Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1529 (2004) of 29 February 2004, especially paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof, and taking into account its paragraph 10. In paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Council authorized the deployment of a multinational interim force (MIF) for a period of not more than three months. The Council further declared its readiness to establish a follow-on United Nations stabilization force to support continuation of a peaceful and constitutional political process and the maintenance of a secure and stable environment in Haiti. The Council also requested that I submit, in consultation with the Organization of American States (OAS), recommendations for the size, structure and mandate of such a force, including the role of international police and means for coordination with the OAS Special Mission, as well as elaborate a programme of action for the United Nations to assist the political process, support humanitarian and economic assistance and promote the protection of human rights and the development of the rule of law in Haiti. Furthermore, the Council called upon the international community, in particular the United Nations, the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), to work with the people of Haiti in a long-term effort to promote the rebuilding of democratic institutions and to assist in the development of a strategy to promote social and economic development and to combat poverty.

2. In order to prepare the relevant recommendations, I dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Haiti, led by Hocine Medili and working under the auspices of my Special Adviser, John Reginald Dumas, to gather the necessary information on the ground. The mission began its work in Port-au-Prince on 11 March 2004, and comprised representatives from several Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. My Special Adviser arrived on 15 March. Meetings were held with the interim President of the Republic of Haiti, Boniface Alexandre, the Prime Minister of the transitional Government, Gérard Latortue, other members of the transitional Government, the Director-General of the Haitian National Police and other relevant stakeholders in Haiti, including civil society actors and political groups, as well as with the United Nations country team, the OAS Special Mission, the MIF and the wider diplomatic community. In addition, my Special Adviser consulted with the OAS, CARICOM and other relevant stakeholders in New York, Washington, D.C., and Kingston,
Jamaica. In addition, he attended the Intersessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, held on 25 and 26 March.

3. The scope of the work of the assessment mission was affected by two main factors. First, the transitional Government was installed only one week after the mission’s arrival, thus limiting the possibility of regular and in-depth interaction with the Haitian authorities who were focused on immediate needs. Secondly, security conditions permitted only limited visits to areas outside the capital (Cap Haitien, Les Cayes and Gonaives).

4. In submitting the assessment and the recommendations hereunder, I am mindful of previous international involvement in Haiti. In February 1993, the joint United Nations-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti was deployed. The Security Council in its resolution 940 (1994) authorized the deployment of a 20,000-strong multinational force to facilitate the prompt return of the legitimate Haitian authorities, maintain a secure and stable environment in the country and promote the rule of law. The multinational force was followed by other United Nations missions from 1994 to 2001. Furthermore, the international community mobilized important resources to alleviate the humanitarian situation and contribute to the development of Haiti.

5. Throughout this period, there were a number of positive developments, including the restoration of some measure of democracy, with the first peaceful handover of power between two democratically elected presidents; the growth of a multifaceted civil society; and its increasing involvement in the development of a political culture based on democratic values. There were, however, also setbacks. Owing to the continuing political crisis and concomitant lack of stability, serious reforms never took hold. The consolidation of a genuine democratic system did not occur; self-sustaining and effective institutions at all levels, particularly in the area of public security and the rule of law, did not take firm root and were unable to deliver public services, a gap which non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sought to fill outside the institutional framework; progress in the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP) was slow and uneven; drug trafficking increased; human rights abuses and corruption continued; and real economic growth did not materialize. Lack of progress over time and lack of accountability resulted in renewed threats of sanctions and the suspension of much of the international assistance.

6. While some of those developments were in no small measure due to a lack of political will from the Haitian leadership, there were also shortcomings in the approach of the international community. Throughout the course of its assistance programmes, the international community failed to develop necessary and sustainable partnerships with the Haitian society at all levels. The Haitian people were insufficiently involved in the development of policies that could move the country forward, resulting in increased alienation. Financial aid did not bear fruit to the extent expected because it was at times ill-targeted and did not take into account the deficiencies in local absorptive capacity.

7. Those prior experiences have been taken into account in the preparation of the present report and in formulating my recommendations, which have been shared with the Haitian authorities by the multidisciplinary assessment mission. The international community should seek to strike the right balance between Haitian ownership on the one side and accountability for results on the other. Haiti would
best be served by watchful support from the international community. A sustained long-term international accompaniment of Haitian efforts at all levels will be key to achieving lasting social peace, national reconciliation, durable democratic institutions and long-term development. In doing so, the international community should ensure that Haitian leaders have participated fully in the design of such assistance and assume responsibility for its implementation.

II. Political situation

8. In the 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections, President Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party claimed victory with a turnout that hardly rose above 10 per cent of the voters. The opposition, as well as members of the international community, contested the results and accused the Government of manipulating them. Subsequently, dialogue between the Government and the opposition broke down. The opposition was increasingly repressed by politicized sectors of the HNP and by irregular armed groups supportive of the Government. By late 2003, a newly united opposition movement, comprising political parties, civil society actors as well as the private sector, was calling for the President's resignation. CARICOM offered to mediate and, on 31 January 2004, submitted a Prior Action Plan, followed in February by an implementation plan worked out by the Group of Six, involving the Bahamas for CARICOM, Canada, the European Union, France, the OAS and the United States. Both of these plans were agreed to by President Aristide. The Prior Action Plan had called for major reforms, including a new cabinet, while allowing President Aristide to serve out his term. However, the opposition refused to back the plan. Several diplomatic initiatives, spearheaded by CARICOM and the OAS, were subsequently taken with a view to overcoming the political stalemate and preventing a further deepening of the political crisis.

9. In early February 2004, armed conflict broke out in the city of Gonaïves, and in the following days fighting spread to other cities. Gradually the insurgents took control of much of the northern part of the country. Despite diplomatic efforts, the armed opposition threatened to march on the Haitian capital. Early on 29 February, Mr. Aristide left the country. His letter of resignation was read out by the Prime Minister, Yvon Neptune. Within hours, Boniface Alexandre, the President of the Supreme Court, was sworn in as interim President, in accordance with the constitutional rules of succession. On the evening of 29 February, the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations submitted the interim President's request for assistance, which included the authorization for troops to enter Haiti. Pursuant to that request, the Council adopted resolution 1529 (2004). The MIF immediately started its deployment to Haiti, as authorized by that resolution.

10. In consultation with the interim President and the then-Prime Minister, steps were taken to form a transitional government. On 4 March 2004, a Tripartite Council was named, consisting of one representative each from the Fanmi Lavalas party, the Plate-forme Démocratique and the international community. On 5 March 2004, this group selected seven eminent persons (known as the Conseil des sages), who would in turn select a Prime Minister. The Council included representatives of key sectors of Haitian society: human rights groups, the Catholic and Anglican churches, academia, the private sector, and the political groups Convergence démocratique and Fanmi Lavalas. On 9 March 2004, the Conseil des sages selected Gérard Latortue as Prime Minister. On 17 March 2004, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the
Conseil des sages, formed a 13-member transitional Government (including three women), chosen on the basis of professional competence and not of party affiliation. Since then, the transitional Government has focused on organizing its work, and has reached out to civil society in an effort to build a base of support. It is expected, however, to be under pressure to accommodate various interests of political groups not directly represented in the transitional Government. Some supporters of the Fanmi Lavalas party and others have contested the transitional Government's legitimacy.

11. Further, until recently the continued role of the Conseil des sages and its future relationship to the transitional Government was unclear. When the multidisciplinary assessment mission was in Haiti, discussions were held to expand and transform the Conseil des sages into a State Council (Conseil d'Etat). In the absence of a functioning Parliament, members of the Conseil des sages saw themselves as being mandated to provide checks and balances while offering advice to the transitional Government.

12. In order to build broad political consensus for the work of the transitional Government, a political pact, the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact, was signed on 4 April by the Prime Minister on behalf of the transitional Government, members of the Conseil des sages, representatives of political groups, with the notable exception of Fanmi Lavalas, and civil society organizations. The signatories agreed to meet on a monthly basis, at the invitation of the Government, to evaluate progress in the implementation of its provisions. Fanmi Lavalas has denounced the Pact.

13. The signatories came to a general understanding on the political transition, which would see the holding of municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005 and would end with the installation of a newly elected President. In this context, members of the transitional Government, electoral council, Conseil des sages and others agreed not to stand in the upcoming elections. Until the opening of the first session of the next parliament, the Conseil des sages will advise the transitional Government, including through consultations on important matters such as the budget, agreements and decrees, and draw the interim President's attention to questions that merit high-level intervention. It will increase its membership after further consultations. The transitional Government, however, will not be bound by the advice of the Conseil des sages. The Pact also provided for procedures to address possible vacancies in the executive branch.

14. The Pact also set out measures to be undertaken during the transitional period in the areas of security, development, fight against impunity and corruption, decentralization, elections, judicial reform, a national conference initiative and a new social contract, institutional strengthening of political parties and civil society organizations, reintegration of former armed elements and professionalization of the HNP. Additionally, it was agreed to establish a number of commissions to address issues such as recent human rights abuses, financial wrongdoing and matters related to the former military. The Pact emphasized the need to provide assistance to victims of the prior government. The Pact also provided that the signatories would engage in discussions with the United Nations on the status of the MIF and the follow-on peacekeeping operation.

15. Extending the authority of the State outside Port-au-Prince will also be a major test for the transitional Government. Many communities are without legitimate local
governments and are controlled by irregular armed groups. Self-appointed or insurgent-designated mayors and leaders have replaced some local bodies. While the authority to appoint regional delegates (equivalent to “prefects”) rests with the central executive branch, the intended nomination by the transitional Government of provisional municipal committees will require a sustained consensus at the local level throughout the transitional period.

16. Addressing the key objectives identified in the Pact will be essential to overcome the current crisis, improve Haiti’s governance and make progress towards sustainable development. It will require a long-term effort at the grass-roots level, with a view to empowering the Haitian people, promoting local ownership and developing a culture of dialogue and compromise. Empowering the Haitian population also implies that more decisions should be taken at, and more resources allocated to, the local level. In this context, the implementation of a genuine decentralization process has been identified as a priority in the Pact for political transition. The international community is poised to assist the Haitian authorities at all levels in these efforts, particularly with a national dialogue and institutional development.

Electoral process

17. Over the last 10 years, most electoral processes have been disrupted or contested. The Parliament is not currently functioning; the term of the National Assembly had expired by January 2004 and, due to expired terms, the Senate has lost more than half of its members and cannot reach a quorum. The term of the local bodies had also expired by January 2004. With regard to the presidential elections, the Constitution provides for a vote within 90 days after the President’s post becomes vacant, which occurred on 29 February. There is a consensus, however, that the election cannot be organized within the prescribed time frame.

18. Given that the controversy surrounding recent elections played a large part in the political crisis of the last few years, the conduct of free and fair elections at all levels will be a key element in the Haitian political and constitutional process. Various interlocutors had called for the transition period to last between nine and twenty-four months. While the Fanmi Lavalas and the Convergence démocratique political groups had expressed a preference for general elections to be held by the end of 2004, members of civil society and the international community were of the view that more time would be needed to prepare the elections and to create the basis for a sustainable democratic process in Haiti. Subsequently, it was agreed by most Haitian stakeholders, with the exception of Fanmi Lavalas, that municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections will be held before the end of 2005 with the elected President to be sworn in on 7 February 2006.

19. Despite efforts throughout the 1990s, Haiti still does not have a permanent or provisional electoral council. As a first step, the formation of a pluralistic provisional electoral council should be facilitated. In accordance with the Pact, the nine members of the provisional electoral council will be appointed in line with the prior 2002 agreement, reached with support from the OAS, which provided for the nomination of its members by civil society, political groups and the government. By 13 April 2004, all members of the provisional electoral council had been designated, including a representative from Fanmi Lavalas. Once formed, the council will establish a timetable for the elections. This time frame will need to take into
account, not only logistical and operational requirements, but also security and political considerations. Haiti’s political life has too often been dominated by highly personalized presidential elections, fostering inflammatory rhetoric and distracting the population’s attention from local challenges. In that context, the convening of municipal and parliamentary elections prior to the presidential elections could be an important step in order to move away from the past and would promote local governance and local ownership of democratic processes.

20. Until time frames for the elections are established, the international community could continue to help create a viable and sustainable infrastructure for the elections. Programmes could include technical support for political parties in developing issue-based campaigns and policy-driven agendas; training for party members in constructive negotiation and dispute resolution; support to women as voters and candidates; and the further development and consolidation of a civil registry and voter registration database. The interim President, the Prime Minister of the transitional Government and other interlocutors of the multidisciplinary assessment mission expressed the view that the international community should supervise, rather than observe the elections to ensure the legitimacy of the results. A further assessment will be undertaken to determine the modalities for the international community’s role in this area.

III. Security situation

21. The security situation in Haiti has visibly worsened since the end of 2003, culminating in an armed insurgency and the near collapse of the entire security apparatus in February 2004. Many of Haiti’s security problems, however, are of a structural nature. After President Aristide’s return to power, having been overthrown in a military coup in 1991, he passed a decree in 1995 to disband the Haitian armed forces. This decision was not followed by an amendment to the Constitution reflecting the army’s dissolution. Moreover, members of the former military were demobilized without adequate provision being made for securing their weapons and for establishing reintegration programmes or compensation packages, including pensions. This resulted in serious discontent among members of the former military and planted the seeds for future civil unrest. As called for in the 4 April Pact, a commission will explore the issue of pensions for former military and make recommendations to the forthcoming elected Government on the advisability of reorganizing the military.

22. Over time, the security situation in Haiti was undermined by the politicization and disintegration of the HNP and the concomitant rise of armed groups, known as chimères, on which the former President increasingly relied to maintain power. In return for their support, these armed groups received financial assistance and were given a free hand to intimidate political opponents as well as segments of the local population and to engage in organized crime, including narcotics trade. Against that backdrop, many Haitians armed themselves for self-protection and unregulated private security companies further contributed to an unprecedented nation-wide proliferation and trafficking of small arms. It should be recalled that the Constitution grants every citizen the right to self-defence within the bounds of his domicile, but not to bear arms without a permit.
23. Following the outbreak of armed conflict in the city of Gonaïves in early February 2004, which spread to other cities in subsequent days, insurgents gradually took control of much of the northern part of the country. Some members of the former military also returned to Haiti and took control of cities in the Central Plateau. Other armed groups, such as community-organized groups, paramilitary and militia groups, armed street gangs and prison escapees joined ranks with the insurgents. Some of them have been embraced by the local population and senior politicians as “liberators”. The community-organized armed groups and gangs are highly fragmented, located primarily in impoverished urban areas and pose the greatest threat to security. Moreover, many of these groups also turned to banditry and other criminal activities in order to sustain themselves. The absence of the rule of law has reinforced a climate of impunity and other crimes, such as kidnapping, robberies and rape, are on the rise. In addition, politically motivated intimidation now mainly targets Fanmi Lavalas supporters.

24. Moreover, Haiti has become a significant trans-shipment place for cocaine due to a lack of law enforcement, porous borders and corruption of some of the law enforcement agencies and their political sponsors. This has resulted not only in increased violence and crime, but also in a higher consumption of drugs, as local intermediaries have increasingly been paid in kind, prompting them to resell it on the local market. This problem would need to be addressed more aggressively by the international community and by the Haitian leadership and law enforcement agencies, both at the local and regional levels.

25. At the time of the deployment of the MIF on 29 February, the Haitian authorities were in control only of the territory around Port-au-Prince. The MIF, which is drawn from Canada, Chile, France and the United States, has already deployed over 3,000 troops. The MIF headquarters and the majority of its troops are deployed in the capital. Since mid-March, the MIF has also established a presence in the northern cities of Gonaïves, Cap Haitien and Fort Liberté. The MIF conducts occasional air and ground patrols in other areas. The MIF’s number of troops does not allow it to guard large numbers of static sites. The HNP has joined the MIF in some patrols.

26. While the security situation has calmed down with the deployment of the MIF, the latter’s restricted resources and geographic areas of operation, as well as limited disarmament activities has constrained its ability to address aspects of the insecurity. The situation on the ground remains complex; in some areas, the MIF and the HNP coexist with the insurgents. Armed groups still control parts of some regions. In addition, a variety of local security arrangements exist, involving civil action groups, former military, local gangs escaped prisoners and some HNP officers who returned to their posts. These groups coexist in some cities, dividing the area among them.

27. The security environment remains uncertain and will be influenced by the political process, the pace and efficacy of the restoration of government authority and State institutions, particularly the HNP, throughout the country, the durability of the measures undertaken by the MIF, particularly with regard to disarmament, and the willingness of armed groups to cooperate with disarmament and reintegration plans. To date, weapons handovers have been largely symbolic and pledges by rebels to lay down arms upon the establishment of a transitional Government have not yet been followed through. In the light of these uncertainties and the institutional
obstacles faced by the HNP in performing law and order functions, an international presence would need to provide a security umbrella under which the Haitian Government could re-establish public security and promote a feeling of safety among the population. That would require that the international security presence, in conjunction with the gradually emerging HNP, confiscate visible illicit arms and seize arms caches. It would also require deployment throughout the country and close coordination with international civilian police as well as the HNP.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

28. As part of the effort to create a secure environment, a comprehensive programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups will be required. The transitional Government should commence political engagement with the armed groups to secure their commitment. The international community could support the national capacity to develop, coordinate and implement a sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, which considers the distinct roles and needs of women, girls and men. The informal and unstructured nature of many armed groups requires a tailored and decentralized approach to voluntary disarmament and could be combined with a sustainable process of socio-economic reintegration, which could be framed within a broader process of longer-term community recovery, development, local reconciliation and peace-building.

29. Furthermore, support could be provided for the development of national legal, law enforcement and administrative capacities for weapons control, collection, management (including licensing and registration), secure stockpiling, destruction and disposal, and combating illicit trafficking. A central element could be the establishment of a national coordination and policy development mechanism, which could bring together national institutions, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations, regional organizations, NGOs, international financial institutions and interested donors. The strategy could be complemented with a community-based information- and awareness-raising campaign targeted at all groups of society, including women and children associated with such groups, to improve the understanding of disarmament and weapons regulations, generate participation in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and foster a culture of settling conflicts by peaceful means. Finally, secure and adequate funding of such a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy should be established from the outset.

IV. Police, judicial and corrections

Police

30. Since the disbandment of the armed forces in 1995, the HNP is the only remaining component of the official security apparatus in Haiti. The HNP comprises 189 countrywide operational police departments (10 Commissariats de département, 46 Commissariats d'arrondissement, and 133 Commissariats de commune). Prior to the recent events, the number of police officers amounted to some 5,000 officers out of a projected strength of 6,367 officers, of which 5.6 per cent were female police officers, in a country of 8.5 million inhabitants. It is estimated that the HNP would need a minimum of 10,000 officers, or 1 police officer for every 800 citizens, in
order to meet Haiti’s basic law and order requirements. The ratio in the region is normally 1 police officer for every 400 citizens. During recent years, the HNP has suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, logistical and financial resources. Border security did not function appropriately, except for some incipient coast guard capacity, and adequate arrangements were not in place to deal with criminal investigation, drug or human trafficking.

31. In addition to a lack of resources in recent years, the HNP has been plagued by heavy politicization, corruption and mismanagement. Arbitrary promotions of Fanmi Lavalas loyalists, the incorporation of chimères, police abuse, rape and drug trafficking further contributed to the demoralization and erosion of professional standards within the police service and a loss of credibility in the eyes of the Haitian population. The weak status of the HNP has also contributed to crime, including drug trafficking. Results in the fight against crime were scarce.

32. During the recent unrest, the HNP almost completely collapsed. Today, with a drastically reduced strength of no more than 2,500 police officers, the ratio stands at 1 officer for every 3,300 citizens. Many police stations were vandalized, burnt and seriously damaged, while equipment, records and archives have been looted or destroyed. Many Commissariats d’arrondissement are not controlled by the HNP. Despite these challenges and shortcomings, the HNP has been able to maintain a minimal law enforcement capability, contribute to a protective detail for the interim President and Prime Minister and maintain elements of an anti-riot operational unit and a 250-strong judiciary police capacity. Law enforcement officers have begun to return to work, after several months of reduced or no activity. However, police patrols and traffic control remain virtually non-existent, although policing activities are expected to gradually expand in conjunction with the stabilization efforts of the MIF. The HNP leadership has been endeavouring to bring back more HNP officers and to recruit new officers.

33. A successful restoration of the rule of law and public security in Haiti will require a comprehensive approach to assist the HNP with sustainable reform and institutional strengthening, in conjunction with parallel improvements in other areas of the criminal justice system. The lack of qualified personnel and basic equipment, as well as rehabilitation of infrastructure, will be the first and foremost challenges. Due to the flight of many HNP officers, the need for new recruits, including increased numbers of female officers to deal with, among others, victims of sexual violence, and police training, including on human rights and violence against women in particular, is pressing. The international community could facilitate the vetting, capacity enhancement and certification of competences and skills of these newly recruited officers; offer on-the-job mentoring within a community-based policing approach; advice on setting up specialized units for dealing with victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as human trafficking; and provide training and refresher courses at the HNP Academy. With immediate support from the international community, the HNP could resume its training activities and restore its capability up to the recent pre-crisis levels in two years. A long-term plan to increase HNP strength up to 10,000 would require sustained support from the international community for at least an additional four years. Guidance and support for the implementation of effective professional standards and transparent internal oversight mechanisms within the HNP would be another necessary element. With regard to drug trafficking, effective structures and mechanisms are needed to tackle
the problem particularly by enhancing national capacity in this area through legislation and law enforcement.

34. The regeneration and professionalization of the HNP must be a national effort on the basis of community requirements. The international presence could accompany such effort, provide operational back-up as needed and assist with training and institution building. However, it will take time for the HNP to be fully revitalized and provide the level of public security required. Therefore, a priority effort should be made to ensure that the HNP is fully able to exercise its responsibilities in the shortest possible time.

Judicial

35. The judicial sector has lacked institutional capacity and resources and suffered from limited territorial coverage and endemic corruption. Basic tools such as criminal registries, investigative techniques and protocols and means for information sharing have been missing. The public lacks confidence in the courts, as impunity often prevailed and the case management flow does not work properly. Justice is distant from the public as it is administered mainly in French on the basis of written documents and costly procedures, thus blocking its access by most Haitians, who are Creole-speaking, illiterate and poor. Legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women. Moreover, the judiciary's independence has been strongly questioned. There has been no functioning juvenile justice system.

36. The administration of criminal justice in Haiti has been greatly affected by the recent crisis. Tribunals came to a standstill, as most judges ceased to report to work. Courts and other judicial buildings have been damaged and in some instances burned down. Equipment and archives have been destroyed or looted. Where courts still exist, judiciary officers are returning to work, security conditions permitting.

37. Considerable improvements in the justice sector are needed to ensure lasting peace and security in Haiti. In order to be sustainable, reforms should take into account the need to respect local absorptive capacity and to ensure local ownership. The international community could resume and bolster efforts in support of the administration of justice. Initiatives groups promoting the reform of the justice and the security sector, deserve further support. Moreover, as part of an effort to reformulate legal texts, the transitional Government could conduct an open and participatory process that aims to stimulate the emergence of a national consensus on the parameters of the judicial system.

38. Short- and medium-term international and local interventions could focus on improving the overall delivery of justice and combating impunity so as to rebuild public confidence in the judicial system, as well as enhance access to justice for marginalized or vulnerable groups. That would require the continuation and expansion of current efforts aimed at improving case-filing systems, strengthening the penal chain in provincial jurisdictions, facilitating better communication between police and investigative judges, reducing response times for cases by judges and courts, and providing training and facilitation for alternative dispute resolution and supporting the establishment of a functioning juvenile justice system. Key issues that could be addressed are the need for judicial independence, palpable anti-corruption measures and the devotion of sufficient Haitian resources to reform the judicial system, including payment of salaries to attract and retain committed, qualified and professional staff. The international community, in particular United
Nations agencies and programmes, have provided considerable assistance to the judicial sector, and is now engaged in a further evaluation of its future intervention in this field. Once this evaluation is completed, the role, if any, that the Organization could play in support of legal and judicial development will be determined.

Corrections

39. The Administration Penitentiaire Nationale, operating under the authority of the HNP, is in charge of 21 detention centres. The system housed approximately 3,800 prisoners prior to the recent disturbances, of whom approximately 80 per cent were pre-trial detainees. During the insurgency in February 2004, all inmates throughout the country were set free and prison facilities, equipment and records were destroyed, looted or severely damaged. At the time of the multidisciplinary assessment mission, the prisons could not be used because they did not provide adequate security and use in their current state would present serious health risks to prisoners and corrections staff. Approximately 300 prisoners have since been detained in police station cells; others, including dangerous criminals, remain at large.

40. Restarting the activities of the corrections system will be a priority since the slow resumption of police and judiciary activities has resulted and will continue to result in a large number of prisoners being held in overcrowded police lock-ups, who require transfer to secure prison facilities. The United Nations system, especially United Nations agencies and programmes, has provided support to the prison system since 1995, including training and advisory support and infrastructure development. It is clear that early investment by the international community in rebuilding infrastructure and provision of equipment would be necessary to enable the system to function in the short term. Medium-term support would be needed in reforming the existing provisions governing the penal system, and such reform should be rooted in an ongoing dialogue with civil society and human rights groups. The international community could further provide technical support to the prison administration in rehabilitating destroyed jails and updating its database to account for all escapees. Currently, 52 of the 600 corrections officers are women. When re-establishing the corrections system, due regard will be needed to ensure that female corrections officers are at least retained, if not increased. A further evaluation of the nature of future assistance to the prison system will be undertaken. Once the evaluation has been completed, the role, if any, that the Organization or any other international actor could play in support of the corrections system will be determined.

V. Human rights

41. Human rights violations in Haiti have been a serious concern in the past and continue to be today. Political and institutional instability, socio-economic impoverishment and a volatile security situation has reinforced a climate of lawlessness and impunity and has led to an increase in human rights abuses and other acts of violence, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, wrongful detentions, abductions, attacks against journalists, human trafficking, sexual violence against women and girls and the use, albeit limited, of child soldiers by various parties. All sides, irrespective of political affiliation, have committed
violations and have been victims of abuses. Many former perpetrators of gross human rights violations joined the rebel movement and remain at large.

42. In the past decade, at the request of the Commission on Human Rights, I have appointed two successive independent experts to provide assistance to the Government of Haiti in the area of human rights, to examine the development of the situation of human rights in Haiti and to monitor the fulfilment by Haiti of its obligations in this field. They have identified the continued serious deterioration of the human rights situation due to weak institutions, police brutality, widespread impunity and corruption. The Commission on Human Rights has also reported on Haiti and has documented serious human rights violations. The multidisciplinary assessment mission came to similar conclusions. The Independent Expert on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, Louis Joinet, visited Haiti from 3 to 11 April to assess the human rights situation in the context of technical cooperation in that field.

43. The Haitian authorities have been unable to address abuses effectively due to, inter alia, the weakness of State institutions in charge of guaranteeing respect for human rights and administering justice. Prior attempts at bringing justice to victims of human rights abuses were inadequate. In March 1995, President Aristide established, by decree, a short-lived National Commission on Truth and Justice, which was mandated to investigate human rights violations perpetrated by the military regime between 1991 and 1994 and make its results available to the Haitian judiciary for further action. About 6,000 victims submitted their cases. In February 1996, the Commission produced a report on the human rights violations, including recommendations on reparation and reform of State institutions. The results achieved by the Commission were relatively satisfactory, but it was handicapped in its ability to offer a comprehensive compensation plan for the victims inter alia owing to lack of resources. Only limited funds were available for community projects indirectly assisting victims. Further, women who were victims of politically motivated rape during the military regime of 1991-1994 have not received compensation or assistance for the psychological trauma and medical consequences, including HIV/AIDS, of such attacks. Offices for human rights protection, such as the Office of the Protection of Citizens, have lost credibility because of their inability to act upon violations committed against human rights activists, political opponents and journalists.

44. Without putting an end to impunity, no genuine reconciliation or sustainable social peace can be attained. The international community could support initiatives and mechanisms established by the transitional Government to re-establish the rule of law and promote a culture of individual accountability for human rights abuses and of redress for their victims. Furthermore, capacity-building efforts could support the Office of the Protection of Citizens on the basis of consultations with all sectors. Assistance could also be provided to local human rights NGOs and civil society organization, particularly women’s organizations and those dealing with child protection; for the promotion of human rights education; and the establishment and maintenance of a human rights database to record human rights violations.

VI. Humanitarian situation, recovery and development issues

45. Haiti is the only least developed country in the Western Hemisphere, is a small island developing State, with 8.5 million inhabitants, occupying a territory (land and
sea) of 27,750 square kilometres, and is emerging from a recent conflict situation. The Haitian commercial sector has been decimated. Forty per cent of Haiti’s revenues come from remittances from Haitians living abroad. Haiti’s socioeconomic indicators are particularly bleak, with an extreme division between rich and poor and a small middle class. Approximately 52 per cent of the Haitian population lives below the poverty line. Haitian women in particular live in precarious humanitarian conditions mainly due to chronic poverty; lack of reproductive health care; a high prevalence and acceptance of domestic violence and a high maternal mortality. Maternal and infant mortality is the highest in the Western hemisphere and one of the highest in the world. Only 34 per cent of children aged 12 to 23 months receive all the required vaccines and 16 per cent of children have not received any vaccine at all. Chronic malnutrition affects some 51 per cent of the population, with two thirds of children under five suffering from anaemia. Before the current crisis, close to half the boys and about 40 per cent of the girls were not enrolled in primary school. It is estimated that more than 2,000 children are trafficked every year outside the country. Exposure of children to violence and exploitation of children as domestic indentured servants (an estimated 75 per cent of these so-called restavèk are girls 7 to 14 years of age) has been widespread. Sexual violence against children and women is on a sharp upswing.

46. Haiti has the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS outside sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 4.5 per cent in 2002. HIV prevalence levels within the country vary enormously, from as high as 13 per cent in the north-west to 2-3 per cent in the south along the border with the Dominican Republic. Despite remarkable progress in combating the epidemic, AIDS claims an estimated 30,000 lives a year and has left some 200,000 children orphaned. Among young people 14 to 24 years of age, 5 per cent of girls and 4.1 per cent of boys are infected with HIV.

47. Owing to failed agricultural policies and rapid environmental degradation, the size of urban areas has more than doubled since the mid-1970s. Those areas now contain close to 40 per cent of the population in the country, including over 2 million people in Port-au-Prince. The concentration of population and poverty in uncontrolled and unsafe slums represent not only a source of physical and social vulnerability to large sectors of society, but also an insecure and volatile environment. Massive unemployment has created large numbers of resentful youths, who embrace radical political rhetoric, hold weapons and contribute to cyclic violence. This dire humanitarian situation contributes to displacement, as it prompts many poor Haitians to leave the country in search of economic opportunities. There has also been a catastrophic erosion of Haiti’s biodiversity and environmental resources.

48. In the past few months, the turbulence has further disrupted the provision of vital services to the population. There has been a sharp decline in food security due to the disruption of distribution mechanisms. The availability of agricultural inputs, usually procured by farmers for the main cereal-planting season between March and April, has been severely impacted. The provision of health services, including emergency hospital services, has been disrupted due to the lack of security. Stocks of essential drugs have been depleted, and it has become very difficult to re-supply the network of health facilities. Key health programmes have also been interrupted. A rapid post-crisis assessment conducted by the United Nations system in coordination with Haiti’s Ministry of Health showed that of the 30 health facilities surveyed in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 22 had their emergency capacity
seriously compromised. Reliable numbers of refugees and others displaced internally as a result of the recent crisis are not available, but are thought to number no more than 2,000. However, as is evident from the assessment of the overall situation in the present report, there is currently no adequate protection framework in place to respond to their safe return.

49. Responding to the immediate crisis and addressing its roots require both a short-term humanitarian response as well as a sustained longer-term development effort. The challenges require sustained international resources and commitment, especially in order to ensure integrated economic support for Haitian communities with a view to generating employment and creating the conditions for armed youths to return to productive economic activity. Creating such conditions would also have the effect of reducing the impetus for departures due to poverty and unemployment. In addition, international assistance should be provided not instead of, but in support of, Haitian institutions at the national and local levels, so that the latter acquire the capacity to fulfil the responsibilities and perform the functions that they are mandated to discharge. The international community’s response should ensure a capacity-building component in all assistance provided, and to further ensure that that assistance reflects the priorities, proposals, and programmes emerging from an intra-Haitian consultative process. In providing support to new initiatives and activities, the international community should also build upon viable activities that are already under way, especially the ongoing efforts of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, regional organizations and initiatives by the Haitian civil society.

50. However, in the light of Haiti’s internal divisions and discord, the provision of such assistance alone might not be sufficient. When Haiti’s political process, national institutions and political and civic leadership were deadlocked and unable to establish a concrete social and economic programme, assistance from the donor community became significantly reduced. Non-governmental organizations filled a gap in the delivery of basic services by the Haitian institutions, benefiting recipients but at the same time undermining the incentive for the authorities to restore essential services.

51. It is therefore important that international assistance be provided in support of programmes and activities that have been jointly developed by different actors across social and political divides at both the local and the national level. The past few years have seen an unprecedented mobilization of key civic sectors in Haiti on behalf of democracy and human rights, to the point where civil society could be an autonomous force in influencing the Haitian polity and economy in a positive direction. The international community could work closely with them, in particular the peasant organizations given the historical divide between rural and urban areas. The transitional Government, as well as civic groups and political parties, have called for a process of national dialogue to establish a concrete plan for national recovery and to reach a viable consensus on an effective plan for the consolidation of democratic governance, including during the transitional period. Drawing on existing dialogue initiatives, the international community could support such a process, as appropriate and requested by the Haitian Government and civil society, and further support the implementation of the proposals emerging from that process.
Key priorities

52. The key political, security, humanitarian, social and economic challenges and problems that Haiti is facing are interrelated and require an integrated response by the Haitians and the international community. Some of the proposed areas of assistance have been mentioned previously, such as national dialogue and reconciliation, electoral processes, institutional capacity-building, combating drug trafficking, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and responses to violence against women. In addition, support and assistance could be provided in such areas as food availability, public health, HIV/AIDS, education, environment, and employment generation. As a matter of principle, assistance should aim at improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children. Assistance should also require the participation of women in its planning and delivery, and facilitate their access to, and control over, resources, especially for single female heads of households.

Ensuring the availability of food

53. Providing the most vulnerable population with food aid, especially at a time when local stocks have been exhausted, and some regional stocks looted, is critical. The United Nations system is currently engaged in deploying its full logistical capacity in that regard and has launched a five-month “special operation” which aims at assisting vulnerable families, and is in line with strategies outlined in the April 2003 Integrated Emergency Response Programme and the United Nations Flash Appeal of March 2004. In addition, significant short-term interventions will be needed to support agriculture, including in the form of agriculture inputs targeting the planting season in the midland and highland agro-ecological zones.

Restoring public health

54. In the health sector, following consultations with Haiti’s new health authorities, an Emergency Health Task Force comprised of relevant United Nations system partners and civic organizations has recommended that support for the health sector should focus on restoring basic health services in the University Hospital in Port-au-Prince and six other regional hospitals, and setting up a basic emergency services system among existing health facilities; restoring key health programmes, such as immunizations, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis prevention, treatment, and surveillance; and organizing a grass-roots and social communication campaign in large population areas to keep hospitals and health facilities free of weapons. The ability of people with both urgent and chronic conditions to access essential health-care facilities and receive appropriate treatment is a critical element of rebuilding public confidence in, and hope for, the future. Ensuring that those in need, as well as staff who care for them, have secure access to the facilities and services identified by the Emergency Health Task Force would be a major task for the HNP, with support from the international security presence, which would also be requested to undertake low-key surveillance of the main health facilities.

55. Since safe access to water and sanitation has been further eroded during the crisis, it will be essential to accelerate in the urban areas the removal of solid waste, clean up streets and public drainage, and restore the main water systems before the rainy season starts. As part of that effort, the international community could support the municipal authorities and contribute to restore the main water systems in Port-
au-Prince, Port-de-Paix, Gonaives, and Cap Haitien, and ensure the provision of a minimum power supply, chlorinating elements, and fuel to ensure adequate operation. In the longer-term, the international community could support national and local authorities in the preparation of an investment plan for infrastructure and equipment for priority health facilities and water systems; the implementation of a human resources programme to strengthen the capacity of public health-care providers; and the implementation of a system of subsidized health care and drugs for the indigent population and their access to health services in the large population areas.

**Combating HIV/AIDS**

56. The United Nations system has been supporting the national programme against HIV/AIDS. This has included assistance to Haitian NGOs, with the participation of the private sector, to create greater awareness among the population regarding the risks of HIV/AIDS and preventive measures, including the provision of counselling and psychological support. As part of short-term assistance for combating the spread of HIV/AIDS, United Nations agencies will endeavour to provide emergency medical kits, condoms, and support to pregnant women, victims of sexual violence and people living with HIV/AIDS, as well as aim to help re-start the treatment and awareness programmes interrupted by the violence and insecurity. The efforts of a Haitian-led multifaceted response to HIV/AIDS would benefit greatly from the longer-term investment in medical infrastructure, systems and human resources.

**Supporting education**

57. In order to bring normalcy to the lives of children, United Nations agencies are supporting a back-to-school campaign for the approximately 60 per cent of children who were attending primary school at the time of the current eruption of violence. For those out of school, such as street children, restavèk, orphans and abandoned children, essential medicines, recreational kits and psychosocial support are being provided. Given the currently low levels of enrolment, attendance and completion at the primary level, and considering the crucial contribution of the education sector to the fight against HIV/AIDS and the promotion of tolerance and human rights, the United Nations system would attach long-term priority to issues of access to, and quality of, primary education. Alternative opportunities for the constructive participation of adolescents in the lives of their communities and in the shaping of a national recovery agenda would be sought in order to prevent violence and build a Haitian society based on tolerance, trust, respect for human rights, and equity.

**Supporting the environment**

58. Environmental degradation in both urban and rural areas is a major concern. Degradation of natural resources due to overexploitation has resulted in the loss of livelihood in the rural areas and migration to urban areas. That can be reversed only by targeted intervention to increase productivity and rural employment. Rapid urbanization also resulted in the proliferation of slums and the breakdown of already limited urban environmental services. Addressing environmental degradation could minimize the risk of civil unrest and lay the foundation for a more sustainable development. In that context, the international community could assist the Haitian authorities in formulating a comprehensive environmental policy together with a
relevant legislative framework, creating the institutional capacity and developing programmes and projects to implement that policy.

**Supporting employment generation, including through a National Employment Fund**

59. The challenges to ensuring lasting peace in Haiti require sustained international resources and commitment, especially in order to ensure integrated economic support for Haitian communities so that employment is generated and that armed youth can return to productive economic activity. One device for providing these resources could be a flexible and autonomous National Employment Fund to provide assistance for specific projects aimed at generating employment and developing economic or social capital at the communal level. The fund could build upon an existing “social investment fund” in Haiti that supports community-level initiatives with contributions from the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations system. The fund could support activities in such areas as: the relaunch of the preparation by the Haitian authorities of an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, with a particular focus on employment-generating programmes at the communal level; the implementation of concrete community-level projects and activities that have been identified on the basis of agreement among relevant actors and sectors within these communities, including through ongoing dialogue initiatives; and support for projects and activities that bring together employment generation with the conservation of the environment, keeping in mind the ongoing environmental catastrophe in Haiti and the imminent depletion of its water and top soil resources.

**Funding resources required**

60. To ensure an effective and timely response to these emergency humanitarian and rehabilitation needs, a quick and generous response from donors is essential. The United Nations issued a Flash Appeal for Haiti in March 2004, requesting urgent funding in the amount of $35 million for six months for coordinated, multi-agency interventions in the health, nutrition, water and sanitation, food and education sectors, disarmament and for protection activities for the most vulnerable sectors of the population, including projects aimed at reducing gender-based violence. The aims of the Flash Appeal are to provide immediate humanitarian assistance for 3 million people for the first three months of the life of the Appeal. During the remaining three months, the Appeal aims to lay the foundation for the rehabilitation of social services and economic recovery. The United Nations country team will systematically review needs on the ground to ensure that no gaps or overlaps occur in the execution of this comprehensive humanitarian assistance programme. Should residual needs be identified, a successor appeal, based on future assessments, will be launched.

61. With regard to the medium- and longer-term assistance needs, a Haiti Contact Group meeting, comprising lead donors, international financial institutions and regional organizations, was convened at World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C., on 23 March 2004, resulting in an agreement to prepare an Interim Cooperation Framework focusing on the current economic, social and institutional needs in Haiti. A policy dialogue meeting on governmental priorities between the transitional Government and donors will take place on 22 April in Port-au-Prince, which will be followed by a pledging conference in late June. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank will be leading the
assessments process for the preparation of the Interim Cooperation Framework on the donor side. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes will participate to inter alia help to ensure that specific transitional strategies from humanitarian relief to development are established. This national reconstruction plan, which will present a national strategy for reconstruction and rehabilitation and build on and strengthen national capacities for development, will be launched later this year.

VII. Gender

62. Insecurity has led to recent increases in sexual violence against women, which is being perpetrated in a climate of impunity. Women and girls also face significant inequality in the political, legal, social and economic spheres. Women do not enjoy equal access to decision-making structures at the national and local levels. Specific legislation on violence against women, including domestic violence, is either non-existent or does not meet international standards. Trafficking in children, especially girls, exists for the purposes of domestic labour and/or prostitution. These factors increase the vulnerability of low-income populations, particularly women and children, to (sexual) exploitation and abuse.

63. Efforts aimed at improving the situation of women in Haiti should support a sustainable, grass-roots approach that is focused on building the capacity of women, women’s leaders and women’s organizations at all levels. Support could be provided to the Haitians to develop a national strategy to promote gender equality. That could include, among others, strengthening the role of women in the transition process, including in decision-making positions; addressing gender-based violence; addressing gender concerns in policing, including the need for female police officers and police officers trained in dealing with victims of sexual and domestic violence and measures to combat human trafficking; updating legislation to ensure protection of women’s rights in accordance with international standards; and promoting the participation of women as voters and candidates in elections.

VIII. Situation of the media

64. Media in Haiti represent an important factor in national life. The diverse and vibrant media landscape includes the government-owned radio and television stations and daily newspaper; a number of media outlets identified with religious, political or other interest groups; and a large private sector. Although the role of newspapers is limited by a relatively high illiteracy rate, the number of radio and television stations throughout the country is high. Some 30 to 40 radio stations and as many as 7 television stations operate in Port-au-Prince alone. Professional standards vary widely, and there is a general lack of capacity in terms of core journalistic methods and tools, critical reporting and in-depth analysis.

65. In recent years, the Haitian media have participated actively in the national debate by virtue of a wide margin of freedom of expression. At the same time, a high level of tension and fear has characterized the situation in which the media operate. Media outlets and journalists throughout the country report being subjected to threats, financial and judicial harassment, vandalism and physical violence accompanied by a growing sense of impunity for such acts. Conditions worsened as the political dialogue broke down; positions polarized and reporting in the media
became more partial. In the period immediately prior to and following the departure of former President Aristide, vandalism and looting, political instability and a scarcity of resources resulted in the suspension or modification by some media outlets of their operations. Lack of resources and the uncertainty of the political and security situation continue to hamper media operations.

IX. Activities of regional and subregional organizations

66. In laying the ground for the implementation of resolution 1529 (2004), account has been taken of the important roles that the OAS, particularly the OAS Special Mission, and CARICOM, have played in recent years. In certain aspects, there has been close collaboration between the United Nations and the OAS, including through a joint mission, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH).

67. Since August 2002 and despite limited financial resources, the 40-person OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti has been working in public security, justice, human rights and governance. In September 2002, the OAS Special Mission was given additional mandates in electoral assistance and disarmament. The OAS Special Mission currently fields 23 police advisers who have been working to improve training at the Police Academy and, jointly with UNDP, attempting to lay the groundwork for a disarmament strategy. Beginning in May 2003, technical advisers have been attached to departmental HNP commanders as well as to senior leadership at police headquarters. The OAS Special Mission has been working at the Magistrates School and holds seminars for judges and lawyers on regional human rights and justice mechanisms. In the light of the political turmoil, the OAS Special Mission's small human rights team has focused on individual cases and extending assistance to victims.

68. While a subregional organization with a primarily economic mandate, CARICOM has played an increasingly prominent political role by initiating, in January 2004, a number of initiatives that sought to overcome the political impasse in Haiti. Elements of these proposals were subsequently carried forward by CARICOM, as well as other international players. The relations between CARICOM and the transitional Government were strained by the arrival of former President Aristide in Jamaica on 15 March 2004. The latter event prompted Prime Minister Latortue to state that diplomatic relations between Haiti and Jamaica would be frozen and to call Haiti's relations with CARICOM into question. On 26 March 2004, CARICOM member States decided to withhold its recognition of the transitional Government pending a review of the situation in Haiti in the near future. At the same time, CARICOM adopted a set of measures that seek to facilitate the interface of CARICOM with the interim leadership of Haiti as well as with the international community on Haiti, including through the reconstitution of the Core Group of CARICOM Prime Ministers on Haiti, the designation of a Special Envoy, and the establishment of a Task Force to coordinate CARICOM's assistance to Haiti. On 7 April 2004, CARICOM informed Haiti's Prime Minister in writing about these measures and reaffirmed CARICOM's commitment to the people of Haiti and to their social and economic well-being.
X. Recommendations for a United Nations operation

69. As envisaged by Security Council resolution 1529 (2004) and on the basis of the findings of the multidisciplinary assessment team, I recommend the establishment of a multidimensional stabilization operation in Haiti, to be known as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with a mandate, structure and concept of operations as described hereunder.

A. Mandate

70. I recommend that the mandate of the Mission include the following:

(a) To support the constitutional and political process under way in Haiti, including through good offices, and foster principles of democratic governance and institutional development;

(b) To ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process can take place and assist, as needed, in maintaining public safety and public order;

(c) To support the electoral processes and ensure credible and democratic elections, including through supervision or other means;

(d) To assist with the restoration of the rule of law and public security in Haiti through the provision of back-up support to the Haitian National Police as well as with its institutional strengthening;

(e) To assist, along with other partners, in the reform and institutional strengthening of the judiciary and re-establishment of the corrections system;

(f) To assist the transitional Government, particularly the Haitian National Police, with comprehensive and sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups, as well as weapons control and public security measures;

(g) To support the transitional Government in launching a broad-based sustained national dialogue to develop a comprehensive framework for key policy issues related to nation-building and durable development, including through decentralization;

(h) To support the transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Haiti and support good governance at local levels;

(i) To assist the transitional Government in its efforts to bring about a process of national reconciliation, as well as foster social cohesion aimed at bridging divides at all levels;

(j) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to, and access by, the Haitian people in need, with a particular focus on the most vulnerable segments of society, particularly women and children;

(k) To assist the transitional Government with the restoration of basic public services;
(l) To support employment-generating activities in the context of a sustainable development strategy;

(m) To monitor and report on the human rights situation, including the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons; and strengthen the Haitian institutional and societal capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights, particularly of women and children, in order to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims;

(n) To cooperate and coordinate with the OAS, CARICOM and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as well as all relevant stakeholders, particularly donors, in carrying out these tasks;

(o) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and humanitarian assets associated with the operation; and, within means and capabilities and taking into account the responsibilities of the Haitian authorities, protect civilians facing imminent threat of physical violence; and

(p) To mainstream gender perspectives throughout the Mission’s policies, programmes and activities, and support the development of a national strategy to promote gender equality, women’s rights and women’s full and equal participation in the transition process.

71. It is recommended that the Mission be established for an initial period of 24 months, until after the implementation of the results of the 2005 elections, during which regular progress reports would be submitted to the Council. Subsequently, it is recommended that the Mission be authorized for subsequent periods of 12 months, with periodic reviews with respect to the appropriate mix of its different components and the priority assigned to its multiple areas of activity.

B. Structure and concept of operations

72. The Mission would be multidimensional and would help Haiti address a complex range of issues in a sustainable manner, achieve peace and stability, build and strengthen functioning democratic institutions; support the re-establishment of the rule of law; and promote social and economic development, as well as good governance. The Mission would conduct these activities in close cooperation and coordination with the Haitian authorities at the national, regional and local levels, as well as with civil society actors and the population at large.

Structure

73. To fulfil its mandate, a strong civilian component, including United Nations civilian police, backed up by a robust United Nations military force, would be required. In addition to a military component, a support component, a security division and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, I recommend that the Mission comprise pillars under the overall leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General consisting of a humanitarian affairs and development pillar and a civilian affairs pillar.

74. One pillar under a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and development, including in his/her capacity as the Resident
and Humanitarian Coordinator, would be responsible for the coordination of the activities of the humanitarian and development community, resource mobilization and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

75. Another pillar, under a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for civilian affairs, would comprise civilian police, civil affairs, and human rights, and would be supported by HIV/AIDS and child protection advisers and a gender unit, which will have direct access to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for civilian affairs would also act as Chief of Mission in the absence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Judicial, corrections and electoral elements would be defined after further assessments and consultations with relevant stakeholders, including the OAS and CARICOM.

76. Refinement of the Mission's structure and concept of operations may be required at a later stage depending on ongoing consultations with the OAS and CARICOM, the evolving political process and volatile security situation as well as the ongoing and future programmes by a number of actors, including United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, other regional organizations, as well as bilateral and multilateral donors. A mission implementation plan detailing the objectives, tasks and timelines of the operation would be developed and updated as necessary.

77. The Mission would operate with a clear chain of command under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who would also serve as the Head of Mission and have direct authority to manage all activities of the operation. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would liaise with the Haitian authorities and other stakeholders, particularly interested Member States, international and regional organizations, international financial institutions and bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as the diplomatic community. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would provide good offices to the Haitian authorities at all levels, as required. The Special Representative would also have overall authority over other United Nations activities in Haiti in support of the Mission's mandate and would provide leadership, political guidance, and support to the United Nations system in this regard. The Special Representative would be assisted by a senior management team consisting of, among others, his/her Deputies, a Force Commander, a Police Commissioner and a Chief Administrative Officer.

78. The Mission would deploy and operate freely throughout Haiti as well as establish a presence in various parts of the country. Elements of the operation would be deployed to 10 regional offices and 7 sectors. Important emphasis will be placed on integration, cooperation and coordination at all levels within the Mission both at the headquarters and in the field offices.

Coordination

79. Since the departure of the last United Nations Mission in 2001, United Nations agencies and programmes as well as the OAS, CARICOM, and other organizations have remained actively involved in Haiti. On the political level, the OAS played a leadership role in key areas, such as negotiations on a formula for the designation of a provisional electoral council and the establishment since 2002 of the OAS Special Mission in Haiti. In order to ensure coordination and cohesion of the international effort in Haiti, the Mission would integrate and build upon the substantial programmes and capacities that United Nations agencies and programmes as well as
regional organizations have developed over the years, among others in such areas as justice, the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, human rights, civic education and good governance.

80. The Mission would seek to institutionalize the cooperation with these actors and ensure continuity of action in the immediate future as well as in the longer term. Consultations have been conducted, most recently on 12 and 13 April 2004, with the OAS and CARICOM on the modalities for cooperation in the context of the United Nations Mission, including a definition of respective roles and responsibilities. These consultations may result in changes to the proposed structure of the Mission.

81. In order to ensure that the institutional capacities are pooled for optimal effectiveness, coordination and liaison mechanisms would form an integral part of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and those of the Deputy Special Representative. This integrated structure would enhance interaction with the Haitian authorities as partners, while ensuring unified and coordinated action by the international community. The Mission would also engage in close coordination, information exchange and cooperation with the donor and diplomatic community in order to facilitate the implementation of its mandate and to enhance the effectiveness of the international community’s response in Haiti. In order to achieve this aim, a “core group”, comprising the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, his/her Deputies, representatives of regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions and other major stakeholders, would be established. Of a consultative nature, the Core Group would meet on a regular basis in order to review the Mission’s policy priorities and their implementation. A group comprising representatives of the same actors could also meet in New York or Washington, D.C., as needed.

Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

82. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be supported, as part of his/her office, by a political affairs and reporting division; a planning and best practices unit; a legal affairs office; a public information office; a joint operations centre; and an office of the resident auditor. The Chief of Staff of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be responsible for procedural coordination within the operation, channelling communication between the Special Representative and all components of the operation, and the day-to-day management of the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Political affairs and reporting

83. A political affairs and reporting division would provide political advice and assessments to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as the Mission as a whole. The division would monitor, analyse and report on political, civil, social, economic and other relevant developments throughout the country, which may have an impact on the implementation of the mandate. It would also assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and other senior management in their contacts with Haitian authorities, political parties and civil society organizations; maintain close liaison with relevant stakeholders, including the diplomatic community and the wider United Nations system; fulfil the Mission’s reporting requirements; and provide inputs, as appropriate, for the dissemination of
public information of a political nature. The division would also support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his/her role as chair of the Core Group.

Planning and best practices

84. The planning and best practices unit would support the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in his/her planning for the Mission, including the development and updating of the mission implementation plan and would ensure that lessons learned and good practices are taken into account throughout the conduct of the Mission.

Legal affairs

85. The legal affairs office would provide advice to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with regard to all aspects of the mandate of the United Nations operation, as well as on issues of constitutional law, especially as they affect the political transition in Haiti. The office would also provide advice on any legal issues that might arise concerning the substantive activities of the United Nations operation, including international law issues, human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, police and rule of law. The office would also support a review of national legislation by the Haitian authorities, if requested, to bring such legislation into harmony with Haiti’s obligations under international human rights instruments. Furthermore, the office would provide support to the administrative units of the Mission, in areas such as privileges and immunities, procurement matters, the legal arrangements for any government-owned premises provided to the United Nations operation, any third-party claims against the United Nations operation, as well as any legal questions involving the interpretation or application of United Nations regulations and rules.

Joint Operations Centre

86. A Joint Operations Centre, as well as mission analysis elements, as required, consisting of civilian, military and civilian police personnel, would analyse and synthesize information from all sources and provide, as one of its core functions, high-level risk assessments to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and advice on appropriate responses thereto. Similar mechanisms may be established at the local level, as required.

Public information

87. The public information office would have a central role in explaining the United Nations presence in the country and in helping to build public trust in that presence. A public information programme would also galvanize public support for national reconciliation and the constitutional political process, including eventual elections, as well as for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and contribute to raising awareness among the media about these matters. Effective public information would require country-wide public outreach and advocacy programmes. In addition, the mission’s public information office would include capacity for media relations and media monitoring as well as for radio, video and print production.
C. Civilian affairs pillar

88. The civilian affairs pillar, under a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, would include civilian police, a civil affairs office and human rights office. It would also include advisers on HIV/AIDS and child protection as well as a gender unit.

Police, judicial and corrections

89. In view of the critical situation in the internal security and criminal justice sectors in Haiti, the Mission would include a strong civilian police, within a concept that incorporates lessons learned from past and ongoing Missions. A further assessment of Haiti’s legal, judicial and corrections system is needed to determine what role the Mission could play in those areas. This assessment will take into account the past and ongoing work undertaken by the OAS, UNDP and other actors in these fields. I shall revert to the Council on this matter as soon as the assessment has been completed.

90. The civilian police would support the transitional Government in restoring the rule of law and public security, including its efforts to extend State authority throughout Haiti. The maintenance of law and order and public security would remain the responsibility of the HNP. However, the Mission would assist and support the HNP, as necessary, including by accompanying the HNP in their duties and by providing operational support through inter alia joint patrolling and management of civil disturbance.

91. The civilian police would also assist with the restoration of the rule of law and public security through sustainable institutional strengthening and professionalization of the HNP. The civilian police would assist the HNP Academy to implement training programmes; mentor and provide on-the-job training at the main operational levels of HNP; transfer skills and proactively assist multi-tier management functions within HNP; develop and implement an effective, transparent and accountable HNP oversight mechanism; develop and implement vetting and certification programmes in accordance with international standards; and support the implementation of a community-based policing programme throughout the country. The civilian police would also assist in developing and enhancing in a sustainable fashion the overall law enforcement capacity of the HNP, including civil disturbance management, land and marine border policing, judiciary, information gathering, immigration, customs, port authority and related sectors of internal security, and in determining related infrastructure and logistical requirements, as needed. Furthermore, the civilian police will provide advice and training, in conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the HNP in its drug-enforcement activities. The civilian police would also support other components of the Mission in selected disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. Finally, the civilian police component would seek to build the public’s confidence in the criminal justice sector by observing the HNP and advising and reporting on its activities regarding compliance with professional standards and human rights. That would require the civilian police to co-locate and liaise closely with Haitian authorities and have free access to relevant facilities, including police and detention premises, as well as police records and investigation files.
92. To accomplish these tasks, the civilian police would be comprised of a total of 1,622 civilian police. That would include 872 advisers on management, training, mentoring and professional standards (inspection-general) co-located with HNP 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, as needed, as well as six formed units of up to 125 officers each, operating under civilian police rules of engagement, to provide operational back-up support in complex activities and areas where HNP has limited capacity.

93. Given the volatile security situation and currently weak capacity of the HNP, and taking into account the time needed to strengthen the HNP, the civilian police formed units would support the HNP in law and order functions; assist, as needed, to address civil disturbance problems; help to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; and, within means and capabilities, protect civilian lives under imminent threat. Three formed police units would be deployed in Port-au-Prince and one each in Gonaives, Cap Haitien and Les Cayes. As the HNP increases its capacity and gradually narrows the security gap, the number, mandate and areas of operation of the civilian police would be reviewed.

Civil affairs

94. A civil affairs office would be required to help create the necessary conditions for a functioning democracy as well as for the establishment and strengthening of legitimate local authority throughout the country. There would be an emphasis on interaction at the grass-roots level focusing on sustained capacity-building, democratic development, dialogue and reconciliation, and good governance. In addition, the office would assist with a further needs assessment in consultation with the Haitian authorities and other international partners, particularly the OAS, in defining the role the Mission could play in the electoral process. I shall therefore revert to the Council on this matter in due time.

95. To accomplish these tasks, the civil affairs office would inter alia support initiatives aimed at fostering a national dialogue, including at the local level; identify, in close consultation with the local authorities, quick impact projects and coordinate their implementation by implementing partners; assist with developing and strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations; and liaise with the regional and municipal councils, and civil society actors, including women’s organizations. The civil affairs office would conduct these activities by reaching out to the population in the 173 communes of the country and participating in town meetings — a forum in which the local population discuss issues of common concern with the authorities and others. The office would also provide assistance to the civilian police and other rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and human rights experts, and develop cooperation with the field presences of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in this regard. The office would also assist the military and other components of the Mission with liaison at the communal level. The civil affairs office would include gender officers in its field offices who would work closely with the Haitian authorities, the United Nations system and civil society actors, including women’s groups, to ensure coherence between mission policies and local and national gender priorities. In undertaking these activities, the civil affairs office would work jointly and in close collaboration with the humanitarian affairs and development pillar, especially with regard to ongoing initiatives relating to dialogue and reconciliation, rule of law and quick impact projects.
Human rights

96. Given the current and past serious human rights situation and in order to comprehensively address this situation in an integrated manner, a human rights office would be established, which would have a promotion, monitoring and protection mandate. In order to fulfil its mandate, it would inter alia monitor and report on the human rights situation; strengthen the Haitian capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights, including the situation of returned refugees and displaced persons; and assist the Haitian authorities to ensure individual accountability for human rights abuses and redress for victims. The office would achieve this through inter alia support to the Haitian authorities in developing a national human rights strategy and plan of action; support for human rights training and education programmes; and support to national institutions responsible for the protection and promotion of human rights.

97. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) would provide substantive and methodological support in all phases of the Mission and assist in the selection of the human rights officers to be deployed in the country. The expansion of the OHCHR presence within the framework of the Mission would be explored with a view to ensuring an ongoing human rights presence in Haiti in the years to come. The human rights office would work closely with all components of the Mission, particularly the military, the civilian police, the gender unit and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration unit in order to ensure that human rights and protection policies are integrated into the overall political strategy and programmes of the Mission.

Gender

98. In line with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, a gender unit would be created within the civil affairs office to facilitate, support and provide technical guidance to all staff in the Mission to ensure gender mainstreaming. The gender unit would support the humanitarian affairs and development pillar in ensuring appropriate development assistance for women, especially with regard to long-term strategies in this area, and in this regard work closely with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in supporting the Haitian authorities and civil society actors, including women’s groups, in developing a national agenda to address gender inequalities at all levels as well as violence against women.

HIV/AIDS

99. In line with Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), the Mission would include an HIV/AIDS adviser to assist with the mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS programming throughout all components, policies and programmes of the Mission, including by developing, implementing and monitoring an HIV/AIDS training, awareness and prevention strategy for the Mission to reduce the risk of HIV transmission. The HIV/AIDS adviser would also support United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as well as NGOs in assisting the Haitian authorities and civil society in developing their national AIDS strategy.
Child Protection

100. In view of the importance of child protection issues, the Mission would include a child protection adviser to ensure that the rights, protection and well-being of children remain a priority throughout the Mission. The child protection adviser, in close cooperation with UNICEF, would advise, monitor and report on child protection issues and raise awareness among all Mission personnel.

D. Humanitarian affairs and development pillar

101. The humanitarian affairs and development pillar would be headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who would be responsible, including in his/her capacity as the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, for humanitarian coordination; development; donor coordination and resource mobilization; and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

102. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and development, in his/her capacity as humanitarian coordinator, would be assisted by a coordination office to ensure the necessary coordination with national institutions and between United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, donors, NGOs and other components of the Mission. The objective would be to ensure the complementarity of emergency humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation components. The assistance programme would be decentralized through the establishment of five field coordination units in the most affected regions. A United Nations Joint Logistics Centre would be established to provide support to the humanitarian coordinator for the practical implementation of assistance activities on the ground. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be assisted in ensuring appropriate liaison with the military in relation to security and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for ensuring that protection activities are mainstreamed throughout the humanitarian response. Finally, keeping in mind the specific vulnerability of Haiti to natural phenomena, disaster response and reduction functions would be linked to this coordination office to ensure the development of national mitigation capacities and an integrated response.

103. The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for humanitarian affairs and development, in his/her capacity as Resident Coordinator, would ensure that the efforts of United Nations agencies are, in the first instance, fully coordinated with the activities of the Mission throughout the period of its mandate, particularly by mobilizing, in the initial phases, efforts to restore basic services and promote employment opportunities. The development component would assist the Haitian authorities in formulating a national development strategy, based on systematic dialogue and consensus among relevant stakeholders at the national and local levels, which could serve as a framework for bilateral and multilateral development cooperation efforts. The proposed strategy could also include steps towards building democratic institutions and good governance, including institutions for the rule of law, which are essential for ensuring sustainable peace and development in the longer term. In particular, the proposed strategy will identify means for continuing in the longer term the assistance provided through the Mission in areas such as the rule of law, economic recovery, HIV/AIDS, and gender issues. The humanitarian affairs and development pillar would also ensure the participation
of local authorities and population in defining their development priorities and related assistance.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

104. In order to provide assistance for the planning and implementation of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, the Mission would include a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration unit, which would work closely with all components of the Mission, particularly the military, civilian police and human rights, as well as United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Mission would integrate and build upon ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration technical expertise and in-country resources. In order to accomplish its tasks, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration unit would participate in the development and implementation of the initial plans to disarm armed groups and in the formulation of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, including reintegration efforts and arms control.

E. Military component

105. In the light of the continuing volatile security situation, including the proliferation of arms in Haiti, the Mission would operate under robust rules of engagement with sufficient capacity to be able to deal with threats to the implementation of its mandate. The military component would assist in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment throughout the country. It would provide security in all key towns and surroundings; secure key sites and installations; provide security along major roads; deter armed groups from engaging in violence; protect access to humanitarian infrastructure; undertake disarmament tasks in conjunction with the HNP and the international civilian police; assist HNP and international police in the event of riots and organized violence, as needed; monitor major crossing points along the border; and provide protection for national and key United Nations and humanitarian assets in the country. The military component would also ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel and protect, to the fullest extent possible, civilians facing imminent threat of physical violence. The military component would need to monitor and verify the security and law and order environment and aim at preempting, preventing and deterring the escalation of imminent security threats.

106. In order to accomplish these tasks, the military component would consist of up to 6,700 troops, all ranks, and would be deployed throughout the country. On full deployment, there would be one infantry brigade comprising two infantry battalions in Port-au-Prince to maintain security in the capital of nearly 2 million people and along the major artery to the border; one battalion each in Cap Haitien and Hinche to cover regional population centres and monitor major crossing points along the border; one battalion in Gonaives to provide security to the third largest city and along the major roads to the capital; one battalion in Port-de-Paix to provide security to the remote north-west region; one battalion in Les Cayes and a small battalion of approximately 450 in Jacmel to secure the extensive south-west regions. An independent force reserve of an airborne rapid reaction infantry company to respond to threats to security throughout the country would also be located in Port-au-Prince.
107. The deployment of troops would be undertaken in a sequential manner in brigade-or battalion-size elements in seven sectors around the country. First, the United Nations Force headquarters and its support units would be deployed to Port-au-Prince in the second half of May to commence their coordination and preparations for transition with the MIF, as well as to supervise the deployment and onward movement of the United Nations Force. The transfer of authority from the MIF headquarters to the United Nations Force headquarters would be accomplished by 1 June 2004. Once the transfer of authority between headquarters has taken place, it is anticipated that the MIF units would conduct a phased departure as part of a proper, structured relief by the deploying United Nations troops, which is essential to avoid any security gap. The United Nations Force headquarters and MIF would establish and maintain liaison and coordination processes until the MIF troops have departed the Mission area. The phased relief of MIF forces in Port-au-Prince and other locations must be carefully coordinated and planned jointly between the MIF and United Nations Force headquarters; this will be followed by the deployment of additional troops to implement the broader range of tasks to be implemented by the United Nations Force. It is expected that the military component would be required until free and fair elections are held and for an appropriate period of time thereafter.

F. Support

108. The support component of the proposed Mission would be headed by a Chief Administrative Officer, reporting directly to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The support component would be responsible for the creation and maintenance of the essential physical and administrative infrastructure to enable the implementation of the mandate. The component would be based on the concept of integrated administrative and support services for the logistical, material and administrative requirements of the Mission for optimal effectiveness and efficiency. It would include a language unit to provide language assistance to all components of the Mission and provide language training in French and Creole to Mission staff, as necessary. The Mission would establish an integrated mission training centre which would provide an induction course for all personnel, including civilian, military and police, particularly in such areas as culture and history, as well as appropriate training throughout the life of the Mission. The Mission would share common premises and common services (in particular in the areas of communications and information technology, and transportation) with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in Haiti, wherever possible in order to enhance coordination and increase cost-effectiveness.

G. Security

109. Security for the United Nations Mission must take into account the larger national security environment. Threats exist in Haiti that could potentially disrupt political, humanitarian, economic, human rights and rule of law processes and may also reduce the credibility and capability of the Mission, threatening the security of its personnel and assets.

110. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General as head of Mission, is exclusively responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for the security of
peacekeeping personnel and assets. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General would also be appointed as the United Nations Designated Official and, in this capacity, would be responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General through the United Nations Security Coordinator for the safety and security of non-peacekeeping United Nations personnel within Haiti. The Mission would work closely with the United Nations humanitarian and development agencies in this regard.

111. In addition to the security activities and operations of the military and civilian police, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would be supported in carrying out security responsibilities by a number of security-related staff elements including a Joint Operations Centre. Specific measures would be put in place to deter, deny, detect and mitigate risks, in particular of violence, to mission personnel and assets. The Mission would be supported by a sufficient number of international and local security staff at headquarters and in all sectors and regional offices, as may be required, and would coordinate security management operations with the United Nations humanitarian and development agencies.

**H. Financial implications**

112. The pre-mandate financial implications of the proposed mission will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

**XI. Observations and recommendations**

113. It is unfortunate that, in its bicentennial year, Haiti had to call again on the international community to help it overcome a serious political and security situation. Eleven years ago the United Nations deployed a mission, together with the OAS, to Haiti — and later the United Nations also deployed on its own — to assist local authorities in developing democratic and effective institutions and socioeconomic capacity. In 2001, the previous United Nations mission ended. In hindsight, our involvement was too brief and fraught with both international and domestic hindrances. Now, the international community is presented with another opportunity to support Haiti and its people in the transition to a peaceful, democratic and locally owned future.

114. Yet, our task will not be easy. The situation looks more daunting today than it did a decade ago. At the same time, positive change can occur in a fully transparent and participatory way, based upon consensus and compromise. I welcome the recent political pact that has brought together many Haitian leaders from different parts of society in order to chart the way forward during the transitional period. However, this pact did not include all major political movements, as it could have. All Haitians should have, and seize, the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a comprehensive national dialogue on key policy issues confronting the country and to have their views heard through non-violent means. Ultimately, the success or failure of Haiti will primarily be their responsibility.

115. A cornerstone of progress will be a process of nationwide reconciliation, embracing all segments of society accompanied by a genuine effort to put an end to the prevailing climate of impunity and enforce individual accountability. The
vicious cycle of victimization of, or vendetta against, those in opposition by those in power should also be broken in a further effort to unite a deeply divided society. I call upon all people and leaders in Haiti to stop the cycle of violence and impunity. All perpetrators of past and present serious human rights violations must be brought to justice.

116. With the gradual improvement of the security situation following the deployment of the MIF, Haiti seems to have overcome the worst phase of the crisis it recently endured. I would like to commend the MIF for its efforts to stabilize a precarious security situation and to contain an ever-present potential for instability. I would, however, also like to call upon the MIF to take, in the remaining period of its mandate, all possible measures that would further contribute to the removal of security threats, in particular with regard to disarmament.

117. Haiti is still facing an immediate emergency humanitarian situation. The international response to the United Nations Flash Appeal, launched on 9 March 2004, has been slower than anticipated. I call on donors to contribute more generously in order to secure the US$ 35 million required to meet pressing humanitarian needs and establish the basis for recovery over the course of the next six months. Additional funds will be required in the future and I call upon Member States to support our efforts. I am also hopeful that Haiti, as a post-conflict country, could benefit from the attention of the international financial institutions with regard to the urgent needs of its population. I also urge donors to provide OAS and CARICOM with the means required to enable them to plan and finance projects and activities that will enable them to participate meaningfully and fully, both in the forthcoming common endeavour and over the longer term.

118. In order to ensure the sustainable development of Haiti, a long-term commitment, politically and financially, is necessary. I am therefore encouraged by the Security Council’s call upon the international community to work with the people of Haiti in a long-term and sustained effort to promote reform and development. In order to move forward, it is essential that we do so in partnership — first and foremost with the Haitian authorities and people, and also with other important partners in the region, such as the OAS and CARICOM, as well as other international actors, including the wider United Nations family. The nature of the challenge in Haiti is such that no organization or agency can go it alone. I welcome, in particular, the readiness of CARICOM member States, as stated on 3 March, to participate in the United Nations force as well as in efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, the rebuilding of the economy and civil society and the reconstitution of the democratic structures, processes and institutions. I also welcome the stated readiness of the OAS to work with us in an integrated manner. In order to achieve our common goal, we should collectively draw lessons from past involvements in Haiti and recognize that we must break the start-stop cycle, which characterized earlier assistance programmes in Haiti.

119. However, we can only be truly successful if the Haitians are successful. Watchful support by the international community will be necessary to ascertain that State-building efforts in Haiti are and remain on track. I appeal to the Haitian authorities to respond to the offer of assistance by the international community with a commitment to accountability, including to its citizenry. Lessons learned from past experience show also that the international community should not shy away either
from putting in place mechanisms that will help monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of its own efforts in partnership with the Haitian authorities.

120. Finally, in accordance with the request of the Security Council, I recommend the establishment of a multidimensional stabilization operation with a mandate, size and structure as contained in paragraphs 68 to 111 of the present report. In order to implement the proposed mandate, the Mission would consist of up to 6,700 troops, 1,622 civilian police, including those in formed police units, as well as the required number of international and local civilian staff. I appeal to Member States to uphold their declared readiness to establish a United Nations follow-on mission with a commitment to provide the necessary financial and human resources, including the military and civilian police. I welcome the participation of the regional organizations, in particular the OAS and CARICOM, and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes within the Mission in order to enhance our collective efforts in Haiti. As the report illustrates, Haiti's challenges are manifold. If the international community is to be engaged effectively in Haiti, the response must be multidimensional. This endeavour will need the sustained attention of all its partners, and especially the Haitian authorities and the Haitian people, if it is to be successful.