

# **Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations Trends and Challenges Session One 26 March 2007**

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### **Background**

Progression through various phases of Peace Operations

- Monitoring ceasefires between states (The Cold War phase – but remember also ONUC in 1960s in the Congo some similarities with current operations)
- Post cold war operations in early 1990s –essentially experimental and mono dimensional
- The Brahimi Report and trend to “Integrated Operations”
- Emergence of genuine Multidimensional Operations
- Transitional Administrations (eg: Timor, Kosovo)

### **Reasons for Trend to complex operations**

- Natural evolution in response to lessons learned (an example from Mozambique – PKO framework at that time unable to assist with funding for DDR)
- Huge and embarrassing failures (Rwanda Bosnia and Somalia)
- Recognition that just focusing on security aspects was not working and root causes not being addressed
- Kofi Annan’s four interlinked pillars “ security, development, governance, human rights”

## **Current Trends**

- A steady intensification of move to Multidimensional Peace Operations (“MDPOs”)
- Essentially MDPOs are now Security Council default option
- Very strong support for MDPOs from AU
- But Council will decide case by case
- Trend to resist MDPOs in some cases (Sudan Chad Lebanon)
- Interesting examples of support in Asia (Nepal, Timor where operations are predominantly civilian not military)

## **Current Challenges**

### *A. Political Resistance*

- Reasons may include fear that end result will change power relationships/ leading to arguments based on sovereignty
- Fear of western imposed agenda
- Fear that MDPO carries stigma of “Failed state”
- Fear of coerced consent

### *B. Failures of Integration*

- Always a big UN problem at Interdepartmental and Interagency level, but Country Teams may be improving situation in many cases
- Real worries among many delegations in NY about SG’s restructuring of DPKO in this respect – but have agreed reluctantly to proceed
- When coalitions are present in so called mixed operations the outcomes can be badly affected due to split control (e.g. Kosovo UNMIK/KFOR/OSCE –couldn’t prevent ethnic cleansing)
- Need to watch out for similar problems in Timor Leste

- UNAMA seems to be doing rather better – but huge challenge of coordination and Council plays little practical role

*C. Development is seen as still the “Poor Relation”*

- Example of MINUSTAH
- Concerns in Council
- Voluntary versus assessed funding issue
- When Military Units bring their own aid packages these problems are diminished
- Planning Donor coordination as part of development of mission concept could help

*D. Slow Start by the Peacebuilding Commission*

- History of establishment part of problem
- Difficult relationship with Council
- NY focus
- Perception of PBC as simply another donor is an issue
- PBC ability to play successful coordination role in the field still not proven

*E. Still learning how to mainstream Human Rights/Governance Reform advice/SSR*

- Council Mandates inconsistent
- DPKO is producing very good Doctrine material
- How to determine what kind of political and security sector structures the people in host country want and are appropriate is huge task for SRSGs
- What kinds of models should be used
- Getting right balance between peace and justice and avoiding impunity is major challenge

*F. Security Council Performance*

- Limited attention span

- Working methods still don't effectively involve TCC
- No role for host country in Working methods
- Military Staff Committee dormant
- How to energise Working Group on PKOs

### *G. Exit Strategies*

- The “hold election then cut and run” strategy has been disastrous
- Hand off to PBC is not yet a viable option
- The persistent tendency to look at most missions through a cost saving prism

### *H. Managing Violence*

- Spoilers are inevitable eg resisting DDR and need to be confronted
- Attacks on civilians need to be deterred and responded to robustly
- Passivity in missions is sometimes a real problem (even when robust mandate (MONUC and MINUSTAH at earlier stages)
- Over emphasis on force protection often leads to inadequate discharge of mandate even in robust missions (The failure in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing shows it is also a problem even when coalitions command the military component)
- Impartiality does not mean neutrality (Brahimi)

### *I. Conclusion*

- Future credibility of UN is at stake if future failures are traced back to failure to apply in the field the wider lessons and principles (will be worse backlash than the 90s)
- Need to have solutions to compelling challenges of the present (protection of civilians in Darfur)

- Need for peace to keep and commitment to peace processes (challenge of Chad at present)
- How and when to use force remains a critical issue.
- The challenges currently being faced are not insuperable – they are really more a part of the natural evolution of the MDPO concept.
- There are strong opportunities for countries in Asia participating in these operations to play a more active role in planning and training not only at home and regionally, but also in NY via TCC meetings, in more active involvement with the Security Council and its subordinate bodies and with the Secretariat