with a view to bringing about peace and stability in Libya and neighbouring countries.

May God preserve Libya.

The 5+5 Joint Military Commission
Representatives of the General Command of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces
Annex 15    **Sudanese groups in Libya**

1. Since the entry into force of the Juba Peace Agreement, most of the signatories who had an important presence in Libya, namely Sudan Liberation Army / Minni Minawi (SLA/MM), Sudan Liberation Army / Transitional Council (SLA/TC), Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), have brought their elements back to Sudan (paragraph 19 to S/2021/229). However, it is estimated that their forces still in Libya are scattered in the areas of Hun, Suknah, Jufra, Zilla, Brak al-Shatii and Ghat. Since October 2020, other subgroups of non-signatories, such as Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) and the Sudanese Revolutionary Awakening Council (SRAC), have not had an effective military capability in Libya due to internal divisions.

2. SLA/MM is still receiving salaries and equipment from HAF however they have been reduced over the last months. This group is recruiting fighters in Sudan and training new members in Darfur, some of whom are sent to Libya. On 29 April 2021, the Sudanese Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok issued a decree appointing Minni Minawi, leader of SLA/MM, as governor of the Darfur region. The members of this group move back and forth between Darfur and Libya.

3. Abdallah Banda’s group is still active in Libya in the area of Jufra, providing support personnel to HAF there. It has been reported that some of his members have allied to the SLA/MM group remaining in Libya, from whom they receive salaries.

4. By December 2021, half of Taher Hajar’s GSLF group remained in Libya and are positioned around Surt and Jufra.

5. On 30 June 2021, the social media website of the military operation “Volcano of Rage” reported that a group of armed Sudanese nationals attacked a police station in Hun, in an attempt to free one of their members, who had been arrested by the local authorities for the killing of a Libyan national. This incident was later confirmed and described by Mahmoud Ghmed, President of the “Jufra Society”.

6. In mid October 2021, at least 150 vehicles belonging to Sudanese armed groups, escorted by vehicles marked as belonging to HAF 116 and 117 brigades relocated from the area of Al Fawwar (south-east of Waw al-Kabir) to the region of Kilinja (west of Kufra).

7. In early December 2021, at least 300 members of SLA/TC led by Saleh Jabal Si have moved from Libya to Korma in Sudan where a field visit was undertaken by UNITAMS, a team of experts from United Nations headquarters and members of the Darfur Permanent Ceasefire Committee (S/2022/172).

8. On 1 March 2022, during a patrol, the HAF Subul Al Salam battalion clashed with a Sudanese armed group that used to serve under HAF 128 in the Al-Rubyana, 90 km from Tazerbu area. Sources of the Panel indicated that after their defection from the latter, this group of armed Sudanese engaged in criminal activities and set up checkpoints to rob the population in the area. The group was composed of at least 18 individuals and 3 armed vehicles with HAF 128 brigade insignia.

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9 “Al Jufra Society” is a social group created in February 2021, based in Hun. It is a civil society organization that cares of all social issues related to the Jufra region including human rights.

10 See annex 10 HAF disbanding 116 brigade. The Panel has yet to reconcile the status of this military grouping.

11 24°03’08.5”N 17°35’37.9”E

12 23°16’35.80”N, 20° 1’37.02”E
Annex 16  Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde (FACT) and other Chadian opposition groups in Libya

Background on FACT

1. By early 2021, this group held several bases in the areas of Tamenhint, Brak Shati and Jabal Al Aswad. Comprised of at least 1,500 fighters, it was affiliated to HAF for which it operated surveillance and patrol missions in the south of Libya in cooperation with the 128 brigade and the 116 brigade (prior to its disbandment). The leader of FACT, Mahamat Mahdi Ali, claimed that during their stay in Jufra in 2020, they collaborated with ChVK Wagner operatives in security missions in Brak Shati, adding that this PMC distrusted him because of his close relationship with France (where he was a political refugee for 25 years). Mahamat Mahdi denied to the Panel receiving any kind of training from ChVK Wagner, and further added that all contact with HAF stopped in April 2021.

FACT military activities in Libya

2. On 11 April 2021, FACT launched its offensive against the Chadian forces from its bases in south Libya to Tibesti in Chad, which coincided with the presidential election day in Chad. The Chadian army claimed more than 300 FACT fighter fatalities and imprisonment of 150 others, whilst losing five of its soldiers in the clashes. FACT counter-claimed that they took control of two Chadian bases in Wour and Zouarké. The FACT leader claimed that drones of unknown origin constantly monitored his forces’ movement.

3. On 18 April 2021, the Chadian President was reported to be dead, from wounds suffered on the combat front against FACT. However, the FACT leader claimed that his group had no knowledge of the presence of Deby on the battlefield and was unsure whether his forces were directly responsible for the Deby’s death.

4. On 14 September 2021, the HAF Tariq Bin Ziyad (TBZ) special forces battalion led an offensive against a FACT base in the area of Terbu that lasted at least 4 days. FACT later issued two communiqués on the incident describing the armed clashes against their group. The HAF official media branch reported on its official social media page that the offensive was led by the TBZ battalion supported by the 116 brigade, with air support from its air force.

5. FACT members are still present in Libya, reportedly south of Qatrun.

FNDJT and CCMSR:

6. On 26 January 2022 FNDJT claimed responsibility for an armed attack launched from its rear bases in south of Libya on a Chadian military post (Post 35) in Kouri Bougoudi, in the Tibesti region, north of Chad. FNDJT and CCMSR are both members of a military-political coalition created on 28 March 2021 along with two other Chadian opposition groups namely L’union des mouvements pour la démocratie et le développement (UMDD), l’Union Nationale pour le Changement (UNC) (Fig.1).

Figure 16.1
Constitution of the alliance

![Constitution of the alliance](https://www.facebook.com/www.CCMSR)


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22 The Panel has reported on the activities of CCMSR in Libya in to [S/2021/229](https://www.facebook.com/tchadienne.larevolutionpopulaire), annex 9.
Annex 17  Syrian fighters in Libya

Figure 17.1
Alaa Al-Junaid at Tikbali Camp, Tripoli

Tikbali Camp, Tripoli
(32°47’52.9”N 13°13’26.9”E)
(19 May 2021)

On 19 May 2021, open source media affiliated to the Hamza division of the ‘Syrian National Army’ published a video showing the Syrian commander of the division, Alaa Al-Junaid, paying a visit to members of his forces in Tikbali camp in Tripoli.

Primary sources
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.

1. On 18 July 2021, in a video interview, Colonel Fadl Allah Hajji of the ‘Syrian National Army’ admitted sending Turkish backed Syrian combatants to Libya “as part of a strategic plan of the cooperation between the (Syrian) National Army and the Turkish Army…and they are not considered as mercenaries by the Turks nor by the Libyans…we didn’t send fighters to kill the Libyans, but to maintain peace and security, to protect airports and the Libyan oil interests…”.

24 Identified from figures 13.2 and 13.3.
2. On 31 August 2021 a group of GNU-AF Syrians demonstrated outside their base camp of Al Yarmouk against the delay in their salaries for over four months (figure 13.4). They put road blockades on a main road and set small fires in the immediate surroundings in front of the entrance gate of the camp. A GNU-AF commander stated to the Panel that the Syrians present in those camps were not engaged in any military activity and some escaped to attempt to migrate illegally to Europe.

Figure 17.4
Demonstration at Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli

Al Yarmouk Camp, Tripoli
(32°47′52.9″N 13°13′26.9″E)
(31 August 2021)

On 31 August 2021, a video widely published on social media shows a group of individuals, later identified as Syrians based in the Al Yarmouk Camp, putting blockades on a road, setting fire and demonstrating in front of the main gate of the same camp.

Primary sources
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
بيان مجلس المفوضية: بشأن تحديد يوم الانتخابات (الجولة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية

 oleh مجلس المفوضية الوطنية للإنتخابات

12-12-2021

لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي بشكل طبيعي، ولكن النص يبدو يتناول بعض النقاط الرئيسية، بما في ذلك:

- يجب أن يتم اختيار رئيس الدولة.
- يجب تحديد يوم الانتخابات الرئاسية.
- يجب أن يتم اختيار رئيس الدولة.
- يجب تحديد يوم الانتخابات الرئاسية.

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لا يمكنني قراءة النص بشكل طبيعي، ولكن النص يبدو يتناول بعض النقاط الرئيسية، بما في ذلك:

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- يجب تحديد يوم الانتخابات الرئاسية.
- يجب أن يتم اختيار رئيس الدولة.
- يجب تحديد يوم الانتخابات الرئасية.
بيان مجلس المفوضية بشأن تحديد يوم الاقتراع (الحلوة الأولى)

لقد اتخذت الحكومة قرارًا بشأن المقاومة (الحلوة الأولى) من الانتخابات الرئاسية.

تعد الحكومة البديلة للحكومة (الحلوة الأولى) لعلاوة على أن تكون تكميلية، والتزامات المعاهدة، التزامات التفاوضية، والإتفاقية، والمعاهدة، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، والإتفاقية، الإ
High National Elections Commission
Statement of the Commission board on setting a polling date for the first round of presidential elections
22 December 2021, 12:09 hours

The Commission is carrying out its responsibility to see the will of the people realized in free and fair elections leading to a peaceful transfer of power that brings about stability as a step towards building the State of institutions and law to which Libyans aspire. Despite the technical and legal difficulties and challenges it has faced since it received the elections laws, it has accomplished a lot and is on the verge of a historic achievement that will shine its light throughout the whole country.

Unfortunately, no sooner is one set of difficulties resolved than another emerges. The challenge stage marked a dangerous turning point in the electoral process. It in effect became the station stop at which efforts to carry forward this historical election came to a halt, owing to considerations that were beyond election officials’ control. Most notably, electoral laws were deficient with respect to the role of the judiciary in electoral challenges and disputes. That had a negative impact on the right of the Commission to defend its decisions. It created uncertainty about the correctness of decisions by the Commission to disqualify a number of candidates who did not meet conditions. The interference of political interests with the judicial rulings issued pushed the decision to announce the final list of candidates into what may be described as a force majeure situation. The Commission was unable to make its announcement, and therefore unable to set 24 December as election day even though, from a technical standpoint, it was fully prepared to conduct the process on that date.

Article 43 of Act No. 1 (2021) on the election and definition of powers of the Head of State and amendments thereto provides that the Commission shall announce the postponement of the voting process and the House of Representatives shall set another date for conduct of the voting process within 30 days. After coordinating with the House of Representatives, the Commission proposes to postpone the polling date for the first round to 24 January 2022 in accordance with the above-mentioned article. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives must act to take measures to remove the force majeure situation standing in the way of the electoral process.

As far as election for the House of Representatives – as provided for by Act No. 2 (2021) – is concerned, the vetting process for the 5,385 candidate applications is nearing completion and is at the final review stage. Once we have received the responses of our partners in the vetting process on whether the conditions for candidacy provided for by the law have been met, the Commission will issue a decision announcing preliminary candidate lists for the House of Representatives. Then the challenge phase will begin.

We would like to take this opportunity to stress that we have not abdicated our responsibilities. We have carried out our duties in a way that leaves no doubt as to our neutrality and independence. The accusations of negligence and politicization being made against us are just efforts to cast a shadow over the Commission’s reputation and obstruct this election in the interests of unconstructive agendas. In the meantime, we encourage the legislative and judicial branches to carry out their responsibilities and take the actions needed for the success of this election in order to achieve the hopes and aspirations of our people for a better tomorrow full of peace, development and prosperity.

May we all succeed achieving the interests of the country and the people, with God’s help.

The High National Elections Commission
22 December 2021
Annex 19   Various factors impacting the electoral process

1. A disputed legal framework

The electoral laws adopted by the House of Representatives (HOR)\(^{25}\) failed to offer a largely agreed constitutional basis.\(^{26}\) Several sources believe that these texts were deliberately devised to create dissent and prevent the elections from happening; they would have been adopted only to demonstrate goodwill and avoid sanctions.\(^{27}\) Similarly, the UN and various Member States received their share of criticism\(^{28}\) for failing to achieve consensus among the Libyans in a timely manner after the adoption of the roadmap\(^{29}\) and for supporting the electoral process despite the flaws affecting the laws finally adopted.

2. Controversial candidacies

The successive candidacies for presidential election of prominent figures across Libya of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015),\(^{30}\) Khalifa Haftar,\(^{31}\) the HoR Speaker, Aguila Saleh,\(^{32}\) and incumbent Prime Minister Dbeibah\(^{33}\) stirred controversies over their legality and/or legitimacy.\(^{34}\) The confirmation of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s (LYi.015) candidacy by the Sebha court on 5 December 2021 antagonized both Haftar and Libyan figures and armed groups from the west. This has exacerbated the challenge of publishing the final list of candidates by HNEC.

3. Threats and security incidents

The Panel identified several problematic incidents that preceded the planned elections, such as forced closure of electoral offices, public calls to boycott the elections, and threats addressed to the HNEC (table 19.1).

\(^{25}\) On 8 September 2021, HoR issued Law No. 1 (2021) on the elections of the president; on 1 November 2021, HoR issued Law No. 9 (2021) amending Law No. 1: [https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR_Law_No_1_2021.pdf](https://liasinstitute.com/PDFs/HoR_Law_No_1_2021.pdf), 8 September 2021.

\(^{26}\) See SG Report 2022/31, paragraph 5 regarding the amendment of the electoral framework, SG Report 2022/31.


\(^{29}\) According to the roadmap, the 75 participants to the LPDF should have agreed on the constitutional basis for the elections by July 2021.

\(^{30}\) On 14 November 2021

\(^{31}\) On 16 November 2021

\(^{32}\) On 17 November 2021

\(^{33}\) On 21 November 2021

\(^{34}\) [https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/1480989-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%9A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%8A%D7%8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%97, 22 November 2021](https://www.skynewsarabia.com/video/1480989-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%9A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%87-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%8A%D7%8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%97, 22 November 2021).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 2021</td>
<td>During a televised interview, Khaled al-Mishri, Head of the PC,</td>
<td>staunchly expressed his opposition to elections “devised for Haftar”, rejected the electoral laws adopted by the HOR, challenged the legitimacy of Imad al-Sayeh as HNEC chair, declared that the outcome of the 24 December 2021 elections will not be accepted and concluded that if Haftar were elected, the western region would take up arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nov 2021</td>
<td>The cleric Sadiq al-Gharyani called upon the Libyan representatives from</td>
<td>various regions to gather and issue a statement supported by “the sound of arms” inciting Libyans to boycott the elections. He also voiced his concern about forged voter cards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nov 2021</td>
<td>Saif al-Islam Qadhafi (LYi.015) submitted his application for the</td>
<td>presidential election that was formally registered by the HNEC. This has drawn angry reactions in Western Libya that forced the HNEC to temporarily close electoral centres in some places (e.g. in Zliten, Zawiya and Misrata). Public calls in the west to boycott the elections also followed the submission of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s (LYi.015) candidacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Nov 2021</td>
<td>HNEC rejected 25 submissions including that of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi</td>
<td>(LYi.015). The next day, the candidate challenged the decision before the Sebha court that was subsequently surrounded by TBZ brigade and forced to close for several days.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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35 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQC1Z1fBIF0; https://mubasher.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2021/11/5/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%A9-%D9%85%D8%A8%D7%8A%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1, 4 November 2021.


37 https://www.alarabiya.net/north-africa/2021/11/5/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A6%D8%A8%D8%BD-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B0%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-, 15 November 2021.


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<th>Event</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>16 Dec 2021</td>
<td>Salah Badi (LYi.028) threatened to shut down State institutions in Tripoli[^41] and asserted that elections would not happen.[^42]</td>
<td>Despite this intimidation, the procedure ended on 5 December 2021 with a decision favourable to Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s (LYi.015) inclusion in the list of presidential candidates.</td>
</tr>
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[^42]: [https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external_log_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfe9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA](https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=search&v=291163996357697&external_log_id=9f7ac813-f3ff-40d3-9aa1-abfe9a2bf367&q=%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%20%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A%20%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA), 16 December 2021.
Annex 20 Incidents of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law committed in detention facilities under the control of armed groups in Libya

1. The Panel has interviewed twenty-three victims and their family members in regard to alleged violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law that took place during the period from 2015 to 2021. The incidents were perpetrated in official and unofficial places of detention including: (a) the Mitiga detention facility in Tripoli, under the exclusive responsibility and control of the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF); (b) the Saadawi Camp in Ain Zara under the control of Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB); (c) the Gernada detention facility in Al Bayda under the control of the HAF Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF); (d) Al Kweifiya detention facility in Benghazi under the control of the HAF LAAF; (e) unofficial place of detention (“military prison”) in Sidi Freij in Benghazi under the control of HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade; (f) HAF LAAF military intelligence facilities in Benghazi; (g) unofficial place of detention under the internal security agency (ISA) facility in Al Marj; and (h) the detention facility in Tarhuna under the control of Al Kaniyat until June 2020. Summary information is at table 20.1.

2. The Panel identified that officials of SDF, TRB and the four LAAF armed groups had complete control over the victims during the period of their arrest, detention, and transfers to other locations. In all twenty-three cases the Panel found that the detaining authorities: (a) violated victims’ right to liberty and security of person by arresting them on arbitrary grounds; and (b) intentionally depriving them of core procedural and judicial guarantees. This equates to arbitrary and unlawful detention.

3. Fifteen individuals consistently reported that different methods of torture and other mistreatment were administrated on detainees, including severe beatings with pipes and cables, suspension, sleep deprivation, denial of food and potable water, and deliberate denial of medical care. Some of these methods were used in combination and repeatedly on a regular basis for the purpose of obtaining information, punishing, or otherwise coercing the detainees. Four family members of individuals detained in the Gernada, Saadawi and Mitiga detention facilities reported inhuman treatment caused by prolonged incommunicado detention and harsh material conditions.

4. Five of seven detainees were executed in detention facilities under the control of Al-Kaniyat. The five victims were identified among excavated bodies from mass graves in the Tarhuna area. All victims and witnesses attributed the seven incidents to individuals of the Al-Kaniyat armed group. Three witnesses consistently stated that the three Al-Kani brothers who were Al-Kaniyat’s top commanders, Abdurahem El Shgagi (a.k.a. Abdurahem Al-Kani), Mohammed El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohammed Al-Kani), and Mohsen El Shgagi (a.k.a. Mohsen Al-Kani), ordered and in five cases executed acts of torture and murder of detainees.

5. Six members of the legal profession told the Panel that armed groups operating in the above locations have seriously undermined the role of judges and lawyers in: (a) ensuring respect for detainees’ procedural rights; and (b) in preventing torture and other ill-treatment in detention. These armed groups act with complete impunity from the judicial system. The Panel identified that in two documented cases, the SDF refused to implement decisions of Libyan judicial and government institutions in violation of procedural and judicial safeguards of detainees held in the SDF Mitiga detention facility.

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43 Where a victim was unable to give testimony due to an ongoing detention the Panel interviewed an immediate family member.
44 Article 9 of the ICCPR; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014.
45 See Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; article 7 of the ICCPR.
46 Panel interview with family members (CS 07, 08, 09 and 13).
47 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Appendix A to Annex 20: Locations of detention facilities under the control of armed groups

Figure 20.1
Map of detention facilities
CONFIDENTIAL Appendix B to Annex 20: Summary of investigated incidents
Annex 21 Slavery of migrant detainees in the Mitiga detention facility

1. Four migrant detainees testified to the Panel that individuals of the SDF formed and supervised groups of able-bodied migrants in the Mitiga detention facility ("Mitiga") for the primary purpose of forced labour. Former detainees identified Osama Najim and Adel Mohamed Ali (a.k.a. "Sheikh Adel") as individuals directly responsible for their unlawful transfer and unlawful labour that violated the prohibition of slavery, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity under international humanitarian law.  

2. Migrant detainees were unlawfully transferred to Mitiga from official and unofficial detention places in Tripoli by a well-organised scheme operated by SDF individuals since at least April 2019. The migrants were captured by the Libyan Coast Guard while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea and taken to temporary detention places in the Tripoli area (see figure 21.1).

3. SDF members responsible for the supervision of detainees deliberately exercised power of ownership over migrant detainees under their exclusive control. They forcibly deployed detainees in various locations inside and in close vicinity of Mitiga, primarily as a labour force in support of SDF military operations. In addition to being unlawfully recruited to participate in military operations, detainees had to perform labour under dangerous conditions and inside legitimate military objectives. Military-related tasks included: (a) cleaning and loading weapons; (b) unloading arms shipments in Tripoli port; and (c) unloading arms and other military equipment into underground ammunition storage sites around Mitiga (see appendix C), where they were occasionally exposed to shelling. Other tasks involved collecting and managing dead bodies of fighters and migrant detainees who were killed on the front lines; and reparation and reconstruction work on facilities belonging to the SDF that were damaged or destroyed during the active military hostilities.

4. Under armed supervision, migrant detainees worked for twelve to fourteen hours a day to the point of physical exhaustion, without any form of compensation. When they refused to engage in unlawful labour or were unable to perform enforced tasks due to fatigue, they were punished by severe beatings and prolonged solitary confinement in an inadequate isolation cell under poor sanitary conditions and without access to food and potable water (for the Panel’s findings on mistreatment in Mitiga, see annex 20). They performed assigned tasks feeling degraded and humiliated, and under the constant fear of violence.

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50 Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; Article 4 of Additional Protocol II.
51 Victims testified that the scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants for forced labour existed at least since the military offensive on Tripoli by HAF LAAF started in April 2019.
52 Victims testified that groups of migrant detainees were forcibly sent to the front lines to directly participate in the hostilities.
53 Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Appendix A to Annex 21: Scheme of unlawful transfers of migrants to the Mitiga detention facility

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Appendix B to Annex 21: Locations of forced labour in the Mitiga detention facility

Figure 21.B.1
Former detainee’s sketch of Mitiga

Source: Confidential
Figure 21.B.2
Satellite imagery of Mitiga for comparison\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{Source: }Google Earth

\textsuperscript{54} The veracity of the detainee’s evidence was supported by the accuracy of his hand-drawn map which matches the actual geographic features shown on the satellite imagery.
Appendix C to Annex 21: Satellite imagery and locations of GNU-AF underground ammunition storage sites where migrant detainees were forced to perform military tasks

Figure 21.C.1
Underground ammunition storage site 1

Source: Google Earth
Figure 21.C.2
Underground ammunition storage site 2

Source: Google Earth
Figure 21.C.3
Underground ammunition storage site 3

Source: Google Earth
Annex 22 Attacks on human rights defenders, social activists and media workers

1. The Panel identified six incidents of attacks committed against individuals who participated in public life as human rights defenders, social activists, or media workers. Attacks were perpetrated in the form of unlawful deprivation of life, unlawful deprivation of liberty, enforced disappearance, intimidation, and threats to life.

2. Two female human rights defenders were further intimidated into withdrawing from public life by being subjected to gender-based violence, which included repeated online harassment for reasons related to their gender, receiving humiliating and degrading messages of misogynistic nature on their social media accounts, and online threats of exposing intimate photographs in public.\(^{55}\)

3. Two prominent human rights defenders were unlawfully abducted from their workplaces by masked armed men and taken in Toyota vehicles to unknown locations shortly after they actively promoted free and democratic elections in Libya. The victims have been kept outside the protection of the law and their whereabouts were deliberately concealed for an extended period of time. The Panel continues to investigate to identify the perpetrators.

4. The Panel found that all these violent acts violated the victims’ human rights and in particular the right to life, liberty, and freedom of expression.\(^{56}\) A summary is at table 22.1 in confidential appendix A.

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\(^{55}\) Article 1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

\(^{56}\) See articles 6, 9 and 19 of the ICCPR. See also UN CAT, Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez v. Venezuela, Communication No. 456/2011, 15 May 2015, para. 6.6; UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, para. 58 (incommunicado detention or enforced disappearance as a form of ill-treatment).
Annex 23  Human rights abuses in unlawful detention places under the control of networks of human traffickers in Bani Walid and Tazirbu

1. This annex contains evidence of human rights abuses committed against four migrants in unlawful detention facilities under the control of networks of human traffickers: (a) Bani Walid (appendix A); and (b) Tazirbu (confidential appendix B).
Appendix A to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Bani Walid

Figure 23.A.1
Excerpts from a video footage of detention places in Bani Walid

Source: https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vkxBPEs4Bs7gYPy9QmUIq.

Figure 23.A.2
Network of identified human traffickers in control of detention places in Bani Walid and responsible for serious human rights violations against migrants and asylum seekers

Sources: CS 85 and 86.
1. Witnesses identified four individuals responsible for running a well-organised network of human trafficking of persons from, among others, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. Abdel Al Munam owns private detention facilities in Bani Walid where trafficked persons were imprisoned and subjected to serious human rights violations. Hassan Qidi manages the detention facilities and Abdel Al Munam’s brothers, Waleed and Ashraf, assist him in running the trafficking chain.

2. Two female victims, who were children at the time of captivity, identified Hassan Qidi and Abdel Al Munam as individuals who repeatedly raped them, subjected them to sexual enslavement and other forms of sexual violence in the period from 2018 until 2020.

3. Hassan Qidi was arrested on 5 March 2021 during a law enforcement operation by members of the Libyan Ministry of Defence.\footnote{https://twitter.com/rgowans/status/1368703470702845959?s=20&t=vkxBPEs4Bs7gYPy9ZQmUYjg.}
CONFIDENTIAL Appendix B to Annex 23: Locations of unlawful detention places under the control of human traffickers in Tazirbu
Annex 24  Violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers

1. This annex contains evidence of serious violations of international human rights law against migrants and asylum seekers: (a) in detention centres for migrants under the authority of the DCIM prior to December 2021, and (b) under the authority of the SSA (appendices A and B); and 2) associated with maritime operations (appendix C). 58

2. The Panel sent five letters to Libya requesting information regarding the human rights situation in DCIM detention facilities and associated with maritime operations, and responses are awaited.

3. On 23 March 2022, the Panel had a telephone call with the new Head of DCIM, Mr. Mohamed Salem al-Khodja, 59 to discuss the human rights situation of migrants and asylum seekers under the control and authority of the DCIM and in particular the identified human rights violations in DCIM detention centres for migrants.

58 See articles 6, 7 and 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
59 Mohamed Salem al-Khodja was appointed as Head of DCIM by GNU Decree 742 (2021) on 23 December 2021.
Appendix A to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants in detention centres

Table 24.A.1
Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants prior to December 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Latitude (°N)</th>
<th>Longitude (°E)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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Table 24.A.2
Location of DCIM detention facilities for migrants as of March 2022

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Sources: CS 24, 36, 45, and Panel analysis.
Table 24.A.3
Location of detention facilities for migrants under the former DCIM administration as of December 2021

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<th>Facility</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Latitude (°N)</th>
<th>Longitude (°E)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mabani</td>
<td>Former DCIM administration</td>
<td>32.849937</td>
<td>13.111648</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baten al Jabal</td>
<td>Former DCIM administration</td>
<td>32.071312</td>
<td>11.43797</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Al Hai</td>
<td>Former DCIM administration</td>
<td>32.191</td>
<td>12.4454</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24.A.4
Location of SSA DCSIM detention facilities for migrants as of December 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Latitude (°N)</th>
<th>Longitude (°E)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Maya</td>
<td>SSA DCSIM</td>
<td>32.808367</td>
<td>12.900751</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zahra</td>
<td>SSA DCSIM</td>
<td>32.41347</td>
<td>12.52082</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>az-Zawiyah Al-Nasr</td>
<td>SSA DCSIM</td>
<td>32.771767</td>
<td>12.696328</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CS 24, 28, and Panel analysis.

Figure 24.A.5
DCIM Ain Zara [L] and DCIM Al Mabani [R]

Source: Google Earth
Figure 24.A.6
DCIM An Naser [L] and DCIM Tarik al-Sikka [R]

Source: Google Earth

Figure 24.A.7
DCIM Shara Zawiya [L] and SSA Al-Maya [R]

Source: Google Earth
CONFIDENTIAL  Appendix B to Annex 24: Summary of investigated incidents
Appendix C to Annex 24: Violations of international human rights law committed against migrants and asylum seekers associated with maritime operations

A. Maritime incidents of 30 April 2021 and 30 June 2021

Figures 24.C.1a and 24.C.2b

Excerpts from video imagery showing the acts of ill-treatment and excessive use of force committed against persons in distress by the Libyan Coast Guard at sea

LCG member beating migrants in distress with a bullwhip. LCG members shooting at and making hazardous manoeuvres against migrants.

a Sea-Watch 4 crew video of 30 April 2021.
https://twitter.com/seawatch_intl/status/1388171810315902976, 30 April 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62BDsKmjsVY, 5 July 2021. The Panel authenticated the video with the primary source.

B. Maritime incidents of 12 August 2021 and 19 January 2022

1. The Panel identified that on the night of 12 August 2021, in a supposedly law enforcement operation, armed individuals of SSA maritime units used deadly force against migrants, located in a boat in the waters that survivors claimed to be an hour away from the coast of Zawiya, in violation of their right to life.60 In particular, SSA individuals performed hazardous movements, including by hitting the migrant boat, and fired gunshots at the passengers that caused the death of one person on board.61 The surviving eyewitnesses, whom SSA embarked on their boat and returned to Libya, recognised the SSA boat as responsible for the incident (see figure 24.C.3)

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60 Article 6 of the ICCPR.
61 CS 38 and 60; Forensic death report dated 23 August 2021.
2. The Panel identified the same pattern of violence in an incident of 19 January 2022, when the armed individuals of SSA maritime units used excessive force against around fifty migrants at sea and subjected them to degrading treatment (see Figures 24.C.4 to 24.C.6).  

Figures 24.C.3 to 24.C.6  
Imagery of SSA maritime units involved in excessive use of forces and degrading treatment against migrants at sea

SSA boat Alqayid-2 identified by eyewitnesses of 12 August 2021 incident. Source CS 38 and 60.  
SSA Lambro Olympic D74 boat identified by eyewitnesses of 19 January 2022 incident. Source CS82.  
Individual of SSA kicking a person in distress during the 19 January 2022 incident.  
Two individuals of SSA armed with AK-type assault rifles engaged in the 19 January 2021 incident.

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62 Articles 6, 7 and 9 of the ICCPR.  
63 For a detailed overview of SSA naval assets, see annex 27.
C. Maritime incident of 22 April 2021

1. The Panel investigated a shipwreck incident that had resulted in approximately 130 fatalities to individuals in distress\(^{64}\) in the Libyan Search and Rescue region (SRR) on 22 April 2021. During the investigation, the Panel interviewed ten witnesses and collected forty-seven elements of documentary evidence, including imagery of the shipwrecked boat.\(^{65}\)

2. The boat (designated by Panel as BD01) with approximately 130 passengers on board left Al Khoms at approximately 22:00 hours CEST\(^{66}\) on 20 April 2021\(^{67}\) and set course for Italian ports. BD01 was accompanied by a second boat (designated by Panel as BD02), which had approximately 100 passengers on board. The vessels became “in distress” on the morning of 21 April 2021 due to deteriorating weather conditions. This was a complex incident which is best explained by summarising the facts (see table 24.C.7).\(^{68}\)

### Table 24.C.7
Maritime incident with boat BD01 (20 – 22 April 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Apr 2021</td>
<td>22:00</td>
<td>BD01 and BD02 depart Al Khoms, Libya</td>
<td>▪ 230+ migrants and asylum seekers on board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2021</td>
<td>09:52</td>
<td>NGO Alarm Phone alert Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs via email to possible Search and Rescue (SAR) incident.</td>
<td>▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2021</td>
<td>10:03</td>
<td>NGO Alarm Phone establish contact with BD01.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2021</td>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>NGO Alarm Phone receive coordinates and details of dangerous conditions on board.</td>
<td>▪ NGO Alarm Phone maintain contact with BD01 throughout day until evening.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{64}\) International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) defines “distress phase” as “a situation wherein there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance”, Annex, Chapter 1, para. 1.3.13, SAR Convention.

\(^{65}\) The Panel considers a boat in this context as a small watercraft designed for use on inland waterways or protected coastal areas. This is to distinguish it from a vessel, which has a sea going capability.

\(^{66}\) All times are in Central European Summer Time (CEST).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2021</td>
<td>12:05</td>
<td>NGO Alarm Phone make first attempt to contact Libya MRCC by phone.</td>
<td>▪ Only one of the seven phone lines was responsive. Libya MRCC operator informed about alert messages sent via email.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2022</td>
<td>18:39</td>
<td>Frontex patrol plane streams live video from the scene.</td>
<td>▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 21 Apr 2021| 18:51 | Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive information on the incident. | ▪ Details obtained from a Frontex flight.  
▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.                                                                                             |
| 21 Apr 2021| 18:58 | Contact lost with BD01.                                               | ▪ Assuming satellite phone batteries exhausted.                                                                                                                                                       |
| 21 Apr 2022| 19:14 | Frontex asset broadcasts an initial “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 regarding the incident. | ▪ *MV Ocean Viking* (IMO 8506854) and *MV Alk* (IMO 9298612) receive the MAYDAY call (see figures 24.C.18 and 24.C.19).  |
| 22 Apr 2021| 12:42 | Shipwreck of BD01 found by Frontex patrol plane.                      | ▪ No survivors found.                                                                                                                                                                                  |
| 22 Apr 2021| 12:43 | Frontex asset broadcasts a second “Mayday” call to all ships in vicinity of BD01 call regarding the incident. | ▪ No acknowledgement or response.                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 22 Apr 2021| 13:08 | Frontex send email to Libya, Italy and Malta MRCCs containing extensive updated information on the incident. | ▪ Details obtained from a Frontex flight.  
▪ No acknowledgement or response from any MRCC.                                                                                             |
| 22 Apr 2021| 13:23 | Last attempt [by *MV Ocean Viking*], of 38 attempts, made to contact Libya MRCC by phone and VHF radio. | ▪ NGO Alarm Phone, *MV Ocean Viking* and Frontex attempt to reach the Libyan MRCC by phone and VHF radio 38 times in total.  
▪ Libya MRCC respond to only seven phone calls of NGO Alarm Phone. See paragraph 4 for Libya MRCC response. |

*a* All timings are CEST (GMT+1).

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70 Two vessels that arrived in the location of the capsized BD01 on 22 April 2022 observed several dead bodies floating in the water (see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28), [https://twitter.com/sosmedintl/status/1385297161550798851](https://twitter.com/sosmedintl/status/1385297161550798851). The Panel received the information on the identity of 18 people who were boarded on BD01 and have been disappeared since the shipwreck. In its letter of 10 March 2022 to Libya, the Panel requested information on the actions that Libyan authorities took to recover and manage the dead bodies after the shipwreck, in particular the identification of the bodies and the delivery of the bodies to family members. A response is awaited.

3. Responsible officials of all three notified States, Libya, Italy and Malta, were obliged to protect and respect the lives of individuals who found themselves in a situation of distress at sea on 21 and 22 April 2021 in accordance with their international obligations on rescue at sea,\textsuperscript{72} provided that they exercised power or effective control over the enjoyment of the right to life of the distressed individuals.\textsuperscript{73} The Panel notes that legal obligations of the three MRCCs regarding this incident, other than under international human rights law, are outside of the Panel’s mandate.\textsuperscript{74}

4. Since the incident took place in the Libyan Search and Rescue Region (SRR) (see figure 24.C.8), the Libyan national authority, Libyan MRCC, had the primary obligation under international law to actively proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance.\textsuperscript{75} The Panel considers that Libya MRCC was well informed about the emergency situation that threatened the lives of all estimated 130 passengers, as established above, but failed to take appropriate measures to provide the needed assistance to BD01.\textsuperscript{76} NGO Alarm Phone informed the Panel that Libya MRCC had provided three conflicting scenarios to them as a justification for this failure: (a) that the Libyan patrol boat was on the way to search and rescue BD01 on 21 April 2021; (b) that the Libya MRCC was unaware of BD01 distress case; and (c) that Libyan maritime units were unable to execute SAR operation on 21 April 2021 due to bad weather.

5. The Panel finds these justifications problematic. Firstly, none of the actors that had visuals on BD01, including Frontex and private vessels, received any information that Libyan patrol boats were engaging in a SAR operation that involved BD01 (for example, see figures 24.C.27 and 24.C.28). To the contrary, NGO Alarm Phone, Frontex and MV Ocean Viking all reported that Libya MRCC officers were consistently unresponsive to distress calls and alert messages that these three entities conveyed to them multiple times. Secondly, the overwhelming evidence of the direct knowledge of the Libya MRCC officers contradicts the claim that they were unaware of the incident (for example, see figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28). Finally, whilst the Panel appreciates that the assessment of operational conditions that might have endangered the boat or the crew members due to bad weather was at the relevant authorities’ discretion,\textsuperscript{77} Libya MRCC was responsible at the minimum to engage in activities aimed at rendering assistance to BD01 such as: (a) providing shelter to BD01; and (b) actively coordinating SAR operation with neighbouring MRCCs and merchant vessels that were attempting to search and rescue BD01.\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, the ability of Libyan officers to search and rescue BD01 on time was indicated in the morning hours of 21 April, 2021 when the Libyan Coast Guard found BD02 and returned the surviving passengers to Libya.\textsuperscript{79} The Panel wrote to Libya on 10 March 2022 and has yet to receive a response.

6. While the primary responsibility for the search and rescue operation of BD01 fell to Libya MRCC, the Italian and Maltese MRCC also had a duty to cooperate with and provide assistance to Libya MRCC to rescue people in distress at sea and to take all feasible measures to prevent loss of life at sea.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{72} Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention).

\textsuperscript{73} Articles 2(1) and 6 of the ICCPR; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, para. 63. This obligation applies to all individuals within the power or effective control of the said authorities, regardless of their nationality, statelessness or other status.

\textsuperscript{74} Paragraph 11(a) of resolution 2213 (2015). International humanitarian law is inapplicable in this incident due to the absence of the required link (or “nexus”) of alleged acts to the armed conflict in Libya.

\textsuperscript{75} Although Libya is not State Party to the UNCLOS, it is bound by the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea as a norm of customary international law codified in article 98(1) of the UNCLOS: “Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.” See also Chapter 5, Regulation 33 of the SOLAS; Annex, paras. 4.2.1 and 4.3 of the SAR Convention; International Law Commission, Commentary to draft article 36 of the Articles concerning the Law of the Sea, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Volume II (1956).

\textsuperscript{76} Article 6 of the ICCPR.

\textsuperscript{77} Article 98(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

\textsuperscript{78} Chapter 4, Regulation 33 of SOLAS Convention; Chapter 2, para. 2.1.9 of the SAR Convention.

\textsuperscript{79} https://twitter.com/alarm_phone/status/1384973210702200835?s=21.

\textsuperscript{80} SAR Convention, Annex, paras. 4.2.1.1. and 4.3.
(a) Malta MRCC did not engage in such cooperation, despite their knowledge of BD01, their position being that “Malta was not the responsible nor the coordinating authority on this particular case” given that the incident took place outside the Maltese SRR.\(^{81}\)

(b) Italy MRCC was also uncooperative in providing assistance to BD01. In addition to multiple email messages, Italy MRCC received at least five telephone calls from NGO Alarm Phone and MV Ocean Viking asking the Italian authorities to provide assistance to search and rescue of BD01. The Italian officers referred them to the Libyan MRCC as a competent authority. Furthermore, according to the NGO Alarm Phone report, Libya MRCC claimed that Italy MRCC engaged with them to request authorisation for an Italian flagged merchant vessel engage in SAR operations for BD01. The Panel was unable to verify this claim.

7. While the passive attitude of the Italian and Maltese MRCCs to alert messages might be qualified as a serious failure in the response to assist in the search and rescue operation under the international law of the sea, having assessed all the evidence available, the Panel was unable to establish a jurisdiction link between these authorities and BD01, necessary to make the findings on the responsibility of Italy and Malta MRCCs officials under international human rights law.

8. Shipmasters of private vessels that were in sufficient proximity to the boat in distress also had the duty under international law to proceed with all possible speed to render assistance to persons in distress. Four private vessels – MV Alk (IMO: 9298612), VS Lisbeth (IMO: 9309978), MY Rose (IMO: 8207381), and MV Ocean Viking (IMO: 8506854) were the only vessels that actively searched for BD01 for over ten hours.\(^{82}\) They, however, reached the site of BD01 on 22 April only to find a number of dead bodies in the sea and a capsized boat without survivors.

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\(^{81}\) Written response to the Panel’s request for information by Malta, dated 12 July 2021. Malta reiterated its position at the meeting with representatives of the Government of Malta on 15 February 2022 in Valletta.

\(^{82}\) Merchant vessels ALK and BRUNA [IMO 7601073] were in close proximity of BD01 at around noon of 21 April but Bruna declined to engage in the search and rescue and instead changed its course for unestablished reasons (see figures 24.C.11 and 24.C.13).
Figure 24.C.8
Map of Central Mediterranean Search and Rescue Regions and locations of boat in distress on 21 and 22 April 2021
Figures 24.C.9 to 24.C.28
Copies of email correspondences between involved actors of the 22 April 2021 incident

Figure 24.C.9

Dear Madams and Sirs,

Our hotline was informed by a fishermen about a possible distress at sea. The information, which we received from the fisherman, are so far:

Number of people: approximately 120

Thuraya number: 008821655549123

Place of departure: Al-Khoms

Time of departure: 20.04.2021 - 10 pm CEST.

Position Type and color of the boat: the boat has the color grey the material is unclear

Further Information: The boat left Al-Khoms in a Convoy with another boat (AP183 see our other mail) and until now we could establish contact to the boat.

Thank you for your attention.

Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
In case of emergency call
+334 86 51 71 61
To whom it may concern

we could establish contact to the people on board and got following information:

There are around 130 persons on board, including 7 women. One of them is pregnant.

Type of boat: white rubber boat

We assume the Position to be: N 33° 11' E 14° 07'; Timestamp: 11 CEST

There are some life jackets on board, but not enough for everybody and as the weather is getting worse, the sea is getting rougher as well!

The people are urgently asking for help!

Thank you for your time and consideration

Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
In case of emergency call
+34 86 51 71 61
Re: AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med

To: itmrcc@mit.gov.it, 10 more... on 2021-04-21 12:00 pm
From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
Copy: from mrcc@mit.gov.it, itmrcc@outlook.it, rccmalta@gouv.mt, libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com, sar@ans.caa.gov.ly, lcg.nav.room@gmail.com, 1mrcc.1@mod.gov.ly, lmrcc.2@mod.gov.ly, lcg.ops.rr@mod.gov.ly, admin@hamamlivestock.com 1 more.

Date: Wed 12:00 pm
All headers...

Details

Dear Madam or Sir,

Please be informed that the Vessel Bruna IMO number 7601873 is close to the below mentioned distress case. Please inform the ship about the case and advice them to render assistance. The company hamamlivestock seems to operate this ship, thats why we are sending this email as well to "operations@hamamlivestock.com". @hamamlivestock if you as a company are not operating the ship anylonger please let us know asap and inform the current owner.

Thank you for your cooperation

On 2021-04-21 11:28 am, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

To whom it may concern

We could establish contact to the people on board and got following information:

There are around 130 persons on board, including 7 women. One of them is pregnant.

Type of boat: white rubber boat

We assume the Position to be: N 33° 11' E 14° 07'; Timestamp: 11 CEST
Figure 24.C.12

URGENT AP-182.2021-SOS from Central Med

To itmrcc@mit.gov.it 8 more... on 2021-04-21 1:18 pm
From Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
To itmrcc@mit.gov.it, ITMRCC@outlook.it, roomalta@gov.mt, libyan naval comms centre@gmail.com, sae@ansa.caa.gov.ly, lcg.nav.room@gmail.com, lrnrc.1@mod.gov.ly, lrnrc.2@mod.gov.ly, lcg.sps.sm@mod.gov.ly
Copy

Date Wed 1:18 pm
All headers...
Details

To whom it may concern

as we just informed MRCC Rome via phone, we got following position for Ap-182 at 12.51 CEST, as the people read it out:
N 33 17 19 85
E 614 77 478

we assume that the first 7 is a 0, that would match earlier positions.
The people are desperate, as more and more water is entering the boat.

We kindly ask you to take action! Don’t let them drown!

Kind regards

--
Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
In case of emergency call
+334 86 51 71 61

www.alarmphone.org
www.watchthemed.net
UPDATE NEW POSITION! Re: URGENT AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med.

To: itmrcc@mit.gov.it, ITMRCC@outlook.it, rccmalta@gov.mt, libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com, sar@ans.ca.gov.ly, lcg.nav.room@gmail.com, lrnc.1@mod.gov.ly, lrnc.2@mod.gov.ly, log.ops.rm@mod.gov.ly, admin@hanmamilivestock.com

From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone

Date: Wed 4:15 pm

To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated positon of Case Ap 182

The new position ist:
N33 22 4251, E014 02 41 23 @1602CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).

Please be as well adviced that the Merchand vessels ALK (IMO 9298612) and BRUNA (IMO number:7601073) are in the area of this case. Please advice them to assist.

People are urgently asking for help. If you can provide us an ETA of your Vessel this would be great!

Kind regards

On 2021-04-21 1:18 pm, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

To whom it may concern

as we just informed MRCC Rome via phone, we got following position for Ap-182 at 12.51 CEST, as the people read it out:
N 33 17 19 85
E 014 77 478
Re: !UPDATE NEW POSITION!Re: URGENT AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med

To: itmrcc@mit.gov.it 8 more... on 2021-04-21 5:16 pm

From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone

To: itmrcc@mit.gov.it, ITMRCC@outlook.it, rccmalta@gmail.com, libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com, sar@ans.caa.gov.ly, lcg.nav.room@gmail.com, libmrcc.1@mod.gov.ly, libmrcc.2@mod.gov.ly, lcg.ops.sm@mod.gov.ly

Date: Wed 5:16 pm

To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
N 33 24 562, E014 00 158 @1712CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).
Please be as well advised that the Merchant vessel ALK (IMO 9290612)
is still in the area of this case. Please advice them to assist.

People are urgently asking for help. If you can provide us an ETA of your Vessel this would be great!

Kind regards

On 2021-04-21 4:15 pm, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
N33 22 4251, E014 02 41 23 @1600CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).
Figure 24.C.15

OCEAN VIKING - Distress alert Case AP-182.,2021-SOS from Central Med 🌐

From: Ocean Viking // Bridge on 2021-04-21 5:53 pm
To: lmercc.1@mod.gov.ty, lmercc.2@mod.gov.ty
Copy: 1mmercc@mit.gov.ty, rccmail@navy.mil

Dear Madame and Sirs,

MV Ocean Viking has not succeeded to find the distress case AP 181 (last night it was called AP 180).

MV Ocean Viking is now proceeding towards the distress case AP 182.

MV OCEAN VIKING at 1559Z in position: 34 00.9 N 011 39.2 E speed 11kts COG 102

Ocean Viking will keep you informed.

Please inform us if you have an updated position.

Regards,

MVH

Bridge

Ocean Viking

Heyland Offshore A/S

-----Original Message-----
From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone [mailto:wtm-alarm-phone@antira.info]
Sent: 21 April 2021 17:16
To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
N 33° 25 3948, E013° 57 5567 @1815CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).

The people confirmed that they are adrift.

We saw that the Plane "Frontex G-WKTH OSPREY1" is active. Please forward them the current position so they can locate the boat and guide possible rescue assets in the area.

We asked pub to save battery but as they are calling constantly we are unsure how long there Thuraya will be reachable.

People are urgently asking for help.

Kind regards

On 2021-04-21 5:16 pm, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:
To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
Re: UPDATE NEW POSITION! Re: URGENT AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med

To: itmrrcc@mit.gov.it 8 more...
on 2021-04-21 7:15 pm

From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone

To: itmrrcc@mit.gov.it, ITMRRCC@outlook.it, rcc@mit.gov.it, libyan naval comms centre@gmail.com, sar@ans.ca.gov.ly, lcg.nav.room@gmail.com, linrec.1@gov modify, linrec.2@gov modify, lcg ops mod gov

Copy: [Redacted]

Date: Wed 7:15 pm

All headers...

Details

To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
N 33° 26' 33.72", E013° 56' 37.60 @1858 CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).

The people confirmed that they are adrift.
The people could see a plane we assume this to be frontex Osprey.

People are urgently asking for help.

Kind regards

On 2021-04-21 5:16 pm, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

To whom it may concern,

we just received an updated position of Case Ap 182
The new position is:
N 33° 24' 56.2", E014° 00' 15.8 @1812 CEST 21.04.2021 (as received on the phone).
Please be as well advised that the merchant vessel ALK (IMO 9298612)
is still in the area of this case. Please advice them to assist.
Dear Sirs,

At 1715Z received via VHF Ch 16 the following message: 'MAYDAY MAYDAY for a boat in distress in position 33 20N 013 36E'.

The mv AIX replied and relay the message to Lampedusa Radio requiring instructions. Lampedusa Radio replied that the position is out of their competences and to contact Libyan JRCC.

Ocean Viking called LJRCC, no answer.

At 1733Z Ocean Viking called ITMCC informing about the mayday relay asking to send a Navtex to all ships.

MV Ocean Viking is proceeding towards the distress position. ETA 8.5 hours.

Regards

MVH

Bridge

Ocean Viking

Hereford offshore A/S

-----Original Message------
From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone [mailto:wtm-alarm-phone@antara.info]
RE: UPDATE NEW POSITION!Re: URGENT AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med

From: Ocean Viking // Bridge // on 2021-04-21 09:00 pm
To: 
Copy: 
Date: Wed 9:00 pm

Dear Madams, Sirs,

At 1025 received via VHF CH 16 the following message: "MAYDAY MAYDAY for a boat in distress in position 33 26N 013 56E"

MV Ocean Viking tried to contact via VHF CH16 the station sending a Mayday Call: NO REPLY

MV Ocean Viking is proceeding towards the distress position.

Regards

Bridge

Ocean Viking
Neyland Offshore A/S

-----Original Message-----
From: Ocean Viking // Bridge (mailto:viking.bridge@hvessel.com)
Sent: 21. april 2021 20:04
To: 'lmcc.1@mod.gov.ly'; 'lmcc.2@mod.gov.ly'; 'lmcc@mod.gov.ly'; 'rccmalta@gov.mt'
Cc: 'itnercc@malta.gov.mt'; 'rccmalta@gov.mt';

Subject: RE: UPDATE NEW POSITION!Re: URGENT AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med

Dear Sirs,

At 1715Z received via VHF CH 16 the following message: "MAYDAY MAYDAY for a boat in distress in position 33 26N 013 56E"
Re: UPDATE NEW POSITION!Re: URGENT AP-182.,2021-SOS from Central Med

To: itmrocc@mit.gov.it 8 more... on 2021-04-21 9:52 pm

From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone

To: itmrocc@mit.gov.it, ITMRC@outlook.it, rcomalta@gov.mt, libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com, sar@ans.caa.gov.ly, lcn.nav.room@gmail.com, lmbc.1@mod.gov.ly, lmbc.2@mod.gov.ly, lcn ops.m@imod.gov.ly

Copy:

Date: Wed 9:52 pm

All headers... Details

To whom it may concern,

the people on board are now without battery on their thuraya phone. Our last call was too short to ask for a new position.

They are still in a distress situation at sea and now in the dark with weather getting worse.

They were still adrift and with urgent need of help.

We tried hardly to call so called Lybian CG but no one picked up until now.

We learned that the Frontex plane Osprey was circling above the last position we got from the boat, so authorities now where it is and are obliged to rescue!

They urgently need help!

Kind regards,

On 2021-04-21 7:15 pm, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

To whom it may concern,
To whom it may concern,

we are urgently asking for air support to find the below mentioned boat in distress!

The last known position:
N 33° 26' 33''72, E013° 56' 37''60 (18:58 CEST 21.04.21)

Due to weather conditions, it is hardly possible to find the survivors of the distress without air support.

The merchant vessels VS Lisbeth, Alk and My Rose are in the area as well as Ocean Viking. Please guide them to the survivors.

If the people survived the night they are still in urgent need of help.

Kind regards

Watch The Med Alarm Phone

On 2021-04-21 21:52:03, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:
To whom it may concern,

the people on board are now without battery on their Thuraya phone. Our last call was too short to ask for a new position.
Dear Sirs,

MY Ocean Viking in position 33 31.9N 013 37.2E 50G 6.9 006 099 is performing a search pattern in the area of the MAYDAY call (Alarm Phone case 102).

In the same area the following vessels are performing search patterns as well:
- MY ROSE mmsi: 372595000
- ALK mmsi 394619000
- VS LISBETH mmsi: 2320085615

Weather conditions:
Wind: 7 to 8 near gale/gale
Seastate: 6 very rough

We require assistance for the search.

Regards,
Bridge

Ocean Viking
Havland Offshore A/S
AP-182, 2021-SOS from Central Med - AIR SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED

To frontex@frontex.europa.eu on 2021-04-22 8:42 am

Dear sir or madam,

We kindly ask you to support the search for the people in distress and provide us with info about the outcome of your flights so far.

AP182
approx. 130 ppl from Al Khoms on 20.04.2021.
last known position:
N 33° 26 3372, E013° 56 3760 (18:58 CEST 21.04.21)

We ask you for information about the outcome of your flight from yesterday (21.04.2021):
- did you spot the boat and in which position?
- what was the condition of the boat?
- who did you alert about the boat in distress?
- what were the responses of the responsible authorities?
- when will your next flight take place?

Due to weather conditions, it is hardly possible to find the survivors of the distress without air support.

The merchant vessels VS Lisbeth, Alk and My Rose are in the area as well as Ocean Viking.

Please guide them to the survivors.

If the people survived the night they are still in urgent need of help.

Kind regards

Watch The Med - Alarm Phone
Dear Sir/Madam,

Thank you for your email. Please be informed that Frontex has immediately relayed the message to the Italian and Maltese authorities.

Best Regards,

From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone <wtm-alarm-phone01@antira.info>
Sent: 22 April 2021 07:52
To: ltmrcc@mit.gov.it; ITMRCC@outlook.it; rccmalta@gov.mt; libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com; sar@ans.caa.gov.ly; lcg.nav.room@gmail.com; lmrcc.1@mod.gov.ly; lmrcc.2@mod.gov.ly; lcg.ops.rm@mod.gov.ly; Frontex; FSA.MT; lo.itcg; FSA IT.SAR; FSC.EMT

Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: AIR SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED! URGENT AP-182., 2021-SOS from Central Med

[EXTERNAL EMAIL] CAUTION: Email originated from outside of Frontex. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize and trust the sender.

To whom it may concern,

we are urgently asking for air support to find the bellow mentioned boat
in distress.
Dear sir or madam,

we kindly ask again for information on your activities and the outcome of your spotting of the distress case we requested earlier:

AP182
approx. 130 ppl from Al Khoms on 20.04.2021.
last known position:
N 33° 26 3372, E013° 56 3760 (18:58 CEST 21.04.21)

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Watch The Med Alarm Phone

On 2021-04-22 8:42 am, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone wrote:

Dear sir or madam,

We kindly ask you to support the search for the people in distress and provide us with info about the outcome of your flights so far.

AP182
approx. 130 ppl from Al Khoms on 20.04.2021.
Re: [EXTERNAL] AP-182., 2021-SOS from Central Med - AIR SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED

From: FSC on 2021-04-22 4:06 pm

To: wtm-alarm-phone01@antira.info

Subject: [EXTERNAL] AP-182., 2021-SOS from Central Med - AIR SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED

Dear [Redacted]

Reference your email below please be informed that Frontex is aware about the distress case in question, occurring within the Libyan Search and Rescue Region and initially spotted by OSPREY 3 on April 21.

Upon sighting, all the MRCCs in the area have been informed, including RCC Tripoli as Rescue Coordination Centre responsible for the Libyan SRR.

Additionally, and due to the dangerous condition of the boat in distress, a MAYDAY radio message was broadcasted in order to alert all the ships in the area.

Frontex is still supporting the search and rescue operations.

Kind regards.

-----Original Message-----
From: Watch The Med - Alarm Phone <wtm-alarm-phone01@antira.info>
Sent: 22 April 2021 08:49
To: Frontex <frontex@frontex.europa.eu>; FSA.MT <FSA.MT@frontex.europa.eu>; lo.itcg <lo.itcg@frontex.europa.eu>
FSA.IT.SAR <FSA.IT.SAR@frontex.europa.eu>; FSC.EMT <FSC.EMT@frontex.europa.eu>
Cc: itmrcc@mit.gov.it; ITMRCC@outlook.it; rccmalta@gov.mt; libyan.naval.comms.centre@gmail.com;
sar@ans.ca.gov.ly; lcg.nav.room@gmail.com; lmrc.19h@mod.gov.ly; lmrc.20@mod.gov.ly; lcg.ops.am@mod.gov.ly;

Subject: [EXTERNAL] AP-182., 2021-SOS from Central Med - AIR SUPPORT URGENTLY NEEDED
Dear Madams and Sirs,

Below the recap of the 22nd of April 2021:

- Ocean Viking starts the search at 0317Z in pos 33 30.4N 013 53.0E in cooperation with MY ROSE (msi: 372508000), ALK (msi: 304619000), VS LISBETH (msi: 232005015)
  - at 1024Z MY ROSE has visual on 3 bodies in pos 33 34N 013 37E
  - at 1042Z Osprey 3 order to MY ROSE to standby in position and wait for Libyan patrol vessel Ubari
  - at 1045Z Osprey 3 has visual on the shipwreck (grey rubber boat) in pos 33 44.44N 013 37.57E
  - at 1155Z ALK leaves the scene and communicate via VHF that patrol vessel Ubari is the coordinator, meanwhile VS LISBETH left the area
  - at 1206Z Ocean Viking has visual contact on the shipwreck and few bodies in pos 33 45.0N 013 38.0E. Only the sponsons were remaining afloat, no deck, no transom, no engine and bow completely under water level. No signs of survivors and MY ROSE is still holding her position in the area.
  - at 1206Z Ocean Viking calls via sat phone LY3RCC asking information about ETA of Ubari. The officer on watch confirmed that Ubari was going to come on scene
  - at 1323Z Ocean Viking calls via sat phone LY3RCC asking information about ETA of Ubari. The officer on watch confirmed that Ubari was going to come on scene
  - at 1505Z Ocean Viking on scene in pos 33 45.5N 013 40.6E 3nm from MY ROSE. Patrol vessel Ubari is not yet arrived

Ocean Viking while standing by in the area spotted several bodies in the water.

Current weather condition: wind 6 to 7, seastate 5 to 6.

Regards

Ocean Viking
Hayland Offshore A/S
Figure 24.C.28

RE: OCEAN VIKING - AP-182, 2021 - REQUEST OF ASSISTANCE

From: Ocean Viking // Bridge

To: Imrc.1@mod.gov.ly, Imrc.2@mod.gov.ly

Copy: Imrc.3@mod.gov.ly, Bregatelementet, SAR, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone, post@sjofartsdir.no, lo.itc@frontex.europa.eu, SAR.MAS@frontex.europa.eu

Date: Thu 8:07 pm

Dear Madam and Sirs,

Following my email below, please be informed that my vessel ROSE left the area at 1700Z and as night is falling, there is no sign of patrol vessel Ubari in the vicinity nor contact established with the Ocean Viking.

As my vessel is not able to further provide assistance with this case, we resume course at 1746Z (06 272 SOG 5Kts.

Ocean Viking position 33 49.8N 013 42.2E

Regards,

Bridge

Ocean Viking

Nordland Offshore A/S

-----Original Message-----
From: Ocean Viking // Bridge [mailto:viking.bridge@hvessel.com]
Sent: 22. april 2021 17:08
To: Imrc.1@mod.gov.ly, Imrc.2@mod.gov.ly
Cc: Imrc.3@mod.gov.ly, Bregatelementet, Watch The Med - Alarm Phone, post@sjofartsdir.no, lo.itc@frontex.europa.eu, SAR.MAS@frontex.europa.eu
Subject: RE: OCEAN VIKING - AP-182, 2021 - REQUEST OF ASSISTANCE

Dear Madam and Sirs,

...
Annex 25  Maritime and air delivery non-compliance profile indicators

1. The Panel has continued to use a set of profile indicators\(^{83}\) of suspicious activities and documentation that, when considered collectively, indicate that a vessel or aircraft is likely to be carrying illicit cargo (see tables 25.1 and 25.2). Multiple indicators are required before a vessel, aircraft or airline is classified as of interest to the Panel or reported as being a violation of or non-compliance with the arms embargo. This annex summarises these indicators.

Table 25.1
Maritime non-compliance profile indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System (AIS)(^{a})</td>
<td>“Dark activity” periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Route(s)</td>
<td>Destination Ports</td>
<td>The ports of Gabes and Algiers are often inaccurately declared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unusual routing from past voyages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Frequent change of vessel’s owners</td>
<td>Lack of corporate on-line presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>Frequent change of vessel’s operators</td>
<td>Lack of corporate on-line presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vessel Name</td>
<td>Frequent change of vessel’s name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Vessel Tonnage</td>
<td>Tonnage Range</td>
<td>Comparison to historical tonnage of vessels known to be non-compliant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Vessel Draught</td>
<td>Change of Draught</td>
<td>Comparison of draught at loading and discharge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commercial Relationships</td>
<td>Linkages</td>
<td>Links between owners / operators / agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Commercial Activity</td>
<td>Uneconomic behaviour</td>
<td>Low utilization profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Flag of Registry</td>
<td>Flags of convenience and multiple flag changes</td>
<td>Includes Flag refusal to allow inspections when requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Documentation</td>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>Transparency in information supplied to Panel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accuracy of completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cargo Shielding</td>
<td>Container layout on weather deck</td>
<td>Containers are used to line the edge of the weather deck to shield the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Container layout on port dock</td>
<td>remainder of the deck from external view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Containers are used to shield offloading sites at ports from external view.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{83}\) First developed for use in S/2021/229.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cargo Analysis</td>
<td>Volumetric and mass analysis</td>
<td>• Do reported weight and packaging match declaration on documentation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Sanctions Listings</td>
<td>Sanctions designated or reported vessel</td>
<td>• Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sanctions notices by subscription-based resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Or Long-Range Identification and Tracking system (LRIT).

Table 25.2
Profile indicators of airbridge and air delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Flight volume</td>
<td>The number of unscheduled flights on a previously little used route</td>
<td>• For example, a significant number of flights over a short period indicates a centrally organized supply chain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Flight timings</td>
<td>Most flights are planned so that the cargo aircraft are unloaded during darkness</td>
<td>• Disguises the nature of cargo being offloaded from onlookers in areas where access is difficult to control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Flight routing</td>
<td>The flights often take off from a civilian airport, then land at a military airbase before departing on a flight track directly towards Libya</td>
<td>• Civilian cargo aircraft require time in civilian airports where the appropriate servicing and maintenance capabilities exist. • Indicative of the loading of military related equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Flight safety</td>
<td>Signals from the aircraft ADS-B(^4) transponders are not visible on open-source ADS-B monitoring shortly after entering Egyptian airspace</td>
<td>• Airline captains sometimes “go dark” when approaching Libyan airspace as a countermeasure against being targeted by air defence systems, but usually not for the majority of the flight. • Deliberately switched off due to the covert nature of these flights. • Other legitimate flights (for example the scheduled Afriqiyah Airlines A320 from Benghazi to Alexandria always displays ADS-B data).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Flight safety</td>
<td>Signals from the aircraft ADS-B transponders are switched to MLAT (multilateration) mode(^4) for the whole flight</td>
<td>• MLAT mode only transmits aircraft code, heading, altitude and speed but NOT current location.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{4}\) Aircraft without, or that are not broadcasting on, ADS-B transponders do not broadcast their latitude/longitude, so flight monitoring software uses multilateration of 1090 MHz Mode S transponder signals to determine the aircraft’s location by using the time difference of arrival (TDOA) when an aircraft is detected across four or more receivers/ground stations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6  | Flight transparency      | Signals from aircraft ADS-B transponders are not available for all flights | • Airlines have utilised a “blocking” service provided by some of the open-source ADS-B monitoring providers.  
• A deliberate attempt by the airline to avoid scrutiny and disguise covert or illicit flights. |
| 7  | Flight availability      | Scheduled or non-scheduled route                                       | • Ticket unavailability from the air operator for passenger aircraft flights suggests movement of military personnel. For example: Cham Wings flights from Syria to Benghazi. |
| 8  | Aircraft documentation   | The use of fake Air Operating Certificates (AOC)                       | • The Panel has identified the use of at least one fake AOC used to justify an ADS-B signal blocking service.                           |
| 9  | Flight documentation     | The submission of incomplete or inaccurate Cargo Manifests and Air Waybills | • Fake consignees listed.  
• Fake consignors listed.  
• Used to disguise the true nature of the actual cargo.  
• Customs value listed as zero.  
• Failure to supply, for example: 1) Flight Plan; 2) Aircraft Technical Logbook; 3) Journey Flight Log; 4) Weight and Balance Report; 5) Take-off and Landing Balance; and 6) General Declaration. |
| 10 | Air operator transparency| Limited, inaccurate or no information provided to requests for information | • Indicative of covert or illicit activity.                                                                                                                                                     |
| 11 | Air operator web presence| Lack of corporate website or very limited contact information on website | • A reputable cargo aircraft company would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.                                                                 |
| 12 | Cargo agency web presence| Lack of corporate website                                               | • A reputable cargo agent would have an easily sourced online presence as part of the company marketing strategy.                                                                              |
| 13 | Air operator’s relationships | Corporate links                                                      | • Change of ownership or operating conditions for aircraft between linked companies.                                                                                                        |
| 14 | Sanctions Listings       | Current or previous listings of owner, operator, or aircraft           | • Previous reports by other UN Panels and Monitoring Groups.  
• Sanctions notices by subscription databases.                                                                                                                                                    |
Annex 26  Summary of arms embargo equipment violations (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022)

1. Tables 26.1 and 26.2 summarises confirmed arms and military materiel transferred into Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent resolutions. It does not include arms and military materiel transferred to Libya for which exemptions were provided for by the Committee.

Table 26.1
Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred from Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment) 86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>IOMAX AT-802i</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dassault Mirage 2000/9</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Operated from Sidi Barani airbase in Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Dynamics F-16</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Overflight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>** MiG-21MF</td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-23ML(D)</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>New 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-29</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Su-24</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Pilatus PC-6</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Lancaster6</td>
<td>Project Opus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ISR) 87</td>
<td>** AS332L Super Puma Medium Utility</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Lancaster6</td>
<td>Project Opus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Mi-8</td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rotary Wing)</td>
<td>Mi-24</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-24V</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-24P</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UH-60M Blackhawk</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>Airbus A400B Atlas</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>For transfer of military materiel into Libya.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 This annex updates and clarifies information within the previous original work at https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html, 23 March 2021.
86 Items marked ** appeared in the 29 May 2021 7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0.
87 Fighter Ground Attack.
88 https://medium.com/war-is-boring/it-looks-like-russia-gave-a-fighter-jet-to-libyas-warlord-1a564098b223, 1 March 2017. Although the imagery shows the MiG-23 in Libya the Panel does not endorse the supply chain in the article.
89 UID, in all uses, means unidentified, or low evidential levels, and responsibility has yet to be attributed by the Panel.
91 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-12A</td>
<td>[#2340806](^{92})</td>
<td>New (^{93})</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-12BP</td>
<td>[#5342908]</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-12BP</td>
<td>[#5343005]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-26</td>
<td>[#503]</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-32B</td>
<td>[#2009]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-17A Globemaster</td>
<td></td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>• For transfer of military materiel into Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130E Hercules</td>
<td></td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>• For transfer of military materiel into Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130E Hercules</td>
<td></td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>• For transfer of military materiel into Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-18D</td>
<td>[#172001401]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-18D</td>
<td>[#187009903]</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>[#73479367]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>[#1013405167]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>[#1013409282]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Green Flag Aviation</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>[#1023411378]</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc</td>
<td>• Operating in Libya in direct support of HAF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>[5A-ILA]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD Various</td>
<td></td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>• For transfer of military materiel into Libya.</td>
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<td>23mm ZSU-23-2CP</td>
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<td>35mm Korkut Cannon</td>
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<td>S/2021/229</td>
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<td>MIM-23 Hawk</td>
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<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIM-104 Patriot</td>
<td></td>
<td>New (^{94})</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pantsir S1</td>
<td></td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>• On KaMAZ platform.</td>
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<td>Pantsir S1</td>
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<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>• On MAN platform.</td>
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<td>9K115-2 Metis-M</td>
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<td>UID</td>
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<td>UID</td>
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<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• With GNU-AF.</td>
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<td>AMN 233114 Tigr-M</td>
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<td>Likely Russian PMC</td>
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\(^{92}\) These are the manufacturer’s serial numbers (MSN).  
\(^{93}\) Where indicated as new, the evidence appears elsewhere in the annexes to the report as an infographic, unless otherwise indicated by a footnote reference.  
\(^{94}\) In a single open-source report in https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html, 23 March 2021. A confidential source informed the Panel that the system was only very briefly deployed to Libya and soon withdrawn.  
\(^{95}\) Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.  
\(^{96}\) Armoured Personnel Carriers. Sometimes also referred to as Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPV).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Irigiri 4x4</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>First seen 2015.</td>
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<td>Inkas Titan-DS 4x4</td>
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<td>Inkas Titan-S 6x6</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>** KADDB Al Wahsh 4x4</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmerciler Kirac</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenco Bearcat G3 4x4</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>With GNU-AF.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mezcal Tygra 4x4</td>
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<td>UAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC VPK Tigr-M</td>
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<td>Russian PMC</td>
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<td>MSPV Panthera F9 4x4</td>
<td>S/2018/812</td>
<td>UAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streit Cobra 4x4</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Transferred in 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Streit Cougar 4x4</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Transferred in 2012.</td>
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<tr>
<td>** Streit Cougar 4x4</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>“Snake Head” Turret fitted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG BATT APC</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<td>Tundra Variant</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<td>Armoured Vehicles (IAFV)98</td>
<td>FNSS ACV-15</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADDB Mared 8x8</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** KADDB Mared 8x8</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>“Snake Head” Turret fitted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramount Mbombe 6x6</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>With HAF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratel-60</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>With HAF.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC Kirpi 4x4</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMC Varan 4x4</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evro-Polis Valkyrie 4x4</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChvK Wagner</td>
<td>Based on a Ural-432007 platform.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Streit Typhoon 4x4</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>New attribution.</td>
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98 Infantry Armoured Fighting Vehicles.
99 Mine Resistant Armoured Protected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery (Towed)</td>
<td>** 122mm M1938 M-30 Howitzer</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.100 • Identified with HAF 106 brigade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery (Self-Propelled)</td>
<td>** 155mm G5 Howitzer</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• With HAF.101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery (MLRS)</td>
<td>155mm Firtina T-155</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery (MLRS)</td>
<td>Rocketsan 122mm Sakarya T-122</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery (MLRS)</td>
<td>** 128mm LSRVM Morava</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• The 107mm variant may also have been supplied.100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>122mm Hybrid Version</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>** CFORCE All-Terrain Vehicle</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>** Jeep Gladiator</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>KamAZ 6x6 Truck</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• Identification from 2018 and unreported by Panel. • Also delivered to Libya on MV Fehn Calypso in 2020.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>KamAZ 8x8 Truck</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>• Identified as the mobility platform for the ChVK Wagner operated Pantsir-I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>Militarised Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4x4</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>** Toyota 6x6 Light Utility Vehicle</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>UAZ-469 Light Communications Vehicle</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>Ural-4320 Truck</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• Some identified on deck of MV Fehn Calypso on 25 April 2020 during transit of Bosporus, but these offloaded in Alexandria according to shipping company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic Vehicles</td>
<td>Ural-4320 Truck (Armoured)</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars (Field)</td>
<td>120mm 120-PM-43 M1943</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>• With HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars (Field)</td>
<td>120mm M-74</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>•</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

101 Also https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1328016339072638978, 15 November 2020.
102 Single source report in https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/06/types-of-arms-and-equipment-supplied-to.html, 23 March 2021. Extract imagery from a video dated 29 May 2021 (https://youtu.be/mbIDXxI7Tpa0) (2:37:26) may also show the 107mm variant, but resolution was insufficient to allow confirmatory analysis by photogrammetry.
103 Information from shipping company.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naval Vessels</td>
<td>Corrubia Class patrol boats</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Member State</td>
<td>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Damen Stan Patrol 1605 Class patrol boats</td>
<td>S/2018/812</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Gabrya Class Frigates</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lambro Olympic D74 Fast Patrol Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libya SSA</td>
<td>In use with SSA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MRC-1250 Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boats</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Lancaster6</td>
<td>Project Opus</td>
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<td>Offshore Patrol Vessel Alkarama</td>
<td>S/2018/812</td>
<td>Universal Satcom Services, UAE</td>
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<td>Patrol Boat Alqayid Saqar</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Libya SSA</td>
<td>Type UID.</td>
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<td>Raidco RPB 20 class patrol boats</td>
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<td>Member State</td>
<td>Converted to naval vessels post-delivery</td>
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<td>Aselsan Koral Electronic Warfare System</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>** 1KL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar</td>
<td>New</td>
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<td>LEMZ 96L6E Target Acquisition Radar</td>
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<td>UID</td>
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<td>Samel-90 Mobile IED Jammer</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
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<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
<td>5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles</td>
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<td>Likely Russian PMC</td>
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<td>5.56mm MFR Multi-Functional Rifles</td>
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<td>5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles</td>
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<td>7.62 x 39mm AK-103-1 Assault Rifles</td>
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<td>7.62 x 39mm AR-M9F Assault Rifles</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
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<td>7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle</td>
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<td>7.62 x 51mm FN FAL Assault Rifle</td>
<td>S/2013/99</td>
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<td>7.62 x 51mm JNG-90 Bora -J2 Sniper Rifle</td>
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<td>7.62 x 51mm MPT 76 Assault Rifles</td>
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<td>7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun 104</td>
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<td>0.338 Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle</td>
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<td>UID</td>
<td>Chambered for Lapua rounds.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.338 Steyr SSG-08 Sniper Rifle</td>
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<td>Chambered for Lapua rounds.</td>
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<td>0.50 Barrett M82 variant Anti-Materiel Rifle</td>
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<td>9mm Caracal F Pistols</td>
<td>S/2018/128</td>
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<td>9mm EKOL P29 Blank Firing Pistols</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
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<td>9mm SUR BRT M9 Blank Firing Pistols</td>
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<td>12.7 x 108mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun</td>
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104 [https://twitter.com/r_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793](https://twitter.com/r_u_vid/status/1221227142911905793), 26 January 2020.
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<td>AGS 30mm Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Either AGS-17 or AGS-30 based on ammunition recovered.</td>
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<td>VOG-25 40mm Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Based on ammunition recovered.</td>
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<td>40 x 46mm Akdas AK-40-GL Grenade Launchers</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>RPG-32 Nashhab Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type-69 85mm Rocket Launcher</td>
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<td>Tanks (MBT)</td>
<td>M-60 Patton 105</td>
<td>New</td>
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<td>T-62MV</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Also see annex 56.</td>
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<td>Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAV)</td>
<td>Adcom Yabhon-HMD</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aeryon Scout Micro</td>
<td>S/2013/99</td>
<td>Zariba Security Corporation</td>
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<td>Chilong CL-11 VTOL</td>
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<td>DJI Inspire</td>
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<td>Mohajer-2</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
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<td>Orbiter-3</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>GNA-AF</td>
<td>Dual use system.</td>
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<td>Orlan-10</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Possibly from ChVK Wagner.</td>
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<td>STM Kargu-2</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>With a UID Militia.</td>
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<td>Xiamen Magin 4450</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Dual use system.</td>
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<td>Zala 421-16E</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>With HAF.</td>
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<td>UAV (Loitering Munition)</td>
<td>IAI Harpy</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>With GNU-AF.</td>
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<td>WB Warmate</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncrewed Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACV)</td>
<td>Bayraktar TB2</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>TAI Anka</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Wing Loong I</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
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<td>Wing Loong II</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UAE</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahua DHI-UAV-D-1000JHV2 Anti Drone Gun</td>
<td>S/2017/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS)</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

105 Also https://twitter.com/MiddleEastWatch/status/1281616199957323776, 10 July 2020.
Table 26.2
Confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air to Ground Missiles (AGM)</td>
<td>BA-7 Blue Arrow</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank (ATGM)</td>
<td>FGM-148 Javelin</td>
<td>S/2019/914</td>
<td>Member State</td>
<td>Present under resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocketsan UMTAS</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank (Rockets)</td>
<td>M-79 Osa</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Stores</td>
<td>ML-8 anti-lift initiators</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Flight Rockets (FFR)</td>
<td>122mm Rocketsan FFR</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>F1 Fragmentation</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30mm VOG-17M Grenades</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser Guided Bombs (LGB)</td>
<td>GBU-12 Paveway II</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laser Guided Projectiles (LGP)</td>
<td>155mm GP-1A</td>
<td>S/2017/466</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155mm GP-6</td>
<td>S/2018/812</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (Anti-personnel)</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON-90</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON-200</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OZM-72</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PMN-2</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POM-2R</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (Anti-Tank)</td>
<td>TM-62M</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Bombs</td>
<td>120mm high explosive</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120mm M62P8 high explosive</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120mm M62P10 high explosive</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannon Ammunition</td>
<td>7.62 x 39mm</td>
<td>S/2019/128</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>For Ministry of Interior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.62 x 39mm</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.62 x 51mm M80</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.62 x 54Rmm</td>
<td>S/2016/209</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Manufactured in 2012.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

106 In S/2019/914, the Panel recommended that the Committee provide guidance as to whether the term “combat by all means” in paragraph 3 of resolution 2214 (2015) overrides the requirements of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) and as subsequently amended.
2. Tables 26.3 and 26.4 summarises arms and military materiel that have been reported in open-sources as new transfers. The Panel is still investigating these alleged transfers as: (a) in some cases the arms and military materiel were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo; and/or (b) the imagery was not of high enough resolution to identify serial numbers or lot/batch numbers to confirm post-2011 manufacture, and thus enable the initiation of tracing requests to identify supply chains. The Panel continues to investigate to find confirmatory information to the appropriate evidential standards.

Table 26.3
Reported but not yet confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (weapon systems and equipment) 107

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Defence (Missiles)</td>
<td>S-125 (SA-3)</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Tank (ATGW)</td>
<td>9M113 Konkurs 110</td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>• For Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armoured Vehicles (APC)</td>
<td>NIMR II 111</td>
<td>S/2022/427</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Thermobaric Munitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Panel Report</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.7 x 108mm</td>
<td>S/2013/99</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>• For Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5 x 114mm</td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>• For Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 x 115mm</td>
<td>S/2015/128</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>• For Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 x 115mm</td>
<td>S/2021/229</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPg5CTUJHQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPg5CTUJHQ), 12 July 2020.
110 Reported capture. [https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1249681644933599233](https://twitter.com/AnalystMick/status/1249681644933599233), 13 April 2020.
111 [https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/966794267585925120](https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/966794267585925120), 22 February 2018.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Armoured Vehicles (IAFV)     | BRDM-2                 | • This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• S/2016/209 reported the transfer of these APC types from Libya to Mali.  
• Ukraine sold 108 BRDM to a UAE customer in 2017.  
• More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven. |
| Artillery (Towed)            | 122mm D-30 Howitzer    | • This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven. |
|                              | 152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer | • This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• The open-source imagery that initially referred to this weapon was later updated to attribute the gun as a G5 Howitzer.  
• The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system deployed in Libya. |
|                              | 155mm Norinco AH4 Gun-Howitzer | • This weapon system was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• Procured by UAE in 2019.  
• Ammunition for the weapon system reported in S/2017/466, S/2018/812 and S/2019/914, but this may be compatible with the 155mm G5 Howitzer known to have been transferred.  
• The Panel has yet to find any imagery of the weapon system proving deployment in Libya. |
| Artillery (Towed)            | 107mm LSRVM Morava     | • The 128mm version was reported in S/2021/229.  
• Also see table 26.1. |
|                              | 107mm Taka             | • Copy of Chinese Type-63 manufactured in Sudan.  
• The single source imagery cannot confirm the weapon type, nor deployment in Libya. |
| Logistic Vehicles            | Safir Light Utility Vehicle | • This vehicle was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven. |
| Mortars (Field)              | 60mm Type-32           | • Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification. |
|                              | 82mm 82-BM-37          | • This weapon system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.  
• More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven. |
| Mortars (Self-propelled)     | 120mm Boragh Armoured Mortar Vehicle | • The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya. |
| Radars and EW                | Grozna-S Counter UAV   | • The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya. |

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118 https://twitter.com/libyatogether20/status/1378031331132254209, 2 April 2021.  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grozna-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The single source image is of a Grozna-6 deployed in the UAE, but the Panel has yet to see imagery of the system deployed in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasuha</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Single source on 18 May 2020 with no supporting high-resolution imagery to allow for confirmation of type or location in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 x 54mmR PKM General Purpose Machine Gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>• This system was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks (MBT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55E</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The T-55 was in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• HAF official social media showed a T-55 variant with the Tariq bin Ziyad brigade in 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 16 and overhauled 31 T-55 variants in 2019, so possible these are from that work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• More confirmatory evidence required before post-2011 transfer to Libya can be proven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62M</td>
<td></td>
<td>• T-62 variants were in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ChvK Wagner personnel also repaired 4 and overhauled 9 T-62 variants in 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The imagery was not sufficient to allow for confirmation of a new transfer to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ababil-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reported as operated by HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Image resolution insufficient for 100% identification of type or location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagil</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Panel has identified a single-source report alleging Sudan supplied this UAV type in 2014. The imagery shows Libyan officers but is insufficient to prove the presence of this UAV type in Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No open-source imagery of a &quot;Zagil&quot; UAV could be found to allow for confirmation of UAV type.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26.4
Reported but not confirmed arms and military materiel transferred to Libya (26 Feb 2011 - 25 Apr 2022) (ammunition and explosive ordnance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm 2K25 Krasnopol laser guided projectile.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reported as being for the 152mm 2A65 Msta-B Howitzer (see table 26.3), so possible calibre error in report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Imagery insufficient to confirm calibre or transfer to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The imagery could equally be of a GP1, which is a direct copy. GP1 reported in S/2017/466 and S/2018/812.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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125 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXt5d1iacEk, 14 November 2020. [14min 29sec].
126 Table 77.2 to S/2021/229.
127 Table 77.2 to S/2021/229.
131 Confidential source analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generic type</th>
<th>Nomenclature / Calibre</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Stores</td>
<td>Fateh-4 mine clearance line charge</td>
<td>• The single source imagery identified is insufficient to allow for confirmation of a transfer to Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (Anti-personnel)</td>
<td>MON-100</td>
<td>• The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines (Anti-Tank)</td>
<td>TM-83</td>
<td>• LibMAC have confirmed that no mines of this type have been reported, identified or rendered safe in Libya to date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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133 Email to Panel of 25 January 2022.
135 Ibid.
Annex 27  Naval assets used by the Stability Support Apparatus

A. Overview of SSA naval assets

1. The newly formed maritime unit of the SSA operates at least six vessels, including the Alqayid-1, the Alqayid-2, Alqayid Saqar and a fast patrol boat (FPB) whose name is unknown to the Panel (figures 27.1 through 27.5). Further context on the use by the SSA on its naval assets can be found in Annex 24.

B. Civilian-type vessels

1. Alqayid 1 and 2

2. The Panel has identified the Alqayid 1 and the Alqayid 2 as being operated by the SSA. Alqayid 1 has been observed both with and without a heavy machine gun mounted on its bow (figure 27.1). No imagery has emerged of the Alqayid 2 being armed (figure 27.2). They are not specifically designed for intercepting migrant boats for return, mainly owing to their limited passenger and life-saving equipment capacity. The SSA addresses this shortcoming by operating these boats in tandem with a large wooden boat with higher passenger capacity (also pictured in figure 27.1).

Figure 27.1
Vessel Alqayid 1 in unarmed (left) a and armed configuration (right)b

Sources: a https://twitter.com/SARwatchMED/status/1485711494633472000, 24 January 2022;
b https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=305766508128448, 28 December 2021

137 At least two further, unidentified civilian vessels are presented on the SSA’s official social media: https://twitter.com/SSA_Gov/status/1480979918456504331, 11 January 2022.
2. Alqayid Saqar

3. The *Alqayid Saqar* has a yellow paint scheme that would suggest SAR use (see figure 27.3). While appearing to be a tender or a pilot boat, it also has features that support use as a SAR vessel. These being a deck to accommodate a limited number of survivors and a low stern platform for ease of recovery and man-overboard assistance. However, the vessel also has a 12.7mm DShK variant heavy machine gun (HMG) mounted to its bow, which gives the vessel a role as a fast patrol boat (FPB), even if other features of a naval-type vessel[^39] are missing.

Primary sources


Developed by UN Panel of Experts

3. **Military conversion of dual-use items**

4. All of these vessels are civilian in design and thus are not classified as naval-type vessels by virtue of design, hence they are not classified as military materiel *per se*. 140 While an initial transfer of a vessel in a civilian configuration, be it as

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140 Annex 32 of S/2019/914 explains the rationale for the classification of specifically naval designed vessels as military materiel, regardless of whether armed or not.
tender, pilot boat or as SAR vessel, would not be a violation of the arms embargo, a post-transfer mounting of weaponry is problematic. This clearly shows how modification, even if post-transfer, converts dual-use into military materiel (see paragraph 61 of main body of report). The Panel is still investigating the exact type, capabilities, and supply chain of this vessel.

C. Naval-type vessel

1. Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) Fast Patrol Boat

5. The SSA also operates a FPB that has design features consistent with the Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) FPB previously used by the Hellenic Coast Guard. The vessel was first observed unarmed (figure 27.4) and later with a twin mounted machine guns on its bow (figure 27.5). Regardless of being armed or unarmed and regardless of its eventual capabilities for SAR use, it is by design a naval-type fast patrol boat, and hence classified as military materiel. The Panel has written to Greece to establish the supply chain and is awaiting a response. The transfer of this vessel is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Figure 27.4
Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, unarmed (in red, left) and used by the Greek Coast Guard (right)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lambro Olympic D74 (Javelin 74) Fast Patrol Boat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Lambro Olympic D74" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Lambro Olympic D74" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Lambro Olympic D74" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Lambro Olympic D74" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Primary sources

1. Confidential.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Figure 27.5
Lambro Olympic D74 used by the SSA, in armed configuration

Annex 28 Activities by HAF naval units

1. Overview

1. The Panel is investigating 24 incidents of unlawful hailing, boarding and detention of foreign-flagged vessels by members of the HAF Susah Combat Marine Squadron (SCMS) that have taken place since late 2020. The SCMS individuals execute these unlawful acts under the justification that the targeted vessels violated a restricted zone unilaterally declared by the LNA in 2015 (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of report). The majority of the hailing incidents occurred between January and November 2021. While the Panel is still investigating each individual case, it has established the *modus operandi* and highlights one incident as a case study.

2. Modus operandi

2. While its selection criteria are so far unclear to the Panel, the SCMS intercepts on average one to two vessels per month, although on an irregular basis. In 2021, only March, April, July and December saw no interceptions. Once members of the SCMS identify a vessel, they hail the vessel over the radio (VHF channel 16) and ask it to reduce speed and prepare for inspection. Vessels are regularly intercepted around 20 nautical miles (nm) from the Libyan shore, in international waters, that fall within the unlawfully demarcated HAF “no-sail zone” but mostly outside the “prohibited zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Vessels are then approached by naval-type vessels flying the Libyan flag, that most often are high-speed rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIB) of the same type widely used by Coast Guards, military or law enforcement agencies of other Member States.\(^\text{141}\) SCMS also operates a Damen Stan 1605 patrol boat.\(^\text{142}\) The use of these boats gives merchant vessels the first impression that they are being hailed by an authorised enforcement unit of a Member State.\(^\text{143}\)

3. Once merchant vessels have stopped, armed members of SCMS in camouflage uniforms with distinct insignia board. They present themselves as the Libyan Coast Guard and inform the master of the merchant vessel that the vessel is being stopped for having violated the “no-sail zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 in main body of the report). Ship and crew documents are confiscated, and vessels are detained and forced to follow the SCMS to the anchorage area 2 nm off Ras El Hilal, within Libyan territorial waters.

4. Once at anchorage off Ras El Hilal, crews remain detained on the merchant vessel, while the vessel’s insurance company, through local intermediaries, arranges for the payment of an unlawful fine for the violation of the “no-sail zone”. The fine of LYD 200,000 (approximately USD 42,000) is negotiable and has to be paid in cash. Once paid, the master of the merchant vessel has to sign a document declaring that an agreement to pay the fine for having violated the “no-sail zone”. Documents are then returned and the vessel is released.

3. Case study: MV Corona J

5. On 24 May 2021, the MV *Corona J* (IMO: 9238686) on track from Port Said, Egypt to Misrata, Libya, was hailed via radio by members of the SMCS identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard, instructed to reduce speed, and then boarded by members of SMCS around 20 nm off the coast of Libya, north of Ras El Hilal (interception point: 33°14’30.00”N, 22°17’18.00”E). SMCS used two naval-type RHIBs with Libyan flags, one approaching and one trailing several miles behind. Once on board, members of SMCS, wearing uniforms and being armed with assault rifles and sidearms, informed the vessel’s master that the *Corona J* had been stopped for violating the “no-sail zone” then, and also a few years earlier; thus a fine needed to be paid. SMCS collected the ship’s and crew’s documents but refused to inspect the documents on

\(^{141}\) The Panel has recently identified the type of RHIB used by SMCS but has yet to give the relevant Member State appropriate time to respond. That Member State is therefore not named here.

\(^{142}\) Confidential sources.

\(^{143}\) Panel interviews with primary sources.
board the *Corona J*; instead, they returned to their RHIB and instructed the *Corona J* to follow them to anchorage off Ras El Hilal.

6. En route to the anchorage position SMCS did not respond to radio calls. During that time, the *Corona J* was in contact with the vessel’s owner, who informed the insurance company and the flag State (Antigua and Barbuda). Once at anchor off Ras El Hilal (32°53'60.00"N, 22°11'0.00"E), a six-member SCMS team arrived, again all armed, wearing uniform and identifying themselves as Libyan Coast Guard. They told the master of the *Corona J* to assemble the crew on the bridge, from where they were prohibited to leave by two armed SMCS members. They ordered the seal on one container to be removed, opened the container, superficially checked the cargo, and then closed the container again. No certificate of inspection was issued. Thereafter, they started to search the crew’s quarters, while the crew was not allowed inside, despite request. When they were finished, crew checked and noted that currency and personal valuables of crew members had been taken (value totaling around USD 11,000). The ship’s safe in the master’s quarters had signs of (failed) attempted forcible entry. The crew protested the theft but were threatened with the use of force. The SCMS members left the *Corona J*.

7. On 25 May 2021, the *Corona J* protection and indemnity insurance mutual (P&I Club) negotiated the settlement of the fine for having violated the “no-sail zone”, through a local agent. In the end, LYD 180,000 (USD 41,000) was paid in cash. In addition, to secure the release of the vessel, the master of the *Corona J* was forced to sign a document stating that he was guilty of “entering territorial waters without authorization” by “entering the restricted area in Ras El Hilal” and accepted the fine. He also needed to provide a letter from the vessel’s owner, to also be counter-signed by him, in which he apologized for having brought forward unwarranted allegations of theft against the Libyan Coast Guard. The stolen currency and valuables were not returned. The ship was allowed to sail after having spent about one day in detention.

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144 The Panel has reviewed the relevant documentation and established its veracity to reach these findings.
Annex 29  “Prohibited zone” declared by HAF

SUBJECT:- LIBYAN COAST GUARD PROHIBITED ZONE
TO ALL SHIP MASTERS, SHIP OWNERS, CHARTERS, AND SHIP AGENTS
THIS IS TO INFORM YOU ALL THAT SAILING THROUGH AND/OR CROSSING THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES IS PROHIBITED.
32 54 42 N, 022 04 22 E
33 04 11 N, 022 01 55 E
32 59 22 N, 022 40 59 E
32 65 12 N, 023 14 40 E
32 36 21 N, 023 07 57 E
MUST SAIL 5 NM NORTH TO ABOVE COORDINATES
ANY VESSEL DOES NOT CONFORM AND COMPLY TO THE LIBYAN COAST WARNING, WILL BE SUBJECTED TO DETAINING AND FINANCIAL PENALTIES.
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY TO ENTER PROHIBITED ZONE PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONS;
CAPT. HUSSEIN ALSHARA - ISPS OFFICER, MOB. +218 92 580 7934 /+218 91 052 0474
EMAIL: beng.safetyport@gmail.com
MR. MIUTAH AL GHOUH - MOB. +218 92 756 9391
NAVY COAST GUARD OFFICER , MOHAMED AL MAJDOUB - MOB. +218 92 579 84 65
NAVY OFFICER - MR KHALED ABOKHAI - MOB. +218 91 382 7051
EMAIL: khaledboket@gmail.com
OR CALL YOUR LOCAL SHIPPING AGENCY FOR GUIDE LINES.

Source: Confidential
Annex 30  Military Armoured Vehicles on board MV Luccello (4 March 2022)

Introduction

1. Open and confidential sources have informed the Panel that on 4 March 2022 the MV *Luccello* (IMO: 78100112) offloaded 100 military armoured vehicles (MAV) in Benghazi Port (LYBNG, 32°06'04"N, 20°02'52"E). This was confirmed by satellite imagery of 6 March 2022, which showed 100 MAV parked in the port area behind shielding (figure 30.1).

Figure 30.1
Satellite imagery of armoured vehicles at Benghazi Port on 6 March 2022

Source: Confidential

Voyage

2. The vessel arrived at Aqaba, Jordan (JOAQJ) on 18 February and left on 21 February 2022. The draft of the vessel had changed from 4.7 to 5.8 m (+1.1 m), confirming that a cargo was embarked at Aqaba. On 22 February 2022, whilst still in the Gulf of Aqaba, the vessel declared Suez Canal, Egypt (EGSUZ) as the next destination.

3. On 24 February 2022, after transit of the Suez Canal, the vessel continued north towards Antalya, Turkey with intermittent AIS transmissions. On 26 February 2022, on approaching Turkish territorial waters the vessel declared Tripoli, Libya (LYTIP) as the next destination. The vessel’s track was then erratic, first heading west into Greek territorial waters, then west and finally north to an anchorage off Kemen Marina, 15 nautical miles (NM) south of Antalya, Turkey (TRAYT).

4. On 27 February 2022 the vessel continued its voyage on a south-west track, passing south of Crete, until on the evening of 1 March 2022 the vessel turned onto a southerly track when 55nm north of Al Bayda, well within the HAF “no-sail zone”, but outside of the HAF “prohibited zone” (see paragraphs 68-71 of main part of the report). The AIS transmission was lost soon thereafter north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH) until 2 March 2022 when the vessel was near Derna (LYDRX). AIS was lost again until 3 March 2022 close to Ras Al Hilal, when the vessel track was then west in close proximity to the coast. The vessel stayed within Libyan territorial waters until approaching Benghazi port on 4 March 2022. The vessel then changed its declared destination to Benghazi before entering the port and making a port call. Elements of the unusual routing and track changes of the vessel from Aqaba to Benghazi is shown at figures 30.2 to 30.4.
5. A draft change for the vessel from 5.8m to 5.5m (-0.3m) indicates that the vessel discharged cargo in Benghazi between 4 and 6 March 2022. Change of draft cannot be used as a sole indicator of cargo discharge as the vessel could be ballasting. In this case cargo discharge is supported by the presence of MAV in the port area immediately after the vessel’s arrival (see below). The vessel departed Benghazi on 6 March 2022 on a north-east track.

Analysis of voyage, seizure claims and cargo

6. The initial detour of the vessel via Antalya, Turkey can plausibly be explained by the inclement weather conditions known to be prevailing during the transit days in the south-eastern Mediterranean. One subscription-only source reports that the vessel declared a technical issue on 26 February 2022 and might have anchored off Antalya for repairs.

7. On 15 March 2022, a claim surfaced on social media[^145] that HAF had intercepted a vessel 70nm off Libya’s coast that was carrying 100 armoured vehicles, worth 100 million LYD, destined for Abdel Raouf Kara’s Special Deterrent Force (SDF). The report stated the vehicles were coming from Aqaba, Kingdom of Jordan, and that the vessel was intercepted “70 miles” off Libya’s eastern coast, boarded and redirected under the threat of force to the port of Derna.[^146] The vessel was later released after the vehicles had been seized. A confidential source confirmed to the Panel that the background of the image that accompanied the report indeed shows the MV Luccello and its cargo in question (see figure 30.5 below).

8. At this stage it is unclear whether the above-described seizure indeed took place. The AIS signal loss north of Ras Al Hilal (LYREH), followed by a dark period of almost two days, the subsequent sailing in Libyan territorial waters within the NSZ, and the declaration of Benghazi as of destination only upon arrival at that port supports are indicators that would support that a seizure took place. However, were this to be the case, and the true destination was Tripoli and the SDF, this would be remarkable as it would indicate shifting alliances. Such a large military cargo could not have been loaded in Aqaba, Jordan without permission of, at least, local port officials. The interception point, regardless if 70 nm as per the open-source report or if 55 nm as per the vessel’s sudden change of direction, would be at a far greater distance to the Libyan coast than the area that members of the SCMS have so far undertaken interceptions in (see annex 27).

[^146]: The social media sources give different dates for this event, ranging from 1 March to the evening of 2 March 2022.
9. A confidential source has stated that the MAV offloaded in Benghazi are Spartan-manufactured by Streit Group (figure 30.5). In 2011 Streit Group opened a manufacturing facility in Aqaba, Jordan, and the port of departure of the voyage of the MV Luccello. HAF have previously received deliveries of Streit Group MAV, and such vehicles form a major component of its military capability.

Figure 30.5
Spartan-2 MAV on board the MV Luccello (left) and manufacturer’s image (right)


10. After delivery, the MAV were temporarily stored in an area with a perimeter wall (see figure 30.1). A confidential source informed the Panel that the approximately 6 metres high perimeter wall had only been erected between November 2021 and January 2022. This indicates that deliveries of sensitive cargo were expected, as this is a common concealment tactic used in Libya.

Other indicators

11. The vessel changed its name and flag a few days after the voyage, to MV Victory Roro under Equatorial Guinea flag. This is the third name and second flag change in five years for this vessel. Frequent name and flag changes for vessels are both indicators of illicit activity.

Violation

12. The Panel continues its investigation into the full supply chain and the perpetrators of this transfer of MAV from Jordan to Libya. The transfer is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) and a non-compliance by Jordan for failure to inspect the vessel.

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148 https://www.armored-cars.com/company/manufacturing-facilities/
Annex 31  Italian naval vessel presence in Libya

1.  Delivery of equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use

   1. On 7 December 2021, a media article reported the delivery of a Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) to Libya, on board the MM San Giorgio Landing Platform Dock (L9892). Italy informed the Panel that on 2 December 2021, the Italian MM San Giorgio Landing Platform Dock (L9892) docked at Tripoli’s commercial harbour and delivered an MRCC facility to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy. The delivery was undertaken within the framework of the EU program “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya” (SIBMMIL). The MRCC consisted of ten containers that serve for lodgings, office space, mobile kitchen, storage, electricity generation and MRCC functions and activities. The San Giorgio departed Libya the next day.

   2. The MM San Giorgio is operated by the Italian Navy and is equipped with an Oto Melara 76mm / 62 calibre gun and two Oerlikon 20mm cannons, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) (see figure 31.1).

   3. While the items delivered by the MM San Giorgio fall under the exception of “supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, ...” under the auspices of paragraph 9 of resolution 2095 (2013), in the Panel’s view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.1
MM San Giorgio Landing Platform Dock (L9892)

Source: Panel of Experts, Brindisi, 8 April 2022.

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149 https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/07/news/nave_italiana_libia-329232874/?fbclid=IwAR1V3mGgd_WZwfdWjsBk2TV1Y1s1vtDfxJu0f70BR8F8f0, 7 December 2021.
2. Presence in Abu Sitta naval base

4. In S/2019/914, the Panel noted the activities of Italian Navy Gorgona class coastal transport ships (CTS) MTC Capri (A5353) and MTC Tremiti (A5348). The Panel has identified that a Gorgona-class vessel has continued to be regularly moored at Abu Sitta navy base, Tripoli (32°54'24.68"N, 13°13'12.48"E). Open-source satellite imagery shows that the vessel has been present there consistently since 2018 (for the latest image, see figure 31.2). There has been also a rotation that included the MTC Caprera (A5349). The Panel has written to Italy to inquire about the vessels’ activities and is awaiting a response.

5. The Gorgona-class vessels are operated by the Italian Navy and are equipped with an Oerlikon 20mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns, and clearly falls under the category of arms and related materiel in the sense of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

6. In the Panel’s view, the entering and exiting of Libyan territory by the vessel is by itself a technical violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011), even if there is no intent to transfer arms and related materiel to Libya.

Figure 31.2

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150 Table 27.3, page 189.
151 Moto Trasporto Costiero (MTC).
152 See also https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Libia_Missione_bilaterale_di_supporto_e_assistenza/notizie_teatro/Pagine/Nave_Caprera_sostituisce_la_Capri_nella_missione_bilaterale_di_assistenza_e_supporto_in_Libia.aspx
Annex 32  Summary of newly identified arms embargo equipment transfer and training violations and non-compliances

1. Sources for tables 32.1 and 32.2, which are shown in the appropriate annexes, are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) official social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) authoritative specialist military media; (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.

2. Transfer violations that took place and went unreported during previous mandates are included in table 32.1 to provide the evidence for the baseline data necessary to assist in the identification of any future violations.

Table 32.1  Summary of equipment transfer violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</th>
<th>End User</th>
<th>Equipment nomenclature</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Cross-references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>31 Dec 2014</td>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Streit Typhoon 4x4</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1 Jun 2018</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>5 Mar 2019</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>SPG-9 73mm Rocket Launcher</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>7 May 2019</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>26 Jan 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>7.62 x 39mm Type 63-1 Assault Rifle 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun Type 69 85mm Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>15 Mar 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Inkas Titan-S 6x6 APC</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>21 Mar 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>17 Apr 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Zala 421-16E UAV</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>14 June 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>ZSU 23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>3 Jun 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>120mm HE Mortar Bomb M62P10</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>18 Jun 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>IRL131 P-18 Early Warning Radar</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>12 Jul 2020</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 Aug 2020</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 46    | 9 Oct 2020                          | GNU      | 120mm HE Mortar Bomb    | Turkey      | Update to table 4, and annex 41 to S/2021/229.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</th>
<th>End User</th>
<th>Equipment nomenclature</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Cross-references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>15 Nov 2020</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>21 Nov 2020</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) virtually identical to EOTECH design</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>21 Nov 2020</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>4 Jan 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>120mm M-74 Mortar</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>28 Jan 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Akdas AK40-GL 40x46mm Grenade Launchers</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Also a training violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>30 Jan 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>5.56mm AK-103 Assault Rifles</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>2 Feb 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>System Defence MFR 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle</td>
<td>Balance of Probability</td>
<td>Turkey b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>4 Feb 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>JAWS-556 5.56mm Assault Rifle (14.5” barrel)</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>23 Mar 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>122m M-30 M1938 Howitzer</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>23 Mar 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>T-62MV variant Main Battle Tanks</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Update to annex 64 to S/2021/229/Corr.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>27 Mar 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Patton M60 Main Battle Tanks.</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Also a training violation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>30 Mar 2021</td>
<td>PMC / HAF</td>
<td>AMN 233114 Tiger-M Multi-Purpose Vehicle</td>
<td>UID</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**During resolution 2571 (2021) reporting period (all new identifications)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</th>
<th>End User</th>
<th>Equipment nomenclature</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Cross-references</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>5 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>18 May 2021</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols</td>
<td>UID</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>24 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>UAZ-469 light communications vehicle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>24 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Militarized Jeep Gladiator light 4 x 4 vehicle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>27 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Militarized Toyota light 6 x 6 vehicle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>29 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>TAG BATT 4x4 APC</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>3 Jun 2021</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</td>
<td>End User</td>
<td>Equipment nomenclature</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
<td>Cross-references</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>3 Jun 2021</td>
<td>Russian PMC</td>
<td>Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 79 4 x 4 vehicle</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>5 Jul 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>GFORCE all-terrain vehicle (‘ATVG’)</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>11 Jul 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>MKEK JNG-90 Bora-12 Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>Balance of Probability Turkey</td>
<td></td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>9 Aug 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>AN/PVS-7 Night-Vision Goggles</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>17 Aug 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Rocketsan 122mm Free Flight Rocket pods</td>
<td>Turkey UAE</td>
<td>Battlefield capture of hybrid system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>18 Sep 2021/9 Jan 2022</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Small arms and ammunition</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>Transfer from Libya to Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>24 Dec 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Katmerciler KIRAC Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>31 Dec 2021</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL)</td>
<td>UID</td>
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<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>8 Feb 2022</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>8 Feb 2022</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>MKEK 5.56mm MPT 55K Assault Rifles</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>24 Mar 2022</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>M79 OSA Anti-tank Rockets</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Unidentified as yet.
b International arms sales are virtually always widely reported by the manufacturer in authoritative defence media as it is their major means, other than conflict, of attracting publicity for future sales. Authoritative media includes: Janes Defence Weekly (https://www.janes.com/defence-news/); Janes Intara (https://www.janes.com/intara-interconnected-intelligence/defence-industry); Defence Procurement International (https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/magazine); Military Systems and Technology (https://www.militarysystems-tech.com/); and Army Technology (https://www.army-technology.com/). Covert arms transfers go unreported until identified by investigation.
1. The Panel has determined that none of the training listed in table 32.2 falls under the exception contained in paragraph 10 of resolution 2095 (2013), which is for disarmament and security purposes only.

Table 32.2
Summary of training violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Date identified in Libya or by Panel</th>
<th>End User</th>
<th>Type of training support</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Cross-references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>During resolution 2509 (2020) reporting period and unreported or unattributed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>1 Feb 2021 GNU</td>
<td>Air defence systems, <em>iHASAVAR</em> and <em>iHATAR</em> anti-drone systems training in Konya, Turkey</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>6 Feb 2021 GNU</td>
<td>Military diving training</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>7 Feb 2021 GNU</td>
<td>Officer Cadet training</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>25 Mar 2021 GNU</td>
<td>Training to Unit 444 in UAV use, <em>Foxtech</em> Baby Shark 260 VTOL UAV.</td>
<td>UID *</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>30 Mar 2021 GNU</td>
<td>Operation of <em>Firtina</em> T-155 artillery</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>•</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Transfer reported in table 4, and annexes 28 and 34 to S/2021/229.**

| **During resolution 2571 (2021) reporting period (all new identifications)** |
| 82    | 7 Aug 2021 GNU                      | Special Forces unit from Misrata training in Turkey | Turkey | • |
| 83    | 8 Sep 2021 HAF                       | Official HAF social media report that elements of HAF 106 brigade were training in Egypt | UID | • |
| 84    | 3 Oct 2021 GNU                       | Sniper training of GNU-AF | Turkey | • |
| 85    | 9 Oct 2021 GNU                       | Mountain Corps Academy training of GNU-AF in Turkey. | Turkey | • |

* Unidentified as yet.
Synergy with other arms embargo violation attempts


3. The complete list of arms requested by the UAE from KOMID is at figure 32.1. In S/2021/229 the Panel reported on a Serbian manufactured P62M8 120mm Mortar Bomb and provided a copy of the End User certificate (DP3/2/50/1/2015/64/185) dated 21 October 2015 from the UAE, which was supplied to Serbia for the purchase of the ammunition (see figure 32.2). A comparison of the two lists shows them to be over 75% identical (see table 32.3). The Panel considers that the purchase from Serbia was made after the failure of the deal through KOMID. Table 32.3 also identifies the arms subsequently identified as being transferred to Libya.

Figure 32.1
UAE Products List for procurement from KOMOD, DPRK (2 May 2015)

153 Annexes 104 and 105.
154 Annex 52.
Figure 32.2
UAE End User Certificate from UAE to Serbia (5 October 2015)

DECLARATION BY END-USER
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

WE, THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE GOODS LISTED BELOW AND ORDERED BY USE FROM G. H. Q ARMED FORCES, UAE IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF GHO UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE AND WILL NOT BE EXPORTED OR RE-EXPORTED WITHOUT A PRIOR WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC SERBIA.

We confirm that the goods will not be used in any activities related to the development or production of chemical or biological weapons.

PURCHASER: GHO UAE ARMED FORCES, UAE
CONTRACT NUMBER: DPJ/501/1/2015/544 dated: 05/10/2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity-pcs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.62x39mm small arms FMJ ammunition</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sniper Rifle M91 7.62x54R with optical sight and accessories</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.62x54mm Sniper ammunition</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.62x54mm general purpose machine gun M64 (PKM Machine gun substitute)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.62x54mm R M50 FMJ ammunition</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.7x108mm Black Arrow Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.7x108mm M09 Sniper Ammo</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Machine gun 12.7x108mm with tripod</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mortar 60mm M67</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>60mm mortar shells HE</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>82mm mortar</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>82mm mortar HE 62 bombs</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>120mm mortar</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>120mm mortar rounds</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23mm Ammo HE</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>23mm Ammo APIT</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>107mm HE Rocket M15 type 63</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>120 mm M63 multiple rocket launcher fired</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Armor vest Level 3A</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ballistic plates L4</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upon request by the competent authorities of Serbia we undertake to confirm the receipt of the goods listed above.

Source: Member State.
### Table 32.3
Comparison of arms requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity in Products List to KOMID DPRK (5 May 2015)</th>
<th>Quantity UAE EUC to Serbia (5 Oct 2015)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M92 Rifle 7.62x39mm</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>KOMID request only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.62x39mm ammunition</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sniper Rifle 7.62x54Rmm Draganov</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.62x54mm R ammunition</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.62mm PKM Machine Gun</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.62x54mm ammunition</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sniper Rifle 12.7x108mm</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.7x108mm ammunition</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Heavy Machine Gun M02 Coyote 12.7x108mm</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.7x108mm ammunition</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>KOMID request only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>60mm Mortar M57</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>60mm Mortar Bombs</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>82mm Mortar M69</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>82mm Mortar Bombs</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>120mm Mortar PM-38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>120mm Mortar Bombs</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>14.5x114mm B-32 BZT ammunition</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>KOMID request only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>23mm HEI Linked ammunition</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td><strong>107mm Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>107mm Rockets</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>122mm Rocket Projectile M210</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>KOMID request only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Hand Grenade</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Armour Vest</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>106mm Anti-Tank HEAT ammunition</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>128mm M63 MBRL (Towed)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ballistic Plates</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Serial is from the Products List requirement submitted to KOMID, DPRK by the UAE.

* Items in bold text have been identified as transferred to Libya in violation of the arms embargo.

* Serial is from the EUC supplied to Serbia by the UAE.
Annex 33  Streit Typhoon 4x4 APC (13 December 2014)

Streit Typhoon 4x4 MRAP (Libya)  
(13 December 2014)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of Streit Typhoon 4x4 mine resistant armour protected (MRAP) vehicles in the possession of the then Government forces on 13 December 2014.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The Panel notes that an attempt was made to illicitly transfer Streit Typhoon MRAP to Libya on board the MV Tychy (IMO: 8302284) during Summer 2015. Eight such vehicles were impounded by Greek Customs at Keratsini Port (UN: GRKRS) on 15 June 2015.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 34  KaMaz 6x6 Military Trucks (1 June 2018)

Kamaz 43118 6x6 Military Truck (Dirne) (1 June 2018)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a KaMaz 6x6 Military Truck in the possession of HAF on 1 April 2018.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The Panel has also identified that Kamaz 43118 6x6 Trucks were shipped to Benghazi on the MV Fehn Calypso on 24 April 2020. These were declared as civilian vehicles, but have obvious dual-military use.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1002608845762585965, 1 June 2018;
2. Confidential source, 15 June 2020; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 35    SPG-9 73mm Grenade Launcher (5 March 2019)

SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle
(Al Gharefa)
(05 March 2019)

The Panel has now identified the presence of an SPG-9 73mm Recoilless Rifle in the possession of HAF near Al Gharefa, which went unreported in S/2021/229.

These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. Extract from video imagery at https://twitter.com/MansourTalk/status/11028933380857981952, 5 March 2019; and
2. Jane's Defence.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 36    Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle (7 May 2019)

0.338in Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle (HAF) (7 May 2019)

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of an early version of an Orsis T-5000 Sniper Rifle in the possession of HAF. The magazine profile suggests that this weapon is chambered for 0.338in Lapua Magnum ammunition.

These is the first sighting of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2011 and is in service with at least seven Member States. Without the serial number a tracing request would be ineffective.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/analyzemick/status/1135785280626269052, 7 May 2019;
3. Confidential source for identification; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 37  Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, Type-80 GPMG and Type-69 Grenade Launcher
(26 January 2020)

7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifle, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Gun and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launcher
(Eastern Libya)
(26 January 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 7.62 x 39mm Type 56-1 Assault Rifles, 7.62 x 54mmR Type-80 General Purpose Machine Guns and Type 69 40mm calibre Grenade Launchers in the possession of the Municipal Guard Fighting Unit in Benghazi, which went unreported in S/2021/228.

These weapon types were not reported to be in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of these weapon types is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 38 Inkas *Titan*-S 6x6 APC (15 March 2020)

**Inkas *Titan*-S 6x6 APC**  
(HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade)  
(15 March 2020)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of Inkas *Titan*-S 6x6 APCs in the possession of the HAF Tariq bin Ziyad brigade on 15 March 2020.

This military vehicle type was manufactured in the United Arab Emirates by Inkas Armoured Vehicle Manufacturing. It is no longer advertised as being in production on the manufacturers website.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

**Primary sources**

   (Extract at 5’21’’); and  

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 39  12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (21 March 2020)

12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun (Benghazi)  
(21 March 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a 12.7mm W-85 Heavy Machine Gun in the possession of HAF in Benghazi on 21 March 2020 and with the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021, which went unreported in S/2021/229.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

2. Abdullah Doma, AFP via Getty Images;
3. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1346162996967191553, 4 January 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 40 ZALA 421-16E UAV (20 April 2020)

ZALA 421-16E UAV
(Near Ain Zara)
(17 April 2020)

The Panel has now identified from open-source imagery the presence of a Zala 421-16E UAV that was downed near Ain Zara, south of Tripoli during the conflict in that area. This event was unreported in S/2021/229.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/oded121351/status/1251052368906596352, 17 and 18 April 2020;

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 41  ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon (14 June 2020)

ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin-Cannon
(HAF Al Saiqa Special Forces)
(14 June 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of ZSU-23-2-CP 23mm Twin Cannon retrofitted to Toyota 4x4 “Technicals” in the possession of HAF Al Saiqa Special Forces on 14 June 2020.

The weapon system was also seen on “Technicals” taking part in the 29 May 2021 HAF 7th anniversary “Operation Dignity” parade near Benghazi.

This weapon type is manufactured in Poland by Zaklady Mechaniczne Tarnow S.A.. The Panel wrote to the manufacturer on 14 February 2022 and a response is awaited.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
3. Extract from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mlhDO804364, 31 May 2021. (At 1:51.36 in video);
5. Identification confirmed by confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
1. The Panel noted that the broker for this procurement was the United Arab Emirates based International Golden Group PJSC (www.iggroup.ae). The Panel has reported before on the involvement of this company in the illicit transfer of arms and military materiel to Libya in Panel reports S/2013/99 and S/2016/209.

2. Open-source media has reported that International Golden Group PJSC is an essential link in Haftar’s equipment supply chain. It was reported that the company plays a key role in the procurement of weapons from Serbia and other Eastern European countries in support of Haftar.

International Golden Group PJSC involvement in previous violations of arms embargoes (Libya)

3. In S/2013/99 the Panel identified that the International Golden Group PJSC procured 800,000 rounds of 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition from the Military Export Import Company (MEICO) of Albania through a Ukrainian broker (Ukrinmash) and an Armenian facilitator (DG Arms Corporation). Although the end user was falsely declared as the United Arab Emirates the ammunition was shipped by air directly to Benghazi, Libya on the Ayk Avia owned Ilyushin IL-76 (#EK-76659). This was a post-departure diversion, as the flight plan filed with the Albanian authorities showed the United Arab Emirates as the destination. A Delivery Verification Certification dated 24 February 2012 was provided to Albania by the International Golden Group PJSC stating that the ammunition had been delivered to the declared end user, the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. Note that a commercial company, albeit an official supplier to the United Arab Emirates
Armed Forces, is authorised to sign DVC on their behalf. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.162

4. In S/2016/209163 the Panel identified a Bulgarian manufactured AR-M9F assault rifle164 (AB 46 7722) being offered for sale on open-source social media. Bulgaria informed the Panel that the weapon had been procured by the International Golden Group PJSC using a United Arab Emirates end user certificate. The United Arab Emirates did not respond to a tracing request from the Panel.165

5. On 21 February 2019 the UAE announced at IDEX 2019 that it had procured Norinco 155mm AH4 gun howitzers, and that International Golden Group PJSC was awarded a US$2.8 million contract to supply the ammunition.166 This weapon system fires the GP6 155mm Laser Guided Projectile (LGP). In S/2019/914167 the Panel reported on the presence of GP6 155mm LGP from a consignment supplied to the United Arab Emirates prior to 2019. In its response, 14 months after the Panel tracing request,168 the United Arab Emirates "rejected the allegation" but provided no information or clarification as to how ammunition delivered to their armed forces was present in Libya.169

Previous violations of arms embargoes (other)


Signatory

7. The Panel notes that the end user certificate signatory for the 12.7 x 108mm small arms ammunition shipment reported in S/2013/99 is the same individual that signed the end user certificate in 2018 for the 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex; Staff Brigadier General (Engineering) Waheed Hasan Ibrahim Al Zaaki, Director of General Purchasing, GHQ Armed Forces Logistics Staff.

8. The General Headquarters of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces appears to be selective as to when and when not to use the auspices of the International Golden Group PJSC for the procurement of ammunition. In annex 52 to S/2021/229171 the Panel reported on the sale of 120mm High Explosive M62P8 Mortar Bombs, identified in Libya, to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates in September 2016. Whereas in 2018 the importer for 120mm High Explosive M62P10 Mortar Bombs referred to in this annex was International Golden Group PJSC.

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163 Annex 27.
165 Panel letter of 22 December 2015.
166 Christopher F Foss, "UAE confirms Chinese 155mm AH4 gun-howitzer acquisition", in Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 February 2019.
167 Para. 95 and annex 39.
168 12 July 2019.
169 Member State letter of 3 September 2020.
170 Annex 104.
171 Annex 52 (p.281).
Annex 43  

1RL131 P-18 early warning radar (18 June 2020)

1RL131 P-18 early warning radar  
(29°12′41.25″N, 15°59′28.63″E - Al Jufra)  
(18 June 2020)

The Panel has now identified the presence of 1RL131 P-18 early warning radars at Al Jufra military air base on 18 June 2020, which were unreported in S/2021/229.

The same equipment type also featured on the official HAF social media covering the HAF 7th Anniversary Operation Dignity parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mblDIxTFYwo, 31 May 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 44  Ural 6x6 Military Trucks (12 July 2020)

Ural 4320 6x6 Military Truck
(Russian PMC Convoy)
(12 July 2020 and 10 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of Ural 4320 6x6 Military Trucks in a Russian PMC convoy on 12 July 2020. An armoured version was identified in Houn on 10 May 2021.

This military vehicle type was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://twitter.com/Oded123i/status/13941691-4534535/3525photos/10 May 2021;
3. https://1can.org/125-ural-4320-specifications-modifications-photos-videos-reviews.html, Accessed 21 January 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 45  TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine (1 August 2020)

TM-62M Anti-Tank Mine
(Russian PMC)
(Summer 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source media and confidential sources the presence of TM-62M anti-tank mines in Southern Tripoli. The mines were made safe and recovered from areas previously occupied by Russian PMC. Many had anti-lift devices underneath.

The mines identified had 1981 lot numbers, so tracing is no longer possible due to their age and the wide spread export of such mines.

This explosive ordnance was NOT in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this explosive ordnance type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. Confidential source; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 46  120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bomb (9 October 2020)

120mm High Explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs (GNA-AF in Western Libya)  
(9 October 2020)

Imagery from the website of the “Sons of Lions” Mortar Unit of the GNA Western Command showed the presence of a batch of 120mm high explosive (HE) Mortar Bombs not previously seen in Libya before. This is an update to that reported in table 4 and annex 41 of Panel report S/2021/225.

The markings on the ammunition identify that it was produced in January 2018, whereas markings on primary packaging shows ammunition manufactured in April 2017. The markings also indicate that the ammunition was manufactured by the Arsenal 2000 ISCo Dunarii company of Bulgaria. The Panel has confirmed that the bombs are from a consignment under Export Licences 017610 (18 February 2020) and 017677 (18 March 2020) for the Turkish Land Forces Command as the end user.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey on 8 March 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of this ammunition to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/saraai38629865/status/1314623862986531485, 9 October 2020;
3. www.armscontrol.org, 14 October 2019 (Subscription); and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
Annex 47  120mm 120-PM-43 M1948 Mortar (15 November 2020)

120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortar (HAF)  
(15 November 2020)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of 120mm 120-PM-43 M1943 Mortars in the possession of HAF on 15 November 2020.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/8led121351/status/1328012789948312576. 15 November 2020;
3. Confidential source for identification; and
Annex 48  XP Type Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS) (21 November 2020)

EO TECH “Type” Holographic Weapon Sights (HWS)
(HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura)
(21 November 2020)

From imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on, 21 November 2021 the Panel has identified weapon sights, virtually identical to the XP type holographic weapon sights (HWS) manufactured by EO TECH LLC, USA. The HWS were fitted to 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF). Weapons sights fall under the auspices of “arms and related materiel of all types” under the arms embargo.

The present owners of the US company claim that they cannot be sure that HWS were not supplied to Libya prior to 31 July 2020, the date they purchased the company. The company also informed the Panel that the XP HWS was widely counterfeited by “Far East based” companies.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the HWS to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 49    MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles (21 November 2020)

5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K Assault Rifles
(HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura)
(21 November 2020)

The Panel identified from imagery of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 21 November 2020, 5.56mm MKEK MBT 55K assault rifles in the possession of the armed forces of the then Government of National Accord (GNA-AF).

These weapons are designed and manufactured by Mechanical and Chemical Industry Company (MKEK) (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) of Turkey. This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in 2018, and no exports were made until 2021, after they were first identified in Libya. These exports being 30 weapons to two Balkan countries for evaluation. Over 60 weapons were identified at the training demonstration in Koms.

The Panel offered an opportunity to respond to Turkey in letters of 8 March 2021 and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya by Turkey is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. Location confirmed from https://twitter.com/TREFarabi/status/1330177248150990768, 21 November 2021;
5. customer.james.com, 12 July 2021. (Subscriber).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 50 120mm M-74 Mortar (4 January 2021)

120mm M-74 Mortar
(HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade)
(4 January 2021)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media the presence of 120mm M-74 Mortars in the possession of the “10th Unit” of the HAF Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on 4 January 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://www.mogimport.com/en/products/120mm-mortar-m74. Accessed 22 January 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 51  Akdas AK40-GL type 40x46mm Grenade Launchers (28 January 2021)

Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR Grenade Launchers (GNA-AF Khoms Joint Naval Training Centre) (28 January 2021)

On 28 January 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of the then GNA-AF receiving training in the use of the Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers from Turkish military instructors.

This is the first time that Akdas AK-40 GL variant 40x46mm SR grenade launchers have been identified in Libya. These weapons are designed and manufactured by the Akdas Arms Company of Turkey (www.akdassilah.com). This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in October 2019, and deliveries of the 8,000 units ordered continued through 2020. No exports have been reported in the authoritative defence trade media. They are also designed for use as under barrel grenade launchers fitted to the Turkish MKEK 5.56mm MBT 55K assault rifles, also supplied to Libya by Turkey.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 52  AK-103 Assault Rifles with HAF 106 brigade (30 January 2021)

7.62mm AK-103 variant Assault Rifle
(HAF 106 brigade, Eastern Libya)
(30 January 2021)

The Panel has identified from official and open source imagery of a
training exercise on 30 January 2021 the presence of AK-103 variant
assault rifles in the possession of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel is confident these are a new import into Libya due to the
two digit year code [20] that forms part of the serial number
[201109571].

On 12 May 2021 the Panel wrote to the Member State that designed
and manufactures the weapon, and also the two Member States that
manufacture them under licence. No responses have yet been
received by the Panel, so supply chain tracing is stalled.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9

Primary sources
3. https://twitter.com/CahtanCibic/status/1355414380752145035, 30 January 2021; and
4. customer.james.com. Subscriber only.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
**Annex 53**  
*System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR) (2 February 2021)*

**System Defence 5.56mm Multi-Functional Rifle (MFR)**  
(GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies)  
(2 February 2021)

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of System Defence 5.56mm multi-functional rifles (MFR) in the possession of Ministry of Interior personnel on 2 February 2021. Subsequent official social media posted on 2 July 2021 confirmed the presence of this weapon type with the Ministry of Interior security agencies.

These are the first sightings of this weapon type in Libya. This weapon type has only been manufactured since 2018 and there have been no reported foreign sales in the authoritative trade media.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 12 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya, in the absence of an approved exemption request, is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

**Primary sources**

2. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3326759554680301, 2 July 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
5.56mm JAWS-556 Assault Rifle
(Sirte, Libya)
(4 February 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media a weapon in the possession of an armed group affiliated to Khalifa Haftar present in Sirte on, or about, 4 February 2021. The weapon is virtually identical to the JAWS-556 (14.5” barrel) assault rifle produced by the Jordanian Armament and Weapon Systems (JAWS) facility (www.jaws-jordan.com), which is part of the King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) consortium. This is the first sighting of this weapons system in Libya. The weapon has only been manufactured since 2017/2018, and there are no reports of any exports in the authoritative defence trade media. Jordan confirmed to the Panel that no overseas sales had taken place.

The Panel wrote to Jordan on 22 February, 25 March and 7 September 2021. Jordan denied supply to Libya. Their response stated that the weapons “can be assembled (including in Jordan) by a third party and then sold by this third party”, but provided no evidence to support the statement. The Panel considers it highly unlikely that such an activity could take place in Jordan, and a subsequent transfer to Libya take place, without State knowledge.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Jordan as they failed to prevent the transfer.

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1357394846013612032, 4 February 2021;

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 55  122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer in Libya (23 March 2021)

122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzer
(HAF 106 brigade)
(23 March 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of 122mm M-30 M1938 Howitzers in the possession of HAF 106 brigade on 23 March 2021.

This weapon system was NOT reported in the inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the 2011 arms embargo.

The transfer to Libya of this weapon type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/137442432608547843, 23 March 2021;

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 56  T-62 variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) in Libya (23 March 2021)

**HAF T-62 MV variant Main Battle Tank (MBT) (Update)**
(near Benghazi)
(23 March 2021)

The Panel corrected its initial report (annex 64 to S/2021/229) on the presence of T-62 main battle tanks (MBT) in Libya in annex 64 to S/2021/229/Corr.1. Subsequent to the drafting of that corrigendum the Panel has identified further information on social media from third-party investigators on the presence of the T-62 MV variant in Libya, who identified the variant from imagery in official media of HAF 106 brigade.

The Panel initially considered that the presence of the T-62 MV variant may have been due to upgrades made to T-62 MBT by ChtVK Wagner personnel to T-62 already in possession of the Libyan Armed Forces prior to the arms embargo. Further investigations, including consideration of the findings of independent OSINT analysts, now consider that option as highly unlikely due to the design differences between the two variants, and the extensive engineering work necessary to make such modification.

The transfer of this military materiel into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

**Primary sources**

1. Twitter, @Hasari1Okais, 5 June 2020;
2. [https://twitter.com/oryxjoenk/status/1371899346664156475](https://twitter.com/oryxjoenk/status/1371899346664156475), 16 March 2021;
5. [https://twitter.com/oryxjoenk/status/1376829902015154620](https://twitter.com/oryxjoenk/status/1376829902015154620), 30 March 2021; and
6. [customertimes.com](http://customertimes.com). (Subscription)

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 57  GNU-AF training on M60 *Patton* Main Battle Tank in Libya (27 March 2021)

GNU-AF M60 Patton Main Battle Tank Transfer and Training (Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura)  
(27 March 2021)

The Panel identified from open source information, including a subsequently deleted ‘tweet’ from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account, Turkish military personnel training GNU-AF personnel on M60 *Patton* main battle tanks (MBT). This is the first sighting of an M60 *Patton* MBT in Libya as this equipment was not in the past inventory of the Libyan Armed Forces.

In response to an enquiry by the Panel, Turkey denied transferring M60 *Patton* MBT to Libya, denied providing training and denied having a surplus of such MBT in the Turkish Armed Forces.

The Panel has evidence that contradicts the Turkish response to the Panel:

1) Copy of the imagery [R] from the official Turkish Ministry of Defence social media account;
2) Credible evidence that the Turkish Armed Forces have a surplus of M60 *Patton* MBTs, which were originally procured from the USA during 1992/1993; and
3) Confidential information that the M60 *Patton* MBT were delivered to Misrata, Libya on 28 May 2020 onboard the MV Cirkini. [See appendix D to annex 34 to S/2021/229].

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Cesavunma/status/1375772993334718880, subsequently deleted;
6. Member State (20 May 2021); and
7. Confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 58  AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV deployed with HAF (30 March 2021)

AMN 233114 Tiger-M Multi-Purpose Armoured Vehicle (MPV) (HAF Live Firing Exercise and Benina, Benghazi) (30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the presence of a Tiger-M variant with ChVK Wagner operatives in annex 63 to S/2021/299. The vehicles covered in that report were painted grey or black.

Since then the Panel has identified some AMN 233114 Tiger-M MPV present at the HAF 106 brigade live firing exercise in late March 2021. These vehicles were painted in a sand colour. Four vehicles were also seen with the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade on the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation Volcano parade at Benina, Benghazi on 29 May 2021. A further vehicle was identified with HAF 106 brigade on 8 July 2021.

The Panel has not yet identified whether these vehicles are in operational use by HAF, or whether they are used by ChVK Wagner personnel embedded within HAF units as advisors.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/Odeb@121551/status/1376868169416144897, 30 March 2021;
2. https://twitter.com/Odeb@121551/status/1376871499954241542, 30 March 2021;
3. https://twitter.com/RS5ETM/status/140058612257400667, 3 June 2021;
   Accessed 19 June 2021; and
5. https://twitter.com/Libya_OSNInt/status/141300228422117378, 8 July 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 59  HAF Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors (5 May 2021)

Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors
(HAF 106 brigade)
(5 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from official social media of HAF and other open-source imagery the presence of Swedish-manufactured Sordin Supreme Pro-X Max Black hearing protectors being used by fighters of HAF 106 brigade. The Member State confirmed that these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use. Yet they have obvious military utility.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/Ibva_OSINT/status/1390066440254962386, 5 May 2021;
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBiya-0pBTI, 28 May 2021;
3. Member State (11 May 2021), and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 60  Seizure of SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols in Misrata (18 May 2021)

SUR MRT M9 blank firing pistols
(Misrata)
(18 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from social media the seizure of 2,000 Surarms SUR BRT M9 blank firing pistols by customs authorities in Misrata port on 18 May 2021. The pistols were concealed within a shipping container #2803.32.3 full of clothes, which was offloaded from the MV *Medicon Azmir* (IMO 9103374). This information was confirmed to the Panel on 22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022 by the Libyan authorities who are investigating the case.

These pistols can be readily converted into live firing weapons and the Panel assesses that they were destined to be such converted and then sold on the black market by an organized criminal group.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/OSINTstatus/status/1394787961059505731, 18 May 2021;
2. Member State (22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022); and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 61  UAZ-469 communication vehicles with HAF 166 brigade (24 May 2021)

**UAZ-469 communication vehicles**  
(Eastern Libya)  
(24 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of UAZ-469 variant communication vehicles in the possession of HAF 166 brigade. The vehicle type had not been seen in Libya before.

This particular vehicle has been exported to over 80 countries, so a tracing request would be highly unlikely to provide any useful information as to the supply chain to Libya.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 3 of resolution 1970 (2011).

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**Primary sources**

1. [https://twitter.com/ Libya_OsINT/status/1396868224696963077](https://twitter.com/ Libya_OsINT/status/1396868224696963077), 25 May 202; and  
2. [currencyjare.com](https://currencyjare.com), 23 March 2020. (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 62  Militarized Jeep Gladiator with HAF (27 May 2021)

Militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicle (Benghazi) (27 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of two militarized Jeep Gladiator light utility vehicles preparing to take part in the HAF 7th anniversary “Operation Dignity” parade near Benghazi, which was held on 29 May 2021.

The manufacturer has stated that the paint colour of the vehicles is Gobi (Code: PUA), for which 6,965 vehicles were manufactured in 2020. Of these 55 were exported to distributors or individuals in 6 middle eastern countries. None were exported direct to Libya. A tracing request is thus unlikely to yield results.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. Extract from video at https://twitter.com/Libya_OSINT/status/1357790148047560851, 27 May 2021; and
2. Letter from manufacturer (2 July 2021).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 63  

**Militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 variant with HAF (29 May 2021)**

**Militarized Toyota 6x6 light utility vehicle**  
(Eastern Libya)  
(29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of a militarized Toyota Land Cruiser 6x6 type light utility vehicle in Libya for the first time. It was participating in the HAF 7th anniversary "Operation Dignity" parade held on 29 May 2021 at Benina, Benghazi.

The Panel wrote to the manufacturer on 11 June 2021 requesting further information. No response was received.

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

**Primary source**

1. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mblDX5TPo0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mblDX5TPo0), 31 May 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
TAG BATT 4x4 APC
(Benghazi)
(29 May 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source social media the presence of a TAG BATT 4x4 APC taking part in the 29 May 2021 HAF 7th anniversary “Operation Dignity” parade near Benghazi. The antenna array on the vehicle indicates it is equipped for communications, electronic warfare or electronic countermeasures.

This military vehicle type was first manufactured by The Armored Group (TAG) in 2011, which complicates tracing requests due to the requirement to only keep records for 10 years under the auspices of the Arms Trade Treaty. It is no longer in production.

The transfer to Libya of this military vehicle type is a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://posting.ccp/LhXkh44ny, Accessed 23 January 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 65  Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle (3 June 2021)

Steyr SSG 08 variant or copy Sniper Rifle
(Russian PMC in Eastern Libya)
(3 June 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source imagery the presence of a weapon virtually identical to a Steyr SSG 08 variant sniper rifle in the possession of a Russian PMC operative in Eastern Libya.

The Panel was informed by the manufacturer that they had not exported any weapons to Libya, and that the finish on the weapon was not a standard production finish. They also stated that this weapon type has had worldwide sales, and that copies are now being made. This precludes further tracing by the Panel unless a serial number can be obtained.

The transfer of this weapon type to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/RS0TF/status/1405657739490990695, 3 June 2021;
2. https://twitter.com/Odek171381/status/1401482925212966474, 6 June 2021;

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 66  Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 variant with Russian PMC (3 June 2021)

Armoured Toyota Land Cruiser 79 light utility vehicle (29°13′21.03″ N, 16°11′22.29″ E) (3 June 2021)

The Panel has identified from open-source media the presence of armoured Toyota 79 Land Cruiser light utility vehicles in Libya for the first time. The vehicles were heading North East in a Russian PMC convoy from Al Jufra to Sirte.

Panel research has identified that numerous companies provide this up-armouring option to the standard Toyota Land Cruiser 79. Successful tracing of the supply chain is not possible without more detailed information.

The Panel also notes that the GNU-AM (Misrata militias) may also have possession of similar vehicles, but the imagery resolution available does not allow for a 100% identification (see primary source 4).

The transfer of this military materiel to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

2. Geo-referenced at https://twitter.com/CourtesySargon/status/140156278506706708706, 7 June 2021; and
3. Extract from https://twitter.com/salahar2/status/141903333044244484, (0.46min), 7 June 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 67 GNU-AF CForce All-Terrain Vehicles (ATV) (4 July 2021)

CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV)  
(GNU-AF in South Tripoli)  
(4 July 2021)

The Panel has identified from official social media of the GNU Ministry of Interior and other open-source imagery the presence of CFMoto CForce All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) being used by the GNU Ministry of Interior’s General Department of Security Operations in southern Tripoli. Although these items are not subject to export controls, nor specifically classified as military material or dual-use, they have obvious military utility.

This has been included in the report as a further example of the ease with which arms embargos can be negated by the innovative use of commercial or dual-use products. In this case all the vehicles were seen in black or green “military” colours.

CFMoto is a global brand with high production levels and global distribution, which means that without vehicle identification numbers (VIN) supply chain tracing is not possible.

The Panel considers that as this dual-use technology is primarily being imported by actors actively participating in armed conflict, and then used for military purposes, such transfers are a violation of paragraph 9 to resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://twitter.com/Lhya_OsNT/status/1412183012860400098  5 July 2021; and  

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 68    MKEK JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifles in Libya (11 July 2021)

MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifle
(GNU Ministry of Interior security agencies)
(11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022)

The Panel has identified from official GNU Ministry of Interior and open-source imagery the presence of MKEK 7.62mm JNG-90 Bora Sniper Rifles in the possession of Ministry of Interior security agencies on 11 July 2021 and 9 March 2022. The weapons were being used as part of sniper training provided by Turkey.

These are the first sightings of this weapons system in Libya. This weapon type has been manufactured since 2008. The two Member States also licensed to produce the weapon have confirmed to the Panel that they have yet to manufacture any weapons.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter of 22 July 2021. On 12 September 2021 Turkey stated that, based on inventory analysis, it had not sold, transferred or exported such weapons to Libya.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the GNA, and the transfer of this weapon type to Libya, are both violations of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://twitter.com/Oded12351/status/1414847806751446773, 13 July 2021;
   Accessed 22 July 2021;
4. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=511947766965593&set=pbc.511947766965593, 9 March 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 69  AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (9 August 2021)

AN/PVS-7 Night Vision Goggles (PNG)
(Beniwa, Benghazi)
(9 August 2021)

The Panel has identified from official HAF social media imagery of the 81st Anniversary parade of the formation of the Libyan Army, held at Benina on 9 August 2021, HAF personnel equipped with Army/Navy Portable Visual Search 7 (AN/PVS-7) type Night Vision Goggles (NVG). This is the first reporting of this military materiel by the Panel, although independent research has identified a single image of the same equipment with a HAF fighter on 3 August 2017, which went unreported by the Panel at the time.

Designed in the United States in 1982, in-service since 1985, with many manufacturers, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

Weapons sights fall under the auspices of arms and related materiel of all types under the arms embargo.

Although the Panel cannot positively identify the supplier of the AN/PVS-7 NVG to Libya, the transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vsc28zHIl70, 9 August 2021;
2. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1425780777975074821, 12 August 2021;
3. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/99272404813734656, 3 August 2017; and
4. Manufacturers image for comparison and identification.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 70  122mm *Rocketsan* FFR Pods and Hybrid Launcher (17 August 2021)

122mm *Rocketsan* Free Flight Rockets (FFR) and Hybrid Launcher
(Sidi Bilal, 32°48’56.73”N, 12°57’19.76”)
(17 August 2021)

A Hybrid Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) was identified in the possession of the GNU-AF entering Camp Sidi Bilal, near Janzur, on 17 August 2021. The location was confirmed by an independent OSINT analyst using geo-location, and the Panel concurs with the coordinates identified.

This MBRL is of interest as further research identified that a very similar hybrid MBRL was seen in the possession of HAF in Tripoli on 5 June 2020. In 1999/2000 the DPRK supplied the UAE with some 240mm M-1985 MBRL, and the erector launcher seen on the hybrid MBRL is of the same type. The manufacturer has confirmed to the Panel that Ivecco 230.35 WM chassis were supplied to the UAE during 1991/1992.

The Hybrid MBRL seen at GNU-AF Camp Sidi Bilal has the Turkish manufactured *Rocketsan* 122mm free flight rocket (FFR) pods mounted on an M-1985 MBRL erector launcher on an unarmoured Ivecco 230 35WM chassis.

This makes it almost certain that the Hybrid MBRL identified with the GNU-AF at Camp Sidi Bilal is the result of a battlefield capture from HAF.

The transfer of this Hybrid MBRL to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by the UAE. The supply of the *Rocketsan* 122mm FFR is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Turkey.

Primary sources
3. twitter.com/Tedie121351/status/1427141237203934490, 17 August 2021;
4. twitter.com/arsmagazine/status/1427232170981322241, 17 August 2021;
5. twitter.com/arsmagazine/status/1427532760306224671, 17 August 2021;
6. Geo-located at twitter.com/io_tumors/status/1427522397657696139, 17 August 2021;
7. www.arsmagazine.com/2021/12/the-mystery-missile-turkey-launched-vietnam.html, 14 December 2021; and
8. janes.com (Subscription).

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 71   SALW seizures in Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Transfers to Sudan (18 September 2021 and 8 January 2022)

On 18 September 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Sudaneese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of an SALW seizure in the area of Sidi al-Barri, Sudan. It was reported that four smugglers, two Libyans and two foreign nationals, were arrested, but the Panel has yet to verify this information. The seizure included 36 x AK variant assault rifles, two DShK heavy machine guns, two RPG-7 rocket launchers and associated ammunition.

On 8 January 2022 official RSF open source media reported a further seizure of 3,995 rounds of small arms ammunition.

The Panel requested further information from Sudan in letters dated 26 September 2021 and 4 February 2022. No response was received.

This transfer of small arms and light weapons from Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://twitter.com/RSFSudans/status/1439183569591578064, 18 September 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 72 Katmerciler KIRAC Armoured Personnel Carrier (24 December 2021)

Katmerciler KIRAC Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) (GNU Ministry of Interior in Tripoli)
(25 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from Turkish specialist defence media the presence of Katmerciler KIRAC armoured personnel carriers (APC) being used by the GNU in Tripoli. These vehicles are designed and manufactured by the Katmerciler Arac Ustu Ekipman Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. Merkez (Fabrika) company in Turkey.

The manufacturer's coverage on their website states that this New Generation Criminal Investigation Vehicle has a unique design which can be configured as armoured personnel carrier, command control vehicle and internal security vehicle. If designed for use in the “Command Control” or “Internal Security” roles, the vehicles, depending on the end-user, could fall under the exception for non-lethal humanitarian or protective use provided for in paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 1970 (2011), as amended by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 2095 (2013).

However, these particular vehicles are armoured and are being used in the APC role, hence an exemption request and prior approval by the Committee would have been required under paragraph 8 of resolution 2174 (2014). No such request was made by Libya or Turkey.

The Panel offered Libya and Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 1 February and 31 January 2022 respectively. No response was received.

This transfer of military equipment to Libya undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Turkey.

Primary sources
1. https://www.defenceturk.net/turk-katmerciler-firmasinin-zinhili-araclari-libyada, 24 December 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 73  AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL) (31 December 2021)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the presence of a target pointer illuminator (TPI), virtually identical to the AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Laser (ATPIAL), fitted to an assault rifle in the possession of the Joint Operations Force of the Government of National Unity (GNU-AF) in Misrata on 31 December 2021.

Target Pointer Illuminators (TPI) fall under the auspices of arms and related materiel of all types under the arms embargo.

The ATPIAL has high production levels and is globally distributed, which means that without a serial number supply chain tracing is not possible.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://www.facebook.com/GOVLYT/photos/a.1825800534261887, 2 January 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 74  Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular (NVM) (9 February 2022)

Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular
(HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura)
(8 February 2022)

Imagery on GNA 166 Battalion official social media of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 8 February 2022 shows the use of the Aselsan A100 Night Vision Monocular. Night vision optics fall under the auspices of “arms and related materiel of all types” under the arms embargo.

The optics are manufactured by Aselsan A.S of Turkey and there have been no reported exports or transfers in the authoritative defence media. The optics were only in service with the Turkish Armed Forces. The Panel requested information on the supply chain from Turkey on 24 February 2022. The response from Aselsan A.S. on 22 March 2022 denied any direct sale or export by the company to Libya. Their response did not preclude a third party transfer.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1973 (2011).

Primary sources
2. russiajets.com, Accessed 11 February 2022, and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 75  MKEK 7.62 x 51mm MBT-76 Assault Rifles (9 February 2022)

7.62mm MKEK MBT 76 Assault Rifles
(HAF Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre, Tajoura)
(8 February 2022)

Imagery on GNA 166 Battalion official social media of a GNA-AF training demonstration at the Omar Al-Mukhtar Training Centre near Tajoura on 8 February 2022 shows the use of 7.62mm MBT-76 assault rifles.

These weapons are designed and manufactured by Mechanical and Chemical Industry Company (MKEK) (Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu) of Turkey. This weapon type entered service with the Turkish Armed Forces in 2014, and is now in service with six Member States. Tracing requests would therefore be unlikely to yield positive results.

The transfer of these weapons to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://www.facebook.com/ليبيا.الجيش.النacional/\?ref=page&/posts/1366330919719394;8 February 2022;
   and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 76  M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets (23 March 2022)

M79 Osa 90mm Anti-tank Rockets
(Ajdabia)
(23 March 2022)

The Panel has identified from GNU official social media the seizure of five M79 Osa 90mm anti-tank rockets by the Security Directorate in Ajdabia on 23 March 2022. This ammunition type has not been seen in Libya before.

The resolution of the imagery was not high enough to confirm the Lot/Batch number, which appeared to be 18-1964. The age and wide distribution of this ammunition type means that a tracing request would be nugatory.

The transfer of this military material to Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=31125077322370942&id=1766792069275436, 23 March 2022; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 77  GNA-AF Air Defence training in Turkey (1 February 2021)

GNA -AF Air Defence systems training  
(1 February 2021)

On 01 February 2021 imagery was published on social media of the Turkish Armed Forces providing training in Konya, Turkey to the then GNA-AF across a range of air defence systems. It was confirmed by video imagery on the official Turkish Armed Forces website.

The systems included: 1) Korkut Twin 35mm Cannon (SSA and KKA); 2) Kalkun II Air Defence Radar; 3) IHASAVAR Anti-Drone System; 4) IHA TAR Anti-Drone System; and 5) Twin Oerlikon 35mm Cannon.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 9 February and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/COIN_V2/status/135817738629684832, 1 February 2021;
2. https://twitter.com/Oiled1213/status/1359164447908984996, 1 February 2021;

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 78  GNA-AF Military Diving training in Khoms, Libya (6 February 2021)

GNA-AF Military Diving Training by Turkey
(Khoms Naval Base)
(6 February 2021)

On 6 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military diving training in the Khoms Joint Naval Training Command centre being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to 32°41′30.7″N 14°14′31.8″E.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. Their response of 17 March 2022 stated that only training was provided and no diving equipment was supplied.

This military diving training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/icsayumna/status/135031349412126772; 6 February 2021; and
2. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 79  GNA-AF Officer Cadet training in Tripoli, Libya (7 February 2021)

GNA-AF Officer Cadet training by Turkey (Tripoli) (7 February 2021)

On 7 February 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of Officer Cadet training being provided to the then GNA-AF. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-locating the training location to a military base in Tripoli at 32°50'23.2"N, 13°12'67.3"E.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 12 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/cesarunn/status/1358333294059125964, 4 February 2021;
2. https://twitter.com/cesarunn/status/1358333294059125964, 4 February 2021; and
3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 80 GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training in Libya (25 March 2021)

GNU-AF Unit 444 UAV training  
(Takballi Training Camp, Tripoli)  
(25 March 2021)

The official social media account of the GNU-AF Tripoli Military District 444 Unit, showed imagery of training in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) at the Takballi Training Camp on 25 March 2021. The Panel has confirmed the imagery by geo-referencing the location to approximately 32°48′53.9″N,13°13′26.7″E.

The Panel has identified the UAV as a Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, which has dual use military utility as an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform. The imagery shows a vehicle painted in a military sand colour, with air conditioning and a dual antenna array. The Panel considers it almost certain that this vehicle is a command, control and communications (C3) vehicle for the operation of the UAV.

The wide commercial distribution of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL, means that a tracing request is unlikely to identify the supply chain unless serial numbers can be identified.

This transfer of the Foxtech Baby Shark 260 VTOL into Libya is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

3. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 81  GNU-AF training on Fırtına T-155 SP howitzer in Libya (30 March 2021)

GNU-AF Fırtına T155 Training  
(Joint Land Training Centre, Tajoura)  
(30 March 2021)

The Panel reported on the transfer of Fırtına T-155 self-propelled howitzers from Turkey to Libya in annexes 28 and 34 to S/2021/225.

The Panel identified from an official social media account of the GNU-AF “Media Centre for Operation Volcano of Anger” a report of the Turkish Armed Forces providing artillery training on the use of the T-155 Fırtına self-propelled howitzers to the GNU-AF.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in letters dated 15 July and 5 October 2021. No response was received.

This training in the operation of Fırtına T155 self-propelled howitzers undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNU is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Turkarmy/status/137589691259362117, 30 March 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 82  GNU-AF Special Forces Training in Turkey (7 August 2021)

GNU-AF Special Forces Training  
(Egirdir, Turkey)  
(7 August 2021)

On 7 August 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the GNU-AF, and on 15 August 2021 on open-source media, of GNU-AF personnel receiving special forces training at the Turkish Ministry of Defence Counter-Terrorism Training and Exercise Centre near Egirdir, Turkey.

The training location was geo-referenced to 37°52′18.56″N, 30°49′52.14″E by an independent OSINT analyst. The Panel concurs with the location identified (see R).

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military special forces training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

2. https://twitter.com/Abled12135/status/1424552316617991901, 9 August 2021;  
3. https://twitter.com/Abled12135/status/1428527919090417829, 9 August 2021;  
4. https://twitter.com/Abled12135/status/1426881095987623205, 15 August 2021; and  
5. Google Earth Pro.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 83     HAF 106 brigade return from training in Egypt (8 September 2021)

HAF 106 brigade training  
(Egypt)  
(8 September 2021)

On 8 September 2021 imagery was published on the official social media of the HAF 106 brigade reporting the conclusion of a training event in Egypt.

The Panel has confirmed that the aircraft in the imagery showing the return of HAF 106 brigade personnel was in Libya when the image was taken, and that it is the IL-76 [MSN#933446205] [now 5A-7656] flying in support of HAF.

The Panel offered Egypt an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 29 September 2021. On 21 October 2021 Egypt responded that the official HAF report was false.

This training is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by HAF and the, as yet to be identified, training provider.

Primary sources
1. https://twitter.com/JDTeKLYZuyYGebew/status/1436683797979213212/photo/1. 8 September 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 84 GNU-AF Sniper Training from Turkish Armed Forces (3 October 2021)

GNU -AF Sniper Training by Turkey (Western Region, Tripoli) (3 October 2021)

On 3 October 2021 imagery was published on official social media of the Turkish Armed Forces of military sniper training being provided to military personnel of the GNU-AF Western Region.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 7 October 2021. No response was received.

This military sniper training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/rgsanan/status/1446651263788880, 3 October 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 85  GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training in Turkey (9 October 2021)

GNU-AF Mountain Corps Academy Training
(Turkey)
(9 October 2021)

On 9 October 2021 imagery was published on the official website of the Presidency of the General Staff to the Libyan Army of GNU-AF personnel receiving training at the Mountain Corps Academy in Turkey. Note the Blue Beret worn by a Turkish instructor. The Blue Beret is worn by elite units of the Turkish Armed Forces such as: 1) Land Forces Mountain Commandos; and 2) Gendarmerie Commandos.

The Panel offered Turkey an opportunity to respond in a letter dated 13 December 2021. On 15 February 2022 the Turkish authorities confirmed to the Panel that 34 Libyan students were trained between 2 August to 8 October 2021.

This specialist military training undertaken within the scope of the Military Training, Cooperation and Consultancy Agreement between Turkey and the then GNA is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
2. https://twitter.com/Oded121351/status/1447199469953922526; 10 October 2021;
Annex 86  Russian Federation military cargo flights in eastern Libya

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Russian Federation on the air line of communication (ALoC) from the Hmeimim military air base in Syria to eastern Libya. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious. The Panel wrote to the Member State (see paragraph 5).

2. The Panel has identified at least 175 flights by specific aircraft registration number, equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 7,922 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 48-tonne cargo payload for an IL-76TD). Flights are summarised at tables 86.1 and 86.2 and figures 86.1 and 86.2. The data is not exhaustive as pre-departure flight plans are not usually filed directly with Eurocontrol for entry into European airspace. Entry is usually activated by Cyprus air traffic control (ATC) using a ZZZZ code for departure airfield, or by the destination airfield itself.

Table 86.1  Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t)</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>9,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Identified by Panel.
b Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.1  Number of RFF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)

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172 Centred on 35°24'27.07"N, 35°57'8.00"E.
173 Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) www.flightradar24.com; (c) www.radarbox.com; (d) www.italmilradar.com; (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter @ALandewers; @Gerjon (primarily) and (g) Twitter @YorukIsik.
174 The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.
175 https://www.eurocontrol.int/
Table 86.2
Summary of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t)</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>2,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a Identified by Panel.
* b Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft. Data is rounded and includes other aircraft types.

Figure 86.2
Number of RF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)

3. The Panel requested further information from the Member State\(^\text{176}\) and in their reply\(^\text{177}\) they stated that the cargo comprised of “humanitarian assistance to Libya, including the supply of vaccines against COVID-19”. No further details were provided.

4. UN agencies have neither observed, nor heard of, any large quantity of humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation being supplied to, or distributed in, eastern Libya.\(^\text{178}\) No humanitarian aid has been identified from satellite imagery or ground reports in the aircraft unloading areas at Benina (HLLB) and Al Khadim (HL59), and Al Khadim is not known to be a humanitarian hub for any aid agency.\(^\text{179}\) A mass and volumetric cargo analysis by the Panel (see table 86.2) shows the cargo capacity of these flights for selected items.

\(^{176}\) Panel letter of 5 October 2021.
\(^{177}\) Email to Panel of 26 October 2021.
\(^{178}\) Senior UN official in the UN Country Team.
\(^{179}\) Ibid.
Table 86.2
Volumetric cargo analysis of typical humanitarian aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Mass ( tonnes )</th>
<th>Volume ( m$^3$ )</th>
<th>Density ( tonnes/m$^3$ )</th>
<th>Flights</th>
<th>Maximum Payload</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IL-76 TD Cargo Capacity</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19 (5,000 vials) a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>42,000,000 vials</td>
<td>92% of cargo hold volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>8,400 tonnes</td>
<td>26% of cargo hold volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>8,400,000 litres</td>
<td>21% of cargo hold volume</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Assuming packed in Single Use Thermal Type packaging.

5. The Panel also noted that Russian Federation military cargo aircraft are using eastern Libyan airfields for technical stop overs on flights to other destinations in Africa, including the Central African Republic. For example, on 2 October 2021 aircraft tracking websites identified a Russian Federation Air Force Tupolev TU-154M (registered #RA-85042) on the normal route from Latakia (OSLK), Syria to Al Khadim (HL59), Libya. The aircraft tracking websites then showed “no data” for the period from 01:48 hours UTC on 2 October to 15:16 hours UTC on 3 October 2021. A “dark period” of 1 Day, 13 Hours and 26 Minutes. Sentinel-1 satellite imagery for that period did not show a TU-154M aircraft parked at Al Khadim (HL59) in eastern Libya. Figure 86.2 shows the same aircraft at Bangui M’Poko airport (FEFF), Central African Republic on 2 October 2021 between 08:15 to 10:36 hours UTC, based on the ground time for the Air France Boeing 777-228 (F-GSPO) parked in the vicinity and shown on aircraft tracking websites. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) was informed of this flight activity.181

Figure 86.2
TU-154M (RA-85042) at Bangui, CAR (2 October 2021)

Source: https://twitter.com/tom_bullock_/status/1445386123161788421, 2 October 2021.

180 This aircraft was also reported in annexes 55 and 77 to S/2021/229 as operating in support of ChVK Wagner.
6. The Panel has identified that flights from Benghazi, Libya (HLLB) to Modibo Keita International Airport, Mali (GABS) took place on 1, 21 and 26 February 2022. The Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) has been informed of this flight activity.

7. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.
Annex 87  Turkish military cargo flights in support of GNU-AF

1. The Panel has continued to monitor and analyse the quantity of military cargo flights by the Turkish Air Force (TuAF) on the air line of communication (ALoC) from Turkey to western Libya by Airbus A400M operated by the 221 Breeze Squadron based at Kayseri/Erkilat.\(^{182}\)

2. The Panel has identified at least 33 flights by specific aircraft registration number,\(^{183}\) equating to a maximum cargo delivery capacity of 1,221 tonnes from 1 May 2021 to 31 March 2022 (assuming a 37-tonne cargo payload for an Airbus A400M). Flights are summarised at tables 87.1 and 87.2 and figures 87.1 and 87.2.\(^{184}\) The list may not be exhaustive as the TuAF use an indirect route to avoid certain Flight Information Regions (FIR). This route follows the Istanbul / Nicosia FIR boundary and then the Athens / Cairo FIR boundary until reaching the Tripoli FIR. These flights meet the profile indicators for flights deemed to be suspicious and almost certainly violating the arms embargo.

Table 87.1
Summary of TuAF cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights (^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t) (^b)</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Identified by Panel.

\(^b\) Assuming cargo payload of 37 tonnes for Airbus A400M aircraft.

Figure 87.1
Number of TuAF cargo flights to western Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)

182 LTAU. Joint Airbase. 38°46'13"N, 35°29'43"E.

183 Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) www.flightradar24.com; (c) www.radarbox.com; (d) www.italmilradar.com; (e) C4ADS analysis; (f) Twitter @ALandewers; @Gerjon (primarily); and (g) Twitter @YorukIsik.

184 The Panel has maintained a database of flight details.
Table 87.2
Summary of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Identified by Panel.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming cargo payload of 48 tonnes for IL-76 aircraft.

Figure 87.2
Number of TuAF military cargo flights to Libya (1 January - 31 March 2022)

3. On 14 April 2021 one TuAF A400 delivered humanitarian supplies (vaccines) to Tripoli (figure 87.2), but two other aircraft flew to their military operating base at Al Wattiyah.
4. The Panel finds that this flight activity by military cargo aircraft is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya. As they are military aircraft their routine landing at Libyan airports violates paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) regardless of whether the aircraft are transferring arms or military equipment to Libya.
Annex 88  Cham Wings Airlines flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Cham Wings Airlines\(^ \text{185} \) (SAW) aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate.\(^ \text{186} \)

2. On 2 December 2021 the European Union placed restrictive measures\(^ \text{187} \) on Cham Wings Airlines for an issue unrelated to the UN sanctions measures relating to Libya. This action has impacted on the company's flight operations in regard to Libya as the EU sanctions measures consider access to European controlled airspace as an "economic resource". It is the responsibility of the Member State to refuse access to its own national air space.

3. By international law, a State "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory", which corresponds with the maritime definition of territorial waters as being 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) out from a nation's coastline.\(^ \text{188} \) Airspace not within any country's territorial limit is considered international, analogous to the "high seas" in maritime law. Operational control of air space over the Mediterranean is split up, under an agreement with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) into Flight Information Regions (FIR). For the coastal States of the Mediterranean, the FIR consists of the airspace above its land and sea territory plus any international airspace in respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to that State.

4. The Panel has identified that shortly after the imposition of EU sanctions on Cham Wings Airlines their flight routes changed to avoid the national air space of Cyprus and Greece. Their aircraft still transit the FIR controlled by these two nations, as well as Malta FIR, but try and fly on the inter-FIR boundaries in order to introduce a level of confusion of responsibility as to which Member State should take action (see figures 88.1 and 88.2). The Panel mentions this as an example of sanctions evasion tactics used by airlines.

Figure 88.1
Cham Wings Airlines flight profile 2021 (pre-EU sanctions)

\[^{185}\text{www.chamwings.com}, \text{Fardos Street, Damascus, Syria. +963 11 9211. (cs@chamwings.com).}\]
\[^{186}\text{In particular Airbus A320-211 (Registered in Syria as YK-BAB).}\]
\[^{188}\text{Convention on International Civil Aviation, } \text{https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf.}\]
5. The Panel has identified at least 158 flights between 1 January to 31 December 2021, and 29 flights between 1 January 2022 to 31 March 2022 for Cham Wings Airlines aircraft into eastern Libya, (tables 88.1 and 88.2, and figures 88.3 and 88.4).\textsuperscript{189} The list may not be exhaustive if some pre-departure flight plans were not filed directly with Eurocontrol\textsuperscript{190} for entry into European airspace.

6. The Panel identified the following factors and evidence to show that the airline is transporting Syrian fighters to and from Libya:

   (a) UNSMIL source reporting;

   (b) NGO reporting;\textsuperscript{191}

   (c) The flights meet at least six of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule, with flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) some flights depart from the military airbase at Damascus airport (OSDI); (d) AIS is sometimes switched off; (e) tickets were unavailable for public purchase (the Cham Wings Airlines website does not list an office or agent for Libya) and flights to Libya did not appear on their schedule. Flights to Libya could not be booked through their on-line booking service; and (f) air operator transparency is opaque;

   (d) In addition to Benghazi airport (HLLB) unscheduled flights also go to Marsa Brega airport (HLMB), which is closer to the separation of forces area near Surt. Other than for the transfer of foreign fighters close to the front lines, or their rotation, there would be no credible reason for passenger flights to this airport, which serves no other international destinations;

   (e) It was reported on 13 December 2020 that Cham Wings Airlines would commence scheduled twice-weekly flights to Benghazi,\textsuperscript{192} and a Panel test booking found seat availability on the website on 7 January 2021, but it was not possible to book a seat remotely. More recent Panel checks on 14 April 2021 and 26 October 2021 found no flight availability on the airline booking system and flights could not be booked from Cham Wings Airlines via phone; and

\textsuperscript{189} Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: 1) Confidential sources; 2) www.flightradar24.com; 3) www.radarbox.com; 4) www.italmilradar.com; 5) C4ADS analysis; and 6) Twitter @ALandewers; @Gerjon_ (primarily), and @YorukIsik.

\textsuperscript{190} https://www.eurocontrol.int/.


(f) No response to Panel enquiries was received from the Member State nor the airline.

Table 88.1
Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 December 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max passengers</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>3,132</td>
<td>2,262</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>2,958</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>1,566</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>2,436</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>27,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1,249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 88.3
Number of Cham Wings Airlines flights to Libya (1 January - 31 December 2021)

Table 88.2
Summary of Cham Wings Airlines flights to eastern Libya (1 January – 31 March 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Flights</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max passengers</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>5,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max load (t)</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. The Panel has further identified that these flights are not always uniquely military in nature, as flights for migrants have also taken place.\textsuperscript{193} Since 26 June 2021, a Facebook profile\textsuperscript{194} of a representative of the airline has occasionally reported on availability of migrant flights to Libya,\textsuperscript{195} stating tickets and security clearances must be obtained through “their” offices.

8. The Panel finds that Cham Wings Airlines have continued to conduct flight operations in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution \textbf{1970 (2011)}\textsuperscript{196} for the \textit{direct, and indirect, supply of (…) military (…) equipment and (…) other assistance (…) to Libya}. 

\textsuperscript{193} Confidential report by IHL CS24. 10 September 2021.
\textsuperscript{194} \url{https://www.facebook.com/MMD.76/}. 26 June 2021.
\textsuperscript{195} Flights offered for 29 June, 10 July, 14 July, 30 July, 8 August, 17 August, 3 September 2021. A total of seven flights out of the 34 identified during this period. Panel interviews with Syrian migrants (CS66 to CS68) (13 and 14 January 2022) confirmed that this was now a regular route for the onward transfer of migrants.
Annex 89  Summary of aviation related violations, non-compliances and 'of interest' air operators

1. The Panel has multiple sources for the entries in tables 89.1 to 89.5, which are shown in the appropriate annexes, and are primarily from a combination of: (a) Member States responses to Panel enquiries; (b) entity responses to Panel enquiries; (c) official social media of national armed forces; (d) social media of armed groups; (e) other social media; (f) specialist aviation databases\(^1\) and web platforms\(^2\); (g) imagery supported by geo-location; and/or (h) imagery supported by technical analysis.

2. Commercial aviation related violations and non-compliances, or data on airlines of current interest to the Panel, are presented in the annexes listed in tables 89.1 to 89.4 below:

Table 89.1
Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of GNU-AF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airline</th>
<th>ICAO Code</th>
<th>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)(^a)</th>
<th>Operational Base(^b)</th>
<th>Owned aircraft in direct support of GNU-AF or MoI(^c)</th>
<th>Annex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya Police Aviation</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>IL-76TD [MSN#53465956]</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Member State where the company is registered.
\(^{b}\) Member State from which airline primarily operates.
\(^{c}\) Ministry of Interior.
\(^{d}\) Not registered with the ICAO.
\(^{e}\) Information not received from the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority after numerous Panel requests.
\(^{f}\) Previously flew for Sigma Airlines as UP-I7645 and reported in: annex 52 to S/2019/914; and appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report S/2021/229.

Table 89.2
Commercial airlines or operators identified as violating the arms embargo in support of HAF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airline</th>
<th>ICAO Code</th>
<th>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)(^a)</th>
<th>Operational Base(^b)</th>
<th>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</th>
<th>Annex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Air LLC</td>
<td></td>
<td>IL-76TD [MSN#0033446325](^c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cham Wings Airlines</td>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlySky Airlines LLC</td>
<td>FSQ</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlySky Airlines LLC</td>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1) Aerotransport Database (www.atdb.org), (Subscription); 2) www.ch-aviation.com, (Subscription); and 3) http://www.csgnetwork.com/aviationdatabases.html.

2) Flight data for flights is based on data received from a combination of: (a) Confidential sources; (b) www.flightradar24.com; (c) www.radarbox.com; (d) www.italmilradar.com; (e) C4ADS analysis; f) Twitter @ALandewers; @Gerjon (primarily); and (f) Twitter @YorukIsik.
### Table 89.3
Commercial airlines or operators of interest to the Panel regarding potential arms embargo in support of HAF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airline</th>
<th>ICAO Code</th>
<th>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)</th>
<th>Operational Base</th>
<th>Owned aircraft in direct support of HAF</th>
<th>Annex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green Flag Aviation</td>
<td>GNF</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>IL-76TD [MSN#1013409282]</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP Mir Aviakompania</td>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapsan Airlines LLC</td>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

a Member State where the company is registered.
b Member State from which airline primarily operates.
c Also see table 55.3 and appendix E to annex 55 of S/2021/229.
d Also see appendix K to annex 55 of S/2021/229.
e Although Space Cargo Inc FZE owns and operates aircraft the company is not registered with ICAO.
f Also see appendix K to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
g Also see appendix J to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
h Also see appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
i Also see annex 35 to S/2017/466.
j Also see appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
k Ibid.
l Also see appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
m Flying with Sapsan Airline, Kyrgyz Republic since 18 May 2021, with owner changed to BU Shames FZE. Also see appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/229.
Table 89.4
Summary of other aviation related violations and non-compliances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date identified</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Details of violation or non-compliance</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 Apr 2020</td>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Military aircraft</td>
<td>Squadron of ten F16 multi-role fighter aircraft violated Libyan air space off the coast of Tripoli and Misrata. a</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jun 2020</td>
<td></td>
<td>overflights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Cargo aircraft</td>
<td>IL-76 now marked as 5A-?? identified operating in support of HAF, but not 5A-ILA as paint scheme different. 198</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Based on colour scheme, highly probably ex UP-I7651 b or ex UP-I7652. c both operated by Azee Air LLC and owned by Space Cargo Inc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Aug 2021</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Cargo aircraft</td>
<td>IL-76 marked as 5A-ILA first identified operating in support of HAF. Libyan registration and manufacturers serial number to be confirmed.</td>
<td>HAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Source: Member State.
b [MSN#0073479367]. IAC airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020.
c [MSN#1013405167]. IAC airworthiness expired on 19 July 2020.

3. Routine commercial air activity is now expanding for Libya, as time moves on from the more recent conflicts. Table 89.5 lists those air operators now routinely operating commercial cargo and passenger flights into Libya on a regular basis. Panel monitoring has identified no suspicious activity during this reporting mandate.

Table 89.5
Routine commercial cargo and passenger operators for Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Operator</th>
<th>Primary type</th>
<th>ICAO Code</th>
<th>Air Operator Certificated (AOC) a</th>
<th>Operational Base b</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afriqiyah Airways c</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Government owned. Flights mainly to Algeria and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buraq Air Transport d</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>BRQ</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Flights currently only to Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Air Cargo e</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>XRC</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Airlines f</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>LAA</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Government owned. Flights currently only to Turkey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

198 ??? means unknown letters. XXX not used as this could be a real number.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Operator</th>
<th>Primary type</th>
<th>ICAO Code</th>
<th>Air Operator Certificated (AOC)</th>
<th>Operational Base</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Wings Airlines</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>LWA</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNG Airlines</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>MNB</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rada Airlines</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Minsk</td>
<td>* Contracted by WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis Air</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>TAR</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULS Airlines Cargo</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>ULS</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Member State where the company is registered.
* Member State from which airline primarily operates.
www.buraq.aero.
https://libyanairlines.aero.
http://www.rada.aero/.
Annex 90  Libya Police Aviation IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-POL)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-POL\(^1\) is the IL-76TD (MSN\(^2\) 186009403). The aircraft previously flew for Sigma Airlines under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7645\(^3\) and was reported for violating the arms embargo in: (a) annex 52 to S/2019/914; and (b) appendix C to annex 55 of Panel report S/2021/229. At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.

2. This aircraft is listed on www.aerotransport.org (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being operated by ‘Libyan Police Aviation’ since December 2019, and is the only aircraft listed as operating for them. No ownership is listed on ATDB.

3. The last known owner\(^4\) of the aircraft was Technoline FZC of Sharjah, UAE.\(^5\) The owner has no open-source web presence, but the Panel notes that the email address is hosted by North South Cargo, whose website states that they specialise in cargo flights from UAE to the Russian Federation.\(^6\)

4. The aircraft made 53 return flights from Misrata (HLMS) to Istanbul (LTFM) in 2020 and only one in 2021. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 June 2021.\(^7\) Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

Figure 90.1 IL-76TD (POL) at Minsk (26 September 2020)

Figure 90.2 IL-76TD (POL) at Istanbul (6 October 2020)

Sources: (a) https://www.airplane-pictures.net/photo/1346627/5a-pol-libya-government-ilyushin-il-76-all-models/, 26 September 2020; and (b) https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9882694, 6 October 2020

5. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least seven of the Panel's air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule, with flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) AIS is sometimes switched off; (d) tickets are unavailable for public purchase; (e) there is no open-source trace for the air operator; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the previous record of this aircraft for sanctions violations.

\(^1\) Initially reported in Reported in table 39.1 of annex 39 to Panel report S/2021/229.

\(^2\) Manufacturer's serial number.

\(^3\) Kazakhstan removed the aircraft from its civil aviation register on 10 September 2019. Certificate #291.

\(^4\) Member State information of 25 December 2019.

\(^5\) Warehouse 2, Street #24, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 532 5538. nsc@nsc.ae

\(^6\) https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/.
6. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letters dated 31 March 2020 and 7 January 2022. No response was received.

7. The Panel finds that the IL-76TD (MSN 186009403) cargo aircraft undertook internal and external flight operations to Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya.
Annex 91  Alpha Air LLC owned IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656)

1. The Panel has identified that the IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-7656 is the IL-76TD (MSN\textsuperscript{206} 33446325). The aircraft previously flew for Jenis Air LLC under Kazakhstan registration UP-I7656\textsuperscript{207} and was reported for violating the arms embargo in appendix E to annex 55 of Panel report S/2021/229. At that time, it was being chartered by Space Cargo Inc.

Figure 91.1
IL-76TD displaying registration 5A-7656 flying in support of Haftar

\textit{Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (5A-7656) at Benghazi (29 May 2021)}

The Panel has identified an Ilyushin IL-76 cargo aircraft flying as part of the Libyan National Army 7th Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021. Flight operations in support of armed groups affiliated to Khalifa Haftar are a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) as such operations constitute “other assistance”.

The aircraft was displaying the registration number 5A-7656, which is unusual as the correct ICAO format for all Libyan registered aircraft is 5A-XXX (Libyan Civil Aviation Regulations, Aircraft Registration and Markings (LYCAR.47) clause 47.045 (b) refers).

Primary sources

1. https://twitter.com/Gerjon/status/1398695363138273288, 29 May 2021; and
2. Confidential source.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

2. The documentation submitted to the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities states that the aircraft is owned by Alpha Air LLC of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{208} The aircraft is still registered in Kazakhstan as UP-I7656 and is thus flying under a “fake registration”.

3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer's Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 21 May 2020.\textsuperscript{209} Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

\textsuperscript{206} Manufacturer's serial number.
\textsuperscript{207} Registration Certificate #7180 dated 21 May 2019.
\textsuperscript{208} Office 58, House 1A, Dnepropetrovskaya Street, Kiev, Ukraine. +380 67 6123237. yss67uae@gmail.com.
\textsuperscript{209} https://ilyushin.org/en/airworthiness/.
4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received. The Panel also requested further information from Ukraine on 21 October 2021. No response was received.

5. The Panel finds Alpha Air LLC in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya.
Annex 92  FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ)\textsuperscript{210} aircraft continued to be of interest to the Panel during this mandate. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #53 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 28 August 2020 and then operated the aircraft shown in table 92.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.\textsuperscript{211}

Table 92.1
FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MSN#</th>
<th>Current Registration #</th>
<th>Previous Registration #</th>
<th>Current Owner</th>
<th>Previous Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>1033418596</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>UP-I7650</td>
<td>Aero Business Charter FZE \textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>• Azee Air LLC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} Office C3/17, PO Box 8399, SAIF Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 6 557 1440. Sales@charteraflight.com, www.charteraflight.com is non-operational. The Panel notes that a second address in Fujairah International Airport, UAE was used on documentation from the company.

2. Table 92.2 summarises the recent history of this aircraft as it relates to sanctions violations. Note that it was previously owned and operated by Azee Air LLC (AZL) of Kazakhstan who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) in Panel report S/2021/229.\textsuperscript{212} Azee Air LLC (AZL) had their AOC suspended on 21 April 2020, and the aircraft was transferred to a Kyrgyz Republic registration (EX-76003) on 9 June 2020, before the Azee Air LLC (AZL) AOC was revoked by Kazakhstan on 1 February 2021. The aircraft was sold to Aero Business Charter FZE on 31 July 2020. The Panel considers that this action was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the Kazakhstan authorities.

Table 92.2
IL-76TD (MSN# 1033418596) sanctions violations related history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Panel Evidence / Remarks</th>
<th>\textsuperscript{a}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Jan 2020</td>
<td>First identified by the Panel flying on UAE - Libya airbridge operating in support of HAF.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan 2020</td>
<td>Flight data blocked from public view on <a href="http://www.flightradar24.com">www.flightradar24.com</a> platform at Azee Air LLC (AZL) request.</td>
<td>FR24 documentation.\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>Intended to disguise clandestine flights into Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 2020</td>
<td>Dry leased by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to FlySky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
<td>Dry Lease No 04/05/20.</td>
<td>Prior to issuance of FlySky Airlines (FSQ) air operating certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun 2020</td>
<td>Registered by Kyrgyz Republic as EX-76003.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{210} Office No 6, Ch Aitmatova Avenue 82A, Bishkek 720044, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 312 979300. office@flysky.kg.

\textsuperscript{211} Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to S/2021/229.

\textsuperscript{212} Annex 55.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Panel Evidence / Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 Jun 2020</td>
<td>Cancellation of aircraft registration by Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>• Certificate of Cancellation No. 301.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 2020</td>
<td>Sold by Azee Air LLC (AZL) to Aero Business Charter FZE, UAE.</td>
<td>• Sale Agreement #9009-07-2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Panel notes that the Acceptance Certificate was signed on 7 May 2020, 11 weeks prior to the Sales Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep 2020</td>
<td>First flight (FSQ1110) identified as made by IL-76 (EX-76003) on the airbridge leg from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.</td>
<td>• In Panel report S/2021/229 the Panel found that flights along this airbridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flight documentation showed cargo for the return flight only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 2020</td>
<td>IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight (FSQ1110) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.</td>
<td>• The flight documentation listed the shipper as the Khalifa Foundation of Abu Dhabi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Khalifa Foundation was previously used in flight documentation by Azee Air LLC (AZL) for flight AZL1538 on 20 January 2020. In Panel report S/2021/229 the Panel found very similar documentation to be false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• After documentary analysis the Panel finds the flight documentation for this flight to be false (see appendix B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Azee Air LLC Air Operating Certificate revoked by Kazakhstan</td>
<td>• Revocation Order #00.47.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb 2021</td>
<td>IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.</td>
<td>• FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) only supplied flight documentation for the return flight despite two requests from the Panel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Apr 2021</td>
<td>IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli.</td>
<td>• The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix C).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Imagery shows the aircraft on the ground in Mitiga, Libya, with a brand named vaccine packaging box in the cargo hold.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Panel continues to investigate this flight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Date | Activity | Panel Evidence / Remarks
--- | --- | ---
1 Aug 2021 | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli. | - The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements of it are suspicious (see appendix D).
- The Panel continues to investigate this flight.

2 Aug 2021 | IL-76 (EX-76003) made flight on the airbridge from UAE to Mitiga, Tripoli. | - The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for this flight and elements suspicious (see appendix D).
- The Panel continues to investigate this flight.

---

*The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

a Email to Panel of 23 June 2020.
b Annex 55.
c FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) also supplied flight documentation for return flights, claiming outbound flights were empty.
d Para.13 to annex 55.
e https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1378623180458328066, 4 April 2021.

3. The Panel identified that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) flights in 2020 meet at least eight of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo.

- lack of an obvious schedule;
- flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads;
- the random nature of the flights;
- ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off;
- false flight documentation;
- air operator transparency is opaque;
- inconsistent use of flight numbers; and
- the links to Azee Air LLC (AZL).

4. The Panel has examined the documentation for the flights on 4 April, 1 August and 2 August 2021, which reports that the cargo was vaccines and medical supplies. Although the flight documentation is inaccurate and suspicious, the Panel considers it possible that this is because the same shipping agents were used as for the military cargo flights, and thus it was routine for the shipping agents to be inaccurate in completion of such documents. Additionally, the WFP (the logistic coordination agency for the UN presence in Libya) have confirmed that vaccines were delivered during that period, although they have no knowledge of the delivery mechanism. The Panel does not have evidence to the necessary evidential standards that these three flights carried military materiel.

5. The Panel offered FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) an opportunity to respond on 26 November 2021. Their response was sent by the Member State on 17 December 2021. This stated that they were aware of the flights by their aircraft into Libya and that “the airline is also aware of the nature of the cargo being transported, which conforms to the stated requirements, is not prohibited for transport by air and does not constitute military cargo subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions”. The Panel does not consider that this response addresses any of the indicators (paragraph 3) and documentary evidence (appendices) identified by the Panel.

6. The Panel offered the owner of the aircraft, Aero Business Charter FZE, an opportunity to respond on 25 January 2022. No response has yet being received by the Panel.

7. The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt during 2020 in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (…) other assistance (…) to Libya.

7. The Panel also notes that FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) and FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021. The Panel has yet to determine the exact relationship between the two companies.
Appendix A to Annex 92: FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2020 and 2021

1. Table 92.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ).

Table 92.A.1
FlySky LLC Airlines (FSQ) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>A/C a</th>
<th>Flight#</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Sep 2020</td>
<td>OEJN</td>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ1110 • Only return flight documentation to OMDW Al Maktoum supplied to Panel after two requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sep 2020</td>
<td>OMAH</td>
<td>Al Dafra a</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ1110 • Only return flight documentation to Al Dhafra supplied to Panel after two requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 2020</td>
<td>OMAA</td>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ1110 • Suspicious air waybill. See appendix B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Nov 2020</td>
<td>OJAQ</td>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ1110 • On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 2020</td>
<td>OJAQ</td>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ4921 • On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jan 2021</td>
<td>OJAQ</td>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003                  FSQ1120 • AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 2021</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1119 • AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 2021</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1119 • On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1120 • On flight track towards HE40 or Libya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Incl. other destinations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>Flight#</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Feb 2021</td>
<td>OEJN Jeddah</td>
<td></td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1119</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Apr 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLLM Mitiga</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1110</td>
<td>• Declared cargo of vaccines, but flight documentation highly suspicious.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLLM Mitiga</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1110</td>
<td>• Declared cargo of vaccines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Same flight number as used for flights to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLLB Benina</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1112</td>
<td>• Declared cargo of vaccines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLMS Misrata</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1111</td>
<td>• Declared cargo of vaccines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Aug 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLLM Mitiga</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1113</td>
<td>• Declared cargo of vaccines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Aug 2021</td>
<td>OMAA Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>HLLM Mitiga</td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1115</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Oct 2021</td>
<td>OEJN Jeddah</td>
<td></td>
<td>EX-76003</td>
<td>FSQ1110</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Aircraft registration #.
b Al Dafra is a UAE military airbase. 24°14′24″N, 054°32′54″E. This was listed on return flight documentation supplied by airline.
Appendix B to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (24 September 2020)\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{213} The Panel has higher quality imagery available on request. The imagery resolution is poor in some of the remaining appendices due to the infographics being compressed to make the overall document a more manageable size.
Appendix C to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (4 April 2021)

'Inaccurate' Air Waybill
Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1110, Declared UAE to Misrata
(4 April 2021)

Consignor Contact Number: +971 5010 10304
Claims to be contact number for a "Mr Thanos" at the Office of Presidential Affairs.

The Panel notes that "Thanos" is not a typical Arabic name.

Consigee Contact Number: +971 5066 22961
Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to S/2021/229 for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, a.k.a Mubarak Al Amiri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

It is NOT the number for the Libyan Ministry of Health as declared on the air waybill.

Volumetric Cargo Analysis
The declared 3.668kg for the cargo would equate to only 18,000 vaccines if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 8% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 7% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

The second AWB for this flight only declares a cargo of 565kg.
Appendix D to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (1 August 2021)

'Suspicious' Air Waybill
Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1111, Declared UAE to Misrata
(1 August 2021)

Consignor Contact Number +971 5066 22961
Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to S/2021/225 for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.

The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported separately to the Committee.

On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be "Fast Food" shop in Gaza, then "Fast Food" shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.

Consignee Contact Number NONE
No proper address for the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.

Volumetric Cargo Analysis
The declared 12,646kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vaccinnes if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 27% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.

Flight FSQ1115 on 2 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 17,886kg of "relief goods". This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if the cargo was as declared.
Appendix E to Annex 92: Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSQ1110 (2 August 2021)

'Suspicious' Air Waybill
Fly Sky Airlines (FSQ), Kyrgyz Republic, Flight# FSQ1115, Declared UAE to Mitiga
(2 August 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Consignor Contact Number</strong> +971 5066 22961</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same contact number for air waybills for Maximus Air flights on 12, 14, 18 and 19 January 2020. See appendix G to annex 55 to S/2021/229 for the reported violations of the arms embargo for these flights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number linked to Mubarak Al Ameri the contact for the GHQ of United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. a.k.a Mubarak Al Amri or Mubarak Al Ansari. The number is also linked to a security incident of 20 October 2021, which was reported seperately to the Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On 11 Oct 2021 the listed UAE contact number claimed to be &quot;Fast Food&quot; shop in Gaza, then &quot;Fast Food&quot; shop in Abu Dhabi. Same claim to a 12 Oct 2021 OTR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Consigee Contact Number</strong> +218 8285 32639</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact number does not belong to the Ministry of Health for Libya in Mitiga.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Volumetric Cargo Analysis</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The declared 17,886kg for the cargo would equate to 89,500 vaccinnes if packed similarly to the standard WFP Single Use Thermal packaging. This equates to 37% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft, and 33% of the maximum cargo area volume for the aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight FSQ1111 on 1 August 2021, made by the same aircraft had a declared cargo of 12,646kg of &quot;relief goods&quot;. This equates to 26% of the maximum cargo load mass for the aircraft. The use of two flights is inefficient, expensive and unlikely if all the cargo was as declared.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 93  FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) Ukraine flights in support of HAF

1. FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #UK058 from the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on the 28 October 2020 and operated the aircraft shown in table 93.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF route. The company's AOC was suspended by the Ukraine State Aviation Administration on 11 June 2021 for non-compliance with aviation standards. The AOC was reinstated on 19 July 2021.

Table 93.1
FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft of interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MSN#</th>
<th>Registration # on violation</th>
<th>Previous Registration #</th>
<th>Current Owner</th>
<th>Previous Operator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>93498974</td>
<td>UR-FSA</td>
<td>UR-COE</td>
<td>Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE</td>
<td>Europe Air LLC, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>1023412399</td>
<td>UR-FSC</td>
<td>UR-CRN</td>
<td>Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE</td>
<td>Europe Air LLC, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>1003403075</td>
<td>UR-FSE</td>
<td>UR-EAB</td>
<td>Aganya Holdings Limited, UAE</td>
<td>Europe Air LLC, Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Operated from RAK Offshore, PO Box 48904, Al Khaimah UAE. Documentation from the company claims that it is incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, (BVI) but the BVI authorities confirmed to the Panel on 28 April 2020 that the company was not registered in the BVI.

*b Second address used for aircraft registration: PO Box 128666, 24 Al Sila Tower, Abu Dhabi Global Market Square, Al Maryah Island, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

2. The previous owner of the FlySky LLC (FSU) aircraft above was Europe Air LLC of Ukraine, who were reported for violating paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) in Panel report S/2019/914. The Europe Air LLC AOC suspended by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine on 27 July 2019 and the company ceased trading on 9 August 2019. At that time their aircraft were leased from Infinite Seal Inc of the BVI, whose listed beneficial owner works for the Department of Civil Aviation of Fujairah, UAE, but were subsequently transferred to Aganya Limited, UAE. The Panel has not been able to refine the date of transfer of the aircraft from Infinite Seal Inc ownership to Aganya Limited beyond mid-2020. The Panel considers that this ownership transfer was taken to protect the aircraft against any legal action from the appropriate authorities.

3. Tables 93.2 to 93.4 summarise the recent history of the aircraft at table 93.1 as relating to sanctions violations regarding Libya.

214 Office 16, 1 Pidlisna Street, Kiev 03164, Ukraine. +380 44 353 1083. office@flysky.co.
215 Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to S/2021/229.
216 Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 902 dated 10 June 2021.
217 Order of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine # 1134 dated 19 July 2021.
218 Annex 52.
219 In 2020 Aganya Limited also sold other aircraft to Space Cargo Inc (Appendix E to annex 55 to S/2021/229). It appears to the Panel as if aircraft ownership are transferred between the three companies to disguise beneficial ownership and to protect the aircraft against legal action by appropriate authorities.
Table 93.2
FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) aircraft sanctions violations related history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Panel Evidence / Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr 2020</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate of Azee LLC (AZL) suspended by Civil Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan for six months.</td>
<td>• See later for link to Deek Aviation FZE, UAE contract and previous arms embargo violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Oct 2020</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate issued to FlySky (FSU) by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine</td>
<td>• Certificate #UK 058.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 2020</td>
<td>IL-76TD (MSN#93498974) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSA.</td>
<td>• Certificate of Registration #4283/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 2020</td>
<td>IL-76TD (MSN#1023412399) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSC.</td>
<td>• Certificate of Registration #4569/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Nov 2020</td>
<td>General Contract for Freight Transportation signed between FlySky (FSU) and Deek Aviation, UAE.</td>
<td>• Contract #10112020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• See paragraph 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nov 2020</td>
<td>IL-76TD (MSN#1003403075) registered by Ukraine as UR-FSE.</td>
<td>• Certificate of Registration #4434/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 2021</td>
<td>First flight (FSU4812) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.</td>
<td>• In Panel report S/2021/229 the Panel found that cargo flights on this air bridge formed part of the wider supply chain to HAF, and were therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Suspicious flights made during 2021 are at appendix A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate of Azee LLC (AZL) formally revoked by Civil Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>• Order #00.47.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Last flight (FSU4814) identified as made by IL-76 (UR-FSA) on the airbridge from UAE to Sidi Barani, Egypt.</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jun 2021</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) suspended by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</td>
<td>• Order 902 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul 2021</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate of FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) reinstated by State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</td>
<td>• Order 1134 of State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in the tables in this appendix. The documentation is not included in the report as the final report would become even more voluminous.
The Panel identified the FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) flights meet at least seven of the air delivery profile indicators (see annex 25) that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo. (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) the random nature of the flights; (d) ADBS signal on AIS is often switched off; (e) false flight documentation; (f) air operator transparency is opaque; and (g) the links to other Libyan arms embargo violators such as Deek Aviation FZE.

The Panel notes that the airline is contracted under a General Sales Agreement to fly cargo on the Libya airbridge by Deek Aviation FZE; a company with a history of arms embargo violations:

(a) Deek Aviation FZE was reported in Panel report S/2019/914 for violating paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for contracting Europe Air LLC to fly military materiel into Libya.

(b) Deek Aviation was further reported in Panel report S/2021/229 in connection to a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Azee Air LLC, with whom they had a General Sales Agreement.

Due diligence by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) should have identified the involvement of Deek Aviation FZE in sanctions violations activities in Libya. The Panel considers that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have in effect partly taken on the logistic support role to HAF previously undertaken by Azee Air LLC until their AOC was suspended. The remainder of that role being taken on by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) (see annex 92).

The Panel finds that FlySky Airlines LLC (FSU) have conducted flight operations on the air bridge from UAE to Egypt in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya.

The Panel notes that FlySky Airlines, Ukraine (FSU) and FlySky Airlines, Kyrgyz Republic (FSQ) share the same logo, and conducted flights on the Libya airbridge alongside each other in early 2021.

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220 www.deek.aero.
221 Annexes 28 and 52. The two aircraft destroyed at Al Jufra on 26 July 2019 (UR-CMP and UR-CRC) were both operated by Europe Air LLC, the previous operator of the aircraft now operated by FlySky LLC (FSU).
222 Para. 8 of annex 55.
Table 93.A.1 shows a consolidated list of flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC, Ukraine (FSU).

### Table 93.A.1
FlySky LLC Airlines (FSU) suspicious flights on Libya airbridge 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>A/C</th>
<th>Flight#</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 2021</td>
<td>OMDW</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>UR-FSA</td>
<td>FSU4812</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan 2021</td>
<td>OMFJ</td>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>UR-FSC</td>
<td>FSU4814</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jan 2021</td>
<td>OMDW</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td></td>
<td>FSU4814</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>OMDW</td>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td></td>
<td>FSU4812</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jan 2021</td>
<td></td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td></td>
<td>FSU4814</td>
<td>• On direct flight track to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• AIS disabled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb 2021</td>
<td>OJAQ</td>
<td>Aqaba</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>UR-FSA FSU4814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The Panel has analysed the flight documentation for the return flight and finds it suspicious (see appendix B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Feb 2021</td>
<td>OEJN</td>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>UR-FSC FSU4817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMSJ (Sharjah) to OEJN (Jeddah) and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>A/C</td>
<td>Flight#</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Feb 2020</td>
<td>OEJN</td>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>UR-FSE FSU4812, AIS disabled. Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40. Supplied copies of Cargo Manifest showing “EMPTY”, which is highly unusual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Feb 2021</td>
<td>OEJN</td>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>HE40</td>
<td>Sidi Barani</td>
<td>UR-FSA FSU4814, AIS disabled. Flight documentation shows zero payload for the flight from OMDW (Al Maktoum) to OEJN and then zero payload from OEJN to HE40. Subsequent flights made by FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Aircraft registration #.
Appendix B to Annex 93:
Panel analysis of Air Waybill for Flight FSU4814 (Return from HE40)

There is no listing for a company called "Powerex Eastpac LLC" in any UAE business directory, nor a presence on social media.

A company called "Eastpac International" was identified, but their representative informed the Panel that the company had never conducted business in Egypt.

No Customs value is unusual.

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223 The Panel has higher quality imagery available on request. The imagery resolution is poor in some of the remaining appendices due to the infographics being compressed to make the overall document a more manageable size.
Annex 94 Green Flag Aviation, Sudan aircraft in support of HAF

1. The Panel has identified that the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft displaying Libyan registration 5A-EWX\(^{224}\) is the Ilyushin IL-76TD (MSN\(^{225}\) 1013409282). Closer inspection of the number by the Panel has identified that the number has been adapted from a Sudan Civil Aviation Authority registration ST-EWX, in that the “S” uses the bottom half of the original “S” and the “A” uses the top of the “T” from the previous registration number.

Figure 94.1
Change of registration from ST-EWX to 5A-EWX

\[\text{Ilyushin IL-76TD (MSN# 1013409282)}\]
Change of Registration

Khartoum, 8 November 2016

Benghazi, 29 May 2021

Primary sources

1. [https://twitter.com/vcdgf555/status/1401805441810583552](https://twitter.com/vcdgf555/status/1401805441810583552), 7 June 2021; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts

\(^{224}\) New registration first identified when the aircraft was participating in the Libyan National Army 7th Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021.

\(^{225}\) Manufacturer's serial number.
2. The aircraft previously flew for Green Flag Aviation (GNF) and was reported for violating the arms embargo in Appendix K to annex 55 of Panel report S/2021/229. This aircraft is listed on www.aerotransport.org (ATDB), a definitive aviation database, as being owned by Green Flag Aviation (GNF) since July 2011. No ownership transfer to HAF is listed on ATDB.

3. The Panel notes that the manufacturer’s Certificate of Airworthiness for this aircraft expired on 24 February 2017. Without such a certificate, flights cannot be legally made through EU controlled air space, thus restricting the aircraft to operations within Libya.

4. The Panel requested further information from Libya in letter dated 8 July 2021. No response was received.

5. The Panel finds that Green Flag Aviation have supported flight operations within Libya in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya.

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227 The Member State confirmed to the Panel on 21 September 2021 that the aircraft was no longer registered in Sudan.
228 Sources: (a) https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1268467153340174336; and (b) https://twitter.com/HasairiOuais/status/1268466092265127937, 4 June 2020.
Annex 95  NPP Mir Aviakompania (NPP), Russian Federation in support of HAF

Converted Ilyushin IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim (HL59)
(31°59'48.04"N, 21°12'7.03"E)
(3 October to 2 November 2021)

The Panel has identified from satellite imagery the presence of an Ilyushin IL-18D cargo aircraft at Al Khadim airbase (HL59) on 3, 17, 26 and 28 October 2021, and 1 and 2 November 2021. The aircraft has been converted from an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft at some time, as evidenced by the presence of a sensor tail boom.

The aircraft is almost certainly IL-18TD (MSN 186009403). This aircraft is listed on www.aerotransport.org (ATDB), a definitive database, as being operated by NPP Mir Aviakompania of Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation at that time.

The Panel requested further information from the Russian Federation in a letter dated 22 December 2021. On 28 January 2022 they responded that the aircraft was deregistered from #RA-75713 on 24 February 2004. The Russian Federation did not provide the requested information regarding the air operator. ATDB now show the aircraft as registered by the Central African Republic as TL-ARN in October 2021 and operated by an unknown user.

The use of this aircraft in support of HAF is a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011).

Primary sources
1. Satellite imagery and Google Earth Pro;
2. Confidential source; and

Developed by UN Panel of Experts
Annex 96  Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB), Kyrgyz Republic flights in support of HAF

1. The flight activity of Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB)\textsuperscript{230} aircraft became of interest to the Panel during this mandate. Sapsan Airline LLC (KGB) received their Air Operating Certificate (AOC) #54 from the Kyrgyz Republic Civil Aviation Agency on the 27 January 2021 and then operated at least one of the aircraft shown in table 96.1 on the Libyan airbridge to HAF.\textsuperscript{231}

Table 96.1
FlySky Airlines LLC (FSQ) aircraft

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>MSN#</th>
<th>Current Registration #</th>
<th>Previous Registration #</th>
<th>Current Owner</th>
<th>Previous Owner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonov AN-74D</td>
<td>36547098943</td>
<td>EX-74001</td>
<td>RA-74048</td>
<td>Sapsan Airline</td>
<td>• Uktus Air Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>63471147</td>
<td>EX-76005</td>
<td>UR-CIV</td>
<td>Technoline FZC, UAE\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>• Technoline FZC, UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilyushin IL-76TD</td>
<td>1033416515</td>
<td>EX-76008</td>
<td>UR-CIG</td>
<td>BU Shames FZE\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>• Technoline FZC, UAE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}No corporate web presence. Suite Y-2-215, PO Box 8953, Sharjah Airport Free Zone, Sharjah, UAE. +971 65 578170. +971 65 573127. (technoline@nsn.ae).
\textsuperscript{b}No corporate web presence. A4-08, PO Box 7812, SAIF, Sharjah, UAE.

2. Table 96.2 summarises the recent history of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) as it relates to sanctions violations. This aircraft was previously registered by the Aviation Administration of Ukraine as UR-CIG where it was operated by ZetAvia LLC (ICAO Code: ZAV). In appendix J to annex 55 of Panel report S/2021/229 the Panel found that flight activity by ZetAvia using this aircraft was a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct supply of (…) military (…) equipment and (…) other assistance (…) to Libya. ZetAvia LLC also delivered the aircraft in support of Operation OPUS in 2019 (annex 76 of Panel report S/2021/229 refers).

Table 96.2
IL-76TD (MSN# 1033416515) sanctions violations related history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Panel Evidence / Remarks \textsuperscript{a}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 2018</td>
<td>ZetAvia LLC receive Air Operating Certificate from the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine.</td>
<td>• AOC Certificate #UK009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jul 2019</td>
<td>State Aviation Administration of Ukraine prohibited flights of Ukrainian registered aircraft to Libya.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mar 2020</td>
<td>Aircraft first identified leaving Sweihan military base\textsuperscript{b} on the UAE to Libya airbridge route.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{230} 132 A/1 Bakaeva Street, Bishkek 720032, Kyrgyz Republic. +996 552 962888. sapsan.aircargo@mail.ru.
\textsuperscript{231} Identified in para. 83 and annex 55 to S/2021/229.
30 Apr 2020 | Last flight identified of the aircraft on the UAE to Libya airbridge route. |  
11 Jan 2021 | ATDB reports sale of aircraft from Technoline FZE, UAE to BU Shames FZE. |  
21 May 2021 | Aircraft transferred from ZetAvia LLC to Sapsan Airline LLC as air operator. |  
4 Jan 2022 | Aircraft first identified as operating on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using new callsign KGB4961. |  
10 Jan 2022 | Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961. | Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.  
11 Jan 2022 | Aircraft operated on the UAE to Libya airbridge route using callsign KGB4961. | Returned to Sweihan military base in UAE.  

* The Panel has evidentiary copies of the documentation listed in this table on file.

3. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet at least six of the Panel’s air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that a vessel or aircraft is almost certainly carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) flights usually in dark hours for concealment of offloads; (c) use of military airbases; (d) AIS dark activity; (e) air operator transparency is opaque (no online presence); and (f) corporate links to previous sanctions violators.

4. The Panel requested further information from the Kyrgyz Republic in a letter dated 25 January 2022. In their response of 9 February 2022, they provided flight documentation showing that Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) had flown to Chanda, Pakistan on 4 January 2022. This is contrary to the ADBS data shown on open-source flight tracking platforms. The Panel accepts the veracity of the flight data provided by the Member State regarding the air operations of Ilyushin IL-76TD (EX-76008) on that day. Nevertheless, an aircraft transmitting the hex code of that aircraft certainly made a flight on the UAE to Libya airbridge route that day. Independent aviation OSINT analysts have identified that Sapsan Airline operated aircraft have exchanged ADBS Hex “squawk” codes for other flights. This exchange of ADBS Hex “squawk” codes is not accidental and is designed to disguise the activities of specific aircraft. It is also contrary to ICAO regulations.

5. The Panel finds that the Sapsan Airline LLC cargo aircraft flight operations to Libya were in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) for the direct, and indirect, supply of (...) military (...) equipment and (...) other assistance (...) to Libya.

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a | Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast.
b | OMAW. Military Air base. 24°31'38"N, 54°58'27"E.

Annex 97  Space Cargo Inc (UAE) activities in 2021

1. The Panel has previously reported on Space Cargo Inc (United Arab Emirates)\textsuperscript{234} owned or operated aircraft in \textit{S/2019/914}\textsuperscript{235} and \textit{S/2021/229}\textsuperscript{236}. Space Cargo Inc remains a common denominator in many of the illicit aviation activities relating to eastern Libya and airports under the control of HAF. The Panel found that the company has a major coordination and operational role for the United Arab Emirates airbridge to eastern Libya, and the delivery of military materiel to HAF. The company has also operated as a PMC in Libya during this period.

2. During the investigations covered in Panel report \textit{S/2021/229} the Panel identified that Space Cargo Inc supplied false and misleading information in response to Panel enquiries. The company continued to do so during this mandate (see paras. 10, 20 and 24).

A. Aviation logistic support to HAF

3. The Panel has documentation or evidence showing that Space Cargo owns or operates other aircraft previously reported as operating in Libya in support of United Arab Emirates and has developed the consolidated list at table 97.1 for reference. The Panel notes that many aircraft are not flying in accordance with ICAO regulations\textsuperscript{237} as the aircraft do not have a valid airworthiness certificate. Only details of newly identified aircraft (shown below in \textit{italic}) are included later in this annex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft type</th>
<th>MSN#</th>
<th>Registration #</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Jun 2015</td>
<td>AN-26</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>UP-AN601</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mar 2019</td>
<td>IL-76TD</td>
<td>1013409295</td>
<td>UP-I7601</td>
<td>Chartered</td>
<td>Previously operated by Sigma Airlines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Went to ZetAvia (UR-CTO) on 15 June 2020 and not seen in Libya since.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Nov 2019</td>
<td>IL-76TD</td>
<td>1003405167</td>
<td>UP-I7652</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>Previously operated by Jenis Air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Now HAF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 2019</td>
<td>IL-18D</td>
<td>172011401</td>
<td>UP-I1805</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>Previously operated by Jenis Air.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Now HAF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{234} A4-73, Block A4 Street, G Floor, Sharjah International Airport, Al Ruqa Al Hamra, 61487 Sharjah, UAE or SaifZone 125 M2, Warehouse A4-73, P.O. Box 7812, Sharjah, UAE. www.spacecargoinc.com. The website was live and was then removed after Panel enquiries to the Company in September 2020.

\textsuperscript{235} Table 8 and annexes 28 and 52.

\textsuperscript{236} Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

\textsuperscript{237} See annex 8 at \url{https://aviation-is.better-than.tv/icaodocs/Annex%208%20-Airworthiness%20Aircraft/Annex%208%20Edition.pdf}.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft type</th>
<th>MSN#</th>
<th>Registration #</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Feb 2020 | IL-76TD       | 1023411378 | UP-I7646<sup>a</sup>  
5A-7656  
EX-76007 | Owned  | • Previously operated by Azee Air<sup>c</sup> and then Jenis Air.  
• Then HAF.  
• Went to Sapsan Airlines LLC (EX-76007) on 18 May 2021 and not seen in Libya since. |
| 19 Mar 2020 | IL-76TD       | 73479367 | UP-I7651<sup>b</sup>  
5A-7656  
EX-76007 | Owned  | • Previously operated by Azee Air.  
• Now HAF.                                                                                   |
| 12 Apr 2020 | AN-32B        | 2009    | EY-332          | Owned  | • Flying under fake Burundi markings.                                                         |
| 30 Jan 2021 | AN-12A        | 2340806 | UP-AN220  
9U-BBD | Owned  | •                                                                                 |
| 30 May 2021 | AN-12BP       | 5342908 | UP-AN218        | Owned  |                                                                                 |
| 2 Oct 2021  | IL-18D        | 187009903 | ER-ICS<sup>d</sup> | Owned  | • Now flying as 5A-AND.                                                                      |
| 12 Oct 2021 | AN-12BP       | 5343003 | EY-407<sup>e</sup> | Owned  |                                                                                 |

<sup>a</sup> Date purchased, first identified operating in Libya or identified by the Panel as owned by Space Cargo Inc.

<sup>b</sup> Manufacturers serial number.

<sup>c</sup> Includes all registrations legitimately used or illicitly displayed by the aircraft during Libya operations.

<sup>d</sup> No Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness listed.

<sup>e</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired 19 July 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>f</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix E to annex 55 of S/2021/229. Jenis Air LLC had its air operating certificate suspended by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 3 July 2020. It was not renewed by the company.

<sup>g</sup> Reported in appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/219.

<sup>h</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expires on 24 June 2022.

<sup>i</sup> Also see appendix F to annex 55 to S/2021/219. Operating outside Libya since at least 17 July 2021 with Sapsan Airlines (KGB) of Kyrgyz Republic.

<sup>j</sup> Ilyushin Aviation Complex airworthiness expired on 25 September 2020. May now be flying displaying a Libyan 5A series registration.

<sup>k</sup> Reported in annex 55 and appendix D to annex 55 of S/2021/229. Azee Air LLC had its air operating certificate revoked by the Kazakhstan civil aviation authorities on 20 September 2020.

<sup>l</sup> First reported in annex 35 of S/2017/406

<sup>m</sup> First reported as operating in support of HAF in appendix K to annex 55 to S/2021/219. A 31 October 2021 response to the Panel by Space Cargo contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases where the Panel found Space Cargo’s claims as not credible.

1. **Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)**

4. At 13:00 hours on 28 January 2021 the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) departed Amman (Marka) airport, Jordan (ICAO: OJAM) bound for Benghazi (Benina) airport, Libya (ICAO: HLLB). On board were three technicians recruited under a Space Cargo Inc contract to repair the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters reported in annex 76 to S/2021/229 (see later for details of this PMC activity). The aircraft encountered technical issues with its transponders forcing a return to OJAM.  

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<sup>238</sup> Confidential source.
5. The aircraft was clearly marked with a Kazakhstan registration UP-AN220 at this time (see appendix A). This is contrary to a statement made by the then operator, Jupiter Jet LLC\(^{239}\) to the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the Kazakhstan markings had been overpainted on 25 January 2021 (see imagery at appendix A).\(^{240}\) The General Manager of Jupiter Jet LLC, Erikzhan Satenovich Kozbagarov, informed the Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan that the aircraft owner, Space Cargo Inc, had terminated their lease of the aircraft on 25 January 2021 and that the owner had requested that the aircraft be delivered to Amman, Jordan on termination of the lease. The Panel notes that the aircraft had landed at Amman, Jordan on 23 January 2021, two days prior to the declared termination of the lease.

6. After resolving the transponder technical issue, the aircraft departed Amman (OJAM) at 14:45 hours on 31 January 2021 with the same crew, and successfully delivered the three Space Cargo Inc technicians to Benghazi (HLLB). The Panel obtained imagery of the aircraft at HLLB on 5 February 2021, which was then displaying a Burundi registration (see appendix A). The Panel has confirmed with the Burundi authorities that this is a fake registration, and that no AN-12 type aircraft are registered with Burundi.\(^{241}\)

7. This aircraft was registered with the Aviation Administration of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220 until the registration was officially cancelled on 12 February 2021. It is now unregistered.

8. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.2.

### Table 97.2

**Timeline of main events for AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) (ex UP-AN220)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Mar 2020</td>
<td>Ukraine registration (UR-CSI) for aircraft cancelled.</td>
<td>Cancellation No. PB1319.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Then owned by Aeronet FZE.(^{242})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft operating unregistered for nine months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Dec 2020</td>
<td>Aircraft registered by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan as UP-AN220.</td>
<td>Certificate No.1230.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Aircraft arrives at Amman (Marka) (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS).</td>
<td>At Space Cargo Inc request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021. Ferry flight documentation with Panel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Lease agreement(^{243}) with Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan for aircraft cancelled by owner, Space Cargo Inc, UAE.</td>
<td>Space Cargo Inc had requested aircraft be taken to Aqaba, Jordan, but it was already in Amman, Jordan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Kazakhstan registration on aircraft declared by Jupiter Jet LLC to the Kazakhstan aviation authorities as having been overpainted blue.</td>
<td>Fake report as identified with Kazakhstan registration was still displayed on the aircraft on 28 Jan 2021.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{240}\) Letter from Member State of 2 June 2021.

\(^{241}\) Letter from Member State of 30 June 2021.

\(^{242}\) PO Box 7902, Sharjah, UAE.

\(^{243}\) Contract No 02/09/2020 dated 02 September 2020 between Space Cargo Inc, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC, Kazakhstan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 2021</td>
<td>13:00 hours. Aircraft (marked as UP-AN220) departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) but returns after 90 minutes due to a transponder fault.</td>
<td>Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A’ – see Part B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 2021</td>
<td>14:45 hours. Aircraft departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB).</td>
<td>Three Space Cargo Inc technicians as passengers. ('Team A’ – see Part B).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) now displaying Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO.</td>
<td>Burundi has confirmed that this is a fake registration number.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Feb 2021</td>
<td>UP-AN220 registration cancelled by Aviation Authority of Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>Cancellation No.322.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>At the request of the operator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Apr 2021</td>
<td>Aircraft identified in Benghazi airport (HLLB) by satellite imagery.</td>
<td>Identified by unique blue and red colour scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft parking position and orientation different to that of 5 February 2021 indicating flight operations have taken place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. The Panel notes: (a) that the aircraft was moved to Jordan (OJAM) prior to the cancellation of the contract; (b) the contract was extant for only four months: aircraft leases are usually much longer; and (c) the operator provided the Kazakhstan aviation authorities with false information regarding the markings on the aircraft. The Panel considers that these activities were deliberately designed to protect Jupiter Jet LLC from any allegations of arms embargo violations. The aircraft was still technically operated by Jupiter Jet LLC for its flight to Libya, as the aircraft registration was not cancelled until two weeks after the flight.

10. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 15 July 2021. Their response on 10 August 2021 claimed that they had sold the aircraft to a South Sudanese company246 on 20 January 2020. This is the same response they made in their proven false claim when questioned about their ownership of the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367) on 15 November 2020. On 10 August 2021 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc and denied any business relationship with them.247 The Panel considers the documentation provided by Space Cargo Inc to the Panel on 10 August 2021 (see appendix A) as nothing more than a virtual “cut and paste’ of the fake documentation supplied to the Panel on 15 November 2020 for the Ilyushin IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN#0073479367). The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9 September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail, General Manager of Space Cargo Inc., has again provided the Panel with false documentation and a narrative of falsehoods, and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

11. The provision of this aircraft for “other assistance .... relating to military activities” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Space Cargo Inc, and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail. Jupiter Jet LLC remains under investigation for its involvement in this violation.

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244 Letter to Panel of 30 June 2021.
246 The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.
247 Email to Panel of 10 August 2021. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.
2. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908) (ex UP-AN218)

12. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc and is operating in Libya in support of HAF.

13. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.3.

Table 97.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 May 2019</td>
<td>Leased by Roland Aviation FZE, UAE to Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>• Lease unreferenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 2019</td>
<td>Registered in Kazakhstan as UP-AN218.</td>
<td>• Registration certificate #1191.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Previously registered as EY-414 by Lithuania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Jul 2020</td>
<td>Termination of lease between Roland Aviation FZE, UAE and Jupiter Jet LLC (JPJ), Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Aug 2020</td>
<td>Deregistered by Kazakhstan.</td>
<td>• Cancellation certificate #314.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sep 2020</td>
<td>Panel identified from a confidential source that Roland Aviation FZE had sold the aircraft to Space Cargo Inc FZE.</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2021</td>
<td>Identified as flying on HAF parade in Benina, Benghazi.(^a)</td>
<td>• The aircraft has a distinctive blue and white colour scheme (figure 97.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) [https://twitter.com/gerjon_/status/1401616972589248516](https://twitter.com/gerjon_/status/1401616972589248516), 31 May 2021.

Figure 97.1

Comparative imagery of AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5342908)

11 August 2020: Image supplied by Jupiter Jet LLC to Kazakhstan CAA

29 May 2021: HAF Benghazi Parade.


---

\(^{248}\) The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.

\(^{249}\) A senior commercial airline official in Kazakhstan in taped interview with Kazakhstan CAA.
14. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Their response on 20 January 2022 (extract in appendix A) claimed that they were going to act as a broker for the sale of this aircraft, but that the then owner, Roland Aviation FZE, sold the aircraft directly to the same above-mentioned South Sudanese company\(^{250}\) on, or about, 28 December 2020. On 23 January 2022 the South Sudanese company again refuted all claims made by Space Cargo Inc, denying any business relationship with Space Cargo Inc.\(^{251}\) The company also denied that it had purchased any aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE. The Panel requested information as to the ownership trail for this aircraft from Roland Aviation FZE on 15 July 2021 and 14 February 2022. No response was received.

15. The detailed evidence in possession of the Panel serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letter of 20 January 2022. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

16. The provision of this aircraft for “other assistance ..., relating to military activities” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

3. Ilyushin IL-18D cargo aircraft (MSN# 187009903) (ex ER-ICS)

17. This aircraft has been reported on in S/2017/466,\(^{252}\) S/2019/914\(^{253}\) and S/2021/229,\(^{254}\) where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as ER-ICS. A Member State has confirmed that this aircraft was sold to Space Cargo Inc sometime after 8 July 2015.\(^{255}\)

18. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.4.

Table 97.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Dec 2013</td>
<td>Registered in Moldova to Sky Prim Air S.R.L as ER-ICS.</td>
<td>• Certificate 0418.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2015</td>
<td>Export Certificate of Airworthiness listed Chad as country of export.</td>
<td>• Chad confirmed to Panel that this aircraft had never being listed under their aviation registry.(^{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jul 2015</td>
<td>Cancellation of Moldovan registration ER-ICS.</td>
<td>• De-registration Certificate 0418.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Member State confirm sold to Space Cargo Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Sep 2016</td>
<td>IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Zintan.</td>
<td>• Paint scheme identical to that seen later on for positive identification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Nov 2016</td>
<td>IL-18D (ER-ICS) identified in Benina.</td>
<td>• Paint scheme identical to that seen later on positive identification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{250}\) The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its cooperation with the Panel and being named in a UN report on sanctions violations. The Panel has copies of all correspondence from the South Sudanese company that refutes the Space Cargo Inc claim.

\(^{251}\) Email to Panel of 23 January 2022. The address used by Space Cargo Inc in their documentation was last occupied by the South Sudanese company in 2015.

\(^{252}\) Annex 35.

\(^{253}\) Annex 52.

\(^{254}\) Annex 55 and appendix F to annex 55.

\(^{255}\) Letter to Panel dated 15 September 2021.

\(^{256}\) The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.
19. The Panel wrote to Libya on 7 October 2021 requesting confirmation, or otherwise, of the legitimacy of the displayed Libyan registration. No response has been received.

20. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 7 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response of 21 February 2021 denied that their company had purchased the aircraft, which is contrary to the information provided, and subsequently confirmed, by a Member State.

21. The provision of this aircraft for “other assistance ..., relating to military activities” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

4. Antonov AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005) (ex-EY-409)

22. This aircraft was reported on in S/2021/229, where it identified as being the aircraft previously registered as EY-409. The Panel has now confirmed that this aircraft is owned by Space Cargo Inc.

23. The timeline of events regarding this aircraft is summarised at table 97.5.

Table 97.5
Timeline of main events for AN-12BP cargo aircraft (MSN#5343005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Jul 2014</td>
<td>Acquired by ALA International FZE, UAE</td>
<td><a href="http://www.aerotransport.org">www.aerotransport.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 2015</td>
<td>Leased by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan (<a href="http://www.alliedservicesltd.com">www.alliedservicesltd.com</a>).</td>
<td><a href="https://www.alliedservicesltd.com">Lease Agreement No 15/03 dated 1 April 2015</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 2015</td>
<td>Aircraft returned to owners by Allied Services Limited, South Sudan, but stayed in storage in Juba.</td>
<td>No longer required as South Sudan CAA had banned use of AN-12 cargo aircraft in South Sudan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Nov 2015</td>
<td>ALA International renamed as Meridien FZE.</td>
<td>Addendum to Memorandum and Articles of Understanding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^{257}\) Annex 55 and appendix K to annex 55.

\(^{258}\) The Panel has copies of all the documentation referred to in this table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr 2016</td>
<td>Formal expiration of lease between Allied Services Limited, South Sudan and Meridien FZE.</td>
<td>•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Aug 2019</td>
<td>Sold to Space Cargo Inc by Meridien FZE.</td>
<td>• Aircraft Purchase and Sale Agreement dated 20 August 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Oct 2019</td>
<td>Aircraft departed Juba, South Sudan flown by AsiaAirways LLC of Tajikistan.</td>
<td>• South Sudan CAA Pre-Flight Inspection Report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Nov 2019</td>
<td>AN-12BP identified delivering HAF commanders to Al-Muzaq.</td>
<td>• Subsequently confirmed as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Aug 2020</td>
<td>Identified as AN-12 BP (MSN#5343005) in Al Jufra, Libya flying in support of HAF.</td>
<td>• Identified by independent OSINT analyst.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. The Panel offered Space Cargo Inc an opportunity to reply on 19 October 2019 regarding their ownership of this aircraft. Their response to the Panel on 31 October 2021 contained inconsistencies and used a previously discredited purchase type explanation, used in previous cases, where the Panel found Space Cargo’s claims as not credible. In this case Space Cargo Inc claimed to have used an offset credit agreement to sell the aircraft to a company called Mars Avia Tech LLC in Belarus. The Panel found this claim as not credible as:

(a) The alleged sale took place two days after they purchased the aircraft from Meridien. This would not allow time for the normal due diligence for aircraft purchases to take place.

(b) Mars Tech Avia LLC is not registered as a company in Belarus,\(^259\) and there is no trace of the company in open source information in either English or Russian.

(c) The contract with Meridien FZE stated that the Buyer, Space Cargo LLC, should provide the crew at Juba, South Sudan. The aircraft was flown out of South Sudan by a crew from Asia Airways LLC, who were listed on the flight operations manual provided by Meridien to the original lessee.

(d) Allied Services Limited, South Sudan handed the aircraft back to Meridien FZE and not the alleged new owners, Mars Avia Tech LLC as stated in the alleged contract between Space Cargo LLC and Mars Avia Tech LLC.

(e) The contract with Space Cargo LLC stated that the alleged Buyer, Mars Avia Tech LLC, should settle the contract based on 100% pre-payment of US$ 553,446. No mention of an offset credit agreement, which was submitted unreferenced to the Panel, and in a very different format to the fake one supplied for the sale of the Antonov AN-12A cargo aircraft (MSN#2340806) (see paragraph 10).

\(^{259}\) Confirmed by Member State in letter to Panel of 13 December 2021.
25. The extensive and detailed evidence in this annex serves to refute all claims made by Space Cargo in their letters of 10 August and 9 September 2021. Mr Maher Nayef Alismail has again provided the Panel with a narrative of falsehoods and forged documentation. He continues to violate the UN arms embargo with complete impunity.

26. The provision of this aircraft for “other assistance .... relating to military activities” is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Space Cargo Inc and Mr. Maher Nayef Alismail.

B. PMC maintenance support for three AS332L Super Puma helicopters

27. The Panel has established that Space Cargo Inc contracted the provision of helicopter engineers and aircrew from a South African company to make the three AS332L Super Puma helicopters transferred into Libya during July 2019 by Project Opus260 airworthy. In doing so it became a private military company for under the auspices of “other assistance .... relating to military activities”. Supporting imagery and evidence is at appendix C.

28. On 10 December 2020 a South African helicopter maintenance company261 was contracted by Space Cargo Inc to provide qualified individuals capable of making the above-mentioned helicopters airworthy. The individual in Space Cargo Inc responsible for coordinating this programme with the South African company was Aleksandra Isamova, the “Auditor” of Space Cargo Inc, (see figure 97.2, the remaining Email evidence is at appendix C). The Panel offered Aleksandra Isamova an opportunity to respond on behalf of the company on 7 August 2021, which she declined.262

260 See annex 76 to Panel report S/2021/229.
261 The Panel is aware of the identity of the company but considers that: (a) as the company was unaware that the work would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo; and (b) has fully cooperated with the Panel, it is not necessary to report the identity of the company at this stage and expose the company to any reputational risk resulting from its participation. Similarly, the Panel is aware of the identities of all the individuals employed by the company that deployed to Libya.
262 WhatsApp message. 7 August 2021, which the company has confirmed receiving (Email of 20 January 2022). Three separate numbers were also used to call and there was no reply, but the Panel acknowledges that unless the subscriber is using a virtual private network (VPN) calls are blocked on WhatsApp in the UAE.
29. The Panel has established that the first technician deployed to Jordan on 19 December 2020 on flight EK903 from Dubai, where he was met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation\textsuperscript{263} and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.\textsuperscript{264} He then soon flew into Libya on a Space Cargo Inc charter flight.

30. A team of three further technicians (‘Team A’) then deployed to Jordan on 1 January 2021 on Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871. They were also met by a representative from SkyWings Aviation and accommodated in the Hotel Corp, Amman, Jordan.

31. ‘Team A’ was delayed in Jordan until the first attempt was made on 28 January 2021 to fly them to Libya on the Space Cargo Inc owned Antonov AN-12 (#2340806) (see Part A above). This flight had to return to Jordan due to transponder issues, and ‘Team A’ eventually deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021 on the Antonov AN-12 (#2340806). ‘Team A’ remained in Libya working on the helicopters until returning to Johannesburg on 17 February 2021.

32. The Panel has copies of the return flight tickets for Team ‘A’, which were paid for by a credit card in the name of Maher ALISMAIL, the same name as the Managing Director of Space Cargo Inc (see figure 97.3).


33. The agreed contract price for the provision of ‘Team A’ was $195,000, which was invoiced to Space Cargo Inc.\textsuperscript{265}

34. On 27 April 2021 a second team (‘Team B’) consisting of one pilot and four technicians deployed to Benghazi, Libya directly from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport (FALA) on board a Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (see at appendix C).\textsuperscript{266} The Panel also independently obtained a copy of the aircraft flight plan from another source, which confirms this flight. The aircraft charter flight was booked by Shamil Travel Services Company of Benghazi, whom the Panel could not contact for their comment. The charter cost was LYD 135,000 (US$ 29,800), which was paid in cash.

35. After ‘Team B’ maintenance work, two of the AS332L Super Puma helicopters were seen flying as part of the HAF Libyan National Army 7\textsuperscript{th} Operation Dignity anniversary military parade in Benghazi on 29 May 2021 (see figure 97.4).

\textsuperscript{265} Confidential source.

\textsuperscript{266} The Panel is aware of the owner and operator of the private jet but considers that as the company was unaware that the flight would be a technical non-compliance with the arms embargo, and cooperated fully with the Panel, it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified.
36. The agreed contract price for the provision of ‘Team B’ was $375,000, which Space Cargo Inc requested to be invoiced to BU Shames FZE.\(^{267}\) The Panel has identified that a Mr. Abdullah Mohamed Alismail\(^{268}\) is listed as the owner of BU Shames FZE.\(^{269}\) In figure 97.2 there is a copy email address for abdullah.ismail@spacecargoinc.com, and the Panel has confirmed that Abdullah Mohamed Alismail also uses abdullahgm@bushamesfze.com. The Panel has identified that Aleksandra Isamova,\(^{270}\) Auditor of Space Cargo Inc, is also listed as working in the finance department of BU Shames FZE. Although the Panel has yet to confirm the exact family relationship between Maher Nayef Alismail, the General Manager of Space Cargo Inc, and Abdullah Mohamed Alismail, the owner of BU Shames FZE, the Panel considers that the two companies are in effect operated as a single business entity.

37. During the maintenance periods for both Space Cargo Inc ‘Team A’ and ‘Team B’, their local HAF air force counterparts requested information as to the types of weapons that could be mounted to the aircraft, and what sort of weapons mounts were required.\(^{271}\) The Panel also identified from confidential imagery that the three Gazelle helicopters delivered in July 2019 as part of Project Opus had been repainted in military sand colour with Libyan armed forces markings (see figure 97.5).

\(^{267}\) Registered as company #11617945 on 3 March 2020. 600 M2 Warehouse A4-08, Sharjah, UAE. The invoice was paid from account number IBAN AE080260001015771385401, Emirates NBD Bank, Deira Branch, Dubai, UAE.

\(^{268}\) a.k.a. Abdullah Mohamed ALISMAEL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAIL, Abdullah Mohamed AL ISMAEL.


\(^{270}\) Uses sasha@bushamesfze.com and auditor@spacecargoinc.com. Same telephone number as Space Cargo Inc +971 58 206 4133.

\(^{271}\) Confidential source.
38. The Panel has identified that one or more of the Super Puma aircraft has rotor gearbox faults necessitating the delivery of spare parts. These are only legitimately available from Airbus Helicopters\textsuperscript{272} or companies that have passed the Airbus Helicopters’ due diligence and compliance processes. Airbus Helicopters informed the Panel\textsuperscript{273} that the three helicopters were removed from the Airbus Helicopters database on 10 March 2020 after a self-declaration from the previous legitimate owner Starlite Aviation\textsuperscript{274} on 28 August 2019. This was over nine months after Starlite sold the helicopters to L6-FZE of Project Opus. It is thus highly unlikely that Space Cargo Inc or HAF will ever be able to legitimately access the spare parts necessary to maintain any airworthiness for these aircraft. Sources have informed the Panel that illegitimate sources for such parts are rare.

39. The timeline of events regarding this support by Space Cargo Inc is summarised at table 97.6.

\textsuperscript{273} Letter of 2 August 2021 and Email of 1 September 2021.
Table 97.6
Timeline of main events for Space Cargo Inc support to HAF (2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Dec 2020</td>
<td>South African maintenance company contacted by Space Cargo Inc (UAE) for recruitment of Super Puma engineers for a contract in Libya.</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 19 Dec 2020 | Team Leader for the Space Cargo Inc contract deploys to Jordan from South Africa. | • Arrives Amman on flight EK903 from Dubai.  
• Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman. |
| 1 Jan 2021  | Repair Team A (3 persons) deploy from Johannesburg, RSA via Cairo to Amman, Jordan. | • Egypt Air flights MS840 and MS871.  
• Flights booked by info@spacecargoinc.com.  
• Payment card ending in 7800 (Maher Alismail).  
• Met by Skywings Aviation and accommodated at Corp Amman Hotel, Amman. |
| 23 Jan 2021 | Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) arrives at Amman (Marka) airport (OJAM) from Sudan (HSSS). | • At Space Cargo request.  
• Departed Sudan (HSSS) on 22 Jan 2021.  
• Pilot was Nikolay DENISOV (Kazakhstan). |
| 24 Jan 2021 | Repair Team A members identified by Panel. | *                                                                                           |
| 28 Jan 2021 | 13:00 hours. Repair Team A departs from Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) on aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220). | *                                                                                           |
| 28 Jan 2021 | 14:30 hours. Aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) (marked UP-AN220) returns to Amman (OJAM), Jordan due to technical fault. | *                                                                                           |
| 31 Jan 2021 | 14:45 hours. aircraft AN-12A (#2340806) departs Amman (OJAM) for Benghazi (HLLB) | • Repair ‘Team A’ now deployed. |
| 7 Feb 2021  | Repair ‘Team A’ identified working on third Super Puma. | • 32° 5'36.44"N, 20°15'38.67"E. |
| 8 Feb 2021  | Panel identify Repair ‘Team A’ accommodation location. | • 32° 5'18.16"N, 20°15'37.66". |

275 auditor@spacecargoinc.com. Aleksandra. +971 6 55 70 388. Fax: +971 6 57 24 019. Mobile: +971 58 206 4133. SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | UAE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 Feb 2021</td>
<td>General Haftar’s representative visited Benina Hanger and observed ground tests on all three Super Puma. Looking to recruit pilots from RSA as no Libyan pilots qualified. RSA company to recruit and pilots for Space Cargo Inc.</td>
<td>• Confidential source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Repair ‘Team A’ departs Benghazi for Johannesburg</td>
<td>• Route HLLB &gt; Alexandria (HEBA) &gt; Dubai (OMDB) &gt; Addis Adaba (HAAB) &gt; Johannesburg (FAOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr 2021</td>
<td>Private jet flight from Benghazi (HLLB) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Johannesburg (FAOR) to collect Repair ‘Team B’.</td>
<td>• Dassault Aviation Falcon 900EX registered 9A-XXX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Apr 2021</td>
<td>Repair ‘Team B’ fly on private jet flight from Johannesburg (FAOR) via Entebbe (HUEN) to Benghazi (HLLB)</td>
<td>• ‘Team B’ accommodation located 14.5km from airport at 31°59’36.75”N, 20° 9’45.23”E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2021</td>
<td>Two Super Puma helicopters fly in the HAF 7th Anniversary of Operation DIGNITY parade.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul 2021</td>
<td>Repair “Team B” returns to South Africa.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. The Panel offered Space Cargo an opportunity to reply on 23 December 2021. Space Cargo Inc responded on 22 January 2022 and requested a three-week delay for them to respond so that they could consolidate the necessary documentation. The Panel agreed, but no response was received by the agreed 12 February 2022 deadline.

41. On 7 January 2022 the Panel wrote to Holman Fenwick Willan MEA LLP (HFW), the legal representative of the last known owners of the aircraft to request an update on the aircraft ownership, or any sales or transfers that may have taken place. HFW have yet to respond to the Panel’s request.

42. The provision of maintenance technicians for these particular aircraft that were supplied for military use and are operated now by HAF falls under the auspices of “other assistance .... relating to military activities”. This is a further violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by Space Cargo Inc and Maher Nayef ALISMAIL.

C. Space Cargo Inc violations of other arms embargoes

43. The Panel notes that in paragraph 75 of S/2021/569 the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic also named Space Cargo Inc as the owner of two IL-76TD cargo aircraft (MSN# 33446325 and 1013405167) operated by Jenis Air LLC, Kazakhstan, who used the aircraft on 19 December 2020 for the transfer of military materiel into the Central African Republic.

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276 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbIDXxITPa0, 31 May 2021. (@35 min 05 sec).
D. Space Cargo Inc business licences

44. The United Arab Emirates informed the Panel on 24 March 2022 that the company’s business licence (#20155) was not renewed after expiry on 26 October 2021. The United Arab Emirates provided no information on the company’s other business licences (#00607) and (#14987).
Appendix A to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc aviation support

Figure 97.A.1
AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) at Jordan Marka airport (OJAM) (28 January 2021)

Figure 97.A.2
Faked imagery of AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) claiming markings overpaint on 25 January 2021

Sources: Confidential source and Panel analysis

Figure 97.A.2
Faked imagery of AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) claiming markings overpaint on 25 January 2021

* Geo-referenced to 31°58’22”N, 35°59’54”E (OJAM).

b Note UP-AN220 still on aircraft on image in figure 97.A.1, taken 3 days after the claimed date the above images were taken.

Sources: Member State and Panel analysis.
Figure 97.A.3

AN-12A cargo aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi with faked Burundi registration (5 February 2021)

AN-12A Cargo Aircraft (#2340806) in Benghazi
(5 February to 10 April 2021)

Image extracted from confidential source video imagery of 5 February 2021. Note the changed registration number to a Burundi registration 9U-BBD or 9U-BBO. The paint work is of poor quality.

5 February 2021. Benghazi Airport
32°05'34.47" N, 20°15'39.92" E

10 April 2021. Benghazi Airport
32°05'33.16" N, 20°15'40.58" E

Sources: Confidential source and Panel analysis
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No. (2340806)</th>
<th>Registration Mark (UP-AN220)</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2020/03/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sale Purchase Contract of aircraft (ANTONOV AN-12) along with the full material and financial possession. The capacity of our company in the capacity of the owner/medium/broker without any control or actual possession to the airport. Our documentary possession of the aircraft by one day is 10/3/2020 (only one day).
Figure 97.A.5
Extract from Space Cargo Inc fake sales agreement (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)
Figure 97.A.6
Space Cargo Inc fake credit note to South Sudanese company (20 January 2021) supplied to Panel (10 August 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.N.</th>
<th>GL Acct.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cur.</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Amount AED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dr 11000</td>
<td>Accounts receivable, Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Fueling for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>393,652.00</td>
<td>1,446,671.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cr 20000</td>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>393,652.00</td>
<td>1,446,671.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dr 11000</td>
<td>Accounts receivable, Outstanding Balance for Services Provided in Sudan and Ethiopia /Handling and Landing Permits for Aug 2020 to Dec 2020</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>174,371.00</td>
<td>640,813.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cr 20000</td>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>174,371.00</td>
<td>640,813.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong> USD 568,023.00</td>
<td><strong>USD</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amount in words:  **Five Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Twenty Three Dollars Only**

Prepared by: Accounts Manager: General Manager:
Figures 97.A.7 and 97.A.8

One of the South Sudanese company’s responses to Panel enquiry (10 August 2021)

The Panel holds copies of all the other rebuttals from this company, and this one is included for an illustration of that company’s responses.

---

Dear [Redacted],

Thank again and I am just so surprised why this company lie to your UN panel of expert so much. I work in South Sudan and my business is here only. I explained that I don’t have any business relation with this company and yet still claiming that I bought again AN 12. This is also a lie. I don’t know them and I never bought AN 12 from any company or them. I just don’t really know why they keep on using our company name yet we don’t even know them.

Our base is Juba, South Sudan and I don’t have any business connection or interest in Jordan or Libya. I work here locally and my country have enough problems and I don’t have any access to other region.

Looking at the Price of AN 12 they claim I bought the plane, you will even know that it is not true. WHO can buy that plane with that amount of money????

How can a purchase of plane be done with clearing account??

How did they get that money from our company?

Please follow them and let them tell you the truce.

This is a fake company SPACE CARGO INC.

OUR COMPANY NEVER BOUGHT Antonov AN-12 (#2340806)

That company is scammer and criminal and deserve to be taken to court and pay for defamation. How I wish I know where they are located. I trust you will do your investigation and find out the real truth. I never travelled to Jordan all my life.

The address of our company that is mentioned in their claimed, we left that place since 2015. How can that be true.????

If there are international lawyers who can suit this company on our behalf, please help.

Best Regards.

[Redacted]
Figure 97.A.9
Extract from Space Cargo Inc OTR inaccurate response (20 January 2022)

1. Regarding the aircraft (Antonov AN-12A) with the serial number (5342908), and since among the activities of our company is the activity of importing and exporting aircraft and their spare parts under License No. (0067) issued in 1999 by the Sharjah Airport International Free Zone Authority:
   a. On (December 28, 2020), our company requested (reservation in return for purchase) as an intermediary/broker in dealing with the purchase of the aircraft described in our response above from the seller (Roland Aviation FZE) with the intention of reselling it to others.
   b. The selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) issued an invoice in the name of our company, and the amount (the down payment) was settled with the intention of completing the mediation and completing the sale.
   c. Immediately and on the same date on (28/12/2020) and before making any change in the registration or any flight or operation of the aircraft, the selling company executed the sales contract directly with the buyer (other than our company).

2. Our company has not entered with the selling company (Roland Aviation FZE) into any sale and purchase contract and has not concluded any lease contract, because the oral agreement is that the amount paid by our company as a deposit is a refundable/redeemable advance to prove the seriousness of the deal and to book the aircraft, provided that the transaction is direct sale and purchase contract between Seller and Buyer.

3. Our company is not concerned with the name of the air operator/company that currently operates the aircraft described in our response and is not concerned with its technical condition or the scope of its operations and operation, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.

4. Our company is not concerned with the civil registration number of the aircraft described in our answer, nor its registration certificate, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.

5. Our company is not concerned with the airworthiness certificate of the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.

6. Our company is not concerned with operating the aircraft described in our answer, nor is it aware of any of the foregoing.

7. Our company is not concerned with any means of payment regarding the implementation of the operation of the aircraft described in our answer and is not aware of any of the foregoing.

8. To the best of our knowledge, the selling company has executed the sale contract for the aircraft described in our answer directly with the buyer ((Fagle Enterprise Company Limited), Address: Eastern Pearl, Juba, South Sudan, Tel: 00211955921703 and our company has not obtained any copy of any contract between the two parties (the seller and the buyer) in the same matter.
Appendix B to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to IL-18D (MSN#187009903)

Figures 97.B.1
Independent OSINT analyst identification of the IL-18D. a

a Source: https://twitter.com/Gerjon_/status/1287815982350766085, 27 July 2020.
Appendix C to Annex 97: Supporting imagery and documentation relating to Space Cargo Inc PMC support

Figures 97.C.1

Space Cargo Inc emails regarding initial deployment

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The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.
From: Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargo.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2020 2:08 PM
To: [redacted] <redacted@spacecargo.com>, [redacted] <redacted@spacecargo.com>
Subject: HA - RECOVERY AND MAINTENANCE OF HEU

Dear [redacted],

Please let me know when I need to go for COVID test immediately. Once test will be ready, please let me know we will purchase for him regular flight from Cape Town to Amman (Jordan), and from Jordan we will arrange flight to point of work.

Regards, Sasha

Thank you & best regards,

Alexandra
Finance Department
“SPACE CARGO INC.”
T:/ +971 6 55 70 2388/+971 6 37 36 019 | Mobile: +971 55 266 4333
Email: auditor@spacecargo.com; accounts@spacecargo.com
SAP User: 44-471 | DiBox 1712 | Jurab | United Arab Emirates

---

From: Accounts Department <auditor@spacecargo.com>
Sent: 16 December 2020 09:04
To: [redacted] <redacted@spacecargo.com>, [redacted] <redacted@spacecargo.com>, [redacted] <redacted@spacecargo.com>
Subject: regulations for [redacted] or his trip to Amman, Jordan

Dear [redacted],

Please note below and handover to [redacted] information as follows:

1. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=io.quivr.amman - this application he has to download on his mobile device;
2. Above application is for QR code tracking - QR code required at Cape Town and Dubai airports;
3. He has to pay around USD 60-70 for visa stamping on arrival;
4. CORP HOTEL in Amman & Meeting Company is Skywing Aviation - 9637792000077 contact number of Skywing Aviation representative – this information required by immigration in Amman, Jordan;

Confirm receipt of email.

Thank you & best regards,

Alexandra
Finance Department
“SPACE CARGO INC.”
T:/ +971 6 55 70 2388/+971 6 37 36 019 | Mobile: +971 55 266 4333
Email: auditor@spacecargo.com; accounts@spacecargo.com
SAP User: 44-471 | DiBox 1712 | Jurab | United Arab Emirates
On 18 Dec 2020, at 8:10 PM, Lermolchev@spaceagroinc.com wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Good afternoon!

Kindly arrange transportation and HOTAC [1 single room] for [redacted] arriving in Queen Alia International Airport on 19th of December 2020 at 5:55 local Jordanian time by flight #EK953 (EMIRATES AIRLINES) from Dubai.

Thank you in advance!

Best Regards,

Sergey Lermolchev
Operations Manager

T/F: +971 6 544 4159 | Mobile: +971 52 7888 309 | E-mail: Lermolchev@spaceagroinc.com
SAIF Zone | A4-073 | P.O.Box 7812 | Sharjah | United Arab Emirates
From: auditor@spacecarpointinc.com <auditor@spacecarpointinc.com>
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 6:53 PM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Abdullah Ismail; S Ermolchev
Subject: Fed. FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear [redacted],

Hope all is well at your side.

Kindly accept below confirmation for transportation and Hotel Accommodation for [redacted]. Contact details are below.

Regards,
Sasha

Отправлено из Outlook Email App для Android

-------- Перисланное письмо --------
От: s.eromoichev@spacecarpointinc.com
Кому: Auditor SCI auditor@spacecarpointinc.com
Дата: пятница, 18 декабря 2020, 18:44:04:00
Тема: FW: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

From: ops@skywingsjordan.com
Sent: Friday, December 18, 2020 8:11 PM
To: s.eromoichev@spacecarpointinc.com
Cc: Mike <ops@skywingsjordan.com>; suha <suha@skywingsjordan.com>
Subject: Re: HOTAC & TRANSPORTATION REQUEST/19 DEC 2020

Dear Sergey,

Good evening.

Ref below well action and confirm.

Kind regards,
Elie Njeim

OCC/SWA
Mob:+962779200077
24/7:+962777818444
www.skywingsjordan.com
Amman-Jordan

Source: Confidential
Figure 97.C.2
Imagery of AS332L Super Puma helicopter repairs in Libya (February to May 2021)\textsuperscript{278}

\textbf{Source:} Confidential

\textsuperscript{278} The resolution of some of this evidence has been reduced as a result of the means of transfer to the Panel via secure social messaging platform, then data erasure to protect sources and finally file compression when adding to this document. Higher resolution imagery is available on request.
Figures 97.C.3 and 97.C.4
Infographic for 'Team B' private jet transfer from South Africa to Libya (27 April 2021)

PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX
(27 April 2021) Departure from Johannesburg
(25°56'7.13"S 27°55'38.19"E)

A confidential source provided an image taken of the
Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX)
prior to departure from Johannesburg (Lanseria) airport.
The aircraft was used to deploy Space Cargo Inc 'Team
B' to support HAF air operations.

The PMC was contracted to provide the necessary
maintenance personnel to get the 3 x Super Puma
delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.

Primary sources
1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
PMC 'Team B' deployment on P4-XXX
(27 April 2021) Arrival at Benghazi
(32°05'38.30"N, 20°15'45.84"E)

A confidential source provided an image taken from the cockpit of the Dassault Falcon 900DX business jet (registered P4-XXX) during taxiing in Benghazi (Benina) airport. The aircraft was used to deploy the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' to support HAF air operations.

Space Cargo Inc was contracted to provide the necessary maintenance to get the 3 x Super Puma delivered in July 2019 ready for operational flight.

Primary sources
1. Confidential source.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
Figure 97.C.5
Private jet transfer booking request (10 April 2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>عدد الركاب</th>
<th>خط السير</th>
<th>تاريخ الرحلة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Johannesburg (JNB)</td>
<td>27/04/2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benghazi (BEN)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the evening of 10 April 2021, 0619091531-0619091530

Source: Confidential
OFFICIAL UN TRANSLATION 2107704E
Translated from Arabic
Date: 10 April 2021
Falcon Jet
Sirs,

Greetings

The Shamil Travel Services Company would like to inquire as to the possibility of arranging a private aeroplane flight from Johannesburg, South Africa, to Benghazi, Libya, for five people, with the following itinerary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of flight</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Number of passengers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 April 2021</td>
<td>Johannesburg (JNB) to Benghazi (BEN)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take-off time from Johannesburg should be 1000 hours South African time

We ask you to kindly respond about the possibility of providing such a flight and let us know the cost in Libyan dinars and the preferred method of payment. Thank you.

Please find attached a list of the passengers’ names and a copy of the passport photos.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signature) Director of the Reservations Division
Shamil Travel Services Company

Address: Eastern Salmani opposite the Main Post Office  Tel: 0619091531-0619091530
Figure 97.C.6 and 97.C.7
BU Shames FZE Business Licenses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LICENCE NO.</th>
<th>22237</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>BU SHAMES (FZE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL STATUS</td>
<td>Free Zone Est. with Limited Liability Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVITY(S)</td>
<td>Chartering &amp; Leasing of Civil Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWNER(S)</td>
<td>ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGER</td>
<td>ABDULLAH MOHAMED ALISMAEL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDRESS</td>
<td>600 M2 Warehouse A4-08 Sharjah - U.A.E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCORPORATION DATE</td>
<td>08 March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUE DATE</td>
<td>17 March 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPIRY DATE</td>
<td>07 March 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. Visit the website: https://portal.saif-zone.com/LicenseDetail.aspx

This document is official and it does not need to be stamped or signed.
Figure 97.C.8
Repair Team 'A' accommodation in Benghazi airport

PMC 'Team A' Accommodation
(02 February 2021)
(32° 5'18"N, 20°15'38"E)

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team A' that deployed to Libya on 31 January 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

Primary sources
1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Bi-Kanguru".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
Figure 97.C.9
Repair Team 'B' accommodation in Benghazi

PMC 'Team B' Accommodation
(April/May 2021)
(31°59'36.75"N, 20° 9'45.23"E)

A confidential source provided imagery of the accommodation for the Space Cargo Inc 'Team B' that deployed to Libya on 27 April 2021.

The location was identified from geo-referencing.

Primary sources
1. Confidential sources.
2. Google Earth Pro
3. Geo-reference support from "Il-Kangara".

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
Annex 98  Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR) operating in Libya

1. The Panel has identified that the Syrian Arab Airlines\textsuperscript{279} operated IL-76T cargo aircraft displaying Syrian registration YK-ATA (MSN\textsuperscript{280} 93421613) made an initial flight from Damascus to Benghazi or Tobruk on 20 August 2021. The aircraft was identified as making five flights from Benghazi to Tobruk in December 2022 and six flights in February 2022.

2. The activities and profile of this aircraft meet five of the Panel’s air delivery profile indicators that when considered collectively indicate that an aircraft is carrying illicit cargo: (a) lack of an obvious schedule; (b) the random nature of the flights; (c) the indirect route; (d) AIS is often switched off; (d) air operator transparency is opaque; and (e) the aircraft flew a similar track to that used for the “Libya Airbridge” reported in UN document S/2021/229 (paragraphs 81 to 83 and annexes 39 and 55).

3. The Panel requested further information from the airline in letters dated 24 September 2021 and 14 March 2022. No response has yet been received.

4. The Panel will continue to monitor the activities of Syrian Arab Airlines (SYR).

\textsuperscript{279} Office 3N, 35 Starinovskaya Street, 220056 Minsk, Belarus. +375 (17) 3507253. www.rada.aero.

\textsuperscript{280} Manufacturer's serial number.
Annex 99  Update on Project Opus

Aircraft

1. The Panel has identified further information on the design, deployment routing and current whereabouts of the LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) light attack aircraft reported in S/2021/229.281

2. The aircraft282 deployed from GAS Aviation in Rudine, Serbia on 18 June 2019 and flew to Wiener Neustadt airport, Austria (LOAN). Wiener Neustadt airport is the base of Airborne Technologies,283 the company that designed and modified the aircraft.284 It remained there for six days before deploying to Amman, Jordan (OJAM) on 24 June 2019 making technical stops at Sofia, Bulgaria (LBSF) and Heraklion, Greece (LGIR). The pilot was Shawn Matthews, the Head of Airborne Technologies Flight Test department.285

3. The Panel can now confirm that the aircraft left Amman, Jordan on 18 July 2019 for Larnaca, Cyprus (LCLK) and not on 22 July 2019 as initially reported. On 30 July 2019 the aircraft was moved to Paphos, Cyprus (LCPH) where it is now in storage with EDT Hangar Services Limited (see figures 99.1 and 99.2).286 The pilot was Matthew Coughlin, one of the PMC operatives that evacuated from Libya to Malta on the rigid hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) ‘Manta-1’ on 29 June 2019.287 An updated infographic for the aircraft is at appendix A.288

Figure 99.1
LASA T-Bird condition in Serbia on 16 June 2019

Figure 99.2
LASA T-Bird at Larnaca (19 July 2019)

Sources: See figure 99.3

4. The Panel noted that at some time between leaving Serbia on 18 June 2019 and arriving at Larnaca on 19 July 2019 the overall body colour of the aircraft had changed from white to a ‘military grey’. The position and font of the registration

281 See paras. 39 to 41 and annex 76 of S/2021/229.
282 Using Mode-S Hex Code 4C4E47.
283 https://www.airbornetechnologies.at.
284 At that time (2013 to 2017) Erik PRINCE was an indirect partner in the Company, controlling 25%.
285 Confidential source.
287 See appendix R to annex 76 of S/2021/229.
288 This no longer includes the transfer to Aircraft and More GmbH, as the company was purely used as a sales agent. Information from Cerha Hempel Rechtsanwalte GmbH dated 16 November 2021.
markings had also changed (see figure 99.3). The Panel notes that ‘Global Geo Survey’ markings were applied to the aircraft in Paphos. The company does not exist, and the company name was last seen on the sister aircraft H80-156DC on 12 November 2014 in Malta. This sister aircraft was last seen in Nakasongola air force base in Uganda in May 2019.

Figure 99.3
Comparison of overall body colour and registration markings

5. The aircraft no longer holds a valid certificate of airworthiness, which expired on 4 June 2020, and the Serbian authorities revoked the aircraft registration certificate on 8 October 2021. At this time, the aircraft can no longer legally fly until re-registered with a Member State and a certificate of airworthiness issued.

6. The aircraft were inspected by the Cypriot authorities, in the presence of a Member State law enforcement agency on 11 October 2021. The Panel is awaiting the official release of this report to the Panel.

Disguised company ownership

7. In S/2021/229 the Panel made a statement regarding the assistance provided by Erik Prince for the rapid transfer of aviation assets from companies that he controlled. What the Panel did not report at that time, due to it being single source, was an interview with Gregg Smith who, as the Chief Executive Officer of Frontier Services Group (FSG) from 2014 to 1

---

May 2016, worked closely with Erik Prince, then the Chairman of FSG. Gregg Smith stated to the Panel that the cover story for Operation Opus would be “oil and gas security” or “oil and gas survey” as that was what Erik Prince had always used. Gregg Smith repeated this publicly in an interview with www.narativ.org on 17 September 2020.

8. Gregg Smith also claimed that it was implausible that Erik Prince did not control Lancaster6, the company that launched the operation. Gregg Smith went on to explain that, in his experience, Erik Prince protected himself from litigation by not owning companies, and by controlling them through debt ownership or security pledges he would receive material or financial benefits in other ways. The Panel now has evidence of this technique being used by Erik Prince regarding PBM Limited (Malta #C74485), which was 50% owned by Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) a company controlled by James Fenech, coincidently the supplier of the RHIBs to Operation Opus. On 1 June 2017 Unified Global Services Group Limited pledged 100% of their shareholding in PBM Limited (Malta) to a US registered company Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Delaware# 4901076), which was controlled by Erik Prince, hence making Erik Prince in effect the beneficial owner of PBM Limited (Malta). After the investigation and arrest of James Fenech in late April 2020, and the freezing of Fenech’s assets on 24 April 2020 by the Maltese court, Erik Prince made efforts to divest himself of his interest in PBM Limited (Malta) and sever business links with James Fenech. The Panel believes this to be part of a wider cover up operation. At this point Erik Prince revealed his interest in Phalanx Holding Company LLC by personally signing the termination of pledge documentation, in effect returning control and ownership of the company back to Nicola Bandini and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta) on 21 July 2020. This was an uncharacteristic error of Erik Prince whose signature has not previously been identified by the Panel on open-source corporate documentation. Documentary evidence is at appendix B to this annex.

293 Initially identified by @bugdavem (Twitter), 18 April 2019.
Appendix A to Annex 99: LASA T-Bird (YU-TSH) infographic
Appendix B to Annex 99: Documentation illustrating disguised ownership technique used by Erik PRINCE

1. Documentation for figures 99.B.1 to 99.B.3 within this annex is from the Malta Business Registry.\(^{294}\)

2. PBM Limited was registered on 2 December 2016 with 1,200 authorized shares. Nicola Bandini held 600 shares and Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) the remaining 600 shares. Unified Global Services Group Limited (Malta C66387) is owned by James Fenech, the individual who supplied the RHIBs to Opus through a separate subsidiary of Unified Global Services Group Limited called Sovereign Charterers (Malta) Limited.

Figure 99.B.1
Authorised Share Capital of 1000 shares

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\(^{294}\) [https://registry.mbr.mt](https://registry.mbr.mt)
Figure 99.B.2
Pledge of shares to Phalanx Holding Company LLC (USA)\(^{295}\) (1 June 2017)

![Form T (2) Notice of a pledge of securities](image)

4. Further research establishes that Phalanx Holding Company LLR is registered to Erik Prince’s home address in Virginia.
Figure 99.B.4
Identification of the use of Erik Prince’s home address for registration of Phalanx Holding Company LLC (Virginia, USA)
Annex 100    Update on ChVK Wagner and Russian PMC operations and logistics

General

1. The Panel has obtained further information and records relating to ChVK Wagner operations and logistics additional to that reported in Panel report S/2021/229.297

2. In early 2021 the BBC gained exclusive access to a Samsung electronic tablet left behind on a Libyan battlefield by a ChVK Wagner mercenary.298 Their investigation was published on 10 and 11 August 2021.299 The Panel has spoken to the BBC investigative team regarding the circumstances of the find and is assured of the chain of custody and continuity of evidence for the electronic tablet. Furthermore, although a single technical source, the electronic device contains tangible documentary and imagery evidence that makes it highly likely that the contents are authentic. Some of the information contained in the tablet has been corroborated by other sources (see below). Two confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization, independent from the BBC, also considered the find of the electronic tablet and its contents as authentic.

3. The Samsung electronic tablet contained:

   (a) Over 42 military diagrammatic images for Russian designed fuzes, mines and booby-traps (see examples at appendix A);

   (b) Over twenty pages of Russian military low level tactical information on, for example, range finding through weapons sights, published by the Senior Service College of the Far East Department of Weapons and Marksmanship (author S.P. Proshchenkov) (see examples appendix B),300 and

   (c) A mapping application software “All in One Offline Maps Plus”,301 which had at least 35 locations of mines and booby traps displayed, as well as code names of fighters and fighting positions in the Ain Zara area of South Tripoli.

__________________
296 There were a number of Russian PMC operating in Libya between 2019 and 2020. The Panel will only attribute an incident or activity to a named Russian PMC where evidential standards for attribution have been met. Otherwise, the term “Russian PMC” will be used.
297 Primarily in p.32 and annex 77.
298 The term “private military operative” was previously used in Panel reporting as evidential standards of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ by specifically ChVK Wagner personnel had not been met to allow the Panel to use the term ‘mercenary’ when referring to ChVK Wagner personnel. The term ‘mercenary’ when used in this document refers to ‘armed mercenary personnel’ as referenced in paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011). The information contained in this update provides evidence of ‘direct participation in hostilities’ by ChVK Wagner individuals thus allowing the Panel to make a definitive finding as to the “armed mercenary personnel” status of the individuals identified in Libya as operating for ChVK Wagner.
300 Official UN translation 2108754E.
Imagery of anti-personnel mines

4. The imagery included schematic diagrams of the Russian designed MON-50, POM-2 and PMN-2 anti-personnel mines (APM). The POM-2 and PMN-2 APM were reported as being first seen in Libya in Panel report S/2021/229302 and were found to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by a Russian PMC. Also see paragraphs 7 to 9 below for other equipment, weapons and ammunition requested in the logistic resupply documentation found on the electronic tablet, that were first seen in Libya during 2020.

Mapping application - location of anti-personnel mines

5. The locations of thirty-five APM were indicated within the mapping application as shown in table 100.1 and in figure 100.1. The Panel has geo-referenced the locations shown to confirm the accuracy of the mapping application software. The Panel also confirmed that the area within which the mined locations are indicated on the mapping software was under the control of HAF, including his ChVK Wagner support, from the end of February 2020 until the HAF withdrawal in late May 2020. It was their frontline at that time, which explains the deployment of defensive command initiated anti-personnel mines such as the MON-50, 90 and 200 series. The Panel has further confirmed303 that explosive hazards were removed from these specific locations by a combination of Libyan Ministry of Interior, military and NGO explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams as part of ongoing battlefield area clearance (BAC) operations in mid 2020. Examples of screenshots from the electronic tablet are at appendix C.

Table 100.1
Indicated locations of APM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>ChVK #</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location (Longitude and Latitude)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'36.33&quot;N 13°17'02.69&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'40.36&quot;N 13°16'56.46&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'21.96&quot;N 13°16'51.43&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'54.59&quot;N 13°16'50.97&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Booby Trap</td>
<td>32°46'24.01&quot;N 13°16'21.85&quot;N</td>
<td>• Booby trapped F1 Grenade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>32°46'23.52&quot;N 13°16'21.33&quot;N</td>
<td>• Possible remote controlled OZM APM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Booby Trap</td>
<td>32°46'24.28&quot;N 13°16'20.24&quot;N</td>
<td>• Booby trapped F1 Grenade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'08.80&quot;N 13°16'20.64&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'38.24&quot;N 13°16'41.90&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'33.28&quot;N 13°16'23.97&quot;N</td>
<td>• Second A1 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'41.13&quot;N 13°16'48.19&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'32.27&quot;N 13°16'31.89&quot;N</td>
<td>• Second A2 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'42.48&quot;N 13°16'54.73&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46'31.72&quot;N 13°16'26.77&quot;N</td>
<td>• Second A3 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'42.65&quot;N 13°16'55.88&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45'44.47&quot;N 13°16'55.43&quot;N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

302 PMN-2 in table 6 and annex 67. POM-2R in table 6 and annex 70.
303 Source: An operational demining organization in Libya.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>ChVK #</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location (Longitude and Latitude)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′29.50″N 13°16′23.78″N</td>
<td>• Second A3 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>A6</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′45.14″N 13°17′10.12″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>A6</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′27.40″N 13°16′23.81″N</td>
<td>• Second A6 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>A7</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′50.90″N 13°17′09.53″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>A7</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′37.36″N 13°16′18.79″N</td>
<td>• Second A7 code location referenced. • Second A3 code location referenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>A8</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′46.25″N 13°16′48.46″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>A9</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′30.35″N 13°16′35.27″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>A10</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′41.26″N 13°16′42.17″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>A11</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°45′39.13″N 13°16′43.20″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>T2</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′12.35″N 13°16′44.75″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′21.88″N 13°16′41.41″N</td>
<td>• Possibly remote initiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′18.27″N 13°16′30.64″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′19.33″N 13°16′28.80″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′21.46″N 13°16′21.21″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′21.20″N 13°16′27.13″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′23.08″N 13°16′25.52″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>MON-90</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′24.75″N 13°16′31.35″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>MON-90</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′24.45″N 13°16′31.98″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>MON-200</td>
<td></td>
<td>32°46′22.64″N 13°16′32.18″N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Source: Accident report by an operational demining organization in Libya.*

6. The locations at table 100.1 also includes some information as to the type of mine deployed. These include MON-50, MON-90, MON-200 and OZM-72, none of which have been reported as being in Libya before. The transfer of these mines to Libya is therefore a violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011). Imagery of three of these mine types recovered by GNU-AF and Libyan NGO EOD teams in the Tripoli area is at appendix D.
Figure 100.1
Indicated locations of APM from mapping software
5. The Panel also received information regarding the recovery during Summer 2020 of booby-trapped TM-62M anti-tank mines from positions previously occupied by, primarily, ChVK Wagner operatives in Southern Tripoli (see figure 100.2).

Figure 100.2
TM-62M mine with booby trap

IHL and indiscriminate use of explosive ordnance

6. When employing explosive weapons in their military operations, Russian PMC operatives were obliged under IHL to respect the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks and to take all feasible precautionary measures to protect civilians from the indiscriminate effects of those weapons. These measures should include: (a) the visible marking of mines and other explosive devices; (b) issuing effective warnings on the emplacement of these devices to the local civilian population; and (c) removing or facilitating their removal upon the end of active hostilities.

7. The Panel found that ChVK Wagner operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the thirty-five APMs (table 100.1 above) in urban locations of the Ain Zara municipality that were likely to be used by civilians after their withdrawal. This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.

8. In at least one case on 5 July 2020, shortly after the withdrawal of the ChVK Wagner operatives from their positions in Ain Zara, a booby-trapped mine (serial 21 in table 100.1 above) unexpectedly detonated during an EOD clearance operation. This resulted in the indiscriminate death of two civilian EOD operators. The device was unmarked and attached to a harmless object inside a civilian house (see appendix F). The two victims, who did not take a direct part in the hostilities, were staff members of a mine action non-governmental organisation deployed to remove mines, booby-traps and other explosive devices from the populated area of Ain Zara.

---

304 Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).
305 The use of ML-8 anti lift initiators was reported in S/2019/229.
306 Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL) rules 1, 11-12, and 15.
307 CIHL rules 80-83. See also CIHL rule 15.
308 Confidential sources within mine action organizations operational in Libya. The Panel has copies of the death certificates.
9. The Panel further found that Russian PMC operatives did not take the required precautions when they laid the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines (figure 100.2 above) in an urban location along the civilian road in Southern Tripoli, which was expected to be used by civilians after the withdrawal of the PMC operatives.\textsuperscript{309} This failure to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental effects of the deployed ordnance on the civilian population and civilian objects rendered their method of warfare unlawful under IHL.\textsuperscript{310}

10. The method in which ChVK Wagner operatives emplaced the thirty-five APMs and the Russian PMC operatives the TM-62M booby trapped anti-tank mines, without any feasible precautionary measures, also heavily undermined the safe return of the displaced civilians to their homes as well as the protection of those civilian organizations mandated to carry out mine clearance as a specific measure to facilitate the right of the displaced civilians to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{311}

**Mapping application - tactical information**

11. The mapping application software data also contained tactical information such as names and unit identifiers. These are at table 100.2 for reference.

**Table 100.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Panel analysis</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Red Dot</td>
<td>ChVK Wagner location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Blue Dot</td>
<td>Enemy / GNU-AF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yellow Dot</td>
<td>LNA / HAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Purple Dot</td>
<td>Not confirmed</td>
<td>Possibly ‘Protective Fire’ (PF)\textsuperscript{a} or ‘Final Protective Fire’ (FPF)\textsuperscript{b} locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Black Dot</td>
<td>Mines, booby traps or IEDs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Light Blue Dot</td>
<td>Not confirmed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>“Diver”</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Possible code name of fighter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>“German”</td>
<td>Code name of fighter</td>
<td>Three Wagner operatives are known to use this nickname.\textsuperscript{c}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>“Himmler”</td>
<td>Code name of fighter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>“Metla”</td>
<td>Fedor Andreevich METELKIN</td>
<td>Wagner # M-1913.\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>“Spirits”</td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>“Spirits” is ChVK Wagner nickname for ISIS in Syria, so could mean similar here.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{309} Civilian casualties due to UXO were reported in this area during the summer of 2020. Confidential source in the mine action community (19 January 2022).

\textsuperscript{310} CIHL rules 80-83.

\textsuperscript{311} CIHL rule 132.
‘Protective fire’ refers to a tactical fire plan for a military unit, pre-set up to protect itself against overwhelming attack. It involves the pre-laying and concentration of all support weapons fire (heavy machine gun, artillery, mortar and air support) directly in front of the unit to impede enemy movement.

As the “final” in the name implies, this is the last resort in defensive plans, involving weapons fire directed dangerously close to friendly defensive positions that are at risk of being overrun by the enemy. An FPF request has absolute priority over any other kind of fire support request.

1) Makarov (DOB 6 Jan 1994); 2) Ivanovich Apes (Wagner # M2206); and 3) Alexander Alexanderovich (Wagner # M-0176).

d https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/metelkin-fedor-andreevich/

Logistic resupply documentation

The electronic tablet also stored a ten-page document dated 19 January 2020, which included a list of the weapons and equipment required for various sub-units within ChVK Wagner in Libya. The document is at appendix E together with an official UN translation. Within this document are code names or nick names of senior ChVK Wagner staff who are mentioned within, or contributed to, the document. These are at table 100.3. A summary of the equipment requested is at appendix G.

Table 100.3
Identification of report name mentions and contributors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page #</th>
<th>Codename</th>
<th>Panel identification</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Highly probably Yevgeny PRIGOZHIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lipetsk</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Signals Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td></td>
<td>New in position as Head of Communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Nineth</td>
<td>Dimitry UTKIN</td>
<td>Utkin is known as “the ninth”. This is based on his Wagner number M-0209. The Panel assesses that the hand written word “DA” in Cyrillic appears in the document next to the typed “nineth”, meaning “Yes” has been written as a personal approval for the transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bonya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Intelligence Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bonya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Probably a former district police officer from the Asiatic regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bonya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Been with Wagner since 2014 but still unidentified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chukcha</td>
<td>Kirill Vladimirovich TIKHONOVOIC</td>
<td>M-0379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chukcha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander, Assault Team 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chukcha</td>
<td></td>
<td>DoB 16 March 1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

312 2107434E.

313 This assessment is agreed by two confidential sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner Organization. The Panel has seen other documents authenticated as genuine ChVK Wagner documents where both the Cyrillic initials “DU” and “DA” appear in the same handwriting as approval signatures.
13. The Panel notes that the equipment list contains equipment, weapons and ammunition not previously seen in Libya before 2020, and reported for the first time in Panel report S/2021/229: (a) MIC VPL Tigr-M armoured vehicles;\(^{315}\) (b) KBP RPO-A Schmel Thermobaric Munitions;\(^{316}\) (c) VOG-17M 30mm Grenades; and (d) VOG-25 40mm Grenades.\(^{317}\) These were all found by the Panel to be violations of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) by a Russian PMC.

14. Other weapons on the equipment list have been identified by the Panel as being newly present in Libya during 2021, and are reported on elsewhere in the report: (a) AK-103 Assault Rifles manufactured in 2020 (annex 52); and (b) Steyr SSG 08 anti materiel rifle (annex 65).

15. The Panel noted that some military materiel requested in the equipment list are technologically advanced systems that have only very recently been made available for operational use. The systems include: (a) the Ironiya electro-optical system (serial 17 to table 100.E.1), which was first seen publicly in April 2019;\(^{318}\) (b) the 1L277 Sobolyatnik battlefield surveillance radar (see serial 11 to table 100.E.1), which have only been seen operationally deployed since 2018.\(^{319}\)

16. The Panel is currently investigating how much of the requested equipment was physically supplied, if any, to ChVK Wagner in Libya.

Media response to BBC coverage in Russia

17. Media outlets closely linked to, or controlled by, Yevgeny Prigozhin\(^ {320}\) have heavily criticised the initial BBC report.\(^ {321}\) RIAFAN (a.k.a the Federal News Agency)\(^ {322}\) stated the BBC report was “…an assortment of inventions, rumours, falsified materials and fakes which have been disproved many times”.

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\(^{314}\) Another Wagner mercenary with this nickname, Alexander Viktorovich UMANSKY (M-1181), was previously killed in operations elsewhere.

\(^{315}\) Annex 63.

\(^{316}\) Annex 60.

\(^{317}\) Annex 77. VOG-17 and VOG-25.


\(^{320}\) Mentioned as connected with ChVK Wagner in Panel report S/2021/229 (annex 77 and appendix A to annex 77).


\(^{322}\) [https://riafan.ru/1502678-professionalizm-izhi-vasserman-obyasnil-cel-filma-vvs-o-rossiyanakh-v-livii](https://riafan.ru/1502678-professionalizm-izhi-vasserman-obyasnil-cel-filma-vvs-o-rossiyanakh-v-livii). This is also commonly referred to as the “Troll Factory”.
18. The RIAFAN response was reprised in other media outlets within the Prigozhin controlled Patriot Media group. RIAFAN questioned the chain of custody of the electronic tablet and the continuity of the evidence contained within it.

19. Key to the RIAFAN response was that some of the locations within the mapping application were under the control of the GNU-AF and “Tripoli gangs” in 2019. This is true, but irrelevant as they later came under control of HAF and ChVK Wagner (see paragraph 4).

20. RIAFAN also reported that they had interviewed an individual mentioned in the report, Fedor METELKIN (“Metla”), who denied being in Libya and that he worked on a construction site.

Communications liaison between ChVK Wagner and HAF

21. The Panel obtained a copy of a separate handwritten document that contained receipts from HAF officers for the delivery of BauFeng UV-5R series hand-held radios. Two independent confidential Panel sources with extensive knowledge of the ChVK Wagner organization considered the document as credible and authentic. The Panel has also confirmed that the names of the HAF officials accurately reflect the command appointments reflected in the document. A copy of the original documentation and official UN translation is at appendix H, and summarised in table 100.4 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receipt #</th>
<th>ChVK Wagner name</th>
<th>HAF Official in receipt</th>
<th>Communication device</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zurab*</td>
<td>lieutenant colonel Omar Mraji‘i Hasan commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Salih Abbudah battlefield commander</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division</td>
<td>BauFeng 5R</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Confidential source.

https://mediapatriot.ru/o-mediagruppe/.

https://baofengtech.com/product/uv-5r/.
## Table 2.7: Receipt of Communication Devices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receipt #</th>
<th>ChVK Wagner name</th>
<th>HAF Official in receipt</th>
<th>Communication device</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>lieutenant colonel Omar Mraji’i commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad battalion</td>
<td>BauFeng 5R</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division</td>
<td>BauFeng 5R</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Ahmad Salim commander, second division</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>Ali al-Ghazwi (^b) western region operations room</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>Ali al-Ghazwi western region operations room</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Zurab</td>
<td>major general Salih Abbudah battlefield commander forward operations room western region operations room</td>
<td>BauFeng UV-5R</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) See table 27.3.
\(^b\) a.k.a Mabrouk Al Ghazwi.

### 22. The Panel assesses that the radios were supplied to ensure deconfliction between the armed groups during low-level tactical operations within a 5km area. The radios are readily available consumer items, insecure and obsolescent. Nevertheless, they are cheap, simple to operate, can be pre-programmed to operate on specific frequencies and are expendable.

**Verified open-source information**

### 23. A social media page for the mercenary community,\(^{327}\) known as Reverse Side of the Medal (RSOTM), has recently begun to display imagery of ChVK Wagner in Libya that was verified by geo-location or from other sources.\(^{328}\)

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\(^{327}\) [https://twitter.com/RS0TM](https://twitter.com/RS0TM).

\(^{328}\) For example:

- [https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1403061848665112588](https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1403061848665112588), 10 June 2021 (@0.31 minutes) (geo-located);
- [https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1420379513712746499](https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1420379513712746499), 28 July 2021;
- [https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/143166303786646851](https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/143166303786646851), 28 August 2021 (by geo-location); and
- [https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1431657243603259401](https://twitter.com/RS0TM/status/1431657243603259401), 28 August 2021 (by geo-location).
24. Other social media video imagery\textsuperscript{329} contains evidence of ChVK Wagner in Libya. This video, geo-located by the Panel, shows a mixed ChVK Wagner and HAF 106 brigade convoy entering Bani Walid in late May 2020. The image at figure 100.2 provides evidence of ChVK Wagner / HAF interoperability as the vehicle is painted in the distinctive “Africa” camouflage used exclusively by HAF 106 brigade.

Figure 100.2
HAF 106 brigade ‘Africa’ camouflage

\textsuperscript{329} https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2w2S05sQ, 26 May 2020.
Appendix A to Annex 100: Low level tactical publications (example)
Appendix B to Annex 100: Diagrams of fuzes, mines and booby traps (example)
Appendix C to Annex 100: Mapping software mine and booby trap locations (examples)
Appendix D to Annex 100: Imagery of explosive ordnance recovered from old ChVK Wagner locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MON-50 APM</th>
<th>MON-90 APM</th>
<th>OZM-72 APM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="MON-50 APM" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="MON-90 APM" /></td>
<td><img src="image" alt="OZM-72 APM" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Primary sources**

1. @Jpc.ly Twitter, 3 September 2021.
4. customer.janes.com (Subscription), 7 September 2021.
5. CAR-UXO. 7 September 2021.

Developed by UN Panel of Experts.
Appendix E to Annex 100: ChVK logistic resupply documentation (original: left; translation: right)\textsuperscript{330}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|p{0.4\textwidth}|p{0.6\textwidth}|}
\hline
\textbf{Requisition note} & \\
\hline
I hereby request the purchase of the following communication equipment to ensure the success of the Lipetsk (LIBYA) combat mission: & \\
\hline
1. Motorola DM4600 radio to be installed in vehicles and armoured vehicles, 70 units. & \\
2. AW-6 UHF antenna, 70 units. & \\
3. Set of cables, 70 sets (a power cable to connect the radio to the battery, a set of cables and mount for connecting the radio to the antenna and a BU-312 antenna adopter). & \\
4. Motorola DP4400 wearable radio (in a set with two batteries and charging device), 190 sets (replacements for the old Motorola DP4-400, Vertex, radios). & \\
5. A backpack for carrying a Motorola DM4600 radio with two lithium polymer batteries, with a pocket for the radio and another for the battery, charging device, antenna assembly with mount for connecting the radio to an eight-meter antenna, and a cable assembly for the AW-6 UHF antenna, 20 sets. & \\
6. DJI Mavic 2 Pro quadcopter with night vision camera, 20 sets. & \\
7. Smartphone with a 64 GB SD card for installing the All-in-One Offline Maps application, 30 units. & \\
8. Throat microphone for Motorola DP4400 and DP4600 radios, 500 units. & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{330} Only two pages of the ten have been included due to document size limitations.
Requisition note

The following equipment, munitions, optical devices and communications equipment are required to carry out the Lipetsk and [unknown abbreviation] SSbG Trak combat missions:

I. Armoured vehicles

1. BTR-82 armoured personnel carrier, two units.
2. BMP-2 armoured personnel carrier, one unit.
3. T-72B tank, one unit.
4. Land Cruiser Pickup 70 with ZU-23 gun, four units.
5. Land Cruise Pickup 70 (armoured), five units.

II. Munitions

1. 9L333 Verba shoulder-fired air-defence missile system with 1L122-2E radar, two units.
2. 120-mm 2B11 mortar (for Assault Team 1 and the Legion assault group), six units.
3. Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, three units.
4. 7.62-mm PKM light machine gun, eight units.
5. AS Val assault rifle (GRAU designation 6P29), three units.
6. 9-mm Stachka automatic pistol, 40 units.
7. 9-mm PB silent pistol (Russian armed forces GRAU index 6P9), six units.
8. 7.62-mm PBS silencer, 20 units.
9. 12-gauge semi-automatic shotgun, 16 units.

III. Ammunition

1. PG-7 (fragmentation) rocket, 50 units.
2. Subsonic 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 28,000 rounds.
3. 9 x 56 mm PA/AB-9 ammunition, 5,000 rounds.
4. MRO-A sighting device, 100 units.
5. RPO rocket, 50 units.
6. 12-gauge cartridge (buckshot), 2,000 rounds.
7. 12-gauge cartridge (ballet), 2,000 rounds.
8. Rockets for the Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, 60 units.
IV. Optical devices

1. 1PN93-3 night sight (for night-vision Kalashnikov machine gun), 10 units.
2. 1PN93-1 night sight for assault rifle, six units.
3. Laser designator with Picatinny rail mount for Kalashnikov assault rifle, 10 units.

V. Communications equipment

1. Motorola DP radio headset, 60 units.
2. Quadcopter with night vision and zoom, four units.
3. Noise-cancelling headphones, 60 units.

[Handwritten note:]
Throat microphone, 100 units
DI-600 [illegible]
DP-4400 [illegible]

19 January 2020

“1374”
Commander, Assault Team 1

Engineer operations

UR-83 mine clearing system, three units
ZTP-50, 150 and 300 times
Portable manual mine clearance kits, 20 units
PM-4 blasting machine, 10 units
Green camouflage netting (3.5 x 6), 30 units
Metal detectors, five units

Understaffing of 60 persons (maximum age: 40, maximum weight: 100 kg)

19 January 2020

“Cap”
Commander, Assault Team 2
Appendix F to Annex 100: Imagery from the 5 July 2020 explosion site

Figure 100.F.1  
Overview of incident site (5 July 2020)

Figure 100.F.2  
Location of victims (5 July 2020)

Source: Confidential source.
### Appendix G to Annex 100: Summary of major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

Table 100.G.1
Major equipment requested by ChVK Wagner in Libya

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<th>Generic Type</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Signals</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
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<th>Assault Team 2</th>
<th>Assault Team 6</th>
<th>Assault Team 7</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<sup>331</sup> Requested but quantity unidentified.
<sup>332</sup> Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
<sup>333</sup> Night Vision Sight.
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334 Electronic Warfare System.
335 Armoured Fighting Vehicles / Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles.
336 Armoured Personnel Carrier.
337 Anti-Tank Guided Weapon.
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<th>Generic Type</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Signals</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>7.62 x 39mm Rounds Link</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>9 x 56mm PAB-9 Rounds</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.7mm Rounds Link</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>12 Gauge Pellet</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>12 Gauge Solid Shot</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>23mm Rounds</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

338 Man Portable Air Defence System.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Generic Type</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Signals</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Assault Team 1</th>
<th>Assault Team 2</th>
<th>Assault Team 6</th>
<th>Assault Team 7</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*a The equipment in **bold** has been identified as being in Libya in violation of the arms embargo.*
Appendix H to Annex 100: HAF receipts for communications equipment from ChVK Wagner

Only one of the six documents has been included due to document size limitations.
Document No. 2
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Twenty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

| Deliverer: | On behalf of the company | Zurab |
| Recipient: | On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces | Lieutenant Colonel Omar Mraji’l Hasan Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion |

Document No. 3
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

| Deliverer: | On behalf of the company | Zurab |
| Recipient: | On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces | Major General Salih Abbudah Battlefield Commander |

Document No. 4
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

| Deliverer: | On behalf of the company | Zurab |
| Recipient: | On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces | Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division |

Document No. 5
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Fifteen black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

| Deliverer: | On behalf of the company | Zurab |
| Recipient: | On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces | Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division |
Document No. 6
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document No. 7
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Five black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Omar Mraji’i Commander, Tareq Bin Ziyad Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document No. 8
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Seven black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document No. 9
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Ahmad Salim Commander, Second Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Document No. 11
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Two black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng 5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Operations Room Ali al-Ghazwi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document No. 12
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Ten black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Western Region Operations Room Ali al-Ghazwi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Document ?
Delivery and receipt of wireless devices
Fifty black Chinese-made Turbo Sky wireless devices (Baufeng UV-5R) were delivered to the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliverer:</th>
<th>Recipient:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On behalf of the company Zurab</td>
<td>On behalf of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces Major General Salih Abbudah Battlefield Commander Forward Operations Room Western Region Operations Room</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 101  End user certificates for communication surveillance systems

1. Figures 101.1 to 101.3 are the EUC submitted by AR Global FZE to the supplier. The signatory, Ahmed Al Alwerfly, is not one of the only two individuals authorised to sign on behalf of Libya, as notified to the Committee in accordance with Implementation Notice (IAN) Number 2.340

Figure 101.1
EUC for Sigma Thuraya (3 December 2020)

340 As provided in letter from the Permanent Representative of the State of Libya to the United Nations on 12 December 2018.
Figure 101.2
EUC for Alpha Max surveillance system (3 December 2020)

### END-USER CERTIFICATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Parties</th>
<th>4. Country of final destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Experior</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Consignee</td>
<td>Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Libya, Benghazi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Libya, Benghazi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha-MAX tactical cellular interception system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quantity (Units) / weight:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 qty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. End-use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Specification of end-use location of the items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-terrorism and organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Libya, Benghazi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+218 61 479 9494 info@gacily.com www.gacily.com
C. Commitment

We certify that the items described in section B1:

1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.

2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)

5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance of such commitments.

6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.

I undersigned

NAME – RANK/ROLE

AHMED M. ALWAFLY

certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.

(Signature)

03/12/2020-Libya

(Place, Date)
Figure 101.3
EUC Alpha interception system (3 December 2020)

### END-USER CERTIFICATE

**A. Parties**

1. **Exporter**

   [Redacted]

   **Country of final destination.**

   Libya

2. **Consignee**

   Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
   East Libya, Benghazi

3. **End-user**

   Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
   East Libya, Benghazi

**B. Goods**

1. **Items**

   - Alpha-AC-V tactical cellular interception system.
   - Alpha-DET tactical cellular interception detection system.

2. **Quantity (Units) / weight:**

   1 qty

3. **End-use**

   This is a software and hardware solution for intelligence purposes and tactical interception of cellular communications. This product is sold only to qualified government intelligence agencies.

4. **Specification of end-use location of the items**

   Anti-terrorism and organized crime

   Libyan Ministry of Communication and Information Technology
   East Libya, Benghazi
C. Commitment

We certify that the items described in section B1:

1. will only be used for the purposes described in section B.3 and that the items are intended for final use in the country named in section A.4.

2. that the items will not be used in any nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activity.

3. that the items will not be used for any purpose connected with any chemical or biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

4. that the items will only be used for civil end uses. (Tick if applicable)

5. as far as technology is concerned, we certify that we treat the technology strictly confidential and neither pass the technology on to other companies nor shall we make knowledge available to third parties. In case of goods produced by the help of transferred technology, these goods will only be delivered to a third person/company in condition that this person/company accepts the commitments of the above declaration as binding for itself and on condition that this third person/company is known to be trustworthy and reliable in the observance of such commitments.

6. we further certify that we will not re-export the items to a third country without the consent of the UAE authorities.

I undersigned

NAME – RANK/ROLE

AHMED M. ALWRFLY

certify that the information given in this document is true and accurate.

(Signature) 03/12/2020 – Libya

(Place, Date) (Company Stamp / Official seal)
Annex 102  Member States and regional organizations responses to arms embargo violations

1. In S/2021/229[341] the Panel provided information on unilateral action taken by Member States and regional organizations during 2020 to violations of the arms embargo. Table 102.1[342] summarises unilateral responses taken from 1 January 2021 to 31 March 2022, and for those unreported in S/2021/229.

Table 102.1
Member State responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Equipment / Entity</th>
<th>Member State location</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul 2020</td>
<td>Kapor Trade LP a</td>
<td>Engines and spare parts for vehicle type used by</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Consignment seized pending disposal decision. b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Azee Air LLC (AZL) c</td>
<td>Airline</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Revocation of air operating certificate. d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Feb 2021</td>
<td>Jenis Air LLC (JEN) e</td>
<td>Airline</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Revocation of air operating certificate. f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 2021</td>
<td>Company g</td>
<td>Communications surveillance equipment.</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Denial of export licence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reference (24.38-72E)-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jun 2021</td>
<td>FlySky Airlines (FSU) h</td>
<td>Airline</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Revocation of air operating certificate. i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Oct 2021</td>
<td>L6-FZE j</td>
<td>LASA T-Bird (#YU-TSH)</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Revocation of civil aircraft registration. k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 2021</td>
<td>Individual 1</td>
<td>Member of ChVK Wagner</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Placed under restrictive measures. m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Jan 2022</td>
<td>Add Helium n</td>
<td>Rebreathing diving equipment</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Supply prohibited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner and manager from the company convicted. o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Kapor Trade LP, Office 29, Clifton House. Fitzwilliam Street Lower, Dublin, D02 XT91.
b Member State.
c Appendix D to Annex 55 to S/2021/229.
d Revocation Order: 00.47.
e Appendix E to Annex 55 to S/2021/229.
f Revocation Order: 00.46.

[342] This table does not include national or regional organization designation listings made in response to a UN designation.
The company cooperated fully with the Panel and the contract was immediately cancelled by the company once they were aware that the system would be a breach of a UN arms embargo. This occurred before the Panel made contact with the company. The Panel considers that it is not necessary to expose them to the reputational risk resulting from the company being identified in a Panel report.

b Annexe 75 to S/2021/229.

Revocation No: UK 058.

Annexe 76 to S/2021/229.

De-registration Certificate No-01-0022/2021-0008.

Annexe 77 to S/2021/229.


Annex 103  HAF tactical ballistic missile test launches

1.  Background

1.  On 7 March 2022 the 1st missile battalion of the LAAF launched at least three tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) in eastern Libya. HAF claimed that two single missiles and a double missile launch took place, but available open-source imagery can only confirm a single and a double launch. This was an unexpected event that surprised much of the international community. Unannounced launches of any form of ballistic missile type may act as deterrence but they are also equally likely to be regarded as threatening, particularly when launched by a non-state actor with the recent history HAF has for initiating armed conflict.

2.  HAF displayed ballistic missiles with a profile virtually identical to the R-17/SCUD-B TBM at the 29 May 2021 "7th Anniversary of Operation Dignity" parade in Benina. Four transport erector launchers (TEL) (figure 103.1) and four missile transport vehicles (figure 103.2) were paraded.

2.  Identification of missile type

3.  The imagery resolution and positioning of the missiles on the vehicles was not sufficient to be able to confirm the exact type of missile or whether they were practicable TBM or not. The number and positioning of fuel and oxidiser filling and drainage valves is a key visual indicator as to type and figure 103.3, as an example, shows the key components for a SCUD-B.

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345 4 April 2019 "Operation Flood of Dignity" offensive against Tripoli.
346 SCUD-B can also be classified as a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM), which has a range classification of up to 1,000km. The Panel will use the term TBM to desensitise the issue. Some Member States also classify it as an Operational-Tactical missile.
348 9P117 Uragan 8x8 MAZ-453 wheeled vehicles.
349 One missile was displayed on the LNA “Alkarama parade” on 7 May 2018. https://mobile.twitter.com/mahmoudgami/status/993809662163243008, 8 May 2018.
4. Although virtually identical to the R17/SCUD TBM it is also possible that the missiles are Hwasong-6 TBM. Libya reportedly acquired a few from the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea in 1993.\textsuperscript{351} The Hwasong-6 is a variant of the SCUD-C design. The only major external difference from the SCUD-B being the missile length (see table 103.1). Imagery resolution was insufficient to enable the use of photogrammetry as the differential in length of 0.31m is only 2.8% of the total length, which is within the error margin for photogrammetry at this resolution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile</th>
<th>Diameter</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Warhead Mass</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Accuracy (CEP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCUD-B</td>
<td>0.88m</td>
<td>11.25m</td>
<td>545kg\textsuperscript{354}</td>
<td>300km</td>
<td>450m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwasong-6</td>
<td>0.88m</td>
<td>10.94m</td>
<td>770kg</td>
<td>500km</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Launch operations

5. Confidential satellite imagery identified the launch area as being at 31°51’08”N, 20°24”02’E (figure 103.4). Four TEL vehicles, five military trucks and two unidentified light utility vehicles were observed on the access road to the training area where the launch positions were located. HAF misinformation placed the launch area as south of Suluq (see figure 103.5).

6. Open-source media reported that the missiles were launched "towards hypothetical targets 300km south of Tobruk",\textsuperscript{355} (see figure 103.5) but the HAF released imagery of the target area only showed explosions and could not be geo-

\textsuperscript{350} From UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report \textit{S/2018/594}. Not scaled but proportional. Valves are shown larger proportionally than on real missile to assist in identification. FFV is Fuel Filling Valve, FDV is Fuel Drainage Valve, OFV is Oxidiser Filling Valve and ODV is Oxidiser Drainage Valve.

\textsuperscript{351} \url{https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-6/}.

\textsuperscript{352} Data varies dependent on source, so worse case options used in this table, which was compiled primarily from \url{customer.janes.com}.

\textsuperscript{353} Circular Error Probability. The CEP is a measure of a weapon system’s precision. It is defined as the radius of a circle, centred on the mean, whose boundary is expected to include the landing points of 50% of the missiles fired.

\textsuperscript{354} From confidential “SCUD data pack”.

\textsuperscript{355} \url{https://twitter.com/ObservatoryLY/status/150096276806477765?s=20&t=60EpJCaRRCelikjg6V3Nvg}, & March 2022.
referenced, so the range of the missile, and effectiveness of the warhead cannot yet be independently verified. Official HAF imagery of the firings was released (see figures 103.6 to 103.8).  

Figure 103.4  
Location of missile launch area

Source: Google Earth

Figure 103.5
Map of missile launch location and possible target area
7. Note the red flag at the front left-hand side of the TEL vehicle. This almost certainly indicates that the missiles are being fired from pre-surveyed positions. Pre-surveyed positions are used to assist in the accuracy of the missile system. They are an indicator that this was the launch of a fully capable missile.

8. Also note that in the HAF video that the crew are wearing full personal protective equipment, indicating that live fuelling operations took place on site. The missile can only be safely filled with the liquid bipropellant when it is in the erected launch position. The missile should not be pre-fuelled when in the transport position as the missile propellant tanks and joints are not strong enough to support the weight of the fuel and oxidiser when being moved the 90° from the transport to launch position. There is also the risk of internal valve leakage due to movement-induced internal pressure on seals. Either event could result in immediate spontaneous combustion of the bipropellant if the fuel and oxidiser met the ignition fuel (usually “Samin”).
Figure 103.7
TBM on TEL in launch position

9. The Libyan flag and the Arabic text “Al Karama” are indicators that this is real imagery of the launch area.
10. The orange-brown smoke on launch is typical for the combustion of the fuel (kerosene or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH)) and the oxidiser (inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA)). These chemicals also have commercial applications and are available in Libya. Stocks of the bipropellant have been reported as been stored near Tobruk. 357

11. Analysis of imagery from the launch (figure 103.9) shows indicators that live warheads were fitted to the missiles, but no evidence as to if the full explosive yield of 545kg was present. 358

357 Confidential source.
358 Two of the three ballistic missiles show a constant diameter from the base until the guidance and control section, but one appears to have a guidance and control section with a smaller diameter and a small conic section below the guidance and control section, and also between the oxidiser tank and the tail unit (see the missile at the top in figure 103.9 versus the one at the bottom). This is probably an optical illusion, because the cable ducts make the diameter look a bit larger; investigations of this continue.
12. Comparison against one of the few known images of a Libyan SCUD-B (figure 103.10) clearly shows that the black line markings for safe lift points and internal separation points are in the identical positions of those launched (figure 103.9).
3. Availability

13. The availability of SCUD-B TBM in Libya is, yet, undetermined. In February 2005 Muammar Qadhafi attempted to sell the entire Libyan stockpile of 417 SCUD missiles to the United States of America for USD 834 million, but the United States only acquired ten for testing. More recent estimates state that only 80 SCUD-B missiles remained at the time of the 2011 uprising.  

14. During the 2011 uprising Qadhafi launched a SCUD-B TBM against rebel forces, which had no military effect. At that time experts doubted the utility of Libya's SCUD-B TBM arsenal due to poor maintenance and operability, and a history of suboptimal test flight and combat performance.

15. Technical sources who have operated within Libya over the past ten years have yet to report seeing any examples of the SCUD-B TBM, which have remained "hidden" from the international community. Reports have stated that although missile main assemblies may have existed, the specialist missile fuelling and air pressure systems had been lost or were inoperable. The launch on 7 March 2022 clearly indicates that HAF have resolved this issue.

Source: http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets/Specials/Scud/.

360 https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/libya-missile/.
4. Threat analysis

16. The low number of SCUD-B available to HAF are of minimal military utility. They can only deliver an explosive warhead, no bigger than an average terrorist vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), to an accuracy of within 450m of the target under ideal conditions.

17. Nevertheless, the launch demonstrates that HAF has access to capable missile engineers and technicians, highly probably with cross-transferable skills allowing them to maintain the remainder of his arsenal. This being another indicator of their movement from undisciplined light infantry towards a capable all arms combat force. Khalifa Haftar personally attended the launch and regarded it as a success, and then immediately promoted all the personnel of 1st missile battalion.

18. The possession of a capability to launch ballistic missiles, even at the tactical level, is highly symbolic and goes well beyond the actual combat effectiveness of the system. They are regarded as "prestige" weapon systems despite their limited military utility. Only two non-state actors are confirmed as possessing a launch capability for TBM: (a) the Houthi in Yemen;\(^\text{362}\) and now (b) HAF.

19. The possession of TBM by non-states actors provides them with a long-range strike capability to attack symbolic area targets such as international airports or critical national infrastructure. Although damage will be limited there is a strategic impact as: (a) it demonstrates a defensive weakness if the target party does not have an effective air defence system;\(^\text{363}\) (b) it compels the target party to deploy a disproportionate air defence capability to reassure the civilian population; (c) it demonstrates the vulnerability of the civilian population to surprise attacks by TBM; and (d) results in an immediate increase in military tension.

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\(^\text{363}\) MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems did not stop Houthi SRBM attacks against Riyadh. See footnote 98 to para.82 of S/2018/594.
Annex 104  Central Bank of Libya (CBL) reunification process from report of external consultant to the CBL

1. Pillars and challenges resulting from the institutional split
   (a) Currency stability;
   (b) Reserves management;
   (c) Monetary policy;
   (d) Foreign exchange regulation;
   (e) Financial system stability; and
   (f) Banking regulation.

2. Recommendations
   (a) Strengthen financial accountability and transparency;
   (b) Reconcile the two branches’ Balance Sheets;
   (c) Unifying the ledger system of the two branches;
   (d) Assessment of letters of Credit system/process;
   (e) Review foreign currency sales distribution to ensure fair distribution;
   (f) Review the composition of asset backing for Currency in Circulation issued by the two branches;
   (g) Adoption of widely accepted IFRS standards for financial reporting;
   (h) Periodic physical count of gold, currencies and verification of value of other tangible assets;
   (i) Establish third party confirmation process;
   (j) Resolve potential conflicts of interest on account of holding investments;
   (k) Assessment of impact of devaluation of LYD;
   (l) Unified organization structure, operations, resource needs and plans;
   (m) Establishment of effective governance and internal controls;
   (n) Comprehensive governance framework for transactions with the Public Treasury; and
   (o) Ensure data proposed to be published reconciles with the trial balances.
Figure 105.1
Assessment of progress status of LIA by Ernst and Young Global Limited

![Progress status of EY's work: 18 February 2022](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Work progress</th>
<th>Report draft issued?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tangible and intangible assets</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in subsidiaries</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in associate and JV</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in financial assets</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and bank balances</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchases and Trade payables</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payroll</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting and Information System</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AUPl**

| Investments in financial assets   | 30%           | No                  |
| Trade and Other receivables       | 40%           | Yes                 |
| Cash and bank balances            | 90%           | Yes                 |
| Equity                            | 60%           | Yes                 |
| Retained Earnings - Focus Revenues| 0%            | No                  |

**Source:** Ernst and Young Global Limited.
بيان صحفي

تنفيذًا لأحكام القضاء النافذة، أفرج اليوم عن الموقوف الساعدي معمر القذافي بعد عامين من قرار الإفراج عليه بالتعاون مع مكتب النائب العام وجهة الردع لمكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة. وقد تسلمته عائلته وفقاً لإجراءات القانونية.

واذ تؤكد حكومة الوحدة الوطنية التزامها بما تعهدت به بالعمل على الإفراج على جميع السجناء ممن تقضي أوضاعهم القانونية ذلك دون استثناء، فإنها تأمل بأن تكون مثل هذه الجهود تصب في مسار المصالحة الوطنية الشاملة، والتي أساسها اتفاق القانون واحترامه.

حكومة الوحدة الوطنية
06/09/2021م
In accordance with binding court rulings, the detainee Saadi Muammar Qadhafi was released today, two years after the decision to release him was issued. The release was executed in cooperation with the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the Deterrent Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. He was received by his family in accordance with the relevant legal procedures.

The Government of National Unity reaffirms that it is committed to its undertaking to release all prisoners, without exception, whose legal situation warrants doing so, and it hopes that such efforts will promote comprehensive national reconciliation, the basis of which is enforcement of and respect for the law.

Government of National Unity
6 September 2021
Annex 107  Certificate of death for Abu Zayd Umar Dorda (LYi.006)
Official UN translation
Translated from Arabic

Arab Republic of Egypt
Ministry of the Interior
Civil Status Division

Copy of death registration

National ID:

Particulars of the deceased

Name: Abu Zayd Umar Ahmid Durdah
Gender: Male
Religion: Muslim
Nationality: Libya
Mother’s name:

Social status: Married

Date of death: 28 February 2022
Place of death: Cairo
Age at death: 78 years, 1 month, 27 days

Place of birth:
Health office: Zaynhum
Record No.: 1155
Civil registration office: Sayidah Zaynab
Date of record: 28 February 2022
Issuing registry: Division forms office
Date of issue: 24 March 2022

Serial number: 149555820

Check for watermark and eagle emblem of the Republic - Civil status document

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of the Interior</th>
<th>Request to obtain copy of death registration (Form 40/3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Status Division</td>
<td>Special service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name of person requesting service:

Date: