Overview

South Africa will preside over the Security Council in January. President Jacob Zuma is expected to preside over a high-level debate on the strategic partnership between the UN and the AU in the area of the maintenance of peace and security. The Secretary-General is likely to brief on his report on this matter expected to be published in early January.

An open debate is planned on justice and the rule of law, with a possible Arria formula meeting preceding it.

An open debate on the Middle East is also expected.

Several other briefings are planned on:
- the Middle East, most likely by Special Coordinator Robert Serry;
- Libya, by Special Representative Ian Martin, to be followed by consultations;
- Yemen, by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar (in consultations);
- Iraq and progress towards ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, and on compliance with making required deposits to the compensation fund established under resolution 687 (1991) and the post-Development Fund for Iraq mechanism, most likely by the UN Controller, Maria Eugenia Casar, to be followed by consultations;
- the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), probably by the Joint Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari, to be followed by consultations;
- the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA), by Special Representative Said Djinnit, to be followed by consultations;
- the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), by Special Representative Bert Koenders, to be followed by consultations;
- children and armed conflict, by Special Representative Radhika Coomaraswami (in consultations);
- justice and the rule of law, possibly by the Secretary-General; and
- issues of current concern, as part of the monthly horizon scanning practice (in consultations), by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe.

UN-AU Strategic Partnership

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is expected to hold an open debate on the strategic partnership between the UN and the AU with respect to maintenance of peace and security in Africa. South African President Jacob Zuma is expected to preside and the President of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in January 2012 (Kenya) is likely to address the Council. The Secretary General is likely to brief on the UN’s strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation. A likely outcome will be a resolution underlining the importance of the relationship and stressing the need to create mechanisms for a more effective strategic partnership.

Background and Key Recent Developments

Since 1990, about 44 percent of Council meetings have dealt with situations in Africa. South Africa will preside over the Security Council in January. President Jacob Zuma is expected to preside over a high-level debate on the strategic partnership between the UN and the AU in the area of the maintenance of peace and security. The Secretary-General is likely to brief on his report on this matter expected to be published in early January.

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- issues of current concern, as part of the monthly horizon scanning practice (in consultations), by the head of the Department of Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe.

Consultations may also be scheduled to review the force level of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

In January, the Council will select two of its elected members to be part of the Organisational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission for a one-year term and is expected to announce the bureaux of its subsidiary bodies for the year 2012.

In Hindsight: The Working Methods Open Debate

Sudan/Darfur

South Sudan

Libya

Côte d’Ivoire

UNOWA (West Africa)

Iraq

Yemen

Rule of Law

Status Update since our December 2011 Forecast

Notable Dates
On 30 November 2011, the Council held an open debate on its working methods, the fourth such debate on the issue with 35 delegations participating, including 20 members at large. As president, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal) volunteered to speak last, allowing him to sum up the debate.

Developments since 2006
Many speakers referred to developments since the Council undertook a more systematic approach to its working methods in 2006. One of the initial steps was deciding that the chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions should serve on an annual—as opposed to monthly—basis. Japan chaired the group in 2006, 2009 and 2010, culminating in two presidential notes (S/2006/507 and S/2010/507), cataloguing and updating practices and understandings.

Some progress
During November’s debate, Bosnia and Herzegovina, outgoing chair of the informal working group, highlighted some of the issues that the group had discussed:
- streamlining the issues under the Council’s active consideration; and
- distributing mandate renewals more evenly throughout the year.

Council members and members at large recognised some improvements, including:
- increased interaction with troop-contributing countries;
- briefings for non-Council members by presidents after the monthly adoption of the programme of work; and
- “horizon-scanning” briefings by the Department of Political Affairs.

“Always room for improvement”
Many delegations called for further implementation of note 507, describing it as “inconsistent”. Some, including China, said that there was “room for improvement” while others underscored the importance of the Council’s “continuing to innovate” [France] and being prepared to “evolve continually” [UK]. The Small Five (S5 – Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland), called for an action plan for implementation, suggesting that the informal working group could be mandated with this task.

Portugal, in a concept note circulated before the open debate (S/2011/726), encouraged suggestions that could make “a difference in the day-to-day business” of the Council. Five featured prominently:

1. The P5’s designation of chairs and leading on country-specific resolutions
Several speakers called for review of the practice by which P5 members alone dictate the chairs of subsidiary bodies. Switzerland described this as an “anachronism,” while Mexico said that the “opacity” was unacceptable.

Several members also questioned the P5’s lead on country-specific resolutions. India stated that it was difficult to understand why pen-holding should “basically be a monopoly of permanent members.” New Zealand said both practices lacked “any obvious justification and should be discontinued.”

2. Sharing of draft resolutions
Australia echoed many in calling for draft resolutions and presidential statements to be made available to non-members at an early stage. Spain directly linked this to paragraph 44 of note 507, which calls on the Council to do so “as appropriate” and “as soon as such documents are introduced.”

3. Monthly presidency assessments and the annual report
Speaking for the Non-Aligned Movement, Egypt welcomed the initiative of some presidents in preparing an analytical assessment of the work of the Council under their presidency. This trend should be institutionalised, it said, and be complemented by informal wrap-up sessions at the end of each presidency. Others, such as Japan and Nigeria, linked the improvement of monthly assessments to a more substantive and analytical annual report.

4. Open debates and informal meetings
Several speakers called on the Council to further increase the number of open debates and public meetings, as well as more frequent “Arria-formula” meetings (informal, procedurally-flexible gatherings with relevant parties).

Mexico called for the speakers list during open debates to be reversed so that Council members would deliver their statements at the end, encouraging them to “truly listen” to the membership. It expressed regret that Portugal was not allowed to do so during the 30 November debate.

Singapore questioned how the Council could benefit from others’ views when outcomes were often predetermined, whereas Colombia said a reasonable break should be allowed between debates and the adoption of outcomes. Portugal concluded that the goal of open debates was to “reflect the relevant inputs…not speaking first, deciding on the outcome and then listening to the wider membership.”

5. The use of the veto
Even though note 507 contains no provisions on the veto, three specific measures were proposed.

First, P5 members should provide an explanation of vote when casting a veto (suggested by Jordan, New Zealand and Spain). The latter described this as an “obligation of conduct.”

Second, P5 members should refrain from resorting to the veto when there are allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of international law. Jordan related this to the obligation to maintain peace and security “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.” It said that in such cases, a veto-wielding member voting against measures agreed on by a majority of the Council should “at least explain why its position is consistent with the Charter.”

Third, Liechtenstein suggested that when an absolute majority had been obtained in the Council, P5 members be allowed to cast a negative vote without giving it the effect of a veto, thereby enabling them to take a position on the substance, without blocking adoption of a proposal.

Next Steps
In concluding the debate, Portugal said that the Council must intensify its commitment to monitoring implementation of agreed practices on methods of work and assess their impact. “There is always room for improvement”, it noted.

The informal working group is likely to discuss the proposed suggestions in the coming year, and it is expected that progress will continue to be made on “internal” aspects of Council reform, such as distributing mandates more evenly. Progress on “external” issues—such as making the annual report more analytical, improving monthly assessments and encouraging presidents to be more forthcoming regarding outside communication—will also be sought.
most prominently peacekeeping, surpass the UN’s capacity. While UN peacekeeping has registered some marked successes, there is general recognition within the Council that its conflict prevention and mediation efforts in Africa have been less effective.

This recognition is shared by the AU, which, on its creation in 2002, crafted plans for an “African Peace and Security Architecture” and two years later established the PSC. Following these developments, the Council, meeting in Nairobi in 2004, adopted a presidential statement that among other things welcomed the establishment of the PSC and called on the international community to support the efforts of the AU to strengthen its peacekeeping capacity. This was followed by several other presidential statements and Council documents on the evolving relationship.

An important development in this respect was the Council’s 2007 open debate, organised by South Africa during its debut membership on the Council as an elected member, on the UN’s relationship with regional organisations, in particular the AU. That led to a presidential statement which, among other issues, asked the Secretary-General to provide a report on specific proposals for how the UN could better support arrangements for further cooperation and coordination with regional organisations. (For more detail, please see our Special Research Report of 10 May 2011, Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa: The Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.)

The UN has long recognised that productive burden-sharing between the UN and regional and subregional organisations could be the key to addressing many of the problems. (Chapter VIII of the UN Charter acknowledges the scope for contributions by regional organisations to the settlement of disputes.) The proliferation of crises in Africa requiring outside intervention gave focused attention to this. In January 1992, the Council, meeting for the first time at the level of Heads of State and Government, asked the Secretary-General to recommend ways to strengthen and make the UN more efficient for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The result was that in June 1992, the Secretary-General issued his report, An Agenda for Peace, in which he highlighted the role that regional organisations could play in preventative diplomacy, early-warning systems for crisis prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

To date, the Council and the PSC have cooperated on several initiatives, including the AU-led AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Since 2007, members of the two councils have held annual meetings, alternating between their respective headquarters, Addis Ababa and New York.

Following an open debate on 22 October 2010 which discussed the Secretary-General’s report on assistance to AU peacekeeping operations, the Council adopted a presidential statement requesting a report from the Secretary-General defining the UN Secretariat’s strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation in peace and security and taking into account the lessons learnt from the various experiences of joint cooperation between the two bodies. The report was expected to be made available in 2011 but has been delayed and is now likely to be issued in early 2012.

At the 16th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in January 2011, the chairperson of the AU was asked to submit to the PSC a report on the AU’s “strategic vision of the cooperation between the African Union and the UN on peace and security matters.” The report would be a “contribution to the consideration by the Security Council of the next report of the UN Secretary-General on this issue, bearing in mind relevant AU decisions and the need for flexible and creative interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.” The report is expected to be issued later this month and is likely to stress the development of the relationship to the level of a strategic partnership that emphasises mutual respect, African ownership and priority-setting on issues involving peace and security on the continent; high-level dialogue between the PSC and the Council; and clarification of the principle of subsidiarity.

Key Issues
A key issue is how to ensure that the relationship is effective on a strategic, as well as operational level.

Another key issue for the Council is to devise an effective working method on African issues that would benefit from the partnership with the PSC.

Underlying Issues
A key area of unease in the relationship between the Council and the PSC concerns the putative issue of equality of status. The UN’s Charter mandates the Council as having the primary responsibility for international peace and security. Chapter VIII, though recognising the role of regional organisations, merely underlines this mandate.

Consequently, there is anxiety, especially among the P5 members, about diluting this mandate by appearing to defer to the PSC on African peace and security issues. This is the reason why, though the two organs have held several annual consultations to date, the Council has presented these meetings as between individual members of the Security Council—not the Council itself—and the PSC.

The PSC, on the other hand, has held that its understanding of and interest in peace and security issues in Africa far surpasses that of the Council and should therefore enable it to take the lead on such issues with financial and diplomatic support from the UN Security Council.

Council Dynamics
This is one of the more contentious thematic issues on the Council’s agenda, for it goes to the core of the Council’s mandate: primacy on matters relating to maintenance of international peace and security. Almost all the P5 members appear largely inflexible on this point, though they recognise the important role that the AU plays, and can potentially play, in Africa.
On the other hand, some of the elected Council members, including South Africa and India, and exiting members Gabon and Nigeria, appear to prefer deference to the greater knowledge and interest of the PSC concerning emerging issues relating to peace and security in Africa that are not already on the Council’s agenda.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1809 (16 April 2008) encouraged increased engagement between the AU and the UN and called on the UN Secretariat to develop a list of needed capacities and recommendations on ways that the AU could further develop its military, technical, logistic and administrative capabilities.
- S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005) addressed the issue of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.
- S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) was a summit declaration on the effectiveness of the Security Council’s role in conflict prevention, calling for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) focused on peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a means of addressing challenges to peace and security in Africa.
- S/RES/1197 (18 September 1998) was on the need for the UN to provide support to regional and subregional organisations and to strengthen coordination between the UN and those organisations.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/21 (22 October 2010) reaffirmed Council commitment to strengthening its partnership with the PSC and said members looked forward to receiving within six months a report from the Secretary-General which would define the UN Secretariat’s strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation in peace and security.
- S/PRST/2009/26 (26 October 2009) reiterated the importance of a more effective strategic relationship between the UN and the AU, underlining the importance of expediting the implementation of the UN-AU Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme.
- S/PRST/2009/3 (18 March 2009) requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on practical ways to provide effective support for the AU when it undertakes UN-authorised peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2007/31 (28 August 2007) requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the options for further implementation of resolution 1625.
- S/PRST/2007/7 (28 March 2007) was on relations between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU.
- S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council with more regular analytical reporting on regions of potential armed conflict and stressed the importance of establishing comprehensive strategies on conflict prevention.
- S/PRST/2004/44 (19 November 2004) recognised the importance of strengthening cooperation with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with collective security challenges.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/54 (2 February 2011) was the review of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building program for the AU.
- S/2010/514 (14 October 2010) was on support for AU peacekeeping.
- S/2009/470 (18 September 2009) was on support to AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN.
- S/2008/186 (7 April 2008) was on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.
- S/2008/178 (14 March 2008) included contingency peacekeeping plans.
- S/2008/18 (14 January 2008) was on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1625 on conflict prevention, particularly in Africa.
- S/1998/318 (13 April 1998) was on the causes of conflict in Africa.
- S/1995/1 (25 January 1995) was the supplement to An Agenda for Peace.
- S/24111 (17 June 1992) was the report An Agenda for Peace.

Meeting Records

- S/PV.6409 (22 October 2010) was an open debate at which the Secretary-General’s report on assistance to AU peacekeeping operations was discussed.
- S/PV.6257 (13 January 2010) was a thematic debate on cooperation with regional and subregional organisations, presided over by China.
- S/PV.6206 (26 October 2009) was a debate on the report of the AU-UN panel which covered modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations.
- S/PV 6092 and Res. 1(18 March 2009) was the debate on the AU-UN Panel’s report on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations.
- S/PV.5837 (15 February 2008) was an AU briefing to the Council.
- S/PV.5749 (25 September 2007) was a meeting on peace and security in Africa chaired by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
- S/PV.5735 and Res. 1 (28 August 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.
- S/PV.5649 (28 March 2007) was a Council debate under the South African presidency on relations between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU.

Other

- S/2010/392 (20 July 2010) contained
the joint communiqué issued after a consultative meeting at UN headquarters with the AU PSC and top AU Commission officials.

- S/2009/303 (11 June 2009) was the report of the Council mission to the AU, Rwanda, the DRC and Liberia, which contained the communiqué of 16 May 2009 from the consultative meeting between the members of the Security Council and the AU.
- S/2007/421 (11 July 2007) was the report of the Security Council visit to Adis Ababa, Accra, Abidjan, Khartoum and Kinshasa containing the joint communiqué from the 16 June 2007 meeting.
- S/Agenda/5084 (18 November 2004) was the provisional agenda for the 5084th meeting of the Security Council featuring the item "Institutional Relationship with the African Union."

**Sudan/Darfur**

**Expected Council Action**

In January, the Council will likely receive a briefing and discuss in consultations the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Sudan sanctions committee is expected to receive the final report of its panel of experts in January. At press time, no formal outcome was anticipated in January from the Council on Darfur.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July 2012, while the mandate of the panel of experts expires on 19 February 2012.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Council was briefed on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNAMID on 25 October 2011. During the briefing, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said that progress had been made with the signing of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). In particular, he mentioned the fact that Eltigani Seisi, the leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), a signatory of the DDPD, had been appointed chair of the Darfur Regional Authority. He added that UNAMID was helping civil society groups and community leaders in Darfur to create a strategy for circulating information about the DDPD. He also indicated that while internally displaced persons, civil society groups, local authorities and opposition political parties had expressed support for the DDPD, they deplored the fact that it was not supported by several key rebel groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudanese Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and the Sudanese Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM).

Ladsous also noted that the success of the DDPD will be largely dependent on Khartoum’s willingness to carry out its provisions. He added that the UN and the AU were, in consultation with Sudanese stakeholders, developing a “road map for peace in Darfur” that should be completed by the end of 2011. (The road map, which was referred to in the Secretary-General’s October 2011 report on UNAMID and is expected to be a major focus of his January 2012 UNAMID report, concentrates on implementation of the DDPD, engagement with rebel groups that have not signed the DDPD, internal consultations and dialogue with the people of Darfur on the peace process, and enhanced means of coordination among international partners assisting efforts toward peace.)

On 11 November 2011, Ladsous briefed the Council on Sudan and South Sudan. With respect to the situation in Darfur, he said that the DDPD provides a framework for progress toward a settlement. However, he expressed concern with a number of issues, including, inter-alia, lack of humanitarian access, the number of armed groups outside the peace process, recent attacks on UN peacekeepers and the potential for renewed violence with the end of the rainy season.

On 28 November 2011, a special court for Darfur based in El Fasher sentenced seven members of JEM to death for their role in an ambush of a troop convoy in Darfur in January 2010, which led to the deaths of more than 50 Sudanese soldiers.

The Joint Commission, tasked with implementing the DDPD, held its first meeting on 18 December 2011 in Khartoum. At the meeting, Ibrahim Gambari, Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, noted the responsibility of the signatories of the DDPD, the government of Sudan and the LJM, to implement ceasefire and security arrangements. Participants at the meeting also considered a report submitted by Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba, UNAMID’s Force Commander, which indicated that incidents of violence between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the rebel movements that have not agreed to the DDPD have decreased since the signing of the DDPD.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been actively engaged on Sudan issues in recent weeks. On 2 December 2011, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested Pre-Trial Chamber I to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan’s Defence Minister, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed between August 2003 and March 2004 in Darfur. (Hussein served during that time as Interior Minister and Special Representative of the President in Darfur.)

On 12 December 2011, the ICC announced that Malawi, a party to the Rome Statute, had been referred to the Security Council and the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties for its failure to apprehend and surrender Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when he visited Malawi in October 2011. (The ICC has indicted Bashir for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.)

On 13 December 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided that Chad had also not met its obligation to fully cooperate with the ICC by failing to arrest and surrender Bashir when he visited Chad in August. It likewise referred the case to the Council and the Assembly of State Parties, saying that it is up to those two bodies to “take any measure they may deem appropriate to ensure the full cooperation with the ICC.” (It is the second time the ICC has referred Chad’s non-compliance to the Council, following Bashir’s visit to Chad in July 2010 for a summit of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. In light of the obligations emanating from the Chapter VII resolution
The Council received a briefing on 15 December 2011 from Moreno-Ocampo on the ICC’s work in Darfur. Moreno-Ocampo described the ICC’s evidence supporting its indictments of Bashir, Ahmad Harun, Ali Kushayb and Hussein. He also added that two rebel leaders, Abdallah Banda and Saleh Jerbo, who have been charged with war crimes after leading an assault on an AU facility on 29 September 2007 that resulted in the deaths of 12 peacekeepers, had voluntarily appeared before the Court in June 2010 to answer questions in a response to a summons. He said that their trial should begin in 2012 and that, while accepting responsibility for the attack, Banda and Jerbo questioned the illegality of their actions as well as the legitimacy of the AU mission under the UN Charter. Moreno-Ocampo closed his presentation by saying that the ICC’s arrest warrants needed to be executed and that the AU and the Arab League should respect the authority of the Council and the ICC.

Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali-Osman (Sudan) addressed the Council after Moreno-Ocampo. He prefaced his remarks by saying that Sudan is not a state party to the ICC and that his participation in the meeting did not constitute cooperation with the work of the court. Ali-Osman denied Moreno-Ocampo’s accusations, stating that they contradicted the findings of the Secretary-General’s UNAMID report in October, which described an improvement in the security situation in Darfur. He also questioned the impartiality of Moreno-Ocampo.

The chair of the Sudan sanctions committee briefed the Council in consultations on 16 December 2011. The discussion seems to have focused on the recent arrival in Darfur of the newly constituted panel of experts, who received their visas and work permits in the second half of November.

Key Issues
A key issue (and challenge to the peace process in Darfur) is the fact that the LJM is the only major rebel group in Darfur to agree to the DDPD, as the JEM, the SLA-AW, and the SLA-MM have not acceded to the document.

Another important issue is how the Council chooses to approach the “road map for peace in Darfur”, whose elements are expected to be elaborated in the Secretary-General’s January report. In this respect, issues that the Council could consider include:
- what instruments, including incentives and disincentives, are at its disposal to facilitate the engagement of non-compliant rebel groups in the peace process and how these instruments should be employed;
- how to support the implementation of the DDPD and facilitate enhanced understanding of and support for the DDPD among the inhabitants of Darfur;
- how to calibrate a response to the Sudanese government that facilitates an improvement in the government’s human rights policies;
- how to strengthen coordination and coherence among international actors in supporting the DDPD; and
- whether, and how, to incorporate its approach to Darfur into efforts to develop a more cohesive and integrated strategy toward Sudan and South Sudan.

Another key issue is whether the newly constituted panel of experts will have the time to gain a solid understanding of the situation on the ground and produce a substantive final report. (New appointments have been made to all five positions of the panel since the beginning of October 2011, and the experts received their work permits to travel to Darfur only in late November.)

Options
In considering the UNAMID report, one option is simply to receive the briefing and take no action at the current time.

Another option would be to adopt a statement that could contain any of the following elements:
- welcoming the “road map for peace in Darfur”;
- include language that encourages rebel groups that have not acceded to the DDPD to join the peace process;
- adopting a more coercive approach toward the rebels, signalling the possibility of imposing sanctions in certain cases, in an effort to compel their participation in the peace process; and
- signalling the need for the government of Sudan to respect the human rights of the people of Darfur as a necessary condition for the successful implementation of the DDPD.

Although less likely, on the referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC as per resolution 1593 (2005), the Council could continue to remain silent, or it could adopt a more coercive approach expanding the travel ban and/or asset freeze imposed by resolution 1591 (2005) to those individuals that have already been indicted by the ICC.

Council Dynamics
There is widespread support in principle among Council members for the DDPD. Some members, however, appear to remain concerned that conditions on the ground, given the government of Sudan’s record of violating human rights and repressing dissent, may hinder the peace process. There is also concern among some Council members about the DDPD’s potential negative implications for the peace process due to the fact that many of the major rebel groups have not supported it. There seem to be differences of opinion on the Council about how to calibrate a response, both toward the government of Sudan and the rebel groups, that is most constructive in advancing the peace process. While some Council members remain wary of the government of Sudan’s intentions, others believe that it has made a credible effort to support peace in Darfur and that these efforts should be recognised and encouraged. Regarding the rebel groups, it seems that there are different perspectives on the Council regarding the appropriate level of pressure that should be applied to either encourage or compel them to pursue peace.
It appears that some Council members are concerned that the newly formed panel of experts will not have the requisite time on the ground in Darfur to produce a quality report for the Sudan sanctions committee, given that they will have less than two months to conduct their investigations in the region. One perspective on the Council is that, rather than starting from scratch, the panel should strive to build as much as possible on the findings of the previous panel in formulating its upcoming report.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on Darfur, while Colombia chairs the Sudan sanctions committee.

### UNAMID: Force Commander

Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

### UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

### UNAMID: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

- **Maximum authorised strength:** up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)
- **Main troop contributors:** Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia and Senegal
- **Military strength as of 30 November 2011:** 17,626 troops and 247 military observers
- **Police Strength as of 30 November 2011:** 4,977 police personnel
- **Annual Budget:** $1.69 billion
- **Duration:** 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2012

### Sanctions Committee Chairman

Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

### South Sudan

#### Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s most recent report on UNMISS was released on 2 November 2011. The report noted political progress that had been made by the government of South Sudan with the appointment of a new cabinet in early September that is more regionally and ethnically diverse than the former caretaker government.

However, it also discussed the lack of progress by Sudan and South Sudan in resolving residual Comprehensive Peace Agreement issues, outlined the continuing inter-communal violence in South Sudan and warned of significant food insecurity in several states in the new country. The report further indicated the importance of developing government institutions. Given insecurity in South Sudan and limited projection of state authority, the report recommended that the troop strength of UNMISS be maintained at 7,000 military personnel for the time being. (The Council was scheduled to receive a briefing from DPKO on the force level of UNMISS in October 2011. This briefing was cancelled, although it seems discussion of UNMISS’s force level did take place during the Council’s deliberations on South Sudan in November.)

Clashes between Sudanese armed forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) occurred in the disputed border town of Jau on 3 December 2011. These clashes appear to have ensued for a number of days. According to the SPLA, Sudanese armed forces employed tanks, long-range artillery fire and aerial bombardments during the fighting. South Sudanese officials have said that Jau, which is just north of the Yide refugee camp in Unity state, which was bombed in November 2011, is part of South Sudan. Sudanese officials have said that Jau is in South Kordofan state in Sudan and that the town is used as a supply route for SPLA rebels in South Kordofan.

#### Expected Council Action

In January, the Council may review the force level of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). (On 8 July 2011, in resolution 1996, the Council expressed its intention to review the force level of UNMISS after three months and six months to determine whether conditions on the ground could permit a reduction of military personnel from a maximum of 7,000 to 6,000.) At press time, whether and in what format the Council would discuss this issue in January remained unclear. A resolution would be required if the Council were to reduce the force level to 6,000 military personnel.

The fluid situation along the Sudan and South Sudan border could prompt the Council to hold additional meetings during the course of the month.

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 8 July 2012.
Violence in Jonglei state in South Sudan continued in recent weeks. On 5 December 2011, over 35 people were killed and 22 injured in Bor county during an apparent cattle-raiding incident. (In May, the Council visited the county to familiarise itself with the assistance the UN was providing in the resolution of cattle-related disputes.) UNMISS personnel investigating the incident evacuated four of the wounded to Juba. Forces affiliated with rebel leader George Athor reportedly attacked villages in Pigi county on 11 December, resulting in the deaths of five SPLA troops, five civilians and 24 rebels.

Athur was killed in a clash with South Sudanese forces in Morobo County in Central Equatoria state on 19 December 2011. South Sudanese officials have said that Athor was in the region recruiting troops to support his rebellion.

China dispatched Liu Guijin, its special representative for African affairs, to Khartoum and Juba in early December in an effort to mediate the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan regarding transit fees for oil from South Sudan that runs through pipelines in Sudan before leaving Port Sudan on the Red Sea. (The two countries have been unable to agree on an appropriate transit fee, with Sudan requesting fees between $US32 and $US36 per barrel, a range that South Sudan has rejected.) A statement on the website of the Chinese embassy in South Sudan expressed the hope that Sudan and South Sudan would demonstrate “restraint and resolve...pending issues through dialogue and negotiations.”

On 14-15 December 2011, the US and South Sudanese governments hosted the high-level International Engagement Conference on South Sudan in Washington, DC, which focused on strategies to promote the socioeconomic development of South Sudan. Senior officials from both countries—as well as from the UK, Norway, Turkey, the EU, the AU, the UN, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the Corporate Council on Africa, and InterAction—participated in the conference. The conference, inter-alia, explored ways to help South Sudan:

- manage natural resources effectively;
- strengthen the agricultural, educational and health care sectors;
- promote international trade with and investment in the country; and
- enhance the participation of women and youth in society.

During the conference, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US would continue supporting UNMISS’s “important work to preserve peace, safeguard human rights, and protect civilians.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a message issued by South Sudan’s president on International Human Rights Day (10 December 2011), the government acknowledged the urgent need to revise existing laws and enact new ones to ensure they met international human rights standards. Priorities included the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. Commenting separately, UNMISS Head of Mission Hilde F. Johnson said, “South Sudan has to sign up to the critical human rights conventions, so that as a new and independent country, it is anchored in a firm foundation of human rights.” Johnson added that UNMISS had a strong human rights mandate to monitor, investigate, verify and report human rights violations.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether to maintain the mandated force level of UNMISS at up to 7,000 troops or to reduce the number of military personnel to 6,000 troops.

Another key issue for the Council is to explore ways in which UNMISS and the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) can complement each other most effectively. (For example, air assets and facilities from UNMISS may be used to provide support for UNISFA’s newly mandated border-monitoring support role.)

A related issue for the Council is how to address the recent violence between Sudan and South Sudan along their mutual border and the potential for this fighting to escalate into a larger-scale conflict.

Another important and ongoing issue is the inter-communal and rebel violence in South Sudan, particularly in Unity and Jonglei states. A related issue is the security problem created by land mines laid by rebels in Unity state in recent months.

Another issue that persists in parts of South Sudan is food scarcity sparked by irregular rainfall, violent conflict and Sudanese border closures. (The UN World Food Programme indicated on 15 December 2011 that South Sudan confronted a “severe hunger crisis,” with up to one-third of its people plagued by hunger.)

Underlying Problems

The legacy of more than two decades of civil war has presented South Sudan with enormous challenges. Socioeconomic development is at a minimal level, as reflected by low literacy rates and the poor quality of health services available to the population. The weakness of governing institutions, the dearth of trained civil servants and corruption are also among the significant challenges facing the new country.

Options

Options for the Council with regard to the force level of UNMISS include:

- maintaining the mandated force level at up to 7,000 military personnel;
Council proper.

to address the security challenges faced in Africa to develop strategies for UN-system support for peacebuilding in South Sudan have been established. (UNMISS benchmarks and the UN plan to support peacebuilding in South Sudan are expected to be discussed in the next Secretary-General’s report on UNMISS in March 2012.)

The Council could also request a briefing from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations that explores complementarities between UNMISS and UNISFA.

Another option would be for the ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa to develop strategies to address the security challenges faced by South Sudan and report back to the Council proper.

Council Dynamics
There is general consensus on the Council that UNMISS’s presence is an important factor in addressing the tenuous security situation in South Sudan. Council members are concerned about the many challenges facing South Sudan—including inter-communal violence, rebel activity and the government’s limited institutional capacity.

One perspective on the Council is that the many security challenges in South Sudan require that the force level of the mission remain at its current level. Another perspective is that it might be possible to adjust the force level downward. Several Council members seem to be open-minded about a critical assessment by DPKO in helping them to determine the appropriate force level for UNMISS moving forward. There is a sense among some Council members that such an assessment would be particularly useful at the current time, given the potential implications that UNISFA’s added border-monitoring role may have on the activities of UNMISS.

Strong concerns remain among many Council members about the fighting along the Sudan and South Sudan border and the potential for this violence to escalate into larger-scale violence between the two countries. Different perspectives among Council members on issues, such as how to apportion responsibility for the violence and the reliability of information being provided, have hampered the Council’s efforts to address the recent fighting.

The US is the lead country on UNMISS.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2024 (14 December) added a border-monitoring support role to UNISFA’s mandate.
- S/RES/1997 (11 July 2011) liquidated UNMIS.
- S/RES/1996 (8 July 2011) established UNMISS.
- S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established UNISFA.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/678 (2 November 2011)

Letters

- S/2011/763 (8 December 2011) was from South Sudan to the Security Council accusing Sudan of cross-border incursions and urging the international community to apply more pressure on Sudan to respect South Sudan’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- S/2011/511 (9 August 2011) and S/2011/510 (5 August 2011) were between the president of the Council and the Secretary-General on the UNISFA reconnaissance mission regarding border arrangements in Abyei.

Other Relevant Facts

UNMISS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Hilde Frafjord Johnson (Norway)

UNMISS: Size and Duration
Maximum authorised strength: up to 7,000 military and 900 police
Deployment as of 30 November: 5,528 total uniformed personnel
Duration: 9 July to present; mandate expires 9 July 2012

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Sudan and South Sudan
Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

Libya

Expected Council Action
The Council is likely to remain focused on post-conflict Libya in January, as the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) deploys to full capacity. Ian Martin, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL, is expected to brief the Council.

UNSMIL’s mandate expires on 16 March 2012.

Key Recent Developments
On 2 December 2011, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2022, extending the mandate of UNSMIL until 16 March and tasked the mission to assist the Libyan authorities in addressing the threats of proliferation of all arms and related material, in particular Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).

On 11 December 2011, Andrew Shapiro, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, said that approximately 5,000 MANPADS had been secured by bomb disposal experts in Libya.

On 16 December, B. Lynn Pascoe, head of the Department of Political Affairs, briefed the Council on the UN inter-agency assessment mission despatched in early December to assess the impact of the Libyan crisis on Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. (The Secretary-General’s 20 June report on the UN Office for West Africa and resolution 2017 of 31 October both underlined the risk of destabilisation due to the dissemination of weapons from Libya to the Sahel region.)

Libya has continued to experience some violent incidents. On 6 December 2011, Abdul Aziz Al-Hassadi, Libya’s Attorney General, was attacked by gunmen demanding the release of one of their associates. Residents of Tripoli protested against the lawlessness of the armed militia on 7
December, before security forces were deployed to clamp down on rogue militia. The National Transitional Council (NTC) gave militias until 20 December 2011 to disarm and come under state control.

On 10 December, two incidents of armed clashes were reported between forces associated with Gen. Khalifa Haftar and fighters from Zintan, who control the checkpoints surrounding Tripoli’s international airport. On 13 December, deadly clashes between armed groups from Zintan and neighbouring Al-Mashasha that led to at least four reported deaths ended after tribal elders brokered a ceasefire.

On 19 December, Osama Al-Juwali, the interim Defence Minister, said that the government was working on a plan to deal with the armed militia but it will take weeks to disband the armed groups. (Al-Juwali is also the head of the military council in Zintan, whose forces apprehended Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi on 19 November 2011.)

On December 21, responding to calls for greater inclusiveness, NTC Chairperson Mustafa Abdul Jalil asked former rebels to come up with a list of candidates for potential inclusion in the NTC during a conference in Tripoli.

On 22 December, Martin briefed the Council via videoconference and highlighted the NTC’s ability to meet the immediate needs and high expectations of the Libyan people as one of two key challenges. He noted that the second challenge encompassed the establishment of accountable government institutions. Martin raised concerns regarding the potential of localised clashes that could undermine the authority of the central government.

Several key recent developments involved the issue of accountability.

On 1 December 2011, a team from the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrived in Tripoli to conduct a preliminary investigation of alleged sexual violence against women committed by Qaddafi supporters. On 6 December, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I submitted an urgent request to the NTC, asking when and where ICC officials could meet Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi and whether the Libyan authorities had any plans for surrendering him to the ICC. Fred Abrahams, a special adviser with Human Rights Watch, visited Qaddafi on 18 December and reported that although he was being adequately treated, he did not have access to legal counsel.

On 15 December 2011, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said the circumstances surrounding Col. Muammar Qaddafi’s death in October 2011 raised suspicions that it amounted to a war crime and the ICC was planning to investigate it.

On 28 November 2011, Yussef Al-Aseifir, the NTC chief military prosecutor, named Ali Abdelaziz Saad Al-Essawi, a former NTC deputy prime minister, as the main suspect in the killing of Gen. Abdel Fatah Younes. Al-Essawi denied he was involved in the killing in a phone call to Awalen, a local television station. (Younes was the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces, and circumstances surrounding his death on 28 July 2011 remain obscure.)

On 12 December 2011, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the NTC’s chairperson, denied rumours of an amnesty for the followers of Col. Qaddafi. Also on that day, the NTC decided that Benghazi will be the economic capital of Libya. The decision came after protesters in Benghazi accused Jalil and the NTC of not being transparent and criticised statements by Jalil at the first post-Qaddafi national reconciliation conference held on 10 December, when he said that Libyans were able to forgive and tolerate.

In an interview with the BBC on 19 December, Abdul Hakim Belhaj, head of the Tripoli Military Council, said that he was taking legal action against the UK government. Belhaj, who was detained in Bangkok in 2004, has accused the British government of being complicit in his illegal rendition and torture and subsequent transfer to Col. Qaddafi’s security services.

On 22 December, Martin briefed the Council via videoconferencing. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told reporters on 14 December 2011 that NATO’s military operation strictly adhered to the mandate of resolution 1973 “and there should be no misunderstanding on that.” (China, Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa had accused NATO of going beyond its mandate in Libya, whereas, the US, the UK, France and other NATO members have defended NATO saying it operated within the mandate of resolution 1973.)

### Human Rights-Related Developments

The Secretary-General’s 22 November 2011 report on UNSMIL assessing the challenges facing Libya noted the country’s heavy legacy of human rights violations from the Qaddafi regime, including decades of arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial executions and still-unresolved disappearances. The NTC had already taken some steps towards transferring responsibility for detainees from brigades to proper state authorities, but much remained to be done. UNSMIL was pressing these concerns with the authorities. The report recalled the Secretary-General’s assurance made during his recent visit to Libya of assistance in the holding of elections, in the promotion of transitional justice and national reconciliation and in ensuring public security, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

On 20 December, Philippe Kirsch, Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry on Libya, said that team members were pleased with the Libyan interim authorities’ assurances of continued commitment to human rights and the initial steps taken by them to address the human rights violations. (The Commission of Inquiry set up by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in February to investigate serious violations committed by all parties, visited Tripoli for over two weeks earlier in December 2011 as part of its investigative work. It is expected to present its final report to the HRC in March.)
Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

Deputy Permanent Representative João Maria Cabral (Portugal), briefed the Council on 22 December 2011 on the de-listing of the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Bank on 16 December. Cabral also informed the Council that members of the committee had met in informal consultations on 12 December. On the same day, following briefings by the panel of experts, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), International Civil Aviation Organization and UNSMIL, the members of the committee had agreed that a report would be submitted to the Council shortly after a working document has been produced by its panel of experts in February 2012. (Resolution 2017 requested the committee to assess the threats related to the proliferation of all arms and related material, in particular MANPADS from Libya, in the region and to submit a report to the Council containing its proposals.)

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is its role in ensuring a transition from conflict to peace-building in Libya and preventing large-scale reprisals and killings in a post-conflict Libya.

Preventing the spread of sporadic violence between various armed rebel factions as well as divisions within the NTC before the interim government is fully functional is a related issue.

Determining the long-term role and timeframe for UNSMIL and ensuring its full deployment as well as effective functioning are key related issues for the Council.

Dealing with Libya’s assets freeze in an efficient manner is another key issue for the Council, as is its role in the implementation of resolution 1970 with regard to its referral of the Libyan situation to the ICC and any referral-related trials.

The prevention of proliferation of heavy weaponry in a post-conflict Libya as well as the spill-over effect in the Sahel region continues to be an issue for Council members.

Minimising the impact of the recent conflict and its aftermath on the civilian population and delivering humanitarian assistance are two further closely related issues for the Council.

Another issue is the need for the continued coordination of efforts of various stakeholders and other international bodies in supporting the interim government.

Options

With regard to the ICC, the Council could request an up-to-date briefing from Moreno-Ocampo. A less likely option would be recalling, in a statement, obligations that Libya and other states have towards the ICC under resolution 1970.

Regarding UNSMIL, one option could be a Council visit to Libya before the mandate renewal in March with an eye to using its findings to adjust UNSMIL’s current mandate in accordance with the long-term needs of the new interim government.

More routine options include revisiting any outstanding sanctions imposed on Libya and considering any further measures on weapons proliferation after it is informed of the findings of the UN inter-agency assessment mission that was jointly sent by the UN and AU to the Sahel region from 7 to 23 December 2011 to assess the impact of the Libya crisis on the contiguous countries of Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad.

Council Dynamics

Some Council members view the two key concerns regarding Libya as the issue of the proliferation of weaponry and the assets freeze. They insisted that resolution 2022 not merely be a technical rollover of UNSMIL’s mandate but that it would also mandate UNSMIL to assist the Libyan authorities in addressing the threats of proliferation of all arms, in particular MANPADS. Moreover, some Council members seem to be perplexed by the technical complexities surrounding the assets freeze issue.

Resolutions 1970 and 1973, as well as the no-fly zone, generated much heated debate amongst Council members. This issue continues to be a source of contentions extending to other items on the agenda of the Council as some Council members felt that other members, wrongly, took it upon themselves to use military force. Russia feels that there needs to be an inde-
Key Recent Developments
On 29 November 2011, former President Laurent Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity as an “indirect co-perpetrator” of murder, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts. Gbagbo had been detained in the north of the country since April 2011 and was charged on 18 August with “economic crimes” that included his alleged looting of half a billion dollars from the state treasury. (President Alasane Ouattara’s government had insisted that the prosecution for economic crimes is separate from other charges that may be brought against Gbagbo, either by the national judiciary or the ICC.)

On 30 November 2011, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front Party announced that it was withdrawing from the legislative elections, as well as from the country’s national reconciliation process, as a result of what it considered Gbagbo’s illegal transfer to the ICC. The UN positioned 7,000 troops in Abidjan, the capital, and in the western part of the country to help stave off election-related violence. To complement UNOCI’s security capacity during this period, the Council approved in late November 2011 a request from the Secretary-General for the transfer of three armed helicopters and two military utility helicopters from the mission in Liberia to Côte d’Ivoire from 3 to 31 December 2011.

On 8 December 2011, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNOCI, Albert Gerard Koenders, briefed the Council on preparations for the elections. On 11 December, as many as 1,160 candidates from 35 parties contested 255 legislative seats. In the event, few incidents of violence were reported during the polling, though voter turnout was predictably low—35 percent—but higher than earlier estimates. On 17 December, however, violence erupted between government forces and youths in the western region of Vavoua, 280 miles from Abidjan; six youth were gunned down. UNOCI urged the government to investigate the killings, and on 19 December, the government announced that seven ‘volunteer’ soldiers implicated in the killings had been arrested.

On 14 December 2011, Chairperson of the AU Commission Jean Ping congratulated the Ivorian people and leaders for the peaceful elections, calling them “a further testimony to their commitment to work towards the consolidation of peace in Côte d’Ivoire.” The elections, Ping said, “represent a new step in the establishment of republican institutions and the process of strengthening democracy in Côte d’Ivoire.”

The election results were announced on 16 December 2011. Ouattara’s Rally of Republicans party won 127 out of 255 seats in the legislature, and the Democratic Party, which is in coalition with Ouattara’s party, won 77 seats, giving the government a formidable 80 percent control of parliament. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon hailed the elections as “peaceful and orderly”, and the Economic Community of West African States, which had sent 60 monitors to observe the elections, released a statement calling the elections free and fair.

On a visit to New York shortly after the elections, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro said on 15 December that Côte d’Ivoire would ratify the Rome Statute once parliament begins deliberations. Soro, who led the Force Nouvelles rebel group that backed Ouattara—and which human rights activists have accused of widespread violations—also said that he was ready to face the ICC if charged. Soro met with the Secretary-General and, separately, each of the P5 members of the Council.

The 11-member South African-styled Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which President Ouattara set up in May as a key transitional justice mechanism, was launched in September with Charles Konan Banny, a former prime minister, as chair. Gbagbo’s party has said it will not cooperate with the Commission.

Concerns about the activities of former Liberian mercenaries recruited and deployed by Gbagbo along the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border were underlined in the latest report of the Liberia Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts, which was discussed by the Council on 9 December. A substantial part of the report deals with the impact of the return from Côte d’Ivoire of...
an estimated 4,500 mercenaries, many of whom are now engaged in illicit gold mining in Liberia close to the western part of Côte d’Ivoire. The report notes that these former fighters can be easily mobilised.

The authors of the report interviewed several former mercenary commanders, now engaged in gold mining, and noted that funds accruing from illicit gold mining are significant enough that they should be closely monitored to ensure they are not used to destabilise the two countries. In response, the Council adopted resolution 2025 on 14 December 2011, urging the Liberian government to “improve its control over the gold sector and adopt the necessary legislation in this regard, and focus its efforts on establishing effective governance of the gold production sector.”

UNOCI maintains a significant troop presence in western Côte d’Ivoire. Anxieties over the volatility of this area of the border influenced aspects of resolution 2008, which renewed the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on 16 September 2011, emphasising the need for the two missions to “regularly coordinate their strategies and operations in areas near the Liberian-Côte d’Ivoire border...to prevent armed groups from exploiting the seam of political boundaries.”

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is to ensure that Ouattara’s government builds on the momentum provided by the successful legislative vote to address the remaining challenges facing the country, including completing the disarmament process, embarking on security sector reform and pursuing a policy of national reconciliation.

A related issue concerns supporting the work of the ICC in prosecuting those guilty of serious crimes relating to the post-electoral violence early this year, including associates of Gbagbo and possibly Ouattara.

Options

The Council could:
- issue a press statement welcoming the outcome of the legislative elections and drawing attention to the remaining tasks, including security sector reform, reconciliation and combating impunity; or
- discuss the report and take no action.

Council Dynamics

Côte d’Ivoire is not a contentious situation in the Council. All Council members support the recent action taken by the ICC in transferring Gbagbo to The Hague to face trial. The 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committee, in fact, had to lift the travel ban imposed on Gbagbo in order to authorise his transfer to The Hague. Some are more eager than others to have associates of Ouattara face a similar fate. France and Nigeria co-sponsored resolution 1975 of 30 March 2011, which imposed targeted sanctions and reaffirmed UNOCI’s mandate to protect civilians, and cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL—on which the US leads—has been very good.

France is the lead country in the Council on Côte d’Ivoire.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, Doudou Diène, visited the country from 7 to 13 December 2011 to raise the profile of human rights in the 11 December legislative elections, the first to take place since the presidential poll in December 2010. Speaking after the elections, Diène described human rights in Côte d’Ivoire as “weak”. Alluding to several incidents of violence during the polls, Diène expressed concern that weapons continued to circulate illegally. The Independent Expert will present a report to the Human Rights Council in March 2012 on the findings of his visit.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2025 (14 December 2011) extended the sanctions regime on Liberia and the mandate of its Panel of Experts
- S/RES/2008 (16 September 2011) extended the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2012 and called on

UNOCI and UNMIL to coordinate strategies and operations in the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border regions.
- S/RES/2000 (27 July 2011) renewed the mandate of UNOCI at its current force levels (including the earlier ad-hoc increases) until 31 July 2012.
- S/RES/1992 (29 June 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI until 30 September.
- S/RES/1980 (28 April 2011) extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of the group of experts monitoring it for one year.
- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) authorised the redeployment of aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI.

Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2011/387 (24 June 2011) was the 28th progress report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI.

Letters

- S/2011/577 (15 September 2011) was from the Secretary-General to the President of the Council on the interim mission (UNOCI and UNMIL) use of three helicopters and the transfer of 150 military and 100 police personnel from UNOCI to UNMIL from 1 October to 30 November 2011.
- S/2011/468 (26 July 2011) and S/2011/469 (28 July 2011) was an exchange of letters containing the Secretary General’s intention to appoint Albert Gerard Koenders as special representative for Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI.
- S/2011/419 (7 July 2011) appointed four individuals to the group of experts for the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committee.

Other

- S/PV.6577 (8 July 2011) was the latest briefing on UNOWA.
Key Recent Developments

Djinnit last briefed the Council on developments affecting peace and security in the West African region in July. His report was largely upbeat, noting the end of the protracted post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the successful presidential elections and political transition in Niger and progress in Guinea toward economic and institutional reforms as well as consensus-building measures ahead of legislative elections currently scheduled for 2012.

On the flip side, however, Djinnit noted the growing problems of drug trafficking and organised crime, which continue to pose major challenges for several countries in the region. The Secretary-General’s report on UNOWA, issued on 20 June 2011, reported increased trafficking of heroin through West Africa in early 2011, production of methamphetamine in West Africa for export to Asia and the increased corrupting influence of money-laundering, which was weakening “the already fragile” state institutions in the region.

The report also suggested that large caches of combat weapons might have been transferred from Libya and had fallen into the hands of terrorists in the Sahel, which could have a destabilising effect on the region. In this regard, on 31 October 2011, the Council adopted resolution 2017, drawing attention to “the risk of destabilisation posed by the dissemination in the Sahel region of illicit small arms and light weapons.” The resolution also underlined a suggestion in the Secretary-General’s 20 June report that countries in the Sahel and UNOWA strengthen their cooperation to address emerging security and humanitarian issues.

One of the more dramatic of such challenges has been the increased incidence of terrorism in Nigeria: on 26 August 2011, a car bomb destroyed the UN building in Abuja, killing 18 people, and on 4 November 2011, bomb attacks in the north of the country killed more than 100 people. In both instances, Boko Haram, an inchoate Islamist group, claimed responsibility. Thousands of people also fled Maiduguri, in Borno state, as attacks by Boko Haram and clashes with the army’s Joint Task Force left dozens of people dead in July and August.

On other fronts, drug trafficking and organised crime remain problems, especially in countries such as Guinea-Bissau. Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have become more frequent since the last briefing, as a result of which Lloyd’s Market Association, a leading group of maritime insurers, placed the coastal waters off Benin and part of Nigeria in the same high-risk category as Somalia last August. In resolution 2018 of 31 October 2011, the Council called for “the development of a comprehensive strategy” to counter the problem.

A representative from UNOWA is part of the assessment mission deployed in November 2011 by the Secretary-General to map the scope of the piracy threat in the region and make recommendations for possible UN action. Other representatives were drawn from the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the International Maritime Organization, the UN Development Programme, the UN Regional Office in Central Africa and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Elections in Liberia were ultimately successful but not problem-free, and thousands of West African migrant workers in Libya returned to the region, increasing economic and social problems. The threat of electoral violence, as happened in Liberia in November 2011, remains salient. This may be particularly true of Guinea, where legislative elections, slated for the end of December 2011, were postponed to 2012 because of lack of preparation. In July 2011, two armed attacks on newly elected President Alpha Condé claimed three lives. The authorities arrested General Nouhou Thiam—who was chief of staff to the former president, General Sékouba Konaté—and several other people after the attack.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 4 December 2011 in Bamako (Mali) the Regional Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights in West Africa adopted a Declaration and a Regional Roadmap to support the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States towards justice, peace and stability. The Declaration contains recommendations to strengthen the rule of law through the promotion of human rights and by addressing impunity, corruption, organised crime, illicit trafficking and piracy. The Declaration also calls
for the promotion of transitional justice mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions. It also encourages governments and stakeholders to develop national roadmaps for their respective countries to facilitate effective implementation of the recommendations.

Key Issues
The key issue for Council members is to assess the overall value being added to peace consolidation in the region through UNOWA’s role in monitoring emerging challenges and security trends, as well as supporting the work of other UN missions in the region. Particularly urgent is the issue of arms proliferation in the Sahel region following the conflict in Libya.

Also, the forthcoming legislative elections in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea and the presidential and legislative elections in Sierra Leone in 2012 are important issues for the Council to be focused on.

An increasingly important issue is UNOWA’s role in monitoring and supporting the efforts of regional governments in light of the wider issue of Gulf of Guinea piracy.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- simply receiving the briefing and considering the Secretary-General’s report;
- adopting a presidential statement highlighting key issues raised in the Secretary-General’s report, in particular the issue of Libyan arms in the countries of the Sahel, and reiterating the Council’s support for the work of UNOWA;
- holding an interactive dialogue involving the countries from the region, the representatives of the Gulf of Guinea piracy assessment mission and the chair of the relevant Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configurations on the key underlying issues, along with relevant thematic issues, such as piracy and drug trafficking; or
- addressing issues of UN integration and “delivering as one” as some of the current missions in the region (the UN Integrated Mission in Sierra Leone, for example) wind down.

Council Dynamics
Nigeria, which led on this issue until 31 December 2011, will need to be replaced by another Council member. Council members are generally supportive of the work of UNOWA, especially its active role in monitoring and addressing issues that threaten the region’s peace and security but may not be on the Council’s agenda. It seems also that UNOWA’s role as a focal point in a region that hosts several large missions is largely appreciated by Council members. Djinnit also appears to be well-respected. UNOWA is not a contentious issue on the Council.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/2018 (31 October 2011) was a resolution on the threats of piracy and armed robbery on the seas of the Gulf of Guinea.

Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2009/32 (8 December 2009) was on threats posed by drug trafficking.
• S/PRST/2009/20 (10 July 2009) was on the situation in West Africa.

Letters
• S/2010/661 (20 December 2010) extended the mandate of UNOWA for a further three years, from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013.
• S/2010/660 (14 December 2010) contained the Secretary-General’s report on UNOWA.

Latest Secretary General’s Report
• S/2011/388 (20 June 2011) covers the period from 1 January 2011 to 30 June 2011.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Said Djinnit (Algeria)

UNOWA: Size and Composition of Mission
Staff strength (as of 30 April 2010): 13 international civilians, 10 local civilians and four military advisers

UNOWA: Duration
Mandate expires on 31 December 2013

Iraq
Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting a briefing from the Office for Disarmament Affairs and to hold consultations to discuss Iraq’s progress towards ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in accordance with resolution 1957.

Council members are also likely to be watchful about the security and political situation in Iraq following the departure of the US troops.

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) expires on 31 July 2012.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 December 2011, at least 63 people were reported killed and 185 injured as a result of four car bombs and ten improvised explosive devices across Baghdad. At press time, no one had claimed responsibility for the attacks.

On 19 December 2011, an Iraq judicial committee issued an arrest warrant, under anti-terrorism laws, for Vice President Tariq Al-Hashemi. Adel Daham, an interior ministry spokesman, said that Al-Hashemi was being sought for links to killings and attacks on several Iraqi government and security officials. Al-Hashemi, Iraq’s most senior Sunni official, refuted the claims in a news conference on 20 December. The al-Iraqiya parliamentary bloc, which represents most of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, withdrew from the parliament on 17 December.

On 15 December 2011, Leon Panetta, the US Secretary of Defence, attended a ceremony in Baghdad that officially marked the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. The last convoy of US troops drove into Kuwait on 18 December. Previously, on 12 December, US President Barack Obama met Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki at the White House. The meeting reportedly focused on the future of the US-Iraqi partnership.
On 6 December, Martin Kobler, head of UNAMI, who had assumed his post in October 2011, briefed the Council for the first time on the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNAMI. He said that the withdrawal of US forces at the end of 2011 was a milestone, but security needed to be improved. Kobler urged Iraq to implement its outstanding Chapter VII obligations in accordance with the Secretary-General’s 2009 report (S/2009/385), which would allow for the Council to normalise Iraq’s status in the international community. He stated that the 31 December date for a forced closure of Camp Ashraf by the Iraqi government should be extended. (Camp Ashraf, situated in Diyala province, houses more than 3,000 Iranian exiles belonging to the Mujahedin-e Khalq or the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran, an organisation opposed to the government in Tehran.)

On 16 December 2011, B. Lynn Pascoe, the head of the Department of Political Affairs, briefed Council members on 15 December. The members noted the Secretary-General’s establishment of a successor arrangement to the DFI consisting of an account held by the Central Bank of Iraq at the Federal Reserve Bank (see S/2011/290). (The Council took note of the establishment of the DFI in resolution 1483 [2003] allowing revenues from oil and other goods to be paid into it and disbursed at the discretion of the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, replacing the previous Oil-for-Food programme.)

An advance copy of the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1956 was released on 22 December. The report on Iraq’s compliance with making required deposits to the compensation fund established under resolution 687 (1991) and the post-Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) mechanism mandated under resolution 1956 (2010) concluded that though it was satisfied with the Government of Iraq’s compliance thus far only a forthcoming audit of the successor account will confirm this.

Human Rights-Related Developments

When presenting the latest Secretary-General’s report, Kobler highlighted the need for safeguarding democratic standards, including respect for human rights and the rule of law, after the US withdrawal. Kobler called on the government to do all it could to protect the victims of violence and ensure that those responsible were held accountable. Of particular concern were recent acts of violence against human rights defenders and journalists.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council will be to revisit the issue of security provision for UNAMI personnel, especially in light of the recent bombings and the potential effect that the US military withdrawal is likely to have on the dynamics on the ground.

Developments relating to the arrest warrant issued against Hashemi and the potential for increased sectarian violence will be followed attentively by the Council.

Another key issue for the Council is assessing the level of contribution that UNAMI makes to the stability of Iraq and whether UNAMI’s composition ought to be modified in order to better address the challenges it faces.

Another issue for the Council in January is whether the post-DFI mechanism is functioning in a satisfactory fashion.

Determining Iraq’s commitment to and its progress in ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the CTBT is also an issue for the Council.

Underlying Problems

Significant sectarian and political divisions continue to adversely affect Iraq and the fragile security situation throughout the country remains a key challenge. In addition, key ministerial posts, such as for defence and interior, have been unfilled for months, and different political blocs remain divided over power sharing. The political fallout arising from the arrest warrant issued against Hashemi would only seem to further complicate national reconciliation.

Options

On Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, CTBT and the post-DFI issues the Council could:

- simply receive the briefing;
- take no action at present whilst continuing to monitor the progress of the post-DFI mechanism until the audit is conducted; or
- issue a presidential or press statement that could reaffirm previously agreed language in resolutions 1956 and 1957.

Regarding the political situation, also an option could be issuing a presidential or press statement that could include all or some of the following elements:

- acknowledgement of the increasing security needs of UNAMI;
expressing concerns about the impact of violence on Iraqi civilians;

- urging Iraq’s political leaders to resolve differences through political dialogue; and

- urging Iraq to finalise its government formation by filling all vacant ministerial posts based on inclusiveness.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

At press time, Council members appeared concerned about the political deadlock between the government of Iraq and the leadership of Camp Ashraf. As the evacuation deadline of 31 December approached, they felt the potential for this issue to turn violent grew.

Most Council members seem to view Iraq as a routine issue with no significant developments in the recent times. Many Council members feel that it is important for Iraq to make further efforts to fulfil its obligations to Kuwait. Council members seem to be of the opinion that Iraq’s commitment to resolution 1957 and any progress made in this regard will only serve Iraq’s own international standing.

Russia feels that it might be useful to assess the contribution that UNAMI makes to the stability of Iraq and whether or not UNAMI should continue. Other members tend to view UNAMI as an important factor in Iraq. Some members have expressed concern about the recent arrest warrant issued for Al-Hashemi as signalling the potential for sectarian strife in Iraq.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq/Kuwait issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Documents</th>
<th>Security Council Meeting Records</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security Council Resolutions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/2001 (28 July 2011)</strong> extended UNAMI’s mandate until 31 July 2012.</td>
<td><strong>S/2011/477 (26 July 2011)</strong> was from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, requesting funds for Tarasov’s activities.</td>
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<td><strong>S/RES/1958 (15 December 2010)</strong> terminated the Oil-for-Food programme and established an escrow account to provide indemnification to the UN with regard to the programme for a period of six years.</td>
<td><strong>S/PV.6675 (6 December 2011)</strong> was Kobler’s briefing to the Council, presenting the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>S/RES/1957 (15 December 2010)</strong> extended the DFI and related immunities a final time until 30 June 2011 and affirmed that five percent of Iraqi proceeds from oil sales would continue to be deposited into a compensation fund after that date.</td>
<td><strong>S/AC.51/2011/6 (3 October 2011)</strong> was from Ambassador Hamid Al-Bayati to the President of the Council, updating him on the formation of an Iraqi coordinating committee to deal with Kuwaiti national archives.</td>
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**Letters**

- **S/2011/754 (5 December 2011)** was the 32nd report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284, covering the issue of missing Kuwaiti personnel and property.
- **S/2011/736 (28 November 2011)** was the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001, discussing UNAMI’s progress and other developments in Iraq.
- **S/2011/607 (3 October 2011)** was the Secretary-General’s report reviewing Iraq’s commitment to the chemical weapons convention.
- **S/2011/435 (7 July 2011)** was the third report of the Secretary-General on UNAMI.

**Letters**

- **S/2011/721 (15 November 2011)** was from Ambassador Hamid Al-Bayati to the President of the Council, updating him on the formation of an Iraqi coordinating committee to deal with Kuwaiti national archives.
- **S/2011/503 (8 August 2011)** was from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General, acknowledging his intention to appoint Kobler.
- **S/2011/502 (4 August 2011)** was from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, noting his appointment of Kobler.
- **S/2011/478 (29 July 2011)** was from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General, confirming the allocation of funds in support of Tarasov’s activities.
- **S/2011/477 (26 July 2011)** was from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, requesting funds for Tarasov’s activities.

**Security Council Meeting Records**

- **S/PV.6675 (6 December 2011)** was Kobler’s briefing to the Council, presenting the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001.
- **S/2011/503 (8 August 2011)** was from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General, acknowledging his intention to appoint Kobler.
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**Security Council Meeting Records**

- **SC/10490 (15 December 2011)** expressed the Council’s intention to continue funding for the activities of the high-level coordinator for missing Kuwaiti persons and property.
- **SC/10362 (18 August 2011)** condemned terrorist attacks on 15 August in Iraq.
- **SC/10307 (30 June 2011)** welcomed the Iraqi government’s assumption of autonomy over the DFI.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- **S/2011/477 (26 July 2011)** was from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council, requesting funds for Tarasov’s activities.

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Martin Kobler (Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Secretary-General's High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gennady Tarasov (Russia)</td>
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Yemen

Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting in January a briefing on the situation in Yemen by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar.

Key Recent Developments
Support for President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen continued to deteriorate in the weeks and days preceding his signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative. More than 400 troops reportedly defected from the Yemeni military on 19 November 2011. On 23 November, Saleh signed the GCC initiative in Riyadh after negotiating an implementation mechanism, initiating the transition of power from Saleh to Vice President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi during an interim period leading up to elections. (The initiative provides immunity to Saleh and his family and allows him to remain as honorary president for three months. Following the elections, Hadi would be expected to become president as the consensus candidate agreed by all sides. Hadi would also oversee national dialogue to consider proposals for constitutional reform. These would include replacing the presidential system with a multi-party parliamentary system, which would be decided by a popular referendum.)

On 26 November 2011, and as envisaged in the GCC initiative and the accompanying implementation mechanism, Hadi signed a decree calling for early presidential elections to be held on 21 February 2012. (Prior to Saleh’s signing of the GCC initiative, the election was not due to take place until 2013.) Mohammed Salim Basindawa, a senior opposition figure, was named interim Prime Minister on 27 November.

On 4 December, Hadi also endorsed a decree to form the Military Affairs Committee charged with restructuring the military. (The 14-member committee is to be chaired by Hadi himself.)

On 10 December 2011, and as agreed to in the GCC initiative and the implementation mechanism, the new unity government, with 34 cabinet posts divided equally between the ruling party and the opposition, was sworn in. It will serve until the swearing in of the new government following the presidential elections. There were widespread protests across the country when the inclusion of Saleh loyalists in the new cabinet was announced.

On 13 December, the government ordered the release of all detainees held in connection with the protests, reportedly around 1,400.

Benomar briefed the Council on 28 November and 21 December 2011 after extensive travel in the region and within Yemen. In a press statement after the 28 November briefing, the members of the Council welcomed the signing of the GCC initiative and urged all parties to honour the timetable in the implementation of the agreement. During the 21 December briefing, Benomar said that political developments following the signing of the GCC initiative and the accompanying implementation mechanism were taking place on time. However, he also noted that there remained many challenges on multiple fronts and that the forthcoming presidential elections would be a significant milestone. Members of the Council issued a press statement the following day welcoming the formation of the Government of National Unity while reiterating the call for the implementation of the GCC initiative and the implementation mechanism in a timely fashion.

On 3 December 2011, at least 30 people were reported to have been killed in Taiz during clashes between government forces and anti-government fighters.

On 10 December 2011, Tawakkul Karman, the first Arab woman and the youngest (32 years) person ever to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, said Saleh wanted to push the country into civil war and he would not leave despite signing the GCC initiative.

The humanitarian situation in Yemen has steadily deteriorated. On 28 November the Council was briefed on this matter by Philippe Lazzarini, Deputy Director for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). On 2 December, Catherine Bragg, Assistant Secretary-General and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator of OCHA, reiterated in a press conference that the humanitarian situation in Yemen was of deep concern.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 6 December 2011, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, deplored the recent killing of unarmed civilians in Yemen. “It is appalling and extremely disappointing that despite the successive deals and ceasefires, government security forces continue to use live ammunition against unarmed protestors”, said Pillay. She stressed that violence was not the way to resolve Yemen’s difficulties and that the government must ensure that lethal force was not used against peaceful demonstrators. Pillay also urged that the economic, social and cultural rights of Yemenis be better protected, noting that the rights to education and health had been seriously curtailed over the past ten months. UN agencies had reported that access to basic social services had been increasingly limited, directly affecting more than 100,000 children who now had limited or no access to schooling or health facilities.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to determine what role it can play in the aftermath of the signing of the GCC initiative to minimise the violence and foster a peaceful political transition that abides by the timetables of the implementation mechanism.

A further issue for the Council is its role in ensuring the territorial integrity of Yemen and preventing any large-scale civil war.

Options
The Council’s options include:
• simply keeping abreast of the developments in Yemen and receiving regular briefings from Benomar and the Department of Political Affairs;
• issuing a statement encouraging Yemen’s key players to continue to engage in dialogue and ensure the full implementation of the GCC initiative and the accompanying mechanism, whilst emphasising greater unity and political inclusiveness, with the aid of the GCC; or, although less likely; and
agreeing to a clear message that any attempt to derail the current transition process will be taken seriously by the Council and will have consequences.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members are aware that Yemen’s politicians, as well as the country’s public opinion, follow closely any messages coming out of the Council. Members seem to be cautiously optimistic though they are concerned that while the political developments since the adoption of resolution 2014 are encouraging, Saleh continues to interfere with the political process. Council members also seem to be in agreement that it may be time to evaluate the role of the UN in Yemen and to give thought to a longer-term engagement.

Some Council members also feel that it is necessary to send the message that there will be consequences should anyone attempt to derail the current progress in Yemen. Most members would like to maintain the current focus until the full implementation of the GCC initiative and the accompanying implementation mechanism has occurred.

The UK has the lead in the Council on Yemen.

**Rule of Law**

**Expected Council Action**

An open debate on strengthening the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security will take place in January. In addition to member states at large, the Secretary-General or the Deputy Secretary-General, Asha-Rose Migiro, may address the Council. A presidential statement is expected as an outcome.

An Arria-formula meeting on the rule of law—including Council members and civil society representatives—may take place before the debate.

**Background**

In recent years, rule of law and justice issues have gained prominence in the Council’s thinking and discussions about long-term solutions. They have also influenced the design of its operations in the field and are now part of mainstream Council discussion and action.

Rule of law and international justice issues also have become a focus in a number of other thematic issues in the Council—such as protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; and women, peace and security—and are referred to when evaluating the Council’s use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The Council held its first thematic debate on the rule of law in 2003, followed by debates in 2004 and then in 2006. The last open debate, on “The Promotion and Strengthening of the Rule of Law in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, was on 29 June 2010. In a presidential statement following the debate, members expressed their commitment to ensuring that UN efforts to restore peace and security respect and promote the rule of law and recognised that sustainable peacebuilding requires an integrated approach that strengthens the coherence between political security, development, human rights and rule-of-law activities. It also reaffirmed the Council’s stance on opposition to impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 12 months regarding the implementation of the recommendations contained in his report of 23 August 2004 on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. In an exchange of letters last June, the Secretary-General requested permission to submit his report by 1 November.


**Key Developments since the 2010 Debate**

Several developments relating to various aspects of the rule of law have taken place at the Council since June 2010.

On 22 December 2010, the Council adopted resolution 1966, establishing the international residual mechanism for criminal tribunals, with two branches. (The mechanism is meant to carry out the essential remaining functions of the tribunals, including the trial of fugitives captured after their closure.) Annexed to the resolution are the statute of the residual mechanism and arrangements for the transition period before the closure of the tribunals. The Council requested the tribunals to conclude their work by 31 December 2014.

On 26 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970, referring the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The resolution also imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban on members of the regime and relatives of then Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi as well as an asset freeze on members of the Qaddafi family. A sanctions committee was established to monitor the implementation of these measures.

**Other Relevant Facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jamal Benomar (Morocco)</td>
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</table>

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**

- S/RES/2014 (21 October 2011) endorsed the GCC initiative for a peaceful transition of power.

**Security Council Press Statements**

- SC/10504 (22 December 2011) welcomed the progress that had been made on implementing the GCC and reiterated their call that it be implemented in a timely and transparent manner.
- SC/10460 (28 November 2011) welcomed the signing of the GCC initiative.
- SC/10394 (24 September 2011) urged all parties to reject violence.
- SC/10357 (9 August 2011) expressed concern at the worsening economic, humanitarian and security situations.
- SC/10296 (24 June 2011) expressed grave concern at the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation.
On 17 June, the Council adopted resolutions 1988 and 1989, separating the Taliban sanctions regime from the Al-Qaida (1267) regime. Several new procedures were adopted for strengthening the Office of the Ombudsperson with respect to the Al-Qaida sanctions list in resolution 1989, including making recommendations on individual delisting requests, which become binding unless within 60 days the 1267 and 1989 Sanctions Committee decides by consensus (or the Council decides by vote) to retain the listing.

On 12 October, the Secretary-General presented his follow-up report on the rule of law to the Council. The report focuses on transitional justice and gives an overview of ways in which the Council and its mandates have approached the issue in the past. It recommends that the Council make explicit references to transitional justice where appropriate, continue to support action plans for police and judicial reform, encourage more funding for justice and security institutions, reject any endorsement of amnesty for gross violations of human rights and encourage accountability.

On 9 December, the General Assembly adopted without vote a resolution requesting a report on the rule of law by the Secretary-General by March 2012, in preparation for a high-level event on the rule of law at the national and international levels to take place on 24 September 2012 on the margins of the General Assembly.

Key Issues

An issue for the Council is to be able to develop a more enduring and sustained focus on issues of justice and rule of law, as it has done with other thematic issues regularly on its agenda.

An important emerging issue is being able to address new threats to peace and security, for example piracy, in the framework of the rule of law and justice.

An increasingly important issue is what the Council can do to support and strengthen national rule of law and transitional justice within its mandates.

Another issue is the Council’s own adherence to the rule of law, in particular its practice regarding the rights of those subject to Council-imposed sanctions.

Options

One option is a presidential statement simply focusing on areas to be covered in the debate without asking for any follow-up action.

Another option is a presidential statement that makes specific recommendations for greater Council involvement, with an in-depth focus on specific aspects of the rule of law.

Requesting a follow-up report on rule of law from the Secretary-General is an additional option.

Council and Wider Dynamics

South Africa may choose to circulate a concept paper for the debate. At press time it is uncertain whether there will be a specific focus for the meeting or a general discussion of the rule of law. For the open debate that was originally scheduled during the Portuguese presidency in November, Portugal intended to focus its concept note on transitional justice issues in an attempt to facilitate conditions for concrete action and precise statements from the Council on transitional justice and its importance in maintaining and restoring peace and security.

Council members in general are supportive of the debate and the relevance of the rule of law to the Council’s work. As with some other recent thematic debates, there is general awareness that the Council must be cautious not to appear to encroach on the jurisdiction of other UN organs. Some Council members may try to limit the scope and language of the expected presidential statement in accordance with their view of the Council’s mandate under the UN Charter.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1988 (17 June 2011) and S/RES/1989 (17 June 2011) separated the Taliban individuals and entities subject to sanctions from the 1267 sanctions regime and expanded the role of the Ombudsperson with respect to delisting procedures in the 1267 Sanctions Committee.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC.
- S/RES/1966 (22 December 2010) established the residual mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/11 (29 June 2010) was on the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security and requested the Secretary-General to provide a follow-up report within 12 months.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/397 (27 June 2011) and S/2011/396 (23 June 2011) were the report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict situations.
- A/66/133 (8 August 2011) was the Secretary-General’s latest annual report on strengthening and coordinating UN rule of law activities.
- S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) was the report The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, which assessed existing UN practices, experience and expertise and put forward a series of recommendations for both the Council and the UN system.

Security Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6347 (29 June 2010) was the latest open debate on the rule of law.

Other

- A/66/475 (28 November 2011) was the report of the sixth committee to the General Assembly containing the resolution on the rule of law in preparation for the high-level event.
- S/2011/397 (27 June 2011) and S/2011/396 (23 June 2011) were an exchange of letters between the president of the Council and the Secretary-General, concerning the latter’s request to submit his report on the rule of law by 1 November 2011.
Status Update since our December 2011 Forecast

- **DRC:** On 2 December 2011, the members of the Security Council were briefed by Roger Meece, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), on the presidential and legislative elections of 28 November 2011. Following the briefing, Council members issued a press statement (SC/10470) which stressed the importance of maintaining a peaceful and calm environment, exercising restraint and resolving any differences through established legal and mediation mechanisms. Council members urged all candidates and their supporters to refrain from acts of violence and called on the authorities to investigate any such acts and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The statement also highlighted Council members’ concern about the logistical and technical difficulties encountered during the voting process. On 15 December, Meece briefed Council members again via video-teleconference. He updated them on election observer reports of irregularities in the election process, the security situation on the ground and MONUSCO’s preparations for possible developing scenarios.

- **Eritrea:** On 5 December 2011, the Council adopted resolution 2023 (S/PV.6674 and Resumption 1). The resolution condemned Eritrea’s violations of Council resolutions 1907, 1862 and 1844 and called on it to cease all efforts to destabilise other states. It also condemned the Eritrean government’s use of the diaspora tax to destabilise the Horn of Africa or violate Council resolutions, called on Eritrea to cease such practices and called for appropriate action to be taken by member states to make individuals accountable for and prevent them from engaging in illegal collection of the tax. The resolution also expressed concern over the Eritrean mining sector potentially being used as a source for financing destabilising activities and called on states to be vigilant to prevent such use. Additionally, it urged states to develop due diligence guidelines to prevent the provision of financial services that might contribute to further violations of existing Council resolutions. Finally, it expanded the mandate of the Monitoring group for Somalia and Eritrea and requested the Secretary-General to report within 180 days on Eritrea’s compliance with the resolution. Prior to the adoption (in the same meeting) the Council heard interventions by the President of Djibouti, Ismaël Omar Guelleh, the President of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, the Foreign Minister of Kenya, Moses Wetangula, and the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU, Mull Katende, speaking via video teleconference from Addis Ababa (S/PV.6674). The Eritrean President, Isaias Afwerki, had also been invited to speak, but in a 3 December letter to the Council (S/2011/753) Eritrea wrote that his participation would be logistically impossible and “a mere formality and utterly meaningless” because of the short notice (the invitation was extended on 30 November 2011) for which it blamed the US.

- **Lebanon:** On 9 December 2011, the Security Council issued a press statement condemning the attack on a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) convoy which injured five peacekeepers and two civilians (SC/10478). This is the third such attack in southern Lebanon during 2011, similar incidents occurred in May and July.

- **Cyprus:** On 9 December 2011, Lisa Buttenheim, head of the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), briefed Council members on the Secretary-General’s latest report on Cyprus. On 14 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2026 extending the mandate of the peacekeeping force in Cyprus until 19 July (S/PV.6685). The resolution called on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to intensify the momentum of negotiations and to constructively engage in the process. It also called on the two sides to work on reaching convergences on the remaining core issues, ahead of the “Greentree II” meeting with the Secretary-General in January.

- **Burundi:** On 7 December 2011, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Karin Landgren, briefed the Council on the recent Secretary-General’s report (S/PV.751) which recommended that BNUB’s mandate be renewed at its current composition (S/PV.6677). On 20 December, the Council adopted resolution 2027, extending BNUB’s mandate until 15 February 2013 under the same terms as the previous mandate, stressing that BNUB should support Burundi’s efforts in the area of socioeconomic development (S/PV.6691).

- **Tribunals:** On 7 December 2011, the presidents of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), Judge Theodor Meron and Judge Khalida Rachid Khan respectively, and the Prosecutors of both tribunals, Serge Brammertz and Hassan Bubacar Jallow respectively, briefed the Council (S/PV.6678). The briefers highlighted that staff retention and lack of state cooperation in certain areas threatened the successful completion of the tribunals’ work. (All four also attended the meeting of the Council’s informal working group on international tribunals on 6 December). On 21 December, the Council adopted resolution 2029, extending the terms of four trial judges and eight ad litem judges at the ICTR until 30 June 2012 or sooner if their trials were completed.

- **Abyei:** On 8 December 2011, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6679) and held consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abyei (S/2011/741). The Council adopted a resolution (S/RES/2024) on 14 December adding a border monitoring support role to the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). On 22 December, it renewed the mandate of UNISFA for an additional five months (S/RES/2032).

- **Syria:** On 12 December 2011, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, briefed Council members in informal
consultations on the situation in Syria, indicating that crimes against humanity had likely been committed by government forces. On 15 December, Russia called for emergency informal consultations under the “Middle East” agenda item to discuss a proposed Russian draft resolution on Syria. At press time, Council members had met twice at expert-level, on 19 and 22 December, to discuss the draft.

**Somalia:** On 13 December 2011, the Secretary-General briefed the Council on Somalia following his 9 December historic visit to Mogadishu with the President of the UN General Assembly, Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (S/PV.6681). (It was the first ever such joint visit to Somalia and the first visit by a Secretary-General since 1993.) The Secretary-General’s regular Somalia report (S/2011/759) was circulated on 9 December. In his briefing, the Secretary-General emphasised in particular that the international community was facing “a moment of fresh opportunity” in Somalia and must seize it by consolidating gains already made, offering additional support and ensuring that the military strategy was aligned with political objectives. After the briefing, Council members held informal consultations and subsequently issued a press statement (SC/10481) welcoming the Secretary-General’s visit to Mogadishu. They also underlined the seriousness of the problems in Somalia and the need for a comprehensive strategy and supported the Secretary-General’s call for faster implementation of the road map, while noting that future support to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions would be contingent on its completion.

**ICJ Election:** On 13 December 2011, the Council and General Assembly convened for the third time in order to independently, but concurrently, elect the fifth and final remaining judge for the International Court of Justice (ICJ). During the concurrent sessions, Julia Sebutinde (Uganda) obtained 97 votes in the Assembly, compared to 93 for rival candidate Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone), while in the Council she obtained nine votes and Koroma received six. Sebutinde joins Giorgio Gaja (Italy), Hisashi Owada (Japan), Peter Tomka (Slovakia) and Xue Hanqin (China) for a nine-year term on the Court commencing on 6 February.

**Liberia:** On 14 December 2011, the Council adopted resolution 2025 renewing for a period of 12 months a sanctions regime including asset freezes and arms embargo on non-state actors, and travel ban on selected individuals, as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed to monitor implementation of the sanctions regime (S/PV.6684). The Panel is tasked to “assess the impact, effectiveness, and continued need for the measures” and will conduct a mid-term and final review with a view “to possibly modifying or lifting all or part of the measures of the sanctions regime.” The resolution deplored the pre-election violence of 7 November 2011, and welcomed the establishment of a Special Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events and determine the facts and circumstances through “independent and impartial proceedings that meet international standards.” The resolution notes “with serious concern” violation of measures relating to asset freezes and called on the Liberian government to “make all necessary efforts to fulfil its obligations” in this regard. It also urged the Liberian government to “improve its control over the gold sector and adopt the necessary legislation in this regard, and focus its efforts on establishing effective governance of the gold production sector.” The latest Panel of Experts report (published on 7 December) noted several violations of the sanctions measures relating to asset freezes as well as the arms embargo (mainly by Liberian mercenaries returning from Côte d’Ivoire).

**Subsidiary Bodies:** On 14 December 2011, the Permanent Representatives of the outgoing members of the Security Council—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria—briefed the Council on the work of the subsidiary bodies they had chaired during their two-year tenures (S/PV.6686).


**Central Asia:** On 19 December 2011, Council members were briefed by Special Representative Miroslav Jenča on the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) over the past six months. The Council released a press statement (SC/10495) acknowledging the efforts of the Centre as a mechanism for preventive diplomacy and commended and welcomed the impact the Centre has in the region.

**Israel/Palestine:** On 20 December 2011, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Oscar Fernández-Taranco, briefed the Council (S/PV.6692) followed by informal consultations. Taranco told the Council that the peace process was dangerously uncertain, the security situation between Gaza and Israel had deteriorated and the announcement of new Israeli settlement construction, home demolitions in the West Bank and an increase in settler violence were of serious concern. He also reported that Quartet envoys had met separately with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on 14 December. On Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, Taranco noted that a series of meetings had been held in Cairo. In remarks to the press, EU Council members (France, Germany, Portugal and the UK) expressed concern about increased settlement construction and settler violence and reiterated EU principles on borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem. The IBSA members of the Council (India, Brazil, and South Africa), Lebanon on behalf of the Arab Group and South Africa on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, also delivered statements critical of Israeli settlement policy.
- **Golan Heights**: On 21 December 2011, the Security Council adopted resolution 2028 extending the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) through 30 June 2012. The resolution was a joint text by the US and Russia and noted that conditions in the region could impact UNDOF and also requested implementation of the Secretary-General’s recommendation to upgrade the Force’s equipment and infrastructure.

- **CAR**: On 21 December 2011, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2031 extending the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) until 31 January 2013. Resolution 2031 took into account the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2011/739) and extended the mandate for 13 months instead of 12 in order to spread out the renewal of mandates in 2012 (S/PV.6696). The renewal of a mandate through a resolution was in contrast to BINUCA’s inception, on 7 April 2009, by a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/5) as well as its last mandate renewal, on 14 December 2010, through another statement (S/PRST/2010/26). Some Council members felt it was more appropriate to adopt a resolution and highlight the ongoing challenges that exist in CAR. Prior to this, the Council was briefed on 14 December by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of BINUCA, and Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium), the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s CAR country configuration (S/PV.6687). CAR’s Prime Minister, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, also addressed the Council on the same day. Vogt highlighted that CAR was at a critical juncture while presenting the Secretary-General’s latest report, whereas, Grauls’ briefing noted the security aspects of the situation as well as the lack of political inclusiveness in the post-electoral period. Touadéra updated the Council on the recent developments related to the CAR government.

- **Guinea-Bissau**: On 21 December 2011, the Council unanimously passed resolution 2030 extending the mandate of the UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 28 February 2013 (S/PV.6695). Sponsored by Brazil, Nigeria and Portugal, the resolution welcomed the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries to assist in the reforms of the defence and security sectors in Guinea-Bissau and called on the country’s military to respect constitutional order, civilian rule and oversight, and to refrain from any interference in political issues. It also urged Guinea-Bissau’s political leadership to refrain from involving the military and the judiciary in politics, and to conclude investigations into the political assassinations of March and June 2009 “as soon as possible”. The resolution addressed regional and international anxiety surrounding Guinea Bissau, the threats posed by the “growth in illicit drug trafficking and organised crime” in the country and welcomed the government’s 2011-2014 National Operational Plan to combat illicit drug trafficking and organised crime.

- **Iran**: On 21 December 2011, the Chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee (1737 Committee), Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), provided a regular 90-day briefing to the Council. On 7 December, the Committee had received an oral briefing from the coordinator of the Panel of Experts summarising the key points of its midterm report of 1 November. The Panel had investigated a reported violation of the ban on all exports of arms and related material from Iran (resolution 1747) and initiated an inquiry into an alleged violation of Iran of paragraph 9 of resolution 1929. (The paragraph states that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.) Following the briefing, several Council members expressed concern regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and in particular the issues addressed in the IAEA’s report of 8 November. In his concluding remarks, Osorio noted that a series of concerns weighed heavily on Council members, including that the Panel’s previous report of May 2011 had not been made public due to resistance within the Committee.
### Notable Dates for January

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### Other Important Dates in January 2012

- **12 January**: The Council is expected to hold a debate on UN-AU strategic partnership.
- **19 January**: The Council is expected to hold an open debate on strengthening the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- **24 January**: The Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East.